December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: cpunk-like meeting report
by Major Variola (ret) 15 Dec '03

15 Dec '03

At 09:57 PM 12/14/03 -0800, Morlock Elloi wrote: >> Be sure and check the archive before posting. It is still small. > >Cookies, "members only" archive access. Bad deal. Will not happen. Very few >consumers here. But look how many IP addresses he got from members checking it out!

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self adjusting dummy traffic generation?
by Nomen Nescio 15 Dec '03

15 Dec '03

Would it be possible to have a self adjusting dummy traffic generator feature in remailers? Operator decides that he wants to process x number of incoming and y number of outgoing messages each time period t. Then the software adjusts the number of dummy messages to this value using some statistical calculations of past t2 hours. If incoming traffic increases then the amount of dummy messages are decreasing and so on. Does this feature exist today?

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Re: cpunk-like meeting report
by Eugen Leitl 15 Dec '03

15 Dec '03

On Sun, Dec 14, 2003 at 06:36:12PM -0800, Tim May wrote: > No, we don't need a "cpunx-news" list. This is what Google and the > ability to see hundreds of various lists and sites is for. This is a bogus statement. As long as I can't use a single keyword to make Google's news alerts topical, and _full text_ a search engine is rather useless. > "News" lists tend strongly to be just dumping grounds for crap from > other lists. The point is that you don't have to subscribe to 20-odd email lists, which have about 5% relevance each. Life's too short for that. People are the best filters, and with a handful of sustained contributors the list becomes a valuable resource. > I failed the entrance exam for "Interesting People," which is fine, for > obvious reasons. Case in point: most of IP list traffic is garbage from a cypherpunk point of view. Let one list subscriber read it, and filter relevant bits to the newsticker. If it's a steaming pile of crap for Tim May it doesn't mean it's useless for everybody else. -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 0.97c removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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Idea: Simplified TEMPEST-shielded unit (speculative proposal)
by Thomas Shaddack 15 Dec '03

15 Dec '03

TEMPEST shielding is fairly esoteric (at least for non-EM-specialists) field. But potentially could be made easier by simplifying the problem. If we won't want to shield the user interface (eg. we want just a cryptographic processor), we may put the device into a solid metal case without holes, battery-powered, with the seams in the case covered with eg. adhesive copper tape. The input and output can be mediated by fibers, whose ports can be the only holes, fraction of millimeter in diameter, carefully shielded, in the otherwise seamless well-grounded box. There are potential cooling problems, as there are no ventilation holes in the enclosure; this can be alleviated by using one side of the box as a large passive cooler, eventually with an externally mounted fan with separate power supply. If magnetic shielding is required as well, the box could be made of permalloy or other material with similar magnetic properties. I am not sure how to shield a display. Maybe taking an LCD, bolting it on the shielded box, and cover it with a fine wire mesh and possibly metalized glass? Using LCD with high response time of the individual pixels also dramatically reduces the value of eventual optical emissions. I also have doubts about the keyboard. Several ideas that could help: We may use optical scanning of the key matrix, with the light fed into and read from the matrix by optical fibers, coming out from a well-shielded enclosure, similar to the I/O lines of the first example. We may use a "normal" keyboard, but modified to use reliably random scanning pattern; that won't reduce the EM emissions of the keyboard, but effectively encrypts them, dramatically reducing their intelligence value. It's then necessary to take precautions about the data cable between the keyboard itself and the computer, where the data go through in plaintext; it's possible to encrypt it, or to use a fiber. As really good shielding of complicated cases is difficult to achieve, the primary objective of this approach is to put everything into simple metallic boxes with as few and as small ports as possible, which should be comparatively easy to manufacture, replacing the special contacting of removable panels with disposable adhesive copper tape (the only reason to go inside is replacing batteries, and the tape together with other measures may serve as tamperproofing), and replacement of all potentially radiating external data connections with fiber optic. I should disclaim I have nothing that could vaguely resemble any deeper knowledge of high frequencies; therefore I lay out the idea here and wonder if anyone can see holes in it (and where they are).

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Don't worry...it's just one of Saddam's doubles
by Tyler Durden 15 Dec '03

15 Dec '03

Spread the word. The adminstration got desparate. In a few weeks they'll announce this isn't the real Saddam, but that rounding up all of the clones is necessary progress in the fight to get the real Saddam. -TD _________________________________________________________________ Get holiday tips for festive fun. http://special.msn.com/network/happyholidays.armx

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Wardial for Bush! 1-800-531-6789 -- call AGAIN AND AGAIN!
by Tim Meehan 15 Dec '03

15 Dec '03

>From: Wardialers For Bush <war4bush(a)somewhat.com> >Subject: [Wardialers for Bush] Set a record! Call 1-800-531-6789 AS OFTEN AS YOU CAN! > >Resident George W. Bush wants your support! > >Even though ****every nuisance call to this phone number costs him money****, he >wants you to call NOW, AGAIN AND AGAIN! > >1-800-531-6789 > >If you don't get through, call again! > >1-800-531-6789 > >Keep calling. Say you were told to call by Ken Mehlman! Ask for your free >prize! > >1-800-531-6789 > > >1-800-531-6789 > > >1-800-531-6789 > > >1-800-531-6789 > > >1-800-531-6789

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Cypherpunks List Info
by cpunk＠lne.com 14 Dec '03

14 Dec '03

Cypherpunks Mailing List Information Last updated: Oct 13, 2003 This message is also available at http://www.lne.com/cpunk Instructions on unsubscribing from the list can be found below. 0. Introduction The Cypherpunks mailing list is a mailing list for discussing cryptography and its effect on society. It is not a moderated list (but see exceptions below) and the list operators are not responsible for the list content. Cypherpunks is a distributed mailing list. A subscriber can subscribe to one node of the list and thereby participate on the full list. Each node (called a "Cypherpunks Distributed Remailer", although they are not related to anonymous remailers) exchanges messages with the other nodes in addition to sending messages to its subscribers. A message posted to one node will be received by the list subscribers on the other nodes, and vice-versa. 1. 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Re: PKI root signing ceremony, etc.
by Dave Howe 14 Dec '03

14 Dec '03

Rich Salz wrote: >> *shrug* it doesn't retroactively enforce the safety net - but that's >> ok, most MS products don't either :) > The whole point is to enhance common practice, not stay at the lowest > common denominator. If someone has *already* issued a certificate - and ignored the CA flag - is it part of the software's duty to somehow point this out to you? But regardless, as this only applies to imported keys you would never actually see it in Real Life (tm) >> Key management and auditing is pretty much external to the actual >> software regardless of which solution you use I would have thought. > You'd be wrong. :) I did just download and use XCA for a little bit. > It's practically impossible to audit. Every key in the database is > protected with the same password. um, this is a **CA** - you have *one* key in the database, your CA key. It is bad practice to generate the keys on the CA machine and transport them to the server they will be used on - instead, the Cert request should be generated on the end-use machine, and the *request* transported to the CA, signed, and the certificate returned. That way, the private key never leaves the machine it was generated for and used on, and is protected by its own password. > The system ask for the password > as soon as it starts up. If I leave the program running while > I leave my computer, I'm screwed. Then don't leave it running. If you got out of your car but left the engine running, and somebody stole the car, would you blame the design of the car? > The key-holder isn't asked to > confirm each signing -- there's no *ceremony* -- and they never > enter the password after the program starts. For any kind of root > these are all very bad. This is just fine for a root - the root acquires 'n' signing requests, opens the program, signs or rejects the requests as appropriate, then closes the program. It is not the duty of the CA to generate keys or enter certificate information - that is the requestor's problem, which he can do with the tools appropriate to his machine (openssl on almost anything, the built in keygen in IIS and several other webservers, and so forth. I am actually disappointed in XCA (compared to the earlier but awkward to set up OpenCA project) in that no browser-accessable request interface is provided. of course XCA is compatable with importing requests made from OpenCA, and exporting them back into an openCA "pickup" dir..... but really it would be nice to be compatable with the interface most key requestors are used to. > XCA is pretty nice for a Level-2 or small Level-1 CA. The template > management, etc., is pretty good. (Having them tied to the key > database, and having the keys be unlocked while making cert requests, > are both real bad ideas, however.) There is no mystical value in having to type a key lots of times. I was just pointing out what other options are out there (I would have pointed out EBCrypt as well, which appears better suited to your current ritual, but its website seems to have vanished)

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RFIDs at tech summit
by J.A. Terranson 14 Dec '03

14 Dec '03

Bug devices track officials at summit By Audrey Hudson THE WASHINGTON TIMES Officials who attended a world Internet and technology summit in Switzerland last week were unknowingly bugged, said researchers who attended the forum. Badges assigned to attendees of the World Summit on the Information Society were affixed with radio-frequency identification chips (RFIDs), said Alberto Escudero-Pascual, Stephane Koch and George Danezis in a report issued after the conference ended Friday in Geneva. The badges were handed out to more than 50 prime ministers, presidents and other high-level officials from 174 countries, including the United States. The trio's report said they were able to obtain the official badges with fraudulent identification only to be stunned when they found RFID chips . a contentious issue among privacy advocates in the United States and Europe . embedded in the tags. Researchers questioned summit officials about the use of the chips and how long information would be stored but were not given answers. The three-day WSIS forum focused on Internet governance and access, security, intellectual-property rights and privacy. The United States and other countries defeated an attempt to place the Internet under supervision of the United Nations. RFID chips track a person's movement in "real time." U.S. groups have called for a voluntary moratorium on using the chips in consumer items until the technology and its effects on privacy and civil liberties are addressed. Mr. Escudero-Pascual is a researcher in computer security and privacy at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm. Miss Koch is the president of Internet Society Geneva, and Mr. Danezis studies privacy-enhancing technologies and computer security at Cambridge University. "During the course of our investigation, we were able to register for the summit and obtain an official pass by just showing a fake plastic identity card and being photographed via a Web cam with no other document or registration number required to obtain the pass," the researchers said. The researchers chose names for the fake identification cards from a list printed on the summit's Web site of attendees. The hidden chips communicate information via radio frequency when close to sensors that can be placed anywhere "from vending machines to the entrance of a specific meeting room, allowing the remote identification and tracking of participants, or groups of participants, attending the event," the report said. The photograph of the person and other personal details are not stored on the chip but in a centralized database that monitors the movement. Researchers said they are concerned that database will be used for future events, including the next summit to be hosted by Tunisian authorities. "During the registration process, we requested information about the future use of the picture and other information that was taken, and the built-in functionalities of the seemingly innocent plastic badge. No public information or privacy policy was available upon our demands that could indicate the purpose, processing or retention periods for the data collected. The registration personnel were obviously not properly informed and trained," the report said. The lack of security procedures violates the Swiss Federal Law on Data Protection of June 1992, the European Union Data Protection Directive, and United Nations' guidelines concerning computerized personal-data files adopted by the General Assembly in 1990, the researchers said. "The big problem is that system also fails to guarantee the promised high levels of security while introducing the possibility of constant surveillance of the representatives of civil society, many of whom are critical of certain governments and regimes," the report said. "Sharing this data with any third party would be putting civil-society participants at risk, but this threat is made concrete in the context of WSIS by considering the potential impact of sharing the data collected with the Tunisian government in charge of organizing the event in 2005," it said. The organization Reporters Without Borders was banned from attending the summit and launched a pirate radio broadcast to protest the ban and detail press-freedom violations by some countries attending the meetings, including Tunisia. "Our organization defends freedom of expression on the Internet on a daily basis. Our voice should therefore be heard during this event, despite this outrageous ban," said Robert Menard, secretary general of Reporters Without Borders. Tunisia is among several countries Reporters Without Borders has accused of censoring the Internet, intercepting e-mails and jailing cyber-dissidents.

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Re: Patriot Ants (was: Re: Zombie Patriots and other musings)
by Nostradumbass＠SAFe-mail.net 14 Dec '03

14 Dec '03

From: Thomas Shaddack <shaddack(a)ns.arachne.cz> > On Sat, 13 Dec 2003, John Kelsey wrote: > > > Of course, there's a more fundamental problem with surrendering to the lone > > warriors. Imagine that there's such a wave of pro-life terrorism that we > > finally agree to ban abortion. You're a fanatically committed pro-choice > > activist. What's your next move? > > Two moves possible. > > The violent, far less effective and possibly somehow counterproductive > one: attacking the ones who enforce the measurement, by letal or nonlethal > means, to act as deterrent. I think you should the word possibly when referring to effectiveness of outcomes. One can never knows until one tries. Every monment in history is unique and the effectiveness of the use of a particular strategy can never be ascertained beforehand. Mine is based on at least two inspirations... "How we burned in the prison camps later thinking: What would things have been like if every security operative, when he went out at night to make an arrest, had been uncertain whether he would return alive?" --Alexander Solzhenitzyn, Gulag Archipelago and Our government... teaches the whole people by its example. If the government becomes the lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. -- Louis D. Brandeis As Americans I'm sure we have been tutored by some of the best. Time to put into practice what we have learned. > > The nonviolent one: developing and deploying the technology necessary for > underground clinics to provide higher quality service, and for their > clients to find, order and pay for the services without being likely to > trace down by the Whateveriscurrentlythelaw Enforcement. Causing bad press > for them, keeping public awareness that alternatives to the law-compliance > exist. Learning from countries with similar bans in action, both from the > present and from history, how the alternatives developed there, and > building on this knowledge. > > Direct attack is not always the best route, however tempting. A house can > be brought down from the outside by a bomb, or from the inside by white > ants. The trouble with this method is that is generally requires a large percentage of the population to actively or passively support a position. This almost always occurs after a situation has become intolerable to the masses. I have no intention in placing my ability to enjoy what I consider my basic rights into the hands of a million Joe Sixpacks and await their enlightenment. "The only freedom which counts is the freedom to do what some other people think to be wrong. There is no point in demanding freedom to do that which all will applaud. All the so-called liberties or rights are things which have to be asserted against others who claim that if such things are to be allowed their own rights are infringed or their own liberties threatened. This is always true, even when we speak of the freedom to worship, of the right of free speech or association, or of public assembly. If we are to allow freedoms at all there will constantly be complaints that either the liberty itself or the way in which it is exercised is being abused, and, if it is a genuine freedom, these complaints will often be justified. There is no way of having a free society in which there is not abuse. Abuse is the very hallmark of liberty." -- Quintin H. Hailsham, The Dilemma of Democracy Get ready for a lot of abuse...

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Re: Zombie Patriots and other musings
by Major Variola (ret) 14 Dec '03

14 Dec '03

At 10:12 PM 12/11/03 -0500, An Metet wrote: > >Given small numbers and absence of any other grouping factor there needs to be an "obvious" place for ZPs to refer to. Any obvious place that becomes even remotely attractive to ZPs will be immediately raided. Because ZPs have potential to be actually dangerous to the gang in power, as opposed to everything else I've seen so far. > >So we're back to square one - effective anonymous publishing is prerequisite for the regime change and executing post-natal abortions. And it has been for centuries. You need to think about the "lone warrior" scenario that the Gang worries about. McVeighs and Rudolphs. They were influenced by memes which were not immediately suppressed. Look at Al Q, Inc: you don't need explicit instructions from the Boss to motivate folks to do things. You see who is the enemy, you see opportunity. You don't need permission. There is also the "copycat" phenom ---remember how school shootings reccurred after the first big one? So the memes can get out. As Tim has mentioned here, the talkers can't be the doers. And watch out for COINTELPRO. >When I say "effective" I don't mean posting a message to Usenet via WiFI-ing into some sucker's open AP. No one gives a fuck for Usenet postings, blacknet etc Well, some do, but its not relevent for ZPs. >. - and ZPs are unlikely to educate themselves and search for them. Effective means untouchable web site with untouchable DNS entry. Fuck the web. The web is 0wn3d by the feds and run by largely spineless fedsucking sheep. The web is for talkers, not doers. >Effective means something doable by average determined person. Like tuning to Radio London from occupied Europe in WW2. I don't listen to shortwave, but I understand some of it can be fairly strong. I could easily see some lunatic fringe suggesting that deathbed xians blowing up medical clinics as a holy thing. (And I understand that shortwave is popular among lunatic xians.) As the US descends into statism, perhaps some agitators will pick better targets, like the oppressors. Perhaps some will simply begin to act, the news reports it, and others will clue in and repeat.

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Re: [linux-elitists] Monday 15 Dec: first all-Open Source System-on-Chip (fwd from schoen@loyalty.org)
by Eugen Leitl 13 Dec '03

13 Dec '03

----- Forwarded message from Seth David Schoen <schoen(a)loyalty.org> -----

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Anti-globalization
by Tyler Durden 13 Dec '03

13 Dec '03

The anti-globalization protests are a good example of something misunderstood by Libertarian old-farts. On some levels, these protests have a libertarian character...anti-globalization is not really about eliminating free trade per se, but eliminating "free trade", which is really just the selective and forceful application of free-trade ideas by the US and its cronies, in support of the "American Century" or, in other words, the "Iraq is better off now then under Saddam" approach to international relations. The current political clime is slowly being pushed in the vague direction of lefitst statism-lite, but only because of a philosophical vaccum and because the US has successfully portrayed itself as the embodiment of free-market, Lassaiz Faire capitalism. However, I don't see the strong support for Soviet or Maoist-style state control these days...these are vaguely romantic notions once in a while, but they don't have any deep ideological support like they might have in the 60s. -TD >From: Tim May <timcmay(a)got.net> >To: cypherpunks(a)lne.com >Subject: Re: Decline of the Cypherpunks list...Part 19 >Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2003 11:07:06 -0800 > >On Dec 8, 2003, at 12:11 AM, Bill Stewart wrote: > >>At 07:55 PM 12/7/2003 -0800, Tim May wrote: >>>The Libertarian Party started at about this time, in 1972, and nearly all >>>of the volunteers, spear carriers, etc. were in their 20s. This is very >>>well known. >>> >>>(And today most of the LP volunteers and spear carriers are in their 40s >>>and 50s. A correlation here.) >> >>Yes, and one of the LP's problems is that we've largely turned into old >>farts there also.... > >Indeed. > >I can imagine a bunch of possible reasons for this development. In no >particular order: > >* In the 1950s and 60s, the effects of Rand and Heinlein were pervasive. >Many college kids in the 60s were reading "Atlas Shrugged." (I won't get >into how badly it's written, except to say I devoured it in 2 days in 1968, >when I was 16, and quoted from it to all who would listen in the next >couple of years. But I haven't been able to read it _since_. I can't get >past about page 10 before throwing it down. It's strong propaganda, but >badly written.) > >* The mood of the 50s and 60s was actually one of nearly boundless >possibilities for the future, at least in America. Not because of >socialists in Congress and JFK, but because of a booming economy, >technology, and all the usual things of the time. The generation which >entered the work economy in the 1960s through the early 1980s is the >wealthiest generation in history...especially those who did so in Silicon >Valley or similar areas. > >(My implication being that things were different for the generation which >came of age much later, with more of a sense of limited horizons, dead-end >jobs at Starbucks making lattes for Yuppies, etc. Maybe if I were 25, >working for $9 an hour at Starbucks, I'd shave my head and look like a >refugee from the Apple "1984" commercial too.) > >* A lot of these folks, the ones who came of age in the 60s and 70s, were >enthusiastic libertarians. Some of them joined the Libertarian Party, most >of them dislike government drug laws and redistribution of their income, >and so on. > >* A lot of the younger folks I see interviewed describe "income inequality" >and "discrimination" and "globalization" as the serious problems the world >and America face. They may favor drug legalization, as libertarians do, but >they certainly aren't sympathetic to most laissez-faire, "survival of the >fittest" libertarianism. > > >A couple of folks here have followed-up in this latest thread with claims >that the old farts, especially me, quash discussion of new theories, new >outlooks. > >Hey, this is an anarchy. I have absolutely no power whatsoever to quash >_anything_ related to this list! > >When we were a young list, but when I was still an old fart by most >standards (I was 40 in 1992), we didn't need any permission or approval to >post what we wished. And some of the folks then were even older than me >(Sandy Sandfort, Arthur Abraham, maybe Jude Milhon...). > >And new subscribers and young people who join the list today are perfectly >free to make good contributions. I recall few such newcomers, however. (One >of them was Dave Molnar, now a grad student in CS/something at Berkeley, >interested in many of the issues we are interested in. He was not >"censored" by the old farts when he had something interesting to say.) > >Bottom line is that this crap about how the old farts are suppressing the >young guns is bullshit. If someone has something to say, they should say >it. They may not get a positive response to calls for passing new laws to >raise taxes "on the wealthy," or to break up Microsoft, or to tell people >what kind of software they can write, but that's because the underlying >philosophy of the list is what it is: call it libertarian, call it >anarcho-capitalist, call it whatever, but don't call it "there ought to be >a law" sentiment. > > >--Tim May >"He who fights with monsters might take care lest he thereby become a >monster. And if you gaze for long into an abyss, the abyss gazes also into >you." -- Nietzsche _________________________________________________________________ Our best dial-up offer is back. Get MSN Dial-up Internet Service for 6 months @ $9.95/month now! http://join.msn.com/?page=dept/dialup

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Fuck Them Dead
by Nomen Nescio 13 Dec '03

13 Dec '03

Off the Pigs!

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Fuck em to death
by Nomen Nescio 13 Dec '03

13 Dec '03

Death to the Oinks!

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Fuck Them All Dead
by Nomen Nescio 13 Dec '03

13 Dec '03

Off All the Pigs!

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Re: [linux-elitists] Monday 15 Dec: first all-Open Source System-on-Chip (fwd from schoen@loyalty.org)
by J.A. Terranson 12 Dec '03

12 Dec '03

So, what we need to complete the picture is a good old-fashioned top-posted CASCADE!!! On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 rtusers-lists-fsck-com(a)jal.org wrote: > Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2003 22:22:58 -0500 > From: rtusers-lists-fsck-com(a)jal.org > To: Tim May <timcmay(a)got.net> > Cc: J.A. Terranson <measl(a)mfn.org>, cypherpunks(a)lne.com > Subject: Re: [linux-elitists] Monday 15 Dec: first all-Open Source > System-on-Chip (fwd from schoen(a)loyalty.org) > > On Fri, 12 Dec 2003, Tim May wrote: > > > On Dec 12, 2003, at 5:58 PM, J.A. Terranson wrote: > > > > >On Fri, 12 Dec 2003, Tim May wrote: > > > > > >>On Dec 12, 2003, at 12:16 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote: > > >> > > >>>----- Forwarded message from Seth David Schoen <schoen(a)loyalty.org> > > >>>----- > > >>> > > >>>From: Seth David Schoen <schoen(a)loyalty.org> > > >>>Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2003 23:32:31 -0800 > > >>>To: Jason Spence <jspence(a)lightconsulting.com> > > >>>Cc: linux-elitists(a)zgp.org > > >>> > > >> > > >>Please STOP forwarding traffic from other lists to the CP list. > > > > > >Why don't you just filter it Tim: the rest of are capable of making > > >our own > > >reading decisions. > > > > > > > > > And so why don't you just filter _my_ comments, twit? > > > > It's bad enough that that Eugene Leitl has made himself the new Choate, > > now you have made yourself the new Detweiler. > > > > --Tim May > > Hey! I'm the forth person to meta-comment about the list in this thread. > Do I win a prize? Are we sufficiently indistiguishable from Usenet? Is > there life on Saturn? I hear Detweiler is changing the litter for Andrew > Loeb! > > (With apologies to poor Zippy,) > > -j > > > > -- Yours, J.A. Terranson sysadmin(a)mfn.org Father, you are a great and mighty God. Help our governments to remember the lessons of our history and to appreciate the purpose of your son Jesus. Teach our representatives not to be so arrogant as to speak in one way, but doing another, for surely this not the way of truth. Help us to understand that your will is not death but life, not the darkness of hatred but the light of friendship in Christ. In the name of Jesus we pray. Amen. Merle Harton, Jr.

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Re: ALTA/DMT privacy [was: Re: (No Subject)]
by Nostradumbass＠SAFe-mail.net 12 Dec '03

12 Dec '03

-------- Original Message -------- From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd(a)echeque.com> Apparently from: owner-cypherpunks(a)minder.net To: cypherpunks(a)lne.com Subject: Re: ALTA/DMT privacy [was: Re: (No Subject)] Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2003 14:13:59 -0800 > -- > On 10 Dec 2003 at 15:19, Nostradumbass(a)SAFe-mail.net wrote: > > If you > > fund you accounts using money orders, you may be safe > > (depending on whether you've employed others to purchase the > > money orders or your physical identity is being captured at > > the money order agent during the transaction). > > Some people offer a cash to e-gold service. Though this is mostly discovered through direct communications, for obvious reasons. > > Deposit a bundle of notes in their account, they will sell you > e-gold. You use the low order bits of the amount as an ID. Others have used the serial number of one of the bills submitted (e.g., the one highlighted with a yellow marker). > > > ALTA/DMT does have a certain degree of un-linkability in that > > once accounts are deleted all db references in the system to > > that account are also deleted from all ALTA/DMT dbs. > > Trust us. Would we lie to you? This info was obtained from discussions with the developers, experiments with the system and examination of the code.

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Re: Anti-globalization
by Nostradumbass＠SAFe-mail.net 12 Dec '03

12 Dec '03

From: Neil Johnson <njohnsn(a)njohnsn.com> > What I object to are corporations who utilize their power (money) to influence > governments to make laws that benefit them at the expense of others. > > - The DMCA > - Tariffs AND Free Trade Agreements > - H1-B visas > > Even Ayn Rand weaves this into "Atlas Shrugged" where the competitors of > Reardon Steel get the government to try and force him to give them his > formula for his high-strength steel because it's putting them out business > and "unfair". "Corporations shall not be considered to be 'persons' protected by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania within the Second Class Township of Porter, Clarion County, Pennsylvania." Only a small handful of very large corporations abuse these rights to deceive people, hide crimes, or make politicians violate the will of their own voters. The millions of ethical corporations will thus be freed from the tyranny of the few while democratic government will be returned to its citizens. http://www.commondreams.org/views02/1219-06.htm

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Re: Zombie Patriots and other musings
by Nostradumbass＠SAFe-mail.net 12 Dec '03

12 Dec '03

-------- Original Message -------- From: Anonymous <cripto(a)ecn.org> Apparently from: owner-cypherpunks(a)minder.net To: cypherpunks(a)lne.com Subject: Re: Zombie Patriots and other musings Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2003 05:32:48 +0100 (CET) > The devil is in details. > > Given small numbers and absence of any other grouping factor there needs to be an "obvious" place for ZPs to refer to. Any obvious place that becomes even remotely attractive to ZPs will be immediately raided. Because ZPs have potential to be actually dangerous to the gang in power, as opposed to everything else I've seen so far. > Like I said, we're back to square one - all effective means are firmly shut down. Most cpunk talk about secret/stego messaging is mental masturbation that does not relate to the real thing. We want sex. I think this is a new use for SPAM. Because its a political message it may even be protected under the new Congressional legislation. :-)

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RE: Zombie Patriots and other musings [was: Re: (No Subject)]
by Nostradumbass＠SAFe-mail.net 12 Dec '03

12 Dec '03

From: John Kelsey <kelsey.j(a)ix.netcom.com> > At 02:07 PM 12/11/03 -0500, Trei, Peter wrote: > >It's worth noting that despite over a decade of this rhetoric, > >not a single terminally ill American has done this, so far as I > >am aware. > > Well, I think for most terminal illnesses, by the time it's obvious you're > really not going to live much longer, you're pretty damned sick. About half of my friends who died of a terminal illness were apparently quite healthy when told they had joined the "nearly departed". >And until > then, you'd probably like to make some personal use of what days or weeks > you have left doing something like talking to your kids, praying, composing > that last piece of music, etc., rather than blowing random strangers up to > make some political point. Isn't it depressing than some have been living their lives in a way that such an 11th hour changes of heart are necessary or desired? (Wouldn't it be a hell of a depressing > statement about yourself, if you really believed that the most valuable use > of the last hours of your life of which you were capable would involve > strapping some dynamite to yourself and taking out a busload of random > strangers?) Who mentioned random? Who mentioned dynamite? What I'm suggesting is no more random than soldiers killing other soldiers in war. "The purpose is to get the other poor dumb bastard to die for their ideology." Besides, there is no need for these operations to be a suicide. The lack of fear gives one a decided edge in dangerous situations which may actually increase survival rates. > > Along with that, most people care about either the afterlife form of > immortality, or at least the reputation/legacy form of immortality. Even > if you don't worry about lakes of fire and red guys with pitchforks, you > might prefer not to have your family and friends humiliated and ashamed at > the mention of your name. ("Oh my God! That was *your* son? How do you > live with that?") That's their problem. From my prespective its like Hollywood: as long as you still being talked about you're 'alive'. It doen't matter what they are saying. Better to be infamous down through history than unknown. ND

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RE: Stego worm
by Tyler Durden 12 Dec '03

12 Dec '03

Mr Shaddack... That's some interesting thinking there. The interesting thing is that no one might ever even notice the presence of this benevolent worm. It could go pretty much unchecked for a while. As for Variola's comment, you might be right. I just assumed there's some kind of relationship between LSB and those spatial freuencies wherein image information might be stored. Actually, I would still think there's a relationship, in which case an Echelon-like approach based on ffts and "noise templates" might be going on (hence the usefulness of jamming). Anyone got a TLA Operative Handbook? ANy mention in there of what kind of photos are best for Stego? How about cloud photos? (particularly where there are clouds of many different shapes and sizes present in the photo simultaneously.) -TD >From: Thomas Shaddack <shaddack(a)ns.arachne.cz> >To: cypherpunks <cypherpunks(a)lne.com> >Subject: Stego worm >Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2003 01:10:24 +0100 (CET) > >It's unknown to which extent the Adversary can detect presence of >steganography in images being sent over the Net. > >But whatever capabilities they have, they can be jammed. > >Imagine a worm that spreads from machine to machine, and on the infected >machine it finds all suitable JPEG files, generates some random data as >source and encrypts them with random key, and stegoes them into the files. > >In few days or even hours, a sizeable portion of images on the Net >contains potentially detectable stegoed encrypted data. > >Any Chinese want to get immortalized in Internet history? _________________________________________________________________ Shop online for kids toys by age group, price range, and toy category at MSN Shopping. No waiting for a clerk to help you! http://shopping.msn.com

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RE: Zombie Patriots and other musings [was: Re: (No Subject)]
by John Kelsey 12 Dec '03

12 Dec '03

At 02:07 PM 12/11/03 -0500, Trei, Peter wrote: >It's worth noting that despite over a decade of this rhetoric, >not a single terminally ill American has done this, so far as I >am aware. Well, I think for most terminal illnesses, by the time it's obvious you're really not going to live much longer, you're pretty damned sick. And until then, you'd probably like to make some personal use of what days or weeks you have left doing something like talking to your kids, praying, composing that last piece of music, etc., rather than blowing random strangers up to make some political point. (Wouldn't it be a hell of a depressing statement about yourself, if you really believed that the most valuable use of the last hours of your life of which you were capable would involve strapping some dynamite to yourself and taking out a busload of random strangers?) Along with that, most people care about either the afterlife form of immortality, or at least the reputation/legacy form of immortality. Even if you don't worry about lakes of fire and red guys with pitchforks, you might prefer not to have your family and friends humiliated and ashamed at the mention of your name. ("Oh my God! That was *your* son? How do you live with that?") >The *only* even vaguely simlar cases I'm aware of are in >India and Sri Lanka, where young Hindu widows (who, in >traditional Hindu society have very dim prospects for >a happy life) are recruited as suicide bombers by the >Tamil Tigers. I think Rajiv Ghandi's assassin was >such a woman. So there, the women are still healthy enough to do something, and doing the suicide bombing thing won't leave behind a legacy of relatives who change their names to avoid being associated with you. >Peter Trei --John Kelsey, kelsey.j(a)ix.netcom.com PGP: FA48 3237 9AD5 30AC EEDD BBC8 2A80 6948 4CAA F259

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Re: Zombie Patriots and other musings
by Nomen Nescio 12 Dec '03

12 Dec '03

Another excellent group of potential recruits are prisoners. Especially if you can create a new religious movement teaching them to stop the interracial, intergang fighting and concentrate on their true enemy, the Man. Teach that killing cops, soldiers, any type of government agent, is a holy act. Robbing banks is a holy act. Killing the guards in the prisons, killing the excutives of polluting industries -- all holy acts. Leaflets could be dropped from radio controlled balloons during "yard time" preaching the Word.

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Re: Idea: Using GPG signatures for SSL certificates
by Anonymous 12 Dec '03

12 Dec '03

Thomas Shadduck writes: > The problem that makes me feel uneasy about SSL is the vulnerability of > the certification authorities when they get compromised, everything > they signed gets compromised too. Technically this is true, but the only thing that the CA signs is other keys. So it merely means that the CA can create certificates on behalf of anyone the compromisers choose. It doesnt "compromise" any existing key or previously issued certificate or even any newly created key. In any case, you dont need a CA to use SSL. (Or more accurately, you dont need anyone elses CA to use SSL just create your own CA and issue yourself a certificate. This can be done without a lot of effort using openssl, for example.) > However, the system could be for some applications potentially get > hardened to certain degree, using the web-of-trust approach. What exactly does this buy you? The SSL certification authority system has as its only (but useful) redeeming value that one can connect to www.somecompany.com and have some level of confidence that the SSL certificate presented by that site was actually issued to www.somecompany.com and was issued by a "reputable" certification authority -- one that presumably will not hand out a certificate stamped www.somecompany.com to creditcardscammer(a)blackhat.net. If the certificate presented is not from one of the recognized "reputable" CAs built into your web browser, SSL itself will still work but your web browser will pop up a box saying that the CA is not in its list of "reputable" CAs (and BTW "would you like to connect anyway? yesno"). I dont understand the mindless worship of the "web of trust". PGP (/GPG) is a useful tool, but the "web of trust" is simply a way of "certifying" a key in a non-centralized, non-hierarchical way. -- Frondeur

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