December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RRE: crime and technology
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu" 20-FEB-1997 07:55:48.58 From: Phil Agre <pagre(a)weber.ucsd.edu> =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE). Send any replies to the original author, listed in the From: field below. You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use the "redirect" command. For information on RRE, including instructions for (un)subscribing, send an empty message to rre-help(a)weber.ucsd.edu =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Date: Wed, 19 Feb 1997 18:51:34 -0500 From: Belinda Juran <juran(a)law.harvard.edu> [...] Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Symposium: Crime & Technology Law Enforcement Technology - Cybercrime - Electronic Commerce Saturday, March 15, 1997 Ames Courtroom, Austin Hall at Harvard Law School in Cambridge, MA. Registration: 9:30 A.M. Tentative Schedule, including Confirmed and Tentative Panelists: 9:30-9:45 Registration & coffee 9:45-10 Introduction 10-12 Panel: "Search, Seizure, and Surveillance Technology" (searching of technology & the technology of searching) Moderator: Stephen Heymann assistant United States attorney in Boston who teaches at HLS and was involved with the first wiretap laid on the Internet. Panelists: o Tony West AUSA in San Jose who helped investigate the creator of PGP and is now prosecuting the "Orchid Club" cases against an international child pornography ring that distributed through the Internet. o Chris Slobogin UFlorida professor who is the reporter for the ABA Task Force on Technology and Law Enforcement o Andy Good a Boston defense attorney who has defended computer searches including US v. Steve Jackson Games o Marc Goodman a Los Angeles Police Department sargeant who has investigated computer crimes and has pursued the impact of technology on police departments during his year at the Kennedy School of Government o Elizabeth Marsh a Quinnipiac Law School professor who has done work on encryption and the danger of the federal government's "key" proposal 12 Lunch: box lunch provided 12:45-1:15 Keynote: invited (tentative) keynote speaker: Bob Kahn Corporation for National Research Initiatives 1:15-3:15 Panel: "The Risks of Electronic Banking &Commerce" (content security & payment/banking security) Moderator: Charles Nesson professor at Harvard Law School specializing in legal implications of digital technologies o Marc Rotenberg EPIC (Electronic Privacy & Information Center) o Kelly Frey Copyright Clearance Center o David Byer partner, Testa Hurwitz & Thibeault, Boston, MA o Philip Bane counsel, First Virtual 3:15 end Admission to the Symposium is free to all Harvard affiliates (with valid Harvard ID), $15 for all other students, $30 for public sector professionals, and $100 for private sector professionals. ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS STRONGLY SUGGESTED. - ------------------------Registration Form------------------------------- Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Symposium on Crime & Technology; March 15, 1997; registration begins at 9:30 a.m.; program begins at 10:00 a.m. Ames Courtroom, Austin Hall, Harvard Law School, Cambridge MA Name:____________________________________________________ Affiliation _________________________________________________ Address __________________________________________________ __________________________________________________ Telephone:________________________________________________ Email:____________________________________________________ Check One: _____ Private Sector Professional: $100 _____ Public Sector Professional: $ 30 _____ Student: $ 15 _____ Harvard student (valid ID must be presented at the door): free Make checks payable to: Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Mail the completed registration form with check to: Symposium Registration Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Publications Center Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138 - ------------------------------Cut Here-------------------------------------- The Symposium is sponsored by Hale and Dorr L.L.P., Boston, MA. The Spring Issue of the Journal will include articles covering the broad topic of "Crime and Technology." For additional information about the Symposium, contact Symposium Editor Belinda Juran, by e-mail at juran(a)law.harvard.edu, or by phone at the Harvard Journal of Law & Technology offices at 617-495-3606 or 617-493-7949. ABOUT THE JOURNAL: The Harvard Journal of Law & Technology is a leading scholarly publication for articles addressing the many diverse interstices of science and technology with law and society. We have published articles by law professors, practitioners, business leaders, and politicians on varied topics including biotechnology, computers, international trade, technology transfer, intellectual property, medical technologies, and telecommunications. These and other subjects are some of the most exciting and rapidly developing areas of the law, and we believe that the dialogue provided by the Harvard Journal of Law & Technology will help to shape the future of this important field. We welcome submissions of articles, case comments, or book reviews addressing the relationship of law and technology. SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION: For additional information, please contact the Journal at the address below. The Journal publishes three issues each year. To subscribe to the Journal's upcoming issues in Volume 10, please send the Journal a check for U.S. $45.00 (foreign orders $50.00) to the address below. To obtain the issue discussed above or back issues, please send the Journal a check for $35.00 with a note indicating the desired issue (i.e., "Vol. 9 No. 2"). ************************************************************************* Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Publications Center Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138 Telephone: (617) 495-3606 Fax: (617) 495-8828 E-Mail: jolt(a)law.harvard.edu WWW: http://www.law.harvard.edu/home/jolt/ *************************************************************************

1 0

[NTSEC] ! [ADVISORY] Major Security Hole in MS ASP (fwd)
by Ray Arachelian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos============== .+.^.+.| Ray Arachelian | "If you're gonna die, die with your|./|\. ..\|/..|sunder(a)sundernet.com|boots on; If you're gonna try, just |/\|/\ <--*-->| ------------------ |stick around; Gonna cry? Just move along|\/|\/ ../|\..| "A toast to Odin, |you're gonna die, you're gonna die!" |.\|/. .+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| --Iron Maiden "Die With Your Boots on"|..... ======================== http://www.sundernet.com ========================= ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 20 Feb 1997 11:39:01 -0600 From: Mark Joseph Edwards <mark(a)ntshop.net> To: "'bugtraq(a)netspace.org'" <bugtraq(a)netspace.org> Cc: "'ntbugtraq(a)rc.on.ca'" <ntbugtraq(a)rc.on.ca>, "'ntsecurity(a)iss.net'" <ntsecurity(a)iss.net> Subject: [NTSEC] ! [ADVISORY] Major Security Hole in MS ASP MICROSOFT IIS AND ACTIVE SERVER ADVISORY Security Hole in ASP Discovered in Microsoft ASP February 20, 1997 DESCRIPTION A serious security hole was found in Microsoft's Active Server Pages (ASP) by Juan T. Llibre <j.llibre(a)codetel.net.do>. This hole allows Web clients to download unprocessed ASP files potentially exposing user ids and passwords. ASP files are the common file type used by Microsoft's IIS and Active Server to perform server-side processing. HOW IT WORKS To download an unprocessed ASP file, simply append a period to the asp URL. For example: http://www.domain1.com/default.asp becomes http://www.domain1.com/default.asp. With the period appendage, Internet Information Server (IIS) will send the unprocessed ASP file to the Web client, wherein the source to the file can be examined at will. If the source includes any security parameter designed to allow access to other system processes, such as an SQL database, they will be revealed. DEFENSE There are two known ways to stop this behavior: 1.Turn read permissions off of the ASP directory in the Internet Service Manager. This may not be a practical solution since many sites mix ASP and HTML files. If your site mixes these files together in the same directories, you may want to segregate them immediately. Now and in the future, treat your ASP files like any other Web based executable, and keep them in separate directories wherein permissions can be adjusted accordingly. 2.Download this filter written by Christoph Wille Christoph.Wille(a)unileoben.ac.at which can be located at http://www.ntshop.net/security/tools/sechole.zip or from http://www.genusa.com/asp/patch/sechole.zip END OF ADVISORY

1 0

Re: Constitution and a Right to Privacy
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> >Greg Broiles wrote: >> At 11:56 PM 2/19/97 -0800, Dale Thorn wrote: >> >It's good if you don't read the L.A. Times. One of their lead editor- >> >ializers (whores), a professor at USC law school named Erwin Chemerinsky, >> >writes in relation to this subject "The federal government is an inde- >> >pendent sovereign that cannot have its powers diminished by a state >> >government's actions." (exact quote, 2/7/97). Either that's a load of >> >BS doubletalk, or it's one of the more fascistic commentaries from the >> >Times, which is usually bad enough. >> Hey, don't forget to shoot the messenger. Chemerinsky's statement is a >> concise summary of at least the last 70 years of double jeopardy >> jurisprudence. The only thing that's unusual about the use of the "dual >> sovereign" doctrine against the cops who beat King was that it's usually >> used against ordinary citizens, not cops. Do you suppose it's possible >I understood clearly the (supposed) intent of the feds in retrying >the Whites in the South who were beating up on Blacks and getting >off with White juries - I just believe they would have served the >people better by declaring mistrials or something instead of using >the "dual sovereignty" BS, since a study of the Constitution and >its preparatory papers shows the fathers clearly would have balked >at this. I had understood the basic reasons for the double jeopardy limit to be two: A. to prevent government from tormenting innocent individuals with repeated trials; and B. to prevent convictions of innocents by simple repeated trials until a jury made a mistake. The latter can be analogized in statistics to the consideration that a test with a p value of .05 will turn out false positive results 1 time in 20 by the nature of it; thus, if you look at two different studies/trials with an independent (an oversimplifying assumption for trials, admittedly) 5% chance of an incorrect conviction, the chance is 1-((19/20)(19/20)) or 9.75% for _either_ of them turning out a false positive instead of a 5% chance. In a system partially based on the principle that it's better to let the guilty go free than to punish the innocent, this result is not acceptable. While the founding fathers probably didn't realize the mathematics behind the second, I suspect that they had some intuition of its nature. I can see an argument, however, for using it in the case of state employees, particularly police - the state judicial/prosecutorial system can hardly be said not to be biased in favor of them. A better solution, however, would be to simply do the trial in a federal court to begin with. (Having trials of federal employees in the courts of the state of their alleged victims would be a correspondingly good idea, although multiple possible states for this could be a problem.) I'd appreciate comments from persons with more legal knowledge than I have; I am simply going by logic here. -Allen

1 0

DES search publicity (was Re: Cryptanalysis)
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Peter Trei <trei(a)process.com> writes: > Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> writes: > > There may be a distributed Internet crack using that approach, > > though DES is still very inefficient on general-purpose computers and > > works better on bit-twiddliing chips. > > There's one slowly shaping up, organized by the same people who did > the RC5-48 crack. I'm still rooting for an uncoordinated search, > which is already underway. The people who did the RC5-48 crack over on <des-challenge(a)muffin.org>, and <des-pr(a)mail.des-challenge.xtn.net>, or at least one of them in particular, seems dead set on giving the prize fund 50:50 to the EFF/GNU. I'm having a heck of a time talking him out of it. What does your software do with the key if it finds it? Attempt to email it RSA DS/email it to you/report it to user/other? Do you know how many people are running your uncoordinated breaking project? Are you keeping track of how many people have copies. (I suppose that not knowing how many people are running the client is a disadvantage with the uncoordinated approach.) I'm trying to get UK Computer shopper to include an uncoordinated DES searcher in their cover CD, along with a feature article on the challenge (I thought the possibility of winning $10,000 might be a large part of the interest factor for a reader). Don't know if they'll be interested yet. (What I'm keen on is the sheer size of the readership -- if 10% of that lot runs the software, something might happen fast!) Has anyone tried doing something similar in the US? Anyone with contacts with other PC magazine with CD/disk on front format, preferably with large readership, in UK, US, or other countries? For this kind of project, you'd need something with a simple windows interface and install script. I'd have thought a DES breaker which is installed in win3.1/win95 to always start at boot up, and consume free cycles (ie set to back off when the machine is doing other things). A screen saver with nice presentation would be one way to do this. Do any of the breakers do this? Are there clients from other breaks which could be adapted which do? I think someone wrote a screen saver based breaker after the SSL break? Adam ps Have there been any sightings of your code outside the US? Rumor has it that ftp://ftp.replay.com/pub/incoming is a place where things often turn up, but I haven't seen it yet. -- print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

2 1

Re: Constitution and a Right to Privacy
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> >Greg Broiles wrote: >> At 11:56 PM 2/19/97 -0800, Dale Thorn wrote: >> >It's good if you don't read the L.A. Times. One of their lead editor- >> >ializers (whores), a professor at USC law school named Erwin Chemerinsky, >> >writes in relation to this subject "The federal government is an inde- >> >pendent sovereign that cannot have its powers diminished by a state >> >government's actions." (exact quote, 2/7/97). Either that's a load of >> >BS doubletalk, or it's one of the more fascistic commentaries from the >> >Times, which is usually bad enough. >> Hey, don't forget to shoot the messenger. Chemerinsky's statement is a >> concise summary of at least the last 70 years of double jeopardy >> jurisprudence. The only thing that's unusual about the use of the "dual >> sovereign" doctrine against the cops who beat King was that it's usually >> used against ordinary citizens, not cops. Do you suppose it's possible >I understood clearly the (supposed) intent of the feds in retrying >the Whites in the South who were beating up on Blacks and getting >off with White juries - I just believe they would have served the >people better by declaring mistrials or something instead of using >the "dual sovereignty" BS, since a study of the Constitution and >its preparatory papers shows the fathers clearly would have balked >at this. I had understood the basic reasons for the double jeopardy limit to be two: A. to prevent government from tormenting innocent individuals with repeated trials; and B. to prevent convictions of innocents by simple repeated trials until a jury made a mistake. The latter can be analogized in statistics to the consideration that a test with a p value of .05 will turn out false positive results 1 time in 20 by the nature of it; thus, if you look at two different studies/trials with an independent (an oversimplifying assumption for trials, admittedly) 5% chance of an incorrect conviction, the chance is 1-((19/20)(19/20)) or 9.75% for _either_ of them turning out a false positive instead of a 5% chance. In a system partially based on the principle that it's better to let the guilty go free than to punish the innocent, this result is not acceptable. While the founding fathers probably didn't realize the mathematics behind the second, I suspect that they had some intuition of its nature. I can see an argument, however, for using it in the case of state employees, particularly police - the state judicial/prosecutorial system can hardly be said not to be biased in favor of them. A better solution, however, would be to simply do the trial in a federal court to begin with. (Having trials of federal employees in the courts of the state of their alleged victims would be a correspondingly good idea, although multiple possible states for this could be a problem.) I'd appreciate comments from persons with more legal knowledge than I have; I am simply going by logic here. -Allen

1 0

RRE: crime and technology
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu" 20-FEB-1997 07:55:48.58 From: Phil Agre <pagre(a)weber.ucsd.edu> =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE). Send any replies to the original author, listed in the From: field below. You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use the "redirect" command. For information on RRE, including instructions for (un)subscribing, send an empty message to rre-help(a)weber.ucsd.edu =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Date: Wed, 19 Feb 1997 18:51:34 -0500 From: Belinda Juran <juran(a)law.harvard.edu> [...] Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Symposium: Crime & Technology Law Enforcement Technology - Cybercrime - Electronic Commerce Saturday, March 15, 1997 Ames Courtroom, Austin Hall at Harvard Law School in Cambridge, MA. Registration: 9:30 A.M. Tentative Schedule, including Confirmed and Tentative Panelists: 9:30-9:45 Registration & coffee 9:45-10 Introduction 10-12 Panel: "Search, Seizure, and Surveillance Technology" (searching of technology & the technology of searching) Moderator: Stephen Heymann assistant United States attorney in Boston who teaches at HLS and was involved with the first wiretap laid on the Internet. Panelists: o Tony West AUSA in San Jose who helped investigate the creator of PGP and is now prosecuting the "Orchid Club" cases against an international child pornography ring that distributed through the Internet. o Chris Slobogin UFlorida professor who is the reporter for the ABA Task Force on Technology and Law Enforcement o Andy Good a Boston defense attorney who has defended computer searches including US v. Steve Jackson Games o Marc Goodman a Los Angeles Police Department sargeant who has investigated computer crimes and has pursued the impact of technology on police departments during his year at the Kennedy School of Government o Elizabeth Marsh a Quinnipiac Law School professor who has done work on encryption and the danger of the federal government's "key" proposal 12 Lunch: box lunch provided 12:45-1:15 Keynote: invited (tentative) keynote speaker: Bob Kahn Corporation for National Research Initiatives 1:15-3:15 Panel: "The Risks of Electronic Banking &Commerce" (content security & payment/banking security) Moderator: Charles Nesson professor at Harvard Law School specializing in legal implications of digital technologies o Marc Rotenberg EPIC (Electronic Privacy & Information Center) o Kelly Frey Copyright Clearance Center o David Byer partner, Testa Hurwitz & Thibeault, Boston, MA o Philip Bane counsel, First Virtual 3:15 end Admission to the Symposium is free to all Harvard affiliates (with valid Harvard ID), $15 for all other students, $30 for public sector professionals, and $100 for private sector professionals. ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS STRONGLY SUGGESTED. - ------------------------Registration Form------------------------------- Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Symposium on Crime & Technology; March 15, 1997; registration begins at 9:30 a.m.; program begins at 10:00 a.m. Ames Courtroom, Austin Hall, Harvard Law School, Cambridge MA Name:____________________________________________________ Affiliation _________________________________________________ Address __________________________________________________ __________________________________________________ Telephone:________________________________________________ Email:____________________________________________________ Check One: _____ Private Sector Professional: $100 _____ Public Sector Professional: $ 30 _____ Student: $ 15 _____ Harvard student (valid ID must be presented at the door): free Make checks payable to: Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Mail the completed registration form with check to: Symposium Registration Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Publications Center Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138 - ------------------------------Cut Here-------------------------------------- The Symposium is sponsored by Hale and Dorr L.L.P., Boston, MA. The Spring Issue of the Journal will include articles covering the broad topic of "Crime and Technology." For additional information about the Symposium, contact Symposium Editor Belinda Juran, by e-mail at juran(a)law.harvard.edu, or by phone at the Harvard Journal of Law & Technology offices at 617-495-3606 or 617-493-7949. ABOUT THE JOURNAL: The Harvard Journal of Law & Technology is a leading scholarly publication for articles addressing the many diverse interstices of science and technology with law and society. We have published articles by law professors, practitioners, business leaders, and politicians on varied topics including biotechnology, computers, international trade, technology transfer, intellectual property, medical technologies, and telecommunications. These and other subjects are some of the most exciting and rapidly developing areas of the law, and we believe that the dialogue provided by the Harvard Journal of Law & Technology will help to shape the future of this important field. We welcome submissions of articles, case comments, or book reviews addressing the relationship of law and technology. SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION: For additional information, please contact the Journal at the address below. The Journal publishes three issues each year. To subscribe to the Journal's upcoming issues in Volume 10, please send the Journal a check for U.S. $45.00 (foreign orders $50.00) to the address below. To obtain the issue discussed above or back issues, please send the Journal a check for $35.00 with a note indicating the desired issue (i.e., "Vol. 9 No. 2"). ************************************************************************* Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Publications Center Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138 Telephone: (617) 495-3606 Fax: (617) 495-8828 E-Mail: jolt(a)law.harvard.edu WWW: http://www.law.harvard.edu/home/jolt/ *************************************************************************

1 0

The List
by Steve 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey all, As a somewhat quiet observer and student of the Cypherpunk list over the last two years, I have been able to keep in touch with an unimaginable amount of issues, info, concerns, and news; and the knowledge I have gained from this list is more than I can say in words. I have sifted through the noise and can say the info gleaned was indeed worth the effort. I am sorry to see the list in its present state, ready to move on to better? things. I hope I speak for many of you, like me who listened learned asked and was answered, that the Cypherpunk list must continue and that each of us, active and passive member has a responsibility to ourselves and each other to continue bring the issues to light , fighting the good fight against the gov't's lousy regulations, and bringing encryption to the masses. I have been working with a security software development company for 2 and half years and have been working on this goal: bringing encryption to the masses. The information both directly (actual posts relating to Crypto) and indirectly (Rants and flames on Snakeoil products) gained has helped guide me and my colleagues closer and closer to our goal. For that and more I thank all of you. We are very close to releasing a beta version of our product to the Internet community to use and abuse. We have worked closely with Bruce Schnieir and Counterpane to insure good implementation of our security measures. I hope our product meets with your standards and approval but more importantly I hope that you (the collective you) can be instrumental in helping us to accomplish our goal. I will post to this list (assuming it is still amongst the living) very shortly a more detailed description of the product and where a beta can be gotten. I am sorry for "whetting the appetites" but I figured since I was E-mailing a post relating to the state of list, I include a bit about how the list has positively effected me and has contributed to society. Steveo (privsoft(a)ix.netcom.com) --Privacy Software Division-- Syntel Technologies, Inc.

1 0

[ADMINISTRATIVIUM] RSA
by mixmaster＠remail.obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy `C' May was born when his mother was on the toilet. /\ o-/\ Timothy `C' May ///\|/\\\ / /|\ \

1 0

Re: RSA
by mixmaster＠remail.obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A warning label ought to be tattooed on Tim C[retin] May's head, saying `Warning: shit content under pressure'. /\_/\ ( x x ) -oo0-(o o)-0oo- Tim C[retin] May

1 0

Kiss the Toad
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The news wads we've been posting will appear in the cpunk mail dumpster. Or, we'll e-mail them to anyone who unsubs but wants the stuff. Send us a blank message with subject: DUM_pit ----- Thanks to JG for princely service, a kiss to the toad.

1 0

[IMPORTANT] Elliptic curves
by mixmaster＠remail.obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

May Tim Mayhem's forgeries get stuck up his ass so he'll have to shit through his filthy mouth for the rest of its miserable life. o \ o / _ o __| \ / |__ o _ \ o / o /|\ | /\ ___\o \o | o/ o/__ /\ | /|\ Tim Mayhem / \ / \ | \ /) | ( \ /o\ / ) | (\ / | / \ / \

1 0

Kiss the Toad
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The news wads we've been posting will appear in the cpunk mail dumpster. Or, we'll e-mail them to anyone who unsubs but wants the stuff. Send us a blank message with subject: DUM_pit ----- Thanks to JG for princely service, a kiss to the toad.

1 0

Re: DES search publicity (was Re: Cryptanalysis)
by Mark M. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Wed, 19 Feb 1997, Adam Back wrote: > Have there been any sightings of your code outside the US? > > Rumor has it that ftp://ftp.replay.com/pub/incoming is a place where > things often turn up, but I haven't seen it yet. Last time I checked, deskr06i.zip, which I believe is the correct filename, was in /pub/incoming. Mark -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMwzm9yzIPc7jvyFpAQHeggf9HN1XnB1pWdwfsDPptMCCJdq6whdDlac/ W2In+Yzxro7n+RyCYdPFHXldlCFDh/st6SbL90XFQp2kS7Mg7Zu7BtgMRuUOugqk LGW4cDkpjg/gq5/AL4h49puuch4gVV7//pnfGke6fEvaBF/1wvpxNEh1Ades291t guC1hllIoyQkrZIanwuiMl3ubq5Ep3yuorVoYkqspYYmtfzwkhduDmEbqfMp13mN BCJG2QIUtm2GctkWn7rQDaLwFBBn+VIhOn1zF9EPfgr1PXt8HIhzWfQ3JkmtF9Ql wkxz7ebTyhxIMt6culECrcSNBhSGLgxMCLYsnm8NlkGqESbmMVSHjg== =LePS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

The List
by Steve 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey all, As a somewhat quiet observer and student of the Cypherpunk list over the last two years, I have been able to keep in touch with an unimaginable amount of issues, info, concerns, and news; and the knowledge I have gained from this list is more than I can say in words. I have sifted through the noise and can say the info gleaned was indeed worth the effort. I am sorry to see the list in its present state, ready to move on to better? things. I hope I speak for many of you, like me who listened learned asked and was answered, that the Cypherpunk list must continue and that each of us, active and passive member has a responsibility to ourselves and each other to continue bring the issues to light , fighting the good fight against the gov't's lousy regulations, and bringing encryption to the masses. I have been working with a security software development company for 2 and half years and have been working on this goal: bringing encryption to the masses. The information both directly (actual posts relating to Crypto) and indirectly (Rants and flames on Snakeoil products) gained has helped guide me and my colleagues closer and closer to our goal. For that and more I thank all of you. We are very close to releasing a beta version of our product to the Internet community to use and abuse. We have worked closely with Bruce Schnieir and Counterpane to insure good implementation of our security measures. I hope our product meets with your standards and approval but more importantly I hope that you (the collective you) can be instrumental in helping us to accomplish our goal. I will post to this list (assuming it is still amongst the living) very shortly a more detailed description of the product and where a beta can be gotten. I am sorry for "whetting the appetites" but I figured since I was E-mailing a post relating to the state of list, I include a bit about how the list has positively effected me and has contributed to society. Steveo (privsoft(a)ix.netcom.com) --Privacy Software Division-- Syntel Technologies, Inc.

1 0

Accounts payable
by mixmaster＠remail.obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy C[ocksucker] Mayo is not only as queer as a three dollar bill, but he is also into having sex with children. /''' c-OO Timmy C[ocksucker] Mayo \ -

1 0

Correct paranoia about evesdropping.
by Darren Reed 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I don't read cypherpunks any more, and this may have already been mentioned but it can't hurt to be pushed again. Whilst not directly related to cryptography, if any of you saw the chapters from "Secret Power" posted to best-of-security, know that that particular book is well worth reading. Of interest to those who are concerned for privacy from snooping: * NSA/DSD/CSE/etc (same type of organisation in different countries) use ground stations around the globe to intercept satellite to ground transmissions, have a network of computers built up to scan all telexes, faxes and even some internet traffic for known keywords in real time; * there exist computers which can process speech in real time and scan for known text/words; * embassies are popular "listening posts", as are buildings "along route" of microwave transmissions; No mention is made about what their capacity is to decrypt data, but encrypted data is analysed (e.g. high level Russian stuff). The book has been extensively researched, with an appendix of all the sources where relevant (i.e. newspapers articles, etc). Photographs of many overseas "bases" are included (e.g. Yakima in Japan). Heck, I live less than 1km from one of the sites photographed! It's not an attractive book, but informative and good reading. A quote from the book, talking about agent activities and involvement in surveilence operations: "There is no evidence of a UKUSA code of ethics or of a tradition of respect for Parliament or civil liberties in their home countries. The opposite seems to be true: that anything goes as long as you do not get caught. Secrey not only permits but encourages questionable operations." The extent of the secrecy around the subject matter in the book is best represented by the comments of a former New Zealand Primeminister' foreword which admits that he was unaware of many details in the book but not which ones. I imagine it would be likewise enlighening to many recent politicians of high station... So, in summary, paranoia about being listened to is well formed, especially if you're involved in overseas communications. Just assume it is being "tapped" if it is in clear text and you'll save yourself a lot of worrying about the "might-be" factor. "Secret Power" ISBN 0-908802-35-8 Craig Potton Publishing, Box 555, Nelson New Zealand. First publishing 1996, reprinted 1996. Approximate cost AUS$35 (inc. freight)

1 0

Re: DES search publicity (was Re: Cryptanalysis)
by Elliot Lee 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 19 Feb 1997, Adam Back wrote: > > Peter Trei <trei(a)process.com> writes: > > Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> writes: > > > There may be a distributed Internet crack using that approach, > > > though DES is still very inefficient on general-purpose computers and > > > works better on bit-twiddliing chips. > > > > There's one slowly shaping up, organized by the same people who did > > the RC5-48 crack. I'm still rooting for an uncoordinated search, > > which is already underway. > > The people who did the RC5-48 crack over on <des-challenge(a)muffin.org>, > and <des-pr(a)mail.des-challenge.xtn.net>, or at least one of them in > particular, seems dead set on giving the prize fund 50:50 to the EFF/GNU. > I'm having a heck of a time talking him out of it. http://zero.genx.net/ is going at it as well - and whoever finds the key gets the prize. What's wrong with EFF/GNU? -- Elliot Lee http://www.redhat.com/ http://www.linuxexpo.org/

1 0

Correct paranoia about evesdropping.
by Darren Reed 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I don't read cypherpunks any more, and this may have already been mentioned but it can't hurt to be pushed again. Whilst not directly related to cryptography, if any of you saw the chapters from "Secret Power" posted to best-of-security, know that that particular book is well worth reading. Of interest to those who are concerned for privacy from snooping: * NSA/DSD/CSE/etc (same type of organisation in different countries) use ground stations around the globe to intercept satellite to ground transmissions, have a network of computers built up to scan all telexes, faxes and even some internet traffic for known keywords in real time; * there exist computers which can process speech in real time and scan for known text/words; * embassies are popular "listening posts", as are buildings "along route" of microwave transmissions; No mention is made about what their capacity is to decrypt data, but encrypted data is analysed (e.g. high level Russian stuff). The book has been extensively researched, with an appendix of all the sources where relevant (i.e. newspapers articles, etc). Photographs of many overseas "bases" are included (e.g. Yakima in Japan). Heck, I live less than 1km from one of the sites photographed! It's not an attractive book, but informative and good reading. A quote from the book, talking about agent activities and involvement in surveilence operations: "There is no evidence of a UKUSA code of ethics or of a tradition of respect for Parliament or civil liberties in their home countries. The opposite seems to be true: that anything goes as long as you do not get caught. Secrey not only permits but encourages questionable operations." The extent of the secrecy around the subject matter in the book is best represented by the comments of a former New Zealand Primeminister' foreword which admits that he was unaware of many details in the book but not which ones. I imagine it would be likewise enlighening to many recent politicians of high station... So, in summary, paranoia about being listened to is well formed, especially if you're involved in overseas communications. Just assume it is being "tapped" if it is in clear text and you'll save yourself a lot of worrying about the "might-be" factor. "Secret Power" ISBN 0-908802-35-8 Craig Potton Publishing, Box 555, Nelson New Zealand. First publishing 1996, reprinted 1996. Approximate cost AUS$35 (inc. freight)

1 0

Re:
by Otto Matic 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Wed, 19 Feb 1997 15:37:45 -0800 >From: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> >To: shark(a)turk.net, cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: "Trial" >At 8:02 PM +0200 2/19/97, Shark wrote: >>Trial > >OK, that makes 18 votes for "trial," 26 votes for "no trial," and 3 people >asking what the hell the vote is all about. Make that 4 what the hells. What the hell? this is the first I've seen of this post... I feel so left out. > >Looks like there won't be a trial and we can move directly to the punishment. > > >--Klaus! von Future Prime > > > >-- >[This Bible excerpt awaiting review under the U.S. Communications Decency >Act of 1996] >And then Lot said, "I have some mighty fine young virgin daughters. Why >don't you boys just come on in and fuck them right here in my house - I'll >just watch!"....Later, up in the mountains, the younger daughter said: >"Dad's getting old. I say we should fuck him before he's too old to fuck." >So the two daughters got him drunk and screwed him all that night. Sure >enough, Dad got them pregnant, and had an incestuous bastard son....Onan >really hated the idea of doing his brother's wife and getting her pregnant >while his brother got all the credit, so he pulled out before he >came....Remember, it's not a good idea to have sex with your sister, your >brother, your parents, your pet dog, or the farm animals, unless of course >God tells you to. [excerpts from the Old Testament, Modern Vernacular >Translation, TCM, 1996] > > > otto =-=-=-=-=- Otto Matic "Fuckin' A, Miller!" Bud, Repo Man --------------------------------------------------------- Get Your *Web-Based* Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com ---------------------------------------------------------

1 0

Condolences
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim: Well, if I am still in your killfile you won't be reading this. That's too bad. I just want to say the you are really being given the stake through the heart treatment by Sandy. And you say in your post, from the flames trash bin, Re: Constitution and a Right to Privacy: "I write about what I find interesting. You all know where the Delete key is. (Of course, a fairly large fraction of my recent posts have been deleted for you by Sandy, who sends many of my posts to neither the Main list nor the Flames list. Bet a lot of you didn't know this, did you?)" No, I did not know that and it pisses me off!!! Fuck everyone. Ross =-=-=-=-=-=- Ross Wright King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia Voice: 415-206-9906

1 0

RRE: AAAS Crypto Letter -> Scientific Freedom & Human Rights"
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu" 20-FEB-1997 23:02:43.31 From: Phil Agre <pagre(a)weber.ucsd.edu> =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE). Send any replies to the original author, listed in the From: field below. You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use the "redirect" command. For information on RRE, including instructions for (un)subscribing, send an empty message to rre-help(a)weber.ucsd.edu =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Date: Thu, 20 Feb 1997 14:16:54 -0500 From: afowler(a)aaas.org (Alex Fowler) Subject: AAAS Crypto Letter -> Scientific Freedom & Human Rights What follows is a copy of the letter sent under the signature of AAAS' Executive Officer, Dr. Richard Nicholson, to the Department of Commerce on the Bureau of Export Administration's Interim Rule on the transfer of certain encryption items. The letter expresses our concern that the current federal policy with regard to encryption raises serious questions for both scientific freedom and human rights work. In addition, it marks the first time that the Association has weighed in on the crypto debate at this level. Sincerely, Alex Fowler AAAS Scientific Freedom, Responsibility and Law Program American Association for the Advancement of Science 1200 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20005 February 7, 1997 Ms. Nancy Crowe Regulatory Policy Division Bureau of Export Administration Department of Commerce 14th Street and Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Room 2705 Washington, DC 20230 Dear Ms. Crowe: On behalf of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the world's largest general scientific society, I am responding to the Bureau of Export Administration's Interim Rule on the transfer of certain encryption items, published in the Federal Register, December 30, 1996. Before commenting directly on specific provisions of the Interim Rule, it is important to make the point that its basic thrust threatens to undermine essential features of scientific freedom and the open exchange of information that are generally acknowledged as critical to innovation in science and technology and are responsible in large part for the preeminence of America's research and development enterprise. AAAS opposes attempts by the government to restrict the communication or publication of unclassified research and technical information, efforts which we believe are inconsistent with scientific advancement. We are also concerned that certain provisions of the Interim Rule will adversely affect the effective use of information technologies in efforts to protect and promote human rights. Many of our members in the academic community have legitimate concerns that teaching courses on cryptography appears to violate the Interim Rule if foreign students are enrolled in such courses. Such a control seems to be inadvertent, since Part 744.9 states that "mere teaching or discussion of information about cryptography ... by itself would not establish the intent described in this section, even where foreign persons are present." However, Parts 734.3(b) and 734.9 place controls on all "educational information" applying to encryption software controlled under ECCN 5D002, and "Educational information" is defined as "release by instruction in ... academic institutions." This matter requires further clarification to avoid any unnecessary chilling effect on our educational process. Currently, part 734.3 (b)(3) of the EAR posits a difference between the paper and electronic publication of the same cryptographic materials. While it is acceptable under this provision to publish such material in a book and distribute it internationally without an export license, putting the same information on a disk and sending it abroad is subject to EAR approval. This distinction has serious ramifications for scholarly communication as many professional journals are now moving onto the Internet as electronic publications. Will cutting-edge innovations in cryptography be publishable in this new medium? Consider the following example: the full text of Science magazine, the major peer reviewed journal published by AAAS, is currently available in both print and electronic formats. According to the cited part in the EAR, an article accepted for publication on a new cryptographic algorithm would be acceptable in the print version of the publication. However, because the electronic version is available to people outside the U.S., to comply with EAR, the journal would either have to be published without this article or substantial parts omitted. Scientific publications are crucial to the advancement of science and technology and form a primary source of communication among researchers worldwide. Restrictions that limit potential collaborations and channels of communication into new and innovative cryptographic products will not only impede scientific progress, but will also retard the evolution of a secure Global Information Infrastructure. AAAS has encouraged the development of ethical standards by scientists to encourage responsible conduct and to establish accountability to a supportive public. The codes of professional conduct promulgated by the largest and most important U.S. professional engineering and computing societies all stress the importance of protecting established cultural and ethical norms of information privacy and data integrity. For example, the American Society of Information Science's Code of Ethics for Information Professionals mandates that its members "uphold each user's, provider's or employer's rights to privacy" and resist "all forms of censorship" in carrying out their responsibility "to improve, to the best of their means and abilities, the information systems in which they work or which they represent." The Interim Rule would compel these scientists and engineers -- as employees of major software and hardware computing companies -- to produce information security systems that are intentionally weak for international markets. This would create an ethical dilemma for the professional. He is bound by his responsibility to honor the ethical norms agreed upon by his profession, but as a citizen of the U.S., he is also bound by his responsibility to act according to these federal regulations. The government should avoid whenever possible creating circumstances where professionals must make such choices. AAAS provides technical assistance to human rights groups on the design and development of information management systems for large-scale human rights data collection and analysis. This process concentrates politically volatile information in computers, such as the names of witnesses to military massacres in Guatemala who could be subjected to intimidation, harassment, or murder by those intent on preventing the public discussion and analysis of the information. Such a system must be protected by strong cryptography. In our human rights work, we have observed the growing importance of non-governmental monitoring of state compliance with international human rights agreements as the first line of defense a civil society has against abusive regimes. By documenting and publicizing analyses of abusive behavior by governments, non-governmental human rights organizations provide a fundamental check on state repression. In order to be effective, human rights monitoring organizations must function with a high level of confidentiality. They must protect the people who give them information about state violations of human rights. Similarly, organizations must protect their own staff, many of whom may not be openly associated with the organization. As an increasing proportion of human rights work is supported by the use of information technology, cryptographic techniques, including but not limited to encryption, have become immensely more important. Organizations that concentrate valuable, dangerous information in databases on hard disks must be able to protect them from local authorities, who may be the subjects of human rights investigations. Human rights groups communicating their findings with collaborating organizations in other countries must be able to transmit their information securely. The sending organization must include sufficient information so that the receiving organization can verify the claims. If the information needed to verify the claims were intercepted, it could put the claimants in very serious danger. Using strong cryptography, human rights organizations can communicate their findings without putting informants or staff at additional risk. These are only a few examples of the compelling need for strong cryptography by human rights organizations. The licensing provisions in the Interim Rule permit only inadequate technology for the fundamental, democratic needs of non-government human rights organizations. Part 742.15 of the Interim Rule suggests three categories of weak or unsafe encryption that are eligible for accelerated licensing: (1) includes 40-bit products called "mass market encryption software"; (2) permits key recovery products; and (3) allows non-recovery encryption items using the DES algorithm with 56-bit keys. Provisions (1) and (3) are equally untenable for human rights purposes because they authorize only products known to be breakable with available and inexpensive technology. Provision (2), key recovery, is equally unsatisfactory for human rights organizations. If keys can be recovered by the U.S. government, why should human rights organizations whose entire function is defined by abusive governments trust that their information will remain secure? Given past and ongoing AAAS work in countries such as Haiti, Honduras, Guatemala, Turkey, and South Africa, this matter is of particular concern to us. In view of these concerns, we urge the Bureau of Export Administration to amend the Interim Rule in favor of a more open exchange of ideas and information relating to cryptography. We believe this would advance the nation's interests in a manner consistent with the values that are responsible for America's widely admired scientific achievements and its enduring democratic traditions. Sincerely, Richard S. Nicholson cc: John H. Gibbons Mary L. Good Orrin G. Hatch, Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee Patrick J. Leahy, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Judiciary Committee Jesse Helms, Chair, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Ranking Minority Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee John McCain, Chair, Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee Ernest F. Hollings, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Commerce, Science & Transportation Committee Conrad Burns, Member, Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee Tom Bliley, Chair, House Commerce Committee John D. Dingell, Ranking Minority Member, House Commerce Committee Bob Goodlatte, Member, House Commerce Committee Henry J. Hyde, Chair, House Judiciary Committee John Conyers, Jr., Ranking Minority Member, House Judiciary Committee Benjamin A. Gilman, Chair, House International Relations Committee Lee H. Hamilton, Ranking Minority Member, House International Relations Committee F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chair, House Science Committee George E. Brown, Jr., Ranking Minority Member, House Science Committee Kenneth C. Bass, III, Esq. Ann Beeson, Esq. Cindy A. Cohn, Esq. Gino J. Scarselli, Esq. =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= For more information, contact: Alexander Fowler or Patrick Ball Directorate for Science and Policy Programs 1200 New York Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20005 (202) 326-6600; Fax (202) 289-4950 afowler(a)aaas.org or pball(a)aaas.org =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=

1 0

user: cypherpunks, password: cypherpunks
by Damaged Justice 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Content Sites Vexed By Password Abuse The high cost of subscribers sharing log-ons By Whit Andrews Playboy magazine even has a term for it: "frat-house syndrome." Just as readers might pass around a magazine or a copy of a newsletter among themselves-- why buy multiple copies when you can see it after the guy down the hall is finished?-- Internet users often freely share access to their electronic subscriptions. The difference is that the number of people who can use a magazine or newsletter simultaneously is finite--limited to, say, a workgroup or the number of people who can comfortably fit onto a couch. On the Web, that expands to the number of people worldwide who can hunker in front of their monitors, printers, and personal digital assistants. "We did have one situation where a person posted a link to a story, and with it a user ID and password, on the Web, so people could get into it," said Tom Baker, business director of The Wall Street Journal Interactive edition. "He just thought it was an interesting story." Baker said that user seemed somewhat naive about the profound flouting of copyright law in which he was engaging, and several content providers have reported similar anecdotes involving clueless users. "I even have people we do business with say, 'Oh yeah, I got a password for our office,'" said Kenneth Dotson, vice president of marketing at SportsLine USA Inc., a Fort Lauderdale, Fla.-based sports site with members-only content areas. "I've had that happen two or three times now." The problem of subscribers treating their privileges as a commodity that they can give away is particularly vexing to Web content sites, which have in most cases crossed a difficult hurdle in graduating to a model supported at least to some extent by subscription fees. Losing those usually low fees to user abuse is thus doubly frustrating. "We're here trying to make money," said Jay Froscheiser, corporate Webmaster at Data Transmission Network Corp., an Omaha, Neb., online service creating new products on the Web with prices ranging from $20 to $50 monthly for access. "Serving 10 people on an account, we can't make money." DTN's solution is to use cookies, the tidbits of information that sites can store in browser files to track users' preferences and identities. If subscribers want to change browsers or access information from a different computer, they have to call DTN and set up the switch. Froscheiser said some subscribers complain that the system is too Draconian. For example, while many of the farmers who use agricultural information services have only one computer to work with, others whose work situations make them more itinerant are frustrated by their inability to log on from home, work, and elsewhere. But without exact statistics, it's DTN that is inconvenienced, because its deals with content providers are generally based on the number of subscribers who access the providers' services through DTN, Froscheiser said. "We have to have 100 percent accountability for how many people per service there are." Other content providers, whose prices are generally lower and are often defrayed by advertising to generate revenues, have adopted innovative ways to lure subscription cheats into ponying up the price to join. SportsLine, for instance, automatically enters members in all giveaways and promotions, whereas casual users have to key in their information manually. Subscribers can personalize their pages to allow them to follow special sports and teams. Dotson said such gentle measures are intended to make it more attractive to be a member than to use someone else's account, and are the only step likely for the company, at least into the near future. "The environment of the Web doesn't really allow you to police it," he said, and after all, the company has enough of a revenue stream from ads to make extra users less of a burden. "We say, 'Okay, not much we can do about it, we'll just enjoy the extra page views.' " sitewide licenses Other companies whose information is more likely to be passed among office workers who share business interests rather than sports conversations are aggressively pursuing sitewide licenses and lower prices. The Wall Street Journal Interactive offers deals to offices that allow users to sign up, not with a credit-card number, but with a company ID number. Lexis-Nexis does not allow individual licenses, but prices its Web services based on how many people there are in the office instead. All of the content providers agreed that they would prefer other methods of controlling distribution, but that barring technological advances of significant proportion, they're stuck with what they've got. "Our strategy is not to implement a solution that's worse than the problem," said Wall Street Journal Interactive's Baker of encrypted document schemes and micropayment models. "If there were a way to protect our information that didn't put an onerous restriction on our subscribers reading it, we'd do it." Eileen Kent, vice president, new media division of Playboy Enterprises Inc. in Chicago, echoed the sentiment. Until technology improves, she said, content providers need to assume that there will be some improper use of memberships. "I think the technology will find solutions," she said. "But until then, it's just a cost of doing business." ______________________________________________________________ Reprinted from Web Week, Volume 3, Issue 4, February 17, 1997 © Mecklermedia Corp. All rights reserved. Keywords: content electronic_commerce Date: 19970217 http://www.iworld.com

1 0

Re: Revisionism Was: Another email address forgery Was: REPOST: Re: Robert Br
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ISP_Ratings wrote: > Dave Hayes wrote: > > Toto writes: > >> Canada has a set of anti-hate laws that say that if Joe Average says > >> "Martin Looter King is a doo-doo", then he can be put in prison for > >> 40,000 years. > > That's absolutely ludicrous. Anti-hate laws only serve to make people > > hate the laws. Legislating emotions is quite impossible, not to > > mention downright scary. > Canada is one of the worst in the Western World--they have all sorts > of censorous nonsense on the books and seem almost as bad as Germany. > They don't allow certain political stuff like revisionism, etc. even > though quite obviously the best answer to revisionism is the very > crap they produce. Trying to surpress that viewpoint just makes it > all the more powerful. Pardon my intrusion, but doesn't revisionism allow suppressed people to recover at least some of their history (in the official sense), and since when is it not legitimate to re-investigate anything at all?

2 1

Condolences
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim: Well, if I am still in your killfile you won't be reading this. That's too bad. I just want to say the you are really being given the stake through the heart treatment by Sandy. And you say in your post, from the flames trash bin, Re: Constitution and a Right to Privacy: "I write about what I find interesting. You all know where the Delete key is. (Of course, a fairly large fraction of my recent posts have been deleted for you by Sandy, who sends many of my posts to neither the Main list nor the Flames list. Bet a lot of you didn't know this, did you?)" No, I did not know that and it pisses me off!!! Fuck everyone. Ross =-=-=-=-=-=- Ross Wright King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia Voice: 415-206-9906

1 0

Re:
by Otto Matic 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Wed, 19 Feb 1997 15:37:45 -0800 >From: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> >To: shark(a)turk.net, cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: "Trial" >At 8:02 PM +0200 2/19/97, Shark wrote: >>Trial > >OK, that makes 18 votes for "trial," 26 votes for "no trial," and 3 people >asking what the hell the vote is all about. Make that 4 what the hells. What the hell? this is the first I've seen of this post... I feel so left out. > >Looks like there won't be a trial and we can move directly to the punishment. > > >--Klaus! von Future Prime > > > >-- >[This Bible excerpt awaiting review under the U.S. Communications Decency >Act of 1996] >And then Lot said, "I have some mighty fine young virgin daughters. Why >don't you boys just come on in and fuck them right here in my house - I'll >just watch!"....Later, up in the mountains, the younger daughter said: >"Dad's getting old. I say we should fuck him before he's too old to fuck." >So the two daughters got him drunk and screwed him all that night. Sure >enough, Dad got them pregnant, and had an incestuous bastard son....Onan >really hated the idea of doing his brother's wife and getting her pregnant >while his brother got all the credit, so he pulled out before he >came....Remember, it's not a good idea to have sex with your sister, your >brother, your parents, your pet dog, or the farm animals, unless of course >God tells you to. [excerpts from the Old Testament, Modern Vernacular >Translation, TCM, 1996] > > > otto =-=-=-=-=- Otto Matic "Fuckin' A, Miller!" Bud, Repo Man --------------------------------------------------------- Get Your *Web-Based* Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com ---------------------------------------------------------

1 0