December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 28 May 1997, Tim May wrote: > At 5:02 PM -0400 5/27/97, Mark M. wrote: > > >I don't know the reason, but the IRS tax code requires that all passport > >applicants supply their SSNs to the IRS. The penalty for failing to > >notify is $500. I recently encountered this situation and just left > > Good for you, seriously, but you may not yet have heard the last of this. > As with "frivolous returns" (such as writing comments on the tax forms They can always harrass. Supposedly the State Department reports to the IRS anyone who does not give this info, but the IRS seems not to follow up, an the only thing they could do under the law is impose the $500 penalty which would probably not survive a court challenge (I forget the particular reasoning, but if they challenged and lost, no one would have any fear not giving their SSNs out, similarly to why they don't charge every cypherpunk under export laws - fear of grey is more useful than a clear line that will be more liberal than they want). When I applied for a passport (specifically because it is a government recognized ID that need not contain your social security number), I didn't write the IRS at all (you have no duty to notify them), and IF contacted, I would simply say "Who do I make the $500 check out to, and where do I send it, and who should my lawyer contact to challenge it". I have never been contacted. > The woman behind the desk didn't seem interested in my point and just said > that without a valid SS number, no registration tags would be issued. It > was then my choice to drive without tags (and get a ticket anytime a cop > noticed this and decided to act on it) or seek some kind of legal > restraining order (???, but probably $$$). IANAL, but: There is another statute which says that any time a government agency (it does not apply to corporations) asks for your SS# they have to state the reason and authority they have to ask for it (something like a state statute or order - I will look up the info and post here when I have time). Usually the behind-the-counter culture doesn't know about this. You can also give a religous objection. You can ask for the name of the person and their exact title then ask nicely to speak with a manager familar with the law or procedure, and that it might be illegal to ask for that information without citing the authority (with the above law in hand), etc. Since they have to have alternate ID numbers unless they only give licenses out to US citizens and not the Amish or others who have religous objections - you can ask for one of these alternate numbers. You can also be agreeable and say, OK, if you want to see my SSN so that you can confirm that I am me, I will show it to you, but I don't want that specific number on my license, and you can pick any number that is convienient to you, or I can supply my standard "alternate-ID" number. My state uses a number that is a wierd checksum of my name and birthdate and who knows what, so it doesn't apply to my drivers license. I had my SSN used (they didn't tell me that is what it was for, and this was before I was as aware of the privacy matters) on a professional license, and they did things like disclose it to people who bought their mailing list and it appeared in some mailings. I only had to call the state office, explain about the problems of identity fraud, and had a new license with a new number (which I use as my alt-id number) within a week (and they said they would not include SSNs with their mailing list). Some people are reasonable. Generally they try to find the easiest path. When it is clear that you won't go away quietly, and that you are going to be more hassle than it is worth (and that you aren't trying to evade any requirement, e.g. "You agree that I have proper ID, and qualify in every other way, and the only reason you won't is because I won't tell you my SSN even though you can't cite the authority you have ...") you can usually get them to either relent or say something slanderous in public. A silly but necessary game. Now if I can mail in a form, I usually use the alt-id number and write it in place of the SSN with a note right next to it saying it is not my SSN and that if you really want it you have to write me back and explain why they want it. (If they do, I send them a NDA with something to the effect that if I find it has leaked anywhere they have to cover all costs associated with correcting any record, etc.). Given that they are usually desparate to sign me up for whatever it is, and the mail is a hassle for them, they just enter the alt-id number. I keep a copy of the original form with the Not-my-SSN statement in case someone wants to accuse me of any kind of fraud.

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Surveillance State Delayed
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Fascinating article in last Saturday's New York Times about INS plans to revoke the U.S. citizenship of 5,000 people who got that citizenship sans criminal background checks so they could vote for Clinton in '96. Now, the INS revokes a big 25 citizenships a year so they really have a job ahead of them. Demonstrates the enforcement challenges of bureaucracies living in a mass society. They think they can get away with administrative revocations but even those can be appealed to federal court. 5,000 appeals would be quite a burden. If they wait too long and two years pass from time of granting, the Service will lose the administrative option and will have to do full court proceedings to revoke. Even if they revoke, the "aliens" will still have their old proofs of citizenship (passports, etc) as well as their former status as permanent residents so revocation may be meaningless in any case. That's not the cutest bit, though. In addition to the 5,000 new Clinton voters with provable criminal records, they had to go through 180,000 records of people with various sorts of documentation problems to see if any of them were criminals. But the Feds couldn't do it themselves. They lacked the capability. They hired one of the big accounting firms (Peat-Marwick?) to CHECK THE NAMES against the NCIC. They got some 9,000 positive matches but naturally, they can't tell how many of those 9,000 matches are false positives. Lots of work ahead. The gloom and doom types like to claim that it is trivial for the almighty Feds to find out everything about every one, look inside the souls of all of us, separate the good from the evil and unerringly punish the evil. Omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence. Oddly enough, this claim is often made by people who, otherwise, don't believe in God. But this article on citizenship revocation gives lie to this claim of state power. Citizenship applicants have submitted vast quantities of information about themselves to the Feds. They have undergone years of a staged and complex process to move from nonresident alien to resident alien to citizen. At every point, they NARCed themselves out in detail directly to the federal government. And yet, that same government can't even tell if these people are "criminals." If they can't efficiently surveil and regulate this group, what chance do they have to regulate and surveil the other 260 million of us? DCF -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 5.0 beta Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBM43tToVO4r4sgSPhAQHhcAP+O3Kn/rTtonspM+fWF7S/MeoV/zENTgll Di4GCB1oZTlvU9je6ucRxpXvezsjgibmurApR22j3J0rhgHAVOCT8+EjNLAi3yGh mwXXuCH/Z55nAXVit8mZvXSrJ8OPFWMn57Nma33uaD48QJ7AFqVxISi7+pSI91Mx LR0oZ1nJE/8= =oo4o -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Mailing list
by TSadoff197＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please send

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Anonymizer upgrades
by lcottrell＠infonex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(A copy of this message has also been posted to the following newsgroups: alt.security, alt.privacy,alt.anonymous,alt.privacy.anon-server) I am pleased to announce two significant improvements to The Anonymizer (www.Anonymizer.com) First, we have fixed the HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR and HTTP_VIA security holes. This was a problem for people accessing The Anonymizer though a web proxy. Second, we have introduced accounts on the Anonymizer. The poor performance of The Anonymizer (to put it lightly) has been due to our attempts to keep it from completely swamping our T1. Paid accounts on The Anonymizer bypass the slowdown mechanisms, and also provide access to anonymous news and anonymous anonymous FTP. Finally, while it has been true for some time, it is not widely known that the Anonymizer is owned and operated by Infonex. We took over management of the Anonymizer several months ago. For those not familiar with Infonex, we have been active in the privacy business for some time. We host several anonymous remailers, we offer anonymous shell accounts through our subsidiary Cyberpass (www.cyberpass.net) and I personally developed the Mixmaster anonymous remailer system. Lance Cottrell -- Lance Cottrell President, Infonex lcottrell(a)infonex.com http://www.infonex.com/~loki

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Crypto Disputes
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For full versions of the stories below: http://jya.com/kinkey.txt ---------- For two years, the IETF Security Group has labored to hammer out the IP Security (IPSec) protocol, a standard way that businesses can open up an encrypted link to a trading partner's network. The link is encrypted after authentication by means of an X.509 digital certificate at an IPSec-based firewall or gateway. But an unresolved, bitter dispute over the technique for automatically swapping keys over the 'Net - referred to as key management - has resulted in two incompatible schemes in the IPSec specification. In this battle of the acronyms, the debate centers on the Simple Key Management for IP (SKIP), developed by Sun Microsystems, Inc., and the Internet Secure Association Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP), developed by the National Security Agency. ---------- Responding to Sun's announcement that it would license 128-bit encryption algorithms from Elvis+Co., a Russian company, the White House announced that it would look into Sun's actions. "Sun's strategy is another brick from a wall that is coming down," said Jim Bidzos, president and CEO of RSA Data Security. "And it highlights that something is wrong with the U.S. policy." Sun has approximately a 10 percent equity stake in Elvis+, whose product is based on Sun's publicly available protocol, Simple Key Management for IP (SKIP). The 10 percent interest is thought to be key to keeping other companies from licensing and reselling the same technology. The government's resolve, however, may be breaking down. Just last week, Sybase Inc. won approval to export database and server products with 56-bit DES encryption, even though the Emeryville, Calif., company has no model for key recovery. ---------- SKIP, which stands for Simple Key management for Internet Protocols, was submitted by Sun to the Internet Engineering Task Force as an Internet standard. Included in SKIP E+ are algorithms for 56-bit DES, two- and three-key triple DES, and 64- and 128-bit ciphers for encrypting network traffic and keys. The security software was developed by Elvis+, a company of former Soviet space scientists with offices near Moscow. Sun bought a 10 percent interest in the company in 1993, but does not take an active role, said Steven Hunziker, chief operating officer of Russia Communications Research Inc., Los Gatos, Calif. RCR represents Elvis+'s products in the U.S. "RCR is really small - me and an accountant and two lawyers - and they watch the law like hawks," Hunziker said. "Elvis+ has kept a very careful distance from Sun, and those guys don't need anything from Sun to create the technology they're creating. The FBI and the CIA are just lazy, which is why they object." "We've developed key recovery technology and gotten government approval, so we can export without having to resort to what they did," said Ken Mendelson, corporate counsel for Trusted Information Systems Inc., Glenwood, Md. ---------- VeriFone today announced that its Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) -based product suite has received export approval from the US Department of Commerce, marking the first announcement of a SET-based, end-to-end Internet commerce solution containing full strength encryption technology to be approved for international export. VeriFone's vGATE, vPOS and vWALLET software employ the SET encryption protocol for transactions over the Internet, utilizing 1024 bit key size for public key encryption and digital signatures, and 64 bit DES for bulk encryption. This approval enables VeriFone to offer a higher level of end-to-end encryption than was previously available from U.S. corporations to international customers without special permission from the U.S. government. ---------- IBM last week took the first steps to help software vendors comply with federal encryption export rules, with the release into beta of a new security tool kit. ----------

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No Subject
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Press Release Pretty Good Privacy Receives Government Approval to Export Strong Encryption SAN MATEO, Calif., May 28, 1997 -- Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. (www.pgp.com) the world leader in digital privacy and security software, today announced that the U.S. Department of Commerce has approved the export of Pretty Good Privacy's encryption software to the overseas offices of the largest companies in the United States. This makes Pretty Good Privacy the only U.S. company currently authorized to export strong encryption technology not requiring key recovery to foreign subsidiaries and branches of the largest American companies. Click here to view the list of approved companies. The approval allows Pretty Good Privacy to export strong, 128-bit encryption without a requirement that the exported products contain key recovery features or other back doors that enable government access to keys. More than one-half of the Fortune 100 already use PGP domestically to secure their corporate data and communications. "Now we are able to export strong encryption technology to the overseas offices of more than 100 of the largest companies in America, without compromising the integrity of the product or the strength of the encryption," said Phil Dunkelberger, President of Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. "We worked closely with the State Department when they controlled the export of encryption, and are now working with the Commerce Department. And we have never had a license application denied." The license allows export of strong encryption technology, without government access to keys, to the overseas subsidiaries and branch offices of more than 100 of the largest American companies, provided that the offices are not located in embargoed countries, namely Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan or Syria. "As far as we know, Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. is now the only company that has U.S. government approval to sell strong encryption to the worldwide subsidiaries and branch offices of such a large number of U.S. corporations, without having to compromise on the strength of the encryption or add schemes designed to provide government access to keys," said Robert H. Kohn, vice president and general counsel of Pretty Good Privacy. "Pretty Good Privacy still opposes export controls on cryptographic software, but this license is a major step toward meeting the global security needs of American companies." The U.S. government restricts the export of encryption using key lengths in excess of 40 bits. However, 40-bit cryptography is considered "weak," because it can be broken in just a few hours. Generally, the U.S. government will grant export licenses for up to 56-bit encryption if companies commit to develop methods for government access to keys. For anything over 56 bits, actual methods for government access must be in place. Pretty Good Privacy's license permits the export of 128-bit or "strong" encryption, without any requirement of a key recovery mechanism that enables government access to the data. A message encrypted with 128-bit PGP software is 309,485,009,821,341,068,724,781,056 times more difficult to break than a message encrypted using 40-bit technology. In fact, according to estimates published by the U.S. government, it would take an estimated 12 million times the age of the universe, on average, to break a single 128-bit message encrypted with PGP. "Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. has been working diligently to ensure compliance with the export control laws. Clearly, the Commerce Department recognizes the needs of reputable American companies to protect their intellectual property and other sensitive business information using strong cryptography," said Roszel C. Thomsen II, partner at the law firm of Thomsen and Burke LLP. "User demand for strong cryptography is growing worldwide," said Marc Rotenberg, director of Electronic Privacy Information Center, and a leading privacy-rights advocate. "This is just one more example of the need to remove obstacles to the export of the best products the U.S. can provide." Companies that are approved for the export of Pretty Good Privacy's strong encryption should contact Pretty Good Privacy's sales office at 415.572.0430 or visit the company's web site at www.pgp.com. Companies that are not currently on the list of licenses obtained by Pretty Good Privacy, but would like to gain approval to use strong encryption in their branch offices and subsidiaries around the world, should also contact Pretty Good Privacy at 415.572.0430 for information about how to be included in future government-approved export licenses for PGP. About Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. Pretty Good Privacy (www.pgp.com) founded in March 1996, is the leading provider of digital-privacy products for private communications and the secure storage of data for businesses and individuals. Pretty Good Privacy's original encryption software for email applications (PGP) was distributed as freeware in 1991 by Phil Zimmermann, Chief Technical Officer and Founder of Pretty Good Privacy, and allowed individuals, for the first time, to send information without risk of interception. With millions of users, it has since become the world leader in email encryption and the de facto standard for Internet mail encryption. Over one half of the Fortune 100 companies use PGP. In order to provide only the strongest encryption software, Pretty Good Privacy publishes all of its encryption source code and algorithms for extensive peer review and public scrutiny. The company can be reached at 415.572.0430; http://www.pgp.com. For more information, please contact Mike Nelson, Pretty Good Privacy's Director of Corporate Communications, at 415.524.6203.

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No Subject
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last Friday, in a town hall meeting on education in Clarksburg, West Virginia, President Clinton made some news on the technology front. Answering a question from a parent about how to keep children safe on the Net, the president talked about the Communications Decency Act's travails in federal court. Then he said "we're working on" a technological fix, a V-chip for PCs that could protect children from harm. Later, reporters pressed White House aides on whether there was a new V-chip initiative. The new chip is out there, they said, somewhere "within the industry." From White House transcripts of the event and later briefings: Jim Eschenmann: Mr. President, my name is Jim Eschenmann. I'm a proud parent of a 4-year-old preschooler. Your administration, as well as the local board of education, has placed a large emphasis on connecting every classroom to the Internet. What additional measures can we take to protect our school students from the harmful areas of the Internet while guaranteeing full access to post-secondary students and to protect the freedom of speech? President Clinton: Well, you know, I signed a bill - when I signed the telecommunications bill ... I had a provision in there to try to protect against young people being exposed to some of the harmful things that are on the Internet. Not just pornography but, as I'm sure a lot of you know because of the events in the news in the last couple of years, there are even instructions on how to build bombs and things like that. There are lot of things on there that we wouldn't want our children to see. That provision has been thrown out by a court and is still in the courts, I think. So it may be that what we have to do is try to develop something like the equivalent of what we're developing for you for television, like the V-chip, where it's put in the hands of the parents or the educators. And then if it were in the hands of the educators the school board could approve certain guidelines. It's technically more difficult with the Internet. As you know, there are hundreds of new services being added to the Internet every week. It's growing at an explosive capacity and we're in the process actually of trying to develop an Internet II. But I think that is the answer. Something like the V-chip for televisions. And we're working on it. I think it's a serious potential problem myself. But let me say it would be a serious potential problem if they were not in the schools. I think putting them in the schools, because the kids are normally under supervision, you have a far less likelihood that the Internet will be abused or that the children will be exposed to something they shouldn't see during the school hours, in all likelihood, than at home. But I do think you need guidelines in both places and we're doing our best to try to figure out if there's some technological fix we can give you on it. Briefing by spokeswoman Ann Lewis (22 May): Q.: Three things that Clinton said - suggesting V-chips for the Internet, endorsing year-round schooling, and speaking favorably of high school competency tests before graduation. Are any of those new, or are those things he has said before? Ann Lewis: From my understanding, looking at the conversations back and forth on the V-chip for the Internet, as you know this is a principle the president has talked about for a long time, which is giving parents the tools they need, and it's the principle he referred to when he supported the - came out in support of the V-chip. He thinks it continues to be an issue. Second, if you go back and look at his speech on Net Day, when he gave a radio address and we did some talking about the Internet, he announced that he had asked the Department of Education and Secretary [Richard] Riley to come up with a parents' guide to the Internet, recognizing that it is a wonderful resource but that many families also feel they could use some help in ensuring that their children get the most out of the Internet. And, third, it's our understanding, and we just checked this with people at the White House who know much more about technology than all of us put together, that there is in fact technology being developed that would serve as the equivalent of a V-chip for the Internet, and we think that's what the president referred to. Q.: Clinton has talked before about giving parents ways to protect their children on the Internet, but has he ever before suggested the idea of a V-chip for the Internet? Lewis: Not that we know of, but we know - as is clear, I think, from his wording, he is aware that the technology has been developing. Q.: But has he talked about this before? Lewis: We don't think so. We were going to try to do a huge Nexis search; that's going to take a long time. We don't remember that conversation.... Q.: You said the technology is being developed - who is developing it? Lewis: I can't, but we can get you more information. It's my understanding it's being developed within the industry. Q.: That's like the stuff like Kidsitter and all the stuff that's already available on the Internet. There are a lot of sites. Lewis: There are a lot of sort of monitors you can put on that. We think this may be a little more advanced, and we're trying to get more information. White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry and spokesman Barry Toiv (23 May): Q.: Mike, yesterday the president endorsed the idea of a V-chip for the Internet. Was that the first time he did that, and how does the White House plan to proceed? Mike McCurry: Did anyone work on that yesterday? That was - there is some, I think, R&D work, technical work that's being done to develop new software. I'm not sure where within the government they're doing it.... Q.: Mike, I'm still trying to figure out, was yesterday the first time the president endorsed a V-chip for the Internet? McCurry: Did you do any yesterday on the V-chip question? Barry [Toiv] may have handled this up in West Virginia yesterday. Barry Toiv: Well, I'm not sure I have more than you got yesterday from Ann Lewis. The president has not specifically mentioned the V-chip, but this is work that we've been doing because he's been concerned, obviously, about ways that parents can help - can protect their kids with regard to stuff that comes through on the Internet. Apparently, it's our understanding that technology does exist within the industry. It's being developed by the industry. And so I think the president was referring to that yesterday. Q.: Is there any procedure that - I mean, is it something that - is there any kind of official "endorsement" you expect? Toiv: Well, right now - not right at this moment, but it's something we're looking at.

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TURN $5.00 INTO $50,000 IN 6 WEEKS !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
by MoneyMan＠goplay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

YOU CAN START YOUR OWN INTERNET BUSINESS IN YOUR SPARE TIME!!! As you know the internet is growing at a tremendous rate. And I'm sure you realize that millions of dollars are exchanged for goods and services on the internet each day. Have you ever said to yourself "I would like to use my computer too make money" (or to make more money)?? WELL YOU CAN AND WILL MAKE THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS QUICKLY AND EASILY IF YOU FOLLOW THESE SIMPLE INSTRUCTIONS!!! The Business program outlined below is a simplified form of E-mail marketing. Do not take this opportunity lightly, it is a powerful tool that will allow you to have your own business and start you on the path to financial freedom. I KNOW THIS BUSINESS WORKS!! IT HAS WORKED FOR ME AND IT WILL WORK FOR YOU. By the time you receive this business plan there is a good chance that I will have been removed from the system. But thats ok because I have already made a tremendous amount of money using this system, and I would like to see your life change as much as mine has. There is nothing more rewarding than knowing that I have helped many good and honest people enrich their lives. Follow the instructions listed below EXACTLY and you will be on your way. Good Luck, and share the wealth. Sincerely, Samuel Abbott Ph.D. STEP1). Get 5 pieces of 8.5"x11" paper and write: "Please add me to your information mailing list" Now take 5 $1 bills and fold $1 inside each piece of paper. Place the request and money in 5 seperate envelopes and seal. Carefully address the envelopes with the 5 addresses provided below.(Be sure to include a return address and a stamp!) Now mail the requests In a timely manner. #1) D. Ewing; 7620 Washington; Kansas City, Mo. 64114 #2) Shari Davis; 1635 Manning Way; Colorado Springs, CO. 80919 #3) J. Turner; 5460 White Oak Ave #C207, Encino, CA 91316 #4) Steve Wrubel; 3234 Nebraska Place; Costa Mesa, CA. 92626 #5) E. Bennett; 18226 Ventura Blvd #202, Tarzana, CA 91356 STEP2). Copy this entire business plan and make the following changes: Remove the #1 name off the list. Place your name in the #5 position and move the other 4 names up. (#5moves to#4, #4moves to#3, #3moves to#2, #2moves to#1) Your name is now the bottom of the list. STEP3). POST THIS ARTICLE ON AT LEAST 200 NEWSGROUPS!!!!!!! E-MAIL THIS ARTICLE TO EVERYONE YOU CAN!!!!!!! IMPORTANT NOTE: You MUST post this article to AT LEAST 200 newsgroups. There are about 45,000 newsgroups, with more being added every day. Each time you post on a newsgroup your message will be seen by many different people. You should send this article via E-mail to as many people as possible. E-mail addresses are available for free through many sources on the internet. You can also purchase E-mail lists from several companies for a very small fee. Remember it's your business and the more places you send it to, the better your chances of success! (I highly recommend that you send it out to more than 200 places). REMEMBER TO PUT A CATCHY PHRASE IN THE SUBJECT BOX. CONGRATULATIONS YOU HAVE JUST JOINED A GROUP OF ENTREPRENEURS! Let me review why this works..... Send out 200 articles and with a 5% response you get $10. Those 10 people send out 200 and at 5% you get $100. Those 100 people send out 200 and at 5% you get $1000. Those 1000 people send out 200 and at 5% you get $10,000. Those 10,000 people send out 200 and at 5% you get $100,000. EVERYDAY THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE JOIN THE INTERNET!!!!!!!!!!! The above example is a perfect case scenerio. The response rate varies typically from 2% to 10%. To increase your success rate I suggest that you post this article to AT LEAST 200 newsgroups and send it to as many individuals as possible. Remember many people will see this article when it is posted on a newsgroup!! Also note that many of the people you send it to are likely to send it out to more than 200 newsgroups and people. You don't have to retype this article every time you send it, just follow the instructions below and you will see just how easy this business is. If you follow these simple instructions there is no way you can lose. Every day several thousands of people get on the internet. Don't delay start today, you'll be glad you did!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! POSTING TO NEWSGROUPS USING NETSCAPE: 1) Click on any newsgroup, like normal. Then click on to " To News" in the top left corner of the Newsgroups page. This will bring up a message box. 2) Fill in the subject box with a catchy phrase such as: $$$FAST CASH$$$, ARE YOU THE PERSON WHO..., or the like. 3) Now go to the message part of the box and retype this letter exactly as it is here. (The only thing you change is adding your name in the #5 position and moving the other addresses up 1 position each, thus removing the #1 name). 4) When you are done typing in the WHOLE letter, click on "File" above the send button, then "Save as..." DO NOT SEND YOUR LETTER UNTIL YOU SAVE IT!!(this is so you only have to type this once). 5) Now that you have saved the letter, go ahead and send your First copy!(click the send button in the top left corner). 6) THIS IS WHERE YOU POST AT LEAST 200 TIMES!!! OK, go to any newsgroup article and click the "To News" button. Type in Your catchy phrase in the SUBJECT BOX, then go to the body part of the message box and place your cursor there. NOW click on "Attachment" which is right below the SUBJECT BOX. Click on "attach file", then find the letter you saved, click once on your saved file, then click "Open", Then click "OK". If you did this right, you should see your filename in the attachment box and it will be shaded. NOW POST AWAY!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! IF YOU ARE USING INTERNET EXPLORER: 1) Its just as easy, Holding down the left mouse button, highlight this entire article, then press the the "CTRL" key and the "C" key at the same time to copy this letter. 2) Now go to the newsgroups and press "POST AN ARTICLE", Type in your catchy phrase in the subject box, and click the large window below. Press "CTRL" and "V" and the article will appear in the message window. **BE SURE TO MAKE YOUR ADDRESS CHANGES TO THE 5 NAMES** 3) Now re-highlight the letter and RE-COPY it so you have the changes...Then all you have to do for each newsgroup is press "CTRL" and "V" and press "POST" it's that easy!!!!! Thats it ! All you have to do is jump to different newsgroups and post away. For both methods it only takes about 30 seconds to post to each newsgroup. Once you get the hang of it. REMEMBER THE MORE NEWSGROUPS YOU POST TO THE MORE MONEY YOU MAKE!! YOU MUST POST TO A MINIMUM OF 200 NEWSGROUPS!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! You should start receiving replies within a week or so (sometimes they come within days) BE SURE TO SEND OUT $1 TO THE PEOPLE ON THE LIST PROMPTLY!!!!!!!!! PERSISTENCE AND HONESTY WILL REAP YOU HUGE REWARDS!!!!!!!!!!!!! DO NOT TO LET THIS OPPORTUNITY PASS YOU BY!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! FOR JUST $5 YOU CAN CHANGE YOUR LIFE!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! REMEMBER: THE PERSON WHO DARES NOTHING, NEED NOT HOPE FOR ANYTHING. Print this article so you have the addresses to send to, and the information on file.

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Libraries! Partial Solution to PGP Windows Wars and Source Code
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[There's been a major flame war on pgp-users about the lack of Win3.1 support, and more than a few cypherpunks have asked about source.] PGP has always had a policy of making the source code available; it was one of the big things that let us trust it. PGP has also been available under a variety of platforms, whether written/ported by Phil and associates, or ported by others. Recently, PGP Inc. has come out with several major systems, including - PGP 3.0 and 3.0.1 pre-alpha code, including libraries, which have been published in book form and on the net. For portability and compatibility, the most important things are the algorithms and file formats used. - PGP 5.0 with fancy user interface for Win32 only. I'm assuming that PGP 5.0 is written using the PGP 3.0.1 libraries* - if they've got any sense, they've used the same libraries with at most some bug fixes and/or simple new features that they can put out as a point release, and limited the Win32-related stuff to GUIs, interfaces to other Windows programs, and similar non-portable stuff, some of which can be bullied into working on DOS or Win16 and some of which is too much trouble to crowbar in. If so, then *you* can do your own GUI work on Win16, MacOS 6, and OS/360, and be sure of interoperability with Fancy New PGP. In particular, the user-friendliness front-end programs like pgpclip and Private Idaho can use the libraries instead of having to pop up DOS subsystems to run. (PI was very nice with ViaCrypt 2.7.1, which let everything run as communicating Windows programs.) Using the libraries also helps us trust the security - it doesn't mean the GUIware doesn't also send a copy of your passphrase to aldrich(a)nsavax.us, but it does let you build interoperable code you can trust, and it makes it easier to verify that at least the basic crypto routines are solid. [* Perhaps I'm naive, and I must confess to not finishing all 4 volumes of code, but I'd _hope_ they did the right thing...] # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list or news, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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Re: Newsflash: PGP approved for export of strong crypto
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Subject: Re: Newsflash: PGP approved for export of strong crypto To: ddt(a)pgp.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Hi, Dave! Thanks for forwarding the press release to various lists. (Could you also forward this along to Mike Nelson? The press release didn't include his email :-) I was interested in a couple of issues. 1) Cool - especially doing it without GAK! This kind of thing is a major wedge in the export control regime, even if it is mainly for the big players first. 2) Are there explicit terms a company has to agree to to be allowed to export PGP to its non-US subs/branches, or is it just negotiation with the State Department? Does it take excessive expensive legal paperwork, or is it something just about anybody could do? Could Bill Stewart Consulting (i.e. just me) meet the requirements? After a company is approved, are there special record-keeping requirements, or could I just email or registered-US-Snail or DHL-mail a copy to my branch in Japan or the UK? (One of the interesting cases for me is subsidiaries that are joint ventures with other companies such as non-government-owned foreign telcos.) 3) Your press release said: > In order to provide only the strongest encryption software, > Pretty Good Privacy publishes all of its encryption source code > and algorithms for extensive peer review and public scrutiny. Does this mean that the non-encryption parts of your code probably won't be reviewed, at least in public? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 5.0 beta Charset: noconv iQBVAwUBM46IIfthU5e7emAFAQEi4wIAnnS3BM1lZuw179QNq7unrr9IIBAEUI7e ww46TBni27NUL9F5vN54L2HYTlg15Je3hfMTPKcSQn6abAvT12e+Vg== =huGZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- BTW, the 5.0 plug-in to Eudora is nice! I'm having a little trouble guessing when it's going to include my signature block and when it's not, but so far I like it, and the Win95 PGPtray widget was also convenient. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list or news, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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Apology
by MoneyMan＠goplay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a formal apology for the Chain letter I sent you. I was not aware at the time that things such as these were illegal. Please be reassured that you will no longer be recieving any mail from me. I am once again sorry if I have caused you any problems. Eric

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There's something wrong...
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Friday, May 30, 1997 - 21:07:32 MET > A major nail in the coffin of Justice for any accused in the U.S. > > was when the justice system promoted the concept of guilt by virtue > > of "circumstantial" evidence to the point where people can now be > > convicted as a result of speculation rather than evidence. Prosecutors > > now seem to need only to convince the sheeple that it was "possible" > > for the defendant to have commited the crime and that circumstantial > > evidence points *only* to the accused. Actually we are well passed that point. Jim Bell's arrest and pending prosecution amounts to thought crime. Its not "possible they commited a crime" now its possible that they "may" commit a crime. At Waco, dozens of innocents were killed, burned alive on national television in their home and church from an unwarranted, excessive use of force in order to serve a search warrant on David Koresh for what they "may" have been doing. No one was under indictment, under arrest or accused of an actual crime, yet through media manipulation that branded koresh and his followers Kooks, the nation watched another act of Statist-TV-Terrorism. The message through the medium this time?, "We don't need no stinking charges." Mandatory sentencing (a legislative and executive end run that usurps judiaciary power by eliminating judicial discretion) Terroristic Speech (a euphemism for 'thought crime' in many cases) are two examples of end runs around citizens contitutionaly protected rights that are being used daily to commit violent attacks on individual citizens civil rights.

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PGPlib-0.2 available
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text To: pgplib-announce(a)petium.rhein.de Subject: PGPlib-0.2 available Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 15:06:42 +0200 From: Tage Stabell-Kulo <tage(a)acm.org> Reply-To: tage(a)acm.org Sender: pgplib-announce-owner(a)petium.rhein.de Precedence: list -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Announcing PGPlib-0.2 ===================== We are pleased to announce a new verison of PGPlib. You can obtain the newest version (that is 0.2 as of today) from ftp://dslab1.cs.uit.no/pub/PGPlib.tar.gz In short, you will find a library that enables your software to read and write "packages" which can be decrypted and/or verified by means of PGP. In other words, you can incorporate PGP compatibility in your software without having to run PGP. When you uncompress and un-tar the file, you will obtain four files in the CURRENT directory. These files are README Describing how to preceed PGPlib-0.2.tar The library, manual pages and so on PGPlib-0.2.tar.asc A detached signature for verification pubkey.asc My public key (again, for verification) It is described in README how to verify the release you have obtained, how to unpack, what you will actually get when you unpack, and so on. What is there for you ===================== PGPlib is a library that lets you generate (and manipulate) PGP packets without having to run PGP. In particular there is code to generate and understand the following types of PGP packets: - Literal with filename, mode, etc. You can create literate packages from files, or from buffers, and create files from literate packets; - Convential encrypted (IDEA with Zimmermann's context sensitive feedback). The library can both read (decrypt) and write (encrypt) convential packets (in PGP format); - Armor. You can (de)armor a buffer or a file into a buffer or a file; - UserID packets are read and written in a variety of formats; - Keys can be obtained from a database (which is provided) or by parsing keyrings. Keys can be kept in buffers or on files; - You can maintain a PGP public-key database (I use this library to maintain a database with ~40.000 keys). There is code to use DBM as supplied from Berkeley or, if you prefer, GDBM from GNU; - You can verify RSA signatures on public keys and on buffers (files); - You can encrypt data (file or buffer) with public keys. The DEK is naturally written as a separate packet; - With a secret key you can sign other keys and buffers. Keys can be read from databases or files; they are decrypted on the fly. We have made a small program that will (de)armor anything, a parser to parse PGP files (including decryption and so on), a shell to manipulate a keydatabase, a keyserver to run on top of such a database, a program to verify signatures on keys and/or files, a program to split keyrings in smaller parts and a program that will sign files for you. You will find all these (and more) in the applications/ directory. None of these uses PGP, the library provides all the functionality you need. What you need ============= - You must have the SSLeay library as I have not implemented any cryptographic functionality; I hope SSLeay is a good choice. I did not major in mathematics and can thus not judge the quality of their work, although it looks solid (to me). I link with their version 0.6.6. I rely on SSLeay for great many things, in particular their BIGNUMs, RSA encryption and IDEA. I use "fprintf(stderr" when problems occur, but integration into the SSLeay "error-system" might happen. You can obtain SSLeay from: * ftp://ftp.psy.uq.oz.au/pub/Crypto/SSL/ - SSLeay source * ftp://ftp.psy.uq.oz.au/pub/Crypto/SSLapps/ - SSL applications * http://www.psy.uq.oz.au/~ftp/Crypto/ssl.html - SSLeay Programmer Reference SSLeay is quite large and I only use a fraction of it. On the other hand, SSLeay seems to be well maintained and their crypto-library might very well shrink or become more modular as time passes. Your Feedback ============= Your feedback is solicited. Peter Simons <Peter.Simons(a)gmd.de> has created a mailinglist for PGPlib. To subscribe, send an e-mail to the address pgplib-dev-request(a)petium.rhein.de and write the command SUBSCRIBE into the BODY. If you want to be subscribed under a different address than the one you're mailing from, you can also use SUBSCRIBE yourname(a)somewhere.else to do the trick. To post to the list, send an e-mail to pgplib-dev(a)petium.rhein.de as usual. There is also an pgplib-announce(a)petium.rhein.de. Subscribe by sending an e-mail to pgplib-announce-request(a)petium.rhein.de with SUBSCRIBE in the body. The latter list will be very low-volume. If you write a nice application based on this library (the ultimate feedback :-), please feel free to send it to me and I will include it in the next release; Where to get PGPlib =================== ftp://dslab1.cs.uit.no/pub/PGPlib.tar.gz COPYRIGHT (yum, yum) ========= The library and included applications are all available under "Berkely style" copyright terms. Basically, this means that it is FREE for commercial and non-comercial use, and that you can do almost anything with the code. The only thing you can not do is to say that you wrote it. See the file COPYING for details. Let's go to work ================ I hope you like it, that you find is useful, that you will find no bugs, and that you will provide valuable feedback by means of the mailing list. Tage Stabell-Kul¯ Castelmaggiore, Italy 30. May 1997 //// Tage Stabell-Kuloe | e-mail: tage(a)ACM.org //// /// Department of Computer Science/IMR | Phone : +47-776-44032 /// // 9037 University of Tromsoe, Norway | Fax : +47-776-44580 // / "'oe' is '\o' in TeX" | URL:http://www.cs.uit.no/~tage/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: latin1 Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.2, an Emacs/PGP interface iQCVAwUBM47QfAMzZ6tx+9RpAQFHJQQAmsrh3sqgeRdOFscXWAb7/bV5ivdgnB4+ IpgGpGPMhNYfAzDJvz2rdvt1Z38NhLjOHOTEl+RhKGUGmc7cDXiaAE38Vh3OJIPu FijHtMgr++GdxZS5/WvcUxlvvMQjyjDaX84eG0clG1djYizMzR+7HwsIaaJeLtOb wlBORx01NRo= =Q5Ed -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ PGP Library Announcements --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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The Bible Code
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Published today with great fanfare, "The Bible Code" describes the fruits of three Israeli mathematicians in decrypting hidden messages in the Bible by textual analysis algorithms. Blurbs claim that the work passed peer review for publication in a math journal a few years back, was confirmed by "a US Defense Department code-breaker" and predicted the assassinations of JFK, RFK, Sadat and Rabin. The NYT reported on the fanfare a few days ago and quoted some who claimed that the Israelis' claims were examined and faulted when first published, that the book's bunkum, and that if enough analysis is done on any text, any message can be found -- holy writs being perdurable candidates. Even so, are any here familiar with the Israelis' work? Better, is this book the first of many to come to celebrate the cook-ups of codes and cyphers and algorithmic chefs? Is a film in the works, or, best, a Seinfeld of 0s and 1s?

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Re: relevance to Hayek research?
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 11:21:28 -0400 To: Gregransom(a)aol.com From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: Re: relevance to Hayek research? Cc: austrianecon(a)agoric.com, VPostrel(a)aol.com Bcc: X-Attachments: Greg Ransom just set my subscription to Hayek-L to "review" because of the DCSB announcement I sent both there and to AustrianEcon. Since I figure that this posting probably won't see the light of day on Hayek-L, I'll just send it here to AustrianEcon instead. :-). Of course, I'm not complaining, really. Greg can do anything he wants with Hayek-L. I mean, he owns it; the internet being alloidial, and all. But, I thought I'd clear the air here a little bit about why I thought the June DCSB meeting would be useful to people both on AustrianEcon, and, even :-), Hayek-L. At 7:29 pm -0400 on 5/17/97, Gregransom(a)aol.com wrote: > Can you motivate this posting to the Hayek-L list for > me? Wow. I feel like a method actor or something. Say hello to Mr. Stanislawski for me, would you, Greg? > It is important that all posting to the > Hayek-L list be relevant to Hayek and his work, appropriate for the research > community, and not overly promotional or commercial in nature, nor in the > vein of advertising. Yeah. Anything that smacks the least bit of capitalism should be strictly avoided in such an academic setting. Hey, even *I* understand that one. ;-). If it's any consolation, DCSB really *is* just a bunch of people who get together to have lunch on first Tuesday of the month. It's not like I'm leveraging the old Harvard Club membership to create a massive personal fortune, or something. :-). I do confess that I sent the announcement to both place, and mostly on impulse, because I thought people in the Austrian economics trade would want to hear about a relatively unique economic phenomenon on the net, particularly as it reveals interesting things about how the net's decreasing the "latency" of money changes, or at least better defines, all kinds of transaction processes, and, maybe, the underlying economics of same. Not only do the type of instantaneous, continuous, digital cash-settled recursive auctions that Fred Hapgood is going to talk about at the June 3rd DCSB meeting have the potential to remove any need for copyright law on the internet, which I'll get to in a moment, but they're the tip of the iceberg for something waaay bigger. The technology behind the digital cash these recursive auctions will eventually use is all by itself a nation-state killer. In the long run, anyway. <and now, for a few blatantly commercial messages...> Since the strongest form of David Chaum's "ecash" <http://www.digicash.com/> digital bearer certificate transaction settlement protocol doesn't require book-entries, it doesn't require the force monopoly of a nation-state to backstop its transaction clearing process. There's a quote which might be useful here. It's from FC97, the first conference on Financial Cryptography, which we held in Anguilla this February and (plug, plug) a conference I had the good fortune think up ;-) <http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97>. Doug Barnes, a fellow cypherpunk and now the Marketing VP for C2Net, a pioneering financial cryptography company in Berkeley <http://www.c2.net/>, said, during the legal session, "It's a bad idea when your internet payment protocol, in one of its terminating steps, says, 'and then you go to jail'". See my web page, <http://www.shipwright.com/>, for more details about this kind of stuff if you're interested. Also, see the debate I had in March with someone from the American Banking Association about the subject of digital bearer certificate technology. It's on HotWired's Brain Tennis site, <http://www.braintennis.com/>. Remember that, due to to the structure of the debate, he got in the last word, though. :-). <we now return you to the heresy trial, currently in progress> Now you can see why the war cry for most of my cypherpunk crypto-anarchist financial cryptography developer friends is "write software, not laws." That sounds pretty Hayekian, I'd say. Last September I was on the law enforcement panel, of all things, at the Institute, nee Office (go, Newt!), of Technology Assessment's "Symposium on the Regulation of Digital Cash". This thing was held in a conference room deep in the bowels of the Capitol Building. Yech. Talk about the lion's den. Anyway, they had me speaking, dead last in the whole symposium, immediately after the Justice Department's brand-new, wet-behind-the-ears and freshly-lobbied-for-by-the-EFF Assistant Attorney General for "computer crime", whatever that is. And, before him, and more to the point for our discussion here, spoke the Assistant Director of FinCEN. FinCEN stands for the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, a truly amazing government agency which has the ability to tell anyone with a credit card or checking account not only what his current bank balance is, but, through perfectly legal "administrative requests" to his bank, what his, say, total clothing and grocery expenditures were last year, categorized by store. Couple that with those wonderfully subpoenable scanner cards at your supermarket, and I would say that Orwell almost has his revenge with us, eaten very cold indeed, for being so far behind schedule with '1984'. Anyway, there I was, at ground zero, in the very belly of the beast, and, if I do say so myself, I was a wonder to behold. I scared them so bad that the everyone's eyes actually bugged out. Their jaws really bounced on the floor a few times in true Tex Avery fashion. Proving, once again, that cartoon physics really is the only kind of science they allow inside the Washington Beltway. I told the assembled unholy host of legislative aides, beltway bandits, and various other corridor-crawling symbionts to Le Infame Moderne that David Chaum's blind signature patent created fully anonymous digital cash (issued by private free banks, mind you), something they vaguely knew already and were gathered there to try to stop. But, even more frightening to statists everywhere, it was quite a simple matter, really, to use the same cryptographic protocol to create anonymously held digital *bearer* forms of any negotiable instrument you could care to imagine: bonds, stocks, futures, or any derivative thereof. I told them Perry Metzger's joke about "Gold Denominated Burmese Opium Futures". That was good for a titter or two of nervous laughter... Remember, of course, that, and increasingly so, most assets are financial, and thus completely convertable to digital bearer form if the transaction protocol for them turns out to be significantly cheaper than the book-entry settlement methods of the status quo. After all, it wasn't too long ago in financial history that paper bearer certificates were the norm. There's a lot of cultural memory still there. The word "coupon" as a synonym for bond interest is a perfect case in point. Then came the real bombshell. The guy from FinCEN absolutely agreed that if the transaction costs of digital bearer certificates proved to be an order of magnitude (or, say, three) lower than book entries, which I claim they will be (without proof, of course, just yet ;-)), FinCEN would be pretty much out of business. The whole "crime" of money laundering would become the equivalent of a "legislated" value for Pi. An example which, I might add, proves Avery's Laws of Cartoon Physics, um, reigns, in legislative bodies the world over, and not just inside the Beltway. "Actually, it's worse than that, ladies and gentlemen," I said, quoting myself. "Virtually *all* of the current tax infrastructure is based upon book-entries and the necessity of audit trails to verify tax compliance: capital gains, income and sales taxes, even import duties. Those audit trails are there primarily to prevent non-repudiation in the execution of a transaction protocol, that is, all the double-entry bookeeping between the buyer and the seller and the financial intermediary(ies) underwriting the trade. Those audit trails are *not* there to enforce taxes, believe it or not." They didn't get the point, so I drove it home. I said, "Without the requirement to prevent non-repudiation (and, I ask you, when was the last time you had a cash transaction fail to clear?), the marginal cost of tax compliance will become unsustainable over time. Uncle, and his relations elsewhere, are all going to have to figure out something else to tax, in other words. Now, *what*, exactly, do you need all that money for?" I had all the right people standing up and yelling at me at question time, so I knew I was on to something. :-). So, somewhere, Greg, I think Dr. Hayek must be laughing out loud. That's why this kind of stuff might be important to your readership. Oh. Yeah. I forgot. The actual topic of this missive. What's a "recursive auction"? Jason Cronk, who subscribes to AustrianEcon, by the way, did a talk on them at the rump-session of, you guessed it, FC97 in Anguilla. Ian Grigg, a major free banking fan, and also a subscriber, presented an idea which is exactly the obverse(?) for *his* paper, which was accepted for the main conference session. Ian's paper dealt with a way to organize the "buy" side of the same process. Springer Verlag will be publishing the conference proceedings sometime this summer, and I'll announce that here, if there's interest. Anyway, a recursive auction market, for lack of a better analogy, is kind of like institutionalized software piracy. I create something new and digital. I go on the net, and I sell the first copy to the highest bidder. Then I sell the next copy to the next bid, which, of course, is probably lower than the first. I keep on doing this until people stop bidding. Of course, everyone who buys what I'm selling can turn right around and sell it to someone else in turn, probably at a lower price than they bought it from me. This is the only instance I can think of where buying high and selling low makes you money. ;-). Well, on an item-price basis, anyway. Obviously, the total return is higher on the sell side than the buy side, or nobody would be foolish enough to buy anything from you for resale. Just by forgetting the whole quasimystical issue of "rights" to electronic intellectual property (which, like the current "intellectual capital" craze, is, at best, a polite regulatory fiction), timeliness of content is rewarded, as is novelty, which keeps people who create new stuff right on cranking it out. A person who's invested in a big switch and bandwidth, or who has the most valuable use of any other kind, can afford to pay more for earlier, "fresher", copies of something than someone without the same net.resources. Because, for instance, in the case of the person with all the bandwidth, he can resell copies faster than anyone else. A person who doesn't need something badly can wait a while and pick it up at a lower price after the initial feeding frenzy's over. Finally, the person who continually invents something new gets paid as soon as something he makes becomes usable to anybody at all. The things which get sold can be anything from a jotted down brainstorm, to the first draft of a novel, to more perishible "content", like an hour of teleoperated surgery, say. So, for works of art, whatever that means, copyright law becomes superfluous. More to the point, given sufficient attention to such matters, *all* parties in recursive auction transactions can be completely anonymous, and everything still works. I mean, when was the last time you had to produce identification for a cash transaction? Okay, besides at the bank, and even then for deposits greater than $10k. That's the very exception which proves the rule, obviously. Cartoon physics comes to banking. Remember, again, book-entries cause book-entry taxation and regulations, not vice versa. Anyway, whether at the increasingly hysterical legislative cartoons, or because of the now sandy foundations of the nation state, again, Hayek, somewhere, *must* be laughing, Greg. Cheers, Bob Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston (among other things...) --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Government Conspiracy
by nobody＠hidden.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy C. Mayflower sexually molests little children, farm animals, and inanimate objects. < > < > V )_.._( V Timmy C. Mayflower \\ <____> // ~ <______> ~ > /~\______/~\ // /~\_____/~\ /_\ /~\____/~\ /_\ /~\___/\~\ _/_\/ \___/\__/__\/ \___/__\/ There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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INFO: Encryption battle heats up in House; experts weigh in (5/30/97)
by Shabbir J. Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================================= ____ _ _ _ / ___|_ __ _ _ _ __ | |_ ___ | \ | | _____ _____ | | | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____| \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __| | |___| | | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\ | __/\ V V /\__ \ \____|_| \__, | .__/ \__\___/ |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/ |___/|_| PRO-ENCRYPTION BILL CLEARS SECOND CONGRESSIONAL HURDLE; FACES TOUGHER TEST IN COMING WEEKS. CRYPTOGRAPHERS AND COMPUTER SECURITY EXPERTS ASSAIL GOVERNMENT KEY RECOVERY PLANS Date: May 29, 1997 Expires July 1, 1997 URL:http://www.crypto.com/ crypto-news(a)panix.com Redistribution of crypto-news is allowed in its entirety. _____________________________________________________________________________ Table of Contents Encryption battle heats up in the House Experts assail government key recovery plans What YOU CAN DO NOW! Background What's at stake How to start or stop receiving crypto-news Press contacts _____________________________________________________________________________ ENCRYPTION BATTLE HEATS UP IN THE HOUSE On May 14th, the House Judiciary Committee approved a bill designed to dramatically enhance the ability of Internet users to protect their privacy and security online. The bill now moves to the House International Relations Committee, where it is expected to face tougher opposition from the FBI, NSA, and the Clinton Administration. The International Relations Committee is expected to consider the bill soon. The Security and Freedom through Encryption Act (SAFE - HR 695) will prohibit the government from imposing mandatory law enforcement access to private online communications inside the US, affirm the right of American Citizens to use whatever from of encryption they choose, and relax current export restrictions which prevent the development of strong, easy-to-use encryption technologies. The Clinton Administration, led by the FBI and the National Security agency, opposes SAFE and is pushing for a policy of domestic restrictions on the use of encryption, guaranteed law enforcement access to private communications via government designed "key-recovery" systems, and continued reliance on out-dated, cold-war era export controls. For the first time in history, Congress is close to passing real encryption policy reform legislation which will protect privacy, promote electronic commerce, and recognizes the realities of the global Internet. Pointers to additional information on the SAFE bill and other efforts to reform U.S. encryption policy are attached below. Congress needs to hear from you! If you value your privacy and care about the future of the Net, please take a few moments to join the Adopt Your Legislator campaign. Instructions are attached below. ________________________________________________________________________________ CRYPTOGRAPHERS AND COMPUTER SECURITY EXPERTS ASSAIL GOV'T. KEY RECOVERY PLANS On Wednesday May 21, a group of leading cryptographers and computer scientists released a report which for the first time examines the risks and implications of government-designed key-recovery systems. The report cautions that "The deployment of a general key-recovery-based encryption infrastructure to meet law enforcement's stated requirements will result in substantial sacrifices in security and cost to the end user. Building a secure infrastructure of the breathtaking scale and complexity demanded by these requirements is far beyond the experience and current competency of the field." The report substantially changes the terms of the ongoing debate over US encryption policy. For more than four years, the Clinton Administration has pushed for a policy of continued export restrictions on strong encryption, and the development of global key escrow and key recovery systems to address the concerns of law enforcement. The study, the first comprehensive analysis of the risks of key recovery and key escrow systems, calls into question the viability of the Administration's approach. The Report's authors, recognized leaders in the cryptography and computer science field, include Hal Abelson, Ross Anderson, Steven M. Bellovin, Josh Benaloh, Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, John Gilmore, Peter G. Neumann, Ronald L. Rivest, Jeffery I. Schiller, and Bruce Schneier The report is be available online at http://www.crypto.com/key_study/ ________________________________________________________________________________ WHAT YOU CAN DO NOW 1. Adopt Your Legislator Now is the time to increase our ranks and prepare for the fight that lies a head of us in Congress. Please take a few minutes to learn more about this important issue, and join the Adopt Your Legislator Campaign at http://www.crypto.com/adopt/ This will produce a customized page, just for you with your own legislator's telephone number and address. In addition, you will receive the latest news and information on the issue, as well as targeted alerts informing you when your Representatives in Congress do something that could help or hinder the future of the Internet. Best of all, it's free. Do your part, Work the Network! Visit http://www.crypto.com/adopt/ for details. 2. Spread the Word! Forward this Alert to your friends. Help educate the public about the importance of this issue. Please do not forward after July 1, 1997. _____________________________________________________________________________ BACKGROUND Complete background information, including: * A down-to-earth explanation of why this debate is important to Internet users * Analysis and background on the issue * Text of the Administration draft legislation * Text of Congressional proposals to reform US encryption policy * Audio transcripts and written testimony from recent Congressional Hearings on encryption policy reform * And more! Are all available at http://www.crypto.com/ ________________________________________________________________________ WHAT'S AT STAKE Encryption technologies are the locks and keys of the Information age -- enabling individuals and businesses to protect sensitive information as it is transmitted over the Internet. As more and more individuals and businesses come online, the need for strong, reliable, easy-to-use encryption technologies has become a critical issue to the health and viability of the Net. Current US encryption policy, which limits the strength of encryption products US companies can sell abroad, also limits the availability of strong, easy-to-use encryption technologies in the United States. US hardware and software manufacturers who wish to sell their products on the global market must either conform to US encryption export limits or produce two separate versions of the same product, a costly and complicated alternative. The export controls, which the NSA and FBI argue help to keep strong encryption out of the hands of foreign adversaries, are having the opposite effect. Strong encryption is available abroad, but because of the export limits and the confusion created by nearly four years of debate over US encryption policy, strong, easy-to-use privacy and security technologies are not widely available off the shelf or "on the net" here in the US. A recently discovered flaw in the security of the new digital telephone network exposed the worst aspects of the Administration's encryption policy. Because the designers needed to be able to export their products, the system's security was "dumbed down". Researchers subsequently discovered that it is quite easy to break the security of the system and intrude on what should be private conversations. This incident underscores the larger policy problem: US companies are at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace when competing against companies that do not have such hindrances. And now, for the first time in history, the Clinton Administration has DOMESTIC RESTRICTIONS on the ability of Americans to protect their privacy and security online. All of us care about our national security, and no one wants to make it any easier for criminals and terrorists to commit criminal acts. But we must also recognize encryption technologies can aid law enforcement and protect national security by limiting the threat of industrial espionage and foreign spying, promote electronic commerce and protecting privacy. What's at stake in this debate is nothing less than the future of privacy and the fate of the Internet as a secure and trusted medium for commerce, education, and political discourse. ______________________________________________________________________________ HOW TO START OR STOP RECEIVING CRYPTO-NEWS To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com) or send mail to majordomo(a)panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body of the message. To unsubscribe, send a letter to majordomo(a)panix.com with "unsubscribe crypto-news" in the body. Requests to unsubscribe that are sent to shabbir(a)vtw.org will be ignored. _____________________________________________________________________________ PRESS CONTACT INFORMATION Press inquiries on Crypto-News should be directed to Shabbir J. Safdar (VTW) at +1.718.596.2851 or shabbir(a)vtw.org Jonah Seiger (CDT) at +1.202.637.9800 or jseiger(a)cdt.org _____________________________________________________________________________ End crypto-news =============================================================================

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Clinton on privacy and the Internet
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 22:04:03 -0500 From: Andrew Shapiro <ashapiro(a)interport.net> To: telstar(a)wired.com, declan(a)well.com Subject: Clinton on privacy Todd and Declan: I assume you've both seen this quote about privacy (below) from Clinton's commencement speech last week. Declan, you might want to put up on the FC list -- if you haven't already. Cheers, Andrew *** From: http://www.epic.org/privacy/laws/clinton_speech_5_18_97.html#privacy Third, technology should not be used to break down the wall of privacy and autonomy free citizens are guaranteed in a free society. The right to privacy is one of our most cherished freedoms. As society has grown more complex and people have become more interconnected in every way, we have had to work even harder to respect the privacy, the dignity, the autonomy of each individual. Today, when marketers can follow every aspect of our lives, from the first phone call we make in the morning to the time our security system says we have left the house, to the video camera at the toll booth and the charge slip we have for lunch, we cannot afford to forget this most basic lesson. As the Internet reaches to touch every business and every household and we face the frightening prospect that private information -- even medical records -- could be made instantly available to the world, we must develop new protections for privacy in the face of new technological reality. (Applause.)

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INFO: Encryption battle heats up in House; experts weigh in (5/30/97)
by Shabbir J. Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================================= ____ _ _ _ / ___|_ __ _ _ _ __ | |_ ___ | \ | | _____ _____ | | | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____| \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __| | |___| | | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\ | __/\ V V /\__ \ \____|_| \__, | .__/ \__\___/ |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/ |___/|_| PRO-ENCRYPTION BILL CLEARS SECOND CONGRESSIONAL HURDLE; FACES TOUGHER TEST IN COMING WEEKS. CRYPTOGRAPHERS AND COMPUTER SECURITY EXPERTS ASSAIL GOVERNMENT KEY RECOVERY PLANS Date: May 29, 1997 Expires July 1, 1997 URL:http://www.crypto.com/ crypto-news(a)panix.com Redistribution of crypto-news is allowed in its entirety. _____________________________________________________________________________ Table of Contents Encryption battle heats up in the House Experts assail government key recovery plans What YOU CAN DO NOW! Background What's at stake How to start or stop receiving crypto-news Press contacts _____________________________________________________________________________ ENCRYPTION BATTLE HEATS UP IN THE HOUSE On May 14th, the House Judiciary Committee approved a bill designed to dramatically enhance the ability of Internet users to protect their privacy and security online. The bill now moves to the House International Relations Committee, where it is expected to face tougher opposition from the FBI, NSA, and the Clinton Administration. The International Relations Committee is expected to consider the bill soon. The Security and Freedom through Encryption Act (SAFE - HR 695) will prohibit the government from imposing mandatory law enforcement access to private online communications inside the US, affirm the right of American Citizens to use whatever from of encryption they choose, and relax current export restrictions which prevent the development of strong, easy-to-use encryption technologies. The Clinton Administration, led by the FBI and the National Security agency, opposes SAFE and is pushing for a policy of domestic restrictions on the use of encryption, guaranteed law enforcement access to private communications via government designed "key-recovery" systems, and continued reliance on out-dated, cold-war era export controls. For the first time in history, Congress is close to passing real encryption policy reform legislation which will protect privacy, promote electronic commerce, and recognizes the realities of the global Internet. Pointers to additional information on the SAFE bill and other efforts to reform U.S. encryption policy are attached below. Congress needs to hear from you! If you value your privacy and care about the future of the Net, please take a few moments to join the Adopt Your Legislator campaign. Instructions are attached below. ________________________________________________________________________________ CRYPTOGRAPHERS AND COMPUTER SECURITY EXPERTS ASSAIL GOV'T. KEY RECOVERY PLANS On Wednesday May 21, a group of leading cryptographers and computer scientists released a report which for the first time examines the risks and implications of government-designed key-recovery systems. The report cautions that "The deployment of a general key-recovery-based encryption infrastructure to meet law enforcement's stated requirements will result in substantial sacrifices in security and cost to the end user. Building a secure infrastructure of the breathtaking scale and complexity demanded by these requirements is far beyond the experience and current competency of the field." The report substantially changes the terms of the ongoing debate over US encryption policy. For more than four years, the Clinton Administration has pushed for a policy of continued export restrictions on strong encryption, and the development of global key escrow and key recovery systems to address the concerns of law enforcement. The study, the first comprehensive analysis of the risks of key recovery and key escrow systems, calls into question the viability of the Administration's approach. The Report's authors, recognized leaders in the cryptography and computer science field, include Hal Abelson, Ross Anderson, Steven M. Bellovin, Josh Benaloh, Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, John Gilmore, Peter G. Neumann, Ronald L. Rivest, Jeffery I. Schiller, and Bruce Schneier The report is be available online at http://www.crypto.com/key_study/ ________________________________________________________________________________ WHAT YOU CAN DO NOW 1. Adopt Your Legislator Now is the time to increase our ranks and prepare for the fight that lies a head of us in Congress. Please take a few minutes to learn more about this important issue, and join the Adopt Your Legislator Campaign at http://www.crypto.com/adopt/ This will produce a customized page, just for you with your own legislator's telephone number and address. In addition, you will receive the latest news and information on the issue, as well as targeted alerts informing you when your Representatives in Congress do something that could help or hinder the future of the Internet. Best of all, it's free. Do your part, Work the Network! Visit http://www.crypto.com/adopt/ for details. 2. Spread the Word! Forward this Alert to your friends. Help educate the public about the importance of this issue. Please do not forward after July 1, 1997. _____________________________________________________________________________ BACKGROUND Complete background information, including: * A down-to-earth explanation of why this debate is important to Internet users * Analysis and background on the issue * Text of the Administration draft legislation * Text of Congressional proposals to reform US encryption policy * Audio transcripts and written testimony from recent Congressional Hearings on encryption policy reform * And more! Are all available at http://www.crypto.com/ ________________________________________________________________________ WHAT'S AT STAKE Encryption technologies are the locks and keys of the Information age -- enabling individuals and businesses to protect sensitive information as it is transmitted over the Internet. As more and more individuals and businesses come online, the need for strong, reliable, easy-to-use encryption technologies has become a critical issue to the health and viability of the Net. Current US encryption policy, which limits the strength of encryption products US companies can sell abroad, also limits the availability of strong, easy-to-use encryption technologies in the United States. US hardware and software manufacturers who wish to sell their products on the global market must either conform to US encryption export limits or produce two separate versions of the same product, a costly and complicated alternative. The export controls, which the NSA and FBI argue help to keep strong encryption out of the hands of foreign adversaries, are having the opposite effect. Strong encryption is available abroad, but because of the export limits and the confusion created by nearly four years of debate over US encryption policy, strong, easy-to-use privacy and security technologies are not widely available off the shelf or "on the net" here in the US. A recently discovered flaw in the security of the new digital telephone network exposed the worst aspects of the Administration's encryption policy. Because the designers needed to be able to export their products, the system's security was "dumbed down". Researchers subsequently discovered that it is quite easy to break the security of the system and intrude on what should be private conversations. This incident underscores the larger policy problem: US companies are at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace when competing against companies that do not have such hindrances. And now, for the first time in history, the Clinton Administration has DOMESTIC RESTRICTIONS on the ability of Americans to protect their privacy and security online. All of us care about our national security, and no one wants to make it any easier for criminals and terrorists to commit criminal acts. But we must also recognize encryption technologies can aid law enforcement and protect national security by limiting the threat of industrial espionage and foreign spying, promote electronic commerce and protecting privacy. What's at stake in this debate is nothing less than the future of privacy and the fate of the Internet as a secure and trusted medium for commerce, education, and political discourse. ______________________________________________________________________________ HOW TO START OR STOP RECEIVING CRYPTO-NEWS To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com) or send mail to majordomo(a)panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body of the message. To unsubscribe, send a letter to majordomo(a)panix.com with "unsubscribe crypto-news" in the body. Requests to unsubscribe that are sent to shabbir(a)vtw.org will be ignored. _____________________________________________________________________________ PRESS CONTACT INFORMATION Press inquiries on Crypto-News should be directed to Shabbir J. Safdar (VTW) at +1.718.596.2851 or shabbir(a)vtw.org Jonah Seiger (CDT) at +1.202.637.9800 or jseiger(a)cdt.org _____________________________________________________________________________ End crypto-news =============================================================================

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Re: Continuing spam from vulis
by Jeff Burchell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 30 May 1997, Paul Pomes wrote: > The wider circulation is due to the complete lack of response from > remailer-admin(a)cajones.com. Be careful when you say "Complete lack of response". You've got no idea what I did and didn't do once I got your message. I have previously talked with the operator of the cypherpunks list (this was about 2 months ago when someone else was abusing the remailer to post trash to that list). At that time, I offered the standard good will gesture that remailer operators can offer: "Would you like me to block the list, so this remailer won't send anything to it". Because of the nature of anonymous remailers, this is about the extent of the action that I can take. To this, I recieved a very firm "no!" (cypherpunks is of course a list where people do have good reasons to use remailers). Because of that, I _WON'T_ block cypherpunks, until I am instructed to by May, Gilmore, Hughes, et.al. Period. This holds true for all mailing lists. I need to have authorization from the list maintainer to block the list. I have added your address to my block list, this remailer won't send anything directly to you in the future. If you don't want to read anything from this mailer that comes across lists, then you should either manually delete anonymous messages before reading them (the headers and return address make it obvious when a message has come through a remailer), or turn on some client-side mail filters. Your own company makes a product with adaquate functionality to do this. -Jeff Operator... Huge.cajones.com P.S. Besides... aren't ad hominum attacks on Tim May a Cypherpunks tradition? P.P.S. Isn't there a non-flames moderated cypherpunks? Perhaps you want to be on that list instead of the free-for-all. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- "When they came for the 2nd Amendment, I said nothing, for I owned no gun Then the sixth was next to go, and I remained silent, as I was not on trial They took away the fourth, and I said nothing, as I had nothing to hide And then they came for the First, and I could say nothing."

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And speaking of spamming! (was: Stanton McCandlish)
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Speaking of unwanted messages, which legislators call "spamming." An EFF person, whom I do respect, by the way, added my name to a spammer's list, some shtick they have called "sixdegrees." Here's the spam I just got, complete with what they claim is my "password." Inasmuch as I never requested this password, and have no intention of using it, and have no contractual relationship with either "sixdegrees" or Stanton McCandlish, you folks might want to have some fun with this alleged service and (unrequested) password. The password may only work if it comes from "tcmay(a)mail.got.net," but, then, I hear that such "From:" fields are easily spoofed. --Tim >X-From_: bmkf0032(a)auto.sixdegrees.com Sat May 31 10:43:36 1997 >X-Real-To: <tcmay(a)mail.got.net> >From: "sixdegrees" <bmkf0032(a)auto.sixdegrees.com> >To: "May Tim" <tcmay(a)mail.got.net> >Reply-To: "sixdegrees" <bmkf0032(a)auto.sixdegrees.com> >Subject: Stanton McCandlish >Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 13:45:12 Eastern Daylight Time > >Name: May Tim >E-Mail Address: tcmay(a)mail.got.net >sixdegrees Password: cusproll > >You've been listed by Stanton McCandlish as "Acquaintance" >as part of a free Internet networking service called sixdegrees(tm). > >WHAT WE ARE: > > sixdegrees is a Web site at http://www.sixdegrees.com/ that's > based on the theory that everyone on earth is connected to > everyone else through a path of six people or less. We hope to > use the power of the Internet to revolutionize the way people > network. > >WHAT'S IN IT FOR YOU: > > You can come to http://www.sixdegrees.com/ and use our FREE > services to network with the people you want to know through > the people you do know. You can find out how you're connected > to specific people, like that person who's interviewing you for > a new job next week. Or, you can find out how you're connected > to certain kinds of people, like pediatricians in San Francisco, > or inline skaters in New York. > >WHAT'S IN IT FOR US: > > We make money by selling ads on the sixdegrees site. We > never sell lists of names or any specific information about > our individual members to anybody. To find out more about > our policies regarding privacy, just visit > http://www.sixdegrees.com/about/privacy.cfm > >HOW IT WORKS: > > If you list your contacts and how you know them, we'll forward > them an email like this one. They'll be invited to confirm their > relationship to you and to participate in sixdegrees themselves > by listing their contacts. > >WHAT TO DO NEXT: > > Just reply to this e-mail by following the INSTRUCTIONS below > (you may want to print it out first - it's easier that way.) > > > And remember to visit http://www.sixdegrees.com/. Click on Services, > log-in with your password, which is cusproll, and enjoy > networking on a whole new level. > >=================================================================== >INSTRUCTIONS FOR REPLYING: > >FIRST: > > Click your mail program's REPLY button. > >SECOND: > > On the FIRST line of the message body of the reply e-mail that > opens, type only the word CONFIRM or DENY to let us know if you > are in fact Stanton's Acquaintance. > >THIRD: > On the next line of the message body list the first and last names > and e-mail addresses of at least TWO people you know, and the > relationship numbers that correspond with how those people are > related to you. > >MAKE SURE: > >* That the first name, last name, e-mail address and relationship > number are separated by SEMI-COLONS. > >* You list at least TWO people if you want to become a member. > (You can list as many as you want - the more you list, the > larger your network of contacts will be.) > >* Each entry is on its OWN LINE. > >* You follow the format of these examples: > > John; Smith; jsmith(a)fakeplace.com; 12 > Jane; Doe; superjane(a)fakeplace.com; 3 > >* And that you define each relationship by choosing a number from > this list: > > 1=wife 2=husband 3=life partner > 4=significant other 5=mother 6=father > 7=sister 8=brother 9=daughter >10=son 11=other family member 12=friend >13=employer 14=employee 15=co-worker >16=client 17=service provider 18=business contact >19=fellow alum 20=acquaintance > > >FOURTH: > > Click send, and that's it. We look forward to hearing from you. > >=================================================================== > >** PLEASE NOTE: All replies to this address are processed by a > computer. If you have any problems, questions or requests send an > e-mail to issues(a)sixdegrees.com and someone will get back to you > as soon as possible. > >** If you'd rather not participate in sixdegrees and would prefer > not to receive any further e-mails from us at this time, please > send an e-mail to remove(a)sixdegrees.com that says "REMOVE ME". > >=================================================================== > > > >E.DB.ANB.1 >

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Re: Continuing spam from vulis
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(I've removed 9 of the addresses from this response.) At 12:42 PM -0700 5/30/97, Jeff Burchell wrote: >I have previously talked with the operator of the cypherpunks list (this >was about 2 months ago when someone else was abusing the remailer to post And just who is "the operator of the cypherpunks list"? If this was about 2 months ago, it would've been well after the Cypherdiaspora, so there would be even less of a concept of the "operator" than there was before. And why would he or she or they have anything to say about blocking remailers? >trash to that list). At that time, I offered the standard good will >gesture that remailer operators can offer: "Would you like me to block the >list, so this remailer won't send anything to it". Because of the nature >of anonymous remailers, this is about the extent of the action that I can >take. > >To this, I recieved a very firm "no!" (cypherpunks is of course a list >where people do have good reasons to use remailers). Because of that, I >_WON'T_ block cypherpunks, until I am instructed to by May, Gilmore, >Hughes, et.al. Period. This holds true for all mailing lists. I need to >have authorization from the list maintainer to block the list. Neither May nor Gilmore nor Hughes have any say over blocking remailers, blocking use of remailers, etc. >-Jeff >Operator... Huge.cajones.com > >P.S. Besides... aren't ad hominum attacks on Tim May a Cypherpunks > tradition? I mean no disrespect to Jeff, but even getting involved in the slightest way in debates about remailer traffic and what should/should not be blocked is what can only be called a "conceptual error." Ideal mixes, which today's remailers are of course only an approximation of, do not pass and reject messages based on content, or even on sources and destinations. The ideal mix is a soulless black box executing certain protocols. (Practicality may dictate that a remailer place certain minimal, and hopefully publicized, constraints on the process, e.g., no sending to whitehouse.gov, no sending to hundreds of addresses, whatever.) --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Elliptic Curve Rumor
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 10:53:16 -0700 To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> From: Somebody Subject: Elliptic Curve Rumor Mime-Version: 1.0 I assume you will pass this information on. Please don't associate my name with it. I have heard that Apple has a working implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Because of the export regulations they don't want to include it in their products. If anyone wants to try to change their minds, now would be a good time. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Janus (now called LPWA) ready for pre-testing)
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 13:31:25 -0400 From: alain(a)research.bell-labs.com (Alain Mayer) To: rah(a)shipwright.com Subject: Janus (now called LPWA) ready for pre-testing) Cc: alain(a)research.bell-labs.com Hi Robert, the Janus system I presented at FC97 is now running on a proxy at Bell Labs, accessible to everyone. Maybe you can send the announcement below to the fc97 mailing list? Many thanks and I hope everything is fine with you, -- Alain ======================================== Hi, Janus (now called the Lucent Personalized Web Assistant, LPWA) is now pre-testing. Its main goal is to increase convenience, security, and privacy for browsing the web, especially with sites that require registration (and hence user names, passwords and e-mail addresses). We hope that you will use it for a while and give us some feedback on what you like and what kind of things are annoying. Note, that you can only participate if you are able to configure your browser to directly connect to our proxy. Some of you might be behind a firewall or ISP where a particular proxy is required. Instructions can be found at http://lpwa.com:8000. More on the project is located at http://www.bell-labs.com/project/lpwa/ An arbitrary list of (free) sites which require registration can be found at http://www.bell-labs.com/projects/lpwa/extended_summary_tmp.html#account Please note that this project has not yet been publicy announced and that documentation and code are currently being revised. Also, the current set-up, where you have to connect to LPWA/Janus over an insecure connection is not "optimal" (to say the least, but all in all much better than if you browse the "usual way"). Hence, we are really looking for "friendly users" at this time whose feedback might help us to make improvements. Regards, -- Alain --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I suppose I am developing a reputation amongst the Inside the Beltway Cyber Rights Groups (tm) as a pain in the ass, but nearly everytime I see one of their chief spokeswonks giving a policy statement I realize they are "not on my side." The latest quote is from Marc Rotenberg, on a CNN piece on spam and anti-spam legislation, saying that what the legislators in Congress really need to look into is how the spammers develop their data bases..... Incredible. Does he propose investigations of private data gathering? Perhaps search warrants served on those who take public postings and construct data bases? Look, I'm annoyed by getting 5-10 "unwanted" spam messages a day. But I realize the "spammers" are merely taking publicly available (= legally available, as 99.99% of all such information is) information and using legal channels to contact me. I may not "like" it, but their behavior is as legal as someone calling me on the phone. (And ny nearly any measure of hassle factor, dashing to get to the phone only to find it's a salesman selling something I don't want is worse than any 20 unwanted e-mail messages.) So, Marc Rotenberg wants Congress to "look into" (= interfere with) compilation and use of public information. These people are NOT our allies. --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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