December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Black Eye for NSA, NIST, and Denning
by sidney＠taurus.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DEADBEAT <na5877(a)anon.penet.fi> says: >If one's objective is to use SKIPJACK but to defeat key >escrow, pre-encryption is easier, conceptually simpler, and may be more >secure Right now, you need to arrange things with another party if you are going to have secure communication. If Clipper catches on the way the government wants, you may be able to assume that someone you want to contact has an encryption device compatible with yours. If Blaze's hack can be used by the initiator of a communication to defeat key escrow without the cooperation or knowledge of the other person, then Clipper will have made it more difficult for law inforcement, since then criminals and other people with privacy concerns will be able to have secure communication with people who are not part of their pre-arranged secure communications system. That, the defeat of traffic analysis, and the avoidance of the attention one could draw by using non-LEAFed encrypted traffic, are the advantages of Blaze's result. -- sidney <sidney(a)taurus.apple.com>

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A black eye for whom?
by paul＠hawksbill.sprintmrn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Fri, 3 Jun 1994 21:48:53 UTC an5877(a)anon.penet.fi (deadbeat) wrote - > I won't ask why the big deal is being made about all of this -- the > agenda surrounding Clipper and friends is clearly a political one, not > a technical one, so it is no surprise to hear even the technical voices, > i.e., this list, trumpeting Blaze's paper as though it were a dagger in > the heart of SKIPJACK. But let's all acknowledge the technical weight > and importance of Blaze's result for what it is: minuscule. Bullshit. _Any_ pitfall in key escrow system or the Clipper technology itself is far from "miniscule." _______________________________________________________________________________ Paul Ferguson US Sprint Enterprise Internet Engineering tel: 703.904.2437 Herndon, Virginia USA internet: paul(a)hawk.sprintmrn.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLe+x15RLcZSdHMBNAQFgCAQAs6HdAdxs6wVnv2ScKd5cR9jVdz+rVyNn gceOqi/BaOq8utu2lIPvO74qvMufCTycVBrSBPzFIZzfdzGKcwhmKIikpHMCy3f3 II1iM++P6+3HLzVGJUrTca7qMVS8H6fyPda7IufmYDOjqy8KEFfwwkoCXrnTBNY0 VHPYg2HYd3Y= =yI2v -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAiuk0/8AAAEEALqlLc+x9lmgiJCRSpu/aPhQdi0hMjwiGlN2B/GJQqgZPhTb pR+u5/blGogqT+WwcXZ2XfEdIV19FrJY4BXGGn4+4TjdVN3XuuCHuueoygBAmOQD IloU6SJuDqJa0kFA5X/i/1ELn86I5+8A4Hx88FiYJIVUBR6SApRLcZSdHMBNAAUR tCdQYXVsIEZlcmd1c29uIDxwYXVsQGhhd2suc3ByaW50bXJuLmNvbT60JVBhdWwg RmVyZ3Vzb24gPGZlcmd1c29uQGljbTEuaWNwLm5ldD4= =rtcO -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Rperkins remailer
by rperkins＠amtsgi.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just a note to let you know that the rperkins remailer is back in business. This is available via: rperkins(a)nyx.cs.du.edu rperkins(a)nox.cs.du.edu rperkins(a)nyx10.cs.du.edu Sorry it was down for so long, but I lost net connections for a while. I'm still not back on the list, but for those who don't know me, I used to be known as ub075(a)freenet.victoria.bc.ca. Have fun.

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Black eyes heal
by baum＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Its important to realize what was really gained by this revelation- - some PR value - several months before fixed Clipper/Tessara chips become available I have no doubts that the problem that was revealed will be corrected. I'm not sure it was a good idea to reveal the weakness. Imagine how much worse it would be (in terms of PR) if lots of phones had been deployed before the flaw was found? On the other hand, it's possible the weakness was known and would have been (is being) corrected quietly. So, there is a small window in which to take advantage of the PR, and the delay in revised chip availablility. Unless there are some major defections in Congressional support because of this, I don't think much will change; Clipper will become a reality. A competing product could devastate it- yes, government subsidies & requirements might form the nucleus of support, but having to deal with NSA restrictions and sole sourcing of the chip makes it a real, expensive pain to turn it into a product. I don't think the revision will be completely trivial, either. The way these chips are built means a much more extensive verification process must be used- not just reburning a PROM. A standard micro and a standard encryption chip on the side (don't have the references here, but at HotChips there will be a paper on a 100kbit/sec Single Chip Modular Exponentiation Processor from Holger Orup of Aarhus Univ. Denmark) could make a viable, competing product. Note that I'm not volunteering or suggesting that one of you should go out and implement my great idea- just making predictions. ************************************************** * Allen J. Baum tel. (408)974-3385 * * Apple Computer, MS/305-3B * * 1 Infinite Loop * * Cupertino, CA 95014 baum(a)apple.com * **************************************************

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RE:LEAF forgery
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Perry responding to one of the points I made Said: >VACCINIA(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu says: >> How true, yet the NSA also had a lot to lose by putting out a flawed >> backdoor in Skipjack which essentially negates much of this features (LEAF) >> value. They did so none the less. >All the evidence is that it was an accident. You contend, without >evidence or even a rational reason, that they did it intentionally. I do not contend this, I contend they were negligent in checking their work. That they were lax in their standards and that this lackadaisical attitude bespeakes arrogance. An arrogance that would allow them to think that they COULD put in a trapdoor (besides the LEAF) in Skipjack and easily get away with it. >I'm not a conspiracy theorist. I operate on evidence and the >assumption that people behave in their self interest. NSA had nothing >to gain by sabotaging their own efforts in this manner. Even if they >had another back door it is worth their while to make the public back >door as good as possible. The notion that they would have done it >badly intentionally for no reason when doing it well would be easy is >at the very least without evidence or even rational suspicion. > >What would they possibly have to gain via such an act? It would be in the NSA's self interest to have there own little door into Skipjack, wouldn't you say? Especially when the agency is quite satisfied that no one knows their algorithm. I don't see the evidence you are operating on, but will grant you the self interest part I mentioned above. >> In addition, it is possible that the agency is not alarmed about their LEAF >> problems because they don't need to use it. >They may be able redesign the system before widespread deployment. >Its also in their interest to play mistakes down. How do YOU know they >aren't really embarassed? Well, they did say so. But, I did agree with the play down mistakes position in the last post. Vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLe/ZTT2paOMjHHAhAQHOCgP+MPt5QxnQF/2rbPpFWZi8t6iTb+6x45OF sHoC7nZ/yLBjMpn8SdR4Jzf36m2yndQcVVBPAVkfMOAJ0V+mAZcrCqH+jrZWuX55 4Z1/A3fkuFmIp3/7irGnQENQ4PBcWZb7gSihPk4Ytc4EjTKdIDc9U6T5xtx+FbT2 /+7D259kgLE= =WPJQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Pedophiles in Cyberspace
by peb＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I agree with Perry's assessment, and would like to summarize the conclusion of the article since it is about the blurring of national boundaries and lack of control by authority: It is expressed that pedophiles who can communicate with like-minded people anywhere in the world (where laws against it do not exist) will get the impression that they are normal, okay people who live under an unjust state. Additionally, it is mentioned that unsupervised (i.e., no psychiatrist present) discussion between pedophiles will also reinforce their predilections. Unfortunately, the article does not mention how the blurring of national boundaries and uncontrolled (polically incorrect, etc.) conversations would also be beneficial. Perhaps the real upshot of the article is "May you live in interesting times". Paul E. Baclace peb(a)netcom.com

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Re: to The Atlantic
by peb＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The NSA has not admitted that it can break DES, but there is plenty of evidence that 0.01% of its budget would be enough to build a machine to break it. Paul E. Baclace peb(a)netcom.com

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No Subject
by bbrown＠coos.dartmouth.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I posted about the NSA being human on ISCA. This was a response I got from Milamber. I have a close relative who is a cryptologist for the NSA. He knows much about skipjack. he couldn't/wouldn't tell me much, of course, mainly because the last word I use to describe him is 'human'... he's more 'asshole'... but he said the last thing he'd trust is skipjack/clipper... he says that the CIA/FBI/NSA/ATF will almost assuradly _NOT_ violate the escrow rules (in other words, they _will_ get a warrant for the key halves_) however, he also said that there are so many back doors that they don't need them. He also said that they are expecting people to find about 60% of these doors, and they will correct them when found (so they have a deck of aces up thier sleves) Damn people. However, he wasn't directly involved in the clipper shit, but he does have high clearance. But he's an asshole, like I said. NSA people, as a generalization, usually are. He'd turn _me_ in if he knew I hacked. Entropy. Artimage.-

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[ANON} War in rec.guns
by anonymous＠extropia.wimsey.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- {{Reply-To: john.nieder(a)tigerteam.org}} -=> Quoting Royce(a)ug.eds.com to All <=- Ro> Um..not to encourage more of your ranting, but you published email Ro> from the r.g moderator. The post was a message in which the moderator admitted to killing my pro-anon messages to the group. THAT's why I cross-posted it. Ro> You may not remember McCarthy's "I have here a list of 157 Ro> communists...", but this argument sounds a lot like it. The moderator did not post pro-anon messages I received Cc:s of. Period. After I started raising hell and mentioning specific messages, they showed up - after "closure," of course. Some never showed. Ro> You claimed this, and the other posters who were "censored" were free Ro> to post here as proof. No one but you seems to be doing this. Probably they care even less than I do at this point. Still, I stand by what I said, as some the messages started showing up _after_ I made the accusation. Ro> The points you made were not relevant to the discussion. You weren't Ro> paying attention when I explained why the first time. Once and for all - my points; refute them or shut up: 1: "Real" accounts are easily simulated/spoofed. Therefore, a "real accounts only" policy gives no protection whatever from whatever it is that the moderator and rec.guns regulars feared so much from remailed posts. 2: Remailed posts are not always anonymous. Some users (myself included) use remailers non-anonymously because our normal systems do not have as much flexibility, particularly with headers [Cc:, Bcc:, Reference:, etc] as some remailers provide. This is especially true for users of BBS systems and other store-and-forward arrangements. Such posts, even with sigs, CLEARSIGN, and Reply-To: fields were being killed when sent to rec.guns, simply because they came through remailers. This was unreasonable. Jacob Vetleson in particular claimed to have posted many, many tech posts and articles that were killed because they went through a remailer. 3: Some participants on gun forums are uncomfortable using their regular accounts, especially when posting from their business sites, because of employer prejudice against firearms, and desire some degree of anonymity - even the trivial anonymity provided by the simple, unencrypted remailers - to protect their jobs. I also know a _lot_ of single women who do not like to post on _any_ newsgroup because they fear harassment at their jobsites stemming from some weirdo tracking them from their mail address. There are plenty of other reasons to use anonymous remailers. You may think they're stupid, I may think they're stupid, but that's none of our business. The measures one takes for his own defense and privacy are his own affair and his own responsibility, whether this means getting a house gun or using a remailer for his messaging. It's not for me or you to judge. 4: Someone (was it you?) smugly said that remailers were no good anyway, because of other measures available for defeating them, specifically traffic analysis. I posted a message explaining at some length the exhaustive countermeasures some of the more sophisticated remailers (and remailer users) incorporate to defeat traffic analysis. I didn't hear another peep about _that_ subject. 5: The remailers are the brainchildren of extremely pro-RTKBA net activists. Ignorantly banning remailer use was pointlessly antagonistic toward several very powerful, active and well-financed allies. 6: Numerous people simply hated remailed posts "on principle." My answer to that was basically, "So what?" I hated all the inane newbie crap that got posed on rec.guns asking the same _stupid_ questions ten or twelve times a week, usually how best to violate 922(r) or render an otherwise good weapon worthless through brainless modifications, etc.. etc., etc. You know what I do when I see posts I don't like or that offend my sensibilities? I scroll through them. I killfile the author. I don't bother to read them. These are perfect solutions for those who have irrational aversions to anon posts. Look into them. Ro> Answer this: Does every newsreader have a killfile option? Every setup I have used (six or seven, I think) has _some_ provision for twitting, filtering or killfiling. If yours doesn't, you might want to look into a change, especially if other peoples' posts bother you so much. Having whole classes of posts censored from a newsgroup seems an awfully inefficient way of setting up a twitfile...but that's exactly what you are, in essence, advocating. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLe8FnBAm8ppE4nk3AQFD2gP/c17bmgM2JLQDXi9GJapxDYDmjW2KqapH eaFMuxNxX0KBt34jZ1gDDnlM/WpzNN95HH0SLNZbcUF89yZ4bVgR1+cHlzXNi7pi tS8ioYY27B85MXLczfpuTa6/Pi/nhAIhg4dakywAz207sRuQJEXwat6dC8rO0gY7 zJayx7AvNy0= =3pDl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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An Invitation..
by bm189＠cleveland.Freenet.Edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ladies and Gentlemen: You might think at the initial glance; "The Gaul!". However, quite seriously, some of the esteemed members of this community might consider the following announcement more in depth. We invite you -- sincerely to join us in Hawaii, for PNC - People, Networks & Communication '94. Our very best. --------------- Enclosure:- ############################# Advance Release ############################# TITLE: " PNC - People, Networks & Communication '94 " THEME: " Turning 21 - A Journey to Maturity " TOPIC: The Emergence of Application, Information Technology & Policy for the 21st Century. HOST CITY: Honolulu; Island of Oahu - " The Gathering Place ", Hawaii. VENUE: Mid-Pacific Conference Center, Hilton Hawaiian Village Resort. DATES: October 11 - 14, 1994. Sponsored by The Pacific Network Consortium Limited. ############################# Advance Release ############################# The Pacific Network Consortium Ltd., an EMERGING Not-for-Profit Regional Network Services Provider, invites you to enjoy our hospitality and join us in Hawaii for PNC - People, Networks and Communication '94. PNC '94 will facilitate a close exploration to the Building of the Information Super-Highway and examine the essential ingredients to one - being a member among a larger, responsible and informed participating citizenry within a Global Informatic Society. This Conference will lay focus to the various concerns as it relates to participation, management, policy, operations, security and factors of collaboration within and through the NII-National Information Infrastructure; here in the United States and the similar structures in forming - elsewhere in the World. A TASTE of subject areas that will be featured.... O- What will NII mean to me? O- When will it really be here? O- Who will fund the NII? O- Who will be the large stakeholders? O- What role will & must the Government have in developing the NII? O- What does NII mean in terms of Global Citizenry, Fueling Competitiveness in Industry and Education? O- How must the Educational culture evolve to practically react with existing and emerging informatic technology? O- What are some of the problems associated with the youthfulness in the deployment of Networked Information Systems and their use? O- What are the driving forces behind the large scale proliferation of information systems? O- What are the benefits of Networking and Inter-Networking? O- How can companies benefit from connectivity to Global Networks? O- What is the promise of an Electronic Government? O- What is Community Computing; is it an EQUALIZING force for citizenry within the NII? ( MYTH & REALITY ) O- How will information services be structured in the 21st Century? O- How will public libraries of the 21st Century service their patrons? O- What is the need for Law & Order on the Information Super-Highway? O- Who & What, will govern the authenticity of information? Confirmed Speakers who have agreed to present as of 04/12/1994. ________________________________________________________________________ Ms. Gale Warshawsky - Co-ordinator for Computer Security Education & Awareness - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL); Computer Security Awareness Outreach Program for Children. Mr. Charlie Atterbury - Ret., Dir.: Information, Computer & Network Security; The Eastman Kodak Company. Dr. Vinton G. Cerf - Senior Vice-President; Data Architecture, MCI. Dr. William Washburn - Executive Director; CIX - The Commercial Internet EXchange. Mr. Thomas Kappock - Vice-Chairman; Bancorp Hawaii, Inc. Bancorp Hawaii, Inc., is the largest Financial Institution in the PACIFIC Region with Assets exceeding U.S $12.5 Billion. Ms. Linda Delzeit - Administrator; Academy One Educational Network, NPTN - National Public Telecomputing Network. Mr. H. Leonard Fisher - Ret. Manager; Specialized Libraries of LLNL and Senior Adjunct Professor of Telecomunications Management; School of Technology & Industry, Golden Gate University. Mr. Scott Charney, Esq. - United States Attorney-in-Charge; Computer Crime Unit, United States Department of Justice. Dr. Thomas Saka - Information Specialist; State of Hawaii - Department of Education: IRM - Information Resource Management Division. Dr. Hank Becker - College of Education, University of California at Irvine. Mr. Christopher Baker - Consultant; IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency, Network & Systems Administration: DEP - Department of Educational Programs, Argonne National Laboratory. Mr. Michael Higgins - Chief; Office of Counter Measures, DISA - Defense Information Systems Agency. Ms. Gail Thackeray, Esq. - Special Prosecutor; Maricopa County Prosecutor's Office & The Organized Crime Division; Phoenix, Arizona. Mr. James Lewis - Liaison Officer; NIIT - The National Information Infrastructure Testbed Consortia. Mr. Bruce Nelson - Novell Inc. Mr. Dain Gary - Administration: CERT/CC - The Computer Emergency Response Task-force Co-ordinating Center, Carnegie Mellon University. Dr. Richard Smith - Director of Instructional Technology, Huston Independent School District; Huston, Texas. Mr. Walter Pioli - Director; National Network Services, GTE. Mr. William Cook Esq. - Villian, Brinks, Olds, Hofer, Gilson & Lione. (Mr. Cook is a former United States Attorney; now practicing in the area of Information technology and evolving policies within, and associated with, the NII - National Information Infrastructure. Ms. Bonnie Bracey - Member: United States Presidential Advisory Council for the development of the National Information Infrastructure. CONFERENCE REGISTRATION TEMPLATE: ___________________________________ Dr./Mr./Mrs./Ms./Miss: __________________________________________________ Preferred Name on Name Tag: _____________________________________________ Organization Name: ______________________________________________________ Postal Address (Line 1): ________________________________________________ Postal Address (Line 2): ________________________________________________ Province/State: _________________________________________________________ Country & Postal/Zip Code: ______________________________________________ Title: __________________________________________________________________ Telephone & Telecopier Numbers: _________________________________________ Electronic Mail Address: ________________________________________________ Form of Payment: [ ] CHEQUE [ ] BANK DRAFT [ ] MONEY ORDER. Please issue your Cheque, Bank Draft or Money Order - payable to: The Pacific Network Consortium Ltd. ___________________________________ Please send your Payment; together with your Registration Template to: The Pacific Network Consortium Ltd. Suite 814 415 Nahua Street Honolulu, Hawaii 96815. United States of America. ------------------------- ############################################################################# ADVANCE REGISTRATION FEES: (MUST be received - on, or before August 5, 1994) _______________________________ FULL CONFERENCE - 3 1/2 Days. GENERAL ADMISSION. : $ 690.00 Members of Non-Profit & Educational Organizations. : $ 490.00 Members of the K-12 Community - for K-12 DAY ONLY. : $ 150.00 (October 12, 1994) Students. (FULL 3 1/2 DAYS) : $ 70.00 Student CONFERENCE FEES PER DAY. : $ 20.00 -- SEE below, for special conditions -- LATE REGISTRATION FEES: (after August 5, 1994) _____________________________ FULL CONFERENCE - 3 1/2 Days. GENERAL ADMISSION. : $ 890.00 Members of Non-Profit & Educational Organizations. : $ 790.00 Members of the K-12 Community - for K-12 DAY ONLY. : $ 250.00 (October 12, 1994) Students. (FULL 3 1/2 DAYS) : $ 70.00 Student CONFERENCE FEES PER DAY. : $ 20.00 -- SEE below, for special conditions -- Please NOTE special conditions: _______________________________ FOOD & BEVERAGE SERVICES: _________________________ 1) Food and Beverage services within the conference sessions will be available to those attendees from categories of General Admission and Members of Non-Profit and Educational Organizations. Members of the K-12 Schools Community who will be attending the Conference - on the K-12 Day (October 12, 1994) ONLY, will also be extended Food and Beverage services within the conference sessions. 2) Student fees DO NOT include Food and Beverage Services. TOURS & EXTERNAL FUNCTIONS: ___________________________ External Tours and Function fees are NOT included in ALL categories of conference fees. ############################################################################# Accomodations: ______________ For your convenience - The Pacific Network Consortium Ltd., have made available, through special arrangements with HILTON HOTELS; quality and spacious accomodations. The Hilton Hawaiian Village is the largest hotel property on the Island. The Hilton Hawaiian Village sports fine accomodations within our Island Paradise, at a GREAT value. To receive the Special Rate Extension, Please call 1-800-445-8667 & REFER to: "PNC - People, Networks & Communications '94 ". The rates are as follows: PNC '94 Hotel Rates: Current Hotel Rates: Garden View $ 140.00 + Tax $ 225.00 Partial Ocean View $ 155.00 + Tax $ 250.00 Ocean View $ 170.00 + Tax $ 275.00 ############################################################################# Travel. _______ United Airlines has been chosen as the OFFICIAL CARRIER for " PNC - People, Networks & Communication '94. United Airlines, is pleased to offer a 5% discount off the LOWEST applicable fare, including 1st (FIRST) class, or 10% Discount off the UNRESTRICTED BUA COACH fare; through a special arrangement with The Pacific Network Consortium Ltd., Help support PNC - People, Networks & Communications '94. Secure your reservations with United Airlines; offering you the MOST in convenience & flexibility with the LARGEST number of seats (5100) PER DAY to HONOLULU. To obtain the best fares or schedule Inform- ation, please call UNITED AIRLINES Specialized Meeting Reservation Center at 1-800-521-4041. Reservation Specialists are on duty 7 days a week, from 7:00 A.m. to 10:00 P.m., Eastern Time (U.S.) It is a general fact that there exists from time to time, " AIR FARE WARS " between many of the Airlines in these United States. United Airlines stands ready, to offer competitive rates to Hawaii as a Value Destination. So, please enquire about these value fares -- before you book your reservation. Please be sure to REFERRENCE I.D. number " 548NY " to receive MUCH REDUCED fare considerations. As a UNITED Meeting Attendee, You WILL also qualify for special discounts on HERTZ Rental Cars. Mileage Plus members will receive FULL credit for all miles flown to HONOLULU. For your convenience, United will mail your tickets or you can pick up your tickets at your travel agent's desk or an United Airlines ticket office. ############################################################################# Contact Information: PNC - People, Networks & Communication '94 __________________________________________ Conference Chairman: Dr. Ernest Kho, Jr. Chairman - Department of Chemistry, University of Hawaii - Hilo. Telephone: 808.933.3383 Telecopier: 808.933.3693 E.mail: ekho(a)uhunix.uhcc.hawaii.edu Conference Coordinator: Mr. Robert Mathews. Chairman - Steering Committee, The Pacific Network Consortium Ltd. Telephone & Telecopier: 808.921.2097 E.mail: bm189(a)po.cwru.edu * Larger Conference details, Tour and External Function Information will * * be released in the days to follow * ##############################################################################

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Though the war is not over, this battle is ours!
by Vincent.Cate＠FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DEADBEAT: >I won't ask why the big deal is being made about all of this -- the >agenda surrounding Clipper and friends is clearly a political one, not >a technical one, so it is no surprise to hear even the technical voices, >i.e., this list, trumpeting Blaze's paper as though it were a dagger in >the heart of SKIPJACK. But let's all acknowledge the technical weight >and importance of Blaze's result for what it is: minuscule. It is just a battle victory, and the war is not over, but the advantage is now ours. If today they forced everyone to use Clipper chips, we could now do so and still not let the government tap in. If some company wants to use government subsidized hardware to have very high speed encryption, they could do so with security. As Adam/Hall said, Blaze's work is better than pre-encryption in that the government can not even get unit IDs. As Perry said, you can interoperate with someone who isn't attempting to avoid escrow. This flaw, along with the recent DSS flaw, undermine the confidence people had in the NSA. This will slow down Clipper. In terms of controlling encryption in general, the government train has been switched onto a dead-end track. If they decide to go back through the standards acceptance again, it could be a long time before there are products. The rest of the industry will not wait - PGP etc are moving along rapidly. So the government position is either live with a flawed chip, or go back for a probably fatal delay. Either way, they loose. It is a big deal, and we do have cause to party!!!!! :-) -- Vince (PS I have to wonder if this was just flame-bate.)

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MAKE DIGITAL MONEY FAST!!!
by cdodhner＠indirect.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Wanted: Cypherpunk with a little spare time and a lot of reliability, a reputation I trust, and experience with the Pr0duct Cypher Magic money client program, to split digital proffits with me on a 75%-25% basis (ie: you keep 75% of the digicash!) Please reply promptly via email only. Happy Hunting, -Chris ______________________________________________________________________________ Christian Douglas Odhner | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry cdodhner @ indirect.com | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!" cypherpunks WOw dCD Traskcom Team Stupid Key fingerprint = 58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38 82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ A government mandante for key-escrow encryption in all communication devices would be the information-age equivalent of the government requiring private citizens to quarter troups in their home. --David Murray PGP NSA ViaCrypt Phrack EFF #hack LOD/H 950 FBI MindVox ESN KC NUA murder QSD Hacker DEFCON SprintNet MCI AT&T HoHoCon DNIC TRW CBI 5ESS KGB CIA RSA Communist terrorist assassin encrypt 2600 NORAD missile explosive hack phreak pirate drug bomb cocain payment smuggle A.P. bullets semi-auto stinger revolution H.E.A.T. warheads porno kiddiesex export import customs deviant bribe corrupt White House senator congressman president Clinton Gore bootleg assasinate target ransom secret bluprints prototype microfilm agents mole mafia hashish everclear vodka TnaOtmSc Sony marijuana pot acid DMT Nixon yeltsin bosnia zimmerman crack knight-lightning craig neidorf lex luthor kennedy pentagon C2 cheyenne cbx telnet tymenet marcus hess benson & hedges kuwait saddam leader death-threat overlords police hitler furer karl marx mark tabas agrajag king blotto blue archer eba the dragyn unknown soldier catch-22 phoenix project biotech genetic virus clone ELINT intercept diplomat explosives el salvador m-16 columbia cartel -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLfAvLeKc9MdneB1xAQGtjAQAqTYEpiDau95tCM+kKiEUqX2JVbUgHqvb nCGKy/ZcSraiawao7JnHns6BcJ+p0r9xNYEODJO5u1+NpFPLgD+iIpqKXeiY4h9g 7EYrpNdpcM07d49fM1NUk/snXmvFBiKgKbrKyfJJOm7XZDZGTfMZNxikoCUMtTf7 E4gNvfqhR8U= =ex0S -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Software upgrades to my anonymous remailer ghio@kaiwan.com
by Matthew Ghio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I added PGP support to my remailer. For those not familiar with the format, send mail to ghio(a)kaiwan.com, and on the first two lines of the message body, put: :: Encrypted: PGP Then put the PGP encrypted message here. Inside the PGP message, put: :: Anon-To: <address@site> ## Subject: whatever Reply-To: or any other headers that you want to add to the message The message body of the message to be remailed goes here. The remailer now also supports a way to truncate the message. This will allow you to remove your signature. Put a header Cutmarks: in your message with what you want to use as a truncate line. For example: To: ghio(a)kaiwan.com Subject: Anonymous Mail :: Request-Remailing-To: address@site Cutmarks: -truncate_here- this is a message all of this text will get remailed. -truncate_here- this text will not be included in the remailed message. You can also use the cutmarks feature as a boundry between seperate messages. To use it in this manner, you must put a :: and remailing instructions immediately following the cutmarks. For example: To: ghio(a)kaiwan.com :: X-Anonymously-To: joe(a)nowhere.edu Cutmarks:-+-next-+- ## Subject: hi joe this is some anonymous mail -+-next-+- :: X-Anon-To: beth(a)somewhere.edu Cutmarks: [END] ## Subject: Hi, Beth look this is anonymous! :) [END] - Here is my .sig which will get removed - Additional notes & common problems: The :: must go on the very first line of the message, or immediately after the seperator/cutmarks. The :: is for commands/headers that you want to give to the remailer software. Anything that can be put following the :: can also be put in the regular headers. The ## is for headers that you want to appear in the output message. When you use PGP, all the original headers get deleted, so you must put the Subject inside the PGP message if you want one. Messages seperated by cutmarks are treated as seperate mail messages. Each must have its own cutmarks header if you want to use cutmarks in the next message. Only one recipient may be specified per message. This may be inconvienient, but it was necessary to prevent Detweiler exponentiation. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCKAi3vhFUAAAED6KSE5JwFAstBYAUEASfQCEr1wA+1YsWZl7nlNBA8Xq4YSwlg eLCy9oiTDisxsxxxcbQdMtBTFcgQ2GVq7NhhjCEQkRzFRzPOG87T+0aUSufqD2RC PYnwacPDpiTUe/TobHMs/Ov+yDuji0bIacveflubU8DvHLjHgI58Jgk1AAURtCRB bm9ueW1vdXMgUmVtYWlsZXIgPGdoaW9Aa2Fpd2FuLmNvbT4= =v5cv -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Let me know if you have any questions/problems.

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Black Eye for NSA, NIST, and Denning
by an5877＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mr. Shostack makes a good point in identifying immunity from traffic analysis as an advantage of Blaze's subterfuge. Thank you. Metzger, on the other hand, appears to be as stupid as he is brazen. If only one party obscures the LEAF field, the needs of law enforcement are as easily met by inspecting the LEAF transmitted by the other party. DEADBEAT <na5877(a)anon.penet.fi> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQBFAgUBLe/dEvFZTpBW/B35AQF29wGAhymFAS6fXxiirWGPep7d0hXUsBfSqer6 +tZC5a45CqaP9M6zK/lEAJTHZgR6Gd9c =bGiZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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*** Flash - N.Y. Times on Clipper Flaw **
by remail＠desert.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> ... > HOW THE CLIPPER TECHNOLOGY IS FLAWED > > 1. Taking advantage of desing imperfections, people trying to defeat the > system could repeatedly alter the LEAF until it erroneously passed the > "checksum" verification, despite an invalid session-key number. This sounds like a very simple computation. How much would it cost to fab up some chips to do this, and solder them into the circuitry next to the Clipper chip? Or is there an even easier way to do this?

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Black Eye for NSA, NIST, and Denning
by an5877＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Thanks, Hal. Maybe you remember me from some time past. I confess that Perry Metzger's tone set me off and prompted an intemperate reply, for which I apologize. Regardless of the technical brunt, I think we all view with great satisfaction the shock waves produced by someone who the CypherPunks can truly call one of their own. DEADBEAT <na5877(a)anon.penet.fi> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQBFAgUBLe/hCPFZTpBW/B35AQG5/QF+P964XLXWp3SbtD4PyDHZQCAVK0GIsIPd FEJW6UM42BkWd1rFgO+CmIq3bl8AaOzO =MVs6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Re: Pedophiles in Cybersp
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

P >Unfortunately, the article does not mention how the blurring of P >national boundaries and uncontrolled (polically incorrect, etc.) P >conversations would also be beneficial. Perhaps the real upshot P >of the article is "May you live in interesting times". P > P > P >Paul E. Baclace P >peb(a)netcom.com P > P > This phenom is one of my big hopes for cyberspace. Acquiesence in state control was caused by normal primate urges to get along with one's "tribe." Cyberspace extends the changes that have already occured through urbanization and travel to a new threshold. With interface improvements we will be able to live societies of our own choosing and enhance feelings of personal autonomy. DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Re: more info from talk at MIT yesterday.
by gtoal＠gtoal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Defense Messaging System is supposedly going to use Skipjack, > so I assume it's reasonably secure - and if there *are* > NSA-only backdoors in the algorithm, at least they won't > be admitting it to your neighbor hood cops and FBI wiretappers, > so you'd have to be an *interesting* suspect to get cracked. Indeed -- let us recall that Coventry was bombed into ruins rather than reveal that the Brits could read German codes in WWII. I don't recall that at all, and neither do the papers that were recently released under the 30 year rule. (Somewhat delayed...) G

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Re: Pedophiles in Cybersp
by peb＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> >P >of the article is "May you live in interesting times". >This phenom is one of my big hopes for cyberspace. Me too. The growth of non-centralized transfer of information will certainly bring about more democracy in the world (and thus, less war). Even the presence of large flame wars would not totally diminish the emergence of cooperation. E.g., in WWI, trench warfare dragged on because the soldiers on each side started to cooperate in a sort of subliminal way: trench soldiers from either side would develop a pattern of engagement that created a status quo where no one would get killed. This cooperation trend is eliminated by constantly swapping in new soldiers--this depersonifies the enemy and makes it easier to shoot to kill. (I think this same effect is also seen in police beats--if the local cop gets really friendly, s/he starts cooperating with the people s/he is protecting rather than being completely objective. From the "authority and control" perspective, this makes the cop corruptable. >From the citizens perspective, this makes the cop more cooperative to the direct needs (however unfair--it is more personal) of the citizens.) I mention "interesting times" since the transition to new freedoms does not occur without a fight from the side that loses some of its control. Overall, the effect of personifying people's enemies (proportionally less slanted, centrally transmitted news) should have a positive impact. Paul E. Baclace peb(a)netcom.com

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Re: NYT article
by peb＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone find the following somewhat distorted: "...White House and Justice Department officials have argued forcefully that is a necessary information-age compromise between the constitutional right to privacy and the *traditional* powers of law enforcement officials." [my emphasis] If wiretapping laws were passed in 1968, I don't consider that *traditional*. Is Markoff speaking about surveillance in exceedingly general terms? Paul E. Baclace peb(a)netcom.com

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CEB 6 the Unpleasantness
by Gary Jeffers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks' Electronic Book (CEB) 6 the Unpleasantness. >Gary Jeffers apparently blames me for his dropping of the "Cypherpunks >Electronic Book" project: >> Cypherpunks' Electronic Book (CEB) part 5 - the hangover. As badly as it was received, you should be proud to take the blame! But no, I don't blame you. > >> Tim May writes on & on & on about my failure to write the CEB. >> Hey, just where did I pick up GUILT? I had a really great idea for >I did not write "on and on" about this--go back and read what I wrote. >> Cypherpunks that I also felt was a glaring omission of Cypherpunks'. >> I wrote up the idea as best as I could & tried to interest some com- >> petent C'punk to do it. I thought I did a really good job of writing >> up the idea. Unfortunately, I lack the skills to write the particular >> code to do the idea. Its sort of like bringing home a rabbit for suppr >> & everybody dumps on you cause it wasn't a moose. What kind of guilt o >> you dump on people who actually do bad things? >Flaky ranters like you and Hettinga are but the latest in a string of "Flaky ranters like you"? Now, you have lost your pretense of criticism of an idea & have gotten to your real agenda - attack on my person - you sorry fuck. (my turn) :-) >ranters who wring their hands and cry "*Do* something@! I tried to be >polite in my comments, even saying "So, if the CEB enthusiasts want to & now after your heroic self control has been taxed to the max, You are 007 - Licensed to be nasty! a small max really, made for offense taking. >try this, I applaud them." >In most of these cases, including Detweiler's similar wailings that no >one would create "alt.whistleblowers" for him, such politeness is >apparently unappreciated. Ranting is ever so much more fun, I guess. >(Hettinga's rants about "Garth and Wayne," broken windows, fleas on >his head, and "I'm not worthy" are just too strange for me to follow. >I sense a proto-Detweiler is forming in the great void.) I have not followed your dysfunctional relationships with your buddies Detweiler & Hettinga, but do feel free to keep them to your- self. Are you trying disingenuously to identify me with these people? They say that if you squint your eyes just right & long enough, dogs look look much like Adolph Hitler. So, Tim, why don't you go out & find one, squat, & squint till you notice the resemblance? :-) That's a joke Tim. But in a more serious vein Tim (preferable a major one), I thought your bad experience with the Extropians would have kept you from assaulting -ing people with claims of being elements in a class based on flimsy comparisons. You remember when your candy ass got chased off the Extropians' list with allegations of your being a fascist. But, of course, that would have scared anyone: a bunch of savage Extropians writing Fascist! Fascist! Fascist! :-) >> Admittedly, implementing the idea is magnitudes more work that get >> ting the idea. However, it was a great idea & why should I suppress i >> because I personally couldn't implement it? No doubt, great ideas fal >> from Tim May like rain from the skies & he considers them cheap if no >> nuisances. However, in most of the world, they are in short supply & re >> considered valuable. >Nonsense. Like Detweiler's "electrocracy," this idea was just an old >notion in new clothes. In this case, the "stone soup" FAQ idea all >over again. >I said it before, so I'll be brief: worrying about the details of >distribution instead of the writing is the big mistake. Distribution >is relatively trivial, whether by ftp at the soda site, distribution >by mail, whatever. >> I have discovered that the idea of bunches of creative, skilled >> programmers with lots of time on their hands is a myth. I guess they >> all manage to figure out something worth while to write. Originally, >> had thought that there would be at least one of them around looking >> for something worthy to do. Note: There is no covert meaning to the above paragraph. I really was naive in thinking that they might not have their time fully occupied with projects. >If _you_ think it is worth, and _others_ think it is worthy, then >absolutely nothing is stopping you all from doing this project! Do you >think the comments of _me_ are enough to stop you? Jeesh. >What you seem to have done is to see my comments about such "stone >soup" let's-volunteer-the-others appraches and then just _given up_ in >a huff. Methinks you just have no staying power and were hoping the >Cyperpunks Masses would make your CEB project the centerpiece of their >efforts with little further work on your part. It just doesn't happen >that way. >> I believe that I have described a very worthwhile project for anyoe >> who wants to do it. I have a lot of hope that someone will do it late. >> I don't think its going to be forgotten. I would like to thank the >> people who supported the idea. CEB doesn't look like it is going to >> happen soon but if Cypherpunks grows, I think it is inevitable that i >> will happen. >It won't happen because nobody out there is going to do it, not >because your feelings got hurt. Mocking other peoples' hurt feelings can get you into places where your own delicate feelings get hurt. >> But, Tim, if you decide you want this done - do it yourself. You >> just have no idea how you get dumped on when you suggest others do >> it for you! :-) >More nonsense. Nonsense I am finished responding to. Tim, for a guy who doesn't care about other peoples' hurt feelings, you have got real thin skin. >--Tim May Its surprising to me that my CEB plan got such bad reviews. I got my idea flamed by a lot of C'punks but life is tough. You present an idea & its not necessarily going to get accepted. You take a chance. But that is fair. I carry no grudge against the other C'punks. Tim May, however, is different. He criticized ME! & he was so unpleasant! Now we find out how Tim likes the intentionally unpleasant. I don't know Tim May very well but I've noticed he gets into a lot of flame wars. Could this be his M O?: Get into an argument with a victim over a matter of fact, then slyly turn it into an attack on the person without losing the applause of the gallery? Also, I don't like his shrill strident manner. I don't like a bully. When I run into one, I like to make sure he takes a few lumps too! Yours Truly, Gary Jeffers PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWAAAYYY BBBAAACCCKK! BBBEEEAAATTTT STATE !

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Re: Wiretapping, NYT article
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think the "traditional" use of wiretapping, prior to the 1968 law, was _de facto_, not _de jure_. The cops just wiretapped whomever they felt needed wiretapping. (For evidence of this, from the FBI to NSA, see books on Hoover's era, and Bamford on the NSA. For local cops, I have no immediate source, but note that "wire men" did not suddenly spring into existence in 1968...wiretapping has been used for many years.) The increased focus on civil rights (some would disagree with this characterizaton...) with the "Miranda rights" and "authorized wiretap" trends of the 1960s forced these practices to be formalized. More or less. There was a Supreme Court ruling in 1967 (I don't have the citation handy) that held that wiretaps constituted an illegal search and seizure. The Federal wiretap statute (18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq., later amended by the ECPA) was a direct response to this ruling. Until then, wiretaps were barred from Federal use by the Federal Communications Act, and not by 4th Amendment considerations (Nardone v. United States, 320 US 379 (1937)). But that was a question of admissibility of evidence, and in 1953 (Schwartz v. Texas, 344 US 199) the Court ruled that that was not binding on state courts. As a sidenote, the first act regulating police wiretaps was in New York in 1942; in 1895, the state had passed a law prohibiting wiretaps completely.

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Extropians List Statistics 5/23 (fwd)
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Gee Tim, the Ex. list sure has quieted down since your departure! -NetSurfer #include standard.disclaimer >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> == = = |James D. Wilson |V.PGP 2.4: 512/E12FCD 1994/03/17 > " " " |P. O. Box 15432 |finger for key / Viacrypt Reseller > " " /\ " |Honolulu, HI 96830 |====================================> \" "/ \" |Serendipitous Solutions| Also NetSurfer(a)sersol.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sat, 4 Jun 1994 23:01:12 -0400 From: Extropians Mailing List <extropians-request(a)extropy.org> To: Extropians(a)extropy.org Subject: Extropians List Statistics 5/23 Weekly List Statistics for 5/23 to 6/3 Total Number of Messages Posted: 24 Total Size of Messages Posted : 61156 bytes Average Total Size per Day : 8736 bytes Average # of Messages per Day : 3 Average Message Size : 2548 bytes Number of Posters Participating: 21 Top Ten Posters by Frequency 1. nancc(a)netcom.com (2 total, 0.3/day, 8.3% of total) 2. david(a)bitdance.mv.com (2 total, 0.3/day, 8.3% of total) 3. johnkc(a)well.sf.ca.us (2 total, 0.3/day, 8.3% of total) 4. russw(a)netcom.com (1 total, 0.1/day, 4.2% of total) 5. vincent.cate(a)furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu (1 total, 0.1/day, 4.2% of total) 6. sasha(a)cs.umb.edu (1 total, 0.1/day, 4.2% of total) 7. extropians-request(a)extropy.org (1 total, 0.1/day, 4.2% of total) 8. jhdaugh(a)mail.msen.com (1 total, 0.1/day, 4.2% of total) 9. pcm(a)world.std.com (1 total, 0.1/day, 4.2% of total) 10. georgesmit(a)aol.com (1 total, 0.1/day, 4.2% of total) Top Ten Posters by Volume 1. more(a)usc.edu (10.9kbytes, 1601 bytes/day, 18.3% of total) 2. pcm(a)world.std.com (6.4kbytes, 934 bytes/day, 10.7% of total) 3. johnkc(a)well.sf.ca.us (4.7kbytes, 689 bytes/day, 7.9% of total) 4. vincent.cate(a)furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu (4.4kbytes, 648 bytes/day, 7.4% of total) 5. 70544.1227(a)compuserve.com (3.9kbytes, 563 bytes/day, 6.4% of total) 6. david(a)bitdance.mv.com (3.4kbytes, 496 bytes/day, 5.7% of total) 7. jhdaugh(a)mail.msen.com (3.3kbytes, 476 bytes/day, 5.5% of total) 8. pavel(a)park.bu.edu (2.7kbytes, 399 bytes/day, 4.6% of total) 9. nancc(a)netcom.com (2.7kbytes, 398 bytes/day, 4.6% of total) 10. xtr(a)liberty.demon.co.uk (2.6kbytes, 386 bytes/day, 4.4% of total) Histogram of the week by number of messages ++ Sun |0| ++ +----+ Mon |4 | +----+ +---+ Tue |3 | +---+ +-----+ Wed |5 | +-----+ +-------+ Thu |7 | +-------+ +-+ Fri |1| +-+ +----+ Sat |4 | +----+ Histogram of the week by daily volume ++ Sun ||0 ++ +-+ Mon | |7280 +-+ +--+ Tue | |8507 +--+ +---+ Wed | |14024 +---+ +----+ Thu | |19545 +----+ ++ Fri ||2389 ++ +--+ Sat | |9411 +--+

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Bill Machrone's PC Magazine article
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Privacy in the Digital Age" Bill Machrone PC Magazine June 14, 1994 page 87 Copyright 1994 Ziff-Davis, I'm sure, but don't let that stop you from forwarding to interested lists and newsgroups. I'm a fairly conservative, law-and-order kind of guy. I support my local police. I sometimes have trouble identifying with some of my more liberal journalistic compatriots. But suddenly, you and I (along with the rest of the computer industry) are caught up in an issue of national importance that transcends politics and gets down to constitutional issues and basic freedoms. The issues, however,are in danger of being clouded as the usual suspects take sides and start shouting. The knee-jerk liberals have squared off against the knee-jerk conservatives over the privacy and security of digital communications. The Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility oppose the FBI and the Justice Department. And they're all quoting Al Gore. Let's get beyond the labels, politics, and allegiances and look at the facts. Here's the short form: The Feds realized that with the advent of widespread digital commmunications, their ability to monitor and tap communications would be radically diminished or would take far more time and money. So they proposed that all future digital devices be equipped with a high-security scrambling cip, called Clipper. Crazy? Like a fox. Every Clipper chip would have a serial number, which would give you access to a key that would decrypt whatever data the chip had encoded. The key would be kep in two pieces in two different places, and only a court order could bring them together. Trouble is, nobody trusts the law enforcement agencies to keep them apart. Don't even wonder if the National Security Agency will be monitoring digital conversations for its favorite trigger words. Furthermore, the pending legislation provides for fines up to $10,000 a day against telecommunications companies who don't give the Feds the access they want to decoded data streams. It doesn't end with telephones and data networks. The Feds intend to have Clipper technology on every fax machine, every cable TV box, every ATM, every device capable of receiving and sending a digital data stream. They want to monitor the entire information network for "patterns of abuse and criminal activity." Offering this capability in the form of a "security" chip that supposedly protects our data is insulting and offensive. The silly part of all this is that it represents the classic case of locks keeping out the honest people. The sad part is that we don't trust law enforcement agencies, however well-intentioned, not to abuse the power. Even worse, we the taxpayers are going to foot the bill (to the tune of half a billion dollars) just to build the monitoring network. We'll pay again in higher product costs. Nobody builds complex data-encryption chips for free. There is this little issue, however, of First Amendment rights. When the White House issued its briefing document on the Clipper announcement, it averred that no U.S. citizen, "as a matter of right, is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product." FBI director Louis J. Freeh echoed this position in a _New York Times_ interview, in which he claimed that the American people must be willing to give up a degree of personal privacy in exchange for safety and security. I find both statements odious. Privacy is a nonissue for most of us. People who want their communications to be secure have always had the means to do so. People who don't need secure communications don't bother and don't care. Also, security is a pain in the neck. The inherent hassles make us very choosy about when we use it. All the Clipper chip will do is waste our tax money. There's no point in making everyone's transmissions and conversations secure if a third party holds the key. No criminal in his right mind would depend on Clipper encoding when fully secure means are available. If the government manages to overthrow all logic and make Clipper a legal requirement, those of us who want or need real security will be forced into acts of civil disobediance. For data, it's a piece of cake. You can find half a dozen shareware programs on ZiffNet that implement the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Data Encryption Standard (DES). If you're one of the superparanoids who suspect that the NSA put a trap door into DES--no one has ever found evidence of it--you can use PGP (Pretty Good Privacy), a shareware program popular on the Internet, or PC-IRIS, available on ZiffNet. Both use a technique known as RSA to encrypt your data, which is widely regarded as extremely difficult to break. RSA has the additional benefit of providing public-key encryption; you publish a key that people use to encode messages to you, and then you use a private key to decrypt the message. DES is probably only viable for another year or two before it becomes too easy to crack; RSA should be secure for some time longer. Voice security is harder, but not much. You either go to a spook shop and pay a lot of money for a telephone scramber device or build your own. The latter option is not all that difficult, given the advent of DSP (digital signal processing) chips. All you need is the DSP, a couple of megs of memory, and a few support chips. Some of the DSP vendors have evaluation kits that contain virtually everything you need, Basically, you digitize your voice, take samples of the data, and perform calculations and transformations on it. You then turn the resulting data stream back into sound and send it over the phone line. For fun, you might send several data streams at the same time but out of phase with one another, the way modems do. An identical piece of hardware on the other end performs the operations in reverse order. Suffice it to say, however, that if the NSA types hear a scrambled conversation that they can't understand, they're going to wonder what you've got to hide. We're not encouraging criminal behavior by pointing out cryptographic resources. The dummies won't read this and the smarties don't need to. The only people who will be adversely affected by Clipper are you and me. --end--

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Re: Black Eye for NSA, NIST, and Denning
by kentborg＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

thad(a)pdi.com (Thaddeus Beier) >DEADBEAT sez >>> and importance of Blaze's result for what it is: minuscule. [with which thad disagrees:] >Blaze's result destroys the current justification... Both exaggerate, me thinks. 1) Dr. Blaze blasts out of the water any justification for faith in the competence/honesty of the NSA in this matter. This is a real basic, easy to explain to the corner barber, case of the NSA being caught with its pants down. It was a serious technical flub for them to leave something "this easy"* in the PCMCIA version of Clipper. * "this easy" is compared to the billions-and-billions of years good crypto systems are supposed to hold up, it is not a dig on Dr. Blaze who knows one hell of a lot more about this than do I. 2) We might be net-geeks, but Normal People--even crooks--still use the phone. It is not at all clear to me that the Blaze LEAF Spoof (BLS?) is something which will easily retrofit to a Clipper *phone*. First, is it theoretically possible to do his spoof in the key exchange of a telephone call? Second, is it possible to do it quickly enough that the other phone doesn't get suspicious--i.e., time out? Third, is the needed spoofing hardware something tiny which I will be able to find a Circuit City for $30, which I can trivially plug into my phone as I walk out the door? If not, the practical result is that nearly no one will foil the phone tapping. -kb, the mild-mannered Kent who just realized that: "Now I *am* in the NSA's files. Even the NSA on a stupid isn't dumb enough to not archive this list." P.S. Seeing as how the NSA already has cypherpunks archived, maybe we could talk them into letting us have access to their files--not everything, just the stuff we wrote. FoIA request maybe? -- Kent Borg +1 (617) 776-6899 kentborg(a)world.std.com kentborg(a)aol.com Proud to claim 28:15 hours of TV viewing so far in 1994!

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