December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Marty's 4/17 Clipper Chip post-to-many ...
by Martin Hellman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim, It is fine to post my previous message to cypherpunks if you also post this message with it in which: I ask recipients to be very sparse in their requesting further info from me or asking for comments on specific questions. By this posting I apologize for any messages I am unable to respond to. (I already spend too much time answering too much e-mail and am particularly overloaded this week with other responsibilities.) martin ========= Finally, there has been a significant reponse to this by a cryptoid well-known to all of us. Am seeking permission to repost it, also. --jim Incidentally, Marty sez he had no forewarning that Clipper was about to sail. The NY Times article blind-sided him about 11:30 Thursday night. Sounds like the government is really doing an outstanding job of careful, collaborative policy-making. [Danger! Novice gunslinger is shooting from the hip!] --jim

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Re: Clipper Chip
by denning＠cs.cosc.georgetown.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just had another conversation with NSA to clarify some of the features of Clipper. Please feel free to distribute this and my other messages on Clipper. The name of the encryption algorithm is "Skipjack." Martin Hellman had written and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK producing E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number; SK} To which I responded: My understanding is that E[M; K] is not encrypted under SK (called the "family key") and that the decrypt key corresponding to SK is held by law enforcement. Does anyone have first hand knowledge on this? I was correct in that E[M; K] is not encrypted under SK. However, Skipjack being a single-key system, there is, of course, not a separate decrypt key for the family key SK. The unit key, also called the "chip key," is generated from the serial number N as follows. Let N1, N2, and N3 be 64 bit blocks derived from N, and let S1 and S2 be two 80-bit seeds used as keys. Compute the 64-bit block R1 = E[D[E[N1; S1]; S2]; S1] (Note that this is like using the DES in triple encryption mode with two keys.) Similarly compute blocks R2 and R3 starting with N2 and N3. (I'm unlear about whether the keys S1 and S2 change. The fact that they're called seeds suggests they might.) Then R1, R2, and R3 are concatenated together giving 192 bits. The first 80 bits form K1 and the next 80 bits form K2. The remaining bits are discarded. The seeds S1 and S2 do not change. The whole process is performed on a laptop computer, and S1 and S2 are supplied by two independent people so that no one person knows both. The same S1 and S2 are used during an entire "programming session" to generate keys for a stream of serial numbers. Everything is discarded at the end (the computer could be thrown out if desired). The serial number is 30 bits and the values N1, N2, and N3 are formed by padding the serial number with fixed 34-bit blocks (separate padding for each value). The resulting keys K1 and K2 are output onto separate floppy disks, paired up with their serial number. Each pair is stored in a separate file. The floppy disks are taken away by two separate people on behalf of the two escrow agencies. Dorothy Denning denning(a)cs.georgetown.edu ====== >From eff.org!interesting-people-request(a)netcomsv.netcom.com Mon Apr 19 20:07:50 1993 Posted-Date: Mon, 19 Apr 1993 21:17:27 -0500 From: David Farber <farber(a)central.cis.upenn.edu> X-Sender: farber(a)linc.cis.upenn.edu Subject: More technical details -- Chipper To: interesting-people(a)eff.org (interesting-people mailing list) Personal note. Denning suggests such firms as " SRI, Rand, Mitre, the national labs (Sandia, LANL, Los Alamos), Treasury, GAO" as possible escrow organizations. I personally believe that firms which get their funding from the government are just too susceptible to pressure which we have seen historically. It would be best to use organizations that have a more arms length relationship with the government so everyone believes the escrows task is being performed properly. Dave From: smb(a)research.att.com (Steven Bellovin) Subject: More technical details Date: 19 Apr 93 13:43:46 GMT Here are some corrections and additions to Hellman's note, courtesy of Dorothy Denning. Again, this is reposted with permission. Two requests -- first, note the roles of S1 and S2. It appears to me and others that anyone who knows those values can construct the unit key. And the nature of the generation process for K1 and K2 is such that neither can be produced alone. Thus, the scheme cannot be implemented such that one repository generates the first half-key, and another generates the second. *That* is ominous. Second -- these postings are not revealed scripture, nor are they carefully-crafted spook postings. Don't attempt to draw out hidden meanings (as opposed to, say, the official announcements of Clipper). Leave Denning out of this; given Hellman's record of opposition to DES, which goes back before some folks on this newsgroup knew how to read, I don't think you can impugn his integrity. Oh yeah -- the folks who invented Clipper aren't stupid. If you think something doesn't make sense, it's almost certainly because you don't understand their goals. --Steve Bellovin ----- Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 07:56:39 EDT From: denning(a)cs.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning) Subject: Re: Clipper Chip To: (a long list of folks) I was also briefed by the NSA and FBI, so let me add a few comments to Marty's message: The Clipper Chip will have a secret crypto algorithm embedded in The algorithm operates on 64-bit blocks (like DES) and the chip supports all 4 DES modes of operation. The algorithm uses 32 rounds of scrambling compared with 16 in DES. In addition to the system key, each user will get to choose his or her own key and change it as often as desired. Call this key plain old K. When a message is to be sent it will first be K is the session key shared by the sender and receiver. Any method (e.g., public key) can be used to establish the session key. In the AT&T telephone security devices, which will have the new chip, the key is negotiated using a public-key protocol. encrypted under K, then K will be encrypted under the unit key UK, and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK producing E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number; SK} My understanding is that E[M; K] is not encrypted under SK (called the "family key") and that the decrypt key corresponding to SK is held by law enforcement. Does anyone have first hand knowledge on this? I will also check it out, but this is 7am Sunday so I did not want to wait. The unit key will be generated as the XOR of two 80-bit random numbers K1 and K2 (UK=K1+K2) which will be kept by the two escrow The unit key, also called the "chip key," is generated from the serial number N as follows. Let N1, N2, and N3 be 64 bit blocks derived from N, and let S1 and S2 be two 80-bit seeds used as keys. Compute the 64-bit block R1 = E[D[E[N1; S1]; S2]; S1] (Note that this is like using the DES in triple encryption mode with two keys.) Similarly compute blocks R2 and R3 starting with N2 and N3. (I'm unlear about whether the keys S1 and S2 change. The fact that they're called seeds suggests they might.) Then R1, R2, and R3 are concatenated together giving 192 bits. The first 80 bits form K1 and the next 80 bits form K2. The remaining bits are discarded. authorities. Who these escrow authorities will be is still to be decided by the Attorney General, but it was stressed to me that they will NOT be NSA or law enforcement agencies, that they must be parties acceptable to the users of the system as unbiased. Marty is right on this and the FBI has asked me for suggestions. Please pass them to me along with your reasons. In addition to Marty's criteria, I would add that the agencies must have an established record of being able to safeguard highly sensitive information. Some suggestions I've received so far include SRI, Rand, Mitre, the national labs (Sandia, LANL, Los Alamos), Treasury, GAO. When a court order obtains K1 and K2, and thence K, the law enforcement agency will use SK to decrypt all information flowing on the suspected link [Aside: It is my guess that they may do this constantly on all links, with or without a court order, since it is almost impossible to tell which links over which a message will flow.] My understanding is that there will be only one decode box and that it will be operated by the FBI. The service provider will isolate the communications stream and pass it to the FBI where it will pass through the decode box, which will have been keyed with K. for "the wiretap authorizations." When Levy asked for the details so he could review the cases as required by law, the agent told him that his predecessors just turned over 40-50 blank, signed forms every time. Levi did not comply and changed the system, but the lesson is clear: No single person or authority should have the power to authorize wiretaps No single person does, at least for FBI taps. After completing a mound of paperwork, an agent must get the approval of several people on a chain that includes FBI legal counsel before the request is even taken to the Attorney General for final approval. Dorothy Denning

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Re: Marty's 4/17 Clipper Chip post-to-many & Dorothy's 4/8 response
by denning＠cs.georgetown.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fine with me. Post anywhere. Dorothy =====

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Based on previous experience, a couple more will appear overnight. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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on line books (not just in risk mgmt)
by Tapen Sinha 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If you are looking for information on new books, how to buy them (on line!) and review of these books, there is a neat way to do it on internet: telnet books.com if the above does not work on your machine, try telnet 192.148.240.9 It will ask you a bunch of questions (like your name and address) and then you can look at info on books by author, subject... You can look at reviews of those books too. You can order books by email even (have your credit card handy)! It can be quite useful. A word of caution: there are some unhappy users out there who claim that they got billed for books they did not order. tapen_sinha(a)macmail.bond.edu.au

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yes, I remember that now. My interpretation, though, was that with the bank's help you could tell when a coin had been re-used. This could impair the anonymity of the cash. Generally in the analysis of these proto- cols one wants anonymity even if the bank and the other participants collude. That is the whole point of cryptographic (non-transferable) cash, after all; otherwise the bank could just use the "Poor Man's Cash" idea which Tim May suggested here last year and just issue cash in the form of magic numbers with no blinding or digital sigs. Hal

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I read this paper some time ago. Couldn't the cash still be detected as having belonged to the original owner even after you have transferred it? If so, then the other requirement is that you must transfer it anonymously, otherwise they can still get back to you. An example would be if you are doing something which the government doesn't like, such as shipping tracts advocating egalitarianism to a country with explicitly racist policies. The government might be able to put pressure on some members of the organization and use this (in effect) "marked money" to find the others. If you pass the money on to someone else, but they know it came from you, and then the government comes to them, determines that this is "dirty money" (which was given to the threatening egalitarians) they can say "who did you get this from" and your jig is up. Hal

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No Subject
by mkj＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone here seen the so-called Lehman Panel report? It is available by ftp from ftp.uspto.gov, in the directory /pub/nii-ip. It is offered there in several formats. The deadline for comments is September 7th. (Sorry about the short notice, but I've only just recently discovered the report myself.) The Lehman Panel is more officially known as the "Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights", a subcommittee of President Clinton's "Information Infrastructure Task Force". The Lehman Panel report makes a number of recommendations concerning changes to current intellectual property law, in light of challenges presented by the National Information Infrastructure (NII) project. This appears to me to be quite an important report, which could play a major role in shaping vital aspects of our near-future society. I find the whole approach taken by the panel disturbing, though perhaps not surprising. Very briefly, my general concerns are these: There appears to be a natural tension between current intellectual property law and the widespread deployment of computer networking. (John Barlow has put it more simply: "Copyright is dead".) The Lehman panel's report, rather than trying to accomodate and adapt to the inevitable effects of the NII, instead recommends tightening up existing laws, and expanding their scope, in an attempt to preserve the status quo and protect established interests. It seems to me that this approach would dramatically undercut the potential of the NII, making many of its most natural uses and benefits illegal. Worse, I believe this approach would create a body of law which will make speed limits look well-respected by comparison, and any attempt to enforce these laws is likely to be destructive and unpleasant for all of us. There are numerous other, more specific things in this report which make me unhappy, too -- such as the presumption that the NII should be little more than a new marketplace for old businesses; the creation of gratuitous new rights for major record labels which would hurt artists, and would enable the record companies to control the digital audio server industry; and most frightening of all, the shameless suggestion that the public schools should be used to pound these new rules into the heads of children as early as Kindergarten. I've obviously considered firing off a letter of comment myself, but after I calmed down I realized how little impact that would be likely to have. So I decided the most constructive thing I could do would be to post this "alert" here, in the hope that someone with better qualifications and resources than myself might pick up the ball. Thanks for your attention. --- mkj

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Re: Why Doesn't Wired.....
by jimp＠wired.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <v4cAlOwscUg6077yn(a)io.org>, werewolf(a)io.org (Mark Terka) wrote: > .....if it is sooooooo hooked in the online culture have a PGP public key > that 'net users could use to send in their credit card numbers for > subscriptions? Here it is. We're just implementing it. Send us a message (send to talk2subs(a)wired.com) -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.7 mQCOAy8EM1EAAAEEANqhOZTAwWI/99ZZ7t77VHH02n+xM4CQEk2DJe2zZhpjKP8v EHndzBPr3dIsHOZUJABi7ztk5NiQhNVR5EBE7Tqz/7HhGFUE2ErVjAS3OQckcmvW BrCgNXfe0G4tlX1paXFGHsoVT3UgE2IKjttwmZA1WtOH1lbgLCGi/5f257vHAA9A AbQnV2lyZWQgQ2lyY3VsYXRpb24gPHRhbGsyc3Vic0B3aXJlZC5jb20+ =xdqc -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -- Jim Petersen Argue for your limitations.... jimp(a)wired.com And they are yours.

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No Subject
by david＠arch.ping.dk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It is interesting that the situation is so symmetrical. Given collusion with the bank by the other party, with regular ecash we protect Alice's but not Bob's anonymity. With this "reverse ecash" we protect Bob but not Alice. (Alice is the payor, Bob the payee.) If people were allowed to exchange coins anonymously, either system will provide anonymity for both parties. (In the reverse ecash system Alice hands the the blinded proto-coins along with some regular coins to the bank and receives blinded new coins.) Earlier there was discussion of an ecash coin-exchanging service ("Charlie") designed to provide payee anonymity in the regular ecash system. Bob would send his newly-received coins to Charlie along with blinded proto-coins. Charlie would then exchange them at the bank and send the new (blinded) coins back to Bob. Charlie and Bob can be anonymous to each other, but Bob has to trust Charlie with his coins. A similar service would work for the reverse ecash system to protect Alice's anonymity. Bob blinds some proto-coins and sends them to Alice, who further blinds them and sends them to Charlie along with some regular coins of the same values. Charlie exchanges the regular coins for new coins using the doubly blinded proto-coins. He gives the blinded coins back to Alice, who unblinds them and gives them to Bob, who removes the last blinding to reveal the valid coins. It is Alice in this protocol who has to trust Charlie with her coins. Hal

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E-Cash cost advantage acknowledged
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Remember all the stuff I say about the markedly reduced costs of digital bearer transactions? Wanna bet that if a bunch of big bankers say the cost reduction one order of magnitude, given Moore's Law and a little programming elbow grease, we can bring it down to three? Cheers, Bob Hettinga --- begin forwarded text X-Sender: schear(a)mail.lvdi.net (Unverified) Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Fri, 2 Jan 1998 23:01:06 -0800 To: rah(a)shipwright.com From: Steve Schear <schear(a)lvdi.net> Subject: E-Cash cost advantage acknowledged The vast cost advantages of e-cash transactions was acknowledged in a Banking Industry Technology Secretariat (BITS) paper presented at last year's Electronic Payment Forum meeting in Hilton Head, SC on July 17-18, 1997. http://www.epf.net/PrevMtngs/July97Mtng/Presentations/Schutzer/index.htm BITS, a Division of The Bankers Roundtable, members are the 125 largest U.S. holding companies represent 70% of financial assets and deposits in the United States and employ over 1 million people. Projections provided by Salomon Brothers, Nilson Report, Financial Institutions and Markets, and Boston Consulting Group, show e-cash transaction costs easily outdistance ACH/EFT by a factor of 10. Credit cards will be about 40 times as costly. Even the highly touted ECP (Electronic Check Payment) approaches are likely to be 20 times as expensive. What is most interesting is that despite this acknowledgement almost all the BITS member institutions are pursuing a path away from e-cash and second place EFT embracing higher margin (and higher merchant/consumer cost) alternatives, for example VISACash (cash in name only). In fact, many major banks see EFT/POS (and e-cash) is a threat to their franchises and have moved to keep them from expansion through non-competitive practices and regulatory pressure. --Steve PGP mail preferred, see http://www.pgp.com and http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp.html RSA fingerprint: FE90 1A95 9DEA 8D61 812E CCA9 A44A FBA9 RSA key: http://keys.pgp.com:11371/pks/lookup?op=index&search=0x55C78B0D --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | tel: (702) 658-2654 CEO | fax: (702) 658-2673 First ECache Corporation | 7075 West Gowan Road | Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | Internet: schear(a)lvdi.net --------------------------------------------------------------------- I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me ECache or give me debt! "It's your Cacheª" --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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Re: In Search of Genuine DigiCash
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:25 PM 8/22/94 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >Anonymity is what gives digital cash it's raison >d'etre, it's technological advantages over conventional schemes. I'll try to to come at this from another tack. Cryptography gives anonymity. Anononymity reduces the overhead. The reduced overhead should make digital cash more economically efficient than on-line systems like NetBank, or credit-cards or much of anything else, at the moment. The economic efficiency is what may make digitial cash economical as a way to provide liquidity for internet commerce. The major selling point is *not* privacy. The major selling point is economic efficiency. >If anonymity, untraceability, and other "Chaumian" notions are only >seen as peripheral side effects, then we already _have_ "digital cash" >in the encrypted credit card systems some folks are already offering. They are peripheral side effects. They also are the very things that make digital cash a more efficient medium of exchange. They are not necessary and sufficient conditions for the adoption of digital cash for the very same reasons you outlined above. Privacy is like flight. It's cool. It's literally marvelous. But flight also gives you speed, and speed is what sells flight as a usable technology to most people. Is that a better explaination? >Without the technological approach to untraceability and anonymity, >all we have is the usual "trust". Granted, credit card numbers ought >not to be sent over unsecured channels, but fixing that is easy (with >end-to-end encryption). Trust-based systems are not the foundation for >a free society most of us are seeking. Printing is a faster way to transcribe information than copying a book by hand. A secondary benefit of printing is that improves information flow through a culture. A consequence is increased education, which gives you an enlightment ethic and eventually Jeffersonian democacy. I think we're looking at the elephant from opposite ends here, Tim. You seem to be holding the trunk, I believe... >"Digidollar" was one of the many names coined by folks on this list, >along with Cypherbucks, Digimarks, etc. Ah. How grateful I am not to be burdened with its parentage... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: MIT Fascism
by No Taxes through No Government 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>True enough. Most of our rules have been bundled together. Either you >accept all of them or you walk away. So Tim, if you don't like the FBI The above false information incorrectly assumes that all laws apply to all people.

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Re: In Search of Genuine DigiCash
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:27 AM 8/23/94 -0400, Peter Wayner wrote: >tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) wrote: >> >>I don't think any of us on this list is yet ready to present a plan to >>real bankers. Eric Hughes has told me he agrees. > >Real bankers may be well ahead of everyone on this list. I'm told that >Citibank has some very intriguing work pending at the patent office. It's >for digital cash. Thank you. This is exactly the kind of stuff I've been talking about. Real bankers aren't completely necessary. This is why my thinking has changed on the subject. You need financial accumen to make sure you don't spend down your suspension account, but that (cash portfolio management) can be purchased from lots places besides real banks. The technology of digital cash is something that Citicorp thinks it has to reinvent. That's par for the course. But you don't need a real banker to run a secure www/Secure Mosaic node. You barely need real bankers to hook in to the ATM system as long as you can prove that nobody, including the underwriter, sniff the user's card swipe and PIN number. You don't need real bankers to make sure that the fraud laws cover double spending of digital cash. You don't need bankers to make sure that you comply with cash reporting requirements when money comes on and off the net. Wiring all the above together to make a digital cash underwriter is doable at a relatively small level, without bankers for the most part. This is why Citicorp, and other banks like it, are going to shoot themselves in the foot when they try. I 'm pretty sure, having worked for Citicorp myself, they spent big piles of money trying to engineer around Chaum (or anybody else). Chaum almost has a viable product, which will cost a whole lot less (even if he gets his cut of profits) to implement from the underwriter's standpoint. Citicorp has tried this "We are The Technologists" tack in Travel (CIMS), Point of Sale data collection (CPOS), Telephone Banking (they even invented their own dial up terminal!) and several other unrelated businesses. They failed because of an institutional mentality of Not Invented Here and a very centralized, top-down management style. They're not much different from most other very large banks, I'm afraid. Citicorp's early success in bank Data Processing during the late 60's and early 70's, first in ATMs (they aren't the largest any more by a long shot), and the credit cards (same here), makes them, and some readers of this list, think they are a 900lb gorilla when it comes to digital cash. They aren't. Neither is any bank, no matter how large they are. I'd be real interested to see if Citibank can beat an onslaught of smaller underwriters who can offer cash at smaller margins than they can. Folks, the costs of an operation like a digital cash underwriter aren't too difficult to imagine. The entry cost for the average underwriter (if the market is there to support one) is not nearly the amount that Citicorp is going to spend putting up theirs, and so Citicorp will loose money on this investment as well, and eventually back out. It's like people who go in to see the machine The Well runs on. Their jaw drops at how small the box really is. If Citicorp did it the machine would be 10 times bigger and cost 10 times as much, to justify their hockey-stick earnings estimate and a cast of a thousand managers and analysts. The thing that's important here is Grove's Law. Chips have an economic half-life of 18 months, which drops the cost of any computer based business accordingly, along with the costs of entry into those businesses. I've personally seen large companies go into a new high-tech service businesses and kill their entry with overengineering and bloated middle management. You see it in the Wall Street Journal all the time. At some point, if the market is there, there will probably be a consolidation in digital cash underwriting, and larger companies will emerge as economies of scale become evident. But to think that any company can come into a completely different operating paradigm and take over from the start just because they're huge somewhere else is probably not going to wash. Think about railroads and airplanes. If the railroads seriously tried to fund aircraft development, they would have gotten smeared. They would still be trying to make a steam powered plane fly the day Douglas delivered the first DC-3. The banks aren't the big bad monsters we fear them for. Their participation in the market is necessary, as is the participation of most financial instutions, but an Argumentum ad Bacculum with the Banks as the threat of force is pretty much a waste of breath. Sorry. I promise not to turn blue next time. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: Nuclear Weapons Material
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <paBMkOwscIgG070yn(a)io.org> Mark Terka writes: > Not to mention the fact that without tritium, the "trigger" for nuclear > weapons (and extremely expensive and rare at $ 100m a gram) all you have > is a radioactive paperweight. To the best of my knowledge, tritium is not used in nuclear weapons (meaning A-bombs), only in thermonuclear weapons (H-bombs). One of my teachers was involved in the Manhattan project; he never mentioned any need for tritium. -- Jim Dixon

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Re: Voluntary Governments?
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <199408230610.XAA15960(a)netcom3.netcom.com> "Timothy C. May" writes: > Jason Solinsky wrote: > > Easily. They could deny you access to services of greater value than the > > tax being imposed. MIT weilds this power quite successfully. This thread > > Jason is confusing markets and governments. > > A movie theater that sells tickets is not "taxing" its patrons--it is > selling access. A university that charges tuition is not "taxing" its > customers. > > [ complications deleted] > > To call all negotiated prices "taxes" is, bluntly, > absurd. It also cheapens the language by throwing away the essential > distinction between market prices and taxes. Jason's use of the term 'tax' in a special sense is no more an abuse of the language than the attempt to change the conventional meaning of the word 'government'. He says that institutions like MIT govern the behavior of their special populations, that they can impose levies on their users, and that they can enforce rules against their users without the use of physical force. > In any case, something is a "market price" if one can walk away from > the transaction. I know of almost nothing the U.S. government calls a > "tax" that taxpayers are free to walk away from, to not pay (and thus > not receive the service). You can walk away from almost all US taxes by walking away from the USA. I have. What about luxury taxes, fishing licenses, flying licenses, and so forth? If you insist on calling these 'market prices', you begin to really rip the fabric of the language. -- Jim Dixon

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Death & Taxes
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Steve Witham & Jason W Solinsky seem to be sowing a bit of confusion about government and taxes. Steve says: >This is the "monopoly on force in a geographical area" definition of >government. It's also pretty much government as we know it. It's a >fundamentally bad idea and it's what James and I are against. But I don't >think it's a good definition of "government." It *is*, however, the definition that my very commie-liberal poly sci department taught me when I was studying with them. Also "That institution charged with the authoritative allocation of values in society." >The reason is that what most people mean by "government" is a set of >services, the main ones being what James calls "true law": police, courts, >and defense--protection services for large numbers of people. Experts in taxonomy always try to define a species by the characteristics that *distinguish* it from other species. Not those characteristics that are the same. Governments are distinguished by their claim of monopoly on judging the appropriateness of uses of force within a given geographic area. Thus the symbol of a king's office is often a mace (club) and a sword. The American Eagle has arrows clutched in one claw. And in most times and places only the sovereign and his cronies are allowed to carry weapons. The peasants are prohibited from doing so. Jason says: A cybergovernment says "Do as we say or you can't communicate with our citizens" MIT says "Do as we say or go somewhere else" US democrats say "If you don't like US laws, move somewhere else" Actually, if you are a citizen you are bound by US tax laws even if you move to Alpha Centauri. Or if you are a narco terrorist you need not even be a citizen. MIT remains largely consensual. Governments do not. If they become mere market actors as I expect that they will, then they will no longer be the sorts of monopoly institutions that we refer to with the word -- "government." Actually "Self-Government vs. Others-Government" is the real split (with thanks to the Advocates for Self Government. DCF "You speak Treason!" - The Lady Marion Fitzwalter "Fluently!" - Sir Robin of Loxley Not from the politically correct version.

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Zimmerman's use of PGP
by Bill O'Hanlon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As anyone who has ever sent an encrypted "Really neat program, Phil!" message to Phillip Zimmerman knows, he doesn't run PGP where he reads his mail. He has to download messages to decrypt on a local machine. All of the cute elm/vi/emacs/mh/pine scripts you wanna post won't help him. -Bill (P.S. Back when he didn't get so much mail, if you'd done the above, you'd get a response in a couple weeks, telling you this. He mentioned that he saw the irony of the situation -- that the inventor of PGP couldn't make convenient use of it.)

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archives for cypherpunks?
by PatHuff＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Do any archives exist for this group? I would be intereted in scaning them. Pat. PatHuff(a)world.std.com

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Re: Voluntary Governments?
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:14 PM 8/23/94 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >Russell Nelson says: >> In our high school we had a student government. We had no prisons >> and no guns. >> >> Then you were a club. > >Indeed. [snip] >(I once was part of a >debate held by Columbia University's Philolexian Society on the topic >"Resolved: Student Government is Amazingly Lame", in which I noted >that the low probability of a student government coup d'etat complete >with tanks rolling about the campus, and of the following student >government dictatorship run by a student military junta, demonstrated >that the student "government" wasn't a government but a weak way to >keep students placated, devoid even of the mild entertainment the >occassional revolt could bring.) Alas. How true. One of my friends got elected student government president at the University of Missouri by standing outside polling places in a clown suit bribing people to vote for him with play money. Later that year, I authored a student senate declaration of war against the University of Wisconsin. They had originated the concept of snickerocracy, or rule by clowns, and as potential competition for scarce laughs had to be destroyed. The declaration passed unanimously. We passed the hat in the bars for our defense budget (to be spent by the sacred Council of War, COW for short), and sent four determined and somewhat inebriated agriculture majors to Wisconsin's dairy barns to collect one ton of bullshit and deposit it on their student union steps at 3 am. In their defense, I must say that the administration generously let us (the senate) vote on the allocation of about $1.3 million of the university's money (somewhat less than 1% of the total, I believe), which made for a lot of sand in the old sandbox. And, I got to meet both Timothy Leary and Ralph Nader out of the deal. I have trouble telling them apart to this day... Ah, Yout'! Adulthood is terminal, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: Voluntary Governments?
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:37 PM 8/23/94 -0500, Jim choate wrote: >Can't speak for MIT but I can speak for UT Austin, they do have cells to hold >prisoners. The security forces at that school attend the Tx Dept. of Public >Safety training school and hold state law enforcement positions. The last >thing you want to do is really piss one of these guys, you would end up >in one of the state prisons for several years, Huntsville probably. The University of Chicago, where I went for awhile, has the third largest police force in Illinois, after the Chicago PD and the State troopers. They have guns and cells. During the Cambodian days of rage, the administration had an interesting tactic. The acquiesced to the students' demands and took their pictures as they left. Then they expelled them all. Not violent, really, but harmful, maybe. "Hyde Park, where Black and White stand shoulder to shoulder against the Poor." (Nichols and May[not Tim]), Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: Voluntary Governments?
by elton＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Right ... I had taken this offline, but it looks as though it ain't quite dead yet. Kindly stop reading now if you wish this subject would go away. Consolidating two messages from Jim Dixon: >Jason's use of the term 'tax' in a special sense is no more an abuse >of the language than the attempt to change the conventional meaning >of the word 'government'. and >You can't simply take over the ownership of words in the English >language. 'Government' is indeed the name used for an entity that >exercises authority or enforces laws. Of course we can -- it happens all the time. However, this time I haven't usurped the meaning of anything. Force -- the threat or actual use of violence -- is the essence of government. You just said so yourself: "enforces laws". Here's the closest applicable dictionary definition of "government", taken from the Random House Dictionary of the English Language: "1. the political direction and control exercised over the actions of the members, citizens, or inhabitants of communities, societies, and states; direction of the affairs of a state, community, etc.; political administration." This is amplified by looking at "govern" in the same dictionary: "1. to rule by right of authority, as a sovereign does." "Rule", or "political ... control" are only ever exercised through force. People keep using that word, "enforce", without looking carefully at it. >From the same dictionary: "to put or keep in force; compel obedience to." "Enforcement", regardless of the dry dictionary definition, is the essence of government. Without the power to enforce arbitrary rules, there can be no government. There are several methods of achieving compliance with a set of rules: social pressure (shunning, as some religious sects do); withholding of goods or services (the degree that Jason spoke about being denied); and topical application of violence ("enforcement"). Of these, the first two are related, and are commonly practiced by social units that don't recognize the right to use force on one another. The last named is the only one that results in physical damage to the person being "ruled", and is also the only one that can physically prevent that person from engaging in the proscribed behavior. The others can make life bloody unpleasant, but they won't terminate it. One other thing: >I grew up in a small town of 5,000. It had a city government. The >county government was in the same town. No one denies that California >has a government, I think. And then there was the US government. And >we had city police, the sheriff's office, the Highway Patrol, and the >FBI paid an occasional visit. Uh ... you _do_ understand that that's a specious argument, yes? What do you suppose the outcome would be if your home town were to legalize marijuana, and then attempted to prevent the DEA from enforcing the overriding federal law? Yes, we have a distributed government, with each layer operating under the authority of the next layer up; but each layer can only add restrictions, never remove them, and each enforces its restrictions by the same method as the layers above it: main force. Further, each attempts to prevent other agencies from enforcing sets of rules counter to the ones they themselves enforce. That's what makes them true "governments", rather than some other social institution. Here, someone will surely object that by this definition, the Mafia can be considered a government. Well, if they can successfully kick the existing thugs off of some plot of ground, and then defend it against all comers, then yes: that's exactly what they'll be. How else do you suppose that governments become established? -- Elton

2 1

Zimmermann/NSA debate postponed
by Philip Zimmermann 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The debate between Philip Zimmermann and Clinton Brooks from NSA has been postponed. The debate organizers, the World Affairs Council decided today (Tuesday) that there were not enough attendees preregistered to proceed with the debate at this time. The debate had been scheduled for Thursday, 25 August, in Thousand Oaks, California. A major conference organized by the World Affairs Council, scheduled for 27 October, will have the debate included in the conference. When those plans firm up, there will be detailed announcements with more lead time. I'm sorry if this change in plans inconveniences anyone who planned to attend the debate, but I had nothing to do with their decision. --Philip Zimmermann

18 33

Re: NSA Spy Machine and DES
by Ian Farquhar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Aug 22, 9:48pm, Phil Karn wrote: > >do, which is something I really doubt. As Phil Zimmerman pointed out some > >time ago, there are lots of other interesting applications which SIGINT > Actually, I believe it was me who said that. At least I also did. I stand corrected. It was indeed Phil Karn, and not Phil Zimmerman. Ian.

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