December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

cDc GD Update #21-1/97
by Swamp Ratte 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

_ _ ((___)) [ x x ] cDc communications \ / Global Domination Update #21 (' ') January 1st, 1997 (U) Est. 1984 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT: sratte(a)mindvox.com CDC IS NEW FALLEN SNOW ON A BLEAK DESERT LANDSCAPE cDc communications is tittering with joy on the birth of this shiny new year to make two announcements. We are the proud parents of ten bouncing new articles in the continuing saga of the CULT OF THE DEAD COW publication. These feisty little rugrats will put a smile on the face and a Brussels sprout in the stomach with their hearty blend of entertainment and information. We also can now make public our "Good Times" virus hoax. The Good Times meme was launched by cDc to prove the gullibility of self-proclaimed "experts" on the Internet. Any chickenhead would see through the Good Times virus message as the merest wisp of smoke that it is, while the so-called experts ran around in circles, beside themselves in self-induced panic. Therefore, CULT OF THE DEAD COW claims FULL responsibility for the waves of nausea and unrest that have spread from AOL to CompuServe to Prodigy by the actions of egotistical 'experts' who roam the Information Superhighway like squeegee men, seeking to wring a buck or two from the poor souls they confront at every intersection and stoplight on the infobahn. We have far worse to unleash upon you, should you insist upon pontificating and spreading obvious falsehoods. Heed well the motto of the Hell's Angels: "Those who know, don't tell. Those who tell, don't know." We'd also like to take this opportunity to quell a nasty rumor: cDc has NOT been bought-out over the past few months to ANYONE. cDc, as always is 100% independently owned and operated and has no outside sponsors. Viacom and Ziff-Davis, puh-leeze. Coming soon: cDc presents AUDIO on the Internet via Tarkin Darklighter's Shockwave site. New releases from Weasel-MX, Gravelheaver, Tha Gates, Superior Products, Grey Man, and Crucified Goat are on the way. Also, The cDc Media List version 3 from Omega... something fresh for the spring '97 fashion season. _ _ the tedium is the message _ _ ((___)) INFORMATION IS JUNK MAIL ((___)) [ x x ] _ [ x x ] \ / _ |_|_ _ _|_ _|_ |_ _ _| _ _. _| _ _ \ / (' ') (_|_|| |_ (_) | |_ | |(/_ (_|(/_(_|(_| (_(_)\_/\_/ (' ') (U) (U) .ooM cDc communications .ooM deal with it NEW RELEASES FOR JANUARY, 1997: deal with it ________________________________/text files\________________________________ 321:"Nineteen Seventy-Seven" by OXblood Ruffin. It was a good year... Star Wars, The Sex Pistols, the Apple II, and the Death of Elvis. And you thought they weren't connected? 322:"Pariah '67" by Matt Brown. It's like _The Wonder Years_ with real blood. Like Diet Coke with real sugar. Who would've thought Paul would grow up to drum for Marilyn Manson? Gosh. 323:"CYBERsitter" by Peacefire. Overprotective parents are being led down the primrose path to potential pathos. This is an important press release from the Peacefire organization concerning their efforts against the makers of the CYBERsitter Internet filtering software. 324:"Painted Stranger" by Weasel Boy. Creepy-as-hell goth fiction. People with monochromatic wardrobes and Victorian affectations, incest, tragic young death, The Beast. You know the drill. Hup hup! 325:"Zen of Skateboarding, Part 3: Flowing Stream" by Thoai Tran. Skate and destroy. Death to false skating. The search for beauty and truth continues. 326:"The Great Southern Fire God" by John Crow. Everything would be great if it weren't for those DAMN YANKEES (nevermind The Nuge, this is _serious bidness_). Will the assembly please rise and join with me in singing "Sweet Home Alabama." 327:"Vulnerabilities in the S/KEY One-Time Password System" by Mudge. All that and a bucket of chicken wings. 328:"Pantslessness" by Mark Buda. I don't know about you, but every time I go outside without pants, the squirrels poke at my BARE-NAKED POSTERIOR with twigs. They ain't got covered rumps neither. Freaks! 329:"Quadro-Pounder" by Drunkfux. He wants lots of meat. Huh-huh. 330:"Happyland Cell Block 90210" by G. Allen Perry. "Where am I?" "You're in a cheap run-down teenage jail, that's where." "Oh my God!" -The Runaways Reading is FUNdamental! _______________________________/ - x X x - \________________________________ Fools better recognize: CULT OF THE DEAD COW is a publication and trademark of cDc communications. Established in 1984, cDc is the largest and oldest organization of the telecommunications underground worldwide, and inventor of the "e-zine." Every issue is produced on an Apple II for genuine old-school flavor. You thirst for our body of work, you know you do. Find it at these fine locations, among others: World Wide Web: //www.l0pht.com/cdc.html FTP/Gopher: cascade.net in pub/cDc Usenet: alt.fan.cult-dead-cow BBS: 806/794-4362 Entry:KILL For further information, contact: Email: sratte(a)mindvox.com Postal: POB 53011, Lubbock, TX, 79453, USA Sincerely, Grandmaster Ratte' cDc/Editor, Fearless Leader, and Pontiff "We're into telecom for the groupies and money." #### By THE NIGHTSTALKER and GRatte'. Copyright (c) 1997 cDc communications.

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Re: Last nail for US crypto export policy?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:45 AM 1/29/97 -0500, Dan Geer wrote: >Steve is absolutely right on the money, particularly about the likely >happiness on the government side. I pretty much agree. On the other hand, Ian did a nice job on the radio (NPR, probably was All Things Considered) of pushing the "look, if a college student can break 40 bits in a couple of hours, it's really stupid for the government to limit us like this"; a couple of other people also contributed spin, and it came out pretty strongly against export restrictions. I think we do need to get some sort of push going for 3DES as a replacement for DES - it's strong enough, even though DES is showing its age, and it's an obvious transition from the current technology. It's slower and clunkier than IDEA or RC4/128, but still not bad. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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Re: Workaround for filtering/cybersitter
by Pavel Korensky 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mark Rogaski <wendigo(a)pobox.com> wrote: > If I had experience with Netscape plugins and spare time, I'd > try it myself. But here's my proposed solution. > > A plugin in Netscape intercepts all requests, encrypt the URL > with a pubkey algorithm, encode the string base64, send it as GET input to > a proxy server. > > The proxy server decodes and decrypts the URL, gets the requested page, > and returns it. This beats out URL-based filtering. > > Still need to figure out the specifics of key-exchange. If we use > 40-bit encryption, it's exportable, and it still works in our threat > model (ie. we don't care if the watchers figure out the URL a few hours > later). > > To beat out dropping packets with unacceptable pattern in them, we > could use an SSL-based server as the proxy. > > The plugin could even have a nice little on/off switch and a list > list of available proxies. Nice, but I can see one problem here. If I (as a censor) will want to block your communication to prohibited sites, I can block the access to the proxy computers. You will just move the blocking strategy one level up with your plug-in. The censor will block the web servers AND proxy servers. Because the list of proxy servers must be available somehow to users, it is very simple to write some kind of script running on the gateway which is blocking the acccess. The script will download the list of proxy servers, update the gateway tables and the gateway will be blocking acccess to all sites on the proxy list. Bye PavelK -- **************************************************************************** * Pavel Korensky (pavelk(a)dator3.anet.cz) * * DATOR3 Ltd., Modranska 1895/17, 143 00 Prague 4, Czech Republic * * PGP key fingerprint: 00 65 5A B3 70 20 F1 54 D3 B3 E4 3E F8 A3 5E 7C * ****************************************************************************

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encrypt_3.html
by Lynx_User＠linux.nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reuters New Media [ Yahoo | Write Us | Search | Info ] [ Index | News | World | Biz | Tech | Politic | Sport | Scoreboard | Entertain | Health ] _________________________________________________________________ Previous Story: Kodak To Buy Wang Software Business Next Story: Netscape Counts On User Upgrades In 1997 _________________________________________________________________ Wednesday January 29 3:26 PM EST U.S. Encryption Envoy Seeks Industry Cooperation SAN FRANCISCO - The Clinton administration's newly named point man on encryption policy is citing international support for U.S. policies limiting use of encryption and called for industry cooperation. Ambassador David Aaron, special envoy for cryptography, said on a speech to the RSA Data Security Conference in San Francisco that U.S. allies support the concept of lawful access by governments and the use of key recovery mechanisms. Key recovery would involve storing encoding keys in escrow so authorities could get access to them to unscramble data in an emergency, such as to uncover criminal activity. The White House's continued restrictions on encryption have been unpopular in the cryptography community and among major U.S. corporations and high tech companies, which argue the limitations put U.S. business at a disadvantage. Aaron said some U.S. trading partners have misgivings about the U.S. government's decision in October to relax U.S. export controls to allow export of moderately strong 56-bit encryption, but were willing to cooperate on the policy. "As far as I can see, the international encryption market will not be a free-wheeling affair," he said, adding companies should consider that lawful access and key escrow capabilities may become "a growing international requirement." In his speech, Aaron also listed cases where the U.S. government said encryption was used in terrorist plots, drug dealing, child pornography and espionage, adding the White House, "in no way seeks to expand law enforcement powers nor reduce the privacy of individuals." But some independent experts who monitor cryptography policy disagreed with Aaron's characterization of the international posture following his address here, and leading U.S. legislators said they would continue to push the White House to further liberalize the restrictions. "I just don't think it will work," Sen. Conrad Burns, a Montana Republican who has been behind the legislative effort to promote use of stronger levels of encryption, said of the White House encryption policy. "I think if bad people want to do bad things to good people, they certainly won't want to file their key (with any law enforcement authorities)," he told conference attendees over a satellite linkup. Burns appeared in the linkup with three legislative colleagues to stress that together they would push to put "get the administration out in front of the cryptography curve." Marc Rotenberg, director of the Washington, D.C.-based Electronic Privacy Information Center, rebutted Aaron's suggestion that Washington has broad international support for its concept of lawful access by governments to the keys to encrypted files and communications. Rotenberg said at the recent Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) meetings on encryption policy, that was not the case, nor were a number of countries pushing for stronger controls, as Aaron said they had been. In fact, countries such as Japan, Germany, Australia and Canada all have competing cryptography capabilities they are promoting, he added. The OECD guidelines are due to be published next month. Copyright, Reuters Ltd. All rights reserved _________________________________________________________________ Earlier Related Stories * Encryption Export Bill Backed In Senate - Wed Jan 29 9:54 am _________________________________________________________________ ________________________ ___________ Help _________________________________________________________________ Previous Story: Kodak To Buy Wang Software Business Next Story: Netscape Counts On User Upgrades In 1997 _________________________________________________________________ [ Index | News | World | Biz | Tech | Politic | Sport | Scoreboard | Entertain | Health ] _________________________________________________________________ Reuters Limited Questions or Comments

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KOW_tow
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1-28-97: "New Crypto Engines From Trusted Information Systems Allow Easy International Use of Strong Encryption " By supporting any application that calls for the use of algorithms such as DES, Triple-DES, or 128-bit RC2 or RC4, "this product will allow Windows users to use encryption as easily as they use a mouse. Previously, if developers wanted to use encryption in their products, they had to consider writing two different versions, dealing with changing export regulations, and so on. Now, they can write one version of the program and sell it worldwide, knowing that the CSP will handle the encryption legally and safely." "Two Companies Set to Offer Key Recovery Services Using Technology from TIS " SourceKey and Data Securities International (DSI) have applied for approval to operate Key Recovery Centers to support exported encryption products. TIS also announced today that it is in negotiations with the National Computing Centre, Ltd. of the U.K. and Philips Crypto BV of the Netherlands to license the first non-U.S.-based Key Recovery Centers for third party use. "Burns Prepares To Reintroduce Encryption Bill" "This time around," Burns said, "we intend to put a bill on the President's desk and find out if he is truly on the side of the users and providers of rapidly expanding high-tech goods and services." It would prohibit a mandatory system under which producers or users of hardware and software would be required to surrender a decoding "key" to a third party. ----- KOW_tow

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Re: OTP security
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> 1.You've got 16 hardware devices that each generate random noise. > 2.One of the devices fails (or is sabotaged) and emits a predictable stream > (10101...) > 3.The other 15 devices are just fine, and the stream generated by one > device does not effect the stream of another. > 4.You do not know of the (failure/sabotage) until *after* you've generated > your encyrted documents and they are out of your hands. > > So the revamped question is: > How secure are those documents now? Bottom line: You have lost some possible decryptions of the cyphertext. Every 16th bit is now determined therefore each 2nd byte has only 128 possible states. This, rather suprisingly, does not seem to affect the security (though I would say this is a flawed conclusion as we have a pile of sand problem here, how many grains make a pile, how many rngs can be flawed before the security is affected?) I really haven`t had the time to look at it properly, I will do so in the near future as it seems to be an interesting problem... Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Re: Sovreign Right of Lawful Access
by tmcghan＠gill-simpson.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

according to the notorious jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> > {snip} They're getting desperate. "Sovereign Right of Lawful Access" > doesn't state HOW DIFFICULT that "access" is to be. {snip} Just might get a bit more 'difficult', if these demagogues get their grandstand play off.... >Encryption Export Bill Backed In Senate >WASHINGTON - A bipartisan group of U.S. senators has endorsed a bill >to promote U.S. exports of encryption technology by removing government >barriers on foreign sales. >"Foreign companies are fully utilizing this technology, while >Americans companies have their hands tied with draconian U.S. laws on >encryption," Sen. John Ashcroft, R-Missouri, said. >He joined Sens Conrad Burns, R-Montana and Patrick Leahy, D-Vermont >in endorsing the Promotion of Commerce Online in the Digital Era >.................^^........^..^........^.............^.......^.. >(PRO-CODE) bill. Don't you just love their cute little acronym? Must have laid awake nights thinking that one up! Thomas M. McGhan tmcghan(a)gill-simpson.com http://www.gill-simpson.com voice: (410) 467-3335 fax: (410) 235-6961 pagenet: (410) 716-1342 cellular: (410) 241-9113 ICBM: 39.395N 76.469W

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The Politics of Export Restrictions - Clarified
by Rick Hornbeck 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I agree the strategy would have to be hijack-proof. Something like Gore experiencing a convenient "change of heart" towards the end of this current term and convincing Clinton and the administration to soften crypto export restrictions which would make Gore look like a hero to the high-tech community just in time for the election. Naturally this would have to be carefully scripted but the objective would be to keep the democrats in power. Just a theory. >Return-Path: <owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com> >Date: Wed, 29 Jan 1997 23:43:43 -0800 >From: Greg Broiles <gbroiles(a)netbox.com> >To: Rick Hornbeck <rnh2(a)ix.netcom.com> >Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: Re: The Politics of Export Restrictions >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > >At 09:44 PM 1/29/97 -0800, Rick Hornbeck wrote: > >>Is it possible the unreasonable crypto export restrictions are simply being >>imposed at this time for the purpose of making Al Gore look good when he >>runs for President in 2000? > >I suppose it's plausible, but it's an opportunity open to both candidates, >and more plausibly (because of lack of collaboration) to the Republicans - >e.g., Dan Quayle and the "Crypto Freedom For Americans" platform, promising >to rescue Silicon Valley from those evil regulatory Democrats. > >If I were an evil politician trying to set up a trick like you suggest, I >think I'd want a scheme that my opponent(s) couldn't hijack and use against >me. > >-- >Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: >gbroiles(a)netbox.com | >http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. > | > > >

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The BrydDes descracker. Beta-version available.
by svolaf＠inet.uni-c.dk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

BrydDes is a DOS program, which issues a known plaintext attack for DES encryption. The method is brute force. ECB mode and CBC mode with known IV are supported. On a Pentium 120, this version of the program can test 369,000 keys in a second. Please note that this is a beta-release. A new version will be shipped February 11th, or earlier if errors are discovered. So far source is not included. Automatic restart from the last key tested is not supported yet, but a shell could be written. The code is tested on a Pentium, but should run on a 486. The program is available at http://inet.uni-c.dk/~svolaf/des.htm Svend Olaf PS. "Bryd" is crack or break in Danish.

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Re: Rejection policy of the Cypherpunks mailing list
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > The list has been disentigrating for some time since the disgusting > > incident when Dimitri was forcibly unsubscribed from the list. > > I'm curious about the gratuitous use of the word "forcibly" by > Paul. Does this mean Gilmore took a fire axe to the computer or > something? Dimitri was unsubscribed. It was done more or less > against his will. ("More or less" because he in effect said to > John, "bet you can't stop me.") What does "forcibly" add to this > discussion besides melodrama? No force was required. John had > the right and ability to pull the plug on Dimitri. "No animals > were harmed in the making of this film." "Force," my ass. If you can honestly say you think that Dimitri agreed to his being unsubscribed and not being allowed to re-subscribe then I concede the point, however, you cannot argue this. > > have also been a number of postings from members of the list claiming > > to understand anarchism who support censorship to "protect new > > members of the list". > > There are various definitions of "censorship" and various flavors > of anarchism. I'm a market anarchist, Paul is not. Paul claims > to believe that any form of moderation is censorship. I think > that enforcing standards of decorum on a private, voluntary list > are not censorship. Reasonable minds may differ. I acknowledge > that Paul's interpretations are not without some justification. > (I just think they are incorrect in the instant case.) Paul, on > the other hand, seems to be a True Believer. He brooks no view > other than his own. (Curiously hypocritical under the > circumstrances.) My point is not that moderating a private forum is censorship, this is not supposed to be a private forum (if at any point John chooses to make it so that is his right as the list is his property, however, he professes, at least in a collective sense along with the other list founders, that it is a free and anarchic list where people would not be prevented from posting whatever they want, censorship in this context (call it moderation of you like) seems to me out of place)). > > So, there would be no intellectual dishonesty in a country claiming > > to be a free and open society "trying out" fascism for a month or > > two? - After all it`s a private country just as this is a private > > list.... > > Paul's sophistry is showing. Nation-states are entities that > exercise a monopoly on the use of force (real force, Paul) > within (and often without) their boundries. Mail lists are far > more like private homes, businesses or clubs. When you are a > guest there, you are subject to their rules of behavior. The list is indeed a private forum and I resent the term sophistry. My interpretation of the lists original purpose and idealogy is clearly different from your own so we are arguing the wrong point. My interpretation is that the list was supposed to act as a community as much as a forum and is therefore erring to the side of a nation state as opposed to private property, even though, when we come down to it it is someones property.. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Re: Fighting the cybercensor
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ichudov(a)algebra.com writes: > Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: > > ichudov(a)algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes: > > > > > > Why, death of Jim Bell from his own murder machine is a very exciting, I > > > would say a very Kafkian thing to happen. I am looking forward to it. I > > > even think that Jim Bell would not oppose such an outcome that much, > > > since his assination bot would be such an important invention for the > > > humanity. Maybe it will reverse the course of world history! > > > > Igor, you keep misspelling "assassination" as in "talk.politics.assassinati > > an unmoderated Usenet newsgroup carried by all honorable Usenet providers. > > No, I knew what was the correct spelling, but I like the shorter one > more. It sounds funny to me. > > - Igor. > It looks like Igor has made it to Sandy's list of "flamers" whose every submission is procmailed to "cypherpunks-flames". The above quote is crypto-relevant (as is assassination politics) and contains no flames. it was tossed into "cypherpunks-flames" by a robot. The time stamps clearly show that Sandy didn't even look at it. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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RE: Fighting the cybercensor
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:16 PM 1/28/97 -0800, Sean Roach wrote: >At 10:47 PM 1/27/97 -0800, jim bell wrote: >>In the current political system, in the US for instance, 51% of the >>population is able to screw the remaining 49%, just as long as they can >>maintain the majority. Or, perhaps even more accurately and ominously, a >>tiny fraction of the population (the current leadership class) is able to >>screw the 49%, as long as they have the un-thinking backing of the remaining >>and relatively uninvolved 51%. >> >>AP disables this system. AP turns government into the moral equivalent of a >>pick-up football game: Nobody is being forced to play, and everybody and >>anybody can simply "get up and leave" whenever he wants to. The moment the >>"rules of the game" to make an individual's continued participation >>unsatisfying, he can leave. >> >... >In our society, which, if I remember correctly, 10% of the population >control 90% of the wealth, AP would only lead to 10% of the population being >able to screw the remaining 90%. At least as it is, it takes a simple majority. No, that doesn't work. AP does involve money, that's true, but what "the poor" lack in individual assets they make up for in numbers. And AP implements a sort of "mutual disarmament," by not only preventing that 10% from screwing the 90%, but also prevents the 90% from screwing the 10%. >As for the murder of the rich, here is a scenerio. > >A collection of poor pool their capitol to have a tyrant killed. >The tyrant assembles a counter-wager saying that anyone able to prove thier >ability to kill him without harming him, and who can show they got through >will get 110% of the poor's bid. Question: Where does he get the money for the reward? If he gets it through taxation, he'll anger the people who were taxed and they'll pay to see him die. If he got in through taxation in the past, enough people will STILL be angry enough with him to see him dead. His employees (the ones who probably have the most opportunity to kill him) would be made just about as wealthy by killing him as taking him up on his odd offer. Worse, for him, is that he'd lose money paying off those people if they showed they could have "succeeded." Even if they were not motivated to actually kill him, they'd be motived to SHOW they could kill him, and notice that they'll become just about as rich for KILLING him as merely showing they can! Notice that your idea also assumes that an employee has to become willing to, in effect, plot against his employer in such a way that he can be assured that his actions won't be incorrectly interpretated as a genuine assassination attempt. How can you (or anyone else?) tell the difference until the plan either succeeds or fails?) Moreover, how can the employee trust that his boss will actually honor his promise? I think you're also (falsely) assuming that a deliberately-unsuccessful assassination demonstration immunizes the tyrant from a repeat performance. True, it's often useful to know what kinds of attacks are possible, but that doesn't mean that the system can be fixed to prevent future repetitions... The tyrant, then, either loses his life or a lot of money, and he still can't trust anybody. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Fighting the cybercensor
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Sean Roach wrote: >> At 08:15 PM 1/28/97 -0800, Steve Schear wrote: >> >I think a hole in your thinking is to assume that the assasins have no >> >motive other than financial gain. I would submit that there are those that >> >have the skills, training and a political agenda coherent with the >> >wagerers, lacking only the financial incentive to make the risks >> >acceptable. These wetworkers won't consider accepting the bribe of the >> >rich/powerful > >> This may be true, but the example was to show how easy a defensive line >> could be thrown up around the powerful. For example, conventional body >> guards could be included, ones with no real pay but with the fore knowledge >> that they will be buried with the tyrant. These body guards could be ten >> children out of each local village. Merely a human shield. > >[snippo] > >In Prizzi's Honor, Nicholson sez "If you try to hide in a submarine on >the bottom of the ocean, we will find you". But it's not even that >difficult. Lob a missile into the place and blow it up. Earth >penetrators are getting better too, for the Sadaam types. And >there's a zillion more. Does this "rich person" really want to >spend his/her life living in a sealed tomb? Yep. Chemical Biological Weapons (CBW), the choice of many future terrorists and assassins, can now be produced by anyone with a solid background in organic chemistry or microbiology and a relatively modest amount of funding (< USD 10,000). Delivery can be by any number of means, including: static (e.g., planted at a location in wait for the target and remotely triggered, for example by a pager. Cost less than USD 500) or dynamic (e.g., a small remotely piloted or autonomous aircraft, for example, a modified giant-scale RC plane. Cost less than USD 3000 if remotely controlled, USD 5000-10,000 if autonomous using DGPS guidance). EE experience is assumed. If the assassin is unconcerned with collateral damage his success depends only on knowing where his target will be and when. Since CBW agents can have a considerable kill zone there is no need for 'crosshair' accuracy. --Steve

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Just ask you a question
by biz25＠prodigy.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I just want to ask you a question. This is not "unsolicated" email. Do you want me to post you the URL & information if you are MLM & Business Opportinuties Seeker? Please put "SUBSCRIBE" in the subject line. I will put your name on my list. You may give me your new URL. I will send your URL to the people who are on the "Subscribe" email list. If you don't want me to post you the URL & information, please type "UNSUBSCRIBE" in the subject line. I will remove your name on my list. Thanks, Sonia

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Authenticated mail command processor
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I am wondering if anyone has written a package for remote command processing that has authentication and access control built in. I am looking for the following: 1) PGP Authentication of each incoming message 2) Access control where ability of users to execute commands is finely limited 3) Protection against replay and MITM attacks, encryption 4) Sending back of the results of execution 5) Some form of logging I need it for my cryptorobomoderator bot, to allow moderators to go to vacations and perform other admin tasks w/o logging in. Thank you. - Igor.

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Re: Fighting the cybercensor
by Steve Schear 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Sean Roach wrote: >> At 08:15 PM 1/28/97 -0800, Steve Schear wrote: >> >I think a hole in your thinking is to assume that the assasins have no >> >motive other than financial gain. I would submit that there are those that >> >have the skills, training and a political agenda coherent with the >> >wagerers, lacking only the financial incentive to make the risks >> >acceptable. These wetworkers won't consider accepting the bribe of the >> >rich/powerful > >> This may be true, but the example was to show how easy a defensive line >> could be thrown up around the powerful. For example, conventional body >> guards could be included, ones with no real pay but with the fore knowledge >> that they will be buried with the tyrant. These body guards could be ten >> children out of each local village. Merely a human shield. > >[snippo] > >In Prizzi's Honor, Nicholson sez "If you try to hide in a submarine on >the bottom of the ocean, we will find you". But it's not even that >difficult. Lob a missile into the place and blow it up. Earth >penetrators are getting better too, for the Sadaam types. And >there's a zillion more. Does this "rich person" really want to >spend his/her life living in a sealed tomb? Yep. Chemical Biological Weapons (CBW), the choice of many future terrorists and assassins, can now be produced by anyone with a solid background in organic chemistry or microbiology and a relatively modest amount of funding (< USD 10,000). Delivery can be by any number of means, including: static (e.g., planted at a location in wait for the target and remotely triggered, for example by a pager. Cost less than USD 500) or dynamic (e.g., a small remotely piloted or autonomous aircraft, for example, a modified giant-scale RC plane. Cost less than USD 3000 if remotely controlled, USD 5000-10,000 if autonomous using DGPS guidance). EE experience is assumed. If the assassin is unconcerned with collateral damage his success depends only on knowing where his target will be and when. Since CBW agents can have a considerable kill zone there is no need for 'crosshair' accuracy. --Steve

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RE: Cellular phone triangulation
by Internaut 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Snow wrote: I'd rather become an "arms dealer". You may already be one if the government keeps this ITAR shit up. --Internaut

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Re: Rejection policy of the Cypherpunks mailing list
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:05 PM 1/28/97 -0800, Dale Thorn wrote: >I dare say that the downside of this is much less pleasant than the >virtual anarchy (in the bad sense) we suffer now. If the police get >out of control, A.P. will arrive just in time to plug a few of those >holes, so to speak. Ideally, future robotics should be able to >provide something like Gort (sp?) to take the place of human officers, >given advances in the kind of pattern matching needed to deter >aggression and the like. Those who don't make it past the robots, >well, the rest of us can learn to behave, and we'll be much better >off when we do. Your comparison with the fictional Gort, in the movie "The day the earth stood still" is of course apt. It was only after I'd written most of the essay that I realized that an AP-type system would function much as Gort did. Occasionally we (CP) see a spoof where somebody claims to have developed a software program to "replace the judicial system" or something like that. Well, the problem with such a claim (aside from the obvious and enormous AI-type difficulties) is that the current system contains numerous biases. Writing a program to replace the legal system would presumably require that these biases be measured (and admitted-to!) and implemented into a well-defined system. What we'd discover is that the current system only barely resembles the guarantees in the US Constitution. At that point, there would be an argument between those who will insist that the Constitution be followed, and those who believe that the current de-facto system, however biased, be maintained as-is. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Libel & the 1st Amendment
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:22 AM 1/29/97 -0800, Greg Broiles wrote: >At 10:42 PM 1/28/97 -0600, Jim Choate wrote: > >>It has been asserted by at least one member that the 1st Amendment protects >>libelous or other defamatory speech. > >Defamation is not protected by the First Amendment; but the First Amendment >limits the application of defamation law in many circumstances. For >example, the First Amendment requires plaintiffs to prove "actual malice" >if they are a public official, public figure, or a private person seeking >punitive damages. What you ought to explain to us laymen is that the terminology "actual malice" dates from the case New York Times vs. Sullivan, and it used a definition of "malice" that was not in any dictionary at the time. My recollection: Sullivan was a local hero in a particular area in the south in the last 50's (?), gave a speech to a crowd of (?) people who were probably in sympathy with segregation. They proceeded to march. Later, the New York Times claimed (as I vaguely recall it, although it's been years since I read a description) that he had instigated a riot. Sullivan sued, claiming his reputation had been damaged. Arguably, it had, although it's probably equally arguable that Sullivan had done something that would have been looked upon somewhat unsympathetically by non-Southerners. The local (southern, of course) jury found NYT guilty of libel, and awarded Sullivan some huge judgment. (Had the jury been made up of northern people, presumably Sullivan would have lost.) The problem here is that two long-honored principles collided: One, the "free speech" issue, generally tries to guarantee organizations like NY Times the right to print the news and the leeway to do so. The second principle that people should be able to sue for libel in a local court, and be awarded whatever amount of money the jury declares. The problem with this was obvious, after the verdict: It, in effect, allowed essentially any burg in the country, no matter how backwards, potentially to bankrupt any targeted organ of the national news media. Something had to give. Unfortunately, the SC screwed up, as usual. The proper thing for them to do would have been to abandon libel law entirely, recognizing that it did more harm than good. But they blew it: They invented the "actual malice" standard out of whole cloth, raising the standard for libel suits by "public figures," which is really a rather arbitrary standard. Don't go to any ordinary English dictionary for this "malice" definition; it didn't exist before the Sullivan decision, not even in lawbooks. It was really just a rabbit pulled from a hat to try to avoid the collision I mentioned above. Side note: I think that the SC should be unable to re-define ordinary English words. But they try anyway. Basically, it became harder to sue well-known persons. However, what really happened is that they SC had merely put off the problem for another day, because the DEFINITION of a "public figure" was at least as malleable as Jell-O. And oddly, it was eventually revealed that you could be a "public figure" with respect to one subject, but NOT a "public figure" on another. Etc. Ironically, now that Richard Jewell (incorrectly identified as Atlanta bombing suspect) has sued some newspapers (and his former employer) for libel, it seems likely that at least some of those defendants will try to argue that merely being named by the government as a criminal suspect makes him "a public figure." BTW, I think that pressing the Richard Jewell incident would be an excellent way to derail any sort of claim that the government can obey the law. Apparently, they got a number of search warrants based on, essentially, nothing, and to rub this in the government's nose would show that the so-called "probable-cause" standard for warrants is not followed in practice. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Last nail for US crypto export policy?
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:41 AM 1/30/97 -0800, Bill Stewart wrote: >I think we do need to get some sort of push going for 3DES as a >replacement for DES - it's strong enough, even though DES is showing >its age, and it's an obvious transition from the current technology. >It's slower and clunkier than IDEA or RC4/128, but still not bad. The migration to 3DES is underway, at least in the banking sector. ANSI X.9, the group that deals with many of the protocols used in the banking industry, has made tremendous progress. 3DES, elliptic curve, and a host of other improvements all are out of committee and should be available as official (for bankers :-) specs soon, if they aren't already. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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RE: Cellular phone triangulation
by Internaut 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Snow wrote: I'd rather become an "arms dealer". You may already be one if the government keeps this ITAR shit up. --Internaut

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Authenticated mail command processor
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I am wondering if anyone has written a package for remote command processing that has authentication and access control built in. I am looking for the following: 1) PGP Authentication of each incoming message 2) Access control where ability of users to execute commands is finely limited 3) Protection against replay and MITM attacks, encryption 4) Sending back of the results of execution 5) Some form of logging I need it for my cryptorobomoderator bot, to allow moderators to go to vacations and perform other admin tasks w/o logging in. Thank you. - Igor.

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Re: Cats Out of Bags
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Remember, Aaron is employee of the government. He talks in doublespeak, Aaron is employee of the government. Therefore he must lie. -- Sameer Parekh Voice: 510-986-8770 President FAX: 510-986-8777 C2Net http://www.c2.net/ sameer(a)c2.net

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Re: Last nail for US crypto export policy?
by Jeremiah A Blatz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- "Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law" <froomkin(a)law.miami.edu> writes: <snip> > The above may have been dictated via Dragon Dictate 2.51 voice > recognition. Please be alert for unintentional word substitutions. Stego? Maybe 3 bits per substituted word? Good bye, uhnsufride, hello, "speech recognition." Jer "standing on top of the world/ never knew how you never could/ never knew why you never could live/ innocent life that everyone did" -Wormhole -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBMvDlzMkz/YzIV3P5AQExTAL/d5/Bd7hrwi6zWAsHTm+W8j072sQVtVjx kkFbxf5oBYObYScT8h57PZlZcobumV3I8sjAguPVBeBC9uMIiKDd8H0xh5w0Ncr5 EcIsRwmpn/6rXutrUO1IUVTnepCJq6gn =iACw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Last nail for US crypto export policy?
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:41 AM 1/30/97 -0800, Bill Stewart wrote: >I think we do need to get some sort of push going for 3DES as a >replacement for DES - it's strong enough, even though DES is showing >its age, and it's an obvious transition from the current technology. >It's slower and clunkier than IDEA or RC4/128, but still not bad. The migration to 3DES is underway, at least in the banking sector. ANSI X.9, the group that deals with many of the protocols used in the banking industry, has made tremendous progress. 3DES, elliptic curve, and a host of other improvements all are out of committee and should be available as official (for bankers :-) specs soon, if they aren't already. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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