December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Hi... :)
by lile＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would like to join this alias/list. Please direct mee to the list server or wjhoever I need to talk to about getting added. thanks, -lile ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Lile Elam | "Remember... No matter where you go, there you are." lile(a)netcom.com | Un*x Admin / Artist | Buckaroo Banzai ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Web of Trust?
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:17 3/30/94 -0800, Hal wrote: ... >In other words, if I want to communicate with joe(a)abc.com, I can only do so >if one of the signators of his key is a person I know. If not, I have no way >of judging the validity of his key. > >This belies simple interpretations of the "web of trust". I may have signed >A's key, A has signed B's, B has signed C's, C has signed D's, and D has signed >Joe's, but this is of no value unless I know D. Only then can I trust Joe's >key. Ideally, perhaps in cyberspace, one's public key is spread along with X's reputation, i.e. thru the same channels. When a reputation for X reaches you so does X's public key. You say that you want Henry Kissinger's public key. I respond that by whatever means you know that there exists such a person, you will (in cyberspace) already know his public key. The logical limit of this idea is that the public key becomes the name and the key authentication issue dissolves into the mist. We trust reputations because they reach us thru diverse paths. Public keys arriving thru diverse paths should likewise carry extra weight. As crypto becomes more common reputations will eventually belong more to public keys than to names. The question will then be not "What is Henry's public key?" but "What is the name of the person who knows the secret key that corresponds to this public key?". I suppose that Detwiler feared being unable to answer that question in specific cases. I don't. In the meantime, redundant webs that parallel the normal information webs thru which reputations propagate should provide public keys at least as reliable as the reputations themselves. One particular case is of interest. If you contract with me to process some of your secrets, I will agree not to divulge those secrets except under the protection of a one of a set of public keys that you give me. In such a case the web of trust model can be usefully employed and is not intrinsically limited in the number of levels.

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VISA's digital cash
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today's (April 3) Washington Post business section has an article on a consortium of VISA and banks working on a digital cash card. Did I sleep thru the messages, or has the list been scooped? Basic story is that the card is a smartcard, designed to be reused, and suitable for small quantities. Nothing in the article about what would prevent it from storing large amounts. No serious technical discussion either, but I infer that it is an online cash card. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)gmu.edu Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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REMAIL: standardized remailer syntax
by Ian Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In reply to messsage <9404031518.AA06509(a)ah.com> of Sun, 3 Apr 94 08:18:37 -0700 regarding REMAIL: standardized remailer syntax Ok, I've been following this discussion with keen interest as someone who writes mail software and has written a "fairly clean" GUI interface to anonymous remailers, both encrypted and non-encrypted (although the differences to the user are not visible). All this talk of a standard syntax is great, but let me inject some notes from someone in the trenches doing this stuff: 1) Mail software authors would MUCH rather have the commands be in the header lines. If you are writing your own software, modifying header lines is easy. I understand that some people can't modify their headers due to their mail software, but ultimately this will be a chicken and egg problem if the simple header lines are proposed. If you make it easy for the mail software implementor, more software will be available with the capability (or at least patches to existing software). As for deleting subject lines, I think this reasonable to keep people doing potentially dumb things, but someway must be provided to allow people (and mailers) who understand what is going on to retain or insert new subject (header) lines. For example, my software presents a default subject line of "NONE" on anoymous mail (which I think is an ok substitute for ripping off the subject line), but if the user goes to the trouble of actually typing in a subject line it should be preserved in the resulting message. 2) MIME is a must. I just two days ago had my first user complaint that his MIME mail was "damaged" by the remailer. My user interface doesn't show people the details of MIME and he "just expected it to work". I've been considering hacks to use the :: to get the "Mime-Version" header back into the mail, but I have no idea what other shenanigans are going on with the remailer, and MIME parsers tend to be picky. An especially important area is the use of line feeds and carriage returns. I don't know how careful current remailers are to preserve the original message text at the line level, but that's going to be a big deal. Aside: I've been trying to figure out how to get a MIME message part to be a PGP signature in some reasonable way. It *should* work if the PGP sig is removed completely and the rest of the message stays intact. You should be able to concatenate them at the end and then use PGP to check it. Has anyone actually gotten this to work yet? PGP encrypted messages are a lot easier as they are self contained and fit nicely into the MIME paradigm. Also, does anyone out there know what the IANA registered types are for PGP? I heard that they were already registered, but I don't know the types. 3) I support Sameer's efforts as well as others for a standard syntax for all the commands of a remailer, but some of sort of simple syntax(es) are needed to allow users to "get their feet wet." My mailer allows you to just send anonymous mail (via hfinney, good job hal) without understanding/using PGP (or even knowing what it is). If you want to use the PGPed version of the remailers, I require (obviously) that you have my PGP interface set up. I went to a lot of trouble to create as simple a drag-n-drop interface to PGP as I could, but some people just don't want to learn it, so I had to "deal with it." This also allows people an "upgrade path" as they get more confident and interested in the use of remailers. I would very much like to present a GUI interface to a lot of other capabilities of remailers (such as chaining, the use of encrypted reply-to blocks, etc), but these are hard to implement in "clean" ways. Part of my philosophy in this is that sending anonymous mail MUST be just as easy as sending normal mail... it should look the same and work (basically) the same from the users point of view. Any new remailer syntax should consider how the mail program can implement/use the syntax is reasonable ways w.r.t. to a user who probably doesn't care about "the how" but just wants it to work. After saying all this, let me make some suggestions to make life easier for mail program authors: 1) All commands must be available without modifying the message body. This is especially important with respect to MIME mail messages whose body parts must be particularly formatted. I support E. Hughes suggestion about what the header lines should be for anon-remail, anon-post, etc. although this is not a big issue as long as there is a standard way to acess functionality. 2) When automated programs respond to mail messages, they should be formatted in ways to make it easy (preferably trivial) for programs to detect the message and its contents. Good example of this type of thing: Sameer's double blind server. It sends various kinds of control messages back to you.... it should be easy for a mail program author to detect these and take automated actions. Another example: Matt Ghio's anonymous ID allocator. Ideally these should be MIME messages with particular parts that indicate the results. I can assist people who would like to create MIME formats for their control messages. 3) Schemes and syntaxes which require multiple steps (stages) of user control should be avoided when possible (I realize this is not always possible). If a user can hit "compose" and type a mail message and then hit "send" to mail it, a very similar sequence should be preserved when using remailers. From a user interface point of view, forcing the user into some "sequenced steps" is irritating, especially in a GUI which has a very "unsequenced" way of doing things. hope this helps the discussion, ian --------------------------------------------------------------------------- "How soon is now?" ian smith, multimedia computing group, georgia tech, iansmith(a)cc.gatech.edu

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Applied Cryptography Errata - Version 1.5.7
by schneier＠chinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY ERRATA Version 1.5.7 - April 2, 1994 This errata includes all errors I have found in the book, including minor spelling and grammatical errors. Please distribute this errata sheet to anyone else who owns a copy of the book. Page xvii: Third paragraph, first line: "Part IV" should be "Part III". Page 1: First paragraph, fourth line: "receiver cannot intercept" should be "intermediary cannot intercept". Page 6: Sixth and seventh lines: "against symmetric" should be "against a symmetric". Page 8: Second paragraph, first line: "q code" should be "a code". Page 10: Second paragraph, fifth line: Reference "[744]" should be "[774]". Page 11: Second paragraph: "The rotations of the rotors are a Caesar Cipher" should be "Each rotor is an arbitrary permutation of the alphabet". Page 13: Third paragraph: Delete parenthetical remark. Fifth paragraph, first line: "Shift the key" should be "shift the ciphertext". Page 15: Section 1.3, first line: "Throughout the book use" should be "Throughout the book I use". Page 25: "Attacks Against Protocols," first paragraph: "the protocol iself" should be "the protocol itself". Page 27: "One-Way Functions," fourth paragraph: "For example, x^2" should be "For example, in a finite field x^2." Page 28: Third paragraph, third and fourth sentences should be "How to put mail in a mailbox is public knowledge. How to open the mailbox is not public knowledge." Page 30: Fourth line: "symmetric cryptosystems: by distributing the key" should be "symmetric cryptosystems: distributing the key". Page 30: "Attacks Against Public Key Cryptography," second paragraph: "The database also has to be protected from access by anyone" should be "The database also has to be protected from write access by anyone". Also: "substitute a key of his choosing for Alice's" should be "substitute a key of his own choosing for Bob's". Page 30: Last line: "substitute that key for his own public key" should be "substitute his own key for that public key". Page 32: Ninth line: Delete the word "encrypted". Page 34" "Signing Documents with..." First sentence: "too inefficient to encrypt long documents" should be "too inefficient to sign long documents". Page 36: Second line: "document encrypted with" should be "document signed with". "Multiple Signatures," step (4): "Alice or Bob sends" should be "Alice sends". Page 38: Fifth paragraph: "V_X = E_X and that S_X = D_X" should be "V_X = E_X and S_X = D_X". Page 40: Third line: "computer can exist" should be "computer can be". Second paragraph: Delete "should be runs of zeros and the other half should be runs of ones; half the runs". Page 44: Ninth line: "for Alice's" should be "for Bob's". Page 50: First step (3): "With Alice's public key" should be "with "Alice's" public key." Page 51: Step 5: "with what he received from Bob" should be "with what he received from Alice". Page 55: First step (2): At the end of the step, add: "He sends both encrypted messages to Alice." Page 58: Last line: "Alice, Bob, and Carol" should be "Alice, Bob, Carol, and Dave". Page 59: First line: "Alice, Bob, and Carol" should be "Alice, Bob, Carol, and Dave". Page 69: Last line: "tried to recover her private key" should be "tries to recover Alice's private key". Page 73: "Bit Commitment Using One-Way Functions," last paragraph: Second and third sentences should be "Alice cannot cheat and find another message (R_1,R_2',b'), such that H(R_1,R_2',b') = H(R_1,R_2,b). If Alice didn't send Bob R_1, then she could change the value of both R_1 and R_2 and then the value of the bit." Page 77: "Flipping Coins into a Well," first line: "neither party learns the result" should be "Alice and Bob don't learn the result". Third line: parenthetical remark should be: "Alice in all three protocols". Page 78: Step (1): "Alice, Bob, and Carol all generate" should be "Alice, Bob, and Carol each generate". Page 80: Second paragraph, second sentence. It should read: "A general n-player poker protocol that eliminates the problem of information leakage was developed in [228]." Page 90: Last paragraph: "step (3)" should be "step (4)". Page 91: Second line: "step (3)" should be "step (4)". Page 93: "Blind Signatures," first line: "An essential in all" should be "An essential feature of all". Page 98: First paragraph after protocol, fourth line: "to determine the DES key with the other encrypted message" should be "to determine the DES key that the other encrypted message was encrypted in." Page 115: "Protocol #2," third paragraph: "together determine if f(a,b)" should be "together determine f(a,b)". Page 121: Second paragraph: Delete the colon in the third line. Page 131: Fifth paragraph: "each capable of checking 265 million keys" should be "each capable of checking 256 million keys". Page 133: Table 7.2: Third number in third column, "1.2308" should be "0.2308". Page 134: Table 7.3: "1027" should be "10^27". Page 139: Indented paragraph: "could break the system" should be "could break the system within one year". Page 141: "Reduced Keyspaces," last sentence: "don't expect your keys to stand up" should be "don't expect short keys to stand up". Page 148: Eighth line: "2^24" should be "2^32". Page 156: Second paragraph: "blocks 5 through 10" should be "blocks 5 through 12". Page 157: Figure 8.2: "IO" should be "IV". Page 159: Figure 8.3: "IO" should be "IV". Page 161: Figure 8.5: "Decrypt" should be "Encrypt". Page 162: Figure 8.6: "Encipherment" diagram: Input should be "p_i" instead of "b_i", and output should be "c_i" instead of "p_i". "Decipherment" diagram: "Decrypt" should be "Encrypt". Page 164: Figure 8.7: "IO" should be "IV". Page 165: Last equation: There should be a "(P)" at the end of that equation. Page 167: Second paragraph, last line: "2^(2n-4)" should be "2^(2n-14)". Page 168: Figure 8.8: This figure is wrong. The encryption blocks in the second row should be off-centered from the encryption blocks in the first and third row by half a block length. The pads are half a block length. Page 174: Middle of page: Equations should be: k_2 = c'_2 XOR p', and then p_2 = c_2 XOR k_2 k_3 = c'_3 XOR p_2, and then p_3 = c_3 XOR k_3 k_4 = c'_4 XOR p_3, and then p_4 = c_4 XOR k_4 Page 175: Last paragraph, second line: "acting as the output function" should be "acting as the next-state function". Page 177: Diffie's quote, second to last line: "proposal to built" should be "proposal to build". Page 178: Figure 8.20: In "Node 2", the subscripts should be "D_2" and "E_3". Page 190: Fourth paragraph, last line: "to determine M" should be "to determine P". Page 191: First paragraph: "3.5" should be "6.8" in fourth line. "0.56" should be "0.15". "EBCDIC (Extended Binary-Coded Decimal Interchange Code)" should be "BAUDOT". "0.30" should be "0.76". "0.70" should be "0.24". Page 193: Second sentence: "Unicity distance guarantees insecurity if it's too small, but does guarantee security if it's high" should be "Unicity distance guarantees insecurity if it's too small, but does not guarantee security if it's high." Page 197: Third paragraph, fifth sentence: "Thus SATISFIABILITY is the hardest problem in NP" should be "Thus, there is no problem harder than SATISFIABILITY in NP". Page 198: Fourth paragraph from bottom, second sentence: "If a and b are positive and a is less than n, you can think of a as the remainder of b when divided by n" should be "If a and b are positive and b is less than n, you can think of b as the remainder of a when divided by n". Page 199: Middle of the page: In the sentence "Calculating the power of a number modulo a number", a should not be italicized. Page 201: First line of code: Remove "assuming x and y are > 0". Page 202: Middle of the page: In the sentence "Now, how do you go about finding the inverse of a modulo n?" "a" should be italicized. Page 206: Third line from bottom: "L(a,p) = -1 if a is a nonresidue mod p" should be "L(a,p) = -1 if a is a quadratic nonresidue mod p". Page 207: "Jacobi Symbol," formula: Variable "h" should be "a". Also, J(0,n) = 0. Page 209: Fourth paragraph: "If that value does not equal q" should be "If that value does not equal 1". Page 214: Last line: "n" should be "p". Lines 29, 30, and 31: "r" should be "a", and "gcd(p,r)" should be gcd(a,p)". Page 215: Lehman test, step 5: All three "(n-1)/2" should be exponents. Page 217: There should be an open parenthesis in front of the second "ln" in both exponents. Sixth paragraph: "Guassian" should be "Gaussian". Page 222: "Validation and Certification of DES Equipment," first line: "As part of the standard, the DES NIST" should be "As part of DES, NIST". Page 223: Second to last paragraph, last line. Reference "[472]" should be "[473]". Page 225: Figure 10.2: L_i is taken from R_(i-1) before the expansion permutation, not after. And "L_(i)-1" should be "L_(i-1)". Page 226: Third sentence: "bit 1 to bit 58, bit 2 to bit 50, bit 3 to bit 42, etc." should be "bit 58 to bit 1, bit 50 to bit 2, bit 42 to bit 3, etc." Page 227: Fourth line from bottom: "output positions that correspond" should be "output positions correspond". Page 228: Fourth paragraph, last line: "0 to 16" should be 0 to 15". Page 228: Fifth paragraph should read: "For example, assume that the input to the sixth S-box (that is, bits 31 through 36 of the XOR function) are 110010. The first and last bits combine to form 10, which corresponds to row 2 of the sixth S-box. The middle four bits combine to form 1001, which corresponds to column 9 of the same S-box. The entry under row 2, column 9 of S-box 6 is 0. (Remember, we count rows and columns from 0, and not from 1.) The value 0000 is substituted for 110010. Page 230: Fifth sentence: "bit 4 moves to bit 21, while bit 23 moves to bit 4" should be "bit 21 moves to bit 4, while bit 4 moves to bit 31". Second to last line: delete "The key shift is a right shift". Page 231: Table 10.9, sixth line: "80286" should be "80386". Page 233: The second two weak keys should be: 1F1F 1F1F 0E0E 0E0E 00000000 FFFFFFFF E0E0 E0E0 F1F1 F1F1 FFFFFFFF 00000000 Page 238: Next to last line before "Additional Results": "NSA's" should be "IBM's". Page 238: "Differential Cryptanalysis," third paragraph: "(1/16)^2" should be "(14/64)^2". Page 239: Figure 10.4: "14/16" should be "14/64". Page 242: Table 10.14: In "XORs by additions" line, "2^39,2^3" should be "2^39,2^31". In "Random" line, "2^21" should be"2^18- 2^20". In "Random permutations" line, "2^44-2^48" should be"2^33-2^41". Page 245: Line 11" "8 bits is" should be "8 bits was". Page 247: Section heading, "Cryptanalysis of the Madryga" should be "Cryptanalysis of Madryga". Page 250: The two functions should be: S_0(a,b) = rotate left 2 bits ((a+b) mod 256) S_1(a,b) = rotate left 2 bits ((a+b+1) mod 256) Note the difference in parentheses. Page 250: Figure 11.4: Note that a is broken up into four 8-bit substrings, a_0, a_1, a_2, and a_3. Page 251: Figure 11.6: The definitions for S_0 and S_1 are incorrect ("Y = S_0" and "Y = S_1"). See corrections from previous page. Also, "S1" should be "S_1". Page 254: "REDOC III," second sentence: "64-bit" should be "80- bit". "Security of REDOC III," second sentence: Delete clause after comma: "even though it looks fairly weak." Page 262: Figure 11.9: There is a line missing. It should run from the symbol where Z_5 is multiplied with the intermediate result to the addition symbol directly to the right. Page 263: Table 11.1: The decryption key sub-blocks that are Z_n^(m)-1 should be Z_n^((m)-1). Also, the second and third column of decryption key sub-blocks in rounds 2 through 8 should be switched. Page 264: First line: "107.8 mm on a side" shouldbe "107.8 square mm". Page 265: Figure 11.10: There is a line missing. It should run from the symbol where Z_5 is multiplied with the intermediate result to the addition symbol directly to the right. Pages 266-7: Since the publication of this book, MMB has been broken. Do not use this algorithm. Page 267: Sixth line from bottom: Reference should be "[256]". Page 269: "Skipjack." First paragraph. Reference should be "[654]". Page 270: "Karn." Third paragraph. Last sentence: "append C_r to C to produce" should be "append C_r to C_l to produce". Page 271: Middle of the page: "(for example, MD2, MD5, Snefru" should be "(for example, MD2, MD4, Snefru". Page 272: Second to last line: "But it is be analyzed" should be "but it is being analyzed". Page 275: Second to last paragraph: "Using 1028 bits" should be "using 1024 bits". Page 277: First lines: The correct street address is "310 N Mary Avenue" and the correct telephone number is "(408) 735-5893". Page 281: Third paragraph: The correct street address is "310 N Mary Avenue" and the correct telephone number is "(408) 735-5893". Page 283: Table 12.2: "PRIVATE KEY: d e^(-1)" should be "PRIVATE KEY: d = e^(-1)". Page 286: Third paragraph: "Eve gets Alice to sign y," "y" should be italicized. Second to last line: "Eve wants to Alice to" should be "Eve wants Alice to". Page 287: Last line: Wiener's attack is misstated. If d is less than one-quarter the length of the modulus, then the attack can use e and n to find d quickly. Page 288: The correct street address is "310 N Mary Avenue" and the correct telephone number is "(408) 735-5893". Page 289: The correct street address is "310 N Mary Avenue" and the correct telephone number is "(408) 735-5893". Page 292: Fifth line: "sqrt(x/v)" should be "sqrt(1/v)". Page 294: Second and third lines: "Bob" should be "Victor." Page 295: First line: "t random integers fewer than n" should be "t random numbers less than n". Page 297: Last line: "when" should be "where". Page 301: Middle of the page: Delete the sentence "Since the math is all correct, they do this step." Page 302: Fourth line from bottom: "a" should be in italics. Page 303: "Authentication Protocol," step (1): Add "She sends x to Victor." Page 305: Third paragraph, parenthetical remark: "NIST claimed that having DES meant that both that both the algorithm and the standard were too confusing" should be "NIST claimed that having DES mean both the algorithm and the standard was too confusing". Page 306: Eighth line: "cryptographers' paranoia" should be "paranoia". Page 307: "Description of the Algorithm": "p = a prime number 2^L bits long" should be "p = a prime number L bits long". "g = h^((p-1)/q)" should be "g = h^((p-1)/q) mod p". Page 309: Third line: "random k values and then precompute r values" should be "random k-values and then precompute r-values". Page 314: Protocol, step (1): "when" should be "where". Page 319: There should be a blank line before "discrete logarithm:" and another before "factoring:". Fourth line from the bottom: "depends more on the" should be "depends on more than the". Page 321: Third line: "when h" should be "where h". Page 322: Second paragraph: "over 500 pairs of people" should be "253 pairs of people". Page 326: In the definition of h_i, "H_(i-1)" should be "h_(i- 1)". Page 330: Definitions of FF, GG, HH, and II are wrong. These are correct: FF: "a = b + ((a + F(b,c,d) + M_j + t_i) <<< s)" GG: "a = b + ((a + G(b,c,d) + M_j + t_i) <<< s)" HH: "a = b + ((a + H(b,c,d) + M_j + t_i) <<< s)" II: "a = b + ((a + I(b,c,d) + M_j + t_i) <<< s)" Page 336: "HAVAL," sixth line: "160, 92, 224" should be "160, 192, 224". Page 339: "LOKI Single Block": In computation of Hi, drop final "XOR M_i". Page 340: "Modified Davies-Meyer": In computation of H_i, "M_i" should be subscripted. Page 342: "Tandem Davies-Meyer": In computation of W_i, "M_i" should be subscripted. Page 345: "Stream Cipher Mac", first line:" "A truly elegant MDC" should be "A truly elegant MAC". Page 347: Formula: "aX_(n1)" should be "aX_(n-1)". Second paragraph: "(For example, m should be chosen to be a prime number.)" should be "(For example, b and m should be relatively prime.)" Page 351: Second line of text: "they hold current" should be "they hold the current". Page 353: Third line: ">> 7" should be ">> 31". Fourth line: ">> 5" should be ">> 6". Fifth line: ">> 3" should be ">> 4". Eighth line: "(ShiftRegister)" should be "(ShiftRegister))". Tenth line: "< 31" should be "<< 31". Second paragraph: "are often used from stream-cipher" should be "are often used for stream-cipher". Page 356: Source code: "ShiftRegister = (ShiftRegister ^ (mask >> 1))" should be "ShiftRegister = ((ShiftRegister ^ mask) >> 1)". Page 360: Equation should not be "l(2^1-1)^(n-1)", but "l(2^l- 1)^(n-1)". Page 362: Figure 15.10: "LFSR-B" should be "LFSR-A" and vice versa. The second "a(t+n-1)" should be "a(t+n-2)", and the second "b(t+n-1)" should be "b(t+n-2)". Page 363: Fourth paragraph: "cellular automaton, such as an CSPRNG" should be "cellular automaton as a CSPRNG". Page 365: "Blum-Micali Generator": In the equation, "x_i" should be an exponent of a, not a subscript. Page 367: Sixth paragraph: "Ingmar" should be "Ingemar". Page 370: "Using "Random Noise," first paragraph, last line: "output 2 as the event" should be "output 0 as the event". Page 371: Sixth line: "access/modify times of/dev/tty" should be "access/modify times of /dev/tty". Page 371: "Biases and Correlations," third line: "but there many types" should be "but there are many types". Page 376: Seventh line: "send a message, M" should be "send a message, P". Page 391: Second protocol, step (1): "in his implementation of DES" should be "in his implementation of DSS". Next sentence: "such that r is either q quadratic" should be "such that r is either a quadratic". Page 402: First line: "when" should be "where". Line 18: "2^t" should be "2^(-t)". Page 406: Step (5): "i<j" should be i>j". Page 417: Last paragraph: "Kerberos is a service Kerberos on the network" should be "Kerberos is a service on the network". Page 421: Figure 17.2: In the top message "C" should be lower case. Page 435: "RIPEM": "Mark Riorden" should be "Mark Riordan". Page 436: "Pretty Good Privacy," third paragraph: Delete fourth sentence: "After verifying the signature...." Page 436: Pretty Good Privacy is not in the public domain. It is copyrighted by Philip Zimmermann and available for free under the "Copyleft" General Public License from the Free Software Foundation. Page 437: Fifth line: Delete "assess your own trust level". "Clipper," second paragraph: reference should be "[473]". Fourth paragraph: references should be "[473,654,876,271,57]". Page 438: Middle of page: reference should be "[654]". "Capstone," first paragraph: reference should be "[655]". Page 445: The IACR is not the "International Association of Cryptographic Research," but the "International Association for Cryptologic Research." This is also wrong in the table of contents. Source Code: The decrement operator, "--", was inadvertently typesetted as an m-dash, "-". This error is on pages 496, 510, 511, 523, 527, 528, 540, and 541. There may be other places as well. Page 472: Third line: "2, 18, 11" should be "22, 18, 11". Eighteenth line: "for( i = 0; i<<16; i++ )" should be "for( i = 0; i<16; i++ )". Page 473: Function "cpkey(into)". "while (from endp)" should be "while (from < endp)". Page 478: Fourth line: "leftt > 4" should be "leftt >> 4". Seventh line: "leftt > 16" should be "leftt >> 16". Twentieth line: "leftt > 31" should be "leftt >> 31". Page 508: Line 8: "union U_INTseed" should be "union U_INT seed". Page 531: "for( i = 0; i<; i++ )" should be "for( i = 0; i<2; i++ )". Page 558: "#defineBOOLEAN int" should be "#define BOOLEAN int", "#defineFALSE0" should be "#define FALSE 0", and "#defineTRUE(1==1)" should be "#define TRUE (1==1)". Page 564: "#define BOOLEANint" should be "#define BOOLEAN int", "#define FALSE0" should be "#define FALSE 0", and "#defineTRUE(1==1)" should be "#define TRUE (1==1)". Page 569: "rand() > 11" should be "rand() >> 11". Page 569: In "G13.H", "#define G13int" should be "#define G13 int". Page 572: Reference [45]: "Haglen" should be "Hagelin". Page 576: References [136] and [137]: "Branstead" should be "Branstad." Page 578: Reference [184] "Proof that DES Is Not a Group" should be "DES Is Not a Group." The correct page numbers are 512-520. Page 589: Reference [475]: The publisher should be E.S. Mittler und Sohn, and the publication date should be 1863. Page 601: References [835] and [836]: "Branstead" should be "Branstad." Page 602: Reference [842]: "Solvay" should be "Solovay". Page 603: Reference [878]: "Weiner" should be "Wiener." This errata is updated periodically. For a current errata sheet, send a self-addressed stamped envelope to: Bruce Schneier, Counterpane Systems, 730 Fair Oaks Ave., Oak Park, IL 60302; or send electronic mail to: schneier(a)chinet.com.

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THOUGHT: International Electronic Declaration of Rights
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi everyone. This is a fairly involved piece, so forgive me if I ramble a bit. I just finished reading Sterling's The Hacker Crackdown, and one of the statements he said in there struck a chord with me and got me to thinking. Paraphrasing, Bruce said soemthing along the lines of 'Cyberspace is a world unto itself, without borders or national identity.' Why is this important? Because at the same time we are witnessing the birth of Cyberspace (an archaic, and almost vulgar term, yet also most appropriate), we are also witnessing a terrifying and growing movement towards the heavy-handed regulation of this new world. In cyberspace, national borders are merely annoyances on the Information Superhighway, much like that one pothole you manage to hit every morning on your way to work or school. Yet, as the information future comes into existance, governments will seek to put up checkpoints and roadblocks to make sure information does not propogate. Thus, I had a thought. What if we took it upon ourselves to write an International Electronic Declaration of Rights? A single body of ideas (not necessarily founded upon the U.S. Bill of Rights) that will seek to define the underlying tone of this non-existant cyberspace. It would have to be no more that a few statements about what ideals and freedoms we feel are not only important, but also granted to us on the basis of being living beings. Hang on, don't run away yet. :-) What to do with it, you ask? How do we get a bunch of geek-written libertarian ideals to mean somehting? Well, assuming we come up with our Electrion Declaration of Rights, the next step would be to get various civil-liberty organizations (such as EFF, ACLU, CPSR, and others outside the US) to sign on as supporters. Then we pitch it to corporations and universities world-wide, and get them to sign on. Soon, public pressure would force governments to look at it as a Rights issue, and perhaps we get it adopted as bodies of law or some such (a UN resolution?). Ok ok, I'm _obviously_ getting quite ahead of myself, and I apologize. But think about it, I do not know of a single resolution or declaration of the rights a citizen of Cyberspace is granted. Yes, each country has their own rules, but cyberspace doesn't understand the concept of borders, and perhaps it never will. Furthermore, there is precedent for International declarations of this sort. The United Nations has a Declaration of Human Rights (ftp.eff.org :/pub/CAF/civil-liberty/human-rights.un) [Note, though, that I avoided the use of the term 'human' above' for reasons that any avid sci-fi reader should recognize :-)]. If we based our declaration on THAT declaration, as opposed to basing it on the U.S. Bill of Rights, it would be less likely to meet objections from people outside of the United States. In any case, among the rights I think that need to be established (and this is by no means a complete list, jsut what I came up with in the last few hours) Freedom to say what you wish without fear of retaliation Freedom to participate in any forum without fear of retaliation Fundamental right to personal privacy both in storage and in communication (therein lies the right to cryptography) Freedom to hold any religious views your wish, including no religion Freedom from having religious views the basis of policy Access will not be denied to a person without due process Policies will not be implemented on the basis of race, colour, creed, gender, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social status, property, birth, or other status. Oops, sorry, went a little overboard, but you get the point (actually, I like the 'access' one. It's actually pretty important.) In any case, we are on the esge of a new world here, and I fear that reactionary regulation will make it into a dreadful world to live in. Perhaps something like the above, coupled with a grassroots organizational effort that we have shown to be so successful in cyberspace will perhaps slow the regulational onslaught, or perhaps even turn it to freedoms advantage. I'd really like to hear your opinions on this. (BTW: I did not bring this up in EFF forums because I was concerned with 'Americanizing' this idea too much. Instead, it is my belief that if this was a more international effort, with US and other civil-liberty groups signing on AFTER, it may be more successful. Perhaps I'm wrong which case I will repost this into other forums). I appreciate your time. ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Political Correctness is \/ Finger for PGP 2.3a Public Key <=> P.C. for "Thought Police" - - -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 1.0.1) GAT d- -p+(---) c++(++++) l++ u++ e+/* m++(*)@ s-/++ n-(---) h+(*) f+ g+ w++ t++ r++ y+(*) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLZ8siZ3BsrEqkf9NAQGTQQP+IjRM5BAUWY6sVYIAOoiZgHSlOzS327Ap CMnJ2ngMNQdtHN3S7kMkatrb9QA/W4H/tKTsQRTjVz4wR9OKO4R1KwDKMBpOfDGk Y95hUbWlnpcZwuS2g2cvOqY+yfHyazbI34VrnU8jFA0jd4vNLxL5hILyNQR3RaOS FjiGtJy0LPI= =ToZ2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: PHILIP ZIMMERMAN ARRESTED [NOT!]
by Stewart Brand 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Zimmerman prank---I'm sure not funny for him---hardens my line further against anonymity online. At its best, as here, it is an unholy nuisance. Thanks for posting the correction, John. I'm moderating a panel with Zimmerman later this week, and would have been confused.

4 3

Re: THOUGHT: Internation
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:42 PM 04/04/94 -0400, Duncan Frissell wrote: >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > > >T >Yes, the U.N. has quite a fascist declaration of rights. It includes >T >such chestnuts as a right to a job, a right to shelter, a right to >T >medical care, and the right of a country to control its press (cf. >T >the UNESCO fiasco). No thanks. > >Also, the right to two weeks paid vacation a year. > >As a self-employed individual, I want all you UN advocates out there to >pay for my two-week vacations since I've never had one. <g> > >DCF I don't want to start a huge debate on this, I just would like to know if those who object to this object on grounds of practicality or ideology (in other words, for example do you object because you don't believe everyone is *entitled* to a job, or because you think it is idealistic and silly to write something like this when everyone knows capitalism requires unemployment.)

1 0

Crunch Time
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi Folks, McCandlish forwarded my request for help before I go see a Federal Reserve Bank President Tuesday 5 April. Thanks to you all, esp Ms. Dekker of DigiCash. It's occured to me that Clipper could cripple US banking in the world financial market due to the 80% opposition exposed by the Time poll. If all my banking is digitized, my private key ensure's secrurity of transactions and authentication of user. If privacy of US Banks are comprimised by Clipper, why can't I bank in Switzerland? Hoenig, the KC Federal Reserve President will be in a public forum 10:00 MST 5 April. I would appreciate your comments on my reasoning with an eye on turning the Federal Reserve Anti-Clipper. It's crunch time folks, so I'll be reading my email up until 09:30 Tuesday. This is my private battle, so send your email to: <eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com> or <jldavis(a)nyx.cs.du.edu> -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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Re: Cyberspace, Crypto Anarchy, and Pushing Limits
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A thought-provoking essay as usual from Tim. However, I see a contradiction between: > * Crypto means access to "regions" can be controlled by "owners": > > - "my house, my rules" enforced locally, without central State > authority and: > * Physical location of cyberspace locations will be increasingly hard > to pin down. A vast "labyrinth of rooms and corridors" might be > physically instantiated on a computer in Malaysia, while a "virtual > gambling hall" is being run via cryptographic cutouts (remailers) from > someone's bedroom in Provo, Utah. The problem I have is that it is not clear that cyberspace is a space, that one can identify regions which have boundaries, and which can be patrolled by owners. These physical, 2-D and 3-D concepts do not map well to cyberspace. Cyberspace is more of a mental conception, a meeting of the minds. It's not clear that it can be owned. For a concrete example, who owns the Cypherpunks list? Tim and Eric started it, Eric keeps the software working, and John Gilmore supplies the machine, as I understand it (apologies if I am leaving someone out). Do they own the list? What about the role of the contributors? Aren't they the ones who give the list value? (Granted, Tim, Eric and John have been some of the best contributors, but that is separate from their role, if any, as owners of the list.) Suppose, as Tim implies, that the list someday evolved to be some kind of virtual list, hosted on a flexible network of machines around the globe. Who would the owners be then? I would suggest that there would not nec- essarily be any. The list would be a voluntary meeting place for people who had certain interests. Its existance would be essentially defined by the commonality of that interest. It exists not in a cyberspace thought of as machines on a net of wires and fiber, but in a conceptual space that transcends the physical machines which support it. The issue of the ownership of cyberspace has similarities more to the ownership of intellectual property than of houses and roads and other physical objects, IMO. And the problems which arise when you try to fence off part of intellectual property space will also be a part of attempts to own cyberspace. Just another view - Hal

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Re: PHILIP ZIMMERMAN ARRESTED [NOT!]
by dmandl＠lehman.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Stewart Brand <sbb(a)well.sf.ca.us> > > The Zimmerman prank---I'm sure not funny for him---hardens my line > further against anonymity online. At its best, as here, it is an > unholy nuisance. People have gotten anonymous death threats over the telephone and poison pen letters by mail. Are you against phone and mail anonymity? And this wasn't even such a destructive prank! And it was perpetrated on April 1. Doesn't seem like such a big deal to me. --Dave.

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Re: Bekenstein Bound
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > I know this is off topic, but as an astrophysicist I can't let it lie. > >First off, Black holes are singularities or points and have no volumes. > > Black Hole refers to the event horizon, the geometry is not nice inside that. > > > >Second, the 'surface' of the event horizon is a fractal and is therefore > >better represented by a volume. > > The 'surface' is not fractal. It is a simple bounded spheroid of finite area. > > > >Third, Black holes are not de-coupled from the rest of the universe, they > >emit 'Hawkings Radiation' which eventually leads to the evaporatio of every > >black hole, the bigger the faster. > > Blackholes evaporate through Hawking radiation the SMALLER the faster. > Stellar mass black holes will not evaporate in the age of the universe. > This radiation does not carry information about the interior. It is formed > from the quantum field just above the surface. > > > >Fifth, volume is not an issue because several accepted theories imply a > >'many worlds' type of reality. Some of these theories even allow a certain > > > >amount of information to leak between them. This occurs because when the > >Hamiltonian is constructed some states prevent or exclude other states and the > >state space turns out to be smaller than at first apparent. > > This is philosophy not physics. > > > >Sixth, everyone (incl. me initialy) was discussing QED in exclusion. This is > >completely incorrect. You must include QCD and it is a complete unknown at this > >point. When QED succeded because of Feynmann the tools were applied to the > >Quantuam Chromodynamics of Quarks and it has not solved any problems. > > I have no idea what you are trying to say here. > > -------------------------------------------------- > Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD > loki(a)nately.ucsd.edu > PGP 2.3 key available by finger or server. > > "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly > it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice > weasels come." > --Nietzsche > > > I appreciate your feedback. From what I have read of Hawkings and others work I would have to disagree w/ your statements that a black hole is equated w/ the event horizon. In every text (incl. the Hawkings book from the 70's on the subject) to makes a clear distinction. Several years ago (around '90) there was a whole raft of work dealing w/ the event horizon and the consensus that I got was that the event horizon was a fractal. Perhaps you would site some references where this theory is not accepted and a argumetn as to why it fails? What I am saying as far as QED/QCD is that w/o discussing both then the actions of electrons and photons are not quantum mechanical in the sense that they require statistical terms to describe their behaviour. Nowhere in Maxwells Equations is there a statistical term. If you know of a hole in the equations please let me know of it. I am not aware of any behaviour of electrons/photons which are not covered by these equations until hadrons are introduced.

2 1

wrong place at wrong time...
by tmp＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

hello, whoever this `detweiler' person is you really seem to hate him. i appear to have been in the wrong place at the wrong time. would you like me to change my login name to something different so you don't confuse me with him? i think i heard it only costs $10 or so. yes, i do post from denver but i thought i heard detweiler was posting from somewhere else in colorado. (of course, geography is pretty meaningless in cyberspace.) yes, i am something of a newbie to this list. i heard about it out in talk.politics.crypto or something like that. i have also been reading up on your remailers from the public domain stuff out there (soda.berkeley.edu, etc.) the issues of `detweilering' do bring up some interesting questions. it seems to me that merely charging for access to remailers is not a sufficient deterrent (although it would have some effect). consider this argument: top-notch explosives can be very expensive, but that doesn't prevent terrorists from using them. in fact, it just has the effect of deterring the use of them by `casual' terrorists. wouldn't it be simpler to put limits on message propagation through a remailer? for example, limiting the volume of mail from a given source address? other interesting issues raised by `detweilering': hal finney forbids detweiler from using his remailer at any time. but (hello? is anyone home?) remailers operate on precisely the principle that names are irrelevant. how can you forbid anyone from doing something when you have no way of *identifying* them? how do you know what their mail aliases are? i wouldn't be surprised if hal finney censors *me* from his mailers just because he *suspects* that i am detweiler (ouch!). i think everyone here needs to be reminded why names were *invented*-- so that people can attribute actions to various individuals. it is `social ettiquete'. now, in some cases you may say that there is no need to attribute a name to an action (such as a posting) but then it seems you have no right to complain about `detweilers'. consider this-- suppose that i really hate t.c.may (this is just an example). i would like to screen my mailbox of everything he writes. but if he has dozens of imaginary aliases on netcom.com, each individually pretending to be a real person, how can i do this? it would be impossible. and don't say that the cost of multiple addresses would be a deterrent. what if he is a bored millionaire with nothing better to do? what if detweiler is a bored millionaire as well? apparently (from what i can determine) he seems to be endlessly entertained by harassing cypherpunks. and the criteria `that's an annoying post' is obviously not a very effective way of identifying him. so, `cypherpunks', you might consider the following problem. is it possible to have a system where there are multiple aliases allowed to a given person, and comparison between aliases (does alias1 == alias2) is permitted, but anonymity is generally preserved? one possibility is to remove screening one level from the users. that is, i tell a central server `stop sending me all posts generated by [alias1]'. if certain people suddenly disappear from my view that would be highly incriminating but not conclusive that they are all the same person. p.s. if detweiler is using the initials `tmp' (which he is judging by the FAQ piece that was reposted here) does anyone know what they stand for? p.p.s. can anyone tell me of recent press or media accounts of cypherpunk activity? thanks. p.p.p.s. try not to be so paranoid about `detweilers'. seems to me that if all he does is bang on a keyboard he is probably quite harmless. but then again, that's all that mitnick and morris did <g>

3 2

REMAIL: Ray's improved anonymous remailer
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I meant to reply to this several weeks ago, but was too busy then, so here are some comments now. From: rjc(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray) > Seeing as how everyone else is announcing their anonymous remailers, > I may as well announce mine which is nearing completion. The remailer > is written in Knuth's WEB using Perl so there is nice documentation. This sounds like an interesting approach. WEB is Knuth's methodology for creating self-documenting programming projects. You run them through a filter to create the executable code, Perl in this case. This should help portability and ease of support. > The remailer includes among other things, virtual addresses (handles), > padding/packetizing messages (splitting them up and sending pieces through > multiple remailer chains), chaining, mixing, a key-server, a list of > remailers server, a socket-server to bypass the sendmail queue and > get immediate error return, a stealth mode (delivery via direct SMTP or > socket instead of through the local sendmail), secure remailer network > (remailers sign and encrypt chained messages between each other), > fake remailer traffic, and other small features. The virtual handles are > fairly secure. They can be stored in the database as either plaintext real > email addresses, virtual addresses located elsewhere on the remailer network, > or SAEE cypherpunk remailer blocks (self-addressed encrypted envelope) These mostly sound like great features. The virtual addresses are something we have needed for a long time. The idea of keeping records of which remailers are responding should help with the use of the network, too. The one problem with this is that it might be tempting for the users to just trust the remailers to choose their chain paths. It would be much better for the user's own software to hook up, find out which remailers are operating, then choose a chain. Ray's software will allow this, but this function could be split off from the remailers to a specialized server, perhaps. I'm not sure about the advantages of remailers signing and encrypting messages between themselves. It seems to me that the network should work even without this. Ideally we don't want the remailer network to be too centralized and close-knit. It's better for them to be strangers to each other since if they coordinate their efforts they can defeat anonymity. > p.p.s. e-mail commands are of the same form as the extropian's mailing > list, backwards compatibility with the cypherpunks pasting token is not > supported. Why? All headers in the message are ignored (and in socket-mode, > there is no header anyway) and the prefered mode of operation is to encrypt > the body and the commands so no outside eyes can see the remail request > destination nor the message subject. This was one reason I suggested supporting both old-style CP and the extropians-style syntax ("::Anon-To"). As Ray suggests, in some cases we might not have message headers in the RFC822 sense. I think it is simpler to think about a message which has remailer commands at the top. > Socket mode provides a more secure form of operation by bypassing the > standard sendmail delivery mechanism allowing a message to be > piped directly to the remailer. In addition, the socket mode remailer > functions as an information server allowing clients to request > a publically networked list of public keys and up-to-date list of > \rem servers. The port number can be anything but I'm suggesting we all > agree to use port 2258. The number of sites which allow users to run socket servers is far smaller than the number which allow mail filters, so not many people will be able to use this feature. OTOH the mail-only sites are generally of low security and an owned-and-operated system should be able to use this feature. So it is definately a plus for those who can use it. > Upon connection to the remailer port, a greeting message will be sent to you > of the following form. On the first line is a general greeting message > which can be any string. On the next line is status information separated > by ``/''. The status information in order is: \verb|remailer_name|, > version, administrator e-mail address, and finally a list of flags. > The flags are single character upper case letters specifying > the following options. {\bf P} to specify that the machine is > privately owned and single-user, {\bf M} for mixing enabled, {\bf C} for > chaining, {\bf K} if the keyserver is turned on, {\bf E} if this remailer > only accepts encrypted messages, and {\bf S} if stealth mode is on. This is a good feature, but it should also be available from non-socket remailers. There should probably also be a "Help" command to tell how to use the remailer. (A lot of people already have these features.) > Virtual Addresses consist of a {\bf user handle} and an optional > {\bf remailer name} separated by `{\bf \#}' I used `\#' because I wanted > to differentiate virtual addresses from internet style addresses. > An example of a virtual address is ``darkmodem\#deepanon'' which > means that the message should be sent to the user connected with the > handle ``darkmodem'' through the remailer named ``deepanon'' You can > chain your own remailers by simply adding multiple remailer names to the > virtual address. For example, ``user\#remailer1\#remailer2\#remailer3'' > which will send the message first through remailer1, then remailer2, > then remailer 3, and finally to whoever happens to be connected with > ``user''. A special remailer name ``*'' is provided. Each instance of > ``*'' in a remailer chain will be replaced by a random remailer. > For example, ``darkmodem\#*#*#deepanon'' will first chain the message > through two random remailers and then finally to deepanon. The random > remailers chosen are not guaranteed to be unique. Ray had mentioned above that these user handles can also map to encrypted remailer strings. This way users don't have to trust any one remailer op- erator to keep their identity secret. This need for trust is one reason I am not enthusiastic about user#remailer1#remailer2#remailer3 as an address, although it is admirably concise and easy to use. The problem is that it exposes the path to the first remailer in the chain. I really feel that paths must use nested encryption to be of much value. Similarly, the darkmodem#*#*#deepanon requires the user to really trust the first remailer in the chain. Perhaps it deserves such trust, but I feel that a system which does not require such trust would be superior. (Again, Ray's proposal is broad enough that it will allow non-trust modes of operation, as I understand it; my main concern is that these other options are so easy that they will tempt people to be lazy and slip into modes where they are vulnerable to unscrupulous remailer operators.) I am really looking forward to seeing Ray's software. It sounds like a good package of functions. Hal

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Re: THOUGHT: International Electronic Declaration of Rights
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Doesn't the U.N. have some kind of list of basic human rights? (Un- > enforceable, of course.) I thought I saw it in a story about Elanor > Roosevelt. I don't have the UN rights stuff handy, but most of it's non-useful, and is a good example of what happens when you let a committee of governments "define" your "rights" for you. I've spent more time looking at the UN treaty on the Rights of the Child (my church was lobbying our senator about getting the US to sign it, which I had problems with.) Typical "rights" included the right to free speech, subject to the needs of a society to preserve public order, the right to freedom of religion, subject to the needs of a society to preserve public order, the right to free compulsory education through 5th grade, without any particular identification of who would be forced to pay for "free", or acknowledgement of the more important right not to be compelled to be indoctrinated in whatever the government wants to force you to believe (e.g. South Africa forbidding public school students to use their native languages leading to Soweto massacre or France forbidding female public-school students to wear traditional Arab head-coverings), the right to national identity cards, etc. It's a mixture of "rights" that apply unless the government doesn't want them to, "rights" to have other people do things for you, rights that are too watered down to be worth the name, and rights that don't really include enforcement when governments don't honor them. It did have some meaningful parts - forbidding execution of children, forbidding drafting children under some age (I think it was 15 or 16) - and for many governments it would mean positive changes in spite of all the concessions to letting governments do whatever they want in the name of "social order". We can do better than that. Bill Stewart

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Re: Cyberspace, Crypto Anarchy, and Pushing Limits
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sameer writes, in response to Tim: > > - a general move away from "commons"-oriented systems, which breed the > > notions of "fair access" and such. If the "problem" is that poor > > people cannot--it is alleged--afford a $17 a month Net connection > > (what Netcom charges, in about 25 cities and growing), then my > > solution would be to simply _subsidize_ their bill. (I'm not > > advocating this, nor do I think it wise to subsidize anyone's phone, > > Net, or dinner bills, but better this than "nationalizing" networks > > and thus creating more confusion and less efficiency for all.) > > We don't need subsidized bills for cheaper access. > Just cheaper access. It'll happen. Market pressure + all that. Tim's point, though was that we don't "need" cheaper access, and government-regulation solutions to achieve this pressing social need are not only bad, but unnecessary - if the government really wants to provide people with cheaper net access, it can hand them money, with less distortion of the market than regulation. One of the problems with the EFF open access proposals is that they tend to favor, or at least tolerate, regulation of the networks, which is an invitation to disaster, however well-intentioned it may be. Bill Stewart

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Re: THOUGHT: Internation
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com T >Yes, the U.N. has quite a fascist declaration of rights. It includes T >such chestnuts as a right to a job, a right to shelter, a right to T >medical care, and the right of a country to control its press (cf. T >the UNESCO fiasco). No thanks. Also, the right to two weeks paid vacation a year. As a self-employed individual, I want all you UN advocates out there to pay for my two-week vacations since I've never had one. <g> DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

1 0

Re: How many games of chess?
by GRABOW_GEOFFREY＠tandem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

When "different games" are mentioned, are we talking about any difference a significant difference. Are two 1000 move games different just because they have one move difference, or does the outcome need to be different? And, bye the outcome being different, does that just mean that the King i captured in a different square or does it require more? G.C.G. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Geoffrey C. Grabow | "What we demand are rigidly defined | | Oyster Bay, New York | areas of doubt and uncertainty!" | | | -------------------- | | grabow_geoffrey(a)tandem.com | Clipper, SkipJack & Digital Telephony | | | JUST SAY NO!!! | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | PGP fingerprint = C9 95 0F C4 E9 DD 8E 73 DD 99 4E F5 EB 7A B6 1D | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1 0

Economic assumptions
by hughes＠ah.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just read (after a reference by Duncan Frissell on this list) an essay by Nobel-prize economist R. H. Coase. The essay is called "The Nature of the Firm". I have it in a collection called _The Firm, the Market, and the Law_, published by University of Chicago Press. This is a sure-fire antidote to the idea that "the market is the best solution for everything". This is the essay, evidently, that introduced the idea of transaction costs. Some of his basic points are the following: -- There is a cost to using the price mechanism. -- Not all economic allocations use the price mechanism. -- Firms exist because they have lower transaction costs than the market. I can imagine that bandwidth in the fibersphere for text transmission will be too cheap to meter, which means that the cost of metering would more than the marginal revenue. In this case, and this is not the near future, there aren't any delivery charges per message. Suppose 5 billion people are all typing continuously at 300 bps. That's 1.5 Tbps, certainly within the conceivable for a single transmission line. So that's everything everyone in the world types, delivered at flat rate to your computer. The assumption of scarcity for bandwidth, while true now, may not generalize to the future. We should also not assume that every commons is subject to the tragedy of overuse. Eric

4 5

Important Financial Information...
by 68864320＠canma.dyn.ml.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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This List--Public, Private, or Other?
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have a few more things to say on the question Hal raised: is this list privately owned, publically owned, or is it something else? * It's effectively under the control of the folks mentioned (Huhges, Gilmore, Daniel, etc.), but.... * anyone with access to the mailing list names (cf. majordomo) could "invite" subscribers to try another list. Detweiler tried something like this with his "cypherwonks" group. The point: the "list" could move around. * sufficiently bizarre management practices on the List, such as if Eric decided to really crown himself King, would cause folks to leave. The point: the "list" is not permanent. * anyone trying to create their own Cypherpunks-type list would have to deal with inertia, head starts (by us), and so on. The point: sometimes inertia wins. In different words, the list exists as an "emergent phenomenon," like a popular trend or a fad. It's "official" existence is not crucial, as that could evaporated, change, etc. The hundreds of subscribers (can it really be 700?) find this list presumably more convenient than forming their own list, recruiting members, and achieving some critical mass. Call it a "Schelling point" in cyberspace, a meeting place. (A Schelling point is named after the game theorist, and can best be quickly described by an example: if Hal Finney and I agree to meet in Washington, D.C., without making further plans as to place, where might we meet? The Air and Space Museum? The base of the Washington Monument, the EFF offices? A limited number of points are likely to be independently picked by us--these are Schelling points for us. Prices are often Schelling points.) If enough of us "moved" to another list, or another machine, then that's "where" the Cypherpunks list would move to (it didn't happen with "Cypherwonks," for various and obvious reasons). The concept of "ownership" is thus tenuous. I would liken it to the "ownership" by a store of its customer base. Fry's Electronics "owns" the hacker-technophile customers it attracts in such throngs throughout the Bay Area, and no one (except the State, of course) can come in and command them to change their policies. But Fry's must be careful to not lose its customer base, which could easily happen (and will eventually, in all likelihood). To wrap it up: Cyberspace ownership has more similarities to the voluntary asssociations desscribed here--customer bases, clubs, subscriptions to magazines, etc.--than to conventional ideas of "public" and "private" property ownership. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Electronic Purse Press Release (Originally Re: VISA's digital cash)
by Christopher Allen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:25 PM 4/3/94 -0400, Pat Farrell wrote: >Today's (April 3) Washington Post business section has an article on >a consortium of VISA and banks working on a digital cash card. > >Did I sleep thru the messages, or has the list been scooped? > >Basic story is that the card is a smartcard, designed to be reused, >and suitable for small quantities. Nothing in the article about what would >prevent it from storing large amounts. No serious technical discussion >either, but I infer that it is an online cash card. > >Pat > >Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)gmu.edu >Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA >Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer> I was sent this by a friend today. It is the original press release: PR NEWSWIRE 03/22 VISA ESTABLISHES INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR ELECTRONIC PURSE SPECIFICATIONS SAN FRANCISCO, March 22 /PRNewswire/ -- Visa today formed an international consortium of market leaders in the consumer payments industry to develop common specifications for a new way to pay -- an "Electronic Purse," a card with a micro chip that can be used instead of cash and coins for everything from vending machines to public transportation. The Electronic Purse would consist of a micro-chip embedded in a credit card, debit card, or stand alone card to store value electronically. The card would replace cash and coins for small-ticket purchases (less than U.S. $10), such as gasoline stations, pay phones, road/bridge tolls, video games, school cafeterias, fast food restaurants, convenience stores, and cash lanes at supermarkets. Cardholders can "reload" the micro-chip and control the amount of value stored in the card's memory. The Electronic Purse provides cardholders with the security and convenience of carrying less cash and coins, eliminating the need for exact change. Many participants in this worldwide effort are currently pilot testing electronic purse products, additional pilots are expected in late 1995. Joining forces with Visa to develop international technical specifications for the Electronic Purse are: Banksys; Electronic Payment Services, Inc., (EPS); Financial Information Systems Center, (FISC); Groupement des Cartes Bancaires, (CB); NationsBank Corporation; Sociedad Espanola de Medios de Pago, (SEMP); Sociedade Interbancaria de Servicos, S.A., (SIBS); and Wachovia Corporation. To ensure worldwide representation, limited additional payment systems that have invested energies in open-market electronic purse projects, will be invited to join. In addition, Visa will form a parallel group with technology companies to ensure the specifications support low-cost, efficient production of necessary equipment. "The goal of our combined efforts is to lead the market into the next frontier of payment processing -- the automation of cash and coins," said Ed Jensen, president and chief executive officer, Visa International. "The highly complementary capabilities of the participating companies will allow us to address issues for all aspects of smart card-based electronic purse solutions, including the cards themselves, point-of-sale systems, networks and back-end interchange and settlement systems." This announcement reflects Visa's commitment to providing superior, convenient payment services to its member financial institutions who serve consumers and merchants around the globe. The consortium was formed in response to member requests that Visa take the lead in facilitating the addition of an electronic purse to existing credit and debit cards, as well as the introduction of a stand alone card. Visa will leverage its global brand presence by teaming up with strategic partners to develop common standards. "The most critical step in making this concept a global market reality is the definition of open standards that can be shared among all participants," said Wesley Tallman, president, Visa Products and Information Services. "Recognizing that important domestic electronic purse developments are underway, the consortium will leverage the expertise of all participants. Group 'knowledge sharing,' especially with our European participants that have made significant advancements in the chip card arena, will facilitate the development of a specification that is relevant to markets worldwide." The technological specifications will govern the standards needed to establish an infrastructure that supports electronic purse payments. The worldwide market for automating cash transactions remains virtually untapped. According to the Bank for International Settlement, consumer cash transactions in the U.S. alone exceed 300 billion per year. By contrast, bank-facilitated consumer transactions, such as credit and debit cards, checks, and wire transfers total only 60 billion per year. As these figures indicate, there is a vast market potential for automating cash transactions. "EPS has been investing significant resources to develop smart card solutions since 1991," stated David Van Lear, chairman and chief executive officer of Electronic Payment Services, Inc. "Combining the resources of these industry leaders will accelerate market acceptance." Just as the standard operating environments have fueled the growth of the personal computer industry, the specifications that emerge from this collective effort will provide the essential framework to ensure compatibility, reduce development time and cost, and open up the market for others. International payment system participants included in this cooperative effort are: Banksys -- based in Brussels, Belgium, is a leading European specialist in electronic funds transfer (EFT) and payment security. Banksys operates the automated teller machine (ATM) and point-of-sale (POS) network on behalf of all card issuing banks in Belgium. Besides Belgium, 10 other countries are equipped with the Banksys system. Banksys is entrusted with the development of the Belgian Electronic Purse project, with pilot testing expected to begin in December 1994. Electronic Payment Services, Inc.(EPS) -- based in Wilmington, Del., is the leading electronic funds transfer company in the United States with an annual transaction volume of 1.7 billion. EPS is the holding company for BUYPASS Corporation and MONEY ACCESS SERVICE INC., operator of the MAC(R) network. Financial Information Systems Center (FISC) -- based in Taipei, Taiwan, is a government organization that supports electronic purse initiatives in that country. Through its members, FISC has issued 80 thousand integrated circuit cards and has installed more than one thousand point-of-sale systems with integrated circuit card readers. Groupement des Cartes Bancaires (CB) -- based in Paris, is the country's payment cards organization that has succeeded in launching the world's largest integrated circuit card program, with more than 22 million cards in circulation generating 2.2 billion transactions per year. NationsBank Corporation -- headquartered in Charlotte, N.C., is the third largest banking company in the United States with approximately $158 billion in assets, more than 1,900 retail banking centers in nine states and the District of Columbia, and consumer offices in 33 states. NationsBank is a financial services company providing products and services nationally and internationally to individuals, businesses, corporations, institutional investors and government agencies. Sociedad Espanola de Medios de Pago (SEMP) -- based in Madrid, SEMP is a sister company of Visa Espana, a group member of Visa banks in Spain. SEMP operates Sermepa, the card processing company of Visa Espana. Sociedade Interbancaria de Servicos, S.A., (SIBS) -- based in Lisbon, Portugal, is the country's leading bank payments company which provides electronic clearing services and operates the national Multibanco ATM and EFT/POS networks. As an extension to its service offerings, SIBS, is introducing the Multibanco Electronic Purse, (MEP). Visa International -- headquartered in the United States, is the world's leading consumer payments system with more than 333 million cards issued, more than 11 million acceptance locations, and the largest global ATM network. Wachovia Corporation -- with dual headquarters in Atlanta, and Winston-Salem, N.C., is one of the United States' leading debit card issuers and provides credit card services to three million cardholders nationwide. /NOTE TO EDITORS: In December 1993 Visa International, MasterCard International and Europay announced an agreement to form a joint working group to develop a common set of technical specifications for the integration of microprocessor chips in payment cards -- commonly known as "Integrated Circuit," "Chip," and "Smart" cards. The electronic currency specifications referenced in this release will enable the electronic purse application to be added to the integrated circuit cards./ /CONTACT: Albert Coscia of Visa, 415-432-2039/ 09:05 EST PR NEWSWIRE 03/28 VISA TECHNOLOGY GROUP SUPPORTS ELECTRONIC PURSE SPECIFICATIONS SAN FRANCISCO, March 28 /PRNewswire/ -- Visa today announced the formation of a technology group of international manufacturers to support the adaptation of specifications for a variety of technologies that will facilitate the issuance and acceptance of the "Electronic Purse" -- a payment card that stores value electronically and is designed to replace cash and coins for a wide range of low-value (under U.S. $10) consumer payments. The technology group will work with Visa who recently formed an international consortium of payment systems that will develop common specifications for Electronic Purse programs. Because plans are underway for the card to be used globally in a variety of venues -- including, gas/petrol stations, grocery stores, convenience stores, fast food restaurants, school cafeterias, and for such routine items as telephone calls from pay phones, road/bridge tolls and video games -- a number of technologies required to support card acceptance in global markets will be examined by the group. The first suppliers to join the international technology group are VeriFone, Inc., the leading global provider of point-of-sale transaction systems, and Gemplus, SCA, the world's leading manufacturer of smart cards. VeriFone and Gemplus have formed a joint venture, called VeriGem, to pursue electronic purse opportunities. To ensure worldwide representation, additional technology leaders who have invested energies in electronic purse applications will be invited to join the group. In addition to acceptance technologies, "loading" systems that enable cardholders to restore currency value into the micro chip will also be analyzed. Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) are expected to play an important role in loading value into the electronic purse. Future loading methods, such as specialized devices located at merchant locations or in the home, will also be explored. Operating both the largest international consumer payment network, VisaNet, and the world's largest ATM network puts Visa in a unique position to lead this global effort. "As with all emerging technologies, consultation with suppliers responsible for physically implementing the technology is critical to ensuring the viability of the product design," said Wesley Tallman, president, Visa Products and Information Services. "As market leaders in the payment systems field, all of those who have joined us in this initiative are truly partners in paving this 'express lane' of the electronic payment superhighway." Tallman emphasized that the technology group will be charged with ensuring that the specifications developed by the consortium support low-cost, efficient production of necessary systems and equipment. This group approach has been a key tool in support of Visa's product and market development efforts. In December 1992, Visa formed a manufacturer's group to support development efforts for security specifications of integrated circuits on payment cards. Still active today, this group lends critical on-going support and expertise to Visa's chip card efforts. Participants in this international group include: Bull, CPS (France); Gemplus, (France); Giesecke and Devrient (Germany); Schlumberger Industries (France); and Toshiba Corporation (Japan). Visa expects and welcomes the participation of these and other technology partners in the electronic purse effort. Hatim Tyabji, chairman, president and chief executive officer of VeriFone, agreed with the need for a supplier's group that would lend systems expertise to this effort. "Establishing worldwde specifications is the essential first step in the global standardization of the electronic purse, uniting all industry participants on a common playing field with a common set of rules. The endorsement and support of the electronic purse by Visa, its member banks and leading worldwide payment systems send a strong message to the industry -- the electronic purse is no longer merely a possibility, but a real market direction," said Tyabji. "With their high storage capacity, programmability and increasing affordability, smart cards are now poised to move beyond specialized applications and become a truly universal payment medium," said Dr. Marc Lassus, president and chief executive officer of Gemplus. "We share the consortium's vision of the electronic purse, and are excited about helping to bring speed, reliability and efficiency of smart card-based electronic cash to markets around the globe." Visa International, headquartered in San Francisco, California, is the world's leading consumer payments system with more than 333 million cards issued, more than 11 million acceptance locations, and the largest global ATM network. VeriFone, Inc., based in Redwood City, California, is a leading global provider of Transaction Automation solutions used to deliver payment processing and other transaction services to various retail market segments, as well as the healthcare and government benefits market. The company has more than 30 facilities located throughout Asia, Europe and the United States. To date, VeriFone has shipped more than 3.4 million Transaction Automation systems, which have been installed in more than 70 countries. Net revenues in 1993 were U.S. $258.9 million. Gemplus Card International, based in Gemenos, France, is the leading worldwide manufacturer of smart cards. Gemplus' cards are used for secure transactions in public and cellular telephone, banking, pay TV, transportation, healthcare and defense applications. The company has three manufacturing facilities: two near Marseilles, France, and one near Stuttgart, Germany. Current Gemplus production exceeds 14 million cards per month. The company has direct sales offices in 12 countries and a distribution network covering an additional 50 countries worldwide. The company's 1993 revenues were U.S. $130 million. NOTE: Gemplus is a registered trademark of Gemplus Card International. VeriFone is a registered trademark of VeriFone, Inc. Visa is a registered trademark of Visa International, Inc. /NOTE TO EDITORS: On March 22, 1994, Visa announced the formation of an international consortium to develop worldwide technical specifications for the Electronic Purse. The supplier's group discussed in this release is a complementary effort, serving Visa in a consultative or advisory capacity. /CONTACT: Albert Coscia of Visa, 415-432-2039/ 08:45 EST ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ..Christopher Allen Consensus Development Corporation.. ..<consensus(a)netcom.com> 4104-24th Street #419.. .. San Francisco, CA 94114-3615.. .. o415/647-6383 f415/647-6384.. ..Mosaic/World-Wide-Web Front Door: .. ..ftp://netcom7.netcom.com/pub/consensus/www/ConsensusFrontDoor.html ..

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Re: THOUGHT: Internation
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Jamie Lawrence "....... I just would like to know if those who object to this object on grounds of practicality or ideology (in other words, for example do you object because you don't believe everyone is *entitled* to a job......." having a job = making a living using $ "a living": having an idea of a kind of life to live pre-requisite: having a purpose in life requisite: arranging your life to realize (achieve) that purpose following-through on the work required adjusting things around you to suit your interest/sensibilities It would be impractical for another person to deliver all of these things for me at their expense, when they should be spending time on their own dreams & plans. It does not represent an ideal method to me to have my lifestyle delivered to me, while aiming to be an independent, autonomous individual with a mind of my own. Otherwise I would be obliged to serve the purposes & interests of those who supply the means, the job, the money, on their schedule; that is, whenever they could think of something for me to "do" on the entitled job list. Blanc

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Re: Economic assumptions
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:04 PM 04/04/94 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >(If the answer is "No fees, no quotas, use as much as you can," then I >maintain it will be relatively easy to continue to flood sites. Flood >them worse than anything we've seen so far, in fact. I'll go out on a >limb and speculate that cheap delivery makes a fee schedule of some >sort _more important_, not less important. Of course, this is up to >the service providers; anyone who wishes to provded a free bandwidth >link should be free to do so!) Obviously it doesn't map directly, but phones can provide a good example. people can phone-bomb people, but it gets boring. Most prank callers ger sick of it by the time they hit highschool. There are cases of prank callers getting scary but these are pretty few and fall between. You may say that the difference is that I have to have to be on the phone to do this, which doesn't apply to computers- well, I can, using a Macintosh and phone set up a pretty good combination war dialer/recorded message to bomb everyone in my local access range. How often does this happen? and what would happen to me if I did this? *There's* the key. You slap people's hand for this kinda thing. If I send a 200 meg binary file to a site once every 15 seconds for a couple of hours, I get in trouble. Easy. People talking about the future with computers always talk about ways to make things impossible for someone to do- this has never worked in the real world, and won't in the virual one. You just make it not worth doing. >I can think of certain malicious persons--and I expect more of them in >the future, not fewer--who would mount "denial of service" attacks on >sites they didn't like by turning the firehoses of data on them. See above- If I mount a denial of service attack on you via phone- tell my computer to call you once every 15 seconds, forever, how long would it take to get the cops to pay me a visit? About as long as it took you to find a phone that isn't tied up by me ;) >TANSTAAFL--There Ain't No Such Thing As A Free Link I still agree- Whoever ends up standing to profit from this ain't gonna give it way... >--Tim May

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Re: Economic assumptions
by fnerd＠smds.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric says- > I just read (after a reference by Duncan Frissell on this list) an > essay by Nobel-prize economist R. H. Coase. The essay is called "The > Nature of the Firm". I have it in a collection called _The Firm, the > Market, and the Law_, published by University of Chicago Press. ... > -- There is a cost to using the price mechanism. > -- Not all economic allocations use the price mechanism. > -- Firms exist because they have lower transaction costs than the market. There's a piece by Kevin Kelly called "Network Economics" in the latest Whole Earth Review, about how better communications tech and changed business practices lower transaction costs and (along with competition and the pace of things these days) are pushing down the optimum size of businesses. -fnerd quote me - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - `We want information.' `You won't get it!' `By hook or by crook, we will.' -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a aKxB8nktcBAeQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvt3niQCVAgUBLMs3K ui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2tPEot1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz 3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hSnC1R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG sRjLQs4iVVM= =9wqs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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