December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Wimsey cryptography archive is moving to Mindlink
by Mark C. Henderson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Subject: Wimsey cryptography archive is moving to Mindlink The Wimsey cryptography archive at ftp://ftp.wimsey.com/pub/crypto is moving to MIND LINK (http://www.mindlink.net) You can now access the contents of the cryptography archive at its new location ftp://ftp.mindlink.net/pub/crypto The archive has been at Wimsey for about five years. I'd like to thank the folks at Wimsey for providing disk space, bandwidth, technical expertise, and for supporting the distribution of ~140MB of cryptography papers and software on the Internet. As with Wimsey, MIND LINK is providing disk space and bandwidth for the archive at no charge to me or the users of the archive. Thanks should go to MIND LINK for providing this as a service to the Internet community. Two small notes: 1. I assume sole responsibility for the contents of the archive. The folks at MIND LINK are generously providing facilties at no charge above their usual access fees, but they are not necessarily even aware of the exact contents of the archive. My only connection with MIND LINK is as a customer. 2. Please do not attempt to use the MIND LINK crypto archive to violate the laws of the U.S. or Canada. Distribution of cryptographic software is limited to U.S./Canadian persons in the U.S./Canada. All access to the site is logged. Any problems or questions? Please feel free to contact me at mark_henderson(a)mindlink.net -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBMvptauI11LPFgBXjAQGw7AQAgYTIUjU/6O40gTgFvhtDrBMc+TEaWW2x 2sHdk0QYRPJ2uGwoQA7psbHh2r6eu/6NqKCmKALTnZ1caWDcZLKsiLyDHQKwSGQV EK/+xnXqnb87MJfCGL5deDLCUOIo2UupFttCxd6EAdD8Dt670WT+Oe3Q9acrnmIM Lr+wyuw8WS8= =NilL -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Mark Henderson -- markh(a)wimsey.bc.ca, mark_henderson(a)mindlink.net PGP Key Fingerprint: 21 F6 AF 2B 6A 8A 0B E1 A1 2A 2A 06 4A D5 92 46 http://www.squirrel.com/squirrel/ - change-sun-hostid, unstrip for Solaris, computer security, TECO, FGMP, Sun NVRAM/hostid FAQ, MIND LINK crypto archive

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Re: FinCEN hates cybercash, who 'da thunk it...
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:47 pm -0500 2/6/97, Duncan Frissell wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >>But Stanley Morris of the United States Treasury, who chaired a FAFT >>working group which drafted the report, told a news conference that >>law enforcement agencies would face 'very major new challenges' if new >>technology moves the world "to a cashless society, beyond banks, cash >>and borders." > >Oh No! First they told us that they were all in favor of a cashless society >because they could track all the transactions. It was their Orwellian >Dream. Now Nirvana has almost arrived and they're afraid of it. Can't >they make up their minds? > >I noticed the problem long about 1975 when I noticed that the spread of >ATM cards was actually the spread of a bearer instrument and would >not satisfy the control needs of the regulatory types. In a geodesic network, any node which tries to process all the traffic chokes. The network then routes, to paraphrase Gilmore, around it. :-). I remember this pravda chart at CFP a year ago, where FinCEN was "demonstrating" (in a chart with no Y-axis) their "increased supervisory load" due to the exponentiating use of point to point electronic transaction settlement. Be careful whatcha wish for fellas. An old Texas A&M Aggie joke about a poor monkey trying to put the cork back into a pig's butt comes to mind... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/ FC97: Anguilla, anyone? http://www.ai/fc97/

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Re: WANTED: Tolerant, anonymity-friendly news admins
by ISP_Ratings 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

lcs Remailer Administrator wrote: > > Because of recent attacks on the remailer network and mail2news > gateways, I may loose access to at least one of the news servers I > currently feed news to from my mail2news gateway. > > If you are a news administrator, believe in free speech and anonymity, > and you would like to help the cause, please consider giving transfer > (aka "IHAVE" or "hosts.nntp") privileges to this machine. You will > not be the only server, and so do not need to worry about being the > point of entrance of mail2news articles to Usenet. > > Please contact me if you can help. Thank you. > > For those who oppose the existence of mail2news gateways, you should > know that we are taking steps to limit the abuse. However, doing so > without in any way limiting articles that abide by the usage policy is > tricky, and must be done carefully. Please be patient. I'm writing from the Freedom Knights list but am in no way representing them. What exactly do you mean by 'taking steps to limit the abuse'? Personally I think much of what is called abuse is nonsense and that all posts, with the exception of cancels/NoCems should be propogated regardless of content (including what is currently referred to as spam). Also--could you forward to the Freedom Knights list a copy of your 'usage policy' and impressions on the Freedom Knights two FAQs. Thanks, Steve

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Re: mail-to-news fun
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:01 PM 2/6/97 -0500, Scott V. McGuire wrote: >On Wed, 5 Feb 1997 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com wrote: >> People don't read mail headers or disclaimers at the bottom, >> and putting disclaimers like that into message text for >> email exposes the message to traffic analysis.) >How does putting it in the message expose it to traffic analysis but not >putting it in a header? Suppose you're sending a message on a remailer chain of you -> Alice->Bob->Charlie->Dave->Eve->Fred--> target and Bob puts lots of disclaimers in his remailer's outgoing messages. Anything Bob puts in a header will get stripped out by Charlie, so it's no problem. However, if Bob tacks a disclaimer as the bottom text in the outgoing message, when Eve sends mail to Fred she'll also see the disclaimer that The message was sent by an anonymous user through the remailer at Bob's Remailer Shack. Bob doesn't know who sent it, and doesn't keep records, so he can't squash the user, but he can block mail to you if you don't want any more anonymous email. Don't believe everything you read! so she'll know to check the FBI Illegal Wiretap files for Bob. Some comments and backtracking 0) Of course, if you want to avoid traffic analysis, sending unencrypted email is pretty stupid, and only the next hop is going to see a disclaimer that you append after the encrypted part of the message. 1) Prepending the disclaimer to the message body is pretty unfriendly to the :: syntax, and not all that great for PGP encrypted messages either. Pretend I really just suggested appending it at the end, since that's what I would have said if I'd been thinking :-) On the other hand, I suppose that you can see whether the next hop is a Type I remailer by looking for the :: or ##. 2) Cutmarks would be a nice fix, but they require too much attention to detail to get right, in case the next hop is a remailer. So maybe you _should_ always put in the disclaimer, at the end, with a reminder to always encrypt your remailer-chain mail if you want to avoid traffic analysis :-) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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[ANNOUNCEMENT] Secure checksums
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy C[reep] May sits at his terminal dressed in five-inch stiletto heels, fishnet stockings, a gold-lame mini-skirt, a purple halter with girdle underneath to keep in his flabby gut, a Fredericks of Hollywood padded bra also underneath the halter, a cheap Naomi Sims pink afro wig, waiting to yank his crank whenever a black man responds to one of his inane rants. __ ___|[]| Timothy C[reep] May \__|______| /-(o_o_o_o)

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Transparent Cryptographic File System (fwd)
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Haven't seen this on cpunks. ----- Forwarded message from Kenneth Stailey ----- >From xtech-request(a)zephyr.ccrc.wustl.edu Thu Feb 6 18:26:49 1997 Date: Thu, 6 Feb 1997 16:47:28 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199702062147.QAA29127(a)duality.gnu.ai.mit.edu> From: Kenneth Stailey <kstailey(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu> To: tech(a)openbsd.org Subject: Transparent Cryptographic File System Sender: owner-tech(a)openbsd.org Precedence: bulk Hi, I thought that there might be some interest in looking at this: From: ermmau(a)ios.diaedu.unisa.it (Ermelindo Mauriello) Subject: New release of TCFS (Transparent Cryptographic File System) Newsgroups: comp.os.linux.announce Date: Thu, 16 Jan 1997 07:14:53 GMT Followup-To: comp.os.linux.development.system Organization: Universita' di SALERNO - Dip. Informatica ed Appl. Path: ai-lab!bloom-beacon.mit.edu!howland.erols.net!newsfeed.internetmci.com!zeke.ebtech.net!loki.tor.hookup.net!omega.metrics.com!liw.clinet.fi!not-for-mail Lines: 51 Approved: linux-announce(a)news.ornl.gov (Lars Wirzenius) Message-ID: <pgpmoose.199701160914.15063(a)liw.clinet.fi> NNTP-Posting-Host: localhost X-Server-Date: 16 Jan 1997 07:15:02 GMT X-Original-Date: 15 Jan 1997 14:51:36 GMT X-Auth: PGPMoose V1.1 PGP comp.os.linux.announce iQBVAwUBMt3VcjiesvPHtqnBAQECXwH+PKb4gmvn2sSqa3caegRau0cHJ9Lx9hII YG0YmSbwPf+oFV4ie4omldPpTO3VjGXSkY11zIof6b3HzY3dNzajyQ== =aNko -- Start of PGP signed section. We are glad to announce that a new release of TCFS (Transparent Cryptographic File System) for Linux is now available. TCFS is a cryptographic filesystem developed at the Universita' di Salerno (Italy). It operates like NFS but allows users to use a new flag X to make the files secure (encrypted). In theis release files are encrypted using DES. The new release works in Linux kernel space, and may be linked as a module to Linux 2.0.x kernels. A mailing-list is available at tcfs-list(a)mikonos.dia.unisa.it. Documentation is available at http://mikonos.dia.unisa.it/tcfs. Here you can find instructions for installing TCFS and docs on how it works. Mirror sites are available at http://www.globenet.it/~ermmau/tcfs and http://www.inopera.it/~ermmau/tcfs \|||/ (o o) ----------------------ooO--O--Ooo------------------------------- ! //////// //// //// Ermelindo Mauriello ! ! // // /// // e-mail: ermmau(a)edu-gw.dia.unisa.it ! ! ///// // / // ermmau(a)pantelleria.dia.unisa.it ! ! // // // ermmau(a)globenet.it ! ! /////// // // ermmau(a)inopera.it ! !--------------------------------------------------------------! ! LINUX - The choice of a GNU generation !!! ! ---------------------------------------------------------------- -- End of PGP signed section. ----- End of forwarded message from Kenneth Stailey ----- -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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Re: Blessing in Disguise? (H.R. 98, the "Consumer Internet Privacy Protection Act of 1997")
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:27 PM 2/6/97 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote: > >This attempted legislation (see forward, below) is a blessing in disguise. > >It's just more proof that book-entry commerce isn't going to work on the >net in the long run. [deleted] >+ SET, Cybercash/coin, SSL, and other encrypted-channel book entry >methods, is a derigeble. You're flying, but you're using minimally strong >crypto like little aerodynamic fins to push the giant gas bag of book-entry >settlement around. Now, is that a helium or a HYDROGEN dirigible?!? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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lead remailer is shut down
by zinc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following message is a courtesy copy of an article that has been posted as well. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- hi, i came in today to find they (university system admins) had pulled the plug on my machine. this is all because some luser spammed usenet using the remailer on my machine. thanks a lot. so, the lead remailer is gone for good; it lasted almost exactly one year. it was nice while it lasted. - -patrick finerty biochem grad student, u of utah - -- "Those that give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." -- Benjamin Franklin (1773) finger zinc-pgp@zifi for PGP key zifi runs LINUX 2.0.28 -=-=-=WEB=-=-=-> http://zifi.genetics.utah.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.4, an Emacs/PGP interface iQCVAwUBMvqXqE3Qo/lG0AH5AQHsQgP+LJFyMCrYnackXVZqMuDRt2vgliYeWh2L 6i3IgfCqMSxfScyLFQXMP7cRJT1oNWFEilmcBLURWOqK/hy4sAufRaNKNw/rvcOE 4qYFyxm3IDwF3vqdgDnaj5LWISWxaVrglHL8wNKNBQDr1Eq6XVZiqYPT5UC00klt clfXhusEPPg= =0fse -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: anonymous remailers
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:19 PM 2/6/97 +0000, Charley Musselman wrote: >C'punks -- > When I told a friend about the alt.drugs.pot cultivation newsgroup >and suggested that he use an anonymous remailer to post to the group, >he laughed and said, "Who do you suppose runs the remailers? ATF, >FBI, DEA, that's who!" Gee, it makes sense to this paranoid. Does >anyone know the answer? Specifically, how can we choose a trusted >remailer? There is no such thing as a trusted remailer, unless you know and trust the remailer operator. That's why one should use remailer chains. If only one remailer in the chain is run by a non-TLA operator, you are safe. Just for the record, I know numerous remailer operators. I am convinced that neither of them works for any TLA in any way. YMMV. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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[ANNOUNCEMENT] Secure checksums
by lucifer Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy C[reep] May sits at his terminal dressed in five-inch stiletto heels, fishnet stockings, a gold-lame mini-skirt, a purple halter with girdle underneath to keep in his flabby gut, a Fredericks of Hollywood padded bra also underneath the halter, a cheap Naomi Sims pink afro wig, waiting to yank his crank whenever a black man responds to one of his inane rants. __ ___|[]| Timothy C[reep] May \__|______| /-(o_o_o_o)

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M-Net Express
by guyh＠att.net.hk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

WELCOME TO M-NET'S CUT-PRICE TELEPHONE SERVICE We supply worldwide the SAME lines and services that one can buy from local phone companies and providers, BUT FOR LESS! We have purchased millions of minutes from AT&T, Sprint, MCI, British Telecom, and 20 other companies. Call from any country! NO MINIMUM CHARGE! 100% SATISFACTION GUARANTEED! For full details; mailto:guyh@att.net.hk?subject=MNET a BLANK message.

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Re: Blessing in Disguise? (H.R. 98, the "Consumer Internet Privacy Protection Act of 1997")
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:27 PM 2/6/97 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote: > >This attempted legislation (see forward, below) is a blessing in disguise. > >It's just more proof that book-entry commerce isn't going to work on the >net in the long run. [deleted] >+ SET, Cybercash/coin, SSL, and other encrypted-channel book entry >methods, is a derigeble. You're flying, but you're using minimally strong >crypto like little aerodynamic fins to push the giant gas bag of book-entry >settlement around. Now, is that a helium or a HYDROGEN dirigible?!? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: "Why am I being completely censored"?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:47 PM 2/6/97 -0600, Firebeard wrote: >>>>>> John Gilmore writes: > >JG> Hmm. Your message that I just received, about this problem, was >JG> cc'd to cypherpunks. It did not make it into the >JG> cypherpunks-unedited list. In examining the message header >JG> itself, there is an "Approved: yes" line. My guess is that your >JG> attempt to be too tricky has screwed you. > > It appears that this was the problem. Deal with a >self-moderated newsgroup, and ent up with self-censorship. *shrug*. >I wish that John had helped to resolve the problem before I made it >public, but that's life. John does have other things to do with his time, you know :-) If you're abusing email syntax to fake out specialized mail/news handling, you shouldn't be surprised if it doesn't always fake out the parts of the system you were trying to fake out.... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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Re: anonymous remailers
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:19 PM 2/6/97 +0000, Charley Musselman wrote: >C'punks -- > When I told a friend about the alt.drugs.pot cultivation newsgroup >and suggested that he use an anonymous remailer to post to the group, >he laughed and said, "Who do you suppose runs the remailers? ATF, >FBI, DEA, that's who!" Gee, it makes sense to this paranoid. Does >anyone know the answer? Specifically, how can we choose a trusted >remailer? There is no such thing as a trusted remailer, unless you know and trust the remailer operator. That's why one should use remailer chains. If only one remailer in the chain is run by a non-TLA operator, you are safe. Just for the record, I know numerous remailer operators. I am convinced that neither of them works for any TLA in any way. YMMV. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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lead remailer is shut down
by zinc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following message is a courtesy copy of an article that has been posted as well. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- hi, i came in today to find they (university system admins) had pulled the plug on my machine. this is all because some luser spammed usenet using the remailer on my machine. thanks a lot. so, the lead remailer is gone for good; it lasted almost exactly one year. it was nice while it lasted. - -patrick finerty biochem grad student, u of utah - -- "Those that give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." -- Benjamin Franklin (1773) finger zinc-pgp@zifi for PGP key zifi runs LINUX 2.0.28 -=-=-=WEB=-=-=-> http://zifi.genetics.utah.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.4, an Emacs/PGP interface iQCVAwUBMvqXqE3Qo/lG0AH5AQHsQgP+LJFyMCrYnackXVZqMuDRt2vgliYeWh2L 6i3IgfCqMSxfScyLFQXMP7cRJT1oNWFEilmcBLURWOqK/hy4sAufRaNKNw/rvcOE 4qYFyxm3IDwF3vqdgDnaj5LWISWxaVrglHL8wNKNBQDr1Eq6XVZiqYPT5UC00klt clfXhusEPPg= =0fse -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: ITAR and Paper ROM
by Roy M. Silvernail 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In list.cypherpunks, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com writes: > More practically, sort of, there was the Cauzin Softstrip Reader, > which cost about $200 and held enough data to distribute programs > back when computers and programs were much smaller; a few PC magazines > tried distributing programs by printing them in the back that way. > Cute, but not cute enough to stick around very long. Cauzin was bought by Eastman Kodak shortly after they started advertising in the big rags (like _Byte_, which printed a test strip a month or so before Cauzin made their big advertising push). Cauzin was even putting freeware programs in their ads. At that time, Kodak was just entering the soon-to-be-lucrative magnetic media market with their floppy disk line. I'd say they were bought and buried. - -- Roy M. Silvernail [ ] roy(a)scytale.com DNRC Minister Plenipotentiary of All Things Confusing, Software Division PGP Public Key fingerprint = 31 86 EC B9 DB 76 A7 54 13 0B 6A 6B CC 09 18 B6 Key available from pubkey(a)scytale.com, which works now -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMvpwFxvikii9febJAQHI3wP9HrDosf/DQIkbNaJADxqGOaE4fskX3HEP nznkhaMb4WXbCQUg+BNtyh/u15n6M2eA259uHExm1S+//8VENcGC0hmINdsehBJX LcehDOQMpbbj/lSdd/rC0raj7U38wuXZn84xi/bdbXWKwXzVKWaq3AwqRgLm9aBT 9NS0RZOiPEY= =PFiP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Wimsey cryptography archive is moving to Mindlink
by Mark C. Henderson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Subject: Wimsey cryptography archive is moving to Mindlink The Wimsey cryptography archive at ftp://ftp.wimsey.com/pub/crypto is moving to MIND LINK (http://www.mindlink.net) You can now access the contents of the cryptography archive at its new location ftp://ftp.mindlink.net/pub/crypto The archive has been at Wimsey for about five years. I'd like to thank the folks at Wimsey for providing disk space, bandwidth, technical expertise, and for supporting the distribution of ~140MB of cryptography papers and software on the Internet. As with Wimsey, MIND LINK is providing disk space and bandwidth for the archive at no charge to me or the users of the archive. Thanks should go to MIND LINK for providing this as a service to the Internet community. Two small notes: 1. I assume sole responsibility for the contents of the archive. The folks at MIND LINK are generously providing facilties at no charge above their usual access fees, but they are not necessarily even aware of the exact contents of the archive. My only connection with MIND LINK is as a customer. 2. Please do not attempt to use the MIND LINK crypto archive to violate the laws of the U.S. or Canada. Distribution of cryptographic software is limited to U.S./Canadian persons in the U.S./Canada. All access to the site is logged. Any problems or questions? Please feel free to contact me at mark_henderson(a)mindlink.net -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBMvptauI11LPFgBXjAQGw7AQAgYTIUjU/6O40gTgFvhtDrBMc+TEaWW2x 2sHdk0QYRPJ2uGwoQA7psbHh2r6eu/6NqKCmKALTnZ1caWDcZLKsiLyDHQKwSGQV EK/+xnXqnb87MJfCGL5deDLCUOIo2UupFttCxd6EAdD8Dt670WT+Oe3Q9acrnmIM Lr+wyuw8WS8= =NilL -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Mark Henderson -- markh(a)wimsey.bc.ca, mark_henderson(a)mindlink.net PGP Key Fingerprint: 21 F6 AF 2B 6A 8A 0B E1 A1 2A 2A 06 4A D5 92 46 http://www.squirrel.com/squirrel/ - change-sun-hostid, unstrip for Solaris, computer security, TECO, FGMP, Sun NVRAM/hostid FAQ, MIND LINK crypto archive

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Transparent Cryptographic File System (fwd)
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Haven't seen this on cpunks. ----- Forwarded message from Kenneth Stailey ----- >From xtech-request(a)zephyr.ccrc.wustl.edu Thu Feb 6 18:26:49 1997 Date: Thu, 6 Feb 1997 16:47:28 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199702062147.QAA29127(a)duality.gnu.ai.mit.edu> From: Kenneth Stailey <kstailey(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu> To: tech(a)openbsd.org Subject: Transparent Cryptographic File System Sender: owner-tech(a)openbsd.org Precedence: bulk Hi, I thought that there might be some interest in looking at this: From: ermmau(a)ios.diaedu.unisa.it (Ermelindo Mauriello) Subject: New release of TCFS (Transparent Cryptographic File System) Newsgroups: comp.os.linux.announce Date: Thu, 16 Jan 1997 07:14:53 GMT Followup-To: comp.os.linux.development.system Organization: Universita' di SALERNO - Dip. Informatica ed Appl. Path: ai-lab!bloom-beacon.mit.edu!howland.erols.net!newsfeed.internetmci.com!zeke.ebtech.net!loki.tor.hookup.net!omega.metrics.com!liw.clinet.fi!not-for-mail Lines: 51 Approved: linux-announce(a)news.ornl.gov (Lars Wirzenius) Message-ID: <pgpmoose.199701160914.15063(a)liw.clinet.fi> NNTP-Posting-Host: localhost X-Server-Date: 16 Jan 1997 07:15:02 GMT X-Original-Date: 15 Jan 1997 14:51:36 GMT X-Auth: PGPMoose V1.1 PGP comp.os.linux.announce iQBVAwUBMt3VcjiesvPHtqnBAQECXwH+PKb4gmvn2sSqa3caegRau0cHJ9Lx9hII YG0YmSbwPf+oFV4ie4omldPpTO3VjGXSkY11zIof6b3HzY3dNzajyQ== =aNko -- Start of PGP signed section. We are glad to announce that a new release of TCFS (Transparent Cryptographic File System) for Linux is now available. TCFS is a cryptographic filesystem developed at the Universita' di Salerno (Italy). It operates like NFS but allows users to use a new flag X to make the files secure (encrypted). In theis release files are encrypted using DES. The new release works in Linux kernel space, and may be linked as a module to Linux 2.0.x kernels. A mailing-list is available at tcfs-list(a)mikonos.dia.unisa.it. Documentation is available at http://mikonos.dia.unisa.it/tcfs. Here you can find instructions for installing TCFS and docs on how it works. Mirror sites are available at http://www.globenet.it/~ermmau/tcfs and http://www.inopera.it/~ermmau/tcfs \|||/ (o o) ----------------------ooO--O--Ooo------------------------------- ! //////// //// //// Ermelindo Mauriello ! ! // // /// // e-mail: ermmau(a)edu-gw.dia.unisa.it ! ! ///// // / // ermmau(a)pantelleria.dia.unisa.it ! ! // // // ermmau(a)globenet.it ! ! /////// // // ermmau(a)inopera.it ! !--------------------------------------------------------------! ! LINUX - The choice of a GNU generation !!! ! ---------------------------------------------------------------- -- End of PGP signed section. ----- End of forwarded message from Kenneth Stailey ----- -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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Waiting for Mac version [was Re: Full strength Email Clients]
by Steve Schear 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >At 06:51 PM 2/6/97 +0800, pclow wrote: >><You want Eudora 3.0 and PGPMail 4.5. [Despite PGP,Inc's best efforts, >>the >><brand new PGPMail has escaped from the United States and is now >>available >><worldwide.] Its too bad there isn't a Mac version contemplated. They appear to think that existing PGP versions, paired with Eudora, are sufficient. I think a better integrated approach for the Mac would be appreciated as the available AppleScripts are buggy and awkward. --Steve

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Re: True story, Fly the Obsfucted Skies (fwd)
by Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ray Arachelian <ray(a)earthweb.com> writes: ... > I thought about it. I scratched my goatee. I said: ... How can an Armenian eunich grow a bear? Even a faggy goatee? --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Deloitte-Touche?
by Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes: > > Mark <mark(a)infolawalert.com> writes: > > I'm almost certain that Murray is a consultant rather than > > or in addition to an accountant. He's been saying these things > > William Murray used to post frequently to sci.crypt, alt.security.pgp, > etc when I read those forums. He also I think wrote the forword for > one of the books on using PGP. One of my first flame wars on Internet, some 15 years ago, was with William H. Murray over my criticism of DES. How time flies. :-) --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: anonymous remailers
by Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

c.musselman(a)internetmci.com (Charley Musselman) writes: > C'punks -- > When I told a friend about the alt.drugs.pot cultivation newsgroup > and suggested that he use an anonymous remailer to post to the group, > he laughed and said, "Who do you suppose runs the remailers? ATF, > FBI, DEA, that's who!" Gee, it makes sense to this paranoid. Does > anyone know the answer? Specifically, how can we choose a trusted > remailer? Even if the feds are not directtly involved, the so-called "cypher punk" remailers are run by people who should not be trusted. Check out their remailer-operators list: it's full of announcements that some specific person posted something via the remailer that the operator didn't like. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: 40-bit RC5 crack meaningless??
by Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This would be the same Strassmann who stated in public at Harvard early in 1995 that most remailers were run by intelligence agencies such as the KGB, then denied saying it when asked for substantiation? And cut it from his paper? On Thu, 6 Feb 1997, Vin McLellan wrote: > Strassmann, the author of this denunciation of RSADS and > Ian Goldberg, is the former Director of Defense Information > (i.e., CIO,) of the Bush DoD and an often-insightful commentator Having said that, there is some debate about the extent to which in *intelligence gathering* as opposed to, say, trying to crack a banking protocol, one can reasonably count on a known plaintext. And much debate about the processing costs of not having one, especially when one doesn't know what kind of document is being encrypted (e.g. is it ASCII plaintext? a spreadsheet? a jpeg? etc.). I think that's his (misdirected) point. A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) Associate Professor of Law | U. Miami School of Law | froomkin(a)law.miami.edu P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here.

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"Secret" Postal Device -- Update.
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It seems as though it's a keyring(!) with one (some?) of the/those key(s) they use to unlock all the mailboxes for apartment houses. I guess it's a keyring too big for a pocket, but I don't know. Herald reporter revealed this today, but didn't want to. I guessed right, and he ended up admitting it after I informed him of how I know various Herald reporters and sorta social engineered him into saying too much by keeping him talking. :-) My mail has been acting up all weekend due to something unknown happening at Sprint. JMR -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEPAwUBMvZg9TUhsGSn1j2pAQFSNQfPTQ5WVwEu5AoNGoAY/jguoMIMdmOBtp0i fB6ralJD29b0VJ0ci8Z7l/vDoqhwMCT+nbP0Upp8xFDP391hbg4I2/H3KcDUxEen YRzB61k64UOuEVVQoeLJDq8/yyutZHLc599J93lTC6nmPqaogUzdYEjcyMnLuW/D j91pXvst+4IddZ7Aavnucu5AdwN84AitWc5/1sCBUpNlE6StcDtMtndkDnZT3f5H SZezlFpBB0UcRPirehSjaeSbWkgFeiLBIVLfLfFfJ+Fn1zHAeJ20L5fw7M7dAwp6 DruKucQ0jaIGpfeZJnPkwqYyKAmD63e+fFprw2/LaGQgxw== =pcrs -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Regards, Jim Ray <jmr(a)shopmiami.com> DNRC Minister of Encryption Advocacy One of the "legitimate concerns of law enforcement" seems to be that I was born innocent until proven guilty and not the other way around. -- me http://shopmiami.com/prs/jimray/ PGP id.A7D63DA9 98 1F 39 BA 93 86 B4 F5 57 52 64 0E DA BA 2C 71

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Race and IQ
by nobody＠zifi.genetics.utah.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dense Vinegar had his foreskin ripped off last night by a vacuum cleaner. ^-^-^-@@-^-^-^ (..) Dense Vinegar

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