December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 3 Feb 97 6:48:17 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nym config(a)nym.alias.net #**#+*#**-#+ 4:51 100.00% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com ---+-------+ 1:50:51 99.99% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de ++++--+++++ 1:09:14 99.85% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu ++--++++++++ 50:42 99.80% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com ###*###+-- # 5:45 99.62% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ++++--+++ + 1:07:30 99.46% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net +*+ *++++*++ 40:43 99.23% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ----------- 3:42:43 99.09% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com + ++++++++ 47:05 99.03% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com ##### #* *# 2:02 98.68% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com ++.--.- ---+ 5:48:30 98.23% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net ***#*+# *#-+ 15:27 97.21% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ------- .- 6:28:55 96.31% replay remailer(a)replay.com * +++-*** 15:53 93.06% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net +--+ --+ 1:20:32 91.27% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +-.-_-*+ 14:45:36 77.02% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: My Departure, Moderat
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi there, > ...and saw no point in wasting even more of my time arguing against the New > Cypherpunks World Order, as the NCWO was clearly presented as a fait > accompli, not something ablut which opinions of list members (or even list > _founders_, at least not me) were being sought. -=> Quoting In:sandfort@crl11.crl.com to Harka <=- In> Factual error #2. There was a call for comment; Tim chose not to In> do so. In retrospect, I wish we had run it by Tim, Eric and In> Hugh in more detail before making the annoucement, but we didn't. In> Certainly a tactical error and a breach of protocol, but not the In> end of the world. Sorry Tim. I should have spoken to you first. Tactical error and breach of protocol, but not the end of the world?? Very weak and dangerous argument. I already hear the Administration saying: "Oh sorry, we didn't tell you about the new wiretaps affecting 50 percent of all phone lines. Certainly a tactical error and a breach of protocol, but HEY, it's _not_ the end of the world! Plus, it's good for you!" > * But the really important issue is this: is the _physical hosting_ of the > Cypherpunks mailing list coterminous with the "Cypherpunks"? If the list > was hosted by, say, UC Berkeley or PGP Incorporated, would we consider > these hosts to be the "owners" of the Cypherpunks group?... In> I think this is a Straw Man. John and I have never argued that In> John "owns" cypherpunks. When a Cypherpunk meeting is held in In> someone's living room, however, I don't think it's asking to much In> to ask everyone to follow the local rules (e.g., "no shoes in the In> house" or "no smoking" or even "no ad hominem attacks"). As Tim In> is fond of saying, "my house; my rules." I don't think this In> means Tim "owns" a physical meeting in his house. It really doesn't matter. I do agree, that having a meeting in, let's say, your house, everybody has to submit to the "local rules", i.e. no shoes, no smoking etc.. To avoid those rules means not to go to that location. However, any rules in a certain location do NOT affect speech. While I may enforce the rule for people not to smoke in my house, I can't enforce anything in regards to their speech. The mere try would be counterproductice to having a meeting in the first place. On a mailing list like this one, trying to enforce certain _subjective_ standards is even more counterproductive, especially on the self-proclaimed fore-front of liberty (Cypherpunks). I do agree with TCM, that this is an argument for the very enemies of free speech and neglecting the individual filtering-capabilities of each subscriber. In> no evidence that it has made things worse. Remember, there are a In> hand-full of subscribers to the Flames list, 20-30 on the In> Unedited list and *2000* or so on the Moderated list. Sure some In> of that may be due to laziness, but it would be cavalier in the In> extreme to claim that such an overwhelming acceptance of In> moderation is merely an artifact of inertia. Not necessarely. By subscribing the regular way: <subscribe cypherpunks user(a)adress.com> one gets on the moderated list by default. It might take (esp. new) people a while to realize, it's moderated. And since it's Cypherpunks, they subscribed to, they don't even _expect_ such things in the first place... I'd do it vice versa, having them subscribe to unedited by default and only if they make the effort (deliberate choice) to get on any kind of moderated version, they can do so by sending a message to majordomo. Ciao Harka /*************************************************************/ /* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE ...more info at */ /* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! --> http://www.eff.org */ /* E-mail: harka(a)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail preferred) */ /* PGP public key available upon request. [KeyID: 04174301] */ /* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBMvCiUzltEBIEF0MBAQHYGAf+In7n3Us+4g7GtHTlXynV5f1r1n0kF2/1 KCmMvng05kHUL9c2ucG/oVZAy821quvbbgQNGmEbpkbPQezCFLesWLSQ+SaA0XGm KNC8PqjiqGVHyi0UonhE6z48j0tyt1pbgYFk15nm8pb2ejSR77suXGqDNYKabqu3 MsGnn/JFWlBEArvkSjnQ6Psgs9kqi+6DLsGlKhICkaRGj5/lTfvoLvdW183WqbAt 9SkpJBjBSTFSDc6IuC0oYWZnEvbVMO8KCkOJGjgOxYDCjh5kRzQn6lB2cKXmQmyH KxAfMsTLcHV6AcFAONUKzp+TwaUcw2LA4Eu21NtD3bWo03JeHoCQLA== =f+Ki -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

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Re: If guilty of a lesser crime, you can be sentenced for a greater
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:10 PM 2/2/97 -0600, ichudov(a)algebra.com wrote: >jim bell wrote: >> >> Better yet, set up a system to encourage the public to USE those guns (and >> other weapons) to get rid of the people who pass such laws, and the problem >> is solved. >> > >How about this scenario: I borrow 1 million dollars from, let's say, >Phill Hallam-Baker. Not wanting to pay it back, I pay to the >assassination bot and arrange him to be murdered. Simple. Even if a lendor dies (whether by murder or some other cause, perhaps undetermined) you (the debtor) presumably will still be obligated to pay back the debt, to his estate if nowhere else. If you WEREN'T responsible for the killing, you should still make the payments. If you do, then you had no reason to kill him in the first place. Even in the hypothetical scenario that the lendor is single, has no family or other likely heirs, it would be in his interest to declare that his estate goes to charity, including debts to it such as yours. After all, we can assume that he doesn't want to get murdered, and the best way of avoiding that fate is to remove whatever incentive might otherwise exist for anyone else to kill him. Making sure that all of his debtors are revealed would make it difficult for any of them to get away with murder. Or, at least, prevent the fact of such a murder from eliminating the need to repay the debt. If the fact of the loan were revealed, perhaps only after the lendor's death, and ALSO the fact that you (alone among his other debtors) refused to pay it back, everyone else in that society might reasonably come to the conclusion (absent proof or a good explanation to the contrary) that you were probably responsible for the death. At the very least, they wouldn't want to deal with you for fear of a similar outcome (non-payment or death), and some of the public would be likely to punish you by donating money to see you dead. They would do this, even if they had no particular link to the dead lendor, precisely because the publicity from such an outcome would deter other people who might be contemplating a similar thing. The logic is essentially the same as the situation where a person would donate small amounts money to see car thieves dead, even if his car hadn't (yet) been stolen: If it is essentially certain that such a penalty will always exist, it will tend to deter future incidents. All car owners have a motivation to maintain that system. >Another story: suppose that I negligently caused fire that destroys >house of, say, Toto. Toto knows that if he sues me, I can arrange him >murdered for the amount less than the amount of damages. As he could, you. Remember, if your bad actions were publicized, your reputation would suffer. If he's satisfied that you are guilty, and can prove it to others, you'll be in trouble to have the information published. (On the other hand, if nobody knows it was you who were responsible, you won't suffer, but that's no worse than the status quo.) > As a result, >he refrains from suing me, or (if he is a mean person) pays additional >money to have me murdered. A suit would probably be a much better outcome. A "suit" implies that he needs assistance to get the fact of the obligation enforced. Assuming he has enough proof to win a lawsuit, he has more than enough proof to sour everyone else on dealing with you in the future, and possibly get them to donate to see you dead. Do you risk it? >Another story: suppose that OKSAS hired me to work for her, but then >our relationships go south and she fires me. Again, her fate is very >unclear, although I would probably spare her life if it were she. > >The bottom line is, it becomes very hard to do ANYTHING that disappoints >at least somebody. That can lead to a lot of inefficiencies. I predict that agreements will simply change to avoid (or anticipate) such disappointments, in order to ensure that neither party feels "taken" if things don't work out as planned. Or, if there is an innocent-and-unavoidable breach of the agreement that harms one person, the other will be motivated to make it up to the first. In effect, they'll have to find a mutually-agreeable middle ground. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Ireland: Bid To Ban "Tamper Proof" Phones
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:32 PM 2/2/97 +0000, Mani wrote: >>From today's Sunday Independent: > >Bid to ban "tamper proof" telephones. >Liz Allen, Crime Correspondent [...] >Justice Minister Nora Owen is presiding over the conference which will agree >on a memorandum of understanding whereby all of the 22 governments will >agree to allow the sale of only telephones which can be intercepted. [...] >Among the countries which will be in attendance at the conference >are America, Australia, Hong Kong, and Britain. I would like to point out two items: 1. A US ban on domestic sales of secure telephony products will require an act of Congress. 2. Insiders have known for months that the US Department of Justice is planning to introduce crypto legislation during the current session of Congress. You draw your own conclusions. IMHO, we will see the USG approaching Congress, pointing to the multilateral agreement, and ask that Congress pass a law to implement the agreement (which, let us not forget about it, has of course been instigated by the USG). It just might work. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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Voice Encrytion/Scrambling
by Huge Cajones Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can anyone comment on and give pointers to devices designed to encrypt voice transmission over POTS lines? I am interested in the respective sound qualities (if you've tried it) and relative strengths of encryption algorithms. Thus far, I've found: http://www-jb.cs.uni-sb.de/~khuwig/lc-1eng.html http://www.cescomm.co.nz/cesindex.html http://www.worldaccess.com/~djm/crytek.htm The first on the list claims to use RSA but gives no ordering or pricing information. Conversely, the last two seem more "available", however they are each vague on the specifics of their respective encryption/scrambling algorithm. Anyone?

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Re: PCS Encryption?
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John Young wrote: | http://www.nsa.gov:8080/programs/missi/condor.html # How secure is CONDOR? # # Current proof-of-concept hardware is FORTEZZA(TM) based # (sensitive but unclassified) Product versions will use STU # for cellular voice and FORTEZZA(TM) Plus for net broadcast # mode and data I was under the impression that Fortezza was ok for classified traffic. Did I miss the changeover, was it unannounced, or was I simply misremembering? Adam -- Pet peeve of the day: Security companies whose protocols dare not speak their name, because they don't have one. Guilty company of the day is now V-One.

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Re: PCS Encryption?
by Greg Rose 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Douglas C. Merrill" writes: >At 03:30 PM 2/1/97 -0500, Steven Bellovin wrote: >>And an illegal wiretap besides, most likely -- with a warrant, they could >>simply put the tap at the base station. The story may be true, but it >>doesn't sound quite right to me. It doesn't sound quite right to me either. >Phil Karn is, of course, the expert on this -- I hope he'll chime in soon >-- Phil, you out there?? I'm not Phil, but maybe I'll do. The three different digital standards in North America are TDMA, CDMA, and GSM (in NY and DC only AFAIK). Newer analog phones use at least some of this, but I don't know much about them. I'll ignore GSM. There is a fair bit of commonality in the security of TDMA and CDMA because of their use of the "Common Cryptographic Algorithms". I like to think I'm only telling you things which are in the "Interface Specification for Common Cryptographic Algorithms Rev B.1". CAVE is used as a hashing algorithm for a number of purposes. Starting at the beginning (that's a very good place to start... shut up Julie) it is used to verify that the A-key programmed into the phone is correct; the dealer or whoever puts in 26 digits, 20 of which are the A-key, and the other 6 are a checksum calculated with CAVE, and the Equipment Serial Number. (The ESN is always used by CAVE -- I won't mention it again.) If they agree, the phone buries the A-key very deep, never to be seen again. (A_Key_Checksum, A_Key_Verify) >From time to time, but not very often, the network and the phone create "Shared Secret Data"; they start with a 56-bit random number and run CAVE on it and the A-key. The resulting 128 bits is split into two 64-bit chunks called SSD_A and SSD_B. SSD_A is used for authentication purposes only, while SSD_B is used for the generation of keys for other cryptographic stuff. (SSD_Generation, SSD_Update) At various times, the base station authenticates the phone by sending down a random challenge (32 bits); this is hashed by CAVE with some other use-dependent data (not secret, but intended to defeat replays) and SSD_A (either current or new, depending on context) to form an 18-bit signature. Since you only get one go to get it right, 18 bits was deemed enough. Again depending on context, the state of CAVE at the end of this process may be saved for use later. (Auth_Signature) The original intent seems to be that Auth_Signature would happen at the beginning of every call, but I don't think that is actually the case. I'm not certain about the telephony end of this stuff. Now comes the encryption stuff. At the beginning of each call, Key_VPM_Generation is called. (VPM is Voice Privacy Mask.) This uses CAVE, initialised to the saved state it had at the last Auth_Signature, and SSD_B, to achieve two things; it generates the CMEA key (64 bits), and it generates the Voice Privacy Mask. CMEA (Cellular Message Encryption Algorithm) is used to encrypt bits of the signalling stuff over the air, but never any end-user data. It is used in different ways by the three standards, as they have different message formats, but they all (AMPS, TDMA, CDMA) use it. The VPM is ignored by analog (I think). It is constant for the entire call, and is XORed with every frame for TDMA (cryptographically weak, as you can XOR any two frames to cancel it out, but since the frames are heavily compressed actually getting anything from this is not trivial). CDMA ignores all but the last 40 bits, which becomes the initial "long code" for the PN (Psuedo-random Noise) generator. This is a straightforward LFSR, which again, is not cryptographically strong in the face of known plaintext, but again, the input is heavily compressed. More importantly, though, for CDMA you need to have the long code before you can easily sort out the signal from the noise around it (it was originally developed from anti-jamming technology), and since it has a period of days before it repeats, the call will probably be over... The conclusion is that neither way of doing it is truly cryptographically strong, but both are a lot better than listening to Princess Di call Newt "Squidgy" on a Radio Shack scanner. Note, at this point, that neither the phone industry or the NSA particularly cares about end-user stuff being strong. The signalling messages have a 64-bit key used much more appropriately, and so cell-phone fraud is harder to achieve. >Many folks think that "digital = secure" because you can't use radio >shack(TM) listening devices. This much is true. However, you *Can* build >other devices to listen in, and computer hardware is so cheap it's almost >feasible -- though I haven't built one... Or you can take the bits out of existing phones. Greg. Greg Rose INTERNET: ggr(a)Qualcomm.com Qualcomm Australia VOICE: +61-2-9743 4646 FAX: +61-2-9736 3262 6 Kingston Avenue homepage. Mortlake NSW 2137 35 0A 79 7D 5E 21 8D 47 E3 53 75 66 AC FB D9 45

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GAK cracking?
by tmcghan＠gill-simpson.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just days after a U.S. graduate student cracked the most powerful computer encryption system allowed out of the country, the Commerce Department announced it would allow three companies to export an even stronger system. Until this year, computer encryption programs, which scramble information and render it unreadable without a password or software "key," were classified as munitions and stronger programs could not be exported. But under a controversial new Clinton administration policy that took effect Jan. 1, companies may receive permission to export stronger programs. "I'm happy that we've been able to do this within the first month without rancor or difficulty," Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration William Reinsch told Reuters in a telephone interview. To export stronger programs immediately, companies must agree to incorporate features within two years allowing the government to decode encrypted messages by recovering the software keys, however. The administration's policy has been widely criticized as not relaxing the export limits enough and some companies feared the requirement for a two-year plan would substantially delay export approvals. The quick approvals should quell some of the criticism and encourage more applicants, Reinsch said. "As a result of this, you will have more companies taking it seriously and we will expect more plans over the next couple of months," he said. Encryption was once the realm of spies and generals. But with the explosion of online commerce on the Internet, encryption has become a vital tool for protecting everything from a business' email message to a consumer's credit card number sent over the net. The amount of protection afforded by encryption is largely a function of the length of the software key measured in bits, the smallest unit of computer data. Companies said products with just 40-bit long keys, the old limit, were too easy to crack. The approvals came just days after Ian Goldberg, a graduate student at the University of California, cracked a message encoded with a software key 40-bits long. The government did not name the companies given permission to export stronger, 56-bit programs, but Glenwood, Md.,-based Trusted Information Systems acknowledged that it was one of the three.

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Fortune, 3 Feb
by Mike McNally 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Big article in Fortune about e-mail privace. One little paragraph about encryption ("scrambling"). Fairly clue-free overall, but entertaining. -- ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Mike McNally -- Egregiously Pointy -- Tivoli Systems, "IBM" -- Austin mailto:m5@tivoli.com mailto:m101@io.com http://www.io.com/~m101 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

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Re: PCS Encryption?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I was under the impression that Fortezza was ok for classified >traffic. Did I miss the changeover, was it unannounced, or was I >simply misremembering? Fortezza now comes in several implementations for various, variable and multiple levels of classification and message handling. There is info on latest mani-dexterous products at NSA's armadillo and missi sites. If you don't want to be logged by NSA, see the Mykronyx bouquet at: http://jya.com/fortezza.htm To be sure, you might get logged anyway: jya.com may have been approved by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for a snoop.

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Fortune, 3 Feb
by Mike McNally 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Big article in Fortune about e-mail privace. One little paragraph about encryption ("scrambling"). Fairly clue-free overall, but entertaining. -- ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Mike McNally -- Egregiously Pointy -- Tivoli Systems, "IBM" -- Austin mailto:m5@tivoli.com mailto:m101@io.com http://www.io.com/~m101 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

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Re: My Departure, Moderation, and "Ownership of the List"
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, On Mon, 3 Feb 1997, Timothy C. May wrote: > Unfortunately, Sandy responded to my post with his own flames ("piffle," > "disingenous," "straw man," etc.). Now he may well think his points are not > flames becuase they are "true," but to me they take the form of flames. But they are not ad hominem attacks on Tim May. The are my opinions of some of his arguments. Even very smart people such as Tim say poorly thought out or even silly things. > But then I have long disliked Sandy's method of argument. Nothing personal. But Nor I, Tim's. Nothing personal, but that's the point. It is still possible to conduct ourselves with mutual respect even if our views and styles differ. > As Sandy did a too-common section-by-section disssection, I'll do the same > for his comments. After reading through Tim's post, I don't think much would be served by doing another point by point response. From Tim's tone, it appears he is still seething about how this all came about, so I'll just leave our two expressions of opinions where they were. I have no wish to exacerbate any hard feelings Tim may be having. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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GAK cracking?
by tmcghan＠gill-simpson.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just days after a U.S. graduate student cracked the most powerful computer encryption system allowed out of the country, the Commerce Department announced it would allow three companies to export an even stronger system. Until this year, computer encryption programs, which scramble information and render it unreadable without a password or software "key," were classified as munitions and stronger programs could not be exported. But under a controversial new Clinton administration policy that took effect Jan. 1, companies may receive permission to export stronger programs. "I'm happy that we've been able to do this within the first month without rancor or difficulty," Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration William Reinsch told Reuters in a telephone interview. To export stronger programs immediately, companies must agree to incorporate features within two years allowing the government to decode encrypted messages by recovering the software keys, however. The administration's policy has been widely criticized as not relaxing the export limits enough and some companies feared the requirement for a two-year plan would substantially delay export approvals. The quick approvals should quell some of the criticism and encourage more applicants, Reinsch said. "As a result of this, you will have more companies taking it seriously and we will expect more plans over the next couple of months," he said. Encryption was once the realm of spies and generals. But with the explosion of online commerce on the Internet, encryption has become a vital tool for protecting everything from a business' email message to a consumer's credit card number sent over the net. The amount of protection afforded by encryption is largely a function of the length of the software key measured in bits, the smallest unit of computer data. Companies said products with just 40-bit long keys, the old limit, were too easy to crack. The approvals came just days after Ian Goldberg, a graduate student at the University of California, cracked a message encoded with a software key 40-bits long. The government did not name the companies given permission to export stronger, 56-bit programs, but Glenwood, Md.,-based Trusted Information Systems acknowledged that it was one of the three.

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Re: My Departure, Moderation, and "Ownership of the List"
by tmcghan＠gill-simpson.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

on or about: Sun, 2 Feb 1997 14:51:47 -0800 in a message allegedly from: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> {snip} > the really important issue is this: is the _physical hosting_ of the > Cypherpunks mailing list coterminous with the "Cypherpunks"? { much thoughtful and well-phrased commentary elided } > I would have had no problem had John announced that he was creating > a new list, the "Good Stuff" list, with Sandy has his Chooser of > Good Stuff. > But by making the _main list_ the censored one, this skewed things > considerably. > * Why, many reasonable people may ask, did I not simply unsubscribe > from the "Cypherpunks" list and subscribe to the"Cypherpunks-Unedited) >(or whatever it is called) list? Because of my overall anger > But the clear message by having Sandy censor the > main list (the default list, the list name with the main name, the > list we all know about, etc.) {snip} Now that the horse is out of the barn, ( or maybe not? ), I can't help but ask whether one specific 'change to the change' would have satisfied most of your objections: retaining 'cypherpunks' as the name of the unedited, all-the-crud-you-can-read-and-then-some, version, and adding an 'cp-worthwhile' list for those of us who prefer not to wade thru mountains of garbage to glean a few precious tidbits. What's in a name? Is perception more important ( to you ) than reality? If just swapping names between cp and cp-unedited would make such a large difference, I humbly suggest to you that you consider how much labels need to matter. Is the title of the group more important the the content? From where I sit, this looks a lot like a style-over-substance complaint. Of course, I don't have my trifocals on just at the moment. It may also be worth noting that the current 'status quo' is a transient experiment, with a fairly short time limit. When JG, Sandy, et al. evaluate the results with an eye to future direction(s), they may well consider an 'inverted default' for the two list names (i.e.: cp / cp-unedited) In any event, please accept my .02 in the spirit in which it is intended ( constructive criticism ). /* */

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Re: PCS Encryption?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I was under the impression that Fortezza was ok for classified >traffic. Did I miss the changeover, was it unannounced, or was I >simply misremembering? Fortezza now comes in several implementations for various, variable and multiple levels of classification and message handling. There is info on latest mani-dexterous products at NSA's armadillo and missi sites. If you don't want to be logged by NSA, see the Mykronyx bouquet at: http://jya.com/fortezza.htm To be sure, you might get logged anyway: jya.com may have been approved by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for a snoop.

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Re: My Departure, Moderation, and "Ownership of the List"
by Patrick May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy Sandfort writes: [ . . . ] > On Sun, 2 Feb 1997, Timothy C. May wrote: [ . . . ] > > Fourth, it sent a message to enemies of liberty that "Even the > > Cypherpunks have found it necessary to abandon their anarchic > > ways." > > That's one message that one could take from all this, I suppose. > I don't see it that way, nor do several list members who thanked > me in private e-mail for improving the list. Again, YMMV. This is the strongest point in Mr. May's essay, and it is not easily dismissed as a difference in perspective. I admit to looking forward to the moderation experiment when it was announce; the noise on the list was phenomenal even by cypherpunk standards. My procmail filters were approaching the level of complexity required for self-awareness and the ASCII art still slipped through. Plus, I generally agree with Mr. Sandfort's positions. The point above demonstrates that support of the current solution is not rationally justified. Banning people from the list, however ineffectually, and imposing moderation on the main list, rather than offering another filtering service, does indeed support the thesis that even a virtual anarchic society must resort to a central authority to solve some problems. The moderation mechanism is the message. > What didn't work was "local filtering" which has no feed-back > loop to engender comity. This is a strong rebuttal. The primary affect of local filtering is that posts which are filtered do not garner as many responses as those which are not. This feedback is swamped by the tendency of filtered messages to generate flames from those who do not filter them. Filtered sublists are a more effective technique, available to non-technical subscribers as well. Some of the more advanced tools discussed here, such as collaborative filtering, rating schemes, etc. have potential if the ease-of-use barriers can be overcome. A cryptoanarchic solution, however, should be technical and individual. Centralized human moderation does not have the cypherpunk nature. Regards, Patrick May

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Re: My Departure, Moderation, and "Ownership of the List"
by tmcghan＠gill-simpson.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

on or about: Sun, 2 Feb 1997 14:51:47 -0800 in a message allegedly from: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> {snip} > the really important issue is this: is the _physical hosting_ of the > Cypherpunks mailing list coterminous with the "Cypherpunks"? { much thoughtful and well-phrased commentary elided } > I would have had no problem had John announced that he was creating > a new list, the "Good Stuff" list, with Sandy has his Chooser of > Good Stuff. > But by making the _main list_ the censored one, this skewed things > considerably. > * Why, many reasonable people may ask, did I not simply unsubscribe > from the "Cypherpunks" list and subscribe to the"Cypherpunks-Unedited) >(or whatever it is called) list? Because of my overall anger > But the clear message by having Sandy censor the > main list (the default list, the list name with the main name, the > list we all know about, etc.) {snip} Now that the horse is out of the barn, ( or maybe not? ), I can't help but ask whether one specific 'change to the change' would have satisfied most of your objections: retaining 'cypherpunks' as the name of the unedited, all-the-crud-you-can-read-and-then-some, version, and adding an 'cp-worthwhile' list for those of us who prefer not to wade thru mountains of garbage to glean a few precious tidbits. What's in a name? Is perception more important ( to you ) than reality? If just swapping names between cp and cp-unedited would make such a large difference, I humbly suggest to you that you consider how much labels need to matter. Is the title of the group more important the the content? From where I sit, this looks a lot like a style-over-substance complaint. Of course, I don't have my trifocals on just at the moment. It may also be worth noting that the current 'status quo' is a transient experiment, with a fairly short time limit. When JG, Sandy, et al. evaluate the results with an eye to future direction(s), they may well consider an 'inverted default' for the two list names (i.e.: cp / cp-unedited) In any event, please accept my .02 in the spirit in which it is intended ( constructive criticism ). /* */

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swiss buy centralized euro-smartcard system
by Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.hotwired.com/staff/pointcast/Features/1814.html A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) Associate Professor of Law | U. Miami School of Law | froomkin(a)law.miami.edu P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here.

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Re: PGP 2.1
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 3 Feb 1997 10:46:20 -0500, you wrote: >Mark Henderson wrote: >> >> Larry Johnson writes: >> > Hello, >> > Can any;one tell me how to get a version of PGP 2.1? >> > Thanks >> > >> But, why do you want version 2.1? >Because the guy who wrote it was let off after that on his jail Phil Zimmerman? >charges, so I'm not going to use anything he made after that if No, the charges were not "jail charges". They were for exporting munitions. He was let off after 2.5 or 2.6. The urban myth is that 2.3a is safe. You can read the source code yourself. 2.6.2 is fine. Older versions actually have some minor bugs. >I don't know why. >I'm not saying that he rolled over or nothin buyt I'm gonna be >paranoyd like he said in the book. I dont suposse he'd mind, >since he said it. You'd be using a version with holes in it. Why not read the source code of the new version and verify it's security yourself? (If you can't undertsand it, it won't matter which version you're using because you're trusting it no matter what.) >I'm not real smart sometimes but I'nm not a real lamer, either. >(I don't think) Well, start thinking.... Rob ----- "The word to kill ain't dirty | Robert Rothenburg (WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com) I used it in the last line | http://www.asb.com/usr/wlkngowl/ but use a short word for lovin' | Se habla PGP: Reply with the subject and dad you wind up doin' time." | 'send pgp-key' for my public key.

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No Subject
by Krenn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Mark Henderson wrote: > > > > Larry Johnson writes: > > > Hello, > > > Can any;one tell me how to get a version of PGP 2.1? > > > Thanks > > > > > But, why do you want version 2.1? > > Because the guy who wrote it was let off after that on his jail > charges, so I'm not going to use anything he made after that if > I don't know why. > I'm not saying that he rolled over or nothin buyt I'm gonna be > paranoyd like he said in the book. I dont suposse he'd mind, > since he said it. > I'm not real smart sometimes but I'nm not a real lamer, either. > (I don't think) > No, you're not real smart. The source code is _provided_ with PGP. If you are paranoid, _read_ it. Krenn

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Re: Key Security Question
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > > On the other hand, if the "repairman" replaced your pgp executable > > > with version 2.6.3kgb, which uses your hashed passphrase as the > > > session key, you're hosed. Or if he installed a keystroke sniffer, > > > or added a small radio transmitter to your keyboard, or whatever. > > > Depends on your threat model. If you need to be paranoid, > > > they've already gotten you.... > > > > If you're really paranoid, you can boot from a clean floppy and > > reinstall everything from your backup tapes. You do have a > > contingency plan in case your hard disk goes bad, or gets a > > virus, don't you? Well, if you're in doubt, exercise it. Face it, the only solution is to wrap your computer, cat, family, car and yourself in aluminium foil and burn your hard disk whilst chanting "yamma yamma yamma yaaaaamaa" Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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My Departure, Moderation, and "Ownership of the List" -Reply
by Eldon Jenkins 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy, I've been a member of this list off and on for the past few years. In reading this list daily for quite some time I feel that the filtering you are doing has made quite a substantial and positive change. Normally I would spend an hour or so at work filtering through the list deleting endless threads of nonsense just so I could glean the valuable information that is hidden in midst of the mindless chatter. Now the time I spend searching for information has been drastically reduced and I would like to thank you for this. While I am against censorship and moderation whole-heartedly I see this as a different case. You are not preventing anyone from posting, you just sort the posts and place them in their appropriate list. I see your efforts as more of an organizing project rather then censorship. I would love to see the list continue to be moderated. Just my two cents though. Eldon Jenkins USRobotics Programmer

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Dissolving Choke Points
by pdh＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was amused by the similarities of USG crypto policy and the moderation of the cypherpunks list. Recently a number of new regulations were announced to go into effect by a certain date. Requests for comments were made after the policy was announced. Many of us thought that was pretty sneaky. I feel the same way about the moderation plan. Moderation has been a failure. I'm pretty good at filtering and I can sadly report that there is very little signal out there. There are lessons to be learned here. One is that censorship does not promote a stimulating and creative dialogue. The cypherpunks list right now is about as interesting as hanging out by the 7-11. Another lesson is the danger of choke points. We can see how tempting it is for people to exercise their control. Even John Gilmore was unable to restrain himself from involuntary social engineering experiments. Who would we have considered to be more trustworthy? Toad.com is a choke point, not just in terms of moderation but in terms of the rate at which it can distribute messages. Let's replace it. What we want are many machines carrying the cypherpunks list. A message posted to any machine goes to all of the others. Each machine sends messages to its subscribers only once. Some of these machines should be across borders. The mail loop and multiple posting problems are solved by observing the message IDs. Fast implementation: use moderated mailing list software. Put a filter in the .forward file of the "moderator" account which looks at the message ID and forwards the message if it hasn't been seen already. The mailing list machines all subscribe each other. I've been looking for a stable machine with a good net connection to do this. I haven't found one. However, if we have many machines sharing the load, the stability of any one unit is not as important because the list will survive multiple "hits". Only the subscribers on one machine will be affected by having their messages delayed. This greatly reduces the work and responsibility for any one list operator. (As John will attest, keeping a machine running 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, rain or shine, is a lot of work.) Also, with multiple machines, each unit handles a small amount of the load. This makes more machines available and has less impact on people's net connections. Last I checked, there were about 1200 addresses on the mailing list at toad.com. All we need are about 10 machines to take 120 subscribers each. (This is a completely manageable load.) Do you have a Unix machine on the Net? Does it have sendmail and Perl? Then you have all that it takes to participate. Send me mail and I'll help you set it up. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com P.S. I like and respect John and Sandy and I've learned a lot from both of them. While basically well-intentioned, they just made a mistake in this instance.

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Moderation [Tim,Sandy]
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since it seems to be the topic of the day, here are some of my thoughts on moderating CP. o Moderation achieved what it could achieve. Spam is no longer clogging up the list. Insults, i.e., "Tim Mayo fucks children", are no longer polluting the list. o Moderation did not achieve what it couldn't achieve. The level of noise has been reduced, but signal has not been increased. This is sad, but true. The attempt was probably bound to fail, since many of the "top signal generators" have long left the list and are not about to come back. All that is remaining are a few diehards, such as myself, some TLA goons (knowingly or unknowingly) working against the cause, and many newbies and observers. I believe that Cypherpunks is beyond hope of recovery. In fact, each day Cypherpunk (as in cypherpunks(a)toad.com) lives on, it does damage to the cause. Let's kill the list. Once and for all. Let the hard core crypto go to Coderpunks, the politics to Cryptography, and the garbage into the void. I am well aware of the name recognition and reputation capital associated with CP, still I believe it best to *kill the list*. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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No Subject
by Bovine Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy Maytag's father, an idiot, stumbled across Timmy Maytag's mother, an imbecile, when she had no clothes on. Nine months later she had a little moron. \\\ (0 0) _ooO_(_)_Ooo____ Timmy Maytag

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