December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

PRESS RELEASE: VENTURE CAPITAL CD
by spencer＠datamerge.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

_______________________________________________________________ HIGH TECH FINANCING FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: DATAMERGE ANNOUNCES VENTURETRACK 2000 CD-ROM INFOBASE VENTURE CAPITAL INSIDERS "TELL ALL" DATABASE Press Contact: Peter Masi (303) 399-6031 MasiPR(a)aol.com http://www.datamerge.com/venturetrack.html DENVER -- DataMerge, Inc., a Denver-based developer of software and information for companies seeking financing, today announced the release of VentureTrack 2000, a software package containing extensive profiles and proprietary "insider" information on hundreds of venture capital firms throughout North America. The VentureTrack 2000 CD-ROM Infobase gives entrepreneurs and small business owners "insider" information, education and advice critical to establishing business relationships with specific venture capitalists and securing financing from them. The software lets users find the firms that optimally fit their needs by identifying links between their company and the interests of the venture capitalists. VentureTrack 2000's "Inside Track" section then instructs users on custom tailoring their business plan and presentation to each venture capital firm. Specific questions, concerns and objections that a given firm will likely raise and good responses for each are also provided to VentureTrack 2000 users. Information contained in the profiles was gathered by finance savvy investigative reporters who used techniques adapted from the intelligence community. The information is exclusive to VentureTrack 2000 and is not available in competing products. It includes: *Insight into the firm's most likely areas of interest; *Personal/individual preferences of principals; *Best methods of approach and specific things to say or not say to a particular individual; *Investment philosophies and strategies based on past experiences; *Firm background, working atmosphere and relationships; *Case studies of investments that best represent their investment philosophy; *Inside advice/scoop from companies each VC firm has previously financed; *Information from DataMerge's customer "grapevine"; *Key contacts by project type and procedure for internal review; *Portfolio investment overview. In addition to the eight- to 12-page profiles of each venture capital firm, VentureTrack 2000 includes an on-line tutor and venture industry knowledgebase called VentureAdvisor, which was developed with extensive input from venture capital principals. The total package is designed to give users proprietary "insider" information and insight into the venture capital industry, which historically were closely guarded secrets of a few well-placed individuals. In addition to small business people, DataMerge CEO Spencer Kluesner says venture capital firms themselves have shown strong interest in VentureTrack 2000 because they want to gather competitive intelligence on their rivals. VentureTrack 2000 supports Windows 95 and Windows NT. The time-limited introductory price is $495. VentureTrack 2000 can be ordered by calling (800) 580-1188. Privately-held DataMerge was founded in 1989 by Spencer Kluesner, a former securities advisor who today serves as chief executive officer of the 26-person company. DataMerge's products are sold directly to customers in the North America, Western Europe and Asia. Additional information can be obtained at DataMerge's website: http://www.datamerge.com/venturetrack.html Additional Information: VentureTrack 2000 White Paper - http://www.datamerge.com/venture/capital/whitepaper.html Sample VentureTrack Profile - http://www.datamerge.com/venture/page5.html VentureTrack Brochure - http://www.datamerge.com/venture/page2.html --30--

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TEMPEST open-source definition version 0.1alpha
by Ryan Lackey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- So, if we're going to try to protect computers from TEMPEST threats, and we don't have access to the multiple government classified standards, we should come up with the Cypherpunks TEMPEST standard. A theoretical definition of what we want to do (strong) is that we should be able to put the equipment in a virtual box, have an empty virtual box, and then nothing anything which is not in the TCB can do can distinguish one box from the other. Perhaps the "empty" box should also contain simulators for the ethernet, visible light output, and straight power draw (harmonics are still to be avoided), or in some other definitional way they should be accounted for. This prevents non-TCB programs from utilizing the EM spectrum as a covert channel. Additionally, we need to protect the user from divulging state information about his TCB. I guess this condition can best be met by simply saying "take the target system and clone its state perfectly. Separate the two systems. Allow the user to modify the state of the target system while you retain the clone -- you do not have a non-negiligible improvement in matching future state using the EM emissions of the first system over not using the EM emissions." I think there is a better way of stating this, though. So, given a workable theoretical definition which defines perfection, it's time to reverse engineer the practical TEMPEST systems (and in so doing perhaps the classified TEMPEST spec) out there. Next time I find a TEMPEST case at swapfest, or at a con, I'll pick it up (if someone wants to ship me one, so much the better). You *can* buy them from some vendors, although they often refuse to sell them to non-government affiliated entities). MIT's quasi-affiliated Draper Labs has proper TEMPEST verification equipment, and I think some places on MIT's campus have some general purpose equipment which can be used for such purposes. If not, I have a copy of NI LabView and some DAQ hardware which, coupled with some antenna frobbery, can be used to do a quick spectrum analyzer, and there's the capacity to do some serious analysis once the data are on the computer. It would be nice to know how good government TEMPEST systems really are. In practice, matching them would probably be enough. The above theoretical definition doesn't really help that much -- in practice, there's going to be some information coming out, and just because you can't figure out how to use it, doesn't mean no one can. I think preventing the covert channel attack might actually go beyond the government's TEMPEST spec -- certainly if a non-TCB program can cause a system reboot, or power up a peripheral, you can detect the change in power draw, unless the system naturally throws away the difference between its max power consumption and its present power consumption all the time. Being able to telegraph even 1 bit of information might be enough, and if you've got an arbitrary precision clock, you could use this method to send an arbitrary codeword from an arbitrary-length codebook given an arbitrary time interval. The rainbow books talked about covert channel elimination being a really hard problem. Now I see even more why they were right. IIRC, it's only at the not-really-commercially-available levels (A1) that covert channels are utterly eliminated; usually they are comfortable just documenting them. Of course, it would probably make a lot of sense to do TEMPEST reverse engineering in a country that has neither an OSA nor the ability to randomly classify research. Yet another project for cypherpunks.to, Lucky? A practical way of approaching theoretical TEMPEST-perfection is just a decent faraday cage with a lead-glass monitor cover, shielded or eliminated cables, and a serious double-conversion UPS. From the government TEMPEST products I've seen, that's all they are (or they use mesh). I've mainly seen thinks like the SafeKeyper, not general purpose computers, though. I don't think Jim was that far off the mark in thinking class B machines are a worthwhile starting point, but it doesn't go anywhere near far enough. ObCrypto: I've been looking at implementing a cipher in a reconfigurable processor. I might even customize one. Yay. ObGuns: I got to use a .22cal nail gun. It was fun. ObPersonalAttacks: There are a lot of people who are not Real US Citizens on this list. Beware the evil multinationalist conspiacy in our midst, good followers of Bill Clinton! ObQuestion: Can the US government deny a passport for no reason to a random US citizen who is not a felon? - -- Ryan Lackey rdl(a)mit.edu http://mit.edu/rdl/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNOD8sawefxtEUY69AQG3NQf9GWJjz3pwORa4y5V1YQA/BBAebDJNlnhd gauYxwALwsEIID20Da3x7f/ZZ/ipVH1fhk9SJYGgPK+mtc7HMpPA7WhEfR1awuyE FaP6VrJ18vKy6Cf+JlUbag2w5luQfSlo4o1jK0v6Os3D+PpuDyRN3GUI05dTxKyC +VfS8oiw+SaM455l1knHGnegLZzivCKGS/xXDFD71dl5QCRQsAMBaGrjg0pej8gJ ByiO4X7ae8OdlUytdQpfaNOtJTdSQJ7C3FLjczp9dQKvb7msfQUWzAWG9L8XneUP b6xRF5Ra1JaixfFEJisnP+CfZbtJknvNlffUh+//b17ql8Jz5WsFJg== =IRsn -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Godwin, et al, a pity, this
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Who are the "digerati" and why are they "the cyber elite"? They are the doers, thinkers, and writers who have tremendous influence on the emerging communication revolution. They are not on the frontier, they are the frontier. The digerati evangelize, connect people, adapt quickly. They like to talk with their peers because it forces them to go to the top of their form and explain their most interesting new ideas. They give each other permission to be great. That's who they want to talk to about the things they are excited about because they want to see if it plays. They ask each other the questions they are asking themselves, and that's part of what makes this cyber elite work. The Connector < John Brockman> The Pragmatist < Stewart Alsop > The Coyote < John Perry Barlow > The Scout < Stewart Brand > The Seer < David Bunnell > The Thinker < Doug Carlston > The Idealist < Denise Caruso > The Statesman < Steve Case > The Physicist < Greg Clark > The Matchmaker < John Doerr > The Gadfly < John C. Dvorak > The Pattern-Recognizer < Esther Dyson > The Software Developer < Bill Gates > The Conservative < David Gelernter > The Defender < Mike Godwin > The Genius < W. Daniel Hillis > The Judge < David R. Johnson > The Searcher < Brewster Kahle > The Saint < Kevin Kelly > The Prodigy < Jaron Lanier > The Marketer < Ted Leonsis > The Scribe < John Markoff > The Maestro < Stewart McBride> The Force < John McCrea > The Competitor < Scott McNealy > The Publisher < Jane Metcalfe > The Pilgrim < Jerry Michalski > The Chef < Nathan Myhrvold> The Webmaster < Kip Parent > The Citizen < Howard Rheingold > The Buccaneer < Louis Rossetto > The Curator < Doug Rowan > The Oracle < Paul Saffo > The Radical < Bob Stein > The Skeptic < Cliff Stoll > The Catalyst < Linda Stone > The Evangelist < Lew Tucker > The Cyberanalyst < Sherry Turkle > The Lover < Dave Winer > The Impresario < Richard Saul Wurman > http://www.edge.org/digerati/index.html

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Re: Cyber 'Nannys"
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Re: Cyber 'Nannys" > From: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) > Message-Id: <qsoPke10w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> > > The mentally retarded pedophile Guy Polis tried to mailbomb me from his ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^ ^^^ > former eviljay(a)bway.net account, and bway.net pulled his plug in minute. Fire One. ---guy

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Re: TEMPEST open-source definition version 0.1alpha
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 2/10/98 8:19 PM, Ryan Lackey (rdl(a)mit.edu) passed this wisdom: >So, if we're going to try to protect computers from TEMPEST >threats, and wedon't have access to the multiple government >classified standards, we should come up with the Cypherpunks >TEMPEST standard. > >A theoretical definition of what we want to do (strong) is that we >should beable to put the equipment in a virtual box, have an empty >virtual box, and then nothing anything which is not in the TCB can >do can distinguish one box from the other. Perhaps the "empty" box >should also contain simulators for the ethernet, visible light >output, and straight power draw (harmonics are still to be >avoided), or in some other definitional way they should be >accounted for. This prevents non-TCB programs from utilizing the EM >spectrum as a covert channel. [big snip] Some of this reminds me of when I worked at Raytheon, I did some coding for this genius at magnetic fields we had. This was the time of the MX missile and the 'racetrack' concept, mobile launchers that moved all the time. The idea was that a significiant percentage of the mobile launch cannisters were empty and what the scientist I worked with had to do was design a set of coils for the dummy cannister that would make it have the same magnetic signature as a real cannister loaded with a real missile ... "sort of a global thermonuclear shell game" if you will ... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNOEM0D7r4fUXwraZAQG+hQf/U/2Irt9FlQQWxc1nJQ1wlFUEtMf5fAxB 5JUXDwGy7+rAVojReAj9gV9SeXZA+h25WJMIbzngibSOYfieiE0iXPNbgNVsDLm/ /giLgqW/AfBUm+EjQMP5glav4xQxGDTKdBBGSqujyzkn5jaDlBVff5mfw5oUeN1c Vz4dIOzl8n6ivdc2PRbFh+he1X55+y3wLAqYc60VMmhlWPTTHx4PoJRw6hl5lX9c dfxTIo5B1Gw1I7pP0REFTodW+HXASqoXAG/1Xo3J5rn+yup0IQblz9Pg8IBAW22j kuFECDHuo9daXp7QH0nZX1/2hRw/cZUf8AtGMhDq3zNWH21E2pHsQA== =+Gr+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Brian B. Riley --> http://members.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> -- give us the rights Abraham Lincoln cherished lovingly: "Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves."

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Anti-Asian E-Mail Was Hate Crime, Jury Finds
by David Honig 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.latimes.com/HOME/NEWS/ORANGE/OCNEWS/t000013848.html Wednesday, February 11, 1998 Anti-Asian E-Mail Was Hate Crime, Jury Finds Internet: Ex-UCI student Richard Machado is found to have violated civil rights with threatening messages. By DAVAN MAHARAJ, Times Staff Writer SANTA ANA--In the nation's first successful prosecution of a hate crime on the Internet, an expelled university student was found guilty Tuesday of violating the civil rights of Asian students at UC Irvine by sending e-mail threats to kill them if they didn't leave the school. Prosecutors hailed the verdict in the retrial of 20-year-old Richard J. Machado as a victory for federal authorities seeking to police the Internet to deter hatemongers and racist groups. "This verdict shows that high-tech hate is not going to be tolerated," said Assistant U.S. Atty. Michael J. Gennaco, who prosecuted the case. "A line does have to be drawn in the world of cyberspace. If you cross that line and threaten people, you are going to be subject to criminal penalties." The jury of eight women and four men deliberated for less than a day before finding Machado guilty of interfering with students' rights to attend a public university. Jurors deadlocked 9 to 3 in favor of conviction on a second, identical count. Machado displayed no emotion when the verdict was read Tuesday afternoon. His first trial ended in a mistrial in November with jurors deadlocked 9 to 3 in favor of acquittal. Because his conviction carries a maximum sentence of one year in prison and he has already served more time than that in custody, Machado could be set free as early as Friday, when he appears for sentencing before U.S. District Judge Alicemarie H. Stotler. Gennaco, who heads the civil rights division of the U.S. attorney's office in Los Angeles, downplayed Machado's sentence. "What we've taken from this case is a deterrent value that people can't get on the Internet and send threats to folks," Gennaco said. Gennaco hinted that prosecutors would now be more likely to step in and prosecute computer users who stalk or threaten others in cyberspace. "We have a number of ongoing investigations regarding allegations of threats on the Internet," Gennaco said. "Now we have some guidance from 12 people that the government can step in and enforce laws on the Internet." Machado's trial--and retrial--had been seen as a test case. To prosecute Machado, prosecutors turned to civil rights laws enacted in the 1960s that were designed to prevent Southerners from standing in the way of school desegregation. Machado violated students' civil rights, prosecutors contended, when he hunched over a computer in UCI's engineering building on Sept. 20, 1996, and sent an anonymous e-mail message to about 60 mainly Asian students. The message, signed "Asian Hater," warned that all Asians should leave UC Irvine or the sender would "hunt all of you down and kill your stupid asses." "I personally will make it my [life's work] to find and kill every one of you personally. OK? That's how determined I am. Do you hear me?" Apparently thinking the first one didn't get transmitted, Machado sent the same message twice, and school officials quickly traced the messages to him after they received complaints. The e-mail incensed and upset some students, especially those of Asian descent, who constitute nearly half of UC Irvine's 17,000 students, the highest percentage of any UC school. Several students testified that they were petrified by the e-mail. They armed themselves with pepper spray, refused to go out alone at night and became suspicious of strangers. The defense called other students who testified that they became angry over the message but later shrugged it off as a bad joke. During the trial, defense lawyers depicted Machado as a disturbed teenager who became distraught and flunked out of UCI after his eldest brother was murdered in Los Angeles. When he sent the threatening e-mail, Machado was no longer a UCI student, but he was too ashamed to tell his immigrant parents, according to Deputy Federal Public Defender Sylvia Torres-Guillen. Machado testified at both trials that one of his brothers would drive him to UCI each day even after he had been expelled. There, he passed his days in the computer laboratory, sending and receiving e-mail and surfing the Internet until it was time to go home. On the day he sent the e-mail, Machado testified, he was bored and wanted to start a "dialogue" with people who were signed on to the school's computer network. Some attorneys, including Machado's defense team, questioned whether charges should have been filed against the former student. Torres-Guillen even called an expert witness in Internet etiquette, who described Machado's e-mail as "a classic flame"--online lingo for an angry message that, while annoying, is not meant to be harmful. But Gennaco contended that Machado hated Asians because they got better grades than he did. In his rebuttal case, the prosecutor called a University of South Carolina freshman and another computer user in Denver who testified that Machado referred to Asians as "chinks" when he chatted with them in cyberspace. The witnesses contradicted Machado's testimony that he never used derogatory terms for Asians. Gennaco said prosecutors may suggest that Machado attend a racial awareness program as part of his sentence. Search the archives of the Los Angeles Times for similar stories. You will not be charged to look for stories, only to retrieve one. Copyright Los Angeles Times PREV STORY NEXT STORY ------------------------------------------------------------ David Honig Orbit Technology honig(a)otc.net Intaanetto Jigyoubu Lewinsky for President '2012

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Re: How to profit from writing open source (was: free software)
by David Miller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A while back there was a thread on different models of how to profit from free software. I have a few additions that I don't think were mentioned, albeit late. Ok. Way late. The Data Fellows model - supply (ssh) Unix source code free, but charge for Windows (clients) after a 30-day trial period. Yes. The Joel McNamara model - give the (Private Idaho) software away and go fight forest fires and have your children profit from a better world. --David Miller middle rival devil rim lad

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Re: Drivers licenses (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 10 Feb 1998 21:27:57 -0500 > From: David Miller <dm0(a)avana.net> > Subject: Re: Drivers licenses > > > It's a signal that is mixed and laid down by the machine. It covers the > > entire track. The cassette head only has two or four head depending on if > > it has auto-revers and moves the head. > > So you are saying that the is a continuous track of varying amplitiude > that > defines the audio signal? And that your bias is a part of this? Actualy a standard cassette tape has 4 tracks grouped in pairs. Each pair is given one of the channel. The audio that comes in is mixed with a bias signal (using a summing amp) and then laid down on the tape. > >From what I know, the bias is a parameter to the recording process and > not > the recording as it can be recovered from the magnets. It is something > intended to forward-correct error, which is not intended to be > interpreted > in the future. Huh? I have been involved in audio recording for over 20 years, acted as rodies for a host of bands (some of which actualy made records - but alas no money) and I must admit that the above sentences don't make any sense to me at all. Can you possible reword them? What magnets? 'paramter of the recording process'? 'forward-correct error'? 'interpreted in the future'? If your heads are magnetised you really should de-gauss them. They'll erase your tapes eventualy... > Looking for satellites? No, to do that I use a C-band hooked to a alt-az mount and a digital modem. I'll probably just make a normal Newtonian and hood a CCD camera to it and feed my Video Toaster to digitize and enhance the images. I am particular inchanged by the Moon. I can look at it for extended periods. I was enchanted by it when Men stepped onto it for the first time. I very much hope that we (as a race) go back to stay... > Did you snag a job? I had a headhunter call tonight. It's been a year > or > so since they've bothered me. I talked to BMC Software today. Looks like I'll probably go to work for them supporting their suite of database products. I should know tomorrow if they want to do the final interview which means I'll go to work for them on Monday. > > | The obvious is sometimes false; | > > | The unexpected sometimes true. | > > You've gotta get this Pringles thing in order. Faith breaks the back of > these > types of philosophies. If you give in to faith, you should normally > incorporate > it. That doesn't mean that you have to explain it through the > philosophy, but > if that faith is the only thing that you know is indespensable, you need > to > reconsider how indespensable a philosophy that does not make room for it > is. Uh, ok. Ta ta. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The obvious is sometimes false; | | The unexpected sometimes true. | | | | Anonymous | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Cyber 'Nannys"
by eviljay 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Dr. Dimento wrote: > > The mentally retarded pedophile Guy Polis tried to mailbomb me from his > former eviljay(a)bway.net account, and bway.net pulled his plug in minute. > > --- > > Dr. Dimento KOTM > Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps Everybody SING!!! The old grey crank, he ain't what he used to be, ain't what he used to be, ain't what he used to be. The old grey crank, he ain't what he used to be, and it'll be like that forevermore. > Is that censorship? Is sex with the impotent Dr. Dimento intercourse? -->EvilJay<-- MUH-HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAAHA!!!

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FC98 Full Event Schedule
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Resent-Date: Tue, 10 Feb 1998 18:19:23 -0400 X-Authentication-Warning: online.offshore.com.ai: list set sender to fc98-request(a)offshore.com.ai using -f X-Sender: rah(a)pop.sneaker.net Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Tue, 10 Feb 1998 16:58:52 -0500 To: fc98(a)offshore.com.ai From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: FC98 Full Event Schedule Resent-From: fc98(a)offshore.com.ai X-Mailing-List: <fc98(a)offshore.com.ai> archive/latest X-Loop: fc98(a)offshore.com.ai Precedence: list Resent-Sender: fc98-request(a)offshore.com.ai Hello, Everyone! FC98 is fast approaching, and the FC98 organizing team is thrashing together a General Schedule for the combined FC98 events: The FC98 Conference, the FC98 Commercial Exhibition and Exhibition Program, and the FC98 Workshop. In addition to the ASCII version of the schedule in this message, Blanc Weber, the FC98 Exhibition and Sponsorship Manager, has put a very nice tabular version on the web for easy printing: <http://www.cnw.com/~blancw/FC98Sched/FC98Schd.html> Please send any corrections you might have to me offline. Okay, here's the schedule's roadmap: (CON) means conference activity, and an FC98 Conference Badge is required for attendance. (CE) means Commercial Exhibition activity, and is open to the public. (ECC) means Ecliptical Curve Cruise; Conference badgeholders go free, but badges are non-transferrable. Additional tickets for the Cruise are available for sale to FC98-associated people (family, friends, etc.). (IFCA) means the founding meeting of the International Financial Cryptography Association, which all FC98 Conference badgeholders, booth-holders and sponsors are now automatically members of. Only Conference badgeholders can vote at the first General Meeting of the Association, however. We don't have anything about the Workshop on this message, but we will have a schedule for it soon on the web page, for those of you who are interested in sticking around another week for the world's only financial cryptography bootcamp. :-). Also, all FC98 badgeholders, friends, and family are invited to the "Welcome to Anguilla" session on Monday to get some information and advice on what to do during your stay on Anguilla. Finally, like all schedules, this one is subject to change at a moment's notice. ;-). We'll try to keep the website as up-to-date as possible, because it's probably a good idea not to spam you nice folks will all the updates as they happen. :-) See you in Anguilla! Cheers, Robert Hettinga, General Chairman, The 1998 Financial Cryptography Conference, Exhibition and Workshop (FC98) ----- Monday 23 February 1998 800 -- 820 (CON) Breakfast 820 -- 830 (CON) FC98 Conference Sessions Welcome 830 -- 905 (CON) Micropayments via Efficient Coin-Flipping Richard J. Lipton (Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA) Rafail Ostrovsky (Bellcore, Morristown, NJ, USA) 905 -- 940 (CON) X-Cash: Executable Digital Cash Markus Jakobsson (Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill, NJ, USA) Ari Juels (RSA Laboratories, Bedford, MA, USA) 940 -- 1015 (CON) Distributed Trustees and Revokability: A Framework for Internet Payment David M'Raihi (Gemplus, Issy-les-moulineaux, France) David Pointcheval (GREYC, Universite de Caen, Caen, France) 1015 -- 1045 (CON) Coffee Break Exhibition Booths open 1045 -- 1120 (CON) A Platform for Privately Defined Currencies, Loyalty Credits, and Play Money David P. Maher (AT&T Labs--Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA) 1120 -- 1155 (CON) Assessment of Threats for Smart Card Based Electronic Cash Kazuo J. Ezawa, Gregory Napiorkowski (Mondex International, Florham Park, NJ, USA) 1155 -- 1230 (CON) Using a High-Performance, Programmable Secure Coprocessor Sean W. Smith, Elaine R. Palmer, Steve Weingart (IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY, USA) 1230 -- 1330 (CON) Lunch 1330 -- 1400 (CE) The Required Hoopla: FC98 Official Event Opening Dignitaries (the Finance Minister?), FC98 sponsors, FC98 Management, etc. Thanks to Anguilla, Sponsors, etc. Administrivia/How FC98 works Ribbon Cutting for FC98 Exhibition FC98 Exhibition Sessions Welcome 1400--1430 (CE) FC98 Press Conference (on Exhibition Floor) 1400--1500 (CE) IBM Secure Crypto Coprocessor Demonstration Sean W. Smith, Elaine R. Palmer, Steve Weingart (IBM T.J. Watson Research Center) 1500--1600 (CE) (Bring friends and family if you want) Welcome to Anguilla! Anguilla history, what to do, what to see. Various Anguillan Chamber of Commerce, Tourist office folks. 1600--1700 (CE) "So, you want to bank on Anguilla?" Offshore Banking and Incorporation in Anguilla. Various Anguillan Bankers, Lawyers, Financial Planners, Etc. 1830 -- 2000 (CE) Cocktail Reception at Serenity Restaurant, Shoal Bay East Sponsored by Hansa Bank, Anguilla Tuesday 24 February 1998 800 -- 830 (CON) Breakfast 830 -- 905 (CON) Secure Group Barter: Multi-Party Fair Exchange with Semi-Trusted Neutral Parties Matt Franklin (AT&T Labs--Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA) Gene Tsudik (USC Information Sciences Institute, Marina del Rey, CA, USA) 905 -- 940 (CON) A Payment Scheme Using Vouchers Ernest Foo, Colin Boyd (Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia) 940 -- 1015 (CON) A Formal Specification of Requirements for Payment Transactions in the SET Protocol Catherine Meadows, Paul Syverson (Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC, USA) 1015 -- 1045 (CON) Coffee Break 1045 -- 1120 (CON) On Assurance Structures for WWW Commerce Markus Jakobsson (Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill, NJ, USA) Moti Yung (CertCo, New York, NY, USA) 1120 -- 1230 (CON) Panel Discussion Certificate Revocation: Mechanics and Meaning Barb Fox (Microsoft, Redmond, WA, USA), moderator Joan Feigenbaum (AT&T Labs--Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA) Paul Kocher (Valicert, Palo Alto, CA, USA) Michael Myers (Verisign, Mountain View, CA, USA) Ron Rivest (MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA, USA) 1230 -- 1330 (CON) Lunch 1330 -- 1430 (CE) FC98 Sponsor Showcase RSA Data Security 1430 -- 1530 (CE) FC98 Sponsor Showcase C2NET 1530 -- 1630 (CE) FC98 Sponsor Showcase Sicherheit und Privat- International Bank 1630 -- 1730 (CE) FC98 Sponsor Showcase Hansa Bank 1730 -- 1900 (CE) Cocktails and Barbecue at InterIsland Hotel Sponsored by RSA 1900 -- 2000 (IFCA) (CE) (CON to vote) General Meeting: The International Financial Cryptography Association (IFCA) IFCA Founders Group Photo (Net.Nyms Disguised) 2000 -- 2200 (CON to speak) (CE to watch ) Rump Session (For speaking requests contact Matt Franklin <mailto: franklin(a)research.att.com>) Beer provided by RSA Wednesday 25 February 1998 800 -- 830 (CON) Breakfast 830 -- 930 (CON) Invited Speaker Private Signatures and E-commerce David Chaum (DigiCash, Palo Alto, CA, USA) 930 -- 1005 (CON) Group Blind Digital Signatures: A Scalable Solution to Electronic Cash Anna Lysyanskaya, Zulfikar Ramzan (MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA, USA) 1005 -- 1045 (CON) Coffee Break 1045 -- 1120 (CON) Curbing Junk E-Mail via Secure Classification Eran Gabber, Markus Jakobsson, Yossi Matias, Alain Mayer (Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill, NJ, USA) 1120 -- 1155 (CON) Publicly Verifiable Lotteries: Applications of Delaying Functions David M. Goldschlag (Divx, Herndon, VA, USA) Stuart G. Stubblebine (AT&T Labs--Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA) 1155 -- 1230 (CON) Security of Digital Watermarks Lesley R. Matheson, Stephen G. Mitchell, Talal G. Shamoon, Robert E. Tarjan, Francis X. Zane (STAR Lab, InterTrust Technologies, Sunnyvale, CA, USA) 1230 -- 1330 (CON) Lunch 1330 -- 1405 (CON) Security in the Java Electronic Commerce Framework Surya Koneru, Ted Goldstein (JavaSoft, Palo Alto, CA, USA) 1405 -- 1440 (CON) Beyond Identity: Warranty-Based Digital Signature Transactions Yair Frankel (CertCo, New York, NY, USA) David W. Kravitz (Divx, Herndon, Virginia, USA) Charles T. Montgomery (CertCo, New York, NY, USA) Moti Yung (CertCo, New York, NY, USA) 1440 -- 1515 (CON) Compliance Checking in the PolicyMaker Trust Management System Matt Blaze, Joan Feigenbaum, Martin Strauss (AT&T Labs--Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA) 1515 -- 1545 (CON) Coffee Break 1545 -- 1620 (CON) An Efficient Fair Off-Line Electronic Cash System with Extensions to Checks and Wallets with Observers Aymeric de Solages, Jacque Traore (France Telecom--CNET, Caen, France) 1620 -- 1655 (CON) An Efficient Untraceable Electronic Money System Based on Partially Blind Signatures of the Discrete Logarithm Problem Shingo Miyazaki, Kouichi Sakurai (Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan) 1655 -- 1700 (CON) FC98 Conference Session Closing Official Conference T-shirts Group Photo (Net.Nyms Disguised) 1830 -- 2100? (CE) Financial Masquerade Ball (at Cap Julaca) Sponsored by Sicherheit und Privat- International Bank (Proper attire and disguises required, Groucho glasses available at the door). RSVP Thursday 26 February 1998 Beach/Cruise day. No FC98 activity scheduled today except breakfast and lunch at InterIsland for those who don't take the eclipse cruise. 800 -- 830 (ECC) (CON) Boarding: Ecliptic Curve Cruise [ECC] Sponsored by RSA C2NET Sicherheit und Privat- International Bank Hansa Bank Offshore Information Services Shipwright/e$ 825 *SHARP!* (ECC) (CON) ECC "Before" Group Photo (Net.Nyms Disguised) 830 *SHARP!* (ECC) (CON) Ecliptic Curve Cruise Departs For the Ecliptic Curve and the Zone of Totality 900 -- 1030 (Anguilla) (CON) Breakfast at InterIsland 1230 -- 1330 (Anguilla) (CON) Lunch at InterIsland 1435? (Anguilla) (CON) Maximum Partial Eclipse 1436 (ECC) (CON) ECC now at 16.57N, 62.15W (2 minute totality line, 9 miles north of Montserrat) Total Eclipse of the Sun, Maximum Totality "Diamond ring", the stars, and all... 2030 (ECC) (CON) Ecliptic Cryptography Cruise Returns to Anguilla ECC "After" Group Photo (Net.Nyms Disguised) Friday 27 February 1998 1000 -- 1030 (CON) Breakfast 1030 -- 1230 (CE) Roundtable Discussion Financial Intermediaries, Public Networks, and Financial Cryptography Steve Schear, First Ecache, moderator Paul Guthrie, VISA International Frank Trotter, Mercantile Bank/Mark Twain Ecash A. S. von Bernhardi, Sicherheit und Privat- International Bank Lynwood Bell, Hansa Bank Other Financial Intermediaries, TBA 1230 -- 1330 (CON) Lunch 1330 -- 1430 (CE) Roundtable Discussion The Regulation of Financial Cryptography Duncan Frissell, Frissell Associates, Moderator Kevin Manson, US Dept of Treasury, Financial Fraud Institute A. S. von Bernhardi, Sicherheit und Privat- International Bank Other Regulators, Lawyers, TBA 1430 -- 1655 (CE) Financial Cryptography Showcase Dave Del Torto/Dr. Jon Callas, PGP Certserver, banking applications Dr. Nicko van Someren, ncipher SET processing engine Stephan Overbeek, QC N-Count Ian Grigg/Gary Howland, Systemics, TBA Other FC Products, TBA 1655 -- 1700 (CE) FC98 Commercial Exhibition Closing Minor Exausted Hoopla Commercial Exhibition Survivors Group Photo (Net.Nyms Disguised) 1830 -- ? (CE) 2nd meeting: Anguilla Dining Cryptographers' Society (at Serenity) Partially sponsored by C2NET ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/> --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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TEMPEST open-source definition version 0.1alpha (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: TEMPEST open-source definition version 0.1alpha > Date: Tue, 10 Feb 1998 20:19:46 EST > From: Ryan Lackey <rdl(a)MIT.EDU> > time to reverse engineer the practical TEMPEST systems (and in so doing > perhaps the classified TEMPEST spec) out there. Next time I find a > TEMPEST case at swapfest, or at a con, I'll pick it up (if someone wants to > ship me one, so much the better). You *can* buy them from some vendors, Are you possibly confusing Tempest with a NEMA certified case? Educalc used to sell a case for the HP-41C calculator that they touted as NBC certified. I would suggest looking for one of the NIST certified environmental test cases that are available. They'll cook or chill your electronics and block the emissions quite handily. Be shure to get a supply for the copper door gaskets, they wear out under daily use about 3-4 times a year. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The obvious is sometimes false; | | The unexpected sometimes true. | | | | Anonymous | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Someone find Jim Choate a job!
by David Miller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sensory deprivation has caused Mr.Choate to finally go haywire. I suggest that someone from the state of TX (who have IDs from Hell) transport him to the nearest University. --David Miller middle rival devil rim lad

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re: Driver Licenses
by Uhh...this is Joe [Randall Farmer] 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Either should work...I'll bet that scratching the shit off with his keys > worked too ;) > I'll have to remember that when it's time to get mine done. Shouldn't take much if all you need is to stop regular folks from scanning it -- if it's like some other systems, changing a couple bits will keep the checksum from checking and the reader will report the card as invalid. > > That was a good question, though, does anyone know how much data those > little stripes can hold? It can (emphasis on can; most stripes don't) store 300 bytes according to some -- 1846 characters of English in theory, 600 in practice, 480 uncompressed, 300 ASCII. 300 bytes is six monochrome compressed mugshots or a 2400-pixel (about 50x50) uncompressed monochrome photo, or it could hold 33 military-grade biometric IDs. A study of el33t h@qu3r ph1|ez show that actual credit and ATM cards don't use nearly 300 bytes. That might be because error rates would be astronomical, or it might just be because they can't use all the extra space. [After writing this, I saw another web site with a figure of 226 bytes, not 300. Don't know who's right, so I'm going with the paranoid estimate...] > > Scott R. Brower > http://www.infowar.com > http://www.efflorida.org --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Randall Farmer rfarmer(a)hiwaay.net http://hiwaay.net/~rfarmer

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Test [No Reply]
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Loop Test [No Reply] ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The obvious is sometimes false; | | The unexpected sometimes true. | | | | Anonymous | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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[Fwd: Russia/Iraq]
by WebWarrior3＠InfoWar.Com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A bit off of our regularly scheduled program, but with Yeltsin saying that Clinton might be starting a 3rd World War last week, I thought I would pass this on. To: webwarrior3(a)infowar.com Subject: Russia/Iraq From: alert(a)stratfor.com Date: Tue, 10 Feb 1998 19:59:26 -0600 (CST) ______________________________________ Check out our newest product: Santizer Give away your computer, not your data ______________________________________ Global Intelligence Update Red Alert February 11, 1998 Russia Threatens to Arm Baghdad But will Saddam Remain in Power? According to a report on Tuesday in the online edition of the Egyptian newspaper Al-sha'b, the Russian government has warned Washington that Russia will supply arms and humanitarian aid to Iraq if the United States chooses to abandon diplomatic efforts and attacks Iraq. Al-Sha'b reported that Baghdad requested 20 billion dollars in urgent military and humanitarian aid from Russia. Baghdad, which already owes Russia 80 billion dollars, hopes to be able to pay off its debt once sanctions are lifted. Al-Sha'b went on to report that Washington has monitored heightened states of alert and increased military preparedness throughout the Middle East, and has warned neighboring Arab states against providing Iraq with military support. If the Egyptian report is factual, then Russia has just moved even closer to confrontation with the United States. Its previous threats of world war are clearly not credible. Sending aid to Iraq is, on the other hand, quite credible and therefore is in many ways more dangerous. The question is, will Hussein be there after the U.S. attack to receive the arms? We have noticed a curious juxtaposition of official U.S. statements on the crisis in Iraq with the emerging balance of U.S. forces in the region, suggesting that Washington may be expecting an Iraqi coup d'etat. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testified before the Senate on Tuesday that, in the event U.S. air strikes contributed to toppling Saddam Hussein, "it would create a situation which, for a time, would require the presence of troops." The United States has accelerated its deployment of ground troops to the region. Three thousand troops from Ft. Stewart are being deployed to reinforce the 1,500 U.S. ground troops already in Kuwait. The USS Tarawa and the USS Guam, amphibious assault ships each carrying a 2,000-man Marine Expeditionary Unit, are headed for the Persian Gulf. Other U.S. ground forces in the region include 6,000 soldiers at the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia and 10,000 soldiers engaged in military exercises in Egypt. Additionally, the list of potential U.S. targets has grown from suspected chemical and biological agent sites to include command and control installations, the Iraqi air force, and the Republican Guard. This suggests a decapitation strike, aimed at disrupting Hussein's capability to coordinate a defense of his hold on power. Iraqi opposition forces also appear to be preparing for an altered post-air strike environment. The rival Kurdish Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdestan are planning a meeting on February 12 to settle outstanding differences and stabilize their cease-fire. Iraqi Kurdestan's Conservative Party public relations officer, Aram Muhammad Sa'id, declared in an interview on Monday with the Iranian News Agency that Turkey's latest entry into northern Iraq had the "green light" from the United States, and was part of a U.S. plan to use air strikes to topple Hussein and dismember Iraq. Finally, the Iraqi National Congress has reported that Baath Party and military officials have begun evacuating southern Iraq, lest an uprising follow U.S. air strikes. Many in the U.S. Congress have asserted the need for an "end game" that removes Saddam Hussein from power, but thus far the U.S. has been unable to foment or coordinate an overthrow of Hussein. If it is to be successful, we will not know for certain about a coup plot's existence until it is underway. But circumstances do hint that something may be in the works. Baghdad has evidently noticed this, as Iraqi Foreign Minister Saeed al- Sahhaf asserted on Tuesday that the U.S. would fail to topple the Iraqi regime, since Hussein had the support of the Iraqi people. The question is this: is there a real possibility of a coup in Baghdad or is this part of U.S. psychological warfare against Iraq? In a way, the possibility of a coup is more reasonable an explanation for U.S. behavior than the idea that the U.S. is going to mount an air campaign against chemical and biological weapons. What is not clear is whether a coup has a real chance or whether this is just wishful thinking on the part of the United States. And it is not clear what Russia would do if the coup turned into a protracted internal struggle. ___________________________________________________ To receive free daily Global Intelligence Updates or Computer Security Alerts, sign up on the web at http://www.stratfor.com/mail/, or send your name, organization, position, mailing address, phone number, and e-mail address to info(a)stratfor.com ___________________________________________________ STRATFOR Systems, Inc. 3301 Northland Drive, Suite 500 Austin, TX 78731-4939 Phone: 512-454-3626 Fax: 512-454-1614 Internet: http://www.stratfor.com/ Email: info(a)stratfor.com

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Re: Deriving economic profits from writing FREE software?
by Zooko Journeyman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have an idea for a model for deriving economic profits from writing free software. It requires dcash (specifically, some money that is cheaply and easily transferrable in small amounts). People submit requests for changes to a "wishlist"/"bug report list". Along with these requests they send dcash. Various mechanisms of market and/or trusted intermediary ensure that, on the whole, the hackers who satisfy the most highly valued wishes get the most money. See Grigg 1997 for one good idea of how such a market could operate. We already have extensive networks of wishlists, bug tracking systems, and the rest of an integrated open, distributed software development system (e.g. Linux, Debian, many others). Given the ability to pay (perhaps credit cards could be made to work here? Low cost credit card transactions? Cybercash?), we could start trying to add this kind of flow of cash to some such systems. Unfortunately, i fear that such attempts may fail and disrupt currently working systems... --Zooko P.S. Hi, y'all. I've switched continents, contexts, CPUs, sensitivities and perhaps more, but i'm fine. Thanks for missing me. p.p.s. as per <a href="http://www.slashdot.org/slashdot.cgi?mode=article&artnum=685"> this slashdot.org article</a>, it is called "Open Software" from now on, not "Free Software". Tell the kids.

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Re: TEMPEST open-source definition version 0.1alpha (fwd)
by Ryan Lackey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> confusing TEMPEST with NEMA No, I am certain they're TEMPEST cases; they're government security vendors, with names that include the word TEMPEST or Security or whatever, and their prices are huge. And when I said "I'd like to pay COD", they said "we only accept government purchase forms." I have a plain NEMA 19" rack with power and fans, it's quite different. Black Unicorn's post about the demise of cash is particularly true when dealing with vendors who want government POs :) The people at hacking cons who are selling TEMPEST cases are selling what I believe are the real thing acquired through a variety of methods, some legal, others perhaps not. Usually they contain crufty old PCs, but one guy had some really nice fully-enclosed TEMPEST-compliant racks. They had serious power filters at the bottom, massive fans, and shielded fan i/o. They were basically free (a few hundred dollars), but I couldn't motor freight them from the location to my home, since I didn't have anything but cash at the time. ObNonCrypto: Waiting until 10 days before fc98 to buy airline tickets when the cheap fare expired an hour ago was SO SO SO stupid. Like taking 4 c-notes and lighting them on fire. Oh well. -- Ryan Lackey rdl(a)mit.edu http://mit.edu/rdl/

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Transcript of Hillary Clinton's comments on Net-regulation
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 11 Feb 1998 14:54:55 -0800 (PST) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: politech(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Transcript of Mrs. Clinton's comments on Net-regulation Here's what Hillary Clinton said this afternoon about regulation of the Internet during an otherwise routine press conference in the Map Room about the "Millenium Evenings." Tonight at 7 pm EST she and the president will cybercast the first one from the east room of the White House. It's hardly surprising that our elected officials don't like the ability of the Internet to provide everyone with a platform. Even Thomas Jefferson kvetched about the excesses of the press of his day and in 1783 and 1788 endorsed laws that permitted government prosecutions of the press for printing "false facts." Though I somehow suspect that the first lady has recently been more worried about media reporting facts that may turn out to be true... -Declan === Q I just wanted to ask you about something that Gregg said. He's obviously an Internet enthusiast. But when he talked about some of the aspects of the system -- the fact that you could say something and you can't take it back, how it's so available to everyone and instantaneous, he's raised some issues that have been issues for us in the last few weeks in our business. And I wonder if you think that this new media is necessarily an entirely good thing. And also, as somebody who has been through this crucible, in the next millennium how would you like to see this new and ever more interesting -- (laughter) -- handled of things like the issues like the personal lives of public figures. MRS. CLINTON: Well, Kathy, I think that's one of these issues that Dick was referring to, that we're going to have to really think hard about. And I think that every time technology makes an advance -- when you move to the railroad, or you move to the cotton gin, or you move to the automobile, or the airplane, and now certainly as you move to the computer and increasing accessibility and instantaneous information on the computer, we are all going to have to rethink how we deal with this, because there are always competing values. There's no free decision that I'm aware of anywhere in life, and certainly with technology that's the case. As exciting as these new developments are -- and I think Gregg's enthusiasm is shared broadly by Americans and people around the world -- there are a number of serious issues without any kind of editing function or gate-keeping function. What does it mean to have the right to defend your reputation, or to respond to what someone says? There used to be this old saying that the lie can be halfway around the world before the truth gets its boots on. Well, today, the lie can be twice around the world before the truth gets out of bed to find its boots. I mean, it is just beyond imagination what can be disseminated. So I think we're going to have to really worry about this, because it won't be just public elected officials. We've seen some cases where somebody who had a grudge against a girl's mother because the family wouldn't let him date her put out on the Internet that the family were child abusers. Totally private people, never stuck their toe in public life. It can be done to anybody, and it can get an audience, and it can create a falsehood about somebody. And certainly it's multiplied many times over if you happen to be in public life. I don't have any clue about what we're going to do legally, regulatorily, technologically -- I don't have a clue. But I do think we always have to keep competing interests in balance. I'm a big pro-balance person. That's why I love the founders -- checks and balances; accountable power. Anytime an individual or an institution or an invention leaps so far out ahead of that balance and throws a system, whatever it might be -- political, economic, technological -- out of balance, you've got a problem, because then it can lead to the oppression people's rights, it can lead to the manipulation of information, it can lead to all kinds of bad outcomes which we have seen historically. So we're going to have to deal with that. And I hope a lot of smart people are going to -- Q Sounds like you favor regulation. MRS. CLINTON: Bill, I don't know what -- that's why I said I don't know what I'm in favor of. And I don't know enough to know what to be in favor of, because I think it's one of those new issues we've got to address. We've got to see whether our existing laws protect people's right of privacy, protect them against defamation. And if they can, how do you do that when you can press a button and you can't take it back. So I think we have to tread carefully. Q -- one of the balances, though, in this new digital age is that you can have direct communication. You're celebrating that tonight -- people can log on from anywhere. In that spirit, have you thought any more about a direct and frank conversation by the President with the country about these allegations? MRS. CLINTON: I'm not going to add anything to what the President has already said. And I think that any of you who think hard about this issue would have to agree that he's taken the right position. So I'm not going to add to that. ===

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Re: Anti-Asian E-Mail
by Mixmaster 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Gennaco said prosecutors may suggest that Machado attend a racial awareness program as part of his sentence." Political re-education, anyone? Take names, take names, take names.

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[Fwd: SpookTech98]
by sunder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: (Recipient list suppressed) Subject: SpookTech98 From: SpyKing <spyking(a)thecodex.com> Date: Sun, 08 Feb 1998 06:26:52 -0500 SpyKing, with a little help from his friends, is pleased to announce: SpookTech98 The Methods of Eavesdropping & Surveillance Seminar II Live from New York City Friday, June 5, 1998 Location: The Crown Plaza at the United Nations 304 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10017 Sponsered by the Codex Surveillance & Privacy News, A.L.M.I.E. Association of Legal, Medical & Investigative Experts and W.A.S.P. World Association of Surveillance Professionals. If you missed it last year... Don't make the same mistake twice... You'll meet lots of great people and you'll learn a lot... In our "Methods of Eavesdropping & Surveillance" Seminar II you'll learn how various surveillance devices work... and how to protect against them... You will also learn how the spies among us access confidential information sources and learn everything there is to know about YOU... If you're serious about protecting your privacy... you can't afford to miss this seminar... enrollment is VERY limited... You will see ACTUAL Demonstrations... of the latest Surveillance equipment & Investigative techniques... We will have some vendors this year displaying their wares... If you are a vendor and would like to exhibit let us know... You will learn how: Offices/Homes are bugged Phones are tapped Cellular Calls are monitored People/Vehicles are followed Computers are eavesdropped on You will also learn how to PROTECT yourself from these surveillance techniques... We will also give a "live" demonstration of computer data interception... something everyone who "surfs" the net needs to be aware of... AND... We will "crack" a PGP message, show the targets passphrase AND the content of the message... If you're interested in privacy you shouldn't miss SpookTech98! You do NOT have to be a victim... You will receive a Wealth of Handout Material... This is no nonsense information packed seminar taught by seasoned professionals with a lifetime of surveillance experience in the field... You will ALSO Learn How the Spies Among us Obtain: Non-published telephone numbers Addresses from Non published numbers Utility Company information Health insurance information Records of Toll calls Cable company information Bank Accounts & balances Cellular Toll records Pager/Beeper user information and as an added bonus... ALL attendees will receive a FREE micro video pinhole camera and we'll show you HOW to use it to PROTECT your person and/or assets... If you're serious about protecting your privacy... you can't afford to miss this seminar... enrollment is VERY limited... Seminar Date: Friday, June 5, 1998 Hours: 9:00 AM to 6PM Location: The Crown Plaza at the United Nations 304 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10017 Cost: Advanced Registration SLF & W.A.S.P. Members $295.00 Non-Members $350.00 Day of Seminar Registration at the Door $375.00 (Cash or Money Order Only) We have created a SpookTech98 powerpoint presentation for information purposes if anyone would like... just hit reply and request SpookTech98.ppt Refreshments will be served ALL day during the seminar including a FREE buffet lunch and SpyKing will host a FREE party for all attendees afterwards SOMEWHERE IN NEW YORK CITY... and I'll pick up the tab again ;-) Please printout this form and send with reservation. Your reservation will be confirmed to guarantee your seat. Seating is LIMITED. ************************************************************************ Registration Form SpookTech98 ************************************************************************ Name: Company: Street Address: City: State: Postal Code: Country: E-Mail: Tel: Fax: Amount Enclosed: *************************************************************************** *************************************************************************** The information supplied in this registration form is STRICTLY confidential and will NOT be supplied to anyone. It is strictly for inhouse registration confirmation. **************************************************************************** **************************************************************************** Send Registration Form & Payment to: Codex Publishing 2472 Broadway, Suite 328 New York, New York 10025 USA 917-277-1983 **************************************************************************** **************************************************************************** ************************************************************************* The Codex Surveillance & Privacy News - http://www.thecodex.com Moderator of "The Surveillance List"... http://www.thecodex.com/list.html The FIRST & ONLY list dedicated to Surveillance & Investigative Technology... "We don't spy on you... but we DO keep an eye on those that do..." *************************************************************************

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PGP 5.5 BS upgrade
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone got the upgrade/bugfix for PGP 5.5 Business Security? I think it's 5.5.2 (?) I'm looking for the Win platform upgrade if anyone can help. Perhaps someone could upload it to a c'punk FTP site or post the URL. Thanks in advance!

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UK Crypto Ban?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Campaign Against Censorship of the Internet <cacib(a)liberty.org.uk> To: ukcrypto(a)maillist.ox.ac.uk Date: Tue, 10 Feb 1998 18:18:28 +0100 Subject: Key escrow announcement A source who is a lobbyist in a non-computer sector has just called me to say that Margaret Beckett will be announcing a (compulsory?) key escrow program next Tuesday. So far I don't have independent confirmation, although Nigel Hickson recently said here that he was expecting an announcement "soon". Here's hoping we can get it out before the gvt machine controls the spin. Regards, Malcolm Hutty. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Campaign Against Censorship Tel: 0171 589 4500 of the Internet in Britain Fax: 0171 589 4522 e-mail: cacib(a)liberty.org.uk Say NO to Censorship Web: http://www.liberty.org.uk/cacib ---------- Date: Wed, 11 Feb 1998 23:57:32 +0000 To: ukcrypto(a)maillist.ox.ac.uk From: T Bruce Tober <octobersdad(a)reporters.net> Subject: More rumours? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Free Life Commentary Editor: Sean Gabb Issue Number Ten Tuesday 10th February 1998, 11:20pm ========================== "Over himself, over his own mind and body, the individual is sovereign" (J.S. Mill, On Liberty, 1859) ========================== Next Week's British Encryption Ban by Sean Gabb Earlier this evening, I was given confidential information by someone close to a British Cabinet Minister. I am not in the habit of speaking to such people, let alone having them leak state secrets to me. But that is what happened. In publishing what I heard, I am now risking a prosecution under the Official Secrets Acts - or, more likely, being made to look ridiculous if what I predict does not happen. These risks being accepted, here is the leak. Next Tuesday, the 17th February 1998, the Department of Trade and Industry will announce plans to outlaw the use of strong encryption software within the United Kingdom. We are to be encouraged - and ultimately forced - to encrypt our e-mail only in ways that will allow the authorities to read it. My source was vague about the details of the scheme, saying that they had not yet been circulated to the full Cabinet. But I imagine that it will be more or less a reprint of the Conservative Government's public consultation paper of March 1997. This came to nothing because of the change of Government, and it was even hoped that Labour would have a more liberal policy on Internet regulation. However, Margaret Beckett, the Minister now responsible for trade and industrial policy, is neither bright nor forceful; and she was early captured by the officials who in theory are supposed to do her bidding. If next Tuesday's consultation paper differs at all from the last one, it will be only in matters of small detail and presentation. For this reason, it is probably safe to take the last paper as a guide to what we can expect. The Government will propose creating a network of what are called Trusted Third Parties, or TTPs. These are to be organisations licensed to provide encryption services to the public - that is, software, consultancy and other support. Because they have been licensed by the State, we are to be encouraged to believe that they really are trustworthy - that they are not distributing bad encryption software, or robbing their clients in other ways. But just in case we decide not to believe any of this, it will be made illegal for any unlicensed person to offer encryption services. Here, it is worth quoting from last year's consultation paper: The legislation will prohibit an organisation from offering or providing encryption services to the UK public without a licence. Prohibition will be irrespective of whether a charge is made for such services. The offering of encryption services to the UK public (for example via the Internet) by an unlicensed TTP outside of the UK will also be prohibited. For this purpose, it may be necessary to place restrictions on the advertising and marketing of such services to the public. Enacted into law, this would make it illegal for me to copy encryption software from my hard disk for a friend, and for computer magazines to include it on their free cover disks. It would also allow a strict supervision of the material and the links given access to by British sites on the World Wide Web. The paper never clarifies why we need TTPs in the first place, or why - their need granted - they can only be trusted if licensed by the State. But it does say a lot about law enforcement and national security. Or, to be more accurate, it does say a lot in the usual code about the need to fill in any last potholes on the road to a British police state. Starting with the Interception of Communications Act 1985, the British State has given itself powers of surveillance that a Third World dictator might envy. It can tap our phones on the word of a Minister. It can burgle our homes and leave recording devices behind on the word of a senior policeman. It can trawl through and inspect any records on us held by any organisation. It can do all this without our knowledge, and without any effective system of appeal and redress. The relevant laws are careful to describe the permissions for this as "warrants". But they really are no more than what in France before the Revolution were called Lettres du Cachet - things that our ancestors boasted did not and could not exist in the freer air of England. The spread of personal computers seemed likely at first to extend the scope of surveillance still further. This had until then been limited by cost. For all the theoretical risks, sending letters in sealed envelopes through the post has always been reasonably secure: the costs of interception can only be justified in exceptional cases. For the same reason, most private papers are safe. But the routing of an increasing amount of mail through the Internet promised to bring down the costs of surveillance to the point where everyone could be watched. The storage of records on computers connected to the Internet promised to make it possible for the authorities to spy on people by remote control. The problem is the development of strong encryption software like pgp, and its growing popularity among millions of ordinary people who, though not criminals, have a strong regard for privacy. It allows us to keep our e-mail and private records secret to all but the most determined and expensive attacks. It gives to us the benefits of instant communication and mass data storage, but keeps the authorities - despite their new powers of surveillance - no better informed than in the old days of due process and envelope steaming. Therefore all the talk of Trusted Third Parties. The terms of their licences will require them to sell encryption software with keys that cannot be modified by their clients, and to collect and store copies of these keys for handing over to the authorities. Last year's document is full of promises about "strict safeguards" and the like. But the reality is this: The legislation will provide that the Secretary of State may issue a warrant requiring a TTP to disclose private encryption keys... or a body covered by that warrant. No mention of judicial involvement at the time, or judicial review afterwards - just more police state commands. We can ignore anything the Government parrots next week about law enforcement and national security - or, for that matter, child pornography and complex fraud. These really are just code words. If I were a criminal, or a terrorist, or a foreign spy, the last encryption software I would use would come from a Trusted Third Party. Strong encryption packages are available all over the Internet, or can pass from hand to hand on a single floppy disk. Nor would I worry much about laws against the transmission of data encrypted with unlicensed software. There are ways of keeping the authorities from even knowing that an Internet message contains encrypted data. Somewhere, I have an early version of a program called Steganography, created by Romana Machado. This takes an encrypted text and merges it into a graphics file. My version produces a visible degradation of picture quality. Almost certainly, the newer releases have solved this problem. Assuming I had them, and were sufficiently unpatriotic - neither applies in my case, let me add - I could e-mail this country's battle plans straight off to Saddam Hussain merged invisibly into a picture of my dog. GCHQ would never notice until the Scud missiles began landing on Cheltenham. No - the encryption ban will be aimed at us, the honest public. We are the people who tend to respect the law - or at least to be afraid of it enough to comply in most cases. It is our privacy that is to be stripped away. It is we who are to become like Winston Smith, living for every moment when the telescreens are not monitoring our facial expressions. Why this is desired I cannot say. But we are living though an age of withering trust in the common people. In this country, we are not trusted to possess guns for our self-defence - or indeed to carry carpet knives locked inside our cars. We are not trusted to choose and administer our own medicines, or to bring up our own children in the manner of our choice, or to decide whether or not oxtail soup might be bad for us. Plugging in the telescreens is only a logical next step. Normally, when I write on these issues, I work myself into a frenzy of pessimism. At the moment, though, I feel rather optimistic. Next Tuesday's proposals will cause an uproar. This will not come from the so-called civil liberties groups like Liberty - excepting a few small bodies like the Libertarian Alliance, they have all been taken over by New Labour apparatchiks who can be trusted to keep their mouths shut. It will come from the big business interests. British Telecom is the third or fourth largest telecommunications company in the world. If operates in more than 40 markets, often needing to provide its clients with very secure networks. In the City of London there are more representative offices of foreign banks than in the rest of the European Union combined. These have a taste for confidentiality. There are many other large interests - all paying billions in taxes, all likely to be very hostile to any scheme that will make them appear less useful to foreign clients. We have a Labour Government that still needs to establish itself in the public mind as a party friendly to business. These facts can surely be trusted to ensure the dropping of a scheme that would not merely turn the country into a full police state, but also do the greatest damage to British business since nationalisation. Or so I hope. ========================== Free Life Commentary is an independent journal of comment, published on the Internet. To receive regular issues, send e-mail to Sean Gabb at old.whig(a)virgin.net Issues are archived at <http://freespace.virgin.net/old.whig/> Contact Address: 25 Chapter Chambers, Esterbrooke Street, London, SW1P 4NN; Telephone: 0181 858 0841 If you like Free Life Commentary, you may also care to subscribe to my longer, hard copy journal, Free Life, subscription details for which can be obtained by writing to me at the above address. ========================== Legal Notice: Though using the name Free Life, this journal is owned by me and not by the Libertarian Alliance, which in consequence bears no liability of whatever kind for the contents. - -- Sean Gabb | "Over himself, over his own | E-mail: old.whig(a)virgin.net | mind and body, the individual| <http://freespace.virgin.net/old.whig/> | is sovereign" | Mobile Number: 0956 472199 | J.S. Mill, On Liberty, 1859 | -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPfreeware 5.0i for non-commercial use Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBNOI4cDzmzFmU9IJVAQFOFAQAlLgKRAM6wTztCSVvUAAUY/g8k0iOKCGY 4s8O7c+axQUcf3e3RTxKbIPqoIeb81uIcKwv86havRuUsm2r2OHADuRBlWT7VgrR RKKCuuvrF19G4/hLTn7094NqUvnp5LAZpKOX7ITYQC/grQL8gnkd/xvpj55Z9oek idz0EU18xJo= =cNRU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- tbt -- -- |Bruce Tober, octobersdad(a)reporters.net, Birmingham, England +44-121-242-3832| | Freelance PhotoJournalist - IT, Business, The Arts and lots more | |pgp key ID 0x94F48255. Website - http://www.homeusers.prestel.co.uk/crecon/ |

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Anguilla and Ricochet
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Folks, I would like to coordinate the wireless communication efforts for FC'98 in Anguilla. If you were there last year, you know that the lack of a meaningful communication infrastructure is the number one problem on the island. If you intend to bring, or have access to, wireless modems [Ricochet], satellite ground stations [VSAT, INMARSAT], or the like, please get in touch with me immediately. Thanks, -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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Re: Me & Louis Freeh
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> writes: > Just got mail -- > > >Have some friends in the FBI and I just thought that you would like to > >know that Louis Freeh personally considers you, and I quote, and > >"radical". Amazing, isn't it? > > > >Just thought you would like to know what the great Louis Freeh thinks of > >you... > > Somehow I get the impression that FBI directors don't like "radicals" much... I don't like people who forge quotes from me in their netly news "exposes", as Declan has done. Center for Democracy in Technology doesn't like Declan either - they've even complained to Declan's editors at Time Warner about his lies and fabrications. What does it mean when the Vulis, CDT, and the FBI all agree? P.S. Declan, are you an alcoholic? --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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www.lanl.gov
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bleep! I pulled up www.lanl.gov (for whatever reason), flipped back to my ISP shell account, did some stuff, logged out. Five minutes later, my PPP connection timed out, and so the line dropped. Two minutes after that, my computer dialed up my ISP and connected to the Net again: it was the LANL page. I hit 'STOP', and the connection timed out again, and that was that. I hate the way there isn't some choice about allowing (JAVA?) to NOT do that unless expressly allowed. I wonder what LANL loaded into my system that needed Net connectivity after seven minutes??? ---guy Vulgersauris is a shadow of his former self.

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