December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Fighting the cybercen
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- -=> Quoting In:dthorn@gte.net to Harka <=- > The Cold War was not won by the arms race, it was won in > Eastern Europe which was never a major participant. The main > instrument that won it was West German TV which broadcast > pictures of supermarkets with full shelves into the homes > of East Germans every night. The viewers could see that it > was not mere propaganda and their relatives confirmed the > fact. As a result the East German guards on the Berlin wall > simply decided to leave their posts one night. In> That's it? The system collapsed because the guards left their posts? In> And no mutiny charges? Incredible. Actually not quite right. On November 9th, 1989 the East-German government established a new law (under pressure from the demonstrating public), that would allow every East-German to go _up to_ 30 days/per year to a western country. Visas to do so would be given out without problems, effective immediately. At the evening press-conference however, the government speaker Guenther Schabowskie (can't recall his exact position at that time) introduced that new law and then he made the BIG error: after hearing the new provisions of the new travel law, a foreign journalist stood up and asked him "Does _that_ mean, that every East-german citizen could right now go to the western border and gain free entry to West-Germany (or West-Berlin) without problems?" And my man Guenther was looking desperately in all his papers (funny as hell! :)) and then, after finding no pre-made answer, he said: "Yeah, I guess so!"... After which the journalists sped out and cabeled their interpretation of the situation: "The wall is open!". Which in fact was quite a dangerous situation then, cause East-Germans heard that and actually went to the west-german border (and West-Berlin as well). The Border-Control guards however were even less informed then my man Guenther :), with the difference, that they had the order to shoot in case of "Desertion of the Republic". But faced with hundreds of people, who were all talking about some new travel law, they just shrugged and opened the gates without being stupid (they after all, were mostly young men in 1 1/2 or 3 year military service/draft, who were normal people just like everybody else). In fact, for acting in such a way, a lot of people gave them flowers and champaigne later on in that wild night of celebration... Ciao Harka /*************************************************************/ /* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE ...more info at */ /* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! --> http://www.eff.org */ /* E-mail: harka(a)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail preferred) */ /* PGP public key available upon request. [KeyID: 04174301] */ /* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBMunadDltEBIEF0MBAQHw5Af9FTchTTk9/G6Nq/StYwwLv3vt5hFmNUjn jyS5eDOM2rlh9107Awv4TwdGnV43RlJVKvNSnYUOg+dRiYhysewfyyJ4klmmsTBP x+9Cn81o1Jqeqp5aovP52YLgdCKUL9l7BOnvQsXzJIJRglj1KC/Hr+5kXWNsyI6l wN7WSnFPLJ0c+q5QXkkpQfWUj4LwOZItbh+I2Sy+kIdJuhVi66L45oCkJyHwfq2+ SgbuqaGabAGVakOMl53yffuhc6TXKcWcs30Vi2axwqXE//hlwO/NFg/OaoMUz+6i fJZmUtI33iCpsTtELPZzIqeP7DM13CaZ5u1r4URVWUOdXFDRs9Hytw== =YiP5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

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Re: Libel & the 1st Amendment
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:42 PM 1/28/97 -0600, Jim Choate wrote: >It has been asserted by at least one member that the 1st Amendment protects >libelous or other defamatory speech. Defamation is not protected by the First Amendment; but the First Amendment limits the application of defamation law in many circumstances. For example, the First Amendment requires plaintiffs to prove "actual malice" if they are a public official, public figure, or a private person seeking punitive damages. So if you want to think of defamatory statements as those which are false and injurious to someone's reputation, yes, the First Amendment protects some of them. (By definition, defamation is outside the protection of the First Amendment, but I get the impression that you're not trying to use it as a term of art.) >This is hokem. The 1st most certainly does not protect lies in any form. The First Amendment protects some lies. As Justice Powell wrote for the majority in _Gertz v. Robert Welch_, 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974): "Under the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries, but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. They belong to that category of utterances which "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). "Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free debate. As James Madison pointed out in the Report on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798: "Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press." 4 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution of 1787, p. 571 (1876). And punishment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press. Our decisions recognize that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship. Allowing the media to avoid liability only by proving the truth of all injurious statements does not accord adequate protection to First Amendment liberties. As the Court stated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 279: 'Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred.' "The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters." and Justice Brennan, in _NAACP v. Button_ 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963): "For the Constitution protects expression and association without regard to the race, creed, or political or religious affiliation of the members of the group which invokes its shield, or to the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered." So, yes, the First Amendment protects some lies. According to your hypothesis, the country should be collapsing around us any day now because of it. Last one out turn off the lights, ok? -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. |

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COO_kin
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1-29-97. NYP: GAK-czar cooks key hooks. FBI cooks lab books. ----- COO_kin

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More Circumventing the ITAR
by Mark Rosen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm curious as to exactly what the ITAR/EAR/Whatever says specifically about "unrestricted FTP sites." My program, Kremlin, is available for download at the web page below. On my web page, I have some stuff in bold print that informs about the ITAR and tells people to go away if they're not from the US or Canada. Does this count as an unrestricted FTP site? It's not all that much different from what MIT has up for PGP. Also, back to the question of registration numbers. A registration number is just a string of letters and numbers, and is essentially the same as a friendly letter; it contains no cryptographic code. For all anyone knows, I could just be charging for pseudo-random numbers, again, nothing of cryptographic significance. Is it illegal for me to mail someone outside of the US or Canada a registration code? Thanks for any help. Mark Rosen FireSoft - http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Pines/2690 Mark Eats AOL - http://www.geocities.com/TimesSquare/6660

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Re: Machine readable form (was:RE: [DES] DES Key Recovery Project, Progress Report #7)
by David Lesher / hated by RBOC's in 5 states 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Phil Karn sez: > > This seems clear enough. If it's printed on paper, it's kosher for > export. But if we're really overt about it, we may goad the government > into attempting to control printed source code as well. That could > prove most interesting. I wonder where the ADA-approved Large Print for the vision-impaired edition falls. -- A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz(a)nrk.com & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

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Re: [DES] DES Key Recovery Project, Progress Report #7
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:10 PM 1/28/97 -0800, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com wrote: >At 08:31 PM 1/27/97 -0800, Phil Karn wrote: >>And lacking that, the author can always print it out on paper and >>physically mail it out of the country; this is specifically allowed by >>the new Commerce rules as I understand them. And who's to say that the >>overseas FTP copies weren't scanned from such a paper copy? :-) > >At least one PGP site overseas did that - some German university >scanned in a copy of the MIT Press publication of PGP source. >The PGP 3.0 Pre-Alpha code is now available, on paper, from PGP Inc. Do you have an URL to the scanned source? -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred Make your mark in the history of mathematics. Use the spare cycles of your PC/PPC/UNIX box to help find a new prime. http://www.mersenne.org/prime.htm

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Re: [DES] DES Key Recovery Project, Progress Report #7
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:31 PM 1/27/97 -0800, Phil Karn wrote: >And lacking that, the author can always print it out on paper and >physically mail it out of the country; this is specifically allowed by >the new Commerce rules as I understand them. And who's to say that the >overseas FTP copies weren't scanned from such a paper copy? :-) At least one PGP site overseas did that - some German university scanned in a copy of the MIT Press publication of PGP source. The PGP 3.0 Pre-Alpha code is now available, on paper, from PGP Inc. Selling copies of PGP overseas, even if exported this way, might count as "providing a defense service", if that's still illegal now that crypto export laws have been moved to Commerce Dept. On the other hand, indemnifying people against copyright suits from your company _doesn't_ sound like it.... :-) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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PGP Key Preview...
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi there, is there a way to preview the contents of a received public key, without adding it automatically to the public key ring? Thanks a lot in advance... Ciao Harka /*************************************************************/ /* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE ...more info at */ /* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! --> http://www.eff.org */ /* E-mail: harka(a)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail preferred) */ /* PGP public key available upon request. [KeyID: 04174301] */ /* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBMunrbjltEBIEF0MBAQEisgf+OBS8Q06g3pNfKgntaKQdCkHyLXZWHjI7 hOnVeF47C0qgsFjEEymnrQMl4b1l2zcRgqUKTY8jXhmaY6yeGcoRXc5hgo1679MY l+7BTNKIy2YTnzjhFk5bOKXk6V9DDWfq4chhCE2dpEVdUgRPVTfkfbm5VEN+zmn8 gaXyIf/bYv5GEs2F/FPc1kTmySx/NT5CvbvQRHaQdfEDk+QatnRjRLSsprln8cnt vxqZO9a6lveygA/wECPdx1gnHBhrscUeaLHIXz4YVVaSMrkEHJfLWOrzQHg2CGwQ o5OcKmuY0FcvzfpS2Yo0/lA8+/Ez83yUAdeEeY+yF7p2XgrLaOiFnw== =o/jO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

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Re: Last nail for US crypto export policy?
by Steven Bellovin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It is dangerously naive to label this success the ``last nail for US crypto export policy''. Everyone concerned with this issue, from the NSA to the FBI to anyone who wants to use crypto, understands this and accepts it. 40-bit keys are good for protection against casual snooping, and nothing more -- and no one is going to claim that you need supercomputers to crack them. In fact, I assert that the U.S. government is *happy* about these results -- because it's going to push folks towards wanting stronger crypto for export. The only problem, of course, is the terms under which such code can be exported... I'll go further -- in my opinion, the only reason the government doesn't want DES to fall just yet is that alternatives aren't ready. That is, the banks and financial institutions, and for that matter the government agencies, have not converted to 3DES or Clipper or what have you, and can't do so on short notice; the commercial products they need just aren't ready yet. No one wants to risk a loss of confidence in the financial system. Two years from now, though, when some key escrow products are ready, it may be a different story.

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FC97: PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE PROGRAM
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Financial Cryptography '97 February 24-28 1997, Anguilla, BWI PRELIMINARY PROGRAM General Information: Financial Cryptography '97 (FC97) is a new conference on the security of digital financial transactions. The first meeting will be held on the island of Anguilla in the British West Indies on February 24-28, 1997. FC97 aims to bring together persons involved in both the financial and data security fields to foster cooperation and exchange of ideas. Original papers were solicited on all aspects of financial data security and digital commerce in general. Program Committee: Matthew Franklin, AT&T Laboratories--Research, Murray Hill, NJ, USA Michael Froomkin, U. Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, FL, USA Rafael Hirschfeld (Program Chair), CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Arjen Lenstra, Citibank, New York, NY, USA Mark Manasse, Digital Equipment Corporation, Palo Alto, CA, USA Kevin McCurley, Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA Charles Merrill, McCarter & English, Newark, NJ, USA Clifford Neuman, Information Sciences Institute, Marina del Rey, CA, USA Sholom Rosen, Citibank, New York, NY, USA Israel Sendrovic, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY, USA Preliminary Conference Program for FC97: Monday 24 February 1997 830 -- 905 Anonymity Control in E-Cash Systems George Davida (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI, USA), Yair Frankel (Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA), Yiannis Tsiounis (Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA), Moti Yung (CertCo, New York, NY, USA) 905 -- 940 How to Make Personalized Web Browsing Simple, Secure, and Anonymous Eran Gabber, Phil Gibbons, Yossi Matias, Alain Mayer (Bell Laboratories, Lucent Technologies) 940 -- 1015 An Anonymous Networking Infrastructure and Virtual Intranets Jim McCoy (Electric Communities, Cupertino, CA, USA) 1015 -- 1045 Coffee Break 1045 -- 1120 Unlinkable Serial Transactions Paul F. Syverson (Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC, USA), Stuart G. Stubblebine (AT&T Labs--Research, Murray Hill, NJ, USA), David M. Goldschlag (Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC, USA) 1120 -- 1155 Efficient Electronic Cash with Restricted Privacy Cristian Radu, Rene Govaerts, Joos Vandewalle (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium) 1155 -- 1230 The SPEED Cipher Yuliang Zheng (Monash University, Melbourne, Australia) Tuesday 25 February 1997 830 -- 930 Invited Speaker To Be Announced 930 -- 1005 Smart Cards and Superhighways The technology-driven denationalisation of money David G.W. Birch, Neil A. McEvoy (Hyperion, Surrey, England) 1005 -- 1045 Coffee Break 1045 -- 1120 Fault Induction Attacks, Tamper Resistance, and Hostile Reverse Engineering in Perspective David P. Maher (AT&T Labs--Research, Murray Hill, NJ, USA) 1120 -- 1155 Some Critical Remarks on "Dynamic Data Authentication" as specified in EMV '96 Louis C. Guillou (CCETT, Cesson-Sevigne, France) 1155 -- 1230 Single-chip implementation of a cryptosystem for financial applications Nikolaus Lange (SICAN Braunschweig GmbH, Braunschweig, Germany) Wednesday 26 February 1997 830 -- 930 Invited Speaker Ronald Rivest (MIT Lab for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA, USA) 930 -- 1005 Cyberbanking and Privacy: The Contracts Model Peter P. Swire (Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA) 1005 -- 1045 Coffee Break 1045 -- 1120 SVP: a Flexible Micropayment Scheme Jacques Stern, Serge Vaudenay (Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris, France) 1120 -- 1155 An efficient micropayment system based on probabilistic polling Stanislaw Jarecki (MIT Lab for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA, USA), Andrew Odlyzko (AT&T Labs--Research, Murray Hill, NJ, USA) 1155 -- 1230 On the continuum between on-line and off-line e-cash systems - I Yacov Yacobi (Microsoft, Redmond, WA, USA) Thursday 27 February 1997 830 -- 905 Auditable Metering with Lightweight Security Matthew K. Franklin, Dahlia Malkhi (AT&T Labs--Research, Murray Hill, NJ, USA) 905 -- 940 Applying Anti-Trust Policies to Increase Trust in a Versatile E-Money System Markus Jakobsson (UCSD, La Jolla, CA, USA), Moti Yung (BTEC/CertCo, New York, NY, USA) 940 -- 1015 Towards Multiple-payment Schemes for Digital Money H. Pagnia, R. Jansen (University of Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany) 1015 -- 1045 Coffee Break 1045 -- 1120 Legal Issues in Cryptography Edward J. Radlo (Fenwick & West LLP, Palo Alto, CA, USA) 1120 -- 1230 Panel Discussion Legal Issues of Digital Signatures Michael Froomkin (University of Miami School of Law, Miami, FL, USA), Charles Merrill (McCarter & English, Newark, NJ, USA), Benjamin Wright (Dallas, TX, USA) Friday 28 February 1997 830 -- 930 Invited Speaker To Be Announced 930 -- 1005 The Gateway Security Model in the Java Electronic Commerce Framework Theodore Goldstein (Sun Microsystems Laboratories/Javasoft) 1005 -- 1045 Coffee Break 1045 -- 1120 Highly Scalable On-line Payments Via Task Decoupling David William Kravitz (CertCo LLC, Albuquerque, NM, USA) 1120 -- 1155 GUMP; Grand Unified Meta-Protocols Recipes for Simple, Standards-based Financial Cryptography Barbara Fox, Brian Beckman (Microsoft, Redmond, WA, USA) 1155 -- 1230 Secure Network Communications and Secure Store & Forward Mechanisms with SAP R/3 Bernhard Esslinger (SAP AG, Walldorf, Germany) The conference will run from 8:30 AM to 12:30 PM, for five days, February 24-28 1997. Breakfast provided at the conference. The conference organizers have left the afternoon and evenings open for corporate sponsored events, for networking, and for recreational activities on the resort island of Anguilla. Participants are encouraged to bring their families. Workshop: A 40-hour workshop, intended for anyone with commercial software development experience who wants hands-on familiarity with the issues and technology of financial cryptography, is planned in conjunction with FC97, to be held during the week preceding the conference. For more information on the workshop, please see the URL http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~iang/fc97/workshop.html . For workshop registration, see the URL http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97/ . Venue: The InterIsland Hotel is a small 14-room guesthouse and a large, comfortable 150 seat conference facility with additional space for a small 10-booth exhibition. The Inter-Island is on Road Bay, near Sandy Ground Village, in the South Hill section of Anguilla. The conference, workshop, and exhibition will have TCP/IP internet access. The rooms at the InterIsland itself have sold out, but there are many other hotels and guesthouses on Anguilla, and shuttle service to the conference will be available. Air Transportation and Hotels: Air travel to Anguilla is typically done through either San Juan or St. Thomas for US flights, or St. Maarten/Martin for flights from Europe and the US. Anguillan import duties are not imposed on hardware or software which will leave the island again. There are no other taxes -- or cryptography import/export restrictions -- on Anguilla. Hotels range from spartan to luxurious, and more information about hotels on Anquilla can be obtained from your travel agent, or at the URL http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97/ . General Chairs: Robert Hettinga, Shipwright/e$, Boston, MA, USA; rah(a)shipwright.com Vincent Cate, Offshore Information Services, Anguilla, BWI; vince(a)offshore.com.ai Conference, Exhibits, and Sponsorship Manager: Julie Rackliffe, Boston, MA, USA; rackliffe(a)tcm.org Workshop Leader: Ian Goldberg, Berkeley, CA, USA; iang(a)cs.berkeley.edu Registration: You can register and pay for conference admission on the World Wide Web at the URL http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97/ . The cost of the FC97 Conference is US$1,000. Booths for the exhibition start at US$5,000 and include two conference tickets. For more information about exhibit space, contact Julie Rackliffe, rackliffe(a)tcm.org . Sponsorship opportunities for FC97 are still available. The cost of the workshop is US$5000, and includes meals but not lodging. You can register for the workshop, which runs the week prior to the conference, at the URL <http:/www.offshore.com.ai/fc97> Financial Cryptography '97 is held in cooperation with the International Association for Cryptologic Research. It is sponsored by: The Journal for Internet Banking and Commerce <http://www.arraydev.com/commerce/JIBC/> Offshore Information Services <http://www.offshore.com.ai/> e$ <http://www.shipwright.com/rah/> C2NET <http://www.c2.net/> See Your Name Here <mailto: rackliffe(a)tcm.org> ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/ FC97: Anguilla, anyone? http://www.ai/fc97/ "If *you* don't go to FC97, *I* don't go to FC97"

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Call for Participants: The Financial Cryptography 1997 Workshop for Senior Managers and IS Professionals
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CALL FOR PARTICIPANTS The Financial Cryptography 1997 (FC97) Workshop for Senior Managers and IS Professionals February 17-21, 1997 The InterIsland Hotel Anguilla, BWI <http://www.offshore.com.ai./fc97/> Workshop Update: January 29, 1997 FC97 is sponsored by: The Journal for Internet Banking and Commerce <http://www.arraydev.com/commerce/JIBC/> Offshore Information Services <http://www.offshore.com.ai/> e$ <http://www.vmeng.com/rah/> C2NET <http://www.c2.net/> See Your Name Here! <mailto: rackliffe(a)tcm.org> FC97 Workshop for Senior Managers and IS Professionals February 17-21, 1997 FC97 Conference and Exhibition, February 24-28, 1997 The Inter-Island Hotel Anguilla, BWI Workshop and Conference Reservations: <http://www.offshore.com.ai./fc97/> The world's first intensive financial cryptography workshop for senior managers and IS professionals will be held Monday through Friday, February 17-21 1997, from 9:00am to 6:00pm, at the Inter-Island Hotel on the Carribbean island of Anguilla. This workshop will be the prelude to the world's first peer-reviewed financial cryptography conference and commercial exhibition, Financial Cryptography 1997 (FC97), which will be held the following week, February 24-28, 1997. The goals of the combined workshop, conference and exhibition are: -- to give senior managers and IS professionals a solid understanding of the fundamentals of strong cryptgraphy as applied to financial operations on public networks, -- to provide a peer-reviewed forum for important research in financial cryptography and the effects it will have on society, and, -- to showcase the newest products in financial cryptography. Workshop and Conference participants are encouraged to bring their families, though Workshop participants should expect to be busy the first week. :-). The Workshop Ian Goldberg, the Workshop chair, has picked an outstanding team of instructors in financial cryptography and internet financial system security to teach the courses in this workshop. The Workshop will consist of 40 hours of intensive instruction and lab time over 5 days. Each student will have their own internet workstation, and the lab will be open 24 hours. The SSL internet commerce server used in the workshop will be Stronghold, developed by C2NET, of Berkeley, California. For information on Stronghold, please see <http://www.c2.net/>. Thanks to C2NET for their gracious donation of this outstanding software to the FC97 Workshop. Who Should Attend The Workshop is intended for senior IS managers and technical professionals who want to get completely up to speed on the design, development, and implementation of financial cryptography systems, the core technology of internet commerce. After the workshop, senior managers will have a hands-on understanding the strengths and liabilities of currently available financial cryptography and internet transaction security software and hardware, and thus be able to make better asset allocation decisions in this area of explosive technology growth. Senior technical professionals with strong IS experience will be able to implement those technologies and to pass on what they've learned to their clients and colleagues when they return home. The Workshop will be held in a casual but intensive atmosphere at the very cutting edge of financial technology on the internet. Someone has likened the experience to a financial cryptography bootcamp. At the end, Workshop attendees will be utterly conversant in cryptography as it applies to finance, and will be quite prepared for the technical papers in the FC97 conference the following week. Workshop participants will not only know what everyone else is doing now in internet commerce, but, more important, because they understand the implications of strong financial cryptography on ubiquitous public networks, they will be able to know what to do *next*. The Workshop Leader Ian Goldberg is a Ph.D. student in security and cryptography at the University of California, Berkeley. Just last night, he cracked RSA Data Security Inc.'s 40-bit challenge cipher in just under 3.5 hours. In late 1995, he discovered what became a much-publicized flaw in Netscape's implementation of SSL. He is a recognized expert in electronic payment systems, and in DigiCash's ecash digital bearer certificate protocol in particular. He has produced several ecash clients for Unix and Windows, as well as an ecash module for the Stronghold web server, which has extended the existing ecash system for better security, privacy, and ease-of-use. The Principal Instructors Gary Howland worked on digital cash systems for DigiCash, and then moved to Systemics, where he developed the SOX protocol, a flexible payments system currently in use in a bond trading environment, soon to be available to the public. He also developed the Cryptix and PGP libraries in Perl, and assisted on the Cryptix and PGP library implementations in Java. Adam Shostack is a security consultant based in the Boston area. He has extensive background in designing, implementing and testing secure systems for clients in the medical, computer, and financial industries. His recent public work includes 'Apparent Weaknesses in the Security Dynamics Client Server Protocol,' 'Source Code Review Guidelines,' and comparisons of freely available cryptographic libraries. His clients include Fidelity Investments and the Brigham and Women's Hospital, in Boston. Additional Instructors The Workshop will have student-to-instructor ratio of 5 to 1, not including the Workshop leader. The Workshop will have an initial enrollment of 10 students, and an additional instructor will be added for each 5 students up to a 25 student maximum enrollment. Workshop Topics The following is the complete list of topics that the workshop will cover: Security on the Internet Internet Protocols: IP, TCP, UDP Higher-level Protocols: Telnet, FTP, HTTP, SSL Solid Foundations for Cryptographic Systems A History of Internet Attacks Building Internet Firewalls Building a Bastion Host Turning your Bastion Host into a Web Server Non-internet Internet Security Cryptography The Need for Cryptography History of Cryptography Classical Methods Modern Methods Private and Public Key Cryptography Authentication vs. Security Certification and Public Key Infrastructures Cryptographic Protocols Engineering a Cryptographically Secure System Why Cryptography is Harder than it Looks Security Through Obscurity and How to Recognize Snake Oil Internet Payment Systems Payment models: coin-based, cheque-based, account-based Security Issues Privacy and Anonymity Issues Smartcards vs. Software Existing Payment Schemes Credit Cards First Virtual CyberCash DigiCash Forthcoming Payment Schemes SET Mondex Millicent micropayments Setting Up an ecash-Enabled Web Server Setting up the Web Server Signing up for ecash Installing the ecash Module Setting Prices Logging Advanced Methods ecashiers moneychangers The workshop has been covered by Wired Magazine, and FC97 was the featured conference in the January 1997 "Deductible Junkets" section. So, if you have already decided to come to the FC97 Workshop and Conference, please register and make your plane and hotel reservations as soon as possible. Workshop space is extremely limited. The price of the workshop is $5,000 U.S. You can pay for your FC97 workshop ticket with Visa or MasterCard, with ecash, or with any of a number of other internet commerce payment protocols, at the regstriation site: <http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97/>. The workshop price includes meals (but not lodging) at the InterIsland Hotel and lab space, plus the delivery and installation of hardware, network access, internet commerce software, all to a location like Anguilla. And, of course, 40 hours of instruction and structured lab activity. We have priced the workshop to be competitive with other comprehensive business and professional technology workshops of similar total session length. In addition, the first 10 FC97 workshop participants will receive a 50% reduction in their FC97 Conference and Exhibition fee, for a savings of $500 off the $1,000 conference admission. You can register, and pay for, your workshop ticket at: <http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97/> Air Transportation and Hotels Air travel to Anguilla is typically done through San Juan, St. Thomas or St. Maarten/Martin. There are several non-stop flights a day from various US and European locations. Connection through to Anguilla can be made through American Eagle, or through LIAT, or in the case of St. Maarten, with a short ferry ride to Anguilla. See your travel agent for details. Anguilla's runway is 3600 feet, with a displaced threshold of 600 feet, and can accomodate business jets. Obviously, you should talk to your aviation staff for details about your own aircraft's capabilities in this regard. Anguilla import duties are not imposed on hardware or software which will leave the island again, so, as long as you take it with you when you leave, you won't pay import duties. PLEASE NOTE: Your FC97 Workshop fee only covers *meals* at the InterIsland Hotel. The InterIsland is actually a small guesthouse attached to a large conference facility, and so rooms there are in short supply. Fortunately, there are lots of small hotels and guesthouses nearby. For more information on these hotels, please see <http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97/> for more information. Other hotels on Anguilla range from spartan to luxurious, all within easy walking or driving distance of the Workshop at the InterIsland. More information about Anguillan hotels can be obtained from your travel agent, or at <http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97/>. Registration and Information for Other FC97 Events To register and pay for your ticket to the FC97 conference itself, see: <http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97/> For information the selection of papers for the FC97 conference see: <http://www.cwi.nl/conferences/FC97> If you're interested in Exhibition space, please contact Julie Rackliffe: <mailto:rackliffe@tcm.org> If you're interested in sponsoring FC97, also contact Julie Rackliffe: <mailto:rackliffe@tcm.org> Financial Cryptography '97 is held in cooperation with the International Association for Cryptologic Research. The conference proceedings will be published on the web by the Journal for Internet Banking and Commerce. <http://www.arraydev.com/commerce/JIBC/>. The FC97 Organizing Committee: Vince Cate and Bob Hettinga, General Chairs Ray Hirschfeld, Conference Chair Ian Goldberg, Workshop Chair Julie Rackliffe, Conference, Exhibit, and Sponsorship Manager And our sponsors... The Journal for Internet Banking and Commerce <http://www.arraydev.com/commerce/JIBC/> Offshore Information Services <http://www.offshore.com.ai/> e$ <http://www.vmeng.com/rah/> C2NET <http://www.c2.net/> See Your Name Here <mailto: rackliffe(a)tcm.org> ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/ FC97: Anguilla, anyone? http://www.ai/fc97/ "If *you* don't go to FC97, *I* don't go to FC97"

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Re: RC5-12/32/5 contest solved
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Any bets on whether the $5000 RC5-12/32/6 contest will be solved before the www.rsa.com contest status web page is updated? :-) Or how long before someone in the government starts talking about how 56 bits takes 65,000 times as long to solve as 40 bits, which is 26 years for a whole building full of computers, and even 48 bits ought to take a month and a half for a whole building full of computers (or supercomputers, if they hype it up....)? At 09:55 PM 1/28/97 +0100, Germano Caronni <caronni(a)tik.ee.ethz.ch> wrote: >challenge: RC5-32/12/5 >time: from start of contest until Tue Jan 28 21:54:58 1997 >method: massive distributed coordinated keysearch, details later which was a bit slower than Ian Goldberg's crack, but pretty close. How many machines were you using, on average? # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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Re: AltaVista sprouts a hole ...
by Jeremiah A Blatz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> writes: > --- begin forwarded text > > > Sender: e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com > Reply-To: Russell Stuart <R.Stuart(a)rsm.com.au> > MIME-Version: 1.0 > Precedence: Bulk > Date: Wed, 29 Jan 1997 08:07:27 +1000 > From: Russell Stuart <R.Stuart(a)rsm.com.au> <snip> > However, the doubleclick.net ads appear to bear no relationship to the > keywords being searched, and they appear not only in the URL for the > hyperlink to follow, but also in the IMG SRC URL. This means that in > order > to avoid disclosing my keyword lists to doubleclick.net, I have to > disable > automatic loading of inline images when using AltaVista! Actually, the ads *do* relate to the keywords. Try doing a search for "flowers" and a search for "sex." http://www.anonymizer.com/ Jer "standing on top of the world/ never knew how you never could/ never knew why you never could live/ innocent life that everyone did" -Wormhole -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBMu9TH8kz/YzIV3P5AQEL8AL/Tj6fj0hRMYZVK1ppuh/DSxtB89urgSDy DDmA6ycn0DmmUg1TL7w8k2vkN/srUfvddA6pu3vZGU8Pa3unA4LSAe3ipCygzuGK d1s0BW+Cy15HDjdTdFe9I0tYfjdNQo2B =26sJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Best Computer School?
by Jeremiah A Blatz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Matthew Toth <mst114(a)psu.edu> writes: > MIT is one the best schools in the country for C.S. > Close behind is Carnegie Mellon University (C.M.U.) in Pittsburgh, > PA. (the folks who put out CERT.) Not sure how much Crypto they do, though. I think there's one class on crypto (explicitly), but there's some talent here. One who was interested could get an independant study or a research job without too much trouble. After all, MIT isn't the only place that writes kerberos, AFS, and the like. (In case you're wondering, the "A" in AFS stands for "Andrew," of Andrew Carnegie.) Jer "standing on top of the world/ never knew how you never could/ never knew why you never could live/ innocent life that everyone did" -Wormhole -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBMu9V+skz/YzIV3P5AQH/XgL/VFA/4M1XTD8xl86Y6GrtU46YGpmGnhn6 lDKSA/xaxAzUToPTXQdyNqY5xg5CpfwYraVEiyLIvWKsIvOWtJgG3cZzF+xqlx39 sgbM0L6aMXrXkGqLdosZMjrr9Rqc6KE5 =FTU1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [DES] DES Key Recovery Project, Progress Report #7
by Anil Das 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Jan 25, 10:49am, James Robertson wrote: > > Are there any efforts being made to develop a version of the > software that can be used by us non-US residents? > > I would certainly like to participate in the Challenge. I'm > sure there are many other interested people out there, in the > big wide world ... No such development outside the US has been publicized. However, it is easy enough to roll your own. What you need: 1) Eric Young's libdes. ftp://ftp.psy.uq.oz.au/pub/Crypto/DES 2) Svend Olaf Mikkelsen's fast replacement for the core DES routine. http://inet.uni-c.dk/~svolaf/des.htm The latest libdes is supposed to have this faster routine incorporated already, so you may not need it. 3) Peter Trei's article on "Optimizing DES Key Recovery in Software". It is available at HKS's news server. news://nntp.hks.net/<199610171918.MAA23054(a)toad.com> For a first pass, you can just implement the Gray Code technique. That gives most of the speedup. 4) Some information on how to implement Gray Codes. "The Gray Code" by Robert W. Doran. Tech Report 131 from http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~techrep/1996.html Given these resources, it shouldn't take long for a good programmer to implement a DES key search program that is in the same ballpark of performance as Peter Trei's implementation. -- Anil Das

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Re: uae_1.html (UAE censoring Internet)
by Wayne Clerke 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've checked the filtering out already ... it's pretty extensive. Far, far more than Singapore's 'hundred' or so pages. The granularity is such that things like http://www.domain/~user/main may be passed, while a link from that page to a subpage may be blocked. I guess they can afford to do this with so few users and little traffic. Never thought I'd be real interested in how Net Nanny worked ... but I am now. I'd be happy to hear from anyone with good ideas (or (accessible) pointers) about how to minimize the effects of this stupidity ... :-( Regards, Mail: <a href=mailto:wclerke@emirates.net.ae>Wayne Clerke</a> PGP key ID: AEB2546D FP: D663D11E DA19D74F 5032DC7E E001B702 PGP mail welcome. Voice: +971 506 43 48 53 If you're not living on the edge, you're taking up too much space. ---------- > From: Lynx_User(a)linux.nycmetro.com > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: uae_1.html > Date: Tuesday, 28 January 1997 12:26 > > > Reuters New Media > > > [ Yahoo | Write Us | Search | Info ] > > > [ Index | News | World | Biz | Tech | Politic | Sport | Scoreboard | > Entertain | Health ] > > _________________________________________________________________ > > Previous Story: UK Bill To Fight Millennium Computer Bug Moves On > Next Story: Intel to Europe: Get Online Or Fall Behind > _________________________________________________________________ > > Monday January 27 9:50 AM EST > > UAE Launches Service To Censor Internet > > DUBAI - The United Arab Emirates's monopoly Internet provider launched > a service Saturday to censor sites in cyberspace that breached local > moral values and traditions. > > Officials from state telecommunications company Etisalat said the new > Proxy Service would be compulsory for the UAE's 9,669 subscribers, who > will have to configure their web browsers that navigate the net by > February 2. > > "The service was launched today as part of our efforts to improve the > Internet service to our subscribers after lengthy study and research," > said one official at Etisalat. > > "We were working on it before some official statements were made on > the need to control access to some sites on the service," he told > Reuters. > > The move follows repeated calls to regulate access to the Internet in > the conservative Gulf region, where most women are veiled, magazine > pictures revealing cleavage or bare legs are blacked out and > questioning the existence of god can be punishable by death. > > Some are worried about the spread of pornography as well as religious > and political material through the worldwide network of interlinked > computers. > > Last year, Dubai Police chief Major General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim > created a rare public row in the UAE saying the information ministry > and the police, rather that Etisalat, should be authorized to issue > Internet licenses as it was their job to monitor data coming into the > UAE and maintain security. > > Telecommunications experts say the Proxy Service will not be "fully > water-tight," but would help block access to known and unwanted sites > -- a list of which could be constantly updated. > > The proxy server will be pre-fed with Internet addresses where access > is blocked off, industry sources said. But the server will be unable > to block access if addresses of prohibited sites are changed, as > frequently happens. > > Etisalat says it will disconnect any customer who abused its Internet > services and violated "order and clear laws." > > "Singapore has succeeded to a great extent in its drive to control > harm done by the Internet," said another Etisalat official. "Why > cannot we?" > > Singapore government measures to regulate political and religious > content on the Internet and keep it free of pornography became > effective in July last year. They require all Internet service > operators and local content providers to be registered with the > Singapore Broadcasting Authority. > > Copyright, Reuters Ltd. All rights reserved -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2i mQDNAy/T4WIAAAEGAMoa0wYpHlGTFe7fEJeKoDs9xaiSt0/lSjN8u8APrqRg1S+v Z9AXoZ9jnDWzEE8t75PieCPNx8PlX5Z1rnwXfYjpEGR4JiYFBC4ThO8zHE+3V4vv 3JihVe8RpI6Cl+6lLspxh5xVlC6Ode5s+CGvUG1aKqNG5PcI9KSzmnUgyC7UFV66 63ySxOiG2I8KPF3Dx9svk2B76JV/f+9LmuHcJuargmlZSZ3+LXdAOIHJoXKH4uPA fkpiJUvUX8gorrJUbQAFEbQmV2F5bmUgQ2xlcmtlIDx3Y2xlcmtlQGVtaXJhdGVz Lm5ldC5hZT6JAJUDBRAw418r3ic1/dqHwMcBAdZxA/9KFTdRSV12mvi9PogHZ+Vp qXwwxfi7PufQsnZ+QJyXcZ9AXlZg4KGok6/EHCrRmolGyNvmn48nY46BTF/ztS// KpK14TQPnBytKg3cz+bqq9yVVKga5ryF56PYK5SSp3doouNG8yOQkLK6NppbPc7O wjyfHWkgZzKuVDpf/w/Hf7QpV2F5bmUgQ2xlcmtlIDx3Y2xlcmtlQGV4dHJvLnVj Yy5zdS5vei5hdT6JAJUDBRAw42AT3ic1/dqHwMcBAaYUA/9+H96ZnKQpQ2igwRkb hCy1MrvoOddvfSyL5g+V2PdhraLQDE753hJNtC+rRnZYRI9DdrIh3Pio8hqlCoqF cWo2GRaaxh4nqe+UXcTCOKFZ8sX6S8Jfvz2NeYjdkDsuza7r4vI3w9fxWjFG/Q6A +UAuDLfuIF54oA7fXap4r98eS4kA1QMFEC/T5sDUX8gorrJUbQEBbcEF/1x4XLSo UheynBv9lZtVDYdzg5qBQRUKMlHeKHvuDvLHHhCnxy0EqID4sloQAW3hAIf33sCE Os08LWB+VsNtE3nqkrfs54vEdm+OnCiBTwT2o9bcjMXjwSUhEBT0/1dsDGP4boGg gsR6fgaks8kIjuTiLeCJ0aSlVz7VVNgBr8klj1Vi8vMrTrs5jpx9Rh4/DLa8HvXl isr4RHDx290J5yd66U5dwPtwL5PcSGqFWtGfyFUpFjrB92sIzU4cE9+WzokAVQMF EC/T5pxJuCRZ+BFKkwEBHtoCAI/0vtRlvDE4+IMWTfOmU/TuJM80ltVZl9+MOdn3 4EGSf5TO5MIGu9sLIO+mTTTZXZNbFNo0AMyUZAEVDh+JEGQ= =fHhI -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Libel & the 1st Amendment
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, It has been asserted by at least one member that the 1st Amendment protects libelous or other defamatory speech. This is hokem. The 1st most certainly does not protect lies in any form. It protects opinion, this is distinctly different then stating a untruth about some party or distribution of material with the attributation to them without their permission. No civilized society can exist that permits lies and other defamations of character and expect to survive for any length of time. Simply for no other reason than contracts and other such instruments would not be worth the paper they were printed on. Let alone any laws or other issuances from the government itself. ARTICLE I. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Where in there do you see a right to lie, cheat, or steal? If it did, it would be a lie because it would not protect the very freedom it says it is. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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Re: Last nail for US crypto export policy?
by Steven Bellovin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It is dangerously naive to label this success the ``last nail for US crypto export policy''. Everyone concerned with this issue, from the NSA to the FBI to anyone who wants to use crypto, understands this and accepts it. 40-bit keys are good for protection against casual snooping, and nothing more -- and no one is going to claim that you need supercomputers to crack them. In fact, I assert that the U.S. government is *happy* about these results -- because it's going to push folks towards wanting stronger crypto for export. The only problem, of course, is the terms under which such code can be exported... I'll go further -- in my opinion, the only reason the government doesn't want DES to fall just yet is that alternatives aren't ready. That is, the banks and financial institutions, and for that matter the government agencies, have not converted to 3DES or Clipper or what have you, and can't do so on short notice; the commercial products they need just aren't ready yet. No one wants to risk a loss of confidence in the financial system. Two years from now, though, when some key escrow products are ready, it may be a different story.

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Re: Getting into MIT is impossible
by Rick Osborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:45 AM 1/29/97 +0100, Anonymous (Xanthar) wrote: >Most intelligent people apply to several schools, knowing that >admissions practices are subject to the vagaries of reality. If you are implying that I was not intelligent enough to apply to more than one school, then you are mistaken. MIT was the *only* school out of the six I applied to (including CMU, CalTech, GaTech) that turned me down. >My guess is that "other factors" were involved. I'm sure that was probably true. I'm just saying that I doubt the admissions process is as Financial-Aid-blind as they would have us believe. >MIT offered me a substantial economic aid package, in the form of loans, >grants, and various campus jobs. What does this tell you? It tells me that you're a better man than I, I guess. I'm sorry if I sound bitter, but one does not work for a goal for over a decade of his life, get rejected for it, and then just "forget it". Anyone who tells you otherwise needs to see a therapist. _________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________ Don't have awk? Use this simple sh emulation: #!/bin/sh echo 'Awk bailing out!' >&2 exit 2

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FBI=LIE
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/news/washpol/fbi-lab.html Login cypherpunks, password cypherpunks. WASHINGTON -- For decades the FBI's reputation as a crime-fighting agency has rested heavily on its high-tech forensic laboratory, which could solve baffling crimes from a speck of blood, a sliver of paint or the thinnest filament of human hair. But an investigation by the Justice Department's inspector general has put the FBI laboratory, and the way the agency has used it, under the glare of public scrutiny. The findings, which were turned over to FBI officials last week, are threatening to shatter the image of an agency on the cutting edge of scientific sleuthing. [...] -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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Re: East German Collapse (Was: Fighting the cybercensor
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 28 Jan 1997 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com wrote: > (ObCypherpunksContent: if substantial amounts of tax money starts > escaping into Cypherspace, it's not easy to maintain a modern > CorporatistWelfare-for-Bureaucrats state either.....) I disagree. Where does this money "escape" to? Do you spend it on rent, pizza, a new stereo? Hmm... These are all meatspace transactions and can be taxed. I met last week with a senior Clinton administration official for an article I'm working on and posed this question to him, asking how we can tax anonymous online transactions. He replied: "Well, we have this corporate income tax..." -Declan

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Re: Last nail for US crypto export policy?
by Dan Geer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Steve Bellovin writes: It is dangerously naive to label this success the ``last nail for US crypto export policy''. Everyone concerned with this issue, from the NSA to the FBI to anyone who wants to use crypto, understands this and accepts it. 40-bit keys are good for protection against casual snooping, and nothing more -- and no one is going to claim that you need supercomputers to crack them. In fact, I assert that the U.S. government is *happy* about these results -- because it's going to push folks towards wanting stronger crypto for export. The only problem, of course, is the terms under which such code can be exported... I'll go further -- in my opinion, the only reason the government doesn't want DES to fall just yet is that alternatives aren't ready. That is, the banks and financial institutions, and for that matter the government agencies, have not converted to 3DES or Clipper or what have you, and can't do so on short notice; the commercial products they need just aren't ready yet. No one wants to risk a loss of confidence in the financial system. Two years from now, though, when some key escrow products are ready, it may be a different story. Steve is absolutely right on the money, particularly about the likely happiness on the government side. The true explanation of the current effort is a testimony to the strategic skill of the regulators, but it is not as represented aloud. Export controls are meaningless without domestic use restrictions and domestic use restrictions will never pass the test of the First Amendment. Therefore, in an effort to obtain what cannot be obtained politically, this administration makes the following ploy: (1) Withhold from American companies the wherewithal to compete internationally by crippling the products they may export; (2) Offer to those companies that will include the functional equivalent of domestic use restrictions in their products a competitive advantage that could never otherwise withstand any fairness test; (3) Declare the resulting imposition of domestic use controls to be the "voice of the marketplace" and "voluntary." This is as shameful as saying that a rape victim was "asking for it." --dan

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Re: Libel & the 1st Amendment
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A couple points: * The 1st Amendment does protect some lies. If I say "Jim Choate is a Venusian albatross," the statement is probably (?) a lie, but I doubt you'll prevail in a libel suit. What damages do you have? That's the key, I believe -- the statement has to lower you in the opinion of others. * Many 1st Amendment experts don't believe in the legal concept of libel. It is, they say, a rich man's game -- if I'm libeled by the NYT, I'm probably not going t be able to sue them, but Donald Trump can. Moreover, if I don't have the resources to sue but the statement is libelous, it creates a *presumption* in the minds of the readers that the article is certainly true. (If it were not, I would have sued, right?) * The concept you may be searching for is consensual speech, which I believe a society should tolerate. Libelous speech isn't consensual, though obscenity is. -Declan On Tue, 28 Jan 1997, Jim Choate wrote: > > Hi, > > It has been asserted by at least one member that the 1st Amendment protects > libelous or other defamatory speech. > > This is hokem. The 1st most certainly does not protect lies in any form. It > protects opinion, this is distinctly different then stating a untruth about > some party or distribution of material with the attributation to them > without their permission. > > No civilized society can exist that permits lies and other defamations of > character and expect to survive for any length of time. Simply for no other > reason than contracts and other such instruments would not be worth the > paper they were printed on. Let alone any laws or other issuances from the > government itself. > > > ARTICLE I. > > Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, > or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of > speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, > and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. > > > Where in there do you see a right to lie, cheat, or steal? If it did, it > would be a lie because it would not protect the very freedom it says it is. > > > Jim Choate > CyberTects > ravage(a)ssz.com > > >

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Re: libsln.htm -- Is Libel a Crime?
by aga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 28 Jan 1997, jim bell wrote: > At 07:33 AM 1/28/97 -0500, aga wrote: > >On Mon, 27 Jan 1997, jim bell wrote: > > > >> At 01:14 AM 1/27/97 -0600, ichudov(a)algebra.com wrote: > > >> >These postings do not prove that libel is a crime. It is because libel > >> >is not a crime. Libel is a tort, and unlike with crime, the government > >> >cannot initiate a legal action against someone for libel. Only injured > >> >(libeled) individuals and not the government can sue in a libel case. > >> > >> On the contrary, in some jurisdictions libel is indeed a crime. However, > >> that doesn't mean that prosecutions happen anymore, but the laws are (in > >> some places) still on the books. > > > > >Jim, either you are full of shit or that Law is VERY > >unconstitutional. The first amendment prohibits any Criminal Laws > >from being made against libel. > > You'd think that, wouldn't you? Yes, I agree that those laws are > unconstitutional, but so is about 90+% of what the Federal government does > today. Sigh. > > Criminal libel statutes are apparently (in the US, at least) a holdover from > an earlier era in which government took the place of King George, and wanted > the power to punish people who were too outspoken. The fact that they are > "never" (?) used anymore is presumably a reflection of their > unconstitutionality. Criminal libel statues should also be considered > unconstitutional because they give way too much leeway to the prosecutor to > decide whom to prosecute. His friends will never be charged, but his > enemies will. > > One obvious problem with the LACK of a criminal libel statute, from the > standpoint of the "government-controlling-class," or "the bigshots," is that > it's impossible to sue (and collect from) a (comparatively) poor person for > defaming him...but it's still possible to put him in jail. Civil libel is, > therefore, essentially useless to a government agent as a means of keeping > the masses in line. > > > Myself, I believe that libel should be eliminated as a cause of action in > civil cases as well as it has, de facto, in the criminal area. If anything, > the ability to sue for libel makes things worse: There is an illusion that > this is easy and straightforward, if not economical. It is neither. The > result is that people are actually MORE likely to believe a printed > falsehood because they incorrectly assume that if it wasn't true, it > couldn't be printed. > > > > > Jim Bell > jimbell(a)pacifier.com > Interesting analysis here, but remember; libel is just one kind of "defamation" and an action for defamation will always be actionable. The constitution gives us the right to call the President a motherfucker any time we want to, and it also gives the motherfucker the right to sue. Sueing is better than fighting in the streets. This is the SLOWEST I have ever seen Telnet, today.

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Re: uae_1.html (UAE censoring Internet)
by Wayne Clerke 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've checked the filtering out already ... it's pretty extensive. Far, far more than Singapore's 'hundred' or so pages. The granularity is such that things like http://www.domain/~user/main may be passed, while a link from that page to a subpage may be blocked. I guess they can afford to do this with so few users and little traffic. Never thought I'd be real interested in how Net Nanny worked ... but I am now. I'd be happy to hear from anyone with good ideas (or (accessible) pointers) about how to minimize the effects of this stupidity ... :-( Regards, Mail: <a href=mailto:wclerke@emirates.net.ae>Wayne Clerke</a> PGP key ID: AEB2546D FP: D663D11E DA19D74F 5032DC7E E001B702 PGP mail welcome. Voice: +971 506 43 48 53 If you're not living on the edge, you're taking up too much space. ---------- > From: Lynx_User(a)linux.nycmetro.com > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: uae_1.html > Date: Tuesday, 28 January 1997 12:26 > > > Reuters New Media > > > [ Yahoo | Write Us | Search | Info ] > > > [ Index | News | World | Biz | Tech | Politic | Sport | Scoreboard | > Entertain | Health ] > > _________________________________________________________________ > > Previous Story: UK Bill To Fight Millennium Computer Bug Moves On > Next Story: Intel to Europe: Get Online Or Fall Behind > _________________________________________________________________ > > Monday January 27 9:50 AM EST > > UAE Launches Service To Censor Internet > > DUBAI - The United Arab Emirates's monopoly Internet provider launched > a service Saturday to censor sites in cyberspace that breached local > moral values and traditions. > > Officials from state telecommunications company Etisalat said the new > Proxy Service would be compulsory for the UAE's 9,669 subscribers, who > will have to configure their web browsers that navigate the net by > February 2. > > "The service was launched today as part of our efforts to improve the > Internet service to our subscribers after lengthy study and research," > said one official at Etisalat. > > "We were working on it before some official statements were made on > the need to control access to some sites on the service," he told > Reuters. > > The move follows repeated calls to regulate access to the Internet in > the conservative Gulf region, where most women are veiled, magazine > pictures revealing cleavage or bare legs are blacked out and > questioning the existence of god can be punishable by death. > > Some are worried about the spread of pornography as well as religious > and political material through the worldwide network of interlinked > computers. > > Last year, Dubai Police chief Major General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim > created a rare public row in the UAE saying the information ministry > and the police, rather that Etisalat, should be authorized to issue > Internet licenses as it was their job to monitor data coming into the > UAE and maintain security. > > Telecommunications experts say the Proxy Service will not be "fully > water-tight," but would help block access to known and unwanted sites > -- a list of which could be constantly updated. > > The proxy server will be pre-fed with Internet addresses where access > is blocked off, industry sources said. But the server will be unable > to block access if addresses of prohibited sites are changed, as > frequently happens. > > Etisalat says it will disconnect any customer who abused its Internet > services and violated "order and clear laws." > > "Singapore has succeeded to a great extent in its drive to control > harm done by the Internet," said another Etisalat official. "Why > cannot we?" > > Singapore government measures to regulate political and religious > content on the Internet and keep it free of pornography became > effective in July last year. They require all Internet service > operators and local content providers to be registered with the > Singapore Broadcasting Authority. > > Copyright, Reuters Ltd. 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