December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Anarchy Gone Awry (fwd) Cu Digest, #5.91
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Computer underground Digest Sun Dec 5 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 91 ISSN 1004-042X ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 02 Dec 93 04:36:10 -0700 From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782(a)LONGS.LANCE.COLOSTATE.EDU> Subject: File 1--Anarchy Gone Awry Mr. Leichter raises some extremely pivotal issues in CUD #5.90 related to the `anarchy' of the Internet. B.Sterling is the author of one of the most brilliantly colorful characterizations and metaphors of the Internet as `anarchic', comparing its evolution and development to that of the English language: > The Internet's `anarchy' may seem strange or even unnatural, but > it makes a certain deep and basic sense. It's rather like the > `anarchy' of the English language. Nobody rents English, and > nobody owns English. As an English-speaking person, it's up > to you to learn how to speak English properly and make whatever > use you please of it (though the government provides certain > subsidies to help you learn to read and write a bit). > Otherwise, everybody just sort of pitches in, and somehow the > thing evolves on its own, and somehow turns out workable. And > interesting. Fascinating, even. Though a lot of people earn > their living from using and exploiting and teaching English, > `English' as an institution is public property, a public good. > Much the same goes for the Internet. Would English be improved > if the `The English Language, Inc.' had a board of directors > and a chief executive officer, or a President and a Congress? > There'd probably be a lot fewer new words in English, and a lot > fewer new ideas. Unfortunately, though, having attended a lecture by Mr. Sterling and having read `The Hacker Crackdown', I think he has a tendency to overdramatize and glorify quasi-criminal behavior and rebellious, subversive, revolutionary aspects of social structures, including those of the Internet. In my view, to the contrary the Internet is largely held together with the glue of social cohesion and human civility, and ingredients that are destructive to that order are likewise toxic to Cyberspace, and that, conversely, virtually all of the excruciating poison in the bloodstream today can be traced to violations and perversions of that trust. (Unfortunately, the English language is itself subject to unpleasant, corrupt, or toxic uses such as for profanity, disinformation, and lies, which are prevented or at least minimized through rejections by honest people.) I agree with Mr. Leichter in the belief (to paraphrase Twain) that `reports of the anarchy on the Internet are greatly exaggerated'. Leichter: >The Internet has been >described as an anarchy, but in fact only relatively small parts of >the Internet are actually anarchic. I would like to go further than this and suggest that the Internet has been over-promoted as `anarchic' by certain subversive, quasi-criminal segments that have found a tenacious hold there, namely extremist libertarians and `Cryptoanarchists'. The Cryptoanarchist cause is closely associated with the Cypherpunk founders E.Hughes and T.C.May (characterized particularly by the latter's infamous signature), who in my view appear to promote not merely `privacy for the masses' and `the cryptographic revolution', but at least condone or tolerate the use of collections of imaginary identities to manipulate and deceive others, and even to evade legitimate government actions such as criminal prosecutions. My most strident requests for their position, personal knowledge, and potential involvement in this practice have gone unanswered, evaded, and repressed over many weeks, but I have many statements from followers that might be regarded as `cult fanatics' about the Liberating Effects of `pseudoanonymity', which they exalt as True Anonymity. In my opinion, in this regard of the ease of creating fake identities, the `anarchic' vulnerability of the Internet reaches its peak in undesirable and socially poisonous consequences, which people are bloodily battling daily on many diverse mailing lists and Usenet groups. In my experience, the Internet inhabitants I have found who most fanatically worship the Internet `anarchy' seem to be closely associated with criminally subversive aims of pornography distribution, tax evasion, black marketeering, and overthrow of governments, goals which are all masked in much of the eloquent Cryptoanarchist dogma and rhetoric. While some of us have glimpsed various hideous corners of Cyberspatial Hell, those who subscribe to the Liberating Religion of Anarchy are in their Paradise on the Internet As We Know It. I call their Utopia a Ticking Time Bomb and a Recipe for an Apocalypse. I have come to these (admittedly melodramatic) conclusions after ~10 months and ~3500 messages of generally unpleasant and at times excruciatingly troubling and painful reading and participation on the Cypherpunks list and many personal communications with the Cypherpunk leaders including E.Hughes, T.C.May, and J.Gilmore. In fact, in my opinion the `Psychopunk Manifesto' parody in CUD #5.89, which longtime cypherpunk list subscriber P.Ferguson describes in 5.90 as having `made its rounds in the cyberspatial world', actually in many ways comes closer to delineating the actual cypherpunk agenda than the one authored by founder E.Hughes on soda.berkeley.edu: /pub/cypherpunks/rants/A_Cypherpunk's_Manifesto. The satire is actually a reformulated version of the original Manifesto, and the former's amazing meme-virus penetration of the into the cyberspatial psyche that P.Ferguson alludes to is indicative of its resonance over the latter. I gave the Cypherpunks the most extraordinary benefit of the doubt for months, far beyond that of a reasonable cyberspatial inhabitant. But now I must warn everyone who can hear me that if they assign the `cypherpunks' as an organization the same credibility as a group like EFF or CPSR they are dangerously, perhaps disastrously, misguided. They appear to me to the contrary to be the cultivators of a flourishing conspiracy and essentially the first Cyberspatial guerilla and terrorist group! The Psychopunk satirization of the Cryptoanarchists is representative of this Internet Anarchy Gone Awry. More information on the CryptoAnarchist & Cypherpunk agenda can be found in RISKS 15.25, 15.27, and 15.28x (FTP crvax.sri.com, directory RISKS:). I also have an essay `Joy of Pseudospoofing', regarding the dangerous consequences and poisonous effects of the manipulations of fake cyberspatial identities such as on the Internet by Cryptoanarchists, available to anyone who requests it from me by email at <ld231782(a)longs.lance.colostate.edu>. * * * I think that many people have mistaken the word `anarchic,' implying no overseeing authority or order (which the Internet is less) with the word `decentralized' (which the Internet is more). Again, the Internet has many regulatory and self-governing systems and orders. For example, connecting sites are required to implement a certain minimum set of software standards and prevent or even root out corruptions in their local sites and software. We have centralized databases that require the registration of domains for fees. A complex network of agreements and policies governs interconnectivity and communication, and a complicated interplay of elements affects basic content such as `commercial vs. academic.' Lack of some of these regulations and protocols would be disastrous. Leichter: >Most of the Internet, in fact, is >better described as self-governing. There are a variety of social >norms concerning network use and interactions. One doesn't post >messages to unrelated groups. One doesn't evade moderation >restrictions. One maintains a certain (rather limited, it must be >admitted) degree of restraint in how one describes other network >participants. There are few effective mechanisms for enforcing these >norms, and they are certainly broken on an all-too-regular basis; but >the network continues to function because social pressure *can* be >applied to those who become too annoying; and in the most outrageous >cases, it's possible to remove the offenders' access to the net. I advocate that we build new formal mechanisms to enforce this order! We have for too long pretended that a central element of the Internet is not integral to it, namely that of the `degree of restraint over network participants' exerted through `social pressure'. Let us codify and formalize these `norms concerning network use and interactions' and develop systems that enforce them! I believe such systems can be developed that do not stray from the sacred Internet tradition of decentralization of control and freedom from censorship. Why should we continue to subject ourselves to the torture of `few effective mechanisms for enforcing these norms broken on an all-too-regular basis'? One of my most enduring Cyberspatial hallucinations is that of a Ratings server. A Ratings server would be a massive distributed network for the propagation of information similar to Usenet, and could conceivably be built upon it. But the Ratings server is not Information, as Usenet is, it is Information about Information. Anyone can post an arbitrary message to the Ratings server that refers to Information somewhere else in Cyberspace. It is in a sense a Rating of that Information. The Information could be *anything* -- a mailing list, a person, a particular Usenet posting, an FTP site. But postings on the Ratings server can be perused by anyone, and anyone can contribute Ratings to the server or indicate their own opinion on the existing Ratings. Different mechanisms exist such that some Ratings are `local' and some are updated globally. The fantastic possibilities of this system are evident upon some reflection and consideration. We could establish arbitrary new groups that have *formal* requirements that are matched by Ratings servers. For example, we could require that new sites that enter the Internet be `trusted' by an existing site. We could require that membership in certain groups requires a certain amount of collateral peer approval, with automatic suspension or expulsion as the consequences for violating it! We could have *meaningful* polls on arbitrary issues. We could have news servers that automatically sort and archive articles according to their passing certain Ratings thresholds. We could restrict the influence of troublemakers! These are all examples of strengthening and formalizing the informal social orders that are, in my opinion, today just barely holding the Internet together. With a Ratings system, I think the civility of the Internet would increase to a fantastic degree. In short, we could have our *own* cyberspatial government! Note that there is no centralized authority or unfair influence in this system, unless people corrupt their servers. When everyone who has joined a group *individually* decides to screen their postings of messages that fail to meet a certain `quality' or posters who have a certain `reputation', that is not Orwellian Censorship but the beautiful Internet freedom and right of Bozo Filtering. When everyone who joins a group *agrees* to a charter that may bar troublemakers based on Ratings, no one can claim they are being unfairly oppressed. Other extremely interesting implementation issues in the use of the Ratings servers can be addressed in detail. For example, the use of cryptographic protocols to ensure the integrity of voting or privacy of certain entries will certainly prove invaluable and even critical to their development. The optimal protocols for the localization or distribution of votes will surely be subject to extremely fascinating and fruitful research. In my view the concept of a Ratings server is wide open territory and holds some immensely promising potential in finally, valiantly slaying the dreaded, ugly, vicious Signal to Noise Monsters harassing, terrorizing, and torturing us everywhere on the Internet, to be replaced with Shining Castles. I urge anyone interested in developing `civilized systems for cyberspace' to subscribe to a new group I have helped start with J.Helgingius (owner of the popular and revolutionary anon.penet.fi anonymous server) called the Cypherwonks, dedicated to openness, honesty, and cooperation on the Internet, and building sophisticated new systems to promote social harmony in Future Cyberspace. We are particularly fascinated with the possibilities of `Electronic Democracy'. (Send a message to `MajorDomo(a)lists.eunet.fi' with the body the commands `info' or `subscribe cypherwonks'.) I fervently hope that the glorifications and manipulations of Internet Anarchy by mouth-frothing libertarian extremists, Cryptoanarchists, and sympathizers can be adequately controlled and minimized in the future, and some harmonious systems and effective countermeasures along the lines of the Rating server can be established by visionaries and tinkerers, but in any case, for the sake of humanity's integrity, sanity, and well-being, I pray that Future Cyberspace is far less Anarchic than the Current Internet. ------------------------------

2 1

Re: Remailer ideas (Was: Re: Latency vs. Reordering)
by anonymous＠hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Dixon writes: >Commercial remailers would probably be very concerned with legal >issues, both criminal (pornography, etc) and non-criminal (copyright >violations). Those commercial remailers probably will be located around the world, so pornography could be send by using an "offshore" [=non-american] remailer as last link in the chain. The jurisdiction where this remailer could be located, preferably shouldn't care about pornografy. [Holland, Scandinavia ?] >-- >Jim Dixon

2 1

Remailer message bundling
by tk＠ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If each remailer encrypts outgoing traffic with its (immediate) recipient forwarder's public key, then several outgoing messages headed in the same direction can be bundled together, obfuscating further the message identities. No need to have 1 message in ==> 1 message out, with or without delay, reordering, or whatever. But maybe everyone already thought of this.

1 0

Dallas Morning News article
by Phil Karn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dallas Morning News, July 23, 1994, Page 5F Cryptography tests rights of electronic word Tom Steinert-Threlkeld Cybertalk The electronic word appears to have fewer rights than the printed word. At least that could be the conclusion drawn from an unusual case emerging from the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the U.S. State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls. There, a book about encryption techniques has won an export license, but a computer disk containing the same information has not. The book in question is titled "Applied Cryptography", an attempt by data security consultant Bruce Schneier to translate 20 years of academic research in scrambling computer traffic "into terms understandable by mere mortals." In so doing, Mr. Schneier hopes to do "more to further the spread of cryptography around the globe than any single (encryption) product could." So far, his publishers, John Wiley & Sons, believe the 600-page tome has been doing almost that. Since its release in November, almost 15,000 copies of the book have been sold. Of that, between 1,500 and 2,000 have been to programmers and other interested parties abroad. Those foreign sales are possible because the book did not have to get an export license. Such controls are used by the State Department to guard against the spread of cryptographic methods that could be too difficult to break, posing a threat to national security. The book contains what Mr. Schneier estimates is about 100 pages of algorithms, hash functions and other lines of computer code that can be used to encrypt messages. But the Office of Defense Trade Controls in March rendered the opinion that the book "is not subject to the licensing jurisdiction of the Department of State since the item is in the public domain." No so with two disks containing the same "source" code. In a May 11 letter, office director William B. Robinson designated the disks as an article "under category XIII(b)(1) of the United States Munitions List." As such, the author would require an export license for the disks. The code itself was not a finished product. It would have to be "compiled" into an executable program before it actually could be used to disguise any data on a computer network. The code was also exactly the same as appeared in the book, or at least as nearly as possible, given the transfer to a magnetic disk. But that appeared to be enough of a difference for the State Department. Mr. Robinson stated, "The text files on the subject disk are not an exact representation of what is found in 'Applied Cryptography'. Each source code listing...has the capability of being easily compiled into an executable subroutine." A State Department official Friday translated the distinction this way: "The difference with the code in the book is you have to type it all in and correct all the errors" before it is usable by a computer programmer. The "value added" by putting the code on the disk is that it is already typed in. "That was the determination we made", the official said. Practically speaking, the distinction escapes the author, Mr. Schneier. Once one overseas programmer types in the code and corrects the errors, hundreds of copies can be easily made and shipped to any country. For the programmer who is too lazy to type, the book's pages even can be scanned in. "What do we think? Foreigners can't type? Or is the worldwide scanning industry influencing this decision?" he asks. Others see larger, constitutional questions. "They're trying to say electronic words have less protection than written words," said David Banisar, policy analyst with the Electronic Privacy Information Center in Washington, D.C. "That's not a proposition that I think any court will support." As more and more words -- from book, magazine and newspaper publishers, for instance -- become electronic, the issue could become critical. "When all words are electronic, they won't be able to be protected under the First Amendment" if this difference between words on a paper medium and words on a digital medium gains footing, he said. Phil Karn, an engineer and ally of Mr. Schneier, however, is appealing the stand on the disks. The State Department's view also is not the final law of the land. "It seems like kind of a foolish distinction and one which in any case is ultimately doomed to failure," said Internet Society executive director Anthony Rutkowski. The different rulings on the book and the disk are "utterly stupid, but that's the way bureaucracies work." Mr. Robinson and the trade control office's deputy director, Rose Brancaniello, declined to comment. Another officer, Tom Denner, said comment was prohibited by confidentiality provisions contained in section 38(e) of the Arms Export Control Act. ------ CyberTalk appears every other Saturday, discussing people, places and problems populating the world of computer communications known as cyberspace. Tom Steinert-Threlkeld can be reached at the Internet address, tomhyphen(a)onramp.net; at America Online, tomhyphen; or at Prodigy, trfj19a.

1 0

Re: e$: Cypherpunks Sell Concepts
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:41 PM 8/6/94 -0700, Eric Hughes wrote: >The obstacles are certainly not for electronic money, which the Fed's >been using for some time now, but rather for electronic cash, which >includes anonymity. We've chased each other around a tree like this one before... Let's see what the differences are this time. I've been doing some thinking about this... Anonymity can come out of retail settlement of e$, if the transactions aren't tracked. We've talked here before about how you think that the tracking of those transactions at the retail level is pretty trivial, so the cost to the user of traceable e$ may be meaningless. I'm not so sure that that's the case, and I think (I hope!) I remember Perry agreeing with me on that point. But if we fiat the argument just to see where it takes us, we come to the sheer volume of transaction records themselves. Is it possible to accurately estimate the cash transaction load of an economy? I bet that if we could, you'd see that the data from each transaction would cause the problem news servers have by several orders of magnitude. The information would get dumped pretty frequently. This is probably the same problem the NSA has now picking out signals to listen in on, but running down an audit trail is different, it's a historical process. Since you don't know whose transactions you need, you need to keep them all. True, this doesn't keep TLAs from trying trying to drink from a firehose, or more to the point, to free-dive to the bottom of the Marianas Trench (if they could keep all of the data), or high-dive into a wading pool (if they couldn't). Hmmm... >The USA provides a fair amount of financial >privacy to everyone but the government, particularly law enforcement. >So the _business_ case for privacy is largely felt to be already >satisfied by the regulators. When *every* business transaction can be scrutinized (as much as physically possible, per above) at any time, for any reason the government deems necessary, it makes a sizable business case *for* traceable electronic cash. This is probably the place to put the lever on the business community. >The Treasury department, among others, really _doesn't_ want >non-recorded transactions. Unless the banking community as a united >front _does_, I don't think it will happen domestically (USA) before >other deployments. If there's not a united front, it'll be divide and >conquer. Non-recorded transactions exist already. It's keeping them from dissapearing that we're really talking about here. It's quite possible to get banks to present a united front. They have one of the largest lobbies in Washington. They have fought reporting requirements tooth and nail with some considerable success, but every time they get greedy (S&Ls) the noose tightens. It might be the threat of international deployment and regulatory arbitrage which brings them around, and fires up the lobbying apparatus on our side of the issue. It has worked before (gold, et.al.). On the other hand if those reporting requirements are frictionless, they don't *need* to fight it, do they... It's time to leave the ring. Somebody tag me. My brain hurts... Now to plug the topic of the thread a bit, how receptive would people in the crypto community be to participating in an annual dog&pony/schmoozefest for the suits? Who should chair the morning "primer" session? *E-mail* me with your ideas, everyone. Thanks, Robert Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

4 3

Re: e$: Cypherpunks Sell Concepts
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:09 PM 8/6/94 -0700, Hal wrote: >There are two legal problems that I could see being used against digital >cash. The first is the civil war era prohibition on banks issuing private >bank notes. Where you stand on this one depends on where you sit. ;-). It seems to me that one could just as easily treat digicash as securities denominated in dollars, just like shares in a money market mutual fund, or more to the point, the actual money market instruments, repos, for instance. It's going to take a sophistical titan to get this through the courts, but if there's a market for digicash, hey, it can happen. It won't happen if this titan's employers never hear about it, though. >The second problem is the regulation of "scrip" and barter systems. This >was pointed out on the list last year by someone who had actually been >involved in a private barter or scrip system which was shut down by the >government, at great cost to all concerned. These regulations can be >found at 26 CFR 1.6045-1. From subsection (f)(5)(ii), "Scrip is a token >issued by the barter exchange that is transferable from one member or >client, of the barter exchange to another member or client, or to the >barter exchange, in payment for property or services". I think this one >will eventually get the "NetBank" people in trouble. (You call a 900 >number and in exchange for a charge on your phone bill they give you a >digital token you can exchange for property or services by participating >merchants.) Barter exchanges are required to get the names and SS numbers >of all participants and report their transactions to the IRS. This would >be inconsistent with the privacy we seek from ecash. Indeed. This is probably where we have a problem. The only thing I can think of here is that the technology of the internet and it's limitless opportunity for regulatory arbitrage. When you make the possession of a medium of exchange illegal you get the same problems that all closed economies have. With the internet, enforcement is half next to useless (an expression I picked up in Albuquerque a while back...). Like I said to Eric in the last post, it may be the threat of regulatory arbitrage that wins the day here, like it has in the past. To plug the thread a bit here, who should chair the afternoon business-heavy session? *Email* me your suggestions, please... Cheers, Robert Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

3 3

Cyphers Out There?
by an114＠vox.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

:: Encrypted: PGP -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.6 hEwCTL2DNtw2i0EBAf4joQKrL2wlyfeRCIHGKaIlSnDhfNdSJ3+MPylu1fix0TIr E//Iw3Z9H2rdbVkJ4gyMQrE7kZzpquyys5ia4031pgAAAjb/CvnS8B2ZX0gpx+dh 8+7dS7i0vbwOePbd/6RIMaemyQhc98npIqQqWodr7z4a+hPp9PyBw5tVPa9N29CF 5b/X50eaeK9vuUVAp1qAB247LsqmQ+nWlFtVXlcy2M3AqZFG0KwvGCg1FLcrSIKj 4gEbp+qD42cetTBe3HFY45Xie1tcEVrTblpibIKZ41NgKcGdRJ8s+ivv/tKu+bDh pftPmiJjqIM1hpOtDqAQvlocP/j4RmxrZFCkdtmczAOKPhG0F6B4tmW/GKY7Kfdk 7vfhrMF6+8sAQSXLSp8xSCpjSGT/RsZKRNOLFK8E6QGCk5MToV5FBtCUd7sVSY7H t+GEsVT4KgLq1jdGGwrsegB99K4ttQ0rYxPn5xQUgUNt6ekOK3v2mfUHQbuY2rdf OTN+RHGRiFI8oplVYVUQGo0q/Ghl7P56TSxVZTHTrxRbFDc/xcnflQHsrVHS/9KC xxP3xuZTrCJaXrZEi8xZ2h/gyQB7xT7VdNvFm4KpFapkt9UP510+4YmyN06SSMq7 zSX4lmcihnf1FGt0A3Q5KOjUjzXz4V4xD9BYtC2Tg+Bp+QtVfJTVhSJ8u8tGs0cB LMSHkj5H2RocbhMhpnmm5Lqnwp+UgUWbH2cVNnx51DbAlOt1NrwetjXs75YZbtfw JBgLj2AOfAi5txky+4xZx/S2uSyrwe0OSFTsBXoSonSSRMjkBPjJ/H0d1XU715oN RSxlTlFIlS8GnUlaiq+eYhHp3sbZILS57A== =YwyP -----END PGP MESSAGE----- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)vox.hacktic.nl Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)vox.hacktic.nl Direct replies to the sender of this message are -not- anonymised <YuK>

1 0

RE: (none)
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Blanc Weber <blancw(a)microsoft.com> writes: > I really meant to ask 'where cypherpunks'. It had been a whole day & > more without the hordes messages and my day seemed empty, without code > or purpose, lacking controversy & jibber jabber. Actually, my response was more of a joke... More than a few people commented on the fact that WHO CYPHERPUNKS is the 'domo command to get a list of subscribers. Your name looked familiar from the list, so I decided to gamble a joke. Guess the joke's on me, eh? :-) --Jeff -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | ==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+

1 0

Re: RemailerNet
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408062108.AA18761(a)snark.imsi.com> perry(a)imsi.com writes: > > Jim Dixon says: > > You can send from a very large network and forge your TCP/IP or > > (more difficult) Ethernet source address. But I can sit on the same > > network, build a table relating TCP/IP to ethernet (or whatever) > > addresses, and filter out messages that should not be there. There > > are commerical packages that do this sort of thing. > > Huh? > > If you are sitting on a network in England, which you appear to be, I > defy you to record anything at all about the ethernet addresses of the > machines that originated this message. [etc] Forgive my casual use of the English language. "A may send from a very large network and forge his or her TCP/IP or Ethernet source address. But if B is on the same network, he or she can build a table ..." The size of the source network is related to the difficulty of determining which machine is forging addresses. If you are ... sorry, one is on a large network, forgery without detection is much easier. Assuming idiocy on the part of correspondents may make for easy and fast responses, but it injects an undue amount of noise. -- Jim Dixon

1 0

Re: Latency vs. Reordering (Was: Remailer ideas (Was: Re: Latency vs. Reordering))
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408070005.AA17290(a)ah.com> Eric Hughes writes: > In a system that is carrying continuous traffic, random packet delay > is functionally identical to packet reordering. > > OK. Prove it. Here are some difficulties I expect you'll find along > the way. > > First, "continuous traffic" is the wrong assumption; some sort of > multiple Poisson distribution for arrival times is. Sigh. I say "A implies B". You say, "not A, and so proposition is incorrect". In elementary logic, you are wrong. IF the traffic is continuous, THEN random delays introduce reordering. The proposition is completely obvious. Do I really have to spell out a trivial proof? > This is by no > means a hypothetical. The backoff algorithms for TCP had to be > developed because packet streams are not continuous, but bursty. Under this modified assumption, you must remember that I proposed that noise packets be introduced to defeat traffic analysis. The bursts will be smoothed out. Not perfectly. Many of the characteristics of TCP/IP derive from its design being optimized for speed. RemailerNet would give less importance to speed, and more importance to opaqueness to traffic analysis. [snip] > Fourth, the problem is incompletely specified, since the distribution > of random added latencies is not made specific. Correct. You assume details that have not been specified, and then critique them at length. > If messages are fragmented, random delays on sending packets out is > functionally identical to reordering. > > This is false; a system that concentrates on reordering has provably > better average latency that one based only on adding latencies. If a message is fragmented into N packets, and then the dispatch time slot for each packet is assigned randomly, the packets are reordered. [Comments deleted ignore the fact that messages are fragmented, and so are irrelevant.] His arguments also ignore the fact that reordering messages of different lengths is useless as a defense against traffic analysis, suggesting that this is polemic rather than a serious argument. > More importantly, RemailerNet as described defeats traffic analysis by > more significant techniques than reordering. Reordering is a weak > technique. > > WHAT?? > > Anyone else listening to this: I believe the above quoted two > sentences to be distilled snake oil. I say again: reordering is not weak, it is irrelevant if messages are of signficantly different lengths and are not fragmented. > The introduction of noise, 'MIRV'ing of messages, > fragmentation of messages, random choice of packet routes, and > encyphering of all traffic are stronger techniques. > > Encyphering is necessary. Reordering of quanta is necessary. > > "MIRV" messages may actually decrease security; multiple routes may > decrease security; fragmentation may decrease security. Noise > messages may not be resource effective. > All the above claims require > some justification, and I have seen nothing robust yet. If by "the above claims" you mean the preceding two sentences, I do agree. -- +-----------------------------------+--------------------------------------+ | Jim Dixon<jdd(a)aiki.demon.co.uk> | Compuserve: 100114,1027 | |AIKI Parallel Systems Ltd + parallel processing hardware & software design| | voice +44 272 291 316 | fax +44 272 272 015 | +-----------------------------------+--------------------------------------+

1 0

Re: Latency vs. Reordering (Was: Remailer ideas (Was: Re: Latency vs. Reordering))
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <199408070216.TAA09025(a)jobe.shell.portal.com> Hal writes: > This suggests, that IF YOU COULD TRUST IT, a single remailer would be just > as good as a whole net. Imagine that God offers to run a remailer. It > batches messages up and every few hours it shuffles all the outstanding > messages and sends them out. It seems to me that this remailer provides > all the security that a whole network of remailers would. > > If this idea seems valid, it suggests that the real worth of a network of > remailers is to try to assure that there are at least some honest ones > in your path. It's not to add security in terms of message mixing; a > single remailer seems to really provide all that you need. Yes, in an ideal world. Each additional remailer introduces another chance of being compromised. But in an ideal remailer network operated by real human beings, you cannot trust the operator. You would prefer that at least the points of entry and exit from the network be different, because this decreases the probability of the message being 'outed' by a very large factor. If you are seriously concerned about legal factors, you would prefer that the remailer gateways be in different legal jurisdictions. However, if you trust the operator and if this trust is guaranteed to be continued forever, the ideal number of remailers is one. -- Jim Dixon

3 2

remailer ideas
by Jonathan Rochkind 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My newsgroup-RemailerNet ideas seem to be getting mixed reviews, but I think that part of the p roblem is that some people don't understand what I'm trying to accomplish. There are several features I think are extremely desirable in a remailernet infrastructure, which our current infrastructure doesn't accomplish, and which no proposed infrastructure that I've seen accomplishes either. I'm not certain my newsgroup/pinging idea addresses these concerns, either, but I'm going to lay them all out, and y'all can see what you think. These points aren't distinct, I realize. They're all interrelated somewhat. 1) New remailers should be able to enter the "remailernet" easily, and with a minimum of human intervention. If I decide to run a remailer, the infrastructure should provide a way to make it visible to all other particpants in the remailer net, other remailers and users. Whether the other participants make use of it or not, is another question, and would presumably depend on a web-of-trust kind of situation. But currently, someone who wants to stay current with this kind of info basically has to read cypherpunks, and take notes when people announce new remailers. Better, would be if this sort of "new remailer" info could be distributed automatically, to both users and other remailers. 2) Remailers should be able to leave the remailernet without devestating it. If my remailer is temporarily, or permanently, down, the remailernet should route around it. Again, the current way for operators to announce this would basically be to post to cypherpunks list, and maybe alt.security.pgp too. If other remailernet particpants miss the announcement, havok can ensue. If a middle link of your remailer chain is down, all you know is your messages aren't getting to their destination, you won't know which link is down. We shouldn't require all particpants to read cypherpunks religiously, and if an operator isnt' conscientious enough to post to the expected places, it shouldn't be fatal. Both users and remailers should have an automatic way of finding out about down remailers. 3) Remailers themselves should have a way of automatically learning the topography of the remailernet. If we want to form a cohesive black-box remailernet, remailers are going to need this info. Maybe they're sending fake padding between themselves to thwart traffic analysis. Maybe they're encrypting with the key of the next remailer down the line automatically for you. I don't know enough about it to know what methods are best, but it seems probable from discussion that remailers are going to need to do something that requires knowing about all the other remailers, and their PGP keys and such. 4) Users should have a way of learning the topography of the remailernet too. A way which doesn't require so much human intervention. I should be able to tell my software "send an anon message to X, put 10 links in the remailer chain," and it will do it. To use the remailer net, I shouldn't need to read cypherpunks in order to keep track of all various remailers, and which are up, and which are down. My software should do that for me. And again, your software doesn't need to use all the remailers that it knows about, it can rely on web-of-trust based on PGP signatures and such. [Although I'm not certain this is neccesary, as I've come to the same conclusion as Hal Finney: as long as you've got one (or maybe two) trustworthy remailers in the chain, you are pretty much okay. Although Jim Dixon points out that a concerted effort by the TLAs could make even finding one trustworthy remailer a serious chore. But this is an implementation problem; we're talking theory here at the moment.] 5) No one entity participating in the remailer net structure should be able to compromise the security of the net acting alone. For example, An "evil remai ler" operating solely for the purpose of compromising the remailernet shouldn't be fatal. This is a matter of degree to some extent: if everyone but you is "evil", you're going to be out of luck in just about any system. But the more robust the infrastructure is, the more evil participants it can handle before it cracks, the better. The current remailer net actually fulfills this requirement fairly well, but it's an important one, and worth noting anyhow. Now I think the infrastructure I've proposed that uses a newsgroup, as well as a pinging mechanism, fulfills all these requirements. But I'm not going to try to defend it now, instead, what do you all think about those requirements? Are they all in fact neccesary? Or desirable? Are there any more that should be added? Can you think of any infrastructure systems that might fill some or all of them?

1 0

Latest mention in Wired
by Al Billings 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I noticed in the Sat Pirate article in the latest Wired (which I finally read this evening), there is a mention of the Cypherpunks in connection to PGP and opposition to the creation of a Police State. Page 128, I think. -- Al Billings mimir(a)io.com http://io.com/user/mimir/asatru.html Nerd-Alberich Admin for Troth - The Asatru E-mail List Lord of the Nerd-Alfar Sysop of The Sacred Grove - (206)322-5450 Poetic-Terrorist Lodge-Master, Friends of Loki Society

2 2

Re: e$: Cypherpunks Sell Concepts
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:20 AM 8/7/94 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >It is perfectly feasable to track all financial transactions in the >U.S., down to the "quarter for a phone call" level, without >eliminating all capacity to use the data or placing more than, say, >another several percent burden on the cost of all transactions. I know >how to architect such a system, and I'm sure that I'm not the only >one. It would be a big job, but not an impossible one, especially not >with modern computer systems. A several percent burden on the economy >would be devistating, but from the point of view of the bureaucrats it >probably isn't such a bad thing. Ahh. Perry to the rescue. This is even better than being technologically impossible. Economic impossibility is *just* as physical (I cite the failure of command economies like the USSR and Cuba as my evidence) as is technology, and since we're looking for a business case here, your reply comes in at the nick of time. One more point for regulatory arbitrage. That "several percent" deducted from the gross domestic product of a nation could tip the balance of it's international competitiveness, and could forgo that country's requirement for trapdoor ecash. The threat of that could be enough to shoot down the idea on this side of the American border. Parkinson's law holds that organizations like bureaucracies tend to expand to use all their available resourcess. But it's a law of biology that a parasite doesn't kill its host. Does your Forbin project above include the ability to store and retrieve *all* transactions down to a quarter phonecall permanently? ObThreadPlug: Here's my panel categories for the afternoon "where do we go" session: Chair: Famous Software/Biz Heavy or TechnoVisionary 1. Internet access provider, 2. Underwriter, 3. Financial Operations Person, 4. Regulator or Lawyer, 5. Politician. Any other ideas?? Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

1 0

Re: e$: Cypherpunks Sell Concepts
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:24 AM 8/7/94 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >Robert, you don't understand. The U.S. is not governed by laws any >more. In the financial community, every action you perform is illegal. >The only way that you stay out of jail is by being nice to the >bureaucrats. This reminds me of my criminology class in college. The prof's main point was that there is no crime, particularly organized crime. It is all just illegal business. There was some research done in Seattle in the early 60's. The researchers discovered that practically every business could be found to be breaking a serious law in Seattle's byzantine city code. Vending machines were illegal, for instance. This allowed cops to shake down anyone they pleased. It also allowed a sizable criminal class to exist, because those people just paid the cops and went about their business. There was reason to believe that all this was done on purpose to enhance the income of various politicians at the top of the payoff tree. Of course, vending machines were everywhere, particularly in cash-based businesses like resturaunts and bars. This could be extended to people in the main business district as well. Their "fees" may not be so much outright bribes, but campaign contributions, "donations" to a politician's favorite charity or civic event, investments in a politician's business activities, and of course, taxes. >They allow money market funds, even though they >technically violate a dozen laws, because they feel like it. They >could prohibit them if they felt like it, too. The bureaucrats aren't >going to want digicash, so they are going to find plenty of excuses to >prohibit it. You can't do legal hacks in an environment like this. It >doesn't work. If the bureaucrats don't like you, they shut you down, >and there is not a damn thing you can do about it, period. Democracy is in fact mob rule, with various Robbespierres guillotining people to keep the crowd happy. Michael Milken was one of those people who got it in the neck, not so much because what he did was wrong (it was) in the eyes of the people who pulled him down, but because he was too good at what he did and thought he could ignore the crowd. Hubris. So, we have to include Mme LaFarge in our thinking. I believe that legal hacks are necessary, but not sufficient. The economic necessity of ecash, the business case, has to be demonstrated. We can't really know whether it will work unless it's tried. We can't really do that until the "civic authorities" let us put up the vending machines. To do that, we need to be able to incent their cooperation. The possibility of profit furthers that discussion enormously. If regulatory agencies can be convinced to allow non-bank banking ala Fidelity, and a multi-billion dollar industry can result, than it might be possible to allow a non-treasury currency (with proper controls of money supply, to keep Uncle Miltie happy) on the promise of another multi-billion dollar industry. In the above quote you're assuming that they aren't going to want ecash, that they won't find plenty of excuses to allow it. The point is, we have to make the bureaucrats *like* us. The best way to get that to happen is to talk about the business e$ could create. It is a proven fact that sizable proportions of regulatory officials leave their agencies for jobs in the markets they regulate. If there's to be a market on the other side of that revolving door, they have to help us out a little. It was ever thus. Columbus did it. Brahe did it. Oppenheimer did it. Friedman did it with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Hell, even Lysenko did it and made it stick for 50 years even when the science was bogus. Fortunately, we don't have our dear comrade, the "Man of Steel", to back us up. > >True, you can leave the country and do your business there -- I know >several hedge funds that already refuse to take any customers from the >U.S. because they don't want the headaches, and there are other >similar things happening in lots of other parts of the financial >industry. However, don't think you can finesse the folks at the Fed, >the IRS, the Treasury, and the SEC -- they are monsters, and they >won't be stopped by the courts. Ever since I've been old enough to understand English, I've heard the various libertarians and ultraconservatives in my family say that they had Seen the Golden Age of America and It's Over Now. I have no idea if they, or you, are right about that. (Not to call you either of those political labels, I know better.) The Roman Empire mutated into the Holy Roman Empire (can you say "Byzantine"?, I knew ya could) and lasted another 1000 years before it was sacked by the Turks in the 1400's. People did business in Constantinople the day the place burned; they were doing business there the day after it burned. If there's a market, there'll be a business. If there's a business there'll be excess money (profits). If there's excess money, there'll be politicians, elected or otherwise. However, it's a stupid parasite which kills it's host, and that's what I'm counting on here. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ObThreadRelevance: Anyone have speaker/demo ideas for the morning "intro to e$" session? ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

1 0

Latency vs. Reordering (Was: Remailer ideas (Was: Re: Latency vs. Reordering))
by hughes＠ah.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sigh. I say "A implies B". You say, "not A, and so proposition is incorrect". No, I say that messages distributions are not continuous, so the model which assumes they are is not the right model. IF the traffic is continuous, THEN random delays introduce reordering. I've never said they didn't induce some reordering. That's not my point, which is about known and not merely suspected properties of systems. Cryptography is about assurances as well as actual security. Information security is a negative property; it works when nothing bad happens, and something bad may happen without it being directly observed. Since one can't always see an actual cryptosystem failure, unlike, say, a robbery, the way to extend the security is by understanding what is possible. And for understanding, proof is always better than intuition, guessing, or supposition. I'll reiterate again. Reordering is what yields privacy, directly. Adding latency adds privacy ONLY insofar as it adds reordering. If you feel like you have to have a latency based system, fine, but the understanding of just how much reordering such systems actually induce is still lacking. It does not suffice to wave hands and say it induces 'enough' reordering. You need to know how much, and that takes a calculation, which has not been done yet. Furthermore, I demonstrated two reasons why latency-based systems are less efficient in implementation than reordering-based systems. So, in upshot, latency based reordering is not only less efficient, but also less well understood. Until someone comes up with a latency-based scheme which can't be algorithmically modified to make a more efficient reordering system, and has similar memory usage, and until someone does some calculations on just how much reordering is induced by various latency schemes, I will continue to call latency based mixing by the name snake oil. > Fourth, the problem is incompletely specified, since the distribution > of random added latencies is not made specific. Correct. You assume details that have not been specified, and then critique them at length. By not specifying exactly what distribution of latencies you're talking about, I assume that you are making a universal claim about latency-adding systems with _any_ distribution. I do not see you claiming that there exists some special distribution that makes latency systems work, because for implementation you actually have to exhibit one. Therefore, I point out that this is another lack of understanding. And I _know_ that if you haven't thought before about the issue of the distributions of the added latencies that you haven't thought very hard about the cryptanalysis of such systems. His arguments also ignore the fact that reordering messages of different lengths is useless as a defense against traffic analysis, suggesting that this is polemic rather than a serious argument. Oh, really? You even quoted me explicitly not ignoring the issue: > Encyphering is necessary. Reordering of quanta is necessary. The phrase "reordering of quanta" seems perfectly clear to me. Eric

1 0

IDEA vs DES
by Phil Karn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Now that I've got DES running about as fast as it can go on the 486, I did a little analysis on IDEA. The algorithm is definitely more straightforward to implement than DES, but not necessarily that much faster. It uses three primitive operations, all on 16-bit quantities: XOR, ADD and multiplication modulo 65537. Each encryption involves 48 XORs, 34 adds and 34 multiplies, plus a few exchanges. The multiplies are a problem. On the 486, a 16x16 integer multiply takes from 13-26 clocks, depending on how many significant bits there are in the multiplicand. Random data usually has 15-16 significant bits, so this distribution is probably weighted more toward the 26 clock figure. So I count an optimistic total of 990 clocks per 64-bit encryption, assuming plenty of registers (which I don't have), not counting the modular reduction steps for each multiply, and ignoring the memory references for the subkeys. I figure my DES code is currently taking about 1300 clocks per encryption. So IDEA won't be much faster, though it may be more secure. Anybody know the speed of the integer multiply instruction on the various PowerPC chips? Along with modular exponentiation and vocoders, which also do a lot of multiplies, it looks like fast multiplication is becoming rather important in secure communications. Phil

5 4

Re: Remailer ideas (Was: Re: Latency vs. Reordering)
by Jonathan Rochkind 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> What I think is a better idea was proposed here last year, and I think > someone was doing it for a while. It is for someone to volunteer to > be the keeper of the remailer aliveness information. He runs scripts > every day to ping the remailers, keeps lists of which remailers are > currently active, and so on. This does seem like a better idea, except for one thing: Everybody has got to trust the Keeper of the Aliveness Info. I'm not sure how much of a problem this is, nor am I sure that the newsgroup method neccesitates any less trust. But I do think that a system where all trust doesn't lie in any one entity is desirable, and I think that such a system is going to have to be decentralized like netnews, rather then centralized . The other problem that a centralized system imposes is that if the Keeper Of Aliveness Info goes down, everyone is scrambling to find a new one. This doesn't seem like a major problem, but again, an ideal system wouldn't have this flaw.

1 0

Re: Improved remailer reordering
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408062320.AA17234(a)ah.com> Eric Hughes writes: > About message mixing: > > A measure that is used for situations like this is entropy. > > Indeed. This is exactly the mathematical measure for what I've called > "privacy diffusion" in a remailer network. It is, namely a measure of > of the uncertainty to a watcher of what ingoing message corresponds to > what outgoing message. > > As soon as you begin to write down some of the equations for this > value, several things become distinct possibilities: > > -- duplicate messages may decrease security > -- retries may reduce security > -- interactive protocols may reduce security > -- there is such a thing as a needlessly lengthy remailer path > -- noise messages might not be worth the bother > -- multiple different routes may reduce security > > One thing becomes blaringly obvious: > > -- it's reordering that's mathematically significant; that's what goes > directly into the equations. On thing is glaringly obvious: if you use the wrong assumptions, you will get the wrong answers. Imagine a RemailerNet (v0.2) that maintained a fixed level of traffic between gateways. Messages are injected into the system at various gateways and emerge at various gateways. All traffic between gateways is encrypted. All traffic takes the form of packets of the same length, perhaps 1024 bytes. [It is possible that a much smaller packet size might be desirable, specifically the ATM packet size, with 48 bytes of data payload.] Messages are fragmented according to policies at the entry gateway. Intervening gateways may or may not further fragment incoming packets according to gateway policy. The exit gateway is responsible for reassembling packets into messages. The routing of packets is randomized to some extent. Message transmission is guaranteed to be reliable in the sense that either the message will get there or the sender will be told that it didn't. Users desiring a high level of security are required to participate in the game. They must accept and send a fixed number of packets at each connection. These users should be responsible for packetizing their own messages when sending and assembling their own messages when receiving. They must encrypt all communications with gateways. These 'empowered' users are in fact operating RemailerNet gateways. It is likely that different levels of gateway would have to be defined, depending upon the degree of physical control that the operator had over the gateway and the level of resources that he or she was willing to devote to RemailerNet operations. Entry level users would communicate using ordinary email. Major gateway operators would communicate using RemailerNet protocols over TCP/IP. Time is measured in this system in steps. Each step corresponds to the dispatch of one set of packets. The relationship between 'step time' and chronological time will vary from link to link. This system will tolerate an arbitrary level of traffic. Over time the level of traffic (in bytes/sec) would be some multiple of the average volume (bytes/sec) of messages carried. The gateways would automatically adjust the traffic level. [Probably it should rise quickly and fall gradually.] The functioning of the system as a whole makes it very difficult to do any kind of realistic traffic analysis. Any reordering of messages is performed at the packet level. In general, the messages do not exist as wholes along the lines connecting the gateways, so a discussion of their reordering is a good way to waste time. A detailed mathematical analysis of what makes the system difficult to attack would itself be quite difficult. But I would suggest that the key factors are the fragmenting of messages, the use of fixed length packets, the systematic introduction of noise, and random delays in dispatching packets. [The random delays reorder the packets and they also introduce noise -- an unused timeslot is filled with a noise packet.] If, of course, your equations include only measures of the reordering of messages, your results will depend only upon measures of reordering of messages. -- Jim Dixon [this is not a complete or final description of RemailerNet] [v0.2 but should be sufficient to encourage a few attacks ]

3 2

Re: e$: Cypherpunks Sell Concepts
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:19 PM 8/7/94 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >The regulators >have taken ten years just to eliminate the restrictions on interstate >banking, and they still haven't quite done the job yet (although >hopefully the restrictions will go away by '96 or so.) It really isn't to most of the individual banking entities' advantage for interstate banking to exist because almost all of them would merged out of existence. It isn't the regulators' fault; it's a wonder they got this far as fast as they did, and that's primarily because the foriegn markets are driving the regulators to it. Regulatory arbitrage. If there was a clearcut financial advantage to interstate banking to First Podunk Bank and Trust, it would have happened already. >They understood >that stuff fairly well. They probably won't understand digital cash as >well, although it will probably be even worse for us if they do. Which, I believe, is the point of this thread. It's time to shuck and jive a bit. If it can be demonstrably proved that a market exists, that there's some boards of directors for those hoary old regulators to sit on in their golden years, then there's a chance to make retail trade settlement a reality. You can't do that without a legimate test, and you can't get that without mau-mauing the regulators some, eh? Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

1 0

Re: e$: Cypherpunks Sell Concepts
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:31 AM 8/7/94 -0700, Eric Hughes wrote: > >There are two legal problems that I could see being used against digital > >cash. The first is the civil war era prohibition on banks issuing private > >bank notes. > > It seems to me > that one could just as easily treat digicash as securities denominated in > dollars, [etc.] > >It didn't occur to me before, but you could also have 'nonbank notes'. >If the issuer isn't a bank, does the regulation still apply? OK. Your question has two parts. First, Eric, what exactly do you mean by 'nonbank notes'. Like the kind issued by corporations in the money markets, or Amex Traveller's Checks?. Second, we need a lawyer. This is a good thing, 'cause a you can't hack laws without a lawyer (most of the time, anyway...), and (ObThreadRelevance) we need one to pitch this stuff to other lawyers (regulators, et. al.) anyway... In search of Vinnie "the Pro" Bono, honorable second cousin of the esteemed mayor of Palm Springs, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

1 0

Re: e$: Cypherpunks Sell Concepts
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:23 AM 8/7/94 -0700, Eric Hughes wrote: >It might be, but remember that in making the case to business, the >financial privacy, such as it exists today, is _not_ "at any time, for >any reason". It might be in the future, but then you're making a >perceived-weaker argument. Ah, my Burroughsian hyperbole strikes again... Gotta get that AJ subroutine fixed... > It might be the threat of > international deployment and regulatory arbitrage which brings them around, > and fires up the lobbying apparatus on our side of the issue. > >With that in mind, shouldn't you have your first conference in London, >invite a bunch of US bankers, and raise the issue explicitly? As soon >as you can get different countries competing for revenue, you're more >than halfway home. One could accuse you wanting to get a "deductable junket" to Europe here ;-), and you might be right about doing it in London, but it seems to me that to present a xenophobic argument to the American banking community, it's best do to that on American soil. Without sounding too parochial, it's entirely possible to incite greed in the international markets with leaving home. I really want to get regulators into the same room, also. The site I have in mind is six blocks from the Federal Reserve Building in Boston. Boston is, you understand, the fulcrum of the universe, even if the long end of the lever finishes up somewhere about Berkeley... > > On the other hand if those reporting > requirements are frictionless, they don't *need* to fight it, do they... > >Nope. And remember, the divide-and-conquer is likely already >starting. The first bank to provide FINCEN with a live transaction >feed will likely see some regulatory hurdles fall, no? JargonQuery(FINCEN?) I'm having fun now. Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

2 1

CreditCard info
by Brian Lane 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An interesting sideline - I ran into an interesting situation at a local video rental place yesterday. If you give them your credit card number they charge you .25 less a tape to rent it(2.75 compared to 3.00) Your number goes into their customer databse. I laughed, and said i'd rather pay the .25 a tape than take the chance of some part-time HS kid getting ahold of my CC number. It's unbelieveable (to me anyway) that people would give this kind of information out and trust that it can't be abused. It's bad enough that we're asked to hand out our SS number for everything. Brian ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Linux : The choice of a GNU generation | finger blane(a)free.org witty comments pending | for PGP key and subLit ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 0

Gore Letter and Software Key Escrow
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some interesting comments from a recent issue of "EE Times": "While some critics declared Clipper dead, Gore made it clear that any encryption system used for voice communications must retain that the key-escrow framework that is the central feature of the Clipper chip. The only difference will be whether private-sector escrow agents will be added." ["Gore letter clouds U.S. Clipper policy," George Leopold, "EE Times," 1994-07-25, p. 4] [the article mentioned Gore's "We welcome the opportunity to work with industry to develop a more versatile, less expensive system. Such a key-escrow system would be implemented in software, firmware, hardware or any combination thereof, would not rely on upon a classified algorithm, would be voluntary and would be exportable."] In an earlier article: "Sen. Patty Murray, D-Wash., cosponsor of the Senate bill, said the Clipper-chip proposal "has had a chilling effect on software manufacturers in my state," particularly Microsoft Corp. She and other Clipper critics testifying last week argued that software encryption is widely available. "Federal efforts to put the genie back in the bottle will be futile," Murray said." ["Congress adds its voice to Clipper debate," George Leopold, "EE Times," 1994-05-09, p. 16] And this chilling comment from Stephen Walker of TIS: " "Most Americans would accept government-imposed key escrow if it was established by law" and subject to judicial review, said Stephen Walker, president of Trusted Systems Inc. [sic] and a former NSA official." ["Congress adds its voice to Clipper debate," George Leopold, "EE Times," 1994-05-09, p. 16] >From these and other articles I continue to believe that several related things are happening: * The Administrations has backed away from the hardware-based, proprietary Skipjack approach that Clipper and EES represented. Though Clipper is not yet officialy dead, its brain wave has flatlined. * The software industry was apparently pressured, based on comments by various people, including Rep. Maria Cantwell (D-Wash) and Sen. Patty Murray. The form and timing of this pressure is not public knowledge, but hints of it keep emerging. * A software-based key escrow system, involving the new Walker-Belenson-others algorithm, is the likely basis for this new "more versatile, less expensive system" that Gore says would be "implementable in software, firmware, hardware or any combination thereof..." Practically speaking, this means software, as the hardware base of machines already out in the world pretty much makes hardware- or firmware-based deployment very problematic...few people will buy new hardware, which is what helped to kill Clipper. * Ostensibly this will be "voluntary," but the "voluntary" part may only be choice from a Chinese menu of approved and licensed escrow agents. [This is my interpretation, reading between the line of a dozen or so articles, articles which quote sources about how "private industry" will provide escrow agents, how choice will be preserved, and how the infamous "legitimate needs of law enforcment" will be preserved. * This compromise will likely put software key escrow (SKE, or Carl Ellison's "GAK"..."Government Access to Keys") into the software for audio and video teleconferencing, communication, and possibly into the OS itself (as this would be needed to ensure wide coverage of installed machines). * The articles suggest Sen. Leahy, Rep. Cantwell, and many others have already accepted this compromise. Enabling legislation could come at any time, and may be closely related to the Digital Telephony Bill, which has had the same behind-the-scenes negotiating. In closing, I reject the point made by Walker, that Americans will accept a "government imposed key escrow if it was established by law." I think this is the real threat on the horizon. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

3 2

Re: URGENT: Please Tell Congress to Allow Encryption Export
by Ian Farquhar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Aug 5, 5:53pm, Jim Dixon wrote: >> Imagine this: you're a politician. If you're a US politician in particular >> you will be correctly told that you are, by virtue of your position, a target >> for a lot of "extremeist" groups and terrorism. [etc] > This has little to do with being a politician and even less with being > a US politician. People at all levels everywhere at all times are willing > to pay for what they perceive as additional security. The original point was an explanation as to one of the reasons why politicians can do unaccountable 180 degree turns of opinion when entering politics. As such it had everything to do with being a politician. Your point that it is a manifestation of a more general desire for security is valid, but you missed the main point at issue here. Ian.

1 0