December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

THE H.E.A.T. IS ON
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, I'm so happy. I've found Acapulco H.E.A.T. in the New York area (18:00 Saturdays, channel 9). Time for another review. This week's episode, "Code Name: Archangel," had a couple of relevant privacy items, and it was a "no Fabio" zone, as well. Bikinis and gun battles were at a minimum, but those that were, were equally divided between the sexes. Anyway, a neo-Nazi (with a really baaad German accent) named "Steinholtz" planned to steal one of the da Vinci "archangel" panels which was being exhibited in Mexico. It was to be reunited in Germany with the three other panels. The idea was that this would be a symbol for the reunification of all the neo-Nazis, and would inaugurate the beginning of the Fourth Reich. A clandestine, world-wide, TV broadcast of the stolen panel would be used to unify the Nazis. There were also two subplots: one involving a Dutch Mata Hari type, and the other involving two of the H.E.A.T. members. ("Hey Tommy, I don' wan' jew dating my seester.") Anyway, since the bad guys use "antibugging devices," our heroes had to use hand-held through-the-wall mikes to listen in on their plans. Later, they were able to install a "sprinkler cam" right over the swastika covered table around which the plotters sat. (Curiously, the swastika they showed was a left-handed version of the actual Nazi one. No explanation given.) Our guys also had to scope out the church where the panel was being exhibited. There they found infrared heat/motion detectors which they foiled by wearing (heat conserving) wet suits. Hmmm. The panel was also protected by pressure sensitive mats and electronic eyes, but no guards! The last bit of technological chicanery came after the bad guys were captured. Using digital technology, the team spoofed the voice of Steinholtz and had him saying we should all live as brothers. Does was done as a voice-over to scenes from the Mexican festival of Santa Guadeloupe or some such. Gag. S a n d y PS The Stateside boss of H.E.A.T. is played by John Vernon who was "Dean Wormer" in Animal House. He only communicates with the team via encrypted videophone. It's obvious (due to some differences in dialog, pronunciation, etc.) that his scenes are not filmed at the same time or place as the rest of the show. In one episode, he kept referring to "M15" ("em fifteen") while the team talked about "MI5" ("em eye five"). ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Nuclear Weapons Material
by iqg1550＠acf4.NYU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Let's all rejoice at the birth of the latest member of The Horsemen of The Criminal Apocalypse -- The Nuclear Weapons Material Smuggler. I'm sure his four siblings will make plenty of room for their baby brother.

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any documents about crypto history online?
by Tomaz Borstnar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello! Are there any sources of crypto history on Internet (reachable via mail, ftp, www, etc)? Thanks in advance. Tomaz

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Re: In Search of Genuine DigiCash
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:36 PM 8/21/94 -0400, Jason W Solinsky wrote: >> Of >> course, the issuer could publish the prices based on the compounded >> interest accrued *for each certificate*, for the time period it's >> outstanding, possibly complete with the compounding factors for each >> compounding period used. (a day, a month, a year, or even continuous over >> the life of the instrument) Lot of overhead there, but mutual funds do it >> all the time. You'd want to just take their word for it, I suppose, and >> trust their price, right? > >OK, I see the problem. You are assuming that certificates will be issued >at a consistent set of notional values. (like ten bucks, five bucks ect.) >The correct way to do things [:-] is to set the notional value of new >certificates based on the trading value of old certificates. Suppose the >first certificate had a principal of $10 and is now worth $11, then the >new certificates that I issue will have their principal adjusted so that >including the effect of interest rates, my new certificate is worth as much >as your old certificate. Thus, there is only ONE value that needs to be >published at any given time. Open-end mutual funds do this now, every share is issued at a the price of a dollar. The problem comes when the value of the suspension pool (it's starting like water treatment plant) backing up that certificate increases. A digital cash operation is another open-ended mutual fund. If you don't price it in terms of something real, like a dollar, not in terms of itself, then you introduce an unnecessary level of complexity, not to mention regulatory gobbledegook, because that really is a scrip mechanism. I just think that it's easier all around to keep a constant notional value (a buck is a buck is a buck). Then to mess with a fluid pricing mechanism for something which is supposed to enhance convenience and liquidity in internet commerce. Let banks and governments worry about the relative prices between their currencies, and let that price be the price of e-cash for now. An e-cash issuer has to worry about his competition and the price of their cash. That's bad enough. Occam's razor, KISS principle, and all that. In theory, though it probably won't happen, an underwriter could issue a greater amount of digital cash than regular cash paid for it (e$1.00 for $0.95, for the sake of argument). The cash flow from the interest on the suspension account (due to long cash lifetimes on the net, for example) would be paying for operations, and profits, and a competitive market forces the underwriter to sell at a slight discount. See? This is exactly the way you price bonds. The case of zero interest digital cash is exactly like that of a zero-coupon bond. The ecash is then spent one or more times on the net at its "par" or face amount, and then the underwriter makes money or eats the difference when it is redeemed. > >Seting prices based on convenience instead of value derived? *BLECH*. That >sort of thing is anathema to free markets. There's probably the hoariest old saw in economics which says "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative." Convience *is* value derived. Market liquidity is convience (more like necessity, actually, certainly not anathema, but who's quibbling). Market liquidity is value derived. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Future NSA spy machine
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by ianf(a)simple.sydney.sgi.com ("Ian Farquhar") on Mon, 22 Aug 9:38 AM >You're talking about silicon fab lines here, Tim. As >far as I am aware, Cray has never fab it's own chips. >Indeed, most of their boards which I have seen (I, II, >Y-MP/8 and Y-MP/EL) have used chips sourced from fairly >well- known vendors, such as VLSI Technologies. > >The original series of systems (I, II and X-MP) >actually used huge numbers of three types of chips. >From memory, one was a couple of NAND gates, one was a >register chip, and the third was a couple of K of SRAM. > More recently, the full Y-MP's have been implemented >in commercial ECL gate arrays (6500 gates per chip for >the full Y-MP's), and the original EL used CMOS 100K >arrays. I have been trying to get one of the computing >industries choicest pieces of marketting junk: the >Cray Y-MP Gate Array paperweight. :) Of course, given >my recent career change, I don't think one will be >coming my way anytime soon for some strange >reason.... Ian, Not asking for state or trade "secrets" but: 1. Is MIPS new "supercomputer" R8000 in the running as array elements for super-supercomputers? 2. Who is in the offing to succeed Cray and others as NSA's grateful suppliers? 3. Will there be more on-base hardware and software production, a "circling of the wagons" as crypto becomes more public? 4. And, thus, an even sharper (and more secret and competitive) line between governmental and commercial crypto hardware and code? 5. Who is NSA (or other TLAs) underwriting as lesser known SRCs, not-for- or for-profit? This is an update on where the jobs are for the "finest mathematicians" other than TLAs. 6. Is NSA (like CIA and NRO) bifurcating into an even more super-supersecret arm and another friendly, public one in response to wider use of crypto and ostensible pressure from the likes of Senators Moynihan and Kerrey? (And the recent RSA to-dos, murder threat, PKP lawsuit, are ploys.) FYI, zero, hopefully minus, security clearance here. Cheers, John

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Notary signing
by nelson＠crynwr.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know of any legal problems with a party asserting that they have a notarized photocopy of certain id, representing that a third party is who they say they are? If I take someone's money, get a notarized copy of their id, and sign their PGP key, can I be sued? Obviously, I don't trust any non-lawyers to answer this question, but does anyone know of an encryption-aware lawyer to whom I could pay money for an opinion? -russ <nelson(a)crynwr.com> http://www.crynwr.com/crynwr/nelson.html Crynwr Software | Crynwr Software sells packet driver support | ask4 PGP key 11 Grant St. | +1 315 268 1925 (9201 FAX) | What is thee doing about it? Potsdam, NY 13676 | LPF member - ask me about the harm software patents do.

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Snore while they snoop
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by solman(a)MIT.EDU (Jason W Solinsky) on Mon, 22 Aug 1:42 AM Tim says: >> nothing that I've >> seen mitigates the 1984 aspects of Cox's ideas. You say: >I'm afraid I'm not familiar with the aspects of which >you speak. Has he proposed some sort of nightmarish >enforcement system? NY Times wrote yesterday on "metering" of software usage by soft and hard means. This type of monitoring could easily, Clipperly, "1984"-ishly, record and report on other activities of the user. Recall alarms here recently about covert features of operating systems. Harmless looking hard devices may hide even more monitoring features, steganographically (my bag). John

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Re: In Search of Genuine DigiCash
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:17 AM 8/22/94 -0400, Jason W Solinsky wrote: >A buck is NOT a buck. It keeps on going down in value. We should use the >introduction of digicash to finally create a monetary instrument that never >experiences positive inflation. It's important not to pile on too many features, desires, agendas onto a relatively simple financial instrument. The point of digital cash is to provide liquidity for internet commerce as cheaply as possible. Anonymity is a happy benefit. Engineering it for anyother purpose reduces its efficiency. >Incorporate in a foreign land, invest the >money safely, issue and buy back shares according to a fixed formula that >depends only on the valuation of the company, publish your returns and >register the stock as securities in as many lands as possible. You now >have a perfectly legal basis for digicash. The shares will float in the >range of values specified by the stock issuance formula. They will >gradually go up relative to inflation and will be easily traded in multiple >currencies. And it will be really difficult for most governments to attack >the "payable to bearer" nature of the currency because it would encroach on >the rights of all American corporations. No? Or, you can take money in over the window and turn it into digital cash denominated on a dollar basis, priced at that point with discounts or primia as necessary. Occam's razor. >> In theory, though it probably won't happen, an underwriter could issue a >> greater amount of digital cash than regular cash paid for it ... [snip...] > >This will once again make the value of the digicash dependent on when it was >issued. An alternative formulation of this same scheme would have the value >od digi-cash be invariant with the data of issue, but have periodic >redemption dates on which the value of the digi-cash would jump. I find >neither to be desireable. That's true, but the difference in price reflects the estimated future value of that money in a suspension account plus the operating costs of the underwriter, not by some complex pricing methodology which makes the cash more difficult to use. >Market liquidity is increased by convenience to the holder of the securities, >not the issuer of the securities. I cash out my "digiDollar" today, it's a dollar. I cash out my digiDollar tomorrow, it's a dollar. I cash out my digiDollar the next day, it's a dollar. Looks pretty simple to use to me. (a digiDollar is a dollar is a dollar is a dollar) :-). [Oops. I went and concocted some more buzzy language. Occupational hazard. Don't worry, I'll try not to use it anymore, and maybe it'll die gracefully.] Cheers, Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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pgp -c,no initialization vector, possible bug, pgp 26ui
by 0x7CF5048D＠nowhere 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In pgp 2.6 UI When pgp is called with the -c switch, the routine idea_encryptfile in crypto.c is called from main in pgp.c. > status = idea_encryptfile( workfile, tempf, attempt_compression); >int idea_encryptfile(char *infile, char *outfile, > boolean attempt_compression) >{ > FILE *f; /* input file */ > FILE *g; /* output file */ > byte ideakey[16]; > struct hashedpw *hpw; Note that idea key is a 16 bytes. Now idea_encryptfile calls squish_and_idea_file in crypto.c with this 16 byte key. > /* Now compress the plaintext and encrypt it with IDEA... */ > squish_and_idea_file( ideakey, f, g, attempt_compression ); Now squish_and_idea_file calls idea_file in the module crypto.c with the same 16 byte key. >static int squish_and_idea_file(byte *ideakey, FILE *f, FILE *g, > boolean attempt_compression) >{

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Re: Snore while they snoop
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:06 PM 8/22/94 -0400, John Young wrote: >NY Times wrote yesterday on "metering" of software usage by >soft and hard means. This type of monitoring could easily, >Clipperly, "1984"-ishly, record and report on other activities >of the user. Then there's this company called, I think, "Wave" Inc. out of Colorado somewhere. The first time I heard of it was in Peter Huber's Forbes column a year or so ago. The guy who's fronting it is a former chairman of a large defense contractor (United Technologies?). It involves metering application software use down to the second, using PC boards and the internet, or some other WAN equivalent. A dongle is forever... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: Voluntary Governments?
by cfrye＠mason1.gmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim - You forget Weber's definition of government, which I remember as "the institution with a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a geographical area". I may have substituted "violence" for "force", but that is the gist of his meaning. Unless a government has some means of coercing its more recalcitrant subjects, it can't function as a government in the sense we mean it here. Curt

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Re: Creating privacy crises: Society hacking
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> At the HOPE conference, there was someone selling CD-ROMs of the DMV > records for Oregon for $125. The same folks promise to add more states > soon: next in line is Texas. > Perhaps one could generate a privacy crisis by collecting that information > and conducting a mass mailing to every person in the database: "we have > this information on you. So could anybody with $125. Call your congress > critter and complain." Mailing that information to everybody in Oregon would be expensive. On the other hand, mailing it to everyone in the Oregon legislature, the governor, the DMV honchos, and maybe a few other high honchos could be interesting, and might not cost that much..... Bill

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CREDIT CARD PRIVACY
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Jim Hart wrote: Most customers want more privacy, but when you think about it, there is not a whole hell of a lot they can do about it right now. If they want to get the status and flexibility of a credit card, they need to give up their privacy.... At this point Duncan Frissel will regail us with some wonderful scheme, understandable only to lawyers, that can be used to get credit cards under aliases, perfectly legal if you use a doubly nested corporate structure going through Aruba and the Caymans,...I won't comment on why most consumers have neglected that option.... Well, I imagine that is because he doesn't have a clue what he is talking about. In our upcoming Privacy Seminar, Duncan and I will discuss trivially simple ways to do just the thing Mr. Hart tells us can't be done. And, as Duncan says, "it'll be as legal as church on Sunday." Tune in to the Privacy Channel, Jim, you might actually learn something. The Privacy Seminar will start approximately 1 September. An announcement giving instructions on how to sign up will be made sometime this week. Stay tuned. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ m ka;sld fas;dlkf a;sdkflkj as;dlf jasd;lkfj

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Re: Voluntary Governments?
by elton＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is probably not really relevant to cypherpunks, but I think it needs to be addressed. Jason Solinsky said: >Government has nothing to do with throwing people into prison or using >guns. It is an entity that exercises authority. Or an entity that enforces >laws. Er. No. Government has _everything_ to do with throwing people into prisons, _and_ with using guns. Further, "exercises authority" is a code phrase that means "throws people into prisons and uses guns." If you want a working definition of government, it would have to be "a group of people who have assumed to themselves the exclusive power to regulate and use coercive force within a set of established borders." ...And, given the USA vs. Manuel Noriega, the nature of the "established borders" becomes subject to flexible interpretation. It's not the case that any use of force defines a government. It _is_ the case that only government pretends to be the sole arbiter of who may use force, and how much they may use. If you inspect the matter carefully, without the threat of force there could be no government. Otherwise, how would they collect taxes and tarriffs? Moreover, they must declare themselves to be the only authorized users of force, or their "enforcement" (look carefully at that word) power will be limited in its effectiveness by the strength of the resistive force. Government depends for its existence on being the biggest gang with guns anywhere in the area. -- Elton

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Re: Creating privacy crises: Society hacking
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:54 PM 8/22/94 -0400, wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart) said, >Mailing that information to everybody in Oregon would be expensive. >On the other hand, mailing it to everyone in the Oregon legislature, >the governor, the DMV honchos, and maybe a few other high honchos >could be interesting, and might not cost that much..... Hey! Representative Democracy! What a concept.... Cheers, Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: In Search of Genuine DigiCash
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >I don't think any of us on this list is yet ready to present a plan to >real bankers. Eric Hughes has told me he agrees. Real bankers may be well ahead of everyone on this list. I'm told that Citibank has some very intriguing work pending at the patent office. It's for digital cash. -Peter Wayner

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Transcript
by fhalper＠pilot.njin.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there or will there be a transcript of the recent debate that Zimmerman was part of? Thanks, Reuben Halper

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Re: Voluntary Governments? (Not)
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<delete if this subject does not give you heart-thumping thrills> From: Elton Wildermuth It's not the case that any use of force defines a government. It _is_ the case that only government pretends to be the sole arbiter of who may use force, and how much they may use. ...................................................................... There must exist cause which would inspire the use of force by an individual, and there should exist just cause for the use of it by a government as well. Realistically there should be a recognition of when it might be logical to resort to violence against another human, whether as an individual or as a group. Only a government pretends to be the sole arbiter of who may use force; of course, everyone is supposed to have agreed on what justifies the use of it, but this is interpreted to mean that individuals themselves are not considered wise enough to make that decision at home alone. So they're back to a defense-less state against potentially overwhelming odds. Blanc

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Adam Smiths Money World
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

'Punksters, For those who missed it, the PBS show "Adam Smiths Money World" was on privacy in the information age. It spent alot of time demonstrating what was available on you if you knew where to look. It also profiled a company called "Kroll and Associates" that does big business doing Blacknet type dossiers on people and corporations. They apparently were able to trace more than 6 billion dollars of So-damm-Insanes secret bank accounts. This company supposedly does U.S. 50 mil a year in business. They also talked about the possibility of "reputation" companies reresenting your privacy interests. The big point was that privacy is drastically decreasing, and that privacy protection was a big growth industry. The unrestrained capitalism approach to the whole thing was very refreshing. Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced communication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham "Have you ever had your phones tapped by the government? YOU WILL and the company that'll bring it to you.... AT&T" --James Speth

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RE; creating privacy crises
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Want to launch a privacy crisis? Try anonymously posting a few adoption records! I've always thought this was an interesting area, information about the real you being kept from you. I won't start a diagression flame fest by going on about "adoption horror stories" ( Hmmm, interesting book idea there!) Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced communication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham "Have you ever had your phones tapped by the government? YOU WILL and the company that'll bring it to you.... AT&T" --James Speth

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Cracking passwords and picking locks
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

cactus(a)bibliob.slip.netcom.com (L. Todd Masco): >>Data crime - 'cracking', 'phreaking' etc usually reflect a total lack of >>responsibility on the part of _administrators_. "Officer, I left my wallet >>on the kerb 10 minutes ago, and now it's gone!" > >This sounds like typical kiddie-cracker garbage. It's more like, "Officer, > I didn't know that master locks could be picked with the greatest of ease: > arrest that man who picked it and took my wallet." >[encryption is more complex than master locks etc] I suppose it's obvious that I was not talking about the present, but future information society, a world where digital signatures and encryption are as familiar as combination locks and safes are today. I think it would be reasonable to assume a fair degree of knowledge on security on the part of system administrators - if by that time it's not widely known that plaintext or simple protection (un-shadowed passwords etc) can, like master locks, be 'picked with ease,' then all our efforts towards greater awareness of privacy and security would have failed. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Re: stealth
by DrayCoN 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tnx for the file. Haven't tried it tho. Btw, how do you use that anon mailer? -- I'm me, you're you. <dcn(a)ripco.com> Finger for PGP key

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EPIC Statement on FBI Wiretap Bill
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

*DISTRIBUTE WIDELY* EPIC Statement on Digital Telephony Wiretap Bill The digital telephony bill recently introduced in Congress is the culmination of a process that began more than two years ago, when the Federal Bureau of Investigation first sought legislation to ensure its ability to conduct electronic surveillance through mandated design changes in the nation's information infrastructure. We have monitored that process closely and have scrutinized the FBI's claims that remedial legislation is necessary. We have sponsored conferences at which the need for legislation was debated with the participation of the law enforcement community, the telecommunications industry and privacy advocates. We have sought the disclosure of all relevant information through a series of requests under the Freedom of Information Act. Having thus examined the issue, EPIC remains unconvinced of the necessity or advisability of the pending bill. As a threshold matter, we do not believe that a compelling case has been made that new communications technologies hamper the ability of law enforcement agencies to execute court orders for electronic surveillance. For more than two years, we have sought the public disclosure of any FBI records that might document such a problem. To date, no such documentation has been released. Without public scrutiny of factual information on the nature and extent of the alleged technological impediments to surveillance, the FBI's claims remain anecdotal and speculative. Indeed, the telecommunications industry has consistently maintained that it is unaware of any instances in which a communications carrier has been unable to comply with law enforcement's requirements. Under these circumstances, the nation should not embark upon a costly and potentially dangerous re-design of its telecommunications network solely to protect the viability of fewer than 1000 annual surveillances against wholly speculative impediments. We also believe that the proposed legislation would establish a dangerous precedent for the future. While the FBI claims that the legislation would not enhance its surveillance powers beyond those contained in existing law, the pending bill represents a fundamental change in the law's approach to electronic surveillance and police powers generally. The legislation would, for the first time, mandate that our means of communications must be designed to facilitate government interception. While we as a society have always recognized law enforcement's need to obtain investigative information upon presentation of a judicial warrant, we have never accepted the notion that the success of such a search must be guaranteed. By mandating the success of police searches through the re-design of the telephone network, the proposed legislation breaks troubling new ground. The principle underlying the bill could easily be applied to all emerging information technologies and be incorporated into the design of the National Information Infrastructure. It could also lead to the prohibition of encryption techniques other than government-designed "key escrow" or "Clipper" type systems. In short, EPIC believes that the proposed digital telephony bill raises substantial civil liberties and privacy concerns. The present need for the legislation has not been established and its future implications are frightening. We therefore call upon all concerned individuals and organizations to express their views on the legislation to their Congressional representatives. We also urge you to contact Rep. Jack Brooks, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, to share your opinions: Rep. Jack Brooks Chair, House Judiciary Committee 2138 Rayburn House Office Bldg. Washington, DC 20515 (202) 225-3951 (voice) (202) 225-1958 (fax) The bill number is H.R. 4922 in the House and S. 2375 in the Senate. It can be referred to as the "FBI Wiretap Bill" in correspondence. Electronic Privacy Information Center 666 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E. Suite 301 Washington, DC 20003 (202) 544-9240 (voice) (202) 547-5482 (fax) <info(a)epic.org> EPIC is a project of the Fund for Constitutional Government and Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. =======================================================================

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New StegoInfo Page on WWW
by machado＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fellow C'punx, Those of you with WWW access might wish to check out my new StegoInfo Page at: http://www.nitv.net/~mech/Romana/stego.html Enjoy. Romana Machado romana(a)apple.com WWW: page under construction To each, according to his greed; from each, according to his gullibility.

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Re: Mail to all drivers in Oregon?
by Pierre Uszynski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Greg Broiles writes: > > Probably more than any of us want to pony up. [...] > > you're still talking about a $216,000 mailing. Pick a smallish city (but one that's "on the map" for whatever reason, university, companies, whatever), and target everyone in the city. At the same time similarly target a number of journalists in the national media. Send to all of these all the data you can find about themselves. This way you minimize the expense, and you get the national media to amplify this and make sure everybody in the country knows about the event. Jeffrey Rothfeder did it with one such journalist (Dan Rather) if I remember around 1989 (story in Business week, Sept 1989). And reuses all this stuff for the book "Privacy for sale", 1992). But he did it on a small scale, just for a story, and a story that he could put his name on. As opposed to what we are talking about here. Pierre. pierre(a)shell.portal.com

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