December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Last nail for US crypto export policy?
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:41 AM 1/30/97 -0800, Bill Stewart wrote: >I think we do need to get some sort of push going for 3DES as a >replacement for DES - it's strong enough, even though DES is showing >its age, and it's an obvious transition from the current technology. >It's slower and clunkier than IDEA or RC4/128, but still not bad. The migration to 3DES is underway, at least in the banking sector. ANSI X.9, the group that deals with many of the protocols used in the banking industry, has made tremendous progress. 3DES, elliptic curve, and a host of other improvements all are out of committee and should be available as official (for bankers :-) specs soon, if they aren't already. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

1 0

NSA Rainbow Series.
by Genocide 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A while back someone posted the 1-800 number for the NSA to call in and get the Rainbow series delivered.... well, I called and put in an order and it never came, I need to call them again... I don't have the phone numbere number anymore...does anyone have it? Can someone email me the number again? Genocide Head of the Genocide2600 Group ============================================================================ **Coming soon! www.Genocide2600.com! ____________________ *---===| |===---* *---===| Genocide |===---* "You can be a king or a street *---===| 2600 |===---* sweeper, but everyone dances with the *---===|__________________|===---* Grim Reaper." Email: gen2600(a)aracnet.com Web: http://www.aracnet.com/~gen2600 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ It is by caffeine alone that I set my mind in motion. It is by the Mountain Dew that the thoughts acquire speed, the lips acquire stains, the stains become a warning. It is by caffeine alone that I set my mind in motion. ================================================================================

2 1

Re: RC5-12/32/5 contest solved
by A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Bell rote: >Assuming it's possible to build a chip which tests solutions in a >massively-pipelined mode, the 400,000 or so solutions per second tried (for >what is probably a $2000 machine) would probably increase to 100 million per >second per chip (at a cost of maybe $100 per chip, if implemented in >parallel). That's 5000 times more economical, which would translate to a >find in 2-3 days if the same dollars in hardware were invested. Hi Jim, still on your list 8*) Funny thing is that 3 1/2 hours for a 40 bit search is the "real world" number I was using two years ago (can look it up in various archives) so is interesting that the first real test came out exactly the same. Is why I said 40 bits should not protect anything worth more than U$250.00 Have good reason to believe your estimate for a purpose built machine this year (expect 600,000,000 to 1,000,000,000 kps per sieve - these will not be cheap chips but will be commecially available). Expect 400 arrays would be required to do DES in a day (average) but is a lot more achievable than the 65k postulated by the gang of nine. Still would not be too concerned about using DES so long as every message encrypted (including orders for a tuna on rye) and each uses a different key - is "security by obscurity" in a way but am comfortable with it. Besides, if really concerned will just superencrypt. Warmly, Padgett "I love it when a plan comes together."

2 1

Re: Rejection policy of the Cypherpunks mailing list
by aga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 30 Jan 1997, jim bell wrote: > At 09:05 PM 1/28/97 -0800, Dale Thorn wrote: > > >I dare say that the downside of this is much less pleasant than the > >virtual anarchy (in the bad sense) we suffer now. If the police get > >out of control, A.P. will arrive just in time to plug a few of those > >holes, so to speak. Ideally, future robotics should be able to > >provide something like Gort (sp?) to take the place of human officers, > >given advances in the kind of pattern matching needed to deter > >aggression and the like. Those who don't make it past the robots, > >well, the rest of us can learn to behave, and we'll be much better > >off when we do. > > > Your comparison with the fictional Gort, in the movie "The day the earth > stood still" is of course apt. It was only after I'd written most of the > essay that I realized that an AP-type system would function much as Gort did. > > Occasionally we (CP) see a spoof where somebody claims to have developed a > software program to "replace the judicial system" or something like that. You may be able to replace the "Letter of the Law" but you can not replace the "Spirit of the Law" with an Android or a bot. (notice I refuse to type like a geek with those "`" characters) So, humanoids will always be entitled to a jury of their "peers" as the constitution says, and that means no AI involved. AI was made for usenet management. > Well, the problem with such a claim (aside from the obvious and enormous > AI-type difficulties) is that the current system contains numerous biases. > Writing a program to replace the legal system would presumably require that > these biases be measured (and admitted-to!) and implemented into a > well-defined system. > > What we'd discover is that the current system only barely resembles the > guarantees in the US Constitution. At that point, there would be an argument > between those who will insist that the Constitution be followed, and those > who believe that the current de-facto system, however biased, be maintained > as-is. > The 12 to 0 verdict will always be the bias in favor of the defendant, and it must stay that way. > > > Jim Bell > jimbell(a)pacifier.com > With the different combinations of Perl and Java and Lisp that are around today, the time will come when an android or an AI bot will have become dangerous to society, and charged with a crime. Will it be entitled to a jury of it's peers? mail.cypherpunks alt.usenet.admin

1 0

Clarification on The Politics of Export Restrictions
by Rick Hornbeck 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am submitting the following a second time as the first one did not seem to get posted. ============== I agree the strategy would have to be hijack-proof. Something like Gore experiencing a convenient "change of heart" towards the end of this current term and convincing Clinton and the administration to soften crypto export restrictions which would make Gore look like a hero to the high-tech community just in time for the election. Naturally this would have to be carefully scripted but the objective would be to keep the democrats in power. Just a theory. >>Return-Path: <owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com> >>Date: Wed, 29 Jan 1997 23:43:43 -0800 >>From: Greg Broiles <gbroiles(a)netbox.com> >>To: Rick Hornbeck <rnh2(a)ix.netcom.com> >>Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >>Subject: Re: The Politics of Export Restrictions >>Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com >> >>At 09:44 PM 1/29/97 -0800, Rick Hornbeck wrote: >> >>>Is it possible the unreasonable crypto export restrictions are simply being >>>imposed at this time for the purpose of making Al Gore look good when he >>>runs for President in 2000? >> >>I suppose it's plausible, but it's an opportunity open to both candidates, >>and more plausibly (because of lack of collaboration) to the Republicans - >>e.g., Dan Quayle and the "Crypto Freedom For Americans" platform, promising >>to rescue Silicon Valley from those evil regulatory Democrats. >> >>If I were an evil politician trying to set up a trick like you suggest, I >>think I'd want a scheme that my opponent(s) couldn't hijack and use against >>me. >> >>-- >>Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: >>gbroiles(a)netbox.com | >>http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. >> | >> >> >>

1 0

ad.doubleclick.net (fwd)
by Mark M. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Thu, 23 Jan 1997 14:15:38 -0800 From: Caveh Frank Jalali <caveh(a)Eng.Sun.COM> Subject: URL filtering, Re: ad.doubleclick.net (RISKS-18.78) The obvious defense against hostile or undesirable web sites is to not visit them in the first place. This process can in fact be automated in netscape's browser. This saves bandwidth and your time! The basic premise is that the browser may optionally execute a function on every URL before it is accessed to determine whether a direct connection should be made or a proxy should be used in the process. This affords the opportunity to [mis]direct the browser to fetch the document from an invalid source. this is a good approximation of not getting the document at all. We sit behind a fire wall, so all WWW access has to funnel through a proxy. If I tell netscape to fetch an external document using a direct connection, the connection attempt will fail, and the document will not be accessed. Netscape will put a broken image icon in its place. Here are the nuts and bolts to do it, but some assembly is required: Under options/network preferences/proxies, select "automatic proxy config" and tell it which file to use. Call it something like "file:///HOMEDIR/.netscape/proxy.pac", replacing HOMEDIR with your home directory; the actual code is included below. Next, go to options/general preferences/helpers and create an application helper of type "application/x-ns-proxy-autoconfig" for suffix "pac", handled by "navigator". Install this java-script code to do the actual filtering. call it "file:///HOMEDIR/.netscape/proxy.pac", as mentioned before. ================ function FindProxyForURL(url, host) { if ( isResolvable(host) && ! shExpMatch(host, "[0-9]*") ) return "DIRECT" ; else if (host == "advertising.quote.com") return "DIRECT" ; else if (host == "ad.doubleclick.net") return "DIRECT" ; else if (shExpMatch(url, "*:*/ads/*")) return "DIRECT" ; else return "PROXY webcache:8080; "; }

1 0

[DSS] Zero-knowledge interactive proofs
by Secret Squirrel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dr.Deflated Viscera has been fired for anally raping officemates. o \ o / _ o __| \ / |__ o _ \ o / o /|\ | /\ ___\o \o | o/ o/__ /\ | /|\ / \ / \ | \ /) | ( \ /o\ / ) | (\ / | / \ / \ Dr.Deflated Viscera

1 0

[ADMINISTRIVIUM] S/MIME
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dr.Disruptive L[eakage] Vulis does NOT eat pussy. He only eats asshole if it's got a big dick up in front. Whoever calls him bisexual is a fucking liar. He likes to suck cocks in front of an audience. /\_./o__ Dr.Disruptive L[eakage] Vulis (/^/(_^^' ._.(_.)_

1 0

Degausser
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Deceptive L<avabo> Violent K<ondom> Of The Moment enjoys sucking the puss from his syphilitic homosexual friends. /o)\ Deceptive L<avabo> Violent K<ondom> Of The Moment \(o/

1 0

Spam filters
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Deviant Vitriolic KOTM likes to be the man in the middle, getting it both up the ass and in his mouth. ^-^-^-@@-^-^-^ (..) Deviant Vitriolic KOTM

1 0

Re: Clipper chip
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dick Vandal will fuck anything that moves, but he'd rather be fucking his own mother's dead body. /^\ |-| | | _| |____ Dick Vandal | | | | | <| | | | | \_______|

1 0

Re: [PGP] PEM
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dr.Deadwood L[apdancer] Vasectomy K[retin]OTM likes to be the man in the middle, getting it both up the ass and in his mouth. /// (0 0) ____ooO_(_)_Ooo__ Dr.Deadwood L[apdancer] Vasectomy K[retin]OTM

1 0

Re: Cats Out of Bags
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, On Thu, 30 Jan 1997, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: > as I've said before, I really hate the "cat out of the bag" > saying, as Aaron's recent comments indicate. Interestingly, the saying, "to let the cat out of the bag" is related to the saying, "to buy a pig in a poke." A poke is a sack or bag. In times past, street peddlers would sell a mark a young pig. The pig was supposedly put into a poke, but in fact, a bag with a cat in it was substituted. By the time the mark figured out his mistake by "letting the cat out of the bag," the peddler was long gone. The lesson the mark learned was "Don't buy a pig in a poke." The better metaphor for crypto is that the genie is out of the bottle. Alternatively, that the crypto bell cannot be unrung. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1 0

Re: Cats Out of Bags
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

fascinating reading sandy, but > >The better metaphor for crypto is that the genie is out of the >bottle. Alternatively, that the crypto bell cannot be unrung. these have the same conceptual limitations I was flaming. to use the analogy: 1. it is unconstitutional to put a crypto genie in a bottle in the first place. 2. it is unconstitutional to make laws against ringing crypto bells. again, when you use the above analogies, the government can argue with you and say, "no, we thing that crypto hasn't really spread as much as it could without the ITAR", and this is a pretty difficult point to argue. how can you argue that crypto has spread as much as it possibly can? relaxing regulations would surely cause it to spread more than it has. admittedly, I can't think of a nice substitute with a good "ring to it". <g> however, I do like the saying that crypto-news has been using about "our safe, our KEYS!!" or something similar. I propose that people emphasize this. using any of the other analogies just encourages orwellian thinking along the lines in the government: oh YEAH?! who SAYS the genie is out of the bottle?! what makes you think we can't put him BACK THERE?! so imho its all a diversion and a decoy. it's the wrong argument to get involved in-- has crypto spread to make it impossible to contain? and as the saying goes, "never get in an argument with a fool, people might not know the difference". do we believe in the constitution or not? perhaps it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy when we don't.

1 0

Re: [GSM] 2 Questions
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dense Vaginal K>rud<OfTheMoment will fuck anything that moves, but he'd rather be fucking his own daughter's prepubescent body. \|/ @ @ -oOO-(_)-OOo- Dense Vaginal K>rud<OfTheMoment

1 0

Re: [OFF-TOPIC] Alphabet frequency charts
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dinghy Violent K)arcass(OfTheMonth wears satin lingerie embroidered with pink swastikas, prancing around for his homosexual, AIDS infected lovers. /\_./o__ Dinghy Violent K)arcass(OfTheMonth (/^/(_^^' ._.(_.)_

1 0

Re: Denial of service attack
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Disruptive Viscera K[ondom] Of The Minute grew a beard to look like his mother. (~\/~) /~'\ /`~\ _ _ `\ /'( ` ) ( `\/' ) `' `\ /' `\ /' Disruptive Viscera K[ondom] Of The Minute `\ /' `\/' '

1 0

[GSM] Hardening mailing lists against spam attacks
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dr.Derisve Vitriol K[reep]OfTheMoment died of AIDS last night with his faggot lover. __o _ \<_ Dr.Derisve Vitriol K[reep]OfTheMoment (_)/(_)

2 1

Re: Get cybersitter to block your ISP
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Path: perun!news2.panix.com!news.panix.com!panix!news.bbnplanet.com!cam-news-hub1.bbnplanet.com!howland.erols.net!rill.news.pipex.net!pipex!news-lond.gsl.net!news.gsl.net!news-feed1.globalnet.co.uk!kew.globalnet.co.uk!usenet From: pevans(a)globalnet.co.uk.removethispart (evans-the-swim) Newsgroups: alt.privacy,alt.censorship,alt.revenge,news.admin.censorship,alt.html Subject: Get cybersitter to block your ISP Message-ID: <5ckclk$6kl(a)kew.globalnet.co.uk> Date: Mon, 27 Jan 1997 20:16:16 GMT Lines: 153 NNTP-Posting-Host: client856c.globalnet.co.uk X-Newsreader: Forte Free Agent 1.0.82 To all readers: I suggest that you do as I have done. If you have a web page, add a link (or many) dealing with Cybersitter, and email Mr. Milburn. Here's my example... Mr. Milburn: I have been reading the reports of you and your company's unethical, deceptive, bullying, and probably defamatory practices. It appears that your response to critics is to add their ISP to the list of sites blocked by your software. Accordingly, I have added to my home page links to various sites and files which will inform the reader of the true nature of your agenda. I am also suggesting to readers in all the newsgroups that relate to this issue that they do the same. My hope is that they will respond by doing so, and in turn force you to add so many ISP's to your list that you effectively restrict your users from the entire net. If successful, this will lead ultimately to the mass realisation that Cybersitter does not do what it is advertised to do, and that people wishing to "protect" their children from influences with which they disagree should choose other methods, and that you and your company will disappear as yet another burp in the turgid indigestion of the net. Please respond when you have added my ISP to your list of blocked sites. Feel free to email my postmaster as well. A sample of the information available to visitors to my site follows: ============================================= Date: Sun, 19 Jan 1997 14:36:55 -0800 From: Jonathan Wallace <jw(a)bway.net> Subject: 1--Solid Oak Blocking Software & Ethical Spectacle FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contact: Jonathan Wallace jw(a)bway.net NEW YORK CITY, January 19, 1997--In an apparent act of retaliation against a critic of the company, Solid Oak Sofware has added The Ethical Spectacle (http://www.spectacle.org) to the list of Web sites blocked by its Cybersitter software. The Ethical Spectacle is a monthly Webzine examining the intersection of ethics, law and politics in our society, which recently urged its readers not to buy Cybersitter because of Solid Oak's unethical behavior. The Ethical Spectacle is edited by Jonathan Wallace, a New York- based software executive and attorney who is the co-author, with Mark Mangan, of Sex, Laws and Cyberspace (Henry Holt, 1996), a book on Internet censorship. "In the book," Wallace said, "we took the position-- naively, I now think--that use of blocking software by parents was a less restrictive alternative to government censorship. We never expected that publishers of blocking software would block sites for their political content alone, as Solid Oak has done." Solid Oak describes its product as blocking sites which contain obscene and indecent material, hate speech, and advocacy of violence and illegal behavior. In late 1996, computer journalists Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) and Brock Meeks (brock(a)well.com) broke the story that Cybersitter blocked the National Organization for Women site (http://www.now.org) along with other political and feminist organizations. In addition, the product blocked entire domains such as well.com, maintained by the venerable Well online service. McCullagh and Meeks implied that they had received an inner look at the Cybersitter database of blocked sites from someone who had reverse engineered the software. Shortly afterwards, Solid Oak asked the FBI to begin a criminal investigation of the two journalists and accused college student Bennett Haselton (bennett(a)peacefire.org) of being their source. Though McCullagh, Meeks and Haselton all denied he was the source (or that anything illegal had occurred), Solid Oak president Brian Milburn called Haselton an "aspiring felon" and threatened to add his Internet service provider to the blocked list if it did not muzzle Haselton. Haselton came to Milburn's attention by founding Peacefire, a student organization opposing censorship. On his Web pages (http://www.peacefire.org) Haselton posted an essay called "Where Do We Not Want You to Go Today?" criticizing Solid Oak. The company promptly added Peacefire to its blocked list, claiming that Haselton had reverse engineered its software, an allegation for which the company has never produced any evidence. "At that point," Wallace said, "I felt Milburn was acting like the proverbial 800-pound gorilla. I added a link to the Spectacle top page called 'Don't Buy Cybersitter' (http://www.spectacle.org/alert/peace.html) Anyone clicking on the link would see a copy of Bennett's 'Where Do We Not Want You to Go' page with some added material, including my thoughts on the inappropriateness of Solid Oak's behavior. I wrote the company, informing them of my actions and telling them that they misrepresent their product when they claim it blocks only indecent material, hate speech and the like." Solid Oak has now responded by blocking The Ethical Spectacle. "I wrote to Milburn and to Solid Oak technical support demanding an explanation," Wallace said. "I pointed out that The Spectacle does not fit any of their published criteria for blocking a site. I received mail in return demanding that I cease writing to them and calling my mail 'harassment'--with a copy to the postmaster at my ISP." Wallace continued: "With other critics such as Declan, Brock and Bennett, Solid Oak has claimed reverse engineering of its software, in supposed violation of its shrink-wrapped license. I have never downloaded, purchased or used Cybersitter, nor had any access to its database. I believe that Solid Oak's sole reason for blocking my site is the 'Don't Buy Cybersitter' page, criticizing the company's bullying behavior." The Ethical Spectacle includes the internationally respected An Auschwitz Alphabet (http://www.spectacle.org/695/ausch.html) a compilation of resources pertaining to the Holocaust. "Sixty percent of the Spectacle's traffic consists of visitors to the Holocaust materials," Wallace said. "Schoolteachers have used it in their curricula, it was the subject of a lecture at a museum in Poland some weeks ago, and every month, I get letters from schoolchildren thanking me for placing it online. Now, due to Solid Oak's actions, Cybersitter's claimed 900,000 users will no longer have access to it." Solid Oak can be contacted at blocking.problems(a)solidoak.com, or care of its president, Brian Milburn (bmilburn(a)solidoak.com.) ----------------------------------------------- Jonathan Wallace The Ethical Spectacle http://www.spectacle.org Co-author, Sex, Laws and Cyberspace http://www.spectacle.org/freespch/ "We must be the change we wish to see in the world."--Gandhi

1 0

Re: A comment on the censorship policy
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 12:19 AM 1/30/97 -0800, Toto wrote: > It is extremely easy to understand. Just read your own words. > The key word here is 'accurate' criticisms. This makes them 'flames', >in Sandy's mind, because the purpose of the 'censorship experiment' >was to place total control of the list in the hands of a man who >rarely posts and doesn't seem to participate in the list discussions, >as well as for the purpose of suppressing any real dissent that may >arise from list members. Interesting interpretation. Mind you, I'm obliged to disagree. My understanding was that the moderator is supposed to ONLY filter out ads and utterly-content-free messages. (Mind you, I took the smart out and subbed to cp-unedited, so I'm in no place to judge.) If the idea was to place control in the hands of someone who rarely posts, why not give it to me? There are probably a few hundred of the real addresses on this list (not the mail-echoers) that have never posted. > Also, one of the reasons that the moderation process is so >haphazard, is that posts from some individuals are automatically >routed to the 'flames' list at some times, and viewed/censored >at other times, so that a few can be posted to the censored >list to give some half-hearted illusion of fairness in the >censorship process. (which remains a bad joke, nonetheless). Aha, a good point to be brought up: Sandy, are you autofiltering anyone based on user name, or on certain keywords? Seems to defeat the purpose of having a _human_ moderator. dave -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.5 iQEVAwUBMvFJl3EZTZHwCEpFAQHGiQf/QjEj9QJ+9viADYdfSQJumpXhb8BF+MHQ zbAYVGxLyt/WYA96cykFHYk2hCzkcfph/XDksSB6lmaStHFHfPCOAOHReu6xfHg2 3+3RyOI/eBJS8RS6z5dQBWTnKiu35sk5J2wMcnOWfMQXTWz8jYVAHnyBh9x39huP +Iwj4jOE0Qelu4/FZhgVgo3tktw5sBGjmaZgOvu/24DoT2YPsG9EQ74i6suX0B15 eE1uPaP+2zumwYpV2ywYNbfFyExY2K9XM6k7M/ZNwpplMyf+plYigVUkNRP6KJWK Gvp3bN6mAa2BF/bnoyCGTulC3By785Fk3s+EV2hUVknoZwH3SGF53w== =Sl5a -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: uae_1.html
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jim bell wrote: > I wonder what these people will think when organizations like Teledesic and > Iridium start operating (low-earth-orbit satellites) to allow > totally-wireless connectivity. It seems to me that there will be a market > for services that allow anonymous browsing, perhaps with encrypted requests > that return otherwise-unidentified data on a publicly-accessible airwaves. Think of the possibility of satellite-fed 'roving' InterNet sites. What will be the 'export' implications of sending crypto to a place such as site.nowhere, site.somewhere, and site.intheUS-hee-hee. Toto

1 0

Re: Fighting the cybercensor
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jim bell wrote: > > At 01:03 AM 1/28/97 -0600, Igor Chudov @ home wrote: > >jim bell wrote: > >> > >> At 10:21 PM 1/26/97 -0800, blanc wrote: > >> >From: jim bell (in response to Dimitri Vulis') > >> >Look, I've proposed what I consider to be a remarkably consistent method to > >> >prevent the kind of political tyranny that you criticize, and I don't see > >> >any recognition of this fact. > >> >........................................................ > >> > > >> >1) Jim, why do you insist on discussing this on an forum for encryption? > >> > >> Because it's on-topic, that's why. Because it's not merely a list > >> concerning METHODS of encryption, it's also about the _reasons_ for using > >> encryption, as well as the _effects_ (both small-scale and large-scale) of > >> using encryption. > > > >Actually AP is one of the more interesting topics here. I think that there > >is a clear need for an AP bot. > > > >Do you feel like writing it? > > Desire? Yes. Ability? Maybe. Time? No. > You can hire someone to write it. - Igor.

1 0

Re: Cats Out of Bags
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, On Thu, 30 Jan 1997, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: > fascinating reading sandy, but > > > > >The better metaphor for crypto is that the genie is out of the > >bottle. Alternatively, that the crypto bell cannot be unrung. > > these have the same conceptual limitations I was flaming. to > use the analogy: > > 1. it is unconstitutional to put a crypto genie in a bottle > in the first place. > 2. it is unconstitutional to make laws against ringing crypto bells. We do not disagree except neither of the metaphors I gave suggest anything about the "putting in the bag" part of the deal. In no way does either suggest a right, power or even ability of anyone to limit any freedom. They are mute on the subject. Their sole meaning is that one CAN'T undo what is already done. In the instant case, that means the wide-spread availability of strong crypto. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

2 1

Re: Complying with the EAR [was: More Circumventing the ITAR]
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:14 AM 1/29/97 -0700, Michael Paul Johnson wrote: >On Tue, 28 Jan 1997, Mark Rosen wrote: > >> I'm curious as to exactly what the ITAR/EAR/Whatever says specifically >> about "unrestricted FTP sites." My program, Kremlin, is available for > >You should check the exact text yourself, but the way I read the EAR, you >are not "exporting" strong cryptographic software without a license (exept >to Canada, which needs no license) if you do things "such as" >(1) have the guests to your site acknowledge that the EAR restricts >export, (2) have the guests affirm that they can legally get the software >(proper citizenship or residency & location), and (3) "check the address >of the destination computer to see if it is in the USA" or Canada. The >last one, I interpret rather loosely to mean that if the guest's email >address domain isn't one commonly used in the USA or Canada, then I deny >access. We all know that not all .com addresses are North American, but >chances are really good that if the address ends in .ru, then the >destination machine is probably not in North America. This is not a >perfect way to prevent export, of course, but it is what the regulations >say, as I read them. For a pointer to the regulations and to my access >request form and crypto site, see http://www.sni.net/~mpj/crypto.htm ... An easy crack to that would be to request access from a hotmail, or similair, account. This account would show up as being on US soil while the account holder would not necessarily be so. In this way, someone with an account ending in your .ru would get through because h[is/er] e-mail request originated from inside the U.S.

1 0

Re: Workaround for filtering/cybersitter
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:43 PM 1/29/97 -0500, Mark Rogaski wrote: >If I had experience with Netscape plugins and spare time, I'd >try it myself. But here's my proposed solution. > >A plugin in Netscape intercepts all requests, encrypt the URL >with a pubkey algorithm, encode the string base64, send it as GET input to >a proxy server. > >The proxy server decodes and decrypts the URL, gets the requested page, >and returns it. This beats out URL-based filtering. > >Still need to figure out the specifics of key-exchange. If we use >40-bit encryption, it's exportable, and it still works in our threat >model (ie. we don't care if the watchers figure out the URL a few hours >later). > >To beat out dropping packets with unacceptable pattern in them, we >could use an SSL-based server as the proxy. > >The plugin could even have a nice little on/off switch and a list >list of available proxies. ... The above paragraph would be a problem, unless you wanted to update the program with a great regualrity. Each time the offending government got the software and blocked all of those sites, the software would be worthless. This would be no big deal if you could guarantee some means of someone getting the software, which would certainly be illegal, again and again. Better to have the user key in the proxy that h[is/er] cousin/uncle/best friend/boss/client/guest told h[im/er] about. Here is a similar idea. Have your plug-in replace the part of Netscape that checks the URL with INTERNIC or similar. Have the system accept your address for the proxy and send the requested URL to it, the server then FTP's the contents of the page (and if server time is readily available, its sub-pages), places them in a temporary directory on itself and allows your computer to see it there thinking that it is on a totally different machine. This way the proxy owner would not have to stay on top of the latest restricted material. The main problem would be that the system would absorb twice as much time, once for the download to itself, and once to show it to you. This is not terribly different to Netscape's caching of recently visited pages in memory on the off-chance that you will return. If you changed passwords at the same time that you changed addresses, and reported them together, the government wouldn't be able to keep up. When the government did its sweep of objectionable words, it would come to this site that would have no such data. Only by having the access password, would they be able to reveal that site as a proxy. If they knew the password then they would already know that that was a proxy site because they would have been given both the password and the address at the same time. You then try to maintain several different addressess at a time, each with a different password. As the Government blocks one, change its password and its address. The software would be either two-piece, assuming a dedicated client plug-in, or one-piece. The pieces would be as follows. The proxy, this software would be as small as possible and would only be a front end. Ideally this software should fit on one 3.5" disk. The address to this machine would be the address handed out. In the one-part scenario, this would be implemented as a web-page with a CGI script for the address. The user types in the request and this bot fetches it, placing it in a special directory for the use of this script, this directory would probably be erased after the allotted space was filled, though not before, (you don't stay logged in to the remote machine when using Netscape so erasing on hang-up would mean continually reloading the data.) The proxy would then refresh your client with the requested information. In the two piece scenario, this proxy would interact with the plug-in in much the same way, forgoing the CGI script. The client, the plug-in, if present, would take over the Location field and have a set up menu to type in the proxy's URL and password. In that way the user would see h[im/er]self as accessing the web page directly. Certainly more user friendly, once the client were configured, though not quite as flexible. In this system the government could make both accessing the proxy and possession of the client illegal. It would also be a problem for persons who use a machine to which they have no control. If the setup were un changeable or reset after power-down, this system would require the user to continually re set up the client. The proxy could be as simple as an opening screen with a field for the password and the URL. The proxy should re-link all external links into its own system so that the system can be transparent after the initial page. In other words, the links should be replaced with a second HTML document with the password and search-criteria inside in much the same way that search-engines relay your request to itself, in the URL. This would be a simple script that changed all occurances of "A HREF="HTTP://This.is.the/real/site.html"" to "A HREF="internal/directory.html Query?=HTTP://This.is.the/real/site.html+password""

1 0