December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Flying - A-10 follow-up
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Thu, 01 May 97 08:33:00 CDT From: Corkum D Capt 2OSS/OSTC <corkumd(a)oss2.barksdale.af.mil> Subject: Flying - A-10 follow-up Corkum D Capt 2OSS/OSTC <corkumd(a)oss2.barksdale.af.mil> "Both the A-10's transponder and the autopilot appeared to have been turned off. Perhaps there is a simple technical explanation why no one noticed anything at first." Let me try and fill in a few of the holes for non-flyers: When aircraft fly in close formation typically only the lead aircraft has a transponder turned on. This is due to limitations with Air Traffic Control (ATC) systems. These systems are designed to prevent two aircraft from getting too close together thereby preventing possible midair collisions. Unfortunately the computers can't distinguish between aircraft that are on a collision course and aircraft in formation that are intentionally close together. For this reason ATC operators often request wingmen to turn off their transponders. Once the A-10 dropped back he was not easily visible to the lead aircraft who would be concentrating on entering the bombing range, working coordination with ATC and the range controllers etc. Inside the range ATC no longer maintains operational control of the aircraft and would not be following any of the aircraft directly. The first indication of the aircraft missing would be a failure of the wingman to respond to a radio call. When this happened it would first be assumed that he was on the wrong frequency. The lead aircraft would try to find him on another frequency, then attempt to call him on the emergency frequency "Guard". When this failed the lead would likely assume that the wingman had radio problems and would attempt to locate him visually. Only after he failed to locate him visually would he begin to worry that something happened. His first thought would be that the aircraft had a major malfunction such as complete loss of electrical power, that forced the pilot to abort the mission and return to base, but also prevented him from calling to the lead aircraft. The other possibility would be that the aircraft was down due to pilot error or aircraft malfunction. The idea that the wingman simply took the aircraft would likely never occur to the lead pilot. The lead pilot at this point would abort his mission and attempt to ascertain what happened to his wingman. He would contact ATC and ask if they had transponder track on the aircraft or reports of an aircraft down. He would also perform a visual search of the area and attempt to call back to the home base to see if they knew what happened. By this time the rogue pilot may have been gone for at least 30 minutes and was actually 200 miles away. The reason ATC could not track him is a technical issue. Modern ATC radars rely primarily on the aircraft transponder to provide location and altitude information. The actual radar returns "know as raw data" are only used as a secondary means to track aircraft when their transponders have failed. This must be performed manually since the computer has no way to distinguish one radar return from another without the transponder. This method is only used when an ATC controller knows an aircraft transponder has failed and must be manually tracked. Since the A-10 was not supposed to have his transponder on, no-one would notice when he broke formation. Only after the fact when the FAA reviewed the taped radar returns were they able to piece together the likely course of the A-10. I hope this explained some of the more technical reasons for what happened. David Corkum PGP mail preferred Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | tel: (702) 658-2654 CEO | fax: (702) 658-2673 First ECache Corporation | 7075 West Gowan Road | Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com --------------------------------------------------------------------- "I know not what instruments others may use, but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt."

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ARE YOU BEING INVESTIGATED ????
by investigations.comv＠angel.chico.joshuanet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Conference on UK Crypto Initiative 19 May 1997
by Phillip M. Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> SCRAMBLING FOR SAFETY > > Privacy, security and commercial implications of > the DTI's proposed encryption policy Didn't the green paper automatically fall since the government which issued it is no longer in office. The DTI does not have the right to make a crypto policy, ministers make policy, nor civil servants. It might be worth seeing if the relevant new junior ministers could attend and turn it into a brainwashing erm briefing session. Phill

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by 68529733＠22374.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Misdirected e-mail
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's no "sdg(a)dm.com". I don't know who this person is, but I hope s/he gets 'eir misdirected message via this mailing list. Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 06:52:58 -0400 Message-Id: <199705031052.GAA06973(a)lillith.anexis.com> From: support(a)freesmut.com (Free Smut Support) Subject: Secret Site Precedence: junk Apparently-To: <sdg(a)dm.com> Thank you, your username and password to our secret hardcore door are: Username: smut12 Password: freesmut This is an automated response to a request made on our web site. This IS NOT a bulk mailing. Our site is located at http://www.fl.freesmut.com/

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Java woes on compatibility
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

in a recent "PC Magazine" the story went into the compatibility problems among different vendors versions of the Java language, predicting that the problems may become worse. in short the vendors have a hard time getting all the compliance exactly correct. unfortunately, this same story happened with Unix and C such that the libraries out there did not fully adhere to a standard, even when the standard went into meticulous detail. is it the same insurmountable problem all over again? can there ever really be a totally portable language? java was invented to solve portability problems, but is plagued with the same ones that other languages have. what's the solution? it hasn't been implemented yet, but I believe the solution is an extremely sophisticated verification package for the correctness of the Java language. this type of idea is hinted in the makefiles of some C programs that compile based on complex attempts to avoid/workaround portability glitches. I saw one that did many regression tests on "strcpy" trying to catch all the kinds of things that can go wrong. the idea is that you actually have code that tests all the key implementation aspects of the library and language. it needs to be capable of being fully automated. for example, you might have code that calls the java window kit and then actually verifies that a window is drawn correctly by reading the screen or something like this. if you find that some things are falling through the tests, you just add to your tests. the tests don't need to be efficient-- you run them once and never again. also, I think the solution would involve writing a lot of verification routines for *every* feature of java that is implemented. the vendors simply run the code on their own implementation and it gives a "pass or fail" response. ideally, the java *user* could go through this process-- then the company cannot claim themselves that their implementation pass it's all out in the open for customers to test themselves. I would suggest that anything in the Java language that can't be tested like this, could be modified slightly to support this "testable" property, and that it would really pay off bigtime. in other words, some part of the library that doesn't seem like it could be tested, could have extra little aspects added to its implementation that support regression testing of the feature. (note that this is not necessarily "regression" in the classic sense of software engineering, but is very similar). I've written software that has this property, that its verification routines are built into it and are accessable by the end user. I think it represents a major new and important design consideration. and ultimately I think it saves developers and users time in the long run, but perhaps not the short run. a lot of work? yes, but it's the only way in my opinion, and it can be done in an elegant way. if it isn't I believe that portability problems will *increase* as the article predicted, and the revolutionary possibilities of Java will be forever handicapped and shortchanged. note that some people think that you should have a certification process. I don't like this at all because then the verification tools are caught up inside the Java company when it makes sense to *distribute* these tools so vendors can debug their own software without going through a bureacracy to get the stamp of approval. the verification suite is actually an extremely powerful utility that can test Java conformance and should be available to anyone trying to support the standard. note also that it wouldn't have to be Sun that creates such a package. in fact it might be better if someone not affiliated with the creation of the Java language built such a package. if anyone from Java/Sun is listening, I would be happy to consult on this. <g>

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Re: Privacy news: Oakland Cameras, Levi employee files, FileGate
by geeman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:35 PM 4/30/97 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: >It's been a busy day for privacy issues in the Oakland Trib. > >Surveillance Cameras in Oakland >------------------------------- >Bay Alarm is trying to sell the City Council a $500K-$1.5M closed-circuit >TV system for watching people in public places. The three picknickers >didn't litter, but the camera mounted on the public library building could >zoom in enough to that the council could tell a ham sandwich from roast beef, >and whether the two joggers were wearing Nikes or Reeboks. >"Anybody who is a law-abiding citizen is not going to be concerned about >this.. >"When I'm out in a public place.... I don't have an expectation of privacy" >said Councilcritter Nate Miley (East Oakland/Elmhurst), who wants a test run >in his district, where residents have bars on their windows and are afraid >to go out at night. Police Chief Joseph Samuels likes it too. >"This is technology spying on our citizens from camera on light poles" >said John Crew of the ACLU police practices project, speaking against it. >Bay Alarm said that some British cities have dealt with privacy fears by >setting up monitoring centers away from city and police offices, >where tapes are kept in case a crime occurs -- crime victims can call up >the police and ask them to play back tapes, said Mark Demier of Bay Alarm. >The camera systems are also capable of taking pictures in the dark. > Brief radio piece on the red-light cameras in S.F. --- red-light running appears to be down at the 4 intersections where cameras are installed; some well-placed official was quoted as saying "The cameras are definitely having an effect on people's behavior." Yes, a Good Thing. They are continuing to move forward with plans to install more cameras. This is fine for red-light-running. I'm just worried about the day when the cameras have an effect on people's behavior with respect to what they say, whom they associate with, the clothes they wear, the thoughts they think... How do you hack a camera?

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Re: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison"
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:09 AM -0800 5/1/97, Jonah Seiger wrote: >Tim - > >It's too bad we may not see eye-to-eye on this one. > >For what it's worth, CDT shares your concerns about the criminal provision >in the SAFE bill. We believe that as currently written, the provision is >overly broad and could create a chilling effect on the everyday use of >encryption, and unnecessary because it duplicates existing obstruction of >justice law. Indeed. All reasons to withdraw support for the Bill and to actively seek to undermine and sabotage it, as I hope many of us do. Further, it is quite clear that the Bill will *not* allow strong crypto (by "strong" I mean "arbitrarily strong," the only kind most of us support!) to be exported freely. Even for "financial cryptography," as clearly any strong crypto system can--and wiil--be used eventually by some group the Administration deems to be "international terrorists." (I would classify the U.S. government as a supporter of international terrorism, for many reasons. The mining of the harbors in a country with a relatively freely elected government, for example. The support of Kurdish terrorists. The funding and equippers of sappers in Serbia. And so on. Oh, and does the use of PGP by Burmese rebels/freedom fighters/terrorists, so often cited by Phil Zimmermann as a postive example, count as use by terrorists? You get the picture. One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. I support, for example, the use of strong cryptography to undermine the Zionist entity which preys upon the life of the people (TM)...does this make me a supporter of terrorists or of freedom fighters? And why do George Bush and Bill Clinton get to decide?) >We have expressed these concerns both publicly (in a letter to the >committee signed by EPIC, ACLU, EFF, VTW, CDT, and over 20 other >organizations - see http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html) and >privately in conversations with the committee staff. We hope to work with >the authors of SAFE to address these concerns, but, as you know, we are not >running this show and have to work with what the Congress gives us. Yoo're not "running the show," nor am I, or we, but you can withdraw support and actively oppose a bad bill. >However, despite our concerns about the criminal provisions, we believe >strongly that the SAFE bill, and the bills in the Senate sponsored by Burns >and Leahy, are vitally important and should be passed. > >As you know, the debate over encryption policy reform has been going on for >more than 4 years. Despite all of our efforts to promote the use of >encryption, crypto is still not widely used by the public. "Use a cipher, go to prison" will hardly engender more public support for cryptography. More importantly, what the hell does the SAFE bill have to do with Americans using crypto? Crypto is completely unrestricted, at least by law, anywhere in the U.S. for use by American citizens and (most) others. If Americans aren't using crypto, it's for other reasons. "Use a cipher, go to prison" will not help in this process. >The Clinton administration has not backed off from their commitment to a >global key-escrow/key-recovery system with guaranteed law enforcement >access to private keys. And despite the brilliant work of EFF on the >various legal challenges to the export restrictions, we feel this issue >will only be fully resolved through legislation. > >The status quo, in our view, is not good enough. Because of the export >controls and the lack of a coherent US encryption policy, Internet users do >not have access to the privacy protecting encryption products they need. > >Congress needs to stand up to the Administration and say, with a strong >voice, "your policy is a failure - we need a different solution". That's >what SAFE, Pro-CODE, and ECPA II do. Sorry, Johah, but these are just platitudes from a press release. More detailed analysis is called for, not just mouthings about Congress standing up to the Administration, etc. For example, answer this question: Will "unbreakable" (*) cryptography, using full-strength RSA and drop-in 3DES, IDEA, Blowfish, AES, etc., be allowed for unrestricted export? If "yes," then this is indeed a good deal. But the weasel words in nearly every section clearly say it is not. If "no," then crypto is still crippled for export...the details just vary (or maybe they don't, actually, as nothing is spelled out). (* "Unbreakable" is a dangerous term. By "unbreakable" I mean here an algorithm and key distribution mechanism (or no KD, as in PK systems) which surpasses any known breaking attempts by some comfortable margin. Cf. the study by the noted cryptographers, and use keylengths like 128 bits of work factor...that ought to be "unbreakable" by the standards of the next few centuries!) Importantly, the putative goals of the SAFE Bill could be much more simply handled this way: "SAFE -- Security and Freedom Through Encryption: Computer software shall be treated as any other form of speech is. Software shall not be subject to restrictions on dissemination, export, or possession." --Tim May, still a felon, and still using encryption to further prosecutable offenses. Fuck Congress. -- [This Bible excerpt awaiting review under the U.S. Communications Decency Act of 1996] And then Lot said, "I have some mighty fine young virgin daughters. Why don't you boys just come on in and fuck them right here in my house - I'll just watch!"....Later, up in the mountains, the younger daughter said: "Dad's getting old. I say we should fuck him before he's too old to fuck." So the two daughters got him drunk and screwed him all that night. Sure enough, Dad got them pregnant, and had an incestuous bastard son....Onan really hated the idea of doing his brother's wife and getting her pregnant while his brother got all the credit, so he pulled out before he came....Remember, it's not a good idea to have sex with your sister, your brother, your parents, your pet dog, or the farm animals, unless of course God tells you to. [excerpts from the Old Testament, Modern Vernacular Translation, TCM, 1996]

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BOUNCE cypherpunks@Algebra.COM: Admin request: /^subject:\s*help\b/i (fwd)
by cpunks＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----- Forwarded message from owner-cypherpunks(a)algebra.com ----- >From owner-cypherpunks(a)Algebra.COM Sat May 3 20:52:56 1997 Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 20:52:56 -0500 From: owner-cypherpunks(a)algebra.com Message-Id: <199705040152.UAA22185(a)manifold.algebra.com> To: owner-cypherpunks(a)Algebra.COM Subject: BOUNCE cypherpunks(a)Algebra.COM: Admin request: /^subject:\s*help\b/i >From cpunks(a)manifold.algebra.com Sat May 3 20:52:48 1997 Return-Path: <cpunks(a)sirius.infonex.com> Received: (from root@localhost) by manifold.algebra.com (8.8.3/8.8.2) with UUCP id UAA22154 for cypherpunks+incoming-cyberpass(a)algebra.com; Sat, 3 May 1997 20:52:44 -0500 Received: from sirius.infonex.com (cpunks(a)sirius.infonex.com [206.170.114.2]) by www.video-collage.com (8.8.5/8.8.0) with ESMTP id VAA13741 for <cypherpunks+incoming-cyberpass(a)algebra.com>; Sat, 3 May 1997 21:46:45 -0400 (EDT) Received: (from cpunks@localhost) by sirius.infonex.com (8.8.5/8.7.3) id SAA28274; Sat, 3 May 1997 18:49:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: from rigel.cyberpass.net (root(a)rigel.infonex.com [206.170.114.3]) by sirius.infonex.com (8.8.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id SAA28267 for <cpunks(a)sirius.infonex.com>; Sat, 3 May 1997 18:49:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mailhub.amaranth.com (root(a)mailhub.amaranth.com [206.96.254.3]) by rigel.cyberpass.net (8.8.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id SAA08032 for <cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net>; Sat, 3 May 1997 18:48:29 -0700 (PDT) Received: from amaranth.com (ppp20.pensacola.com [206.96.254.20]) by mailhub.amaranth.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id UAA13493 for <cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net>; Sat, 3 May 1997 20:45:59 -0500 Message-Id: <199705040145.UAA13493(a)mailhub.amaranth.com> From: "William H. Geiger III" <whgiii(a)amaranth.com> Date: Sat, 03 May 97 15:28:09 -0500 To: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net Subject: Help!! X-Mailer: MR/2 Internet Cruiser Edition for OS/2 v1.27c b9 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Do to some problems with my ISP I have lost several days worth of mail. :( Would someone be kind enough to zip up the cypherpunks posts from thursday to today and send them to me. Thanks, - -- - ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii(a)amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info - ----------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: What I like about MS is its loyalty to customers! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000 iQCVAwUBM2uuPo9Co1n+aLhhAQHNMgP/bqjyLYYW9E5ZNU7mvXgt87IBwONabZUG 3UtHOkdn+y0ONDQED8HGRq8Z/1ns8yU9LfR4Y+FHvGp//3CmWwwce0MDTp3O0Mg1 QF0yX8h4qS8HpZUxn2FNnrhn2dj+dBKqZLm8ADLuOrV5lbNLeFuMFbTRGts/QEAD BDJen5/U8ZI= =bDrX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Tag-O-Matic: I smashed a Window and saw... OS/2. ----- End of forwarded message from owner-cypherpunks(a)algebra.com -----

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cyberpass.net down?
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Is cyberpass.net down? I have posted several messages but have not received any of them. - -- - ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii(a)amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info - ----------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: If Windows sucked it would be good for something. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000 iQCVAwUBM2wNNY9Co1n+aLhhAQELwwQAkpj04nDm0nldgAHpFdfSa4aMa4XqNMWP DDblV3g3QRF/e2+FXk43xl2R611zNIQGchzEiMipPal7NKw1O/RZBlS/QtU7iBeG ScPYxEnom/Nq9xqdlCS0bhP2A6soikaK/SRAdX96w6iUtELbHWSN5GSSAD3LkN5B 0GEFhWgAF1M= =mviw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone, whose reputation is bigger than God, in the hope of sparing me public humiliation from the error of my ways (the very paradigm of a lost cause :-)), wrote to me offline on this topic. I'm posting it here, because frequently people reply to me with stuff which is extremely relevant to the argument at hand, and which should be heard in public. The main consideration I use is that none of the information in the reply can be used to identify the person who sent it, or mess up whatever plans they're laying, something you can clearly see in the following... At 4:48 pm -0400 on 5/3/97, somebody wrote: you write: > > I further claim that the most efficient digital bearer certificate is an > > anonymous one. > > Hal's point is this. There are two types of "anonymity": one where > the bank says "I swear I won't keep any records based on the name > you gave me" (the benign bank), and the other where we use Chaumian > blinding so the bank never even sees the identity information (the > untrusted bank). Right. Let's call the first one the Microsoft model, because I feel especially vicious this evening, and the second one the "Real" Chaum model. > Now, it seems to me that the "benign bank" sort of anonymity can't > cost any more (and in fact will even cost less) than the "untrusted > bank" Chaumian anonymity. Not true. With Chaumian anonymity, all the underwriter does is keep a database of spent digital bearer certificates, which they keep down by expiring certificate issues and the keys which generate them periodically. When someone double-spends a certificate, the underwriter has enough information to reveal their public key, but only when someone double spends and not before. With the Microsoft model, the underwriter knows who's buying your certificates, *and* the shared secret which makes the cash valid, *and* what time the certificate was issued, *and* what your shoe sizes, and the name of your sister's first date, and, and, and,... Anyway, I claim that the very Chaumian inability to *ever* know who bought the certificates you underwrite keeps you from ever *trying* to keep track of any other data, which, of course, is inherently cheaper. > Yet your arguments for anonymity apply > equally to both situations. No they don't. There's a qualitative difference between a system where you can't ever know who some one is, but you can still trust them, and a system where you always know who someone is and they have to trust *you*. :-). I say that one of the additional virtues of the former system is significantly reduced transaction costs, and finally, that that happy side effect will eventually result in a shift away from the latter kind of system, if it ever is useful to begin with. By the way, an additional cost of the system, which is obviously more in line with the privacy concerns of cypherpunks, and possibly less germaine to the transaction cost issue we're discussing, is the cost of the risk of breaking the confidentiality of systems like the Microsoft idea. I have a hunch that all it takes is one big information leak, and such systems will be dropped as a form of digital cash underwriting, but I'm going pretty far out on a limb to make that particular assertion. Should we call this the "Clipper effect", just to rattle peoples' chains? > Therefore, I say your arguments, taken > to their logical conclusion, imply that we'll end up with "benign > bank" anonymity, rather than Chaumian "untrusted bank" anonymity. Again, I don't think so. However, what we really need is some actual estimates and analysis to prove it, barring the existence of any actual transaction cost data, of course. :-). Something I'm not qualified to do, though I bet there are people here who can get those answers. > But "benign bank" anonymity is a very very weak form of anonymity > indeed -- it's not what most cypherpunks (or cryptographers) mean > when they talk about anonymous digital cash. Amen. Only people mired in the book-entry way of looking at things think otherwise. I believe the economics of the marketplace will soon teach them the serious errors of their ways... > "Benign bank" anonymity > is the sort of thing that Cybercash or other traditional systems > provide; "untrusted bank" security is what Digicash provides. And, again, I assert that the paradox of all this is that the cheapest form of commerce is a form where you don't trust anyone, or, better, trust, but verify, everyone. That's the beauty of the blind signature algorithm, it allows you to do all that, and not keep books, which cost money. > So, if I understand your argument correctly, you're saying that > we'll inevitably end up with some weak form of anonymity, but it > will be far weaker than what most cypherpunks want. I hope you can see by now, after I've taken another shot at explaining it better, what I was getting at. > That sounds more like a cause for a call to arms than a reason to > sit around reassuring ourselves that everything will turn out fine > without us! Nah. I don't do calls to arms. It's much better to change the world by making money. An especially important focus to have when you're building transaction systems. :-). I strongly beleive that you can easily knock three, maybe four, decimal places off the cost of any transaction you can care to mention just by using strong financial cryptography and anonymous digital bearer certificates on a ubiquitous geodesic network. That remains to be seen, however. I will say that I'm working as hard as someone with my limited skillset can to prove that hypothesis. :-). Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete with the New York Times?" Andrew Kantor: "Yes." Stahl: "Isn't that dangerous?" The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

1 0

Ready for PrimeTime: FUD! The Newsletter of Fear Uncertainty and Doubt
by geeman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

See this new exciting venture. Cards and Letters Welcome; use "FUD" in the subject header. www.best.com/~geeman

1 0

Re: Firewalls
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy Mayo the self-admitted child molester possesses a rudimentary dick less than one inch long, half the size of his mother's clitoris, that barely makes a fistful. Thereby hangs the root of this Jew-hating sissy's sick fixation on little boys and Usenet forgeries. \|||/ (o o) -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timmy Mayo

2 1

YOU ARE APPROVED!
by YES!＠netcom.es 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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1 0

No Subject
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Quoting: http://www.msnbc.com/onair/nbc/mtp/default.asp Tune in to Meet the Press with Tim Russert on Sunday... check local listings for details. Sunday: Meet the Press will look at crime, terrorism, national security, and foreign campaign contributions. Moderator Tim Russert will speak with FBI Director Louis Freeh. This week's panelist will be NBC's Pete Williams, and the roundtable guest will be Elizabeth Drew, author of Whatever it Takes. Meet the Press transcripts are usually available three hours after the show airs.

1 0

Full Strength Stronghold 2.0 Released Worldwide
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For Release May 5, 1997 C2Net Software: Douglas Barnes +1 510 986 8770 UK Web: Dave Williams +44 113 222 0046 Full-Strength Stronghold 2.0 Released Worldwide C2Net President Sameer Parekh Rejects Weak Keys, Back Doors Oakland, CA - C2Net Software, Inc. annouced today the worldwide availability of Stronghold 2.0, a major upgrade to their secure web server based on Apache. With this release, Stronghold has added more functionality than ever, including uncompromised security, web-based configuration, and new protocol support. "The Stronghold web server -- like all C2Net products -- supports full-sized keys, and will never support government back doors," said C2Net president Sameer Parekh. "We have development teams around the globe working on our products, free from US export control policy. Even if some of these countries cave in to US demands, we'll still be able to produce first-rate, uncompromised security products." Others Use Compromised Security In a recent announcement, Netscape Communications announced plans to include government back doors in their products. "By implementing this so-called 'key recovery', Netscape is getting a small increase in key length in exchange for putting your keys in the hands of the government," said Parekh. "This the same government that hired Aldrich Ames, the same goverment that has IRS employees surfing taxpayer databases at will. What do you think is going to happen to your keys?" According to cryptography expert Bruce Schneier, "There is absolutely no business case for key recovery. Any benefit you get from longer key lengths is offset by the enormous security risk of concentrating keys in a few hands." Current "export" versions of Netscape and Microsoft web servers use a weak 40-bit cipher that can be broken in hours by any bored systems administrator or college student with access to a few hundred idle machines. By comparison, all C2Net software can use at least 128-bit keys. To understand this difference, imagine that the hundreds of computers needed to crack a 40 bit key in a few hours were compressed into a cube an inch on a side, and you built a computer the size of the Earth out of these cubes, it would still take this computer more than four times as long to crack a 128 bit key. It's easy to find a few hundred computers idle at any medium-sized business or university; Earth-sized computers are still relatively uncommon. Stronghold Gaining Market Share In several recent surveys, Stronghold has emerged as a leading contender in the web server market. An O'Reilly and Associates/Netcraft survey of secure web servers in use on the Internet found that Stronghold was second only to Netscape. The monthly Netcraft survey of all web servers on the Internet has indicated for some time that Stronghold is also the second most popular commercial web server for the Unix platform. "We've been steadily gaining market share," indicated Parekh, "and to a great extent it's due to our firm stand that we won't sell deliberately weakened security products to our customers." Features in Stronghold 2.0 "We've redesigned the security interfaces and built on the new Apache 1.2 code base," commented Mark Cox, Stronghold product manager at UK Web. "Stronghold has had many productivity and performance enhancements and it is now fully compliant with the new HTTP/1.1 standard." The HTTP/1.1 standard is a significant update to HTTP/1.0, the protocol that governs how web browsers and web servers communicate. HTTP/1.1 brings many new features to the table, including improved content and language negotiation, improved persistent connections, and better recovery from interrupted transfers. (For more information on HTTP/1.1, see http://www.apacheweek.com/features/http11) Stronghold 2.0 also includes a web-based configuration manager, allowing web administrators to securely administer their sites from the web browser of their choice. "We've had a lot of requests for this feature as Stronghold has grown in popularity," said Douglas Barnes, C2Net Vice President. On the security front, the new release includes support for Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) version 3, which provides stronger security and more flexibility in choosing ciphers. Background UK Web Limited is a leading Internet services company specialising in server technology, Internet security, business solutions and effective site design. C2Net is the leading worldwide provider of uncompromised network security software. Netscape Navigator and Netscape Enterprise are trademarks of Netscape Communications Corporation. Microsoft Internet Explorer and Microsoft Internet Information Server are trademarks of Microsoft Corporation. Stronghold and SafePassage are trademarks of C2Net Software, Inc. Portions of Stronghold were developed by the Apache Group, and were taken with permission from the Apache Server http://www.apache.org/. Stronghold also includes software developed by Eric Young (eay(a)cryptsoft.com)

4 3

Ebonics: The Finale
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Oakland school officials drop ebonics references Associated Press OAKLAND, Calif.-The Oakland public schools African American Task Force has dropped all references to ebonies in a final report about improving education for black students. The district caused a national controversy four months ago when it suggested that ebonies, or black English, was a second language that is "genetically based." The final report, obtained by The Oakland Tribune, still emphasizes improving black students' language skills, but it makes no reference to ebonies. There is also no reference to black students speaking a separate language. And provisions suggesting the district pursue federal bilingual funding for black students, as it does for children who speak Spanish or Chinese at home, have been deleted. The U S. Department of Education quickly dismissed the latter idea when it was raised in December. Instead, the 17-page report calls for better language and reading programs, additional tests to measure the language skills of students who speak black English, and expansion of the Standard English Proficiency program. The task force says the district should aggressively recruit black teachers and offer help to black teachers who have not passed the state teaching exam. The task force also recommends hiring a coordinator specifically to improve the education of black students and a budget of nearly $2 million over five years to achieve the goals. The task force's work is an attempt to improve the dismal record of Oakland's black students. Black students, who represent 53 percent of the district, make up 71 percent of special education classes, 37 percent of gifted classes and 80 percent of suspensions. --end PGP encrypted mail PREFERRED (See MIT/BAL servers for my PK) PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear (N7ZEZ) | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com 7075 West Gowan Road | Voice: 1-702-658-2654 Suite 2148 | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 Las Vegas, NV 89129 | --------------------------------------------------------------------- God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change; The courage to change the things I can; The weapons that make the difference; And the wisdom to hide the bodies of the people that got in my way;-) "Surveilence is ultimately just another form of media, and thus, potential entertainment." --G. Beato "Without censorship, things can get terribly confused in the public mind." -General William Westmoreland

2 1

[STEGO] One-time pads
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy C. Mayonnaise sexually molests little children, farm animals, and inanimate objects. < > < > V )_.._( V Timmy C. Mayonnaise \\ <____> // ~ <______> ~ > /~\______/~\ // /~\_____/~\ /_\ /~\____/~\ /_\ /~\___/\~\ _/_\/ \___/\__/__\/ \___/__\/

2 1

Thanks for signing up!
by The Dilbert Trivia Game 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi from Yoyodyne! This message is to let you know that you're signed up for The Dilbert Trivia Game. Welcome! You'll get questions e-mailed to you on Tuesdays, your answers are due back by 11 p.m. Eastern Time on Sundays, and you'll get your scoring messages on Mondays. It's that simple. When your questions come, you'll be asked to send your answers to dogbert(a)yoyo.com in this format: * Make sure your Player ID -- which looks like this (123456di) -- is on the Subject line of the message you send back with your answers. * Each answer must be preceded by one of these symbols # and each answer must be on its own line. * Each answer must be the letter of the multiple choice answer you like best. Let's repeat. The answer is the letter of the multiple choice selection you like best. It works like this: If one of the questions asks for the name of the evil human resources director, we'll say: "What is the name of the evil human resources director?" Then we'll list these choices: A -- Catbert B -- Ratbert C -- Dogbert You know that Catbert is the evil human resources director, so you'll send back e-mail with your Player ID in the Subject line, and a multiple choice selection in the body of the message that look like this: # A That's pretty much all there is to it. For all the fine print on how to play, the schedule, etc., e-mail these addresses for the autoreply of your choice: How to Play -- dogberthow(a)yoyo.com Official Rules -- dogbertrules(a)yoyo.com FAQ -- dogbertfaq(a)yoyo.com Talk to you soon! P.S. We promised you an answer to this sample question when you signed up: * * * Dilbert is worried that if head count is reduced by 50 percent, all the smart people will leave The boss says: A -- Would that be a bad thing? B -- If only half the people go, how could that be all the smart people? C -- Could you organize a goodbye potluck lunch for them The correct answer is #C. --- Yoyodyne Entertainment "Where the future begins...tomorrow." win(a)yoyo.com

1 0

http:--www.cnn.com-TECH-9705-04-web.libel.ap-
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CNN logo navigation Infoseek/Big Yellow Pathfinder/Warner Bros Tech banner Puzzled about doing real business on the Web? rule CAUTION: ANYTHING YOU POST MAY BE USED AGAINST YOU Libel May 4, 1997 Web posted at: 9:51 p.m. EDT (0151 GMT) In this story: * When slander becomes libel * Privacy issues * E-mail can make it a federal issue * The wrath of large corporations (AP) -- When the Founding Fathers wrote the First Amendment protectingfreedom of the press, they never imagined millions of Americanswould someday have their own version of one sitting in their backrooms. But with the advent of the World Wide Web, that's exactly whathas happened. And from this revolution has emerged a new legalquandary: Just what standards are private individuals to be held towhen it comes to what they "publish" on the millions of Web pagesand other online forums that serve as the world's soapbox? To a great extent, the answer thus far is this: No one knows.With the Web revolution less than 3 years old, a body of case lawhasn't yet been built up. But lawyers who study online issues dohave some observations -- and advice. When slander becomes libel First off, they note, the line between slander, once the realmof individuals, and libel, the bane of publishers, has beenblurred. It used to be that spreading malicious gossip aboutsomeone down at the barbershop could lead to charges of slander.But slander, by definition spoken, was hard to prove and generallydidn't reach enough people to do any major harm. Post that same information where it can be read by millionsonline, however, and you've suddenly entered the realm of libel --governed by stricter laws originally written to cover printpublications. "Let's face it," says Mark Rasch, director of informationsecurity law and policy at the Center for Information Protection atScience Applications International Corp. in McLean, Virginia. "If I wereto print up a handbill saying bad things about my neighbor thatwere false, at most I could distribute a couple of hundred of them.With the Web, I can now damage his reputation worldwide." The law is clear: Libel consists of publishing a false anddefamatory statement about an identifiable person, causing injuryto the subject's reputation. Often tied to it is the legal notionof defamation, defined as that which exposes a person to hatred,ridicule or contempt, causing them to be shunned or injuring theirbusiness or calling. Truth is always a defense against libel, so if your Web pagesays someone has two heads and they do, you're fine. But saythey're a murderer and you can expect someone to come asking forsome proof -- and possibly a bill for damages if you don't have any. Privacy issues Then, there's invasion of privacy. It's one thing to pass alonga juicy bit of gossip to a friend. It's quite another to post it tothe Web. "Let's say, for instance, you disclose some private fact aboutsomebody -- say, their medical records. Or you snuck into theirhouse and took a nudie photo of them and put it up on the Net. Thatwould be a no-no under civil law and they could sue for damages,"says David Banisar, staff counsel for the Electronic PrivacyInformation Center in Washington, D.C. Although few of these cases have actually gone to court, lawyersoften are called in when things get ugly. "I know of a few cases where the ex-husband and ex-wife havegone after each other on the Net," Banisar says. "In oneinstance, the ex-wife put up a diatribe page on what a scumbag hewas and how he wasn't paying his child support -- and gave out hisphone number so suitably angry women could take it up with him." Remember, too, that the Internet's reach magnifies everything inthe eyes of the law. E-mail can make it a federal issue Shouting "You jerk, I'm gonna belt you one!" at a carelessdriver who runs over your mailbox won't get you into trouble. Butposting the threat on the Internet is dangerous. It's all aquestion of reach: Anything done over a telecommunications deviceis automatically an interstate communication. "This suddenly makes it a federal issue if you e-mail,"Banisar warns. State statutes vary, but when federal laws come into effect, anycommunication containing a threat to kidnap or injure a personcarries with it the possibility of imprisonment up to five years ora fine of up to $1,000. And an entirely different level of concern pops up when theobject of the threat is an elected official. Like the "no jokes"signs posted by airport metal detectors, the FBI has no sense ofhumor when it comes to threatening officeholders. "We can't forget all those idiots arrested for sending threatsto the president. So don't send threats to the president overe-mail. It's a federal crime," Banisar says. Fraud is another sticking point. It's illegal everywhere, ofcourse. But the Federal Trade Commission has taken an especiallyhard line against fraud on the Net. Send a snail-mail chain letterasking for money and you might get a call from postal authorities.Try it on the Web, however, and you'll be investigated by the FTCforces who track online scammers. The wrath of large corporations But in the end, the biggest vulnerability of any self-publisheron the Web is probably the wrath of large corporations. You can say their logos are ugly and their presidents are jerksand they don't flinch. But try using any variety of a heavilytrademarked name or image on your site and watch the injunctionsflow. Generally speaking, it's other businesses who get into trouble.But, once in a while, an individual will set out to make a point --and get a legally phrased e-mail in response. Several cases haveresulted in Web sites' being taken down, including individuals whoposted statements against Kmart and McDonald's. Overall, remember that putting words or pictures up on your Webpage is just like publishing them in the newspaper. Use Rasch's simple test: "What you should avoid putting on theWeb is the same stuff you'd avoid putting on leaflets and handingout on the street." Copyright 1997 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. rule Related sites and stories: * The Communications Decency Act: Related sites and stories - June 12, 1996 External sites are not endorsed by CNN Interactive. rule Watch these shows on CNN for more sci-tech stories: CNN Computer Connection | Future Watch | Science & Technology Week rule Message Boards Sound off on our message boards Tell us what you think! You said it... [INLINE] Puzzled about doing real business on the Web? rule To the top © 1997 Cable News Network, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms under which this service is provided to you.

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Re: Full Strength Stronghold 2.0 Released Worldwide
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tom Weinstein wrote on cryptography(a)c2.net: {With Perry dripping Sameer's sperm from his mouth as his C2Nut Jackboots soiled the message with the following:} [I felt I had to let this go through, but I would advise that those involved restrict themselves to calmer comments from here on... --perry] > sameer wrote: > > > > In a recent announcement, Netscape Communications announced plans to > > include government back doors in their products. "By implementing this > > so-called 'key recovery', Netscape is getting a small increase in key > > length in exchange for putting your keys in the hands of the > > government," said Parekh. "This the same government that hired Aldrich > > Ames, the same goverment that has IRS employees surfing taxpayer > > databases at will. What do you think is going to happen to your keys?" > > This is utter crap, and I'm sure you know it. All we're going to do is > provide an OPTIONAL (and I mean really optional, not the way the feds > use it) way for administrators to recover private keys. This is not > GAK. I will never work on a product that includes GAK. > > Oh, but I guess saying that Netscape is responding to customer > requirements by including support for corporate key recovery wouldn't > make such good press release spam. Crap seems to be such a violent, obscene word when used to describe C2Nut's bullshit. Good thing that the cryptography list has Perry to protect the list subscribers from StrangleHold's competition defending themselves from Sameer's self-serving denigration of their products. Too bad C2Nut doesn't have a StrangleHold on the cypherpunks list, as well. Then they could use censorship threats to make us all be good little boys and girls, too. I expect all PR statements to have a modicum of bullshit in them and I resent any lame-fuck-would-be-Hitler trying to put a lid on the response to that bullshit. The fact that StrangleHold seems to have so many things to hide and such a strong need to control discussion of its product indicates to me that perhaps their product cannot stand up to the light of public scrutiny and criticsm. C2Nut's bottle-fed cryptography list may be fine for those who are afraid to know too much about StrangleHold, but anyone who owns a wetsuit needs to subscribe to the cypherpunks list for the good, old-fashioned pissing contests that send the pretenders home with their tails between their legs. (Anyone hear from DataERetch lately?) PissMonger

1 0

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer(a)lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer(a)hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 5 May 97 6:45:39 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nym config(a)nym.alias.net *+*#+#+++**# 3:30 99.99% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net ++++*-++***# 19:39 99.98% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com *####*####*# 1:52 99.97% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de +-++++++++- 1:54:28 99.94% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de +-++-+++++- 1:57:01 99.90% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++++++++++++ 35:18 99.90% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ++.-.-.---.- 8:18:24 99.87% replay remailer(a)replay.com ***++- * -* 54:35 98.34% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ******* *** 8:52 97.43% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -------..- 5:58:48 97.30% hidden remailer(a)hidden.net #+#**#+# + 5:34:09 95.94% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net -+.--+-.+ 1:19:01 90.79% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com -..-- 3:59:41 78.48% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

1 0

Problems with posts
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hmmmm I seem to be having some problems with getting my messages posted to the list (at least they are not showing up back here). :( This is just a test so please ignore. Thanks, - -- - ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii(a)amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info - ----------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: Win3.1? For fast relief call 800-3-IBM-OS2. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000 iQCVAwUBM24DHo9Co1n+aLhhAQFQAwP+L3AXu9AbQsCuaNroI3UfuyAKGO70MiMM MD4bxRENaBwRc4A1aU6QsZosbuyRZfOZqCQ67ANI7Ecowfij9rc92wOvl+ePhYjS ObvDdDoDRpDqBDQ8oVimDkIwXJ8z79xxK6s3F0uevSb4pSlz3MZHrf+BoDxc5L1u mA403n2n+W8= =cAdA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Win up to $4,950.00 Instantly with Cyber Casino
by Service＠iBase.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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1 0

Fast Cheap Unreviewed Stream Cipher
by Bill Frantz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I received this code from another friend. Here's a FAST somewhat cryptographically secure pseudo-random generator written by a friend of mine that wishes to remain anonymous. He has given permission for the following code to be placed in the public domain, and to be sent to cypherpunks and others for review. Alas, I have never gotten around to doing so. As it states, on a PowerPC it'll produce bits fast enough to be a pseudo-one-time pad / stream cipher for good digitized video on a LAN (the purpose for which he originally sent it to me) and hence should do point-to-point audio without even breathing hard. For those who haven't heard, the scenario is for point-to-point audio to use an affordable (weak) stream cipher, but to be changing keys frequently using our strongly secure SSL channel. Each costly break would only compromise a few seconds or so of audio. The following code may serve as the affordable (but maybe better than weak) stream cipher. /******************************************************/ /** (c) 1823 Millard Fillmore, all rights expired **/ /** Full words of pseudorandom bits at video speed **/ /******************************************************/ #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <time.h> #include <sioux.h> #define WORD_SIZE 32 unsigned long shiftRand(); static void refillShiftRand(); void seedShiftRand(unsigned long seed); static unsigned long shiftRandArray[31] = { }; // to hold internal state values static unsigned long * arrayPtr = shiftRandArray; // incremented as state values are consumed static unsigned long * const end = shiftRandArray + 31; // marks end (and need to refill array) // Initializes shiftRandArray to pseudorandom contents using a seed value and the system rand function, // which is assumed to produce 16 bits per call. Low rand bits are obscured by xoring with high bits from other // calls, and all product bits depend on two or more calls to rand. The resulting values are themselves obscured, // not simply revealed at the output, hence this is probably overkill. The seed acts as a key. void seedShiftRand(unsigned long seed) { srand(seed); long cyclesPerWord = ((WORD_SIZE + 7) >> 3) - 1; // will add a net of 8 bits per call to rand unsigned long * arrPtr = shiftRandArray; for (; arrPtr < end; arrPtr++) { unsigned long rand1 = rand(); // wrap this value around word boundary: unsigned long element = (rand1 >> 8) | (rand1 << (WORD_SIZE - 8)); for (long i = 0; i < cyclesPerWord; i++) { element ^= rand() << (8 * i); //previous 8 high bits obscure 8 new low bits } *arrPtr = element; } } // Low-order bits in the following act as an xor-based linear feedback shift register (with moving taps // and stationary data); the repeat period equals (1 << 31) - 1. Higher-order bits have similar // "intrinsic" behavior, but the state of each is determined by additional xoring with a sequence // of carry bits from below, causing repeated period-doubling across the width of the word. // // The choice of 31 and 13 corresponds to a primitive polynomial mod 2; Applied Cryptography has // typos in polynomial coefficients, but the repeat period was tested directly. This code avoids a // shift-direction mistake in Applied Cryptography, and hence follows Numerical Recipes. // static void refillShiftRand() { unsigned long * tap0 = shiftRandArray + 0; unsigned long * tap13 = shiftRandArray + 13; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13 = shiftRandArray; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; return; } // sum at 10 million iterations = 1344076334 /* // Slightly faster than the above on a 604, provided CodeWarrior's instruction-scheduling "optimization" is OFF. static void refillShiftRand() { unsigned long * tap0a = shiftRandArray + 0; unsigned long * tap0b = shiftRandArray + 1; // uses more registers unsigned long * tap13a = shiftRandArray + 13; unsigned long * tap13b = shiftRandArray + 14; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a = shiftRandArray; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b = (shiftRandArray + 1); *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; return; } // sum at 10 million iterations = 1344076334 */ // The array-filling mechanism above provides an information-conserving mechanism for producing // pseudorandom numbers with an effectively unlimited repeat period, fast, but based on a large number of // internal state bits, and having a bit of a given order eventually depend on all bits of the same or // lower order in all words in the array. // Rare, transient states having almost all zeros in the low bits will show strong correlations, // since the restoration of normal bit statistics will take several cycles. (The all-zero state // is inaccessible unless it is the starting condition -- one might test for this.) Correlations // in the frequency of low-order zero bits in sequentially generated array elements are eliminated // in the output by xoring high bits with the low bits; adding a preceding squaring operation // adds the effect of making any given output consistent with a large number of array element states, // making inferences regarding the internal state of the system relatively difficult. inline unsigned long shiftRand() { ((arrayPtr == end) ? // '?:' instead of 'if' to enable inlining by CW compiler (refillShiftRand(), arrayPtr = shiftRandArray, 0) : 0); unsigned long output = *arrayPtr++; unsigned long square = output * output; // this multiplication seems free on a 605 return(square + (output >> (WORD_SIZE / 2))); } // With multiplication (above) and summing of output to prevent bogus optimizations, 16.5 clocks per word. // Test code for CodeWarrier environment. void main () { SIOUXSettings.asktosaveonclose = FALSE; unsigned long sum = 0; seedShiftRand(12345); // easily guessed seed long start = clock(); for (long i = 0; i < 2000000; i++) { sum += shiftRand(); sum += shiftRand(); sum += shiftRand(); sum += shiftRand(); sum += shiftRand(); } unsigned long end = clock(); printf("\n sum = %u", sum); printf("\n\n time = %d \n", (int)(1000.0 * ((float)(end - start) / (float)CLOCKS_PER_SEC))); }

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