December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: PGP Employee on MKR
by mark＠unicorn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A PGP Employee wrote: >> Unfortunately these people just don't get it. Corporations refused >> to buy 5.0 because it did not have any way for the corps to get at >> email encrypted to their employees. There are some very legitimate >> uses of this, such as when an employee dies and someone else has >> to take over for them. No, PGP Inc 'just don't get it'. I'm sure that there are plenty of people out there who disagree with the entire concept of CMR, and I'm not very happy with it myself. But that's not the most important issue here. Since this point just doesn't seem to get through to PGP Inc employees, I'm going to shout. FORCING ENCRYPTION TO MULTIPLE KEYS FOR ONE RECIPIENT IS ONE STEP AWAY FROM GAK. FORCING ENCRYPTION TO MULTIPLE KEYS FOR ONE RECIPIENT IS ONE STEP AWAY FROM GAK! FORCING ENCRYPTION TO MULTIPLE KEYS FOR ONE RECIPIENT IS ONE STEP AWAY FROM GAK!! FORCING ENCRYPTION TO MULTIPLE KEYS FOR ONE RECIPIENT IS ONE STEP AWAY FROM GAK!! !!!*FORCING ENCRYPTION TO MULTIPLE KEYS FOR ONE RECIPIENT IS ONE STEP AWAY FROM GAK*!!! Is that clear enough? Do you understand what I (and, apparently, Adam Back and others) am saying now? The problem is not so much with the fact that you're supporting company needs, but with the way you're doing so. >> They also don't seem to realize that you always have the ability >> to remove the MRK from your list of recipients. Just as government-supported rating schemes are purely voluntary and will be so for, oh, I don't know, a couple of years? Once the infrastructure is there, we need only an executive order to make it mandatory. If this software ships in its current form and becomes the dominant player in the market, in four or five years all keys will be GMR keys with the FBI or NSA as one mandatory recipient. You 'privacy zealots' will have created the government's surveillance infrastructure. I hope you'll feel proud. >> Sometimes I really feel like screaming at these people. _All_ of >> the developers at PGP are personal privacy zealots and no one >> likes the idea of the MRK. Good. Then reimplement it to avoid giving the government a GAK/GMR infrastructure. Yesterday I posted a modified version of PGP's CMR to the cypherpunks list which can't be used for GAK because it only encrypts to one key; Jon Callas just told me I'd 'redesigned PGP 5.5'. Cool. I've redesigned PGP 5.5 so that it can't support GAK; in that case, please implement it, or accept that you're deliberately choosing to support the thugs in governments around the world and have become part of the problem. >> That is why we refuse to make them >> required. Just 'mandatory voluntary' for companies which have your SMTP enforcer enabled. What's the difference? >> Most everyone at PGP has >> internalized personal privacy as a cause (actually most had it >> before they joined PGP). So prove it. Stop working on creating a GMR/GAK infrastructure. The current PGP CMR system has numerous problems which many people have pointed out on the cypherpunks list, and you'd do better to solve those problems rather than see them in a major New York Times article about '101 Ways PGP 5.5 Harms Company Security'. How long will PGP Inc last when it's reputation for providing secure products is in tatters, because it chose to release a product which deliberately reduced company security and opened them to new threats, rather than redesign their CMR to remove these problems? The current CMR implementation is bad for us, bad for PGP Inc's commercial customers, and bad for PGP Inc. Why is this so hard for you to accept? Why ship a bad product when you can fix the problems? Mark

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Re: PGP Employee on MKR
by mark＠unicorn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Resent because god-damned Netscape screwed up the line-breaks] A PGP Employee wrote: >> Unfortunately these people just don't get it. Corporations refused >> to buy 5.0 because it did not have any way for the corps to get at >> email encrypted to their employees. There are some very legitimate >> uses of this, such as when an employee dies and someone else has >> to take over for them. No, PGP Inc 'just don't get it'. I'm sure that there are plenty of people out there who disagree with the entire concept of CMR, and I'm not very happy with it myself. But that's not the most important issue here. Since this point just doesn't seem to get through to PGP Inc employees, I'm going to shout. FORCING ENCRYPTION TO MULTIPLE KEYS FOR ONE RECIPIENT IS ONE STEP AWAY FROM GAK. FORCING ENCRYPTION TO MULTIPLE KEYS FOR ONE RECIPIENT IS ONE STEP AWAY FROM GAK! FORCING ENCRYPTION TO MULTIPLE KEYS FOR ONE RECIPIENT IS ONE STEP AWAY FROM GAK!! FORCING ENCRYPTION TO MULTIPLE KEYS FOR ONE RECIPIENT IS ONE STEP AWAY FROM GAK!! !!!*FORCING ENCRYPTION TO MULTIPLE KEYS FOR ONE RECIPIENT IS ONE STEP AWAY FROM GAK*!!! Is that clear enough? Do you understand what I (and, apparently, Adam Back and others) am saying now? The problem is not so much with the fact that you're supporting company needs, but with the way you're doing so. >> They also don't seem to realize that you always have the ability >> to remove the MRK from your list of recipients. Just as government-supported rating schemes are purely voluntary and will be so for, oh, I don't know, a couple of years? Once the infrastructure is there, we need only an executive order to make it mandatory. If this software ships in its current form and becomes the dominant player in the market, in four or five years all keys will be GMR keys with the FBI or NSA as one mandatory recipient. You 'privacy zealots' will have created the government's surveillance infrastructure. I hope you'll feel proud. >> Sometimes I really feel like screaming at these people. _All_ of >> the developers at PGP are personal privacy zealots and no one >> likes the idea of the MRK. Good. Then reimplement it to avoid giving the government a GAK/GMR infrastructure. Yesterday I posted a modified version of PGP's CMR to the cypherpunks list which can't be used for GAK because it only encrypts to one key; Jon Callas just told me I'd 'redesigned PGP 5.5'. Cool. I've redesigned PGP 5.5 so that it can't support GAK; in that case, please implement it, or accept that you're deliberately choosing to support the thugs in governments around the world and have become part of the problem. >> That is why we refuse to make them >> required. Just 'mandatory voluntary' for companies which have your SMTP enforcer enabled. What's the difference? >> Most everyone at PGP has >> internalized personal privacy as a cause (actually most had it >> before they joined PGP). So prove it. Stop working on creating a GMR/GAK infrastructure. The current PGP CMR system has numerous problems which many people have pointed out on the cypherpunks list, and you'd do better to solve those problems rather than see them in a major New York Times article about '101 Ways PGP 5.5 Harms Company Security'. How long will PGP Inc last when it's reputation for providing secure products is in tatters, because it chose to release a product which deliberately reduced company security and opened them to new threats, rather than redesign their CMR to remove these problems? The current CMR implementation is bad for us, bad for PGP Inc's commercial customers, and bad for PGP Inc. Why is this so hard for you to accept? Why ship a bad product when you can fix the problems? Mark

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Fwd: 56-bit RSA/RC5 Cracked
by Jeffrey Gold 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Apologies if this already seen - JG =================================== Date: Wed, 22 Oct 1997 18:26:52 -0400 To: mac crypto list <mac-crypto(a)vmeng.com> From: Vinnie Moscaritolo <vinnie(a)vmeng.com> Subject: RC5 cracked Press Release and Background Sheet FORMAL PRESS RELEASE For Immediate Release Contact: David McNett October 22,1997 205-458-8208 SECURE ENCRYPTION CHALLENGED BY INTERNET-LINKED COMPUTERS CHICAGO, IL (October 22, 1997) In what could be called the largest distributed-computing effort ever, tens of thousands of computers linked across the Internet, under the leadership of distributed.net, decrypted a message encoded with RSA Labs' 56-bit RC5 encryption algorithm. Considered by many experts to be a sufficient level of encryption, this feat has cast grave doubts in the minds of analysts as to the level of encryption required to keep private data secure. "Our effort has shown that it is dangerous to consider any 56-bit key secure", says David McNett, one of the primary coordinators of this distributed supercomputing project. The distributed.net effort to decrypt the encoded message required massive computing power, harnessed by utilizing the idle, or otherwise unused computing power from ordinary office and home computers. Combined, these machines managed to evaluate 47% of the keyspace, or 34 quadrillion keys, before finding the winning key. At the close of the contest there were over 4000 active teams processing over 7 billion keys each second at a combined computing power equivalent to more than 26 thousand high-end personal computers. The work was performed entirely using consumer PCs during off-hours or otherwise idle time. Add them all together, however, and you have the world's largest computer. The winning key was found by Peter Stuer, working for the STARLab Bovine Team coordinated by Jo Hermans and centered in the Computer Science Department (DINF) of the Vrije Universiteit in Brussels, Belgium. Of the US$10000 prize from RSA Labs, Mr. Stuer will receive US$1000. US$8000 is being donated to Project Gutenberg, a non-profit organization created for the purpose of converting the classics of literature into electronic format for the unlimited public use. The remaining US$1000 is being retained by distributed.net to assist in funding future projects. Distributed.net is the brainchild of Adam L. Beberg. It is the largest non-profit venture focused on developing the full potential of distributed computing. Its purpose is to utilize the Internet, allowing home and office computer users to join forces in tackling great and seemingly insurmountable computational challenges. The net result is computing power sufficient to challenge the dominance of even the most expensive mainframes and research computers. Information about distributed.net is available from the official distributed.net web site at: http://www.distributed.net/ MEDIA CONTACTS: David McNett, Voice: (205) 458-8208, Fax: (205) 458-8206 nugget(a)distributed.net ALTERNATE: Adam L. Beberg, (708) 396-9532, beberg(a)distributed.net ------------------------------------------------------------------ SECURE ENCRYPTION CHALLENGED BY INTERNET-LINKED COMPUTERS Background for release dated October 22, 1997 distributed.net data sheet distributed.net web site: http://www.distributed.net/ Related sites: Project Gutenberg: http://www.promo.net/pg/ RSA Labs: http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/ RSA Secret Key Challenge: http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/97challenge/ Principal organizers: Adam L. Beberg, Software Engineer, Chicago, Illinois Jeff Lawson, Junior Computer Science Major, Harvey Mudd College, Claremont, California David McNett, Computer Programmer/Network Administrator, Birmingham, Alabama Project statistics: Start of contest: January 28, 1997 Start of distributed.net effort: March 20, 1997 End of contest: October 19, 1997 Size of keyspace: 72,057,594,037,927,936 Number of "blocks":268,435,456 Number of keys in one "block": 268,435,456 Peak keys/day: 600,246,644,113,408 Peak keys/second: 7,200,000,000 (estimated) The unencrypted message: "It's time to move to a longer key length" Computing equivalents: Distributed.net is equivalent in processing power to: 14,685 Intel Pentium Pro 200 processors 13,362 Motorola PowerPC 604e/200 processors 116,326 Intel 486DX2/66 processors 58,163 Intel Pentium 133 processors Perspective: distributed.net could compromise 46-bit RC5 in under one hour. If you printed a single page to represent each key block as it was checked and placed those pages in a stack, it would grow 6.24 inches taller every minute. If keys were drops of water, the flow rate would be 464428 litres per second. If Keys were dollars, we could pay off the U.S. National Debt in 12.44 minutes. If keys were bytes, we could fill 290268 3 1/2" floppy diskettes every minute If keys were drops of water, the flow rate would be 122609 gallons per second. If Key Blocks were hamburgers, we could feed the entire city of Phoenix, AZ lunch each day The computer that found the key: CPU: Intel Pentium Pro 200 RAM: 128 megabytes Operating System: Microsoft Windows NT Workstation 4.0 Owner: Vrije Universiteit, Brussels, Belgium Operator: Peter Stuer More information: http://dinf.vub.ac.be/bovine.html/ MEDIA CONTACTS: David McNett, Voice: (205) 458-8208, Fax: (205) 458-8206 nugget(a)distributed.net ALTERNATE: Adam L. Beberg, (708) 396-9532, beberg(a)distributed.net --Brian Bechtel, blob(a)ricochet.net Vinnie Moscaritolo http://www.vmeng.com/vinnie/ Fingerprint: 3F903472C3AF622D5D918D9BD8B100090B3EF042 "You can get a lot more with a smile and a gun then a smile, alone." - Al Capone -- Robert Guerra - PGP public key available on PGP key servers Email-> mailto:az096@freenet.toronto.on.ca Home Page-> http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/3378

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Re: PGP 5.5 CMR/GAK: a possible solution
by mark＠unicorn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

tcmay(a)got.net wrote: > Our mileages apparently vary. When _I_ send a message to, say, Jon Callas > at PGP, Inc., it is to Jon Callas, not to others. It might be a job offer, > it might be an invitationf for him to help monkeywrench CMR, it might be a > stock tip, it might be a comment about a conversation we had a party, it > might be a lot of things. Hmm, as usual, you make a good point. The uses I was thinking of were the kind of uses that people have suggested as reasons for CMR; emailing orders, etc to companies. Today I rarely do that because telephoning companies is much easier, and in the future I'd expect to be sending most of them over the Web rather than by email. I presume these *are* the kind of uses that PGP Inc are expecting, since their system seems to have no other value except as snoopware. > If I was sending it to "Jon's coworkers in Department Z," I probably either > wouldn't encrypt it at all, or would (if the option existed) encrypt to > some departmental or group key. Yep, which is basically what I was suggesting. The user chooses which key to use based on their perception of the sensitivity of the message, not the enforced company policy. If it's confidential, it's confidential; if the company think I'm up to no good they can come around and force me to decrypt a particular message, or sack me if I refuse. Their call. > I expect those who adopt CMR will find an awful lot of folks will just give > up on trying to communicate with those living in a CMR regime. Ditto, at least if it's PGP's current 'mandatory voluntary' snoopware design. I won't be running any version of PGP which includes this 'feature' in its current form; I would also suggest that we boycott any scanning and proofreading efforts for future versions of PGP which include this code, or remove it from the source before release. If PGP's commercial customers lose business as a result, that's their choice. Mark

2 1

***BULK EMAIL FOR PROFIT***
by kiqe11＠zeta.org.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Within one week of my first mailing, I received a record number of orders. All you need to print money is a decent sales letter. Thanks." Randy albertson, Wolverine Capital. "After using Floodgate and your utility program all day today, let me say these are as two of the finest programs I have ever bought in my 52 years! Your support has been superb. Thank You!" Vernon Hale, Prime Data Systems "My first day and I just used Floodgate and Pegasus to send 1,469 sales letters. So far I've got about 25 positive responses. It works GREAT!!! Thanks." Donald Prior "I was able to use Floodgate to extract the names from the Internet news groups. It works perfectly. Needless to say, I am very excited about the use of this new technology." Mark Eberra, Inside Connections "This is a great piece of software and an invaluable marketing tool." Joe Kuhn, The Millennium Group "I just thought you'd like to know that this program is fantastic. After loading it on my system, I wanted to test it out. In my first hour of using this, I collected 6,092 email addresses!" Richard Kahn, LD Communications "I just love the Floodgate program. It saves me hours and hours of time. This is the beginning of a wonderful FUN time marketing on-line. Thank you so much for writing this program." Beth O'Neill, Eudora, KS "Your software is brilliant, and from the technical support I've received, I can see you have a genuine love and respect of people...Floodgate is a divine package. Wish I had found it sooner." Tom Sanders, Peoria, IL ------------------------------------------------- E-Z ORDER FORM: Please print out this order form and fill in the blanks...... Please send order form and check or money order, payable to: Dave Mustachi DEPT KA P.O. Box 772261 Coral Springs, FL 33077-2261 (954) 784-0312 ext.505 ______Yes! I would like to try your cutting-edge software so that I can advertise my business to thousands of people on-line whenever I like! I understand that I have 10 days to trial the software. If I am not fully delighted, I will cheerfully be refunded the purchase price, no questions asked! Please rush me the FLOODGATE and GOLDRUSH package now! ______I am ordering within 72 hours! That qualifies me to receive the FLOODGATE and GOLDRUSH package at a substantial discount! I am ordering BOTH software packages for only $349.95. (Save $150 off the retail price....Software has sold for as much as $2,499.95) ______I am ordering within 72 hours! That qualifies me to receive UNLIMITED technical support for 30 days. ______I want to receive the package OVERNIGHT. I'm including $18.00 for shipping charges. ______I want to receive the package 2nd DAY. I'm including $3.00 for shipping charges. ______I'm ordering Floodgate / Goldrush software and want to order the 45,000,000+ email addresses as well. My additional cost is $100.00 enclosed. ______I'm NOT ordering your Floodgate / Goldrush software, but I want to order your 45,000,000+ addresses on CD. Enclosed is $249.00. (CHECKS: ALLOW 1 WEEK FOR BANK CLEARANCE) YOUR NAME_________________________________________________ COMPANY NAME_________________________________________________ YOUR POSITION_____________________________________________ STREET ADDRESS______________________________________________ CITY, STATE, ZIP____________________________________________ PHONE NUMBERS_______________________________________________ FAX NUMBERS_________________________________________________ EMAIL ADDRESSES_____________________________________________ ************************************************************ We accept Checks, Money Orders, MasterCard, Visa, American Express. You can either mail your order to us OR fax your order to: 954-572-5837 ************************************************************ Today's date:_____________ Visa____MasterCard____American Express____ Card #:____________________________________________________ Expiration date:___________________________________________ Name on card:______________________________________________ Billing address:___________________________________________ Amount to be charged: $________________ Signature:___________________________________________ I agree to pay Dave Mustachi an additional $29 fee if my check is returned for insufficient or uncollectable funds. SIGNATURE: X________________________________DATE:_______________ Please send all order forms and check or money order to payable to: Dave MustachI DEPT KA P.O. Box 772261 Coral Springs, FL 33077 (954) 784-0312 ext.505 *************************************************** OR: PLEASE PASTE YOUR CHECK HERE (If you fax a check, there is no need for you to send the original check by mail. We will draft up a new check, with the exact information from your original check that you faxed to us) Please fax the above order form and check to: 1-954-572-5837 </FONT><FONT COLOR="#000000" SIZE=3>

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Cyberterrorism report according to the NYT
by Ariel Glenn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Day before yesterday I actually saw Ian Goldberg and David Wagner on CNN Headline news, second billing after some auto fuel cell thing, talking about weak encryption etc. in the context of the White House report on cyberterrorism. In any case here's the NYT take on it... Ariel Glenn ariel(a)columbia.edu ----- [beginning irrelevance deleted] The use of encryption by United States residents has been a hotly debated security issue in the White House, in Congress and on the Internet. Louis J. Freeh, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has testified repeatedly that allowing private citizens to use unbreakable encryption would enable criminals to mask their activities unless the police are allowed keys to all scrambled communications. Even so, the commission's report appears to suggest that widespread use of encryption is the nation's first line of defense against attacks by terrorists or spies who want to steal information or eavesdrop. Sophisticated systems like digital signatures can prevent terrorists from shutting down networks, crashing individual computers or erasing databases. Several people familiar with the commission's work, all of whom asked that they not be named, said that the panel had come under intense pressure to support the FBI's plan to build in trap doors known as "key recovery systems" into encryption schemes to make scrambled data easily accessible to the police. In the end, the commission did endorse key recovery, but only because such systems would allow people and companies to recover data if their own keys were lost. It stopped short of recommending easy access for law enforcement. In the interview on Tuesday, Marsh avoided commenting directly on the FBI's assertion that it needs "instant access" to all communications in the nation, saying only that the commission did not "probe into that in great depth." "Exactly how that is done," Marsh said of key recovery systems, "the commission is not expert at that." Some security analysts have argued that a widespread key recovery system could turn out to be a major vulnerability because if it was ever infiltrated or compromised, it would offer cyber-terrorists a database full of keys that could unlock significant portions of communications and computer systems in the United States. In addition to terrorists, any insider could easily reveal secret or proprietary data, either accidentally or maliciously. In recent months, for example, the FBI has been criticized for releasing the background files of Republican leaders to the White House, apparently because of a clerical error. [more irrelevance deleted] Peter Neumann, author of Computer-Related Risks, said of the report: "I think the Commission has made a very important first step toward recognizing the vulnerabilities, threats, and risks." Even so, Neumann said: "They could have gone much further in addressing the risks of the inherently weak computer-communication infrastructures that underlie our critical infrastructures. Also, they almost completely ducked the importance of nonsubvertible cryptography, and issues relating to the intrinsic risks of key-recovery schemes. But the real question is: Where does the government go from here?"

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(no subject)
by Scott L. Haire 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Whats the deal on checking out DL info. on the web? I'd like to know what available info is on the web concerning my DL.

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RE: Bill Gates, the Bully Savior
by Arturo Grapa Ysunza 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I too have my doubts about Microsoft software. Yes, they clearly >dominate a very lucrative market largely due to, as you mention, "sheer incompetance on the part of the rest of the industry" but another important reason is better marketing. Netscape, for example, could have beaten out MS if they had had better marketing and strategy (incompetance?). I believe the point of the Justice Dept. investigations is anti-trust issues more than it is a witch hunt. We all know that monopolies can, but not necesarily do, produce inferior products. Anti-trust laws are meant to facilitate competition on even ground and that can lead to better products for us the consumers. MS canŽt be blamed for the incompetence of the rest of the industry. If MS wins anti-trust litigation then so be it but someone has to keep them in check. We elect the people who appoint others to review these matters. If no one does it then soon weŽll see "Microsoft Compatible" stickers on the dashboards of our cars, toasters, beepers, etc. And what will happen to Unix then when we live in a Microsoft compatible world? BTW, my beef with MS is primarily quality. If they want to dominate the market then they better give me quality or IŽll spend my money elsewhere. Would you buy a Ford if you knew the tires would fall off if you donŽt install the **latest-and-greatest Service Pack**? I, for one, will keep bugging MS to produce better products. In the meantime, IŽll keep buying from the Unix side (which is also lagging). Arturo Grapa Ysunza agrapa(a)banamex.com Ing. de Comunicaciones Banco Nacional de México, S.A. http://www.banamex.com/ >---------- >Desde: Declan McCullagh[SMTP:declan@well.com] >Enviado el: Miércoles 22 de Octubre de 1997 1:07 PM >Para: Lizard >Cc: Jennifer S. Granick >Asunto: Re: Bill Gates, the Bully Savior > >There was a good op-ed in the WSJ on Monday. The Politics of Envy, >basically. Why everyone in Silicon Valley hates Microsoft... > >But some of the complaints about Microsoft come down to personal taste. The >masses offend refined sensibilities when they buy Windows 95 in droves. >Rein them in! Stop them from buying what they want! Don't let them get free >copies of Internet Explorer. > >I share Lizard's distaste for Microsoft products. My Unix workstation at >home has not one MSFT application on it. I have only Microsoft Word on my >Duo at work, and I could get by with WordPerfect. But our dislike for their >products doesn't mean that we are morally justified in restricting what the >company can do. > >-Declan > > > >At 10:42 -0700 10/22/97, Lizard wrote: >>Uhm...how do 'we all' benefit from having the same Justice Department which >>defended the CDA (and which is pushing for GAK) decide for us all what is, >>and is not, part of an operating system? >> >>These people are not qualified to make ANY judgements about computers -- I >>have to assume the 'experts' they got to tell them about OS software are no >>more qualified than the 'experts' they got to testify about the CDA (L-18, >>anyone?). >> >>I have no great love for Microsoft (I don't think anyone forced to use >>their crappy software does), and, emotionally, I'd like to see them get >>taken down a peg -- but legally and ethically, they are not doing anything >>wrong. They're just being tough competitors. Microsoft has prospered not >>due to any technical brilliance on their part, but due to sheer >>incompetance on the part of the rest of the industry, who have made a hobby >>of underestimating Bill Gates and overestimating their own customers >>loyalty. >> >>It's a pity I'm a mind-flaying victim. If I wasn't, I could forget >>principles and ideals and just say, "Microsoft Big. Microsoft Nasty. Uncle >>Sam stomp Microsoft. Yay, Uncle Sam." But because I work from principle >>FIRST, I have to grant Microsoft the same rights I would grant Sam's Deli >>or Joe's Shoe Store, and that includes the right to offer any combination >>of products or services they wish, and let the market decide to buy or not. > > > >------------------------- >Declan McCullagh >Time Inc. >The Netly News Network >Washington Correspondent >http://netlynews.com/ > > >

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What RSA & Netscape have to offer
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi, While the list is busy knocking PGP for not doing the "right thing" or being the "first ones to blink" I though I would share with the list what some of the "big boys" are doing for the spread of "Strong Crypto to the Masses". Below is from the most current S/MIME draft "draft-dusse-smime-msg-05" dated 19-Oct-1997: 2.6 ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier Receiving agents MUST support decryption using the RC2 [RC2] or a compatible algorithm at a key size of 40 bits, hereinafter called "RC2/40". Receiving agents SHOULD support decryption using DES EDE3 CBC, hereinafter called "tripleDES" [3DES] [DES]. Sending agents SHOULD support encryption with RC2/40 and tripleDES. I think that when taking pot-shots at PGP, Inc. and Phil Zimmerman one should look at what the alternatives are and who are really are friends here. IMNSHO companies like RSA, Netscape, Microsoft, Verisign, et al, who would sell us all out if it improved their bottom lines do not qualify. - -- - --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html - --------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a Charset: cp850 Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000 iQCVAwUBNE8Iqo9Co1n+aLhhAQGWswP+MnvOCL1EoURWpEPt23I/UIuRWBovby8d AxZS3N8/exnI2M3kDCC2mTUWmvaKdsUnwErnXCQ9nQTDa9B+2VUBlijtkC+nsTV8 Vuv484AU51havdyttE87YMDXx8LSkdWnGXLs8TpjrRXiDZlxPJWIif3haK1hC5kg I3VmdwaZc/4= =7Fan -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Announcement
by Phillip R. Zimmermann 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 In light of the great amount of discussion currently taking place in regard to the benefits and disadvantages of my latest bid for money, power, fame and the respect of the corporate computer industry, I would like to reassure the cynics that my committment to privacy has never been stronger. However, I have reassessed my views of who truly has a right to control access to privacy and have come to the conclusion that privacy is too important an issue to be left in the hands of the individual, with the obvious potential for misuse. After a review of the astounding success of the PGP Public Key Server's use, in conjunction with our PGP Privy Products, in ensuring proper key management and control of forgery, spoofing and misuse of Public/Private Key technology, it has become clear that individual privacy can best be ensured under the watchful eye of those with the resources to provide proper surveillance of those who have earned the right to privacy, in order to prevent abuse of that right. I would like to thank my other brother, Phil (Hallam-Baker), for helping me to see that unsupervised use of the right to privacy could result in individuals misusing that right to publish extremely embarassing pictures of me in compromising positions which could affect my credibility. As a matter of fact, it was PH-B who suggested my new signature line. PRZ ~~~ "I don't put them in the PGPtray...I just turn on the GAK." ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNE/sV17MfpC8gEO7EQKaCQCePKAo033KBg/O/T9Nz5IrGLIcCZcAn0L4 JDtdMovT9RZKA4PXwJTNdvpr =Xvzl - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNE/svUlfPVhsMJvfEQI2zgCg8aQ15PEU4eNItEprsLQHd2259fIAn2a1 wwKyecnoEQuCElB3ZtJBZQBz =53jb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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CMR versus GAK?
by nobody＠neva.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Big Brother or the Boss?" Are you SURE that's a dichotomy? Big Biz and Big Gov are almost inextricably intertwined these days. If dot-com pushes for snoopware, it is called CMR. If dot-gov pushes for it, it is called GAK. The real question is, if the interests of Biz and Gov coincide, and "real cooperation" is achieved, does it really matter where the idea originated? Either way you still have snoopware. Cpl Kaos

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RE: Bill Gates, the Bully Savior
by Arturo Grapa Ysunza 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Almost. The government should regulate MS for anti-trust reasons. As I mentioned "If MS wins anti-trust litigation then so be it". >---------- >Desde: Lizard[SMTP:lizard@mrlizard.com] >Enviado el: Jueves 23 de Octubre de 1997 11:38 AM >Para: Arturo Grapa Ysunza <cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Cc: 'Jennifer S. Granick' >Asunto: RE: Bill Gates, the Bully Savior > >At 07:20 PM 10/22/97 -0500, Arturo Grapa Ysunza wrote: > >>MS canŽt be blamed for the incompetence of the rest of the industry. If >>MS wins anti-trust litigation then so be it but someone has to keep them >>in check. We elect the people who appoint others to review these >>matters. > >Lemme see if I've got this straight. > >The rest of the industry, due to stupidity, lethargy, or other >incompetance, can't compete succesfully with Microsoft. > >Therefore, the government must regulate Microsoft, in order to give the >other companies a fair chance. > >Uh-HUH. > >Who is John Galt? >

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[RANT] Why America Can't Compete
by Eric Cordian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've just uncovered a massive plot to destroy our nation's competitiveness and inculcate its young people in the collectivist mentality. The tool? Youth sports! This morning's AP wire reports that two football coaches are suing a youth football league after being banned for life because their 11 and 12 year old players won by too large a point spread. Apparently, and I find this truly shocking, it is a common practice in youth sports today to have a rule limiting the number of points by which a game may be won, with horrendous sanctions for violating it. Winning by more than that, it is argued, is "demoralizing" to the other team, and (Gasp!) UNETHICAL! Once the designated point spread is reached, coaches must order their players to deliberately lose, play badly, and act retarded. I became aware of this idiotic practice after I mentioned the AP article to several people, and rather than throwing up their arms in horror, they volunteered that their own local teams had such rules as well. It's time to check closely, to make sure such shenanigans are not afoot in your town, polluting the entrepreneurial spirit of your very own children. Imagine if Ross Perot had played on such a team, or Bill Gates, or Adolf Hitler? The entire course of history might have been changed. ----- FRIENDSWOOD, Texas (AP) -- Two volunteer coaches are taking a youth football league to court after they were banned for life because their 11- and 12-year-old players couldn't resist playing hard. After the Sagemont Cowboys destroyed the Friendswood Chiefs 62-0 on Oct. 4, the Bay Area Football League banned twin brothers Roy and Rene Aguilar -- whose team has dominated the league for several years. ``They're saying that because we demoralized the other team and that we are teaching the kids unethical practices that we're out for life,'' Rene Aguilar, the team's assistant coach, said in Wednesday's editions of The Galveston County Daily News. The league has a rule that prohibits teams from winning by more than 42 points. The Aguilars say they told the team to slow down after building a 42-0 lead, but the players couldn't help scoring again. The Friendswood Chiefs, named after this Houston suburb, fumbled the ball in their own end zone and Sagemont recovered to increase its lead to 48-0. Rene Aguilar said the coaches tried to tell the players not to recover the fumble. ``That's confusing to them,'' he said. ``One minute we're trying to tell them to play hard, then we're telling them to lay down.'' Recovering that fumble, according to a league rule, meant a one-game suspension for the head coach and a $100 fine for the team. Rene Aguilar said the Sagemont club president was at the game and told the coaches to handle the situation however they saw fit. ``So we played the rest of the game because we already knew we were going to be penalized,'' he said. The Cowboys went on to score another 14 points. League officials met two days later and gave the Aguilars a lifetime ban. A judge granted the Aguilars a restraining order to prevent the ban from taking effect, but the order expires Friday. The Aguilars met with the league officials late Wednesday for private mediation in an effort to avoid a court hearing Friday. ``We're not allowed to discuss what went on,'' Peggy Bittick, the coaches' attorney, told The Associated Press late Wednesday. ``We're going full force to court.'' Calls to league officials were not returned. Ms. Bittick said she watched a videotape of the game and it appeared that Friendswood was not trying to recover the fumble. ``It looked like the other team just threw up their hands and gave up.'' -- Eric Michael Cordian 0+ O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division "Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law"

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PGP and CMR: Just a Few Lines...
by Fisher Mark 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A point that I still feel gets lost by some participants in this issue is that the changes to PGP for CMR/GMR are very minor -- all that needs to occur is to get the CMR keys from wherever they are stored, and then add them as additional recipients. The political value of persuading PGP to adopt CDR >> actual technical value, as the change to CMR should involve < 10 lines of code (said, of course, without actually inspecting the code :). ========================================================== Mark Leighton Fisher Thomson Consumer Electronics fisherm(a)indy.tce.com Indianapolis, IN "Their walls are built of cannon balls, their motto is 'Don't Tread on Me'"

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Re: PGP, Inc.--What were they thinking?
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>X-POP3-Rcpt: declan(a)relay.pathfinder.com >From: spencer_ante(a)webmagazine.com >X-Lotus-FromDomain: PCWORLD >To: whgiii(a)invweb.net >cc: hallam(a)ai.mit.edu, declan(a)well.com, aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk, tcmay(a)got.net, > fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu >Date: Thu, 23 Oct 1997 10:36:44 -0700 >Subject: Re: PGP, Inc.--What were they thinking? >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Sender: owner-fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu >X-Loop: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu >X-FC-URL: Fight-Censorship is at http://www.eff.org/~declan/fc/ >X-FC-URL: To join send "subscribe" to fight-censorship-request(a)vorlon.mit.edu > > >So, I was driving to work this morning listening to KQED's Forum program >and lo and behold: Good 'ol Michael Krasny is leading a discussion on >surveillance in the workplace that centered around a new survey/special >report that PC World just published in its November issue. > >You Are Being Watched >An exclusive PC World survey of 200 company executives shows that more and >more businesses are >monitoring their employees' Web use. Here's the lowdown on what you should >know about surfing >the Net on company time. > >http://www.pcworld.com/workstyles/online/articles/nov97/1511p245.html > >Should provide some interesting points for discussion. > ><<<S>>> >

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No Subject
by LEANDRO R. PREDA 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please I need your help! I need of coputers virus , To I infectin the my computers school

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Re: PGP Employee on MKR
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> FORCING ENCRYPTION TO MULTIPLE KEYS FOR ONE RECIPIENT IS ONE STEP > AWAY FROM GAK. FORCING ENCRYPTION TO MULTIPLE KEYS FOR ONE RECIPIENT > IS ONE STEP AWAY FROM GAK! FORCING ENCRYPTION TO MULTIPLE KEYS FOR > ONE RECIPIENT IS ONE STEP AWAY FROM GAK!! FORCING ENCRYPTION TO > MULTIPLE KEYS FOR ONE RECIPIENT IS ONE STEP AWAY FROM GAK!! > !!!*FORCING ENCRYPTION TO MULTIPLE KEYS FOR ONE RECIPIENT IS ONE > STEP AWAY FROM GAK*!!! Mark, just remove the self signature on the user key. The message recovery key packet goes away! That's all you have to do. Is that so tough? This big threat, the dangerous CMR key, turns out to take two seconds of user actions to be destroyed. Something this easy to turn off will never be good enough for GAK. People say, "Oh, but then the government will make everybody run the policy enforcer and reject any mail not encryped to the government." First, if they were going to do this, they could do it with old versions of PGP too. Multiple recipients have been around practically forever. Second, it's a ridiculous idea which ignores how email works. More and more people are running systems at home which could send and receive SMTP mail. The trend is towards home servers which support the multiple home computers people will have in the next decade. There's no way to make those people run filters! People say, "Oh, but they'll make it illegal to receive mail at home without going through an ISP." I'm serious, this has actually been suggested on this list. It has to be suggested, because it's the only way this incredibly stupid scenario could be made to work. I can only assume that people are blinded by emotions or they wouldn't suggest such a bizarre idea. Making it illegal to implement probably the most widely used internet protocol package (email) would be a totally unprecedented, invasive, unjustifiable and unenforcable intervention by government. If the only way the government can enforce GAK is by making it illegal for people to receive email through paths which don't pass through government filters we can all rest easy, because it will never happen. Even for the cases where filtering is done (like businesses), there are easy countermeasures, described by no other than Jon Callas, PGP's chief scientist! Why would he say this if there were a massive conspiracy to enable GAK? He's also the one who explained the point above about the self signature. He has suggested two other easy workarounds: Modify the PGP 5.0 source to put a fake recipient block on it. How many companies release their source so that you could do this? Or superencrypt to the real end user, like you suggested in your scheme. Why is this OK as a privacy workaround for your idea but it doesn't count for PGP? Then people say, "Oh, but PGP shouldn't have written the SMTP filter anyway (or at least they shouldn't have put that one policy in) because it would make it easier for the government to make everybody use it." Ignoring all the considerations above about what a stupid idea this is, the fact is that a simple filter like this is incredibly easy to write. I'm sure a skilled Perl hacker like Adam Back could put together something to check that a PGP message is encrypted to a desired key in a few hours. There are already Perl scripts out there to help parse PGP messages. You just have to look at the recipients and compare with the key you want to see. The existence of such a filter is totally insignificant in the big picture. If we are ever forced into a GAK system and filtering turns out to be a part of the picture, it will be trivial for such filters to be created. PGP's SMTP product will not make any difference one way or the other. The fact is, nobody has come up with a scenario where PGP's CMR feature can be turned into GAK in any practical way. They have to assume that all kinds of changes and additions are made - inability to remove CMR keys, forcing everyone to run SMTP filters, making it illegal to receive email at home, preventing people from implementing clients with workarounds, changing the technology to make it harder to implement workarounds using binding cryptography. Any system can be turned into GAK if you're allowed to postulate these kinds of changes. And the fact is that every GAK system so far designed can be trivially defeated. The big GAK danger has always been that the encryption manufacturers would release GAK-only versions of their software, so that you have a choice between an easy to use system with GAK support, or a difficult and balky product like PGP 2.6.2, distributed via underground means and with GAK workarounds. Now at last you can be sure that even if the very worst happens, you will at least have the convenience and ease of use of PGP 5.0 as the GAK disabled product, via a non-GAK international version. This doesn't have anything to do with PGP's policies or motives; it is strictly because of PGP 5.0's source distribution, which will make it easy for cypherpunks to modify it to look compliant with GAK while using superencryption or some other technology to avoid it. No longer will it be a choice between convenient GAK or clumsy non-GAK, opening the latter option only to cypherpunks and hackers. Now people opposed to GAK will be guaranteed an option of making their software at least as easy to use as PGP 5.0. If source code becomes available for PGP 5.5, that will raise the guaranteed ease of use of non-GAK software even further (by all accounts, 5.5 has an even better interface than 5.0). The existence of these products in source code form will forever stand as a barrier to any hope to coax (most) people into using GAK software by forcing it into built-in products, leaving the alternative of non-GAK software only to a tiny minority. This in itself should monkey wrench any government plans for requiring GAK.

3 2

Re: PGP 5.5 and the corporate environment
by Antonomasia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Just a small aside. Our help desk handles about 50 to 75 > "I forgot my password" requests per day. This might be one > small motivating factor why corporations desire an alternative > method to recover encrypted files. >From my experience I'm sure most of those are due to daft password aging mechanisms. over-frequent compulsory changes forcing a change at no notice (password expired - think of a new one RIGHT NOW) forcing a new password on Fridays (Monday morning: I know my _old_ password!) I have practically no trouble remembering numerous passphrases upwards of 20 mixed chars if I use them semi-regularly and they don't change often. Anyway, when I have forgotten a long passphrase it has only been temporarily - a few days. If your employee is reasonably confident of decrypting his work within the week you're no worse off than if he'd fluffed his cooking ("stand in boiling water" or something). -- ############################################################## # Antonomasia ant(a)notatla.demon.co.uk # # See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ # ##############################################################

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Re: Note from PGP employee on MRK (sic)
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Declan McCullagh wrote: >A friend of mine by the name of Jason Bobier <jason(a)pgp.com> happens >to work at PGP, Inc. I'll preface his comments by pointing out that >I'm sure he doesn't speak for the company in any way. > >> Unfortunately these people just don't get it. Corporations refused >> to buy 5.0 because it did not have any way for the corps to get at >> email encrypted to their employees. There are some very legitimate >> uses of this, such as when an employee dies and someone else has >> to take over for them. >> >> Without corps buying the product, there is no PGP, Inc., and thus >> no dedication of resources to the production of PGP. This leads us >> back to the floundering state of development that PGP was in >> before 5.0. >> >> They also don't seem to realize that you always have the ability >> to remove the MRK (sic) from your list of recipients. >> >> Sometimes I really feel like screaming at these people. _All_ of >> the developers at PGP are personal privacy zealots and no one >> likes the idea of the MRK (sic). That is why we refuse to make them >> required. It is also why there still are freeware and personal >> versions of the product. I wish they would just realize that we >> aren't some evil group of people that are solely plotting how to >> make the most money off of this. Most everyone at PGP has >> internalized personal privacy as a cause (actually most had it >> before they joined PGP). >> >> *sigh* OK, enough ranting. Feel free to quote various parts of >> this if you feel like responding to the list. I would hope that the employees of PGP, Inc. take a deep breath and seriously consider the many cogent and well thought out points its critics have made. We haven't seen much of this, unfortunately. (And those who are claiming that their critics are rude should recall how Dorothy Denning was treated.) It is the unfortunate reality that good people can join a good company which then later does bad things. This can occur due to moles and internal subversion, greed, or simply foolishness. I have seen repeated claims by PGP, Inc. employees that they are privacy zealots. I'm sure some of them really believe what they are saying. But, these points are irrelevant if the result is the wide dispersal of tools which can be effortlessly converted into a mandatory GAK system. A number of people have been arguing that it is necessary for the company to issue snoopware because they can make money doing it. How often have we rejected this argument when the company is AT&T, ITT, Standard Oil, United Fruit, or Microsoft? This rejection is proper, and it applies to PGP, Inc. like any other company. Another claim is that by making money selling snoopware, the proceeds may be taken and used for privacy software. Wouldn't it make more sense to earn money in some more palatable way and then plough the proceeds into a company which is writing privacy software? I'm sure most PGP, Inc. employees would reject the "We had to destroy the village to save it" line of thinking if it were found in any other context. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNE+ow5aWtjSmRH/5AQFsWAf+LWjZNCdR6jdAsffX4PR6KLhX8W+V4jkQ J6odSQNpStVkFhPtcByG+AWaPQLmKxlwVKcO44pQVhTIDhMUlFniSnYtQ/zq+6RF aeqNG7WLE/58g9Pgh78iBOfJ4wKLi/U5dzpdDX1Ua86B8uzcGKVGTerbN6QoFwH2 aOd2tytomYWmFQeMdguN43Ak9hP+ruA1dcqrlZjRPhEBhBJOfbYLSYt3GPDn6Cqq jTL/Ui3fu4KHcK8zGgVnXVwQNL0XubBhQmTZ54ohxywejt1A2Q4g4sh0oxvSCEDY giqk4uElp5an7K+N1tY+vExvkjdRkjsAQEtFAgp4fzHozbS5jNXBWA== =FFl7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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US Senator Lott Criticizes FBI Crypto Plans (fwd)
by Mark Rogaski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An entity claiming to be Matthew Gaylor wrote: >From freematt(a)coil.com Thu Oct 23 18:18:01 1997 X-Sender: freematt(a)bronze.coil.com Message-Id: <v0213050bb0756fe15ee5(a)[198.4.94.192]> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Thu, 23 Oct 1997 18:01:40 -0400 To: freematt(a)coil.com (Matthew Gaylor) From: freematt(a)coil.com (Matthew Gaylor) Subject: US Senator Lott Criticizes FBI Crypto Plans From: "--Todd Lappin-->" <telstar(a)wired.com> Subject: Senator Lott Criticizes FBI Crypto Plans Posted to the fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu mailing list URL: Fight-Censorship is at http://www.eff.org/~declan/fc/ To join send "subscribe" to fight-censorship-request(a)vorlon.mit.edu From: http://www.cdt.org/crypto/legis_105/lott.html In a statement entered into the Congressional Record, Senator Lott urged his Senate colleagues to "deal with reality" by passing legislation to relax cold-war era export controls on encryption, and to reject FBI efforts to impose new domestic law enforcement access requirements. Full text from: http://www.cdt.org/crypto/legis_105/971021_lott.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ENCRYPTION (Senate - October 21, 1997) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [Page: S10879] Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I would like to report to my colleagues on the activities in the House to establish a new export policy on encryption. This is an issue that is still at the top of my list of legislation I hope this Congress can resolve within the next 2 months. The House's actions last month turned a spotlight on how this issue should ultimately be resolved. Let me briefly review the issue. Encryption is a mathematical way to scramble and unscramble digital computer information during transmission and storage. The strength of encryption is a function of its size, as measured in computer bits. The more bits an encryption system has, the more difficult it is for someone else to illegally unscramble or hack into that information. Today's computer encryption systems commonly used by businesses range from 40 bits in key length to 128 bits. A good hacker, let's say a criminal or a business competitor, can readily break into a computer system safeguarded by a lower-technology 40-bit encryption system. On the other hand, the 128-bit encryption systems are much more complex and pose a significant challenge to any would-be hacker. Obviously, all of us would prefer to have the 128-bit systems. And equally as important, we would like to buy such systems from American companies. Firms we can routinely and safely do business with. Foreign companies and individuals also want to buy such systems from American companies. They admire and respect our technological expertise, and trust our business practices. The United States remains the envy of the world in terms of producing top-notch encryption and information security products. However, current regulations prohibit U.S. companies from exporting encryption systems stronger than the low-end, 40-bit systems. A few exceptions have been made for 56-bit systems. Until recently, it has been the administration's view that stronger encryption products are so inherently dangerous they should be classified at a level equal to munitions, and that the export of strong encryption must be heavily restricted. While we are restricting our own international commerce, foreign companies are now manufacturing and selling stronger, more desirable encryption systems, including the top-end 128-bit systems, anywhere in the world they want. Clearly, our policy doesn't make sense. Just as clearly, our export policies on encryption have not kept up to speed with either the ongoing changes in encryption technology or the needs and desires of foreign markets for U.S. encryption products. My intention is neither to jeopardize our national security nor harm law enforcement efforts. I believe we must give due and proper regard to the national security and law enforcement implications of any changes in our policy regarding export of encryption technology. But it is painfully obvious we must modernize our export policies on encryption technology, so that U.S. companies can participate in the world's encryption marketplace. The legislative initiative on this issue has always been about exports, but this summer that changed. During the past month, the FBI has attempted to change the debate by proposing a series of new mandatory controls on the domestic sale and use of encryption products. Let me be clear. There are currently no restrictions on the rights of Americans to use encryption to protect their personal financial or medical records or their private e-mail messages. There have never been domestic limitations, and similarly, American businesses have always been free to buy and use the strongest possible encryption to protect sensitive information from being stolen or changed. But now, the FBI proposes to change all that. The FBI wants to require that any company that produces or offers encryption security products or services guarantee immediate access to plain text information without the knowledge of the user. Their proposal would subject software companies and telecommunications providers to prison sentences for failure to guarantee immediate access to all information on the desktop computers of all Americans. That would move us into an entirely new world of surveillance, a very intrusive surveillance, where every communication by every individual can be accessed by the FBI. Where is probable cause? Why has the FBI assumed that all Americans are going to be involved in criminal activities? Where is the Constitution? And how would this proposal possibly help the FBI? According to a forthcoming book by the M.I.T. Press, of the tens of thousands of cases handled annually by the FBI, only a handful have involved encryption of any type, and even fewer involved encryption of computer data. Let's face it--despite the movies, the FBI solves its cases with good old-fashioned police work, questioning potential witnesses, gathering material evidence, and using electronic bugging or putting microphones on informants. Restricting encryption technology in the U.S. would not be very helpful to the FBI. The FBI proposal won't work. I have talked with experts in the world of software and cryptography, who have explained that the technology which would provide compliance with the FBI standard simply does not exist. The FBI proposal would force a large unfunded mandate on our high technology firms, at a time when there is no practical way to accomplish that mandate. Rather than solve problems in our export policy, this FBI proposal would create a whole new body of law and regulations restricting our domestic market. This and similar proposals would also have a serious impact on our foreign market. Overseas businesses and governments believe that the U.S. might use its keys to computer encryption systems to spy on their businesses and politicians. Most U.S. software and hardware manufacturers believe this is bad for business and that nobody will trust the security of U.S. encryption products if this current policy continues. In fact, this proposal appears to violate the European Union's data-privacy laws, and the European Commission is expected to reject it this week. So, the FBI proposal would: Invade our privacy; be of minimal use to the FBI; would require nonexistent technology; would create new administrative burdens; and would seriously damage our foreign markets. This is quite a list. Mr. President, the FBI proposal is simply wrong. I have learned that even the administration does not support this new FBI proposal. So why does the FBI believe it must now subject all Americans to more and more surveillance? This independent action by the FBI has created confusion and mixed signals which are troublesome for the Senate as it works on this legislation. Perhaps the FBI and the Justice Department need to focus immediately on a coordinated encryption position. Mr. President, I congratulate the members of the House Commerce Committee for rejecting this FBI approach by a vote margin of more than 2 to 1. I am sure all of my colleagues are sympathetic to the fact that emerging technologies create new problems for the FBI. But we must acknowledge several truths as Congress goes forward to find this new policy solution. People increasingly need strong information security through encryption and other means to protect their personal and business information. This demand will grow, and somebody will meet it. In the long term, it is clearly in our national interest that U.S. companies meet the market demand. Individuals and businesses will either obtain that protection from U.S. firms or from foreign firms. I firmly believe that all of our colleagues want American firms to successfully compete for this business. Today there are hundreds of suppliers of strong encryption in the world marketplace. Strong encryption can be easily downloaded off the Internet. Even if Congress wanted to police or eliminate encryption altogether, I am not sure that is doable. So, let's deal with reality. Clamping down on the constitutional rights of American citizens, in an attempt to limit the use of a technology, is the wrong solution. The wrong solution. This is especially true with encryption technology because it has so many beneficial purposes. It prevents hackers and espionage agents from stealing valuable information, or worse, from breaking into our own computer networks. It prevents them from disrupting our power supply, our financial markets, and our air traffic control system. This is scary--and precisely why we want this technology to be more available. Only a balanced solution is acceptable. Ultimately, Congress must empower Americans to protect their own information. Americans should not be forced to only communicate in ways that simply make it more convenient for law enforcement officials. This is not our national tradition. It is not consistent with our heritage. It should not become a new trend. Mr. President, I would like to establish a framework to resolve this difficult issue. I hope to discuss it with the chairmen and ranking members of the key committees. I especially look forward to working with the chairman of the Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcommittee on Communications, Senator Burns. He was the first to identify this issue and try to solve it legislatively. His approach on this issue has always been fair and equitable, attempting to balance industry wants with law enforcement requirements. I believe there are other possible ideas which could lead to a consensus resolution of the encryption issue. It is my hope that industry and law enforcement can come together to address these issues, not add more complexity and problems. The bill passed by the House Commerce Committee included a provision establishing a National Encryption Technology Center. It would be funded by in-kind contributions of hardware, software, and technological expertise. The National Encryption Technology Center would help the FBI stay on top of encryption and other emerging computer technologies. This is a big step. This is a big step in the right direction. It is time to build on that positive news to resolve encryption policy. Mr. President, there is an op-ed piece which appeared in the Wall Street Journal on Friday, September 26. It is well written and informative, despite the fact that its author is a good friend of mine. Mr. Jim Barksdale is the president and CEO of Netscape Communications and is well-versed in encryption technology. Mr. Barksdale's company does not make encryption products; they license such products from others. They sell Internet and business software and, as Jim has told me many times, his customers require strong encryption features and will buy those products either from us or foreign companies. Again, let's deal with reality. The credit union manager in Massachusetts, the real estate agent in Mississippi, the father writing an e-mail letter to his daughter attending a California university, each want privacy and security when using the computer. They will buy the best systems available to ensure that privacy and security. And, in just the same way, the banker in Brussels, Belgium, the rancher in Argentina, and the mother writing e-mail to her daughter in a university in Calcutta, India, each of these people also want privacy and security. They also will buy the best systems available to ensure that privacy and security. And they want encryption systems they trust--American systems. That's what this debate is about. Mr. President, if Congress does not modernize our export controls, we run the real risk of destroying the American encryption industry. And we risk giving a significant and unfair advantage to our foreign business competitors. [Page: S10881] ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ************************************************************************** Subscribe to Freematt's Alerts: Pro-Individual Rights Issues Send a blank message to: freematt(a)coil.com with the words subscribe FA on the subject line. List is private and moderated (7-30 messages per week) Matthew Gaylor,1933 E. Dublin-Granville Rd.,#176, Columbus, OH 43229 Archived at http://www.reference.com/cgi-bin/pn/listarch?list=FA@coil.com ************************************************************************** -- [] Mark Rogaski "That which does not kill me [] wendigo(a)pobox.com only makes me stranger."

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Snoop Remailer Statistics
by Snoop Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Snoop Remailer Statistics for week ending Oct 23, 1997: Percentage of PGP Employees anonymously supporting PGP 5.5: 35% Percentage of PGP Employees anonymously slamming PGP 5.5: 35% Percentage of PGP Employees anonymously pissing in both directions: 35% Percentage of PGP Employees anonymously fooling anyone: 2% Percentage of PGP Employees who can't figure out how to use anonymous remailers: 3% Percentage of PGP Employees about to quit using the Snoop Remailer: 100%

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Re: PGP Employee on MKR
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Lucky Green wrote: >I have watched this silly debate for some time now. PGP pulled an >awsome hack on corporate America, bringing strong crypto to thousands >of corporate drones, while Cypherpunks, the crypto elite, seems >incapable of reponding with anything other than to engage in frenzied >mutual masturbation fueld by GAK fantasies. > >This is sad. Very sad. What is sad is that people who are capable of expositing their beliefs in a clear and coherent way choose instead to stoop to name calling. Wouldn't it be more effective to explain exactly how our views are "silly"? If what you say makes sense, some of us may even agree with you. You describe PGP's achievement as "an awsome hack on corporate America". Yet, Jason Bobier, an employee of PGP, Inc. says "_All_ of the developers at PGP are personal privacy zealots and no one likes the idea of the MRK." What is it that has Jason and his friends concerned? Clearly there are legitimate concerns and some people inside PGP, Inc. have them like everyone else. For that matter, why was it that Phil Zimmermann spoke out against exactly this sort of product not so long ago? What was it that concerned Phil? Why is this concern no longer relevant to the point of being "silly"? While we are at it, why was it that we didn't like Clipper? After all, its use was entirely voluntary and it would have disseminated crypto widely. In many instances, it would actually be preferable to 'PGP for Business' because the Feds wouldn't be tattling to your employer if you were considering employment elsewhere or complaining about your boss. 'PGP for Business' doesn't have the government's key built in, but the infrastructure is all there. It will get people accustomed to the idea that it is reasonable to be under constant surveillance by your employer, an idea which is easily extended to other listeners. And we've already seen members of Congress using 'PGP for Business' to justify GAK. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNE/J3ZaWtjSmRH/5AQF1Qwf/SA169EBTJ5XPC7By/nkiUMYNb9kZLoRP FExdNTiKw0hsRP45i99YhKebCifFwHCgGxhCu/Shw8RkHMWziVt0AhvcVUq4FM67 rHDQ9rzX6JTra8yI+esHmxk7A8C/FlaJJP7HHI38kBzd9XP9HMb7FE/OBF39sYvs RYE6VPKfXv4dL44j90PrJHeTaKRZCDObsauuGWBvynzsZRNNp90dXU9SJiBXQV3e rtmr0bo+IGmumiI1zpMta2jHguCH+16YWlaOoIOe6Ql5fh6KLqTouI+o5PlHM31S eqL6uLdEBUOwVFgbTtcdOlJbnWCvNLVgy/y9AhEr1sU0qYbC+jFcEA== =cVS2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by apache＠bear.apana.org.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

WARNING: Bad signature, doesn't match file contents! Bad signature from user "Monty Cantsin". Signature made 1997/10/23 19:43 GMT using 2047-bit key, key ID A6447FF9 > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > Declan McCullagh wrote: > >A friend of mine by the name of Jason Bobier <jason(a)pgp.com> happens > >to work at PGP, Inc. I'll preface his comments by pointing out that > >I'm sure he doesn't speak for the company in any way. [...] > I'm sure most PGP, Inc. employees would reject the "We had to destroy > the village to save it" line of thinking if it were found in any other > context. > > Monty Cantsin > Editor in Chief > Smile Magazine > http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html > http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.6.2 > > iQEVAwUBNE+ow5aWtjSmRH/5AQFsWAf+LWjZNCdR6jdAsffX4PR6KLhX8W+V4jkQ > J6odSQNpStVkFhPtcByG+AWaPQLmKxlwVKcO44pQVhTIDhMUlFniSnYtQ/zq+6RF > aeqNG7WLE/58g9Pgh78iBOfJ4wKLi/U5dzpdDX1Ua86B8uzcGKVGTerbN6QoFwH2 > aOd2tytomYWmFQeMdguN43Ak9hP+ruA1dcqrlZjRPhEBhBJOfbYLSYt3GPDn6Cqq > jTL/Ui3fu4KHcK8zGgVnXVwQNL0XubBhQmTZ54ohxywejt1A2Q4g4sh0oxvSCEDY > giqk4uElp5an7K+N1tY+vExvkjdRkjsAQEtFAgp4fzHozbS5jNXBWA== > =FFl7 > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > >

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PRZ Announcement
by Phillip R. Zimmermann 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 In light of the great amount of discussion currently taking place in regard to the benefits and disadvantages of my latest bid for money, power, fame and the respect of the corporate computer industry, I would like to reassure the cynics that my committment to privacy has never been stronger. However, I have reassessed my views of who truly has a right to control access to privacy and have come to the conclusion that privacy is too important an issue to be left in the hands of the individual, with the obvious potential for misuse. After a review of the astounding success of the PGP Public Key Server's use, in conjunction with our PGP Privy Products, in ensuring proper key management and control of forgery, spoofing and misuse of Public/Private Key technology, it has become clear that individual privacy can best be ensured under the watchful eye of those with the resources to provide proper surveillance of those who have earned the right to privacy, in order to prevent abuse of that right. I would like to thank my other brother, Phil (Hallam-Baker), for helping me to see that unsupervised use of the right to privacy could result in individuals misusing that right to publish extremely embarassing pictures of me in compromising positions which could affect my credibility. As a matter of fact, it was PH-B who suggested my new signature line. PRZ ~~~ "I don't put them in the PGPtray...I just turn on the GAK." ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNE/sV17MfpC8gEO7EQKaCQCePKAo033KBg/O/T9Nz5IrGLIcCZcAn0L4 JDtdMovT9RZKA4PXwJTNdvpr =Xvzl - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNE/svUlfPVhsMJvfEQI2zgCg8aQ15PEU4eNItEprsLQHd2259fIAn2a1 wwKyecnoEQuCElB3ZtJBZQBz =53jb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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wombat
by apache＠bear.apana.org.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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