December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Nuclear Weapons Material
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <199408251633.JAA16087(a)netcom4.netcom.com> Mike Duvos writes: > Uranium is not particularly radioactive, being a long lived alpha > emitter. This is true of plutonium and some other fissionable > materials as well. I can handle clad uranium or plutonium > reactor or bomb components in complete safety with no protective > clothing needed. The only hazard is from ingestion of the > material, or from accumulation of decay products such as radon in > a badly ventilated area. > > Workers in nuclear fuel fabrication facilities have been known to > use small disks of plutonium sintered into a ceramic base as > poker chips. Is this true? I mean, do you know it from personal experience? I was told by what I considered to be reliable sources that plutonium was extremely toxic. Upon reflection, I am sure that this is the word that was used: toxic, not radioactive. By "clad", do you mean coated in lead? -- Jim Dixon

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swIPe
by alex 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The other day, while I was poking around the C'Punk FTP site, I ran across swIPe, the low-level network security protocol by Matt Blaze and John Ioannidis. I'm not as knowledgeble as many of the people here, but swIPe strikes me as "The Right Way" to apply crypto to net-communications. Instead of having secure email, secure mosaic, secure telnet, etc., you have secure IP traffic. It's comparatively simple, it's very flexible, and it's transparent. I haven't heard much about swIPe, and I was wondering if someone could bring me up to speed on it, let me know the status of the project, the conventional wisdom, etc. In particular, I'd like to know if anyone uses swIPe with Linux. Also, I'm curious about the practicality of using swIPe as a component in a larger secure mail (or secure anything) system. If I understand the situation properly, swIPe would only be one piece of a total security system. You'd still need to protect against unauthorized break-ins on your machine, and you'd still have to trust root, you'd still depend on the OS's built-in security, you'd still need a CFS type of program to store your swIPe keys, etc. Finally (I know I'm asking a lot of questions here), does anyone have any pointers to anything about the key-exchange system (apart from what was at soda)? Thanks, Alex

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Re: Nuclear Weapons Material
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408251708.AA04970(a)vail.tivoli.com> Mike McNally writes: > Mike Duvos writes: > > The idea is that the > > uranium penetrates the armor and the charge then explodes once > > the round is inside. > > I don't know much about modern munitions, but I do know that armor > piercing rounds may have no charge in them at all. Most do. RPGs, for example, definitely do. As I recall, a shaped charge punches a tiny hole through the armor and then injects a blob or jet of liquified metal into the vehicle. It's much worse than a ricochet. The explosion occurs outside the tank, driving the jet of metal in. Armor piercing artillery rounds are called HEAT (High Explosive Anti- Tank). The name says it all. -- Jim Dixon

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Re: Nuclear Weapons Material
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <199408251812.NAA00474(a)zoom.bga.com> Jim choate writes: > I would like to request some reference on the use of Uranium in the casing > of a shell or round. The casing gets thrown out on the ground (by both > aircraft and tanks) when the round goes off. There is no reason to use > anything other than brass or steel for this. There is some confusion in terminology here. The brass case is indeed discarded when the round is fired. Byt 'casing' he means the exterior of the warhead. The word 'round' is used for both the warhead+gunpowder+brass and then for the warhead itself. Larger artillery pieces do not use a brass shell case at all. The round is loaded, and then the powder is rammed in after it. > I can find no reference any U-core round being HE or otherwise carrying a > charge. In all cases that I am aware of and can find reference to it is simply > a KE attack on the target where the by products of the impact bounce around > inside the target grinding up whatever is in there. I believe that this is true, except that the 'products of the impact' are drops of metal and what they do is worse than grinding something up. -- Jim Dixon

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Re: Nuclear Weapons Material
by dance＠cicero.spc.uchicago.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I wonder why the issue of bomb parts is now being given such a >huge push in the press? For one thing, Germany has been going ballistic because of the sheer number of people trying to smuggle Uranium/Plutonium from the ex-Soviet Union across its borders for sale on the world market. The Christian Science Monitor had a good article on this last week sometime. _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ Disobedience is the true _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/ _/ foundation of liberty. _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ The obedient must be slaves. _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ "Civil Disobedience" _/ (Thoreau)

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'What A Long Strange Trip It's Been' by Lewis Sanders
by ajteel＠andronix.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

================================================= === "What A Long Strange Trip Its Been: === === A Hippy's History Of The 60's & Beyond" === === By Lewis Sanders, 2nd. Edition, 1994 === ================================================= Dear Friend I am sending this special announcement to all of the addresses of net.friends that I found in my mailbox. I have come across a book that I am sure that many of you may be interested in. This is a one-time, special announcement and is _not_ the start of new mailing list. The book is, in my opinion, important enough to tell all of you about. "What A Long Strange Trip It's Been" is now available in an autographed, limited edition printing. This new and updated version of Sanders' 1989 underground classic has the reviewers raving. Readers can't put it down. Colleges are using it with great success in American History and Sociology classes. With unique first-hand knowledge of the subject, Sanders writes a detailed account of the people and events of the era. Users of my InfoBot might be especially interested in the appendix regarding 'world domination'. To obtain a brief flyer containing excerpts, a synopsis, and reviews about this riveting account of major trends of the last three decades, simply send a message to walstib-info(a)andronix.org. The author may also be reached at walstib(a)andronix.org <Lewis Sanders>. If you are not interested, _please_ _disregard_this_message_. Regards, -A. J.- =*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-= Without Prejudice UCC 1-207, A. J. Teel, Sui Juris, SLE <ajteel(a)andronix.org> USPS: A.C.T., A. Freeman, c/o 637 So. Broadway #B-212, Boulder, NON-DOMESTIC Colorado Republic, (u).S.A., P.Z.: 80303/TDC (303) 687-4935 24 Hours NIC: AJT =*=-=*=-=*=-= Random Liberty/Freedom Quote for this message =-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*= TREATY. "... Treaties usually provide for their own termination, but independently of that it has been held that when a treaty becomes dangerous to the life or incompatible with the independence of a state or a permanent obstacle to the development of its constitution or the rights of its people, it can be abdicated, and also when the condition of affairs which formed the basis of the treaty has become so modified by time that its execution has become contrary to the nature of things and the original intent of the parties: 22 Ct. Cls. 408." --Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1897 edition. (Is NAFTA a "treaty" or an "agreement"?!) =*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-=*=-= No posts from .andronix.org may be commercially quoted without permission. Email frink-info(a)andronix.org for important 'Freedom, Ink.' Archives Data. Email walstib-info(a)andronix.org for What_A_Long_Strange_Trip_It's_Been Info.

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Re: Nuclear Weapons Material
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >Occasionally coverage in the press does reflect events in the real >world. >-- >Jim Dixon > Christ, don't let the press find out they screwed up like that - otherwise, we'll *never* hear another bit of Real News (tm) again! Dave "I wish I wasn't joking so much" Merriman - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints. Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender. PGP preferred. Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to *love* Big Brother.

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A couple comments: (1) They are not offering any form of encryption -- seem to feel that the intervening Internet mail spools are secure from would-be blackmailers. (2) Are suicide hotline communications, like psychiatric counseling, privileged communications? In what jurisdictions? ------------------------------ Subject: Support for the Suicidal - Full Launch - jo(a)samaritans.org Press Release August 17, 1994 The Samaritans are a non-religious charity offering emotional support to the suicidal and despairing. A test of "Help By E-mail" launched on July 14, 1994 proved so successful that an Internet domain is now open and is reached by mailing jo(a)samaritans.org. The E-mail service is run from Cheltenham, England, and is reached from anywhere with Internet access. At the launch, Mike Haines, the Director said: "During the test month we received over 200 messages. Many were from well wishers, journalists and academics but there were around 15 very desperate people as well. The need for a full launch of our service with an easier address was amply demonstrated." The Samaritans have been offering support to the suicidal and despairing for over 40 years by phone, visit and letter. Callers are guaranteed absolute confidentiality and retain the right to make their own decisions including the decision to end their life. Samaritans are carefully selected and prepared for this work (for which they are not paid). Those working with E-mail have additional training. Volunteers read and reply to mail every day of the year. A nominal end date of December 31, 1994 has been set but initial results have been so encouraging that it is likely to run indefinitely. The idea of an Internet service was born when a volunteer was exploring the UK based CIX conferencing service. Here, he discovered the "suicidehelp" self help group and Newsnet groups such as "alt.support.depression". After discussions with The Samaritans General Office it was decided to try offering a service from Cheltenham. The kind donation of a modem by US Robotics was a great help as was the assistance of staff at Compulink Information Exchange (CIX). The Samaritans of Cheltenham and District 3 Clarence Road CHELTENHAM Glos England Emergency phone: +44 242 515777 Press enquiries: +44 452 854017 E-mail: jo(a)samaritans.org (samaritans(a)cix.compulink.co.uk retained) Anonymous E-mail: samaritans(a)anon.penet.fi (Extremely Slow!) <end>

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Re: Voluntary Governments?
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Here, someone will surely object that by this definition, the Mafia can > > be considered a government. > > Well, yes, of course. It has quasi-governmental functions in southern > Italy. ... and in Central New Jersey and parts of upstate New York as well :-)

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Re: Nuclear Weapons Material
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Dixon <jdd(a)aiki.demon.co.uk> writes: > I was told by what I considered to be reliable sources that > plutonium was extremely toxic. Upon reflection, I am sure > that this is the word that was used: toxic, not radioactive. Plutonium-239 emits alpha particles, which are helium nuclei, at an energy of approximately 5 MeV. Such particles are bulky and can be stopped by a few centimeters of air, or a thin piece of paper or metal foil. In order to cause damage, alpha emitters like plutonium must come in intimate contact with a material, such as the tissues of your lungs or bones or the inside of your favorite memory chip. A billionth of a gram of plutonium inhaled or swallowed is something to seriously worry about, but you can hold a lump of the stuff in your hand as long as it is covered with a leakproof cladding or vitrified into a ceramic. It is in this sense that plutonium is extremely toxic and hazardous to the environment, while at the same time not being particularly radioactive. Heavy shielding is not required between you and it. Of course once fissionable fuels are irradiated, they become extremely radioactive due to a wide spectrum of short-lived fission byproducts and then require precautions when they are handled. > By "clad", do you mean coated in lead? No - the desired properties of cladding are resistance to corrosion and heat, as well as a low absorption cross section for thermal neutrons. We're talking about materials like zirconium and iridium here, as well as specialized alloys of stainless steel. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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$10M breaks MD5 in 24 days
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am not attending the Crypto conference, but I sat in on the evening "rump session" the other day. One of the more interesting papers had a claim (with little detail, unfortunately) that for ten million dollars you could build a machine that would "break" MD5, in the sense of finding another message which would hash to the same as a chosen one, in 24 days. This result did not depend on any internal structure in MD5, but was purely a result of the hash size (128 bits) and the time it takes to calculate a hash. The main new result which allowed this was a more efficient way of handling a parallel search for collisions (two messages which hash to the same thing). In some earlier methods, n machines provide only a sqrt(n) speedup. The new method improves this, although my notes don't show exactly how close they come to an n-fold speedup. The Secure Hash Standard (SHS, aka SHA) is, they said, 64K times slower, hence this technique would take 64K times longer (or cost ~64K times more?) to break that hash. I don't think this is probably anything to really worry about, but maybe it points out a need for a longer hash in the next few years. Hal P.S. The paper was by Paul C. van Oorschot & Michael J. Wiener.

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Kudos to Hal Finney for his descriptions of Stefan Brand's offline cash. As with other offline cash protocols it contains the following assumption: > Let's call the user Irving, and > the number which encodes his identity (it might just be his bank account > number in this case) we will call I. What happens when we've caught Irving double spending (or million spending?) Is it guaranteed that Irving will have enough in his bank account to cover the fraud? I don't see any way to guarantee that except for absurdly large security deposits. Also, are bank accounts required to be in True Names so that multi spenders can be caught and punished? If so, how do we prevent the use of numbered accounts, Duncan Frissel's nom de guerre accounts, etc. and do we really want to set up that kind of True Name infrastructure? Also, what about stolen coins? If Irving can succeed in stealing a coin from Jane without her knowledge, Irving can spend it untraceably as many times as he can get away with (perhaps thousands or even millions, depending on what security precautions we layer above the offline cash), and Jane gets fingered. On the other hand, Jane might simply give Irving some coins, plausibly claim they were stolen, and split the proceeds from Irving's spending spree. In general, multi spending might occur because of accident, malice, or a combination of those two factors. How do we distinguish between accident and malice to determine liability, reputation loss and/or punishment?

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Re: payment & tents
by Hacking In Progress 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 8 Jul 97 at 23:21, Secret Squirrel wrote: > Can you please tell me where tents (for 10+ people) > can be bought/hired in the region of Amsterdam ? > Some of us are eagerly trying to organise this aspect > of the trip, and would welcome pointers. Try for rent: In Purmerend, Netherlands call 02994-20999 They rent army tents. But you'll have to arrange everything with them we can't do that. Expect around 350 guilders rent and about 1000 for deposit. Maurice > Also, I cannot read the [INLINE] phone numbers to call > with my credit card number - can you please publish > both answers on your mailing list ? Call in the Netherlands to 31 20 6263438 cu, Maurice Wessling -- Hacking in Progress 8-9-10 August Tents, TCP/IP, Jolt and politics http://www.hip97.nl/

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Re: EuroEnglish
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Viz speling lik zis, ho neds kriptografy? > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION COMMISSIONERS > > An agreement has been reached to adopt English as the preferred > language for European communications, rather than German, which was the > other possibility. As part of the negotiations, Her Majesty's Government > conceded that English spelling has some room for improvement and has > accepted a five-year phased plan for what will be known as EuroEnglish > (Euro for short). > > In the first year, "s" will be used instead of "c". Sertainly sivil > servants will resieve this news with joy. Also, the hard "c" will be > replaced with "k". Not only will this klear up konfusion, but komputers > and typewriters kan have one less letter. > > There will be growing publik enthusiasm in the sekond year, when the > troublesome "ph" will be replaced by "f". This will make words like > "fotograf" 20 per sent shorter. > > In the third year, publik akseptanse of the new spelling kan be > expekted to reach the stage where more komplikated changes are > possible. Governments will enkorage the removal of double letters, > which have always ben a deterent to akurate speling. Also, al wil agre > that the horible mes of silent "e"s in the languag is disgracful, and > they would go. > > By the fourth year, peopl wil be reseptiv to steps such as replasing > "th" with "z" and "w" with "v". > > During ze fifz year, ze unesesary "o" kan be dropd from vords kontaining > "ou", and similar changes vud of kors be aplid to ozer kombinations of > leters. After zis fifz yer, ve vil hav a reli sensibl riten styl. Zer > vil be no mor trubls or difikultis and evrivun vil find it ezi to > understand ech ozer. > > ZE DREM VIL FINALI KUM TRU. > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >

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AlterNIC takes over InterNIC traffic
by Steve Schear 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C12382%2C00.html?nd AlterNIC takes over InterNIC traffic By Courtney Macavinta July 14, 1997, 12:15 p.m. PT A rival domain name registry to the official Internet registrar, InterNIC, redirected users from "www.internic.net" to its own site last weekend in what is being called a "protest." Netizens told CNET's NEWS.COM that they ended up at AlterNIC, or "www.alternic.net," after typing in InterNIC's URL. AlterNIC was set up by the enhanced Domain Name Services to offer alternate top-level domains, such as ".ltd," ".sex," and ".med." "By redirecting the domain name 'www.internic.net,' we are protesting the recent InterNIC claim to ownership of '.com,' '.org,' and '.net,' which they were supposed to be running in the public trust," AlterNIC CFO Eugene Kashpureff stated on his site. "Our apologies for any trouble this DNS [domain name system] protest has caused you...We think we exercised restraint in the use of our latest DNS technology for this protest," the letter states. "We terminated the protest configuration at 8 a.m. Monday, July 14." The AlterNIC site also contained a link that allowed visitors to access the actual InterNIC in the protest message. InterNIC is the registrar of the most valuable domain names, such as ".com." It is administered in part by Network Solutions under agreement with the National Science Foundation, which ends in March of next year. During its tenure, Network Solutions has collected approximately $78 million in registration fees. The protest is the latest move in the heated debate over who will control the Internet naming system, which has turned into a lucrative business as commercial entities fight to establish brand awareness by using the most coveted names. For example, the name "business.com" was bought recently from its registered owner for $150,000. Last month, the Commerce Department asked for public comment on the future of the domain name system. An ad hoc committee formed in part by the Internet Society also proposed a plan last year for replacing Network Solutions and reconfiguring how the names are handed out. Kashpureff said he is protesting Network Solutions' claim in its recent Securities and Exchange filing that it owned the property rights to ".com" and the other popular domains. "If they think they own the entire domain name space, I've got news for them. Over the weekend, I possessed their name," he told CNET's NEWS.COM. No one at Network Solutions could be immediately reached to comment on whether the company will look into legal ramifications for the rerouting of its traffic by AlterNIC. Kashpureff wouldn't say how he managed to abduct InterNIC's domain name but did say he did it to demonstrate the system's vulnerability. "I'm not releasing how I did it because it would take out the name service on the Net. The hack was a result of a years' worth of work under a project called 'DNS Storm.'" Moreover, there is no telling how many registrations InterNIC could have lost due to the antic. But some Netizens who were involuntarily transported to the alternate site didn't seem to mind. "They do have a good point in the fact that those domain names are supposed to be in the public trust. I don't agree with the InterNIC monopoly either," said Jason Brunette, a Webmaster for TCB Internet in Wisconsin, who was rerouted to AlterNIC this weekend when he tried to register a domain.

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HISTORY - pre-CDA, "compromise", untrue civil-liberties groups (fwd)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 16:44:12 -0400 From: Seth Finkelstein <sethf(a)mit.edu> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Cc: jseiger(a)cdt.org, jberman(a)cdt.org Subject: HISTORY - pre-CDA, "compromise", untrue civil-liberties groups I finally went back digging through my archives, to confirm my memory that we had gone through almost exactly this sort of argument in the run-up to the CDA. All the elements were there - the "compromise" in terms of attempts to use labeling, the defensiveness from EFF, CDT, compared to opposition from the ACLU, and so on. Not a whole lot has changed. Mike Godwin was just as snide and snotty then as he is now :-). The idea then was the infamous White proposal, lower the standard a little, have "good faith" defenses (what evolved into censorware and ratings). Basically, have businesses running the system, don't let the Religious-Right go wild. Well, that lost out narrowly, and so we fought the CDA battle. But after that was won, those interested in content regulation didn't just pack up and go away. They went back to the earlier proposals. Which is an excellent argument that nothing will be gained by any sort of "compromise" here. ================ Seth Finkelstein sethf(a)mit.edu Date: Sat, 2 Dec 1995 21:11:50 -0500 Message-Id: <951202211149_42309455(a)emout05.mail.aol.com> To: declan+(a)cmu.edu, fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu Subject: Re: Reuters/AP: Civil Lib Groups Will Accept Cyberporn Compromise Let me make it clear that the ACLU does not support this compromise and that no true civil liberties organization, which represents the interests of internet users and content providers does. Barry Steinhardt ACLU Message-Id: <QkkAOHO00WCQNEcLgN(a)andrew.cmu.edu> Date: Sat, 2 Dec 1995 16:35:15 -0500 (EST) From: "Declan B. McCullagh" <declan+(a)CMU.EDU> To: Fight Censorship Mailing List <fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu> Subject: Reuters/AP: Civil Lib Groups Will Accept Cyberporn Compromise NEW YORK (Reuter) - A group of commercial online services and civil liberties groups have agreed to accept restrictions on sexual material being sent on the Internet, the New York Times reported in Saturday editions. The compromise, drafted by Washington state Republican Rick White, would create provisions for a Senate bill that would impose fines and prison sentences on people who transmit pornography, the newspaper said. It said the compromise, circulating as a draft on Capitol Hill, made no distinction between commercial and nonprofit service providers. It said the restrictions would presumably apply to all, including Internet access nodes run by academic institutions. The Times said the agreement was being made known days before a joint Senate-House committee is expected to debate a measure that would impose fines of up to $100,000 and jail terms on people who knowingly transmit pornography or material deemed ``filthy'', ``lewd'' or ``indecent''. The compromise would weaken the Senate bill's prohibitions against making indecent material available to children by changing the prohibition to material that is considered ''harmful to children'', the Times reported. The compromise would also offer added protection to online services or information providers who make a good faith effort to keep sex material away from children, the newspaper said. --- NEW YORK (AP) -- There reportedly is agreement on legislation limiting pornography on the Internet. The New York Times reported Saturday that a coalition of commercial on-line providers and some civil liberties groups have reversed course and signed on to a compromise drafted by Rep. Rick White, R-Wash. The move comes just a few days before a House-Senate conference committee takes up a measure that would impose prison sentences and fines on people who knowingly transmit pornography or material deemed ``filthy'' or ``lewd.'' But White's proposal would offer added protection to on-line services that make good-faith efforts to keep pornography away from children. The Times report says the coalition has agreed to the compromise as the lesser evil of other more restrictive proposals. From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic(a)well.com> Message-Id: <199512030242.SAA13684(a)well.com> Subject: Re: Reuters/AP: Civil Lib Groups Will Accept Cyberporn Compromise To: BSACLU(a)aol.com Date: Sat, 2 Dec 1995 18:42:24 -0800 (PST) Cc: declan+(a)cmu.edu, fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu In-Reply-To: <951202211149_42309455(a)emout05.mail.aol.com> from "BSACLU(a)aol.com" at Dec 2, 95 09:11:50 pm Barry Steinhardt writes: > Let me make it clear that the ACLU does not support this compromise and that > no true civil liberties organization, which represents the interests of > internet users and content providers does. > > Barry Steinhardt > ACLU I don't think Barry Steinhardt is in the position of defining, in this rather authoritarian manner, who qualifies as "true civil liberties organization, which represents the interests of internet users and content providers." EFF takes the position that no content-control legislation should be passed. At the same time, we acknowledge the value of efforts, such as that of Congressman White, to steer the Telecom Bill toward language that is congruent with the long-established Constitutional framework that limits what the government can do with regard to expression. (We do so even though we do not endorse any of the proposals that have been floated in the conference committee.) If this counts as "support" for this compromise -- that is, if Barry Steinhardt takes the position that "no true civil liberties organization" could conceivably take a principled position that does not parrot Steinhardt's own -- then perhaps he should say so now, since EFF had planned to work with ACLU on litigation challenging whatever content- control language emerges in the telecom bill. I had not thought, before now, that the only "true" civil liberties position is one that precisely parrots that of Steinhardt and the ACLU. Perhaps the DOJ's antitrust division should investigate the ACLU's monopoly on principled civil-liberties stances. It is a sad historical fact that, all too often, certain civil libertarians feel compelled to spend their energy in quarrelling with allies over relatively minor differences on strategic and tactical issues while the pro-censorship forces close ranks and present a united front. You'd have think we'd all have learned by now. I should hope, by the way, that my own credentials as a "true" civil libertarian are not in question. I'm willing to compare my track record on "cyber liberties" with anyone else's. Perhaps Barry could identify with some specificity those whom he, from his lofty perch, believes to be other than "true" civil libertarians. Alternatively, he may have some suggestions as to how we can all continue to work together without wasting any time pissing on each other. Yours for freedom of speech on the Net, --Mike Godwin Staff Counsel EFF To: fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu From: kip(a)world.std.com (Bob Chatelle) Subject: Re: Reuters/AP: Civil Lib Groups Will Accept Cyberporn Compromise Date: Sat, 2 Dec 1995 22:30:05 EST Message-Id: <kip.1598.0013DAEC(a)world.std.com> In article Mike Godwin <mnemonic(a)well.com> writes: > >Barry Steinhardt writes: >> Let me make it clear that the ACLU does not support this compromise and that >> no true civil liberties organization, which represents the interests of >> internet users and content providers does. >> >> Barry Steinhardt >> ACLU >I don't think Barry Steinhardt is in the position of defining, in this >rather authoritarian manner, who qualifies as "true civil liberties >organization, which represents the interests of internet users and content >providers." >EFF takes the position that no content-control legislation should be >passed. At the same time, we acknowledge the value of efforts, such as >that of Congressman White, to steer the Telecom Bill toward language that >is congruent with the long-established Constitutional framework that >limits what the government can do with regard to expression. (We do so >even though we do not endorse any of the proposals that have been >floated in the conference committee.) I do not believe that Barry was criticizing EFF or any other civil-liberties group that has been opposing content-restrictive legislation. Barry was rightly taking issue with the NYT for claiming that civil-liberties groups were willing to accept compromise on restricting content. I think his statement, that no true civil-liberties group would support such a compromise is valid. Mike, in the above paragraph, explicitly states that EFF does not support such compromises. But we all knew that. I think this was a simple case of someone taking offense where no offense was meant. I do that myself more often than I care to admit. To get pissed off is human. Let's all keep working together. Cheers, Bob -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bob Chatelle kip(a)world.std.com National Writers Union Cambridge, Massachusetts UAW Local 1981, AFL-CIO Boston Coalition for Freedom of Expression Home Page: http://world.std.com/~kip/ PGP Public Key Available on Request "The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom." --Justice William O. Douglas ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Message-Id: <wkkwz4W00YUt9Vcidz(a)andrew.cmu.edu> Date: Mon, 4 Dec 1995 23:51:16 -0500 (EST) From: "Declan B. McCullagh" <declan+(a)CMU.EDU> To: Fight Censorship Mailing List <fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu> Subject: CDT Funding and Cyberporn "Compromise" Cc: berman(a)cdt.org References: <199511230338.TAA00816(a)igc3.igc.apc.org> When I was in Boston over the weekend, I had brunch at a wonderful Harvard Square patisserie with Harvey Silverglate, Seth Finkelstein, and Bob Chatelle. Over coffee and baguettes we talked about the "cybersmut compromise" on the front page of the NYT that morning. The NYT was reporting that "some civil liberties groups" -- in particular the Center for Democracy and Technology -- had agreed to the "compromise:" "While it does embody much of the original Exon proposal, it does so in a way that tries to embody a constitutionally recognized standard." --Jerry Berman, director of the Center for Democracy and Technology We were confused. This is the same "compromise" that Barry Steinhardt from the ACLU said that "no true civil liberties organization" would support. (I recall that Barry is the associate executive director and the head of the ACLU's Civil Liberties in Cyberspace task force.) Today I ran across this message about the CDT. I'm copying this to Jerry Berman in case he'd like to respond. -Declan ---------- Forwarded message begins here ---------- Date: Thu, 23 Nov 1995 00:38:12 GMT From: "W. Curtiss Priest" <BMSLIB(a)mitvma.mit.edu> Subject: Corporate Crime and CDT Funding on behalf of so-called medical privacy There is a very interesting discussion on the Federal Medical Information bill on the med-privacy list, Curt ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- The following article appeared in the current issue of Corporate Crime Reporter (Volume 9, Number 44, November 20, 1995, page one). It is redisseminated on the Internet with the permission of CCR. SELF-PROCLAIMED "PUBLIC INTEREST" GROUP HEAVILY FUNDED BY COMPUTER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, DATABANK CORPORATIONS THAT WOULD BENEFIT FROM "MEDICAL PRIVACY" LEGISLATION GROUP SUPPORTS -- EQUIFAX, TRW, DUNN & BRADSTREET IN THE MIX The Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT), a self- proclaimed "public interest organization," is in fact heavily funded by large private computer, telecommunications, and databank corporations. Funders of CDT, a two-year old Washington, D.C.-based advocacy organization, include Dunn & Bradstreet Corp., Equifax Inc., and TRW Information Services, three large databank corporations that stand to benefit from federal legislation CDT actively helped shaped and is shepherding through Congress. This year, CDT has received $699,643 from more than 30 large corporations, including $100,000 from Microsoft, $75,000 from AT&T, $60,000 from Bell Atlantic, $50,000 from Apple Computer, $25,000 from IBM, $10,000 from TRW Information Services, $10,000 from Dunn & Bradstreet, $5,000 from Direct Marketing Association, and $5,000 from Equifax Inc. (For a complete list of CDT's funders, see At A Glance, page 16) At a hearing before the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee last week, CDT deputy director Janlori Goldman said that CDT "strongly supports" legislation, S. 1360, sponsored by Senators Robert Bennett (R-Utah) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont), because it represents "the most comprehensive and strong privacy bill the Congress has yet considered in this area." But opponents of the bill argue that the legislation is not a privacy statute at all, but instead is a vehicle that would legitimize the creation of large computerized databanks of personal medical information, thus benefitting those companies like TRW and Equifax that give financial support to CDT. The legislation would allow for broad, unauthorized searches of those databanks, opponents claim. In an interview, Goldman told Corporate Crime Reporter that all of CDT's corporate funding is earmarked for other projects and that none of the corporate funding is supporting her work on the medical privacy bill. "The corporate funding is not related at all, in any way shape or form to my work on this bill," Goldman said. "The reason we are doing this bill is that I've worked on privacy issues for a decade. The most important privacy issue to work on is the passage of the medical records privacy legislation. That is a very sincere issue for me." "None of the corporate support that CDT gets is related to my work on this bill," Goldman emphasized. "None. Zippo." CDT's executive director, Jerry Berman agreed. "We have no funding for the medical privacy project -- zero," Berman said. But critics of the CDT's position on the legislation were skeptical. "During the Senate hearing this week, Senator Bennett was angered at the suggestion that S. 1360 was an industry bill," said Jamie Love of Ralph Nader's Center for Study of Responsive Law. "He claimed that he had widely consulted with privacy groups and patient advocates. CDT's Janlori Goldman was the key person who decided who was in the loop, and who was not in the loop on this issue. Groups that were not receptive to the idea of massive database systems of personal medical records were excluded from deliberations." "To find out that CDT has been funded by companies such as Equifax, TRW, Dunn & Bradstreet, IBM and the telephone companies is remarkable, because these are among the groups who have the most at stake in legitimizing and preserving the current system of maintaining and managing medical records," Love said. "I think that Janlori Goldman should have mentioned in her Senate testimony that CDT was funded by corporations who have an interest in this issue." "If CDT were doing its job, TRW and Equifax wouldn't want to give it money," Love added. Harold Eist, president-elect of the American Psychiatric Association, said that "any datagathering and large computer company would clearly benefit from legislation that drives large amounts of individually identified data about American citizens into data banks without the knowledge and permission of those American citizens." "Selling that information would represent a gold mine for those companies," Eist said. "It is not surprising that an organization with a disingenuous name -- Center for Democracy & Technology -- would be supporting a bill with a disingenuous name -- The Medical Records Confidentiality Act," Eist said. "In fact, this bill represents an effort to give away the privacy of American citizens without their knowledge." "My understanding is that Janlori Goldman was involved in writing the bill," Eist said. "It seems to me that as a former civil libertarian, she should know very well that there are loopholes in that bill regarding protections to privacy that you could drive a Mack truck through." "Unless people can be assured that their privacy will be protected, there is little or no chance that they will reveal the kind of tormented and dark secrets that they have to reveal to recover from their illnesses," Eist said. "Confidentially is the sine qua non of medical treatment, and especially if it is psychiatric medical treatment." A driving force behind the effort to derail the Bennett/Leahy bill is Denise Nagel, a Boston physician who organized the Coalition for Patient Rights of New England "to restore confidentiality to the doctor-patient relationship." Nagel refused to comment on CDT's funding. At the Senate hearing last week, Nagel told the committee "I have no industry ties." Nagel charged that S. 1360 was written "to advance the interests of certain segments of the computer, telecommunications, data processing and health-care industries." "With this bill they would be able to careen full speed ahead to develop data networks that will give innumerable people access to our medical records legally and without our knowledge," Nagel said. "I am convinced that S. 1360 is not at all primarily concerned with the confidentiality of medical records," Nagel told the committee. "It is just the opposite. It talks about informed consent, but then authorizes the creation of databases without patient knowledge or consent. It talks about individual rights, and then allows police broad authority to search databases directly instead of obtaining a specific record from the patient's doctor. It talks about civil and criminal sanctions, and then pre-empts all common law and most existing and future state statutes. It talks about ensuring personal privacy with respect to medical records, and then sets a ceiling rather than a floor on medical confidentiality." AT A GLANCE: CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY FUNDING, 1994- 1995 American Advertising Federation 500.00 America Online, Inc. 25,000.00 Apple Computer Inc. 50,000.00 AT&T 75,000.00 Bell Atlantic 60,000.00 Business Software Alliance 6,000.00 Cellular Tellecomm Indust Assn 10,000.00 CompuServ 30,000.00 Delphi Internet Services Corp 10,000.00 Direct Marketing Association 5,000.00 Dunn & Bradstreet Corp 10,000.00 EMA 5,000.00 Equifax Inc. 5,000.00 John Gilmore 2,500.00 Hartford Foundation 153,000.00 IBM 25,000.00 Information Technology Industry 5,000.00 Interactive Digital Software 5,000.00 Lotus 6,250.00 MARC 80,000.00 MCI Telecommunications 15,000.00 Microsoft 100,000.00 National Cable Television Assn 15,000.00 Netscape Communications Corp 5,000.00 Newspaper Association of Am 5,000.00 Nynex Government Affairs 25,000.00 Pacific Telesis 25,000.00 Prodigy Service Company 10,000.00 Software Publishers Assn 10,000.00 Time Warner Inc 5,000.00 TRW Information Svcs 10,000.00 US Telephone Association 10,000.00 US West Inc 10,000.00 Total Funding 814,020.00 Received 1994 114,377.00 Received 1995 699,643.00 Total Funding 814,020.00 Russell Mokhiber russell(a)essential.org voice: 202/429-6928

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by entreprenuers＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: HISTORY - pre-CDA, "compromise", untrue civil-liberties groups (fwd)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 17:19:58 -0400 From: Jonah Seiger <jseiger(a)cdt.org> To: Seth Finkelstein <sethf(a)mit.edu>, fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Cc: jberman(a)cdt.org Subject: Re: HISTORY - pre-CDA, "compromise", untrue civil-liberties groups At 4:44 PM -0400 7/17/97, Seth Finkelstein wrote: > I finally went back digging through my archives, to confirm my >memory that we had gone through almost exactly this sort of argument >in the run-up to the CDA. All the elements were there - the >"compromise" in terms of attempts to use labeling, the defensiveness >from EFF, CDT, compared to opposition from the ACLU, and so on. Not a >whole lot has changed. Mike Godwin was just as snide and snotty then >as he is now :-). > ><....> Ah, the old 'drag out CDT's funding list' trick. For the record, CDT is supported by companies and foundations who share our agenda and goals, and believe that we are effective advocates of our views. Search all you want for a consipracy -- you aren't going to find one. While CDT makes no apology for our position (along with EFF and others) to reluctantly support White's proposal 2.5 years ago given the context of the debate (read our statement at http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp311204.html) - the fact is that the Supreme Court decision settled this debate, and the White compromise was never passed by Congress. As for your claim that what happened yesterday at the white house is similar to the "compromise" of December 1995, you are way off base. White 1995 White House 1997 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Content Regulations imposed No content regulations, no law by Congress on all Internet or regulation of Net, no requiement Publishers. to label or rate content. Criminal Penalties for No criminal penalties for anything display of Harmful To besides trafficing in child Minors Material w/o good pornography, obscenity or faith effort to block stalking kids online (illegal before kids access CDA) The bottom line is that these are two remarkably different approaches. Even White himself is supportive of the direction the President articulated yesterday. Hope that helps clarify a bit. Jonah * Value Your Privacy? The Government Doesn't. Say 'No' to Key Escrow! * Adopt Your Legislator - http://www.crypto.com/adopt -- Jonah Seiger, Communications Director (v) +1.202.637.9800 Center for Democracy and Technology pager: +1.202.859.2151 <jseiger(a)cdt.org> http://www.cdt.org PGP Key via finger http://www.cdt.org/homes/jseiger/

2 1

No Subject
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi everyone, Well, I guess it's official now. I'm going to speak at MacWorld on Thursday the 7th. If your planning to go to MacWorld, feel free to stop by and talk about e$ and financial cryptography on the Macintosh. > ---------------------------------- > * DIGITAL COMMERCE FOR THE REST OF US [Session 92, Thursday 8/7, 4:00-5:15 > pm, World Trade Center] -- What are the fundamental forces in the technology > of digital commerce? What effect will digital commerce have on society? What > are Mac's strengths are in this environment? What are some very specific > things that Apple and the Macintosh community can do, right now, to > participate as a full partner in the development of digital commerce on > public networks? What are the technologies that Mac people should concentrate > on to be first movers in the new geodesic economy? Solo Speaker: BOB > HETTINGA, Freelance Digital Commerce Analyst, e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, > MA 02131; http://www.shipwright.com/ > ---------------------------------- Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Re: <sigh>
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

William H. Geiger III wrote: > If you have sent any message to me between 00:00-13:00 GMT-0400 today > please resend the message. > Also could someone from the mailing list send me copies of the messages > that I have missed. Happy to oblige. ------------------ Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 01:21:41 -0700 To: cypherpunks(a)Algebra.COM From: Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> Subject: Geiger's email Has anyone knocked out Geiger's email yet? --Tim May ------------------ Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 0:15:24 +0200 (MET DST) From: Zooko Journeyman <zooko(a)xs4all.nl> Message-Id: <199707171415.QAA06056(a)xs2.xs4all.nl> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com, neumann(a)csl.sri.com Subject: Re: Geiger's email Yeah, Lucky Green took care of it. We should have a few hours to discuss what we're going to do to that piece of shit, WG III. Zooko...Zooko...Zooko ------------------- Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 00:51:46 -0700 From: geeman(a)best.com To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Gieger's email I've got the bodies of the children on ice. Steve Schear has the superglue and Dimitri has the nails. Peter Neumann just placed an anonymous call to the FBI, so we're ready to fix that rat bastard. Let's take this discussion off-line in case WG III manages to get his email back on-line. Gee, Man! -------------------

2 1

Center for Security Policy calls for domestic key escrow (fwd)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 16:00:27 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Center for Security Policy calls for domestic key escrow In the boxing ring of Washington, the Center for Security Policy packs a hefty punch. Its faxed alerts appear once or twice a week on the desks of thousands of key decisionmakers. They're predictably hawkish, with titles like "The Nation Needs MORE B-2s." A recent one focused on encryption. The message: The Clinton administration isn't doing *enough* to control crypto, especially domestically: But a national information infrastructure also needs selective transparency on call to support users' needs to get at their encrypted data... U.S. law enforcement agencies in carrying out criminal investigations also need to be able to access voice communications, data records and data transmissions consistent with constitutional protections. The loss of this investigative technique, which is subject to strict judicial scrutiny -- would be disastrous for law enforcement. Regrettably, the Clinton Administration has been unwilling to stand up and say, here is what needs to be done -- perhaps out of a fear of alienating a key constituency, the computer industry. Read on for the full text of the alert and a well-reasoned response by ATR's Jim Lucier. -Declan Additional articles on crypto: http://pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,931,00.html http://pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1022,00.html ************** No. 97-D 88 DECISION BRIEF 25 June 1997 For Immediate Release (202) 466-0515 Breaking the Code on the Encryption Debate: National Security Interests Are Being Jeopardized (Washington, D.C.): With relatively little fanfare, a truly momentous public policy debate is taking place in Washington. Unfortunately, all other things being equal, it seems likely that the outcome of this debate concerning the domestic use, foreign export and international regulation of encryption techniques will do grievous harm to the national security interests of the United States. 'You Can't Tell the Players...' Such an extraordinary, and ominous, result is in prospect due to several factors: By its very nature, encryption -- a generic name for numerous means of encoding computer, voice or other transmissions of data so as to conceal the contents from unauthorized access -- is one of the most complex and obscure of sciences. Given its direct relevance for the protection of classified U.S. government information and for the penetration of foreign governments and other entities' secure communications, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) has jealously tried to shield from public view as much as possible about the technology and techniques involved in encryption and code-breaking. The necessary secretiveness associated with what NSA does and how the spread of encryption systems might affect the American ability to perform signals intelligence (SIGINT) by intercepting and monitoring foreign communications enormously complicates this debate. Robust encryption at home contributes to national security as well as protecting American industry, critical information networks and citizens' privacy. But a national information infrastructure also needs selective transparency on call to support users' needs to get at their encrypted data. U.S. law enforcement agencies in carrying out criminal investigations also need to be able to access voice communications, data records and data transmissions consistent with constitutional protections. The loss of this investigative technique, which is subject to strict judicial scrutiny -- would be disastrous for law enforcement. Widespread use of unbreakable encryption is exactly what terrorists, drug lords, pedophiles and their ilk want to see. But law enforcement needs a controlled window into this encryption as part of its responsibility to detect, prevent or prosecute criminal behavior. Experience with court-ordered wiretaps suggests that, by requiring judicial approval of such electronic monitoring, this function critical to the rule of law and a civil society can be performed without risk of serious abuse. Due to advances in information techniques, the know-how and means for providing sophisticated encryption capabilities has proliferated dramatically in recent years. With the burgeoning use of the Internet and other electronic devices for conducting business, the demand for means to keep voice communications, data records and data transfers private has also grown tremendously. U.S. manufacturers of computer software and hardware -- many of whom have been key supporters of and enjoy great influence with President Clinton and his Administration -- are demanding an opportunity to meet this demand with encryption products that will be exceedingly robust, if not impenetrable. They typically point not only to the trade benefits such sales would represent but to the prospect that foreign manufacturers of encryption technologies will gladly supply products not available from American sources. Similar arguments have proven effective in obtaining Administration support for the wholesale elimination of export controls on powerful computers -- even supercomputers. President Clinton has already issued an Executive Order substantially liberalizing the export of powerful encryption capabilities. Under its terms, encryption programs involving up to 40-bit keys (in layman's terms, the number of variables used in combination to conceal a given piece of encrypted message traffic, one of several factors determining the robustness of an encryption program) can be exported without a license. The Executive Order also permits programs of any strength to be exported provided they have a "key recovery" capability (i.e., a code-breaking spare key has been created) -- even if that key resides with the purchaser of such encryption. Civil libertarians -- including some conservatives with well-deserved reputations for concern about U.S. national security -- have taken the position that techniques which impede or preclude government monitoring of electronic transmissions are highly desirable. Their enthusiasm for the most widespread proliferation of encryption techniques, both domestically and internationally, provides tremendous political cover for others with more suspect motivations. Counter-culture opponents of U.S. government power, including some holding high office in the Clinton Administration, appear untroubled by the diminution of American capabilities to perform signals intelligence -- historically an area of decisive and strategically vital advantage for the United States.(1) Evidently, they are no more concerned by the other side of this coin: Thanks to the Clinton-approved transfer of American supercomputers and other powerful data processing systems, foreign governments are likely to have much enhanced capabilities to perform their own code-breaking operations, further reducing U.S. dominance in the field. The Legislative Context Against this backdrop, several bills have been introduced reflecting two basic approaches. The first sponsored by Senators Conrad Burns (R-MT) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT) in the Senate and by Rep. Robert Goodlatte (R-VA) in the House would essentially eliminate controls on the export of encryption. This legislation is favored by the computer software and hardware industries and a number of civil libertarians. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott has thrown his support behind the Burns-Leahy bill. A bill recently introduced by Senator John McCain, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, presents an alternative approach. It attempts to "split the difference," addressing domestic law enforcement concerns by way of creating incentives for U.S. manufacturers to participate in a key management infrastructure (i.e., establishing means whereby federal agencies, with appropriate court orders, can obtain the ability to read encrypted communications). While the incentives to do so are significant, the companies would be under no requirement to take part in this arrangement. As a sop to the encryption industry, however, the McCain legislation would make several concessions that could be injurious to the national security. First, it would raise the threshold for unlicenced exports from 40 bits to 56 bits. This represents a dramatic increase in the power of encryption programs that will find their way into the hands of hostile powers, international terrorists and other foreign criminal elements -- and will add dramatically to the time and computing power required by U.S. intelligence to monitor their activities. Second, the McCain legislation calls for the creation of an industry-government advisory board tasked to consider and jointly develop recommendations concerning future standards for encryption exports. Such an arrangement would put those responsive to multinational stockholders on an essentially equal footing with government agencies responsible for the national security. In addition, the bill would mandate foreign-availability assessments -- a pretext frequently used by industry to argue for even the most irresponsible transfers of U.S. technology.(2) Parsing Out the Issues There are, in fact, three separate issues involved in the present encryption debate -- issues that have, to some extent, been commingled by the Clinton Administration, it appears in an effort to obscure what is at stake for a vital national security capability. 1. Domestic Policy Encryption products are the future for the privacy and security of communications and information. Americans have a right to be secure in the knowledge that their private communications and information remain private, and that they can conduct electronic commercial transactions reasonably safe from fraud or compromise. Security embedded in consumer goods (as well as in information systems) needs to become a common part of how business works in this country. There is today no restriction on the use of encryption within the United States. Americans may import any encryption devices and software into the U.S. There are, however, restrictions on the export of U.S. encryption items. Unfortunately, encryption in the hands of domestic criminals can be a menace to American business and society, enabling them to hide illicit records and transactions. For law enforcement today, encrypted communications mean no electronic surveillance. Court-ordered wiretaps may be unenforceable. Because of the importance of court-ordered electronic surveillance to law enforcement, law enforcement agencies across the country believe the impact of widely proliferating encryption will be disastrous for them, unless they have a means of lawfully and promptly decrypting communications and information of criminal suspects. Accordingly, the United States requires common standards for accessing encrypted data and communications (known as "key recovery"). Importantly, such standards are required not only by law enforcement but in order to support commercial needs (for example, companies need to be able to get at their electronic records if the person who encrypted them dies or turns into a vindictive disgruntled employee). Consumers also have a vested interest in ensuring that standards exist whereby they can be assured that encryption will be reliable and easily interoperable (e.g., to manage interfaces between various network systems). A domestic public key recovery infrastructure is the answer to these requirements, A public key recovery infrastructure is, however, particularly essential for law enforcement. Increasingly, criminals are utilizing techniques to encode their phone calls, concealing their computer transmissions and keeping their records locked up in encrypted computer disks or drives, rather than in file cabinets. Subject to the limits of U.S. constitutional guarantees, law enforcement needs to be able to continue to do its job in the information age. Law enforcement does not need more intrusive authorities or abilities than it has now; it needs merely to be able to continue to be able to make use of the same investigative techniques presently available with respect to wiretaps. Alternatively, if the government does nothing but passively watch as encryption proliferates with no standards to guide it, law enforcement will lose critical investigative capabilities. In all likelihood, it will be forced to turn to more intrusive techniques (microphones in the room or car rather than taps on telephones), measures that are more invasive of privacy and which put more police officers' lives at risk. Criminals (drug dealers, kidnappers, thieves) will enjoy safe havens they do not presently have, and more good citizens will find themselves victims of unsolved crimes. Regrettably, the Clinton Administration has been unwilling to stand up and say, here is what needs to be done -- perhaps out of a fear of alienating a key constituency, the computer industry. The Administration clearly appreciates the need to support law enforcement (law and order is, after all, good politics). But when asked, its spokesmen say they are afraid their endorsement of a domestic policy would prejudice its chances of enactment, citing their experience with the public relations disaster of an earlier encryption management initiative known as the "Clipper Chip." The truth is that there is no one better positioned than President Clinton to provide leadership, given his well known ties to the hardware and software industries. 2. Export Controls In some respects, the Clinton Administration's policy has been worse than doing nothing: It has tied the domestic encryption issue to liberalizing export controls on encryption techniques, ostensibly in the hopes of buying the support of the producers of encryption products for greater cooperation with regard to domestic key management arrangements. This is most regrettable since export controls are the single most important tool the United States has for protecting sensitive national security interests in this arena. The unavoidable reality is that U.S. national security is heavily dependent on being able to collect intelligence by listening in on what its adversaries -- actual and potential -- are up to. This intelligence saves lives, wins wars, and preserves the peace. And in an era of information warfare, having superior information systems may be determinative of military power. This reality was reflected until last year by treating encryption technologies as part of the State Department's Munitions Control List. President Clinton's Executive Order, however, moved export controls on such technology over to the much less rigorous Commerce Department. It also further adulterated the export controls regime by directing that: 40-bit encryption programs may be exported without a license; 56-bit encryption programs may be exported without a license provided the exporter is working on a public key recovery technology base; and any product that is part of a public key recovery system may be exported without a license. American products should enjoy the lion's share of the market (U.S. software has 75% of the global market today), but U.S. exporters of highly capable "crypto" -- 40-bit and above -- should be required to get a license to minimize the likelihood that their products will fall into the wrong hands. Any further weakening of export controls would have a deeply debilitating impact on national security. With all of the focus on domestic encryption regime, and with no advocacy from the Executive Branch, national security interests are not being represented -- and are losing out. 3. International Dimension To make matters worse, the Clinton Administration -- under the "leadership" of a controversial former Carter Administration official, David Aaron, who has been designated as its "Ambassador for Encryption" -- has come up with a curious and dangerous gimmick: It proposes to "multilateralize" yet another area of sovereign U.S. policy concern(3) by getting OECD nations to take the lead in an area it is reluctant to champion domestically, namely in implementing national key recovery regimes. As in other issues -- ranging from environmental regulation to family planning -- the Administration appears to hope that the creation of common international practice and standards will provide a basis for imposing arrangements domestically that would otherwise be highly controversial, and perhaps politically costly. Not surprisingly, the Administration has come under some criticism from allies for the hypocrisy of trying to make them go first with respect to developing key recovery infrastructures even as it declines to step up to the issue at home. But this is worse than simple hypocrisy. It is flatly inconsistent with American values for U.S. officials to argue that foreign governments -- many of which do not recognize the basic individual rights of their citizens -- should have unfettered access to their private communications. Few of these governments actually observe the strict limitations on electronic surveillance which pertain in the United States. It is one thing for the U.S. to have a domestic key recovery regime which is subject to the rigorous and proper constraints of its Constitution and system of justice. It is quite another to say that, as a foreign policy objective of this country, Washington wants to guarantee the ability of foreign governments to spy on their own citizens, or (worse) on Americans who may communicate with those foreign citizens or travel within those countries. The Bottom Line The Clinton Administration appears once again to have gotten the answers exactly wrong. Their efforts have confused the debate and helped to divide the ranks of those who generally are concerned with national security -- even as they are jeopardizing vital national security interests, evidently out of a desire to avoid antagonizing major political donors. Domestic policy, export controls, and international accords concerning encryption are different concerns, each in need of understanding and debate on the merits. And the vital American national security requirement for electronic intelligence abroad must be supported. On an even more fundamental level, those who traditionally are sensitive to national security concerns must not allow differing perceptions of domestic law enforcement to translate into legislation that may not only endanger the defense of the United States but undermine its rule of law domestically. A lawless society is no defender of American liberties. The undeniable fact is that U.S. national security is dependent upon our ability to collect intelligence in peacetime on foreign threats, from terrorist groups to the proliferation of "weapons of mass destruction" to the status of thousands of nuclear-tipped missiles in potentially unfriendly hands. Likewise, success in foreign matters (from trade to diplomacy to support for friends and allies) requires intelligence to identify opportunities for the U.S. officials to act in defense of our values and interests around the world. The U.S. ability to gather SIGINT therefore is not something about which responsible Americans can afford to be ambivalent. This is a vital national security priority. And it is, to be sure, one that must take precedence over the commercial advantages of selling U.S. software abroad. 1. During both World War II and the half century of the Cold War, SIGINT was far and away the most important type of intelligence the U.S. gathered. Without the ability to collect and read enemy codes and ciphers, the U.S. might well have lost the Second World War. Without SIGINT, the Cold War might have ended far differently and might well have turned into a hot war at critical junctures; certainly, the U.S. would have been almost blind to many of the Soviet Union's malevolent activities. 2. It is unclear on what basis other industries selling sensitive products -- for example, the supercomputer, chemical and biotechnology, machine tool, chip manufacturers, etc. -- would be denied similar vehicles for demanding the elimination of any remaining export controls on the transfer of their respective products. What is more, it not self-evident that the national security will be well served by advertising which foreign encryption products are of concern to the U.S. government, let alone encouraging American manufacturers to supply superior -- i.e., less breakable encoding techniques -- in place of such products. 3. See in this connection, the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences #9: C.W.C. Proponents Dissemble About Treaty Arrangements Likely to Disserve U.S. Interests (No. 97-D 46, 27 March 1997). *************** Americans for Tax Reform Memo To: Frank From: Jim Lucier CC: Friends Date: June 26, 1997 Re: Encryption and National Security Dear Frank: I think we both agree that total U.S. dominance of all technologies across the board is a vital guarantor of national security. We disagree on factual premises. The powerful encryption methods under discussion are universally published mathematical techniques taught in universities everywhere to people like my brother who studied them at the undergraduate level. I particularly recommend the fine textbook by Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography. It is a mistake to assume this information, once disseminated, can be controlled. It is also incorrect to assume there is only one type of encryption which the U.S. could somehow keep secret. In fact, there are an infinite variety of techniques, some more elegant than others and all with their quirks, but many offering effective security. Indeed, almost any routine that manipulates data --including file compression algorithms -- can be considered a type of encryption. The case of encryption is dramatically unlike that of supercomputers, where one or two manufacturers in the U.S. may be uniquely capable of producing cutting edge equipment. Bad actors will not voluntarily participate in a key management system they can easily opt out of. The impact on crime will be zero. Only law-abiding people will be trapped in a system that opens them to maximal violations of privacy by governments and technically sophisticated rogue agents. This is not a case of greedy software companies that want to "sell encryption" overseas. In fact, encryption software is a low-margin commodity product that only a few specialists sell profitably. U.S. companies want to sell high-margin products like Lotus Notes, cc:Mail, Domino, secure servers, and Oracle databases, and sophisticated financial management tools that operate in a networked environment. U.S. companies dominate the market for these enterprise-wide, mission-critical applications. For now. The problem is that without encryption modules, the American products are useless for conducting secure business, and the power of networking, which gives them their unique value-added quality, is eliminated. U.S. regulations even prohibit American companies from selling software with "hooks," where foreign-made encryption products can be plugged in. The result is increasing inroads by foreign competitors. The German, Japanese, and Chinese governments are pointedly encouraging their programmers to make hay while they can. Dozens of companies around the world explicitly advertise that they sell products not subject to U.S. export restrictions. There is also the chance that the United States will lose the opportunity to set and dominate standards in vital areas such as digital currency, which involve encryption now subject to control. Currently, Europeans lead in this field. The use of telephone wiretaps has exploded under the Clinton Administration, and under legislation passed last year the number of people impacted by telephone wiretaps is slated to grow still further. For many, this gives ample ground to doubt that wiretaps are used sparingly, or that cases of abuse are minimal. The real restraint on the use of telephone wiretaps is that they are very expensive, and they require human intervention. Technology does not yet allow machines to monitor calls. On the Internet, by contrast, "packet sniffing" is virtually cost-free, and the packets of data are machine readable. Thus there is nothing to prevent widespread abuse of privacy. The single-sentence Frist Amendment to McCain-Kerrey which purports to solve this problem is totally meaningless. The claims of law enforcement are wildly exaggerated and not offered in the context of any statistical evidence to make serious risk assessment possible. Strong encryption is dangerous? Compared to what? No encryption? A government-sponsored system only incompetent criminals will use? For decades people have been predicting the death of SIGINT. It never happens. The reason is that as the volume of communications goes up, the opportunities for SIGINT also increase. In a networked environment, virtually any interaction with legitimate businesses, and even public infrastructure, can create a database of transaction streams greatly useful to law enforcement and intelligence agencies, who can examine this data with powerful heuristic searching tools. The information age will give, and is giving, law enforcement officers and intelligence agencies astonishing new powers. Law enforcement officials who claim they will be powerless in the future are being somewhat disingenuous. What really worries them is missing the opportunity to gain powers they dont have now, plus the stress of learning to operate in a different environment. The key management infrastructure (KMI) called for in McCain-Kerrey is a fiction. Detailed technical standards for such an infrastructure do not exist and may take several years to develop. A recent technical paper by leading private-sector cryptographers claims that the requirements of building a KMI are beyond the current expertise of the field. A central problem is that the Justice Department's insistence on real-time access to data in transit is not consistent with existing models of key recovery for stored data. If KMI works, it offers no advantage and many grave dangers. If it doesn't work, it is a costly drain on the economic sectors currently driving U.S. economic growth. A global KMI in which the U.S. arbitrarily limits its own information security and somehow expects other countries to participate is an atrocious idea. Reasonable people can debate the issue of export controls. The weight of evidence suggests that controls should be loosened, but there can be legitimate argument of how far and how quickly we should go. The McCain-Kerrey bill is by no means a "compromise" on export controls. It is legislation totally different from the Burns, Goodlatte, and Leahy proposals Congress has long been considering. For the first time, McCain-Kerrey would seek to impose controls on U.S. domestic use of cryptography through a combination of regulation, criminal penalties, civil liability exposure, and taxpayer-financed industrial policy. It is highly significant that the Administration forced this legislation through the Commerce Committee without a single day's hearings. Senators were given only three days to study the legislation and supplied with misleading and incorrect information about who supported it. McCain-Kerrey probably could not have withstood public scrutiny in the Commerce Committee. As it is, the bill will very likely never move to the Senate Floor, but the Administration now has substantial leverage to pursue its regulatory agenda. The relaxation of exportable key lengths from 40- to 56-bits is not a sop to industry but a pathetic offering that raises the time-to-break for a foreign intelligence agency stealing U.S. trade secrets from ..0002 seconds to 12 seconds. McCain-Kerrey actually represents a step backward from previous Administration positions on the issue of export controls and exemplifies the bad faith and intransigence this Administration has consistently shown. Last year, for instance, the Administration announced it was relaxing export controls from 40 to 56 bits and then reversed itself, saying the relaxation, if offered, would only be temporary and contingent on businesses developing plans to comply with Administration key-recovery standards. In short, the Administration has been using export controls solely as a club to get unprecedented domestic regulation. In economic terms, McCain-Kerrey represents a stunning arrogation of power by Congress to itself for the purposes of regulating digital commerce which, as the digital age begins, is probably at least as significant as the Communications Act of 1934. This makes the "three days-no hearings" approval process in committee all the more astonishing. A vigorous national security debate is welcome on this issue. The issue of encryption involves profoundly difficult choices and any decisions we make must be taken with grave deliberation and great care. We can postpone these choices but we cannot put them off forever. Ultimately, these decisions turn on findings of fact as to whether control of encryption is still possible. The Administration has made no effort to show its entire proposal is not based on wishful thinking and a regulatory mindset. The United States does have enormous investment in its SIGINT capabilities, which are many and varied. These will also not disappear overnight. But tomorrow will not be like today. Peter Drucker has written movingly of the stress undergone by companies who feel they owe their existence to a particular product but who discover that markets have changed and they must do something different. Companies that succeed are the ones that can innovate. A similar mindset is in order for national security policy. The United States has always competed by out-innovating our adversaries, and on this basis we have always won. The risk to be avoided all costs is a Maginot Line mentality. French planners obsessed with fighting the first World War lavished untold fortunes and considerable engineering brilliance on a structure that was not only useless in the following conflict but locked France into a defensive posture that guaranteed France would be defeated in days by the Germanys mechanized army. The fundamental national security interest of the United States is best served by total dominance of world markets in information technology as well as information technology products and services, financial services, telecommunications and a host of other fields. Our goal should be raw commercial power in all these areas -- especially information products and information flows -- backed by impressive military and intelligence capabilities. However, we do not reach this goal by saddling U.S. business with irrational regulation and ill-conceived industrial policy. When U.S. companies dominate the world markets for advanced management software which foreign businesses must use to remain competitive and telecommunications services which have no equal on the planet, there is tremendous scope for the NSA to work productively with U.S. business. Indeed, the national security community has long enjoyed such a relationship, and law enforcement agencies are well-advised to develop one. The essence of such a relationship, however, is that it must be maintained quietly. We do not need to advertise worldwide exactly how the United States plans to conduct its foreign intelligence or how law enforcement agencies, in truly exceptional and Constitutionally permissible cases, plan to conduct domestic surveillance. Meanwhile, we must remember that the United States has the most to protect in terms of intellectual property, proprietary knowledge, global business dealings, and critical information infrastructures that keep all aspects of our societyincluding the military and strategic onesrunning smoothly. We should be the worlds masters of encryption, the tools to break it, and the ways of getting around it. We should protect our information security by having a diversified environment that relies on no one government-mandated information standard. It should be a stated goal of U.S. policy in the Information Age and the global economy to force totalitarian societies and welfare states to play by our rules or collapse. Our friends in Europe need a wakeup call. Our trusted allies in Asia need reassurance the United States can still exert powerful influence in their region. Developing nations need the model of U.S. economic growth. Russia must see unthreatening but overwhelming U.S. power. The Chinese regime should experience outright destabilization when its totalitarian system breaks down under a coordinated U.S. information technology assault through peaceful means such as Radio Free Asia and Internet communication. These are worthy goals, and they are eminently attainable, as long as technology boondoggles dont sidetrack us along the way. In short, I salute you for making the best possible case for caution at a time when caution is due. However, it is also a time to examine a changing world carefully and prepare for the future as best we can. Let's set our sights on a new American Century. ------------------------- Declan McCullagh Time Inc. The Netly News Network Washington Correspondent http://netlynews.com/

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ESPN hacked -- got info? (fwd)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 17:56:29 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: ESPN hacked -- got info? [From a friend. Any responses? --Declan] ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Declan -- Do you have any information about the ESPN/SportZone web site store being hacked? Or a contact? The pro-crypto folks on the Hill are quite interested to know if 1) this site was using encryption before being hacked and 2) what type of encryption they are using now (one of the press stories noted that crypto was one of the security measures implemented after the hacking). I realize this was probably an inside job, but it's good fodder for the Hill. Any insight you might have -- or other examples -- would be great. Thanks in advance.

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fbi wiretapping law runs into friction
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message From: jackdoolin(a)earthlink.net Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 14:56:59 -0400 Subject: SNET: Phone firms resist FBI wiretap gear - -> SearchNet's SNETNEWS Mailing List - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Published Wednesday, July 16, 1997, in the San Jose Mercury News Phone firms resist FBI wiretap gear New York Times Asserting that the FBI is trying to force the development of wiretapping equipment that goes beyond the law, telephone industry executives said Tuesday they would petition the Federal Communications Commission to resolve a dispute over the limits of digital surveillance in the information age. Industry executives are expected to ask the commission to step in today after more than two years of negotiations with law enforcement authorities over standards for advanced digital telephone switching gear intended to permit the police and FBI agents to listen to suspected criminals. The two sides failed to reach an agreement at a meeting last week in Boston. ``We've come to an impasse and only the FCC can resolve it,'' said Stewart Baker, a Washington lawyer representing the industry. FBI officials said Tuesday they were still confident that disagreements with the industry could be worked out. Another negotiating session is scheduled for next week. ``We're still committed to the negotiating process,'' said Edward Allen, section chief in the Information Division at the FBI. The Communications for Law Enforcement Act, which was signed into law by President Clinton in 1994, calls for spending $500 million to modify the nation's telephone network for wiretapping and specifies a standard-setting process to redesign the equipment. Telephone industry officials have warned that the cost of making the modifications requested by law enforcement might run into the billions of dollars. They also contend that the FBI has overstepped its mandate and is trying to control the process of setting standards. The law, they say, specifies only that the agency will be consulted in setting the standard. Industry executives say their companies will be at risk of being sued by civil liberties groups over privacy invasions. Law enforcement is asking for the ability to maintain a wiretap in a conference call even after the individual who is the object of the court- authorized wiretap drops out of the phone call. Such a capability would require costly modifications to the telephone network, industry officials said. ``We're taking this action out of monumental frustration,'' said Thomas Wheeler, president of the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, a trade group in Washington. The telephone industry is facing an October 1998 deadline to comply with the law. Wheeler said the members of his association were growing increasingly concerned that in the absence of a standard they would have insufficient time to develop new products that comply with the law. The legislation provides for $10,000 a day in penalties for companies that fail to meet the requirements. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBM85q+qNGQSu3SfxnEQKGXwCg/g2blX0utPaIZU8RX0zkTIQY1jQAni8E jpaUHWxH5/mlmkPbtN3oU1Z6 =25h5 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - -> Send "subscribe snetnews " to majordomo(a)world.std.com - -> Posted by: jackdoolin(a)earthlink.net ------- End of Forwarded Message

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PGMedia Comments on the Failure of the NSI-Controlled DNS System
by pgp＠pgmedia.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION: _____________________________________________ PGMedia Comments on the Failure of the NSI-Controlled DNS System (New York, New York) The breakdown of the Internet's Domain Name System ("DNS") yesterday, purportedly caused by human error at Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI") as well as NSI's antiquated hardware, brought internet traffic to a crawl. This and other recent troubles that NSI has experienced in its operation of the Internet's Domain Name System are textbook examples of a monopolist's inertia in developing new and more secure systems to preserve and protect the integrity of the central facilitator of the Internet. The end-users of the Internet demand and deserve better. In NSI's desire to protect its monopoly profits, particularly in view of its stated intention to offer public stock based on that artificially inflated cashflow, NSI has placed the entire Internet at risk. NSI's intransigence to the change demanded by PGMedia, Inc. d/b/a name.space in the antitrust litigation commenced in Federal Court in New York has also led to the recently reported investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice for NSI's alleged antitrust violations. PGMedia, through its name.space service (http://namespace.pgmedia.net) has developed and implemented a rationalized Top-Level-Domain system that allows for registration under unlimited TLDs such as ".art" "news" ".cameras", ".inc" ".sports" and ".weather". The name.space service is housed on a state of the art network with thirteen root servers located in five countries. The name.space system has been fully operational since August 1996, and was not affected by the "human error" which ground NSI's system to a halt yesterday. If end-users of the Internet wish to secure for their own use, and at no cost, a far more reliable DNS system, all they need do is access the above-referenced URL and follow the simple steps therein to redirect their default TCP name server addresses to the name.space network. In addition, PGMedia believes that the name.space shared product and service oriented TLDs, when fully resolvable, will open up the Internet to far greater commercialization and render the wealth of information on the Internet far more accessible to the end-user. PGMedia's demand for access to the central root zone file exclusively controlled by NSI which would render PGMedia's TLD's and the domain names registered thereunder universally resolvable is currently pending consideration by The Honorable Robert P. Patterson, Jr., U.S.D.J., in Federal Court in New York. PGMedia also wishes to stress that it has no affiliation with and does not support the anticompetitive approach propounded by the loose group of purported registrars known as "eDNS." For more information, please contact the PGMedia, Inc. legal counsel at mjd(a)pgmedia.net; the Amended Complaint in the above-referenced Federal Antitrust Action may be viewed and downloaded at http://namespace.pgmedia.net/law

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index.html
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CNN logo Navigation Infoseek/Big Yellow Pathfinder/Warner Bros Tech banner Click here to play IBM's virtual tennis @ www.wimbledon.org rule DATABASE PROBLEM SLOWS SOME INTERNET TRAFFIC July 17, 1997 Web posted at: 9:53 p.m. EDT (0153 GMT) (AP) -- A problem with the database that keeps track of all Internet addresses slowed network traffic for several hours Thursday morning, effectively blinking some Web sites out of existence. The problem appeared to be resolved by midafternoon. During the trouble, computers couldn't always find someaddresses ending in .net and .com, sometimes e-mail didn't go through and attempts to look up some Web sites came up empty. A user seeking an address ending in .com, for example, wouldhave received an error message that read "Could not resolve DNS," said Aggie Nteta, a spokeswoman for Network Solutions Inc., which runs the main registry of Internet addresses, called InterNIC, under an arrangement with the U.S. government. Every morning at 2:45 a.m. EDT, the files listing all Internet addresses for North America are updated and sent out through the network. On Wednesday morning, two of those files somehow became corrupted, setting off error alarms. However, the system administrator on duty chose to release the files anyway, creating a situation in which many Web sites effectively blinked out of existence, at least in the eyes of browsers. "The big effect was that our site became invisible," saidChris Caldwell, chief engineer at NDA, a Web site design company in Woburn, Massachusetts. Problems with addresses The files were corrected and re-released about four hours later, although it may have taken several more hours for the corrected information to spread throughout the network, Nteta said. The problem is the latest in a series of addressing glitchesover the past few days. Last weekend AlterNIC, an InterNIC rival, briefly took over InterNiC's address on the Web. AlterNIC described this on its Web site as a form of protest over InterNIC's current monopoly on distribution of Internet addresses. InterNIC has also encountered numerous problems with badinformation on its database. Some businesses have been double billed, while others have had their Web sites dropped from the address lists by mistake. Dave Crocker, a computer consultant and founder of theInternet Mail Consortium, said it was a problem of qualityassurance. "The fact that they are growing quickly is not an excuse forthis. The rate of errors they are having would not be tolerable for any other professional organization doing a technical task," he said. Copyright 1997 Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. rule Related site: Note: Page will open in a new browser window * Welcome to the InterNIC External sites are not endorsed by CNN Interactive. Search for related CNN stories: ________________________________________ ______ [Help] Tip: You can restrict your search to the title of a document. Infoseek grfk Example: title:New Year's Resolutions rule Watch these shows on CNN for more sci-tech stories: CNN Computer Connection | Future Watch | Science & Technology Week rule Message Boards Sound off on our message boards Tell us what you think! You said it... [INLINE] Click here to play IBM's virtual tennis @ www.wimbledon.org rule To the top © 1997 Cable News Network, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms under which this service is provided to you.

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