December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Votes
by Richard.Bragg＠ssa.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wonder how the good 'ol Beeb will handle loads of votes from non-uk people. Especially how will they cope with anonymous remailers. I know this is off-topic cypherpunks but lets indulge in a little gentle humour. ---------------------- Forwarded by Richard Bragg/UK/SSA_EUROPE on 08/12/98 10:27 --------------------------- Hilary Davidson 08/12/98 10:24 To: UK BEC, UK Contractors BEC, Workfun cc: Subject: Votes This has to be done!! ---------------------- Forwarded by Hilary Davidson/UK/SSA_EUROPE on 08-12-98 10:23 AM --------------------------- "Ashley Lane" <adlane(a)fizzbang.demon.co.uk> on 07-12-98 10:00:39 PM To: "Andy Randerson" <andy(a)andyran.demon.co.uk>, "Marcus Lane" <marcus.lane(a)Drives.Eurotherm.com>, Hilary Davidson/UK/SSA_EUROPE, "Jonathan Cory" <jonathan_cory(a)phoenix.com>, "Jason Boxall" <JBoxall(a)lonza.co.uk> cc: Subject: Votes All, We are going to try to influence the result of the voting for BBC Sports Personality of the year. It has been decided that David Beckham would provide most embarrassment to the organisers if winning, so could you all e-mail your vote to the following address: sports.review(a)bbc.co.uk More importantly, can you forward this mail to all your mates & acquaintances asap in the hope that they will participate. Your co-operation in this matter is greatly appreciated ________________________________ The information contained in this electronic mail message is confidential. It is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom it is addressed and others authorised to receive it. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, copying, dissemination or disclosure of this information is strictly prohibited. ________________________________

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RE: tyranny of corporations (was: Corporate Nations)
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In <3.0.3.32.19981207161424.006ae900(a)209.204.247.83>, on 12/07/98 at 12:17 PM, "Albert P. Franco, II" <apf2(a)apf2.com> said: ><fontfamily><param>Arial</param><color><param>0000,0000,ffff</param><smaller> Please set Eudora so it does not output this junk in your messages. tks, -- --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.openpgp.net Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 5.0 at: http://www.openpgp.net/pgp.html ---------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Corporate Mandarins and The Tyranny of *Hierarchy*
by Michael Motyka 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> This "sociological" analysis probably went over really well at a > touchy-feely corporate navel-gazing camp because it's more the way > some grey-flannel men *wish* they were, than the way they actually > are. > Take a look at the history of the Love Canal in Buffalo, NY or the tobacco industry and think about these as models of corporate behavior when you hire the exterminator to come onto your property to take care of some pesky ants and horribly nasty, dangerous spiders using "safe, environmentally sound" insecticides. The burden of proof is backwards all too often in evaluating the manner in which corporations treat their customers and their community. It sure looks like the corporate world has more than its fair share of major criminals to me: some of them firmly and respectably in place in Congress. They just don't hack little girls to pieces and bury them in the woods; they kill tens of thousands, slowly, and hide behind the finest suits and the sharpest lawyers. The quest for economic gain coupled with the blatant disregard for the health and safety of those around you is what is meant by hyperindividualism. It's simply greed coupled with sociopathy. Describing this as an offshoot of 20th century liberalism is way beyond me. > or even "criminals" like Rockefeller ... > This is well off-thread but I saw a movie clip of John D. from the mid 40's where he was at a podium being fingerprinted as a publicity bit to promote the FBI's policy of trying to fingerprint all Americans. Nothing new under the sun eh? Mike

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Export of PGP Illegal in Denmark. Threatened w. jail (fwd)
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Mon, 7 Dec 1998 08:05:05 -0800 (PST) From: "Jay D. Dyson" <jdyson(a)techreports.jpl.nasa.gov> To: Cryptography List <cryptography(a)c2.net> Subject: Export of PGP Illegal in Denmark. Threatened w. jail (fwd) Organization: NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory X-No-Archive: yes X-PGP-Notice: E-mail me for my PGP Public Key. X-Disclaimer: Opinions expressed here are not necessarily those of NASA/JPL/Caltech. X-To-Spammer: Spamming a U.S. Government institution will only get you a $500 per incident fine. MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-cryptography(a)c2.net -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Courtesy of Defcon Stuff. (Do I hear jackboots in the night? 'Deed I do!) Sorry, Uncle Sam. I'm a fan of cryptography, not crippletography. - ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 07 Dec 1998 13:45:17 +0100 From: "boo(a)datashopper.dk" <boo(a)Datashopper.Dk> To: dc-stuff(a)dis.org Subject: Export of PGP Illegal in Denmark. Threatened w. jail Hi This is a true story. Denmark now - along with the whole EU - has assimilated US-crypto laws. I just had a phone conversation with the danish ministry of commerce, the export control division. The kind lady I spoke to threatened me with fines or jail for up to two years. For having PGP for free download on my homepage! I called the division to hear about the Wassenaar arrangement on export-restrictions on strong crypto and its consequences. So I ask this lady something like: I have this strong crypto program called PGP on my homepage. What should I do. Does this Wassenaar arrangement concern me? 'It sure does', she replies, and start to ask a lot of questions about my homepage - does it have unlimited global access etc. And then she says: 'You better take it down', and starts to reiterate the legal aspects, e.g. two laws from EU on export restrictions. Specifically she points out the penal code: Fines. Jail. So... I'm _not_ going to take down PGP voluntarily. Otoh I'm going to SHOUT this out loud. (I have already contacted two members of parliament and will start calling all 179 later today.) Lets see what happens... - -- Boo PI = int a=10000,b,c=2800,d,e,f[2801],g;main(){for(;b-c;)f[b++]=a/5; for(;d=0,g=c*2;c-=14,printf("%.4d",e+d/a),e=d%a)for(b=c;d+=f[b]*a, f[b]=d%--g,d/=g--,--b;d*=b);} -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNmv8uLl5qZylQQm1AQGYPQQAhDs8XfKRLD0ECTO5LuF1iA+0Yr7B9Yon CAnKwZYAk07BYG2u/xuFEsU/xdoNTap+lVmWEwciREPL+wjF/hSWeq+/YP6uwpCb 9pkoXkMst2NnFQ6744GTYiRJMQPc4no6aaDzWwO4FnMjyIzUpD4kBPkh0MHutCAF PyXXbstG1z8= =ByGn -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls
by x 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:53 AM 12/8/98 +0200, Tim Griffiths wrote: > >x wrote: >> >> This brings to mind again a method of distribution that I've thought for >> some time and has probably been discussed on this list before... >> For (a trivial) example take the image of PGP zipped up for download. >> Three different sites create a unique portion of that image for >> themselves, for example, each site takes every third byte, and throw >> in some additional obfuscation...It then is trivial to reconstruct >> the desired image from the independent sources, while none of the >> sources themselves can be subject to controls without having to go >> down the rat hole of having to define what really constitutes the >> restricted material... > >1. What is the point of the obfuscation? If it's not legal to do it >openly, then it's certainly not legal to hide the fact your doing it. >"The accused did it in such a way as to demonstrate that he was aware >of it's illegality". the point is not to hide anything; the point is to expand, arbitrarily (and this was a trivial example), the f() that takes bits from a controllable image to one that is not. > >2. By your example, you could also take a cruise missile apart, and >ship each part separately. After all, none of it is actually a missile. in a cruise missle, there will be certain parts -- e.g. the warhead explosives? -- that are still identifiable as controlled. taking apart the missle by n people where n is the number of 'parts' will result in some subset of participants possessing components that implicate them in an illegal act. this is simply not true of bits. What is the bit sequence that defines "munition"-ness? My point is that there is no hard point at which that can be defined, when you start talking about mappings from a controlled image to some other images which cannot be controlled. > >However I 'export' PGP from the US, I'm exporting it, even if I have a >web site for each bit, 0 or 1 being determined by whether Clinton has >a cigar or not in a posted picture. You're just asserting the assumptions I am trying to examine, and this is not helpful. You're also assuming a single participant, with accountability. I am assuming multiple participants, and that they're acting independently; let's expand this to say that one individual provides the 'algorithm' for the mapping, and any other participants are free to obtain their image out of band legally, and implement this algorithm on some portion of the image, publishing the result. Whom do you arrest? Where is the culpability? If the algorithm defines that there be 256K subimages of the original, one for each byte, say...can I be arrested for choosing to post f(byte 123,456)? Or do I get arrested for publishing f(byte 123,456) PLUS the information that identifies this byte as corresponding to byte 123,456 in the reconstruction of the original? I honestly don't know where this goes, but to just make a blanket statement like you did doesn't really add anything. >Yes, the law is inconsistent (let alone stupid). Not, I wouldn't want >to try this and expect to be immune from prosecution. > >Tim G > >-- >Tim Griffiths griffith(a)wis.weizmann.ac.il >Center for Submicron Research http://tim01.ex.ac.uk >Weizmann Institute of Science (972)-8-934-2736 >Rehovot 76100 Israel > > 'I have sat and listened to the arguments of men, > and I tell you they are shallow movements in space > tied to reality only by the ego of their minds.' -DF > > >

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RE: y2k/gary north delusions
by Trei, Peter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sure he did. However, geography was not accomodating, and there is at least one point where a major aqueduct is pumped over a ridge. Peter > -----Original Message----- > From: Robert Hettinga [SMTP:rah@shipwright.com] > At 11:07 AM -0500 on 12/7/98, Trei, Peter wrote: > > I suspect that Los Angeles, and other cities > > which have grown recently in arid areas, would > > have a lot more trouble. > > Actually, Mulholland knew what gravity was, as well. :-). > > Cheers, > Robert Hettinga >

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Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls (fwd)
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last spam on this subject. The rest is up to you. Cheers, Robert Hettinga --- begin forwarded text X-Sender: jya(a)pop.pipeline.com Date: Tue, 08 Dec 1998 09:09:04 -0500 To: cypherpunks(a)EINSTEIN.ssz.com From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> Subject: Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls (fwd) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailing-List: cypherpunks(a)ssz.com X-Loop: ssz.com X-Language: English, Russian, German Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net Precedence: first-class Reply-To: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> X-Loop: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net In response to John Gilmore's call for a foil to US-Wassenaar restrictions acoming, we've put up a preliminary list of international cryptography sources for mirroring: http://jya.com/crypto-free.htm This is a quick starter-kit and is far from comprehensive. Contributions welcome. Ken Williams offers an impressive (177MB) crypto/stego archive: http://www.genocide2600.com/~tattooman/cryptography/ --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Wassenaar and the dumming of New Zealand
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: "Blair Anderson" <blair(a)technologist.com> To: "Robert Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> Date: Tue, 08 Dec 98 10:13:56 +1300 Reply-To: "Blair Anderson" <blair(a)technologist.com> Priority: Normal MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: Wassenaar and the dumming of New Zealand See Peter Gutmens contribution at http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/policy/. NZ's very peculiar interpretation of Wassenaar "Export Control Myths and Facts", http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/policy/myths.html. Its a rich source of matter on the subject. Cheers Blair Anderson (Blair(a)technologist.com) International Consultant in Electronic Commerce, Encryption and Electronic Rights Management "Techno Junk and Grey Matter" 50 Wainoni Road, Christchurch, New Zealand phone 64 3 3894065 fax 64 3 3894065 Member Digital Commerce Society of Boston, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, ---------------------------- Caught in the Net for 25 years ---------------------------- --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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DCSB: Ira Heffan and Mike Schmelzer; "Software Patents" and Digital Commerce
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: rah(a)pop.sneaker.net Date: Mon, 7 Dec 1998 13:02:59 -0500 To: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu, dcsb-announce(a)ai.mit.edu From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: DCSB: Ira Heffan and Mike Schmelzer; "Software Patents" and Digital Commerce Cc: Ira Heffan <heffan(a)tht.com>, Mike Schmelzer <schmelze(a)tht.com>, Roland Mueller <roland(a)secunet.com>, "Jonathan J. Rusch" <rusch1(a)erols.com> Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Digital Commerce Society of Boston Presents Ira Heffan and Mike Schmelzer Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault, LLP "Software Patents" and Digital Commerce Tuesday, January 5th, 1999 12 - 2 PM The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston One Federal Street, Boston, MA Although the very idea of patenting software seems to be an anathema to much of the programming community, patents on software continue to stream out of the U.S. Patent Office. Everyone involved in digital commerce applications, which are by definition software-based, probably has heard about recent events: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided "State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group," which explicitly ratified patenting methods of doing business, and a spate of well-publicized patents have issued claiming to cover such concepts as the virtual shopping cart and the reverse auction. As a prerequisite to discussing these recent developments, the first part of our talk will provide an introduction to patents. We will explain what patents are and what they are not, and describe the business goals that a patent can serve. Then we will talk about current events, and attempt to put the _State Street_ case in context. We will present a survey of recently-issued patents (suggestions welcome) related to digital commerce, and conclude with some speculation about current trends, including a novel form of software patent with potentially huge implications. Ira Heffan (heffan(a)tht.com) and Mike Schmelzer (schmelze(a)tht.com) are patent attorneys at Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault, LLP (http://www.tht.com) We will be presenting our own personal views on this topic, and not the views of Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault, LLP or its clients. This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on Tuesday, January 5, 1999, from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the Harvard Club of Boston, on One Federal Street. The price for lunch is $32.50. This price includes lunch, room rental, various A/V hardware, and the speakers' lunch. The Harvard Club *does* have dress code: jackets and ties for men (and no sneakers or jeans), and "appropriate business attire" (whatever that means), for women. Fair warning: since we purchase these luncheons in advance, we will be unable to refund the price of your lunch if the Club finds you in violation of the dress code. We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or, if we *really* know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by Saturday, January 2nd, or you won't be on the list for lunch. Checks payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be sent back. Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", in the amount of $32.50. Please include your e-mail address, so that we can send you a confirmation If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance), please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something out. Upcoming speakers for DCSB are: February Roland Mueller European Privacy Directive March Jonathan Rusch Internet Fraud We are actively searching for future speakers. If you are in Boston on the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga, <mailto: rah(a)shipwright.com>. For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send "info dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu> . If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu> . We look forward to seeing you there! Cheers, Robert Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.5.5 iQEVAwUBNmwX/8UCGwxmWcHhAQFfjgf+IBe01g9XCldZYT+GRDI5ho1sOPgL6W7q zLDQToz0GGM/NZzv44SMTSGpDFx80R1yautvy4xHMnYQy2UnvO2WGsfrjuwSdQte 8qxoRAFkihyP/mi/83As2TwWdp6QhwbjI02hyP6elsdSzsspflwwonOB4I+8E/xX UDsGdQH4AHaWrK1S5XYfJSHSRGOBpk2+cqboiGvbcbC1z0vDRGrnztf8GADoPVC3 6vw4M00f+cgIuoaqqO4ol62Os6D+WPVw2NMop20OD62EGzYO2pyQjboPvBLxyRD7 smLz/4S598uLZF0GX+GO/8rCjAORask/Qt3SFIU2HMMPj9nKIvVtJw== =gz6w -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' For help on using this list (especially unsubscribing), send a message to "dcsb-request(a)ai.mit.edu" with one line of text: "help". --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: linux-gpib licensing (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From llp-owner(a)obelix.chemie.fu-berlin.de Mon Dec 7 17:59:05 1998 X-Authentication-Warning: obelix.chemie.fu-berlin.de: majordomo set sender to owner-llp using -f Message-ID: <XFMail.981207090304.danny(a)holstein.tritonetd.com> X-Mailer: XFMail 1.1 [p0] on Linux Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <Pine.SGI.3.91.981201222534.10972B-100000(a)bragg.chemie.fu-berlin.de> Date: Mon, 07 Dec 1998 08:48:14 -0500 (EST) From: "Danny G. Holstein" <danny(a)holstein.tritonetd.com> To: Claus Schroeter <clausi(a)chemie.fu-berlin.de> Subject: Re: linux-gpib licensing Cc: llp(a)obelix.chemie.fu-berlin.de, James Minyard <jminyard(a)lanhopper.com> Sender: owner-llp(a)obelix.chemie.fu-berlin.de Precedence: bulk On 01-Dec-98 Claus Schroeter wrote: >On Tue, 1 Dec 1998, James Minyard wrote: > >> >> I was wondering if you would consider changing the license for the >> libgpib portion of the linux-gpib distribution from GPL to LGPL. >> I'd like to register my thoughts here. I believe the best model to how the GPL can work is how Apache and IBM handled it. IBM wanted to include the server with a system, they were willing to pay but there was no one to pay, in the end, they paid with the only currency that would work, namely, IBM added some code to the Apache server and was allowed to inlude it with their system. Stick with GPL. No one should be able to sell the work of another person as his own, with GPL, one is assured that the cost of using a code is merely that of returning improvements to the code. ...Dan ------- To get more information on the Linux-Lab Project see: http://www.llp.fu-berlin.de/

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Wiretap Operation Sheds Light on LAPD Tactics
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If it is Monday, December 7, 1998, you can go to http://www.latimes.com/HOME/NEWS/STATE/topstory.html and read about how Los Angeles police wiretapped a small cellular phone service provider because his policies were too helpful for drug dealers. He didn't try hard enough to verify customer names, he sold cell phones with built in scramblers, he allowed customers to change phones and numbers easily. After years of investigation the company owners were never charged, but a number of their customers were convicted as drug dealers, in many cases never being told about the phone taps. It's an ominous account of how privacy-friendly policies can be used by the police to justify an investigation. If it's after December 7, read the story here: : Los Angeles narcotics officers spent a lot of time spying on John : Lopez and his small storefront telephone company--Atel Cellular : Convinced he was in cahoots with drug dealers by selling secure, : cop-proof phone service--no questions asked--they staked out his : Downey office, tailed his customers and finally wiretapped the : customers' and Atel's phones. : Starting with just his business lines and a handful of customers, : the operation spread like kudzu, eventually covering hundreds of : phones and thousands of conversations and becoming the largest wiretap : operation in the history of Los Angeles County. : When the three-year probe ended in March, police had arrested : dozens of Atel's customers, but not Lopez or any of his employees. : The Atel taps are at the center of the nine-month legal : controversy over whether prosecutors have been improperly concealing : their wiretapping operation and the information derived from it. Also : at issue are charges by defense lawyers representing Atel customers : that the allegations against Atel Cellular are a sham created to win : court orders permitting an electronic fishing expedition against their : clients. : Manager Lopez and Atel's owner, Atil Nath, refused to : comment. Their lawyers say the two men are not involved in drugs. : "The whole concept [of the police wiretap operation] was : preposterous," said Dale Hardeman, a Downey attorney. "How are we : supposed to know if customers are involved in criminal activity?" : Details of the probe--revealed through interviews, police : affidavits, wire monitor logs and volumes of court records--provide a : fascinating inside look at how detectives can mold the legal actions : of a suspect into criminal scenarios and persuade judges to authorize : snooping on people's private conversations. : The probe also raises broader questions, such as whether many of : the reasons given for tapping Atel could just as easily be applied to : other phone companies, and whether wiretaps should be allowed to : continue indefinitely, even when police work for months without : finding enough evidence to arrest the target. : The 4th Amendment protects phone privacy. : : Need for Probable Cause : : To tap a phone, prosecutors have to get a court order by showing : they have sufficient reason, known as probable cause, to believe the : phone subscriber is committing crimes. Even if a subscriber's actions : are legal when considered individually, those actions can amount to : probable cause when viewed as part of a larger picture. : If a tap provides a lead or evidence, prosecutors must reveal the : tap and give transcripts to the defendant before trial. : Though the Atel investigation established strong suspicion among : investigators that Lopez knew he was dealing with drug traffickers, it : fell far short of proving it. But police were getting a steady supply : of leads against his customers as well as new phone numbers of people : they considered suspicious. So they kept going back to court for : extensions and new taps. : Police referred all questions about the case to prosecutors, who : defend the wiretap practice, saying they had sufficient evidence to : suspect Lopez of wrongdoing. : Dist. Atty. Gil Garcetti noted in a prepared statement that the : operation had court approval. He said police targeted Atel because : they believed most of its business was providing phones to drug : dealers without requiring them to provide any personal information. : Superior Court Judge John Ouderkirk, who approved most of the : orders, said he could not discuss pending cases. : Not much is known about Lopez and Nath. Nath lives in a two-story : home in a neat, well-kept neighborhood in Downey. Lopez lives in Pico : Rivera with his wife, Maria, and their children. Both have said in : court papers that they have no criminal record. Their company is one : of about three dozen small phone companies in Los Angeles County that : resell or sublease service and equipment. : Police say the closest they came to showing a direct connection : between Lopez and drugs was during a stakeout at his home when they : saw a man arrive in a pickup truck registered to a member of what they : say is a drug gang. : The investigation grew out of, and, in many ways, was modeled : after a 1994 wiretap of Downey Communications, another small retailer : of phone services. As in the Atel probe, police staked out the : business and collected information for wiretap orders. : During hours of surveillance, they watched customers arrive and : leave. They noticed the types of vehicles they drove. They even took : notes on their manner of dress, eventually deciding that silk floral : shirts, pressed denim, hand-stitched leather belts and expensive : cowboys boots were haute couture on the L.A. drug scene. : Police claimed that Downey leased to drug dealers and was : "heavily involved in the sale and transportation of narcotics." : Officers would later use the same language in Atel affidavits. : The Downey wiretaps lasted a year. They ended in drug and cash : seizures and 12 indictments, including one against the brother of : Downey's owner. But the owners and employees of Downey were not : arrested. The owner said in court papers he was never interviewed by : police, was not aware of the investigation and has never been charged : with a crime. : Police used the Downey Communications probe as a springboard to : Atel. : The connection was tenuous. Downey and Atel customers shared the : same taste in cars and fashion. Downey employees were seen paying : short visits to Delta Tri-Telesis, a now-defunct cellular phone : business owned by Nath and operated by Lopez. : So in September 1995, officers turned their binoculars on Atel, : which had taken Delta's customers. They often saw customers in cars : registered to targets of previous drug probes going to houses once : used as drug "stash" sites and employing what police considered : "counter-surveillance" driving. : : Reports on Surveillance : : Investigators say they saw Lopez use such techniques when they : were tailing him in May 1996, shortly before they started tapping his : business phones. They said they saw him on the freeway changing lanes : erratically and driving "at a high rate of speed in excess of 70 miles : per hour," later making a U-turn on Arrington Avenue and lingering too : long--three minutes--at an intersection. : Police also noted in affidavits that Lopez sold money counters : and phone scramblers; that he apparently didn't care if customers gave : him fictitious names; that he let customers change numbers quickly and : easily. : Drug suspects were frequently found with Atel phones. : Police saw what they considered suspicious calling patterns--too : many calls in a short period of time--among groups of Atel customers. : Although such evidence was far from enough to file charges : against Lopez and Nath, legal experts say it was sufficient as : probable cause for a court order, which was granted in May 1996 for 30 : days. : After a month of wiretapping, Garcetti's prosecutors--armed with : transcripts of tapped phone conversations--were back in court asking : for the first extension of the court order and for permission to tap : new telephone numbers. From then on, requests for extensions built on : previous ones. Police eventually received 19 extensions. : Although the taps provided a mother lode of leads against drug : dealers, they seldom offered much evidence against Atel. There was one : conversation that police described in an affidavit as particularly : damning for Lopez. It was on June 25, 1996, from "Oscar," who had been : under police surveillance. : "Hey John, this number is no good," Oscar tells Lopez. : Lopez: Not good? : Oscar: They're on me again! Right behind. : Lopez: OK, bring it in now! : But most of Lopez's conversations in the affidavits simply : confirmed what police already knew: that customers dealt directly with : Lopez, that Lopez based billing records on phone numbers instead of : names and that he handled billing arrangements by phone. : In contrast, the conversations among customers were : fruitful. Most were cryptic discussions about drug deals, pickup : locations, delivery times, police said. According to investigators, : they never mentioned drugs, using words such as "ladies," "stuff" or : simply a number understood to be an amount of drugs. : For example, in June 1996, police overheard this exchange: : Receiver: How do they look? : Caller: Real good. How many do you have? : Receiver: 40 plus 5 out, plus some lying around. : Caller: OK. I'll hold whatever else I have. : Without interpretation by detectives, there is little indication : that that conversation is about drugs. : By the time the operation ended in March, police had tapped close : to 400 Atel phones. : The wiretap controversy erupted that month because San Diego : attorney Philip DeMassa and two other lawyers discovered that the case : against their clients sprang from information garnered from the Atel : taps and handed off to other officers who were not told of the taps so : they would not have to reveal them to defense lawyers. Later, Deputy : Public Defender Kathy Quant went to court for indigent defendants. : Garcetti acknowledged in June that he withheld tap information in : 58 cases and he agreed to notify defendants about future taps. : Although a judge upheld the wiretap handoff practice last month, with : some qualifications, Quant is considering an appeal. Other defense : lawyers are challenging whether Garcetti has revealed all tap cases. : Whatever the outcome, the probe clearly helped police arrest some : of Atel's customers. It netted large amounts of narcotics, about $8 : million in drug proceeds and dozens of arrests. : Lawyers base their doubts about the investigation of Nath and : Lopez partially on the fact that it lasted three years and police : never tried to interview them. In fact, DeMassa alleges in court : papers that Lopez and Nath are actually police informants or are : perhaps cooperating through a grant of immunity from prosecution, an : assertion prosecutors call absurd. : DeMassa is hoping to show that police misled the courts when they : said they were investigating Lopez and Nath. : If Nath and Lopez were such an integral part of a gigantic drug : trafficking operation, the police should be trying to protect the : public from them, he said. : "Why isn't anything happening to these guys?" he said. : : Acts Were Not Illegal, Critics Say : : None of Atel's acts described in the affidavits was illegal, : Quant and other critics say. Well-known phone companies engage in : many of the same practices, Quant said. If police use the same : standards elsewhere, any companies, especially small retailers, may be : vulnerable to taps. : Many of the actions cited in Atel affidavits are suspicious only : in the eyes of police, Quant said. Money counters are legitimate, and : other firms advertise "no eavesdropping" cell phones because : legitimate businesses need secure communications, she said. : There is nothing suspicious, for example, about high usage of : cell phones, particularly among real estate agents, salespeople, even : news reporters, Quant said. And other small retailers allow people to : change numbers frequently. : Regardless of Atel's guilt or innocence, what police did to Atel : could be done to any legitimate businesses, she said. : Deputy Dist. Atty. Robert Schirn dismissed that notion. : "That's quite a stretch," he said. : "Atel was a facilitator and made it possible for drug dealers to : break the law," he said. : Yet Schirn acknowledged that he could not point to any conclusive : evidence that Nath and Lopez knew that some of their customers were : drug dealers. : He said he didn't know if police tried to persuade defendants to : testify against Nath or Lopez. Even if they did, prosecutors would : need more evidence than the tainted testimony of accomplices to make : an arrest, he said. : As for Atel, Hardeman said his clients had no idea some of their : customers were criminals. : "This investigation has virtually destroyed them," he said.

3 2

Re: (fwd) Markus Kuhn on eternity
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Markus Kuhn writes: > The main research aspect of this project is the joint administration of > such distributed archives. For spam protection, you still need people > who decide, which files are allowed on the distributed server > infrastructure, and which are not. This administration is so far the > weak link in the Eternity Service concept, because whoever decides that > something is not spam takes over some responsibility for the content, > and is therefore subject to legal power of national powers. It would seem that it is the provider of the content, not the filterer, who is subject to legal authority. If I set up an open FTP site and allow anyone to post anything there, I can be legally forced to shut down once copyrighted software and child pornography appear. It has nothing to do with my filtering, it is my providing of the material that is objectionable. The Eternity concept has always been vague about exactly who is anonymous. There are many parties involved: the ones who submit material to the Eternity service; the ones who decide what material will go onto the service; the ones who own and maintain the machines which hold the material; the ones who receive requests for the material and supply it in response; the ones who request material and receive it. We need a more careful analysis of Eternity in terms of what levels of anonymity are possible and necessary for each of these roles.

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What freedom means... [Register]
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > The Register - http://www.theregister.co.uk > http://www.theregister.co.uk/981207-000006.html > IBM PC martyrs meet untimely end > Chinese smugglers of kit put to death > http://www.theregister.co.uk/981206-000003.html > Eurospook plan for Web and wireless bugs > If Enfopol 98 is genuine, the cops are getting seriously out of control [much deleted] ____________________________________________________________________ If I can put in one word what has always infuriated me in any person, any group, any movement, or any nation, it is: bullying Howard Zinn The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Ber
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

David Beroff wrote: >Wait a sec. Maybe I'm confused. I thought you were talking about >mass-mirroring the *content* of key sites, not just the URL pointers. > >I would imagine that a small committee would have to "edit" by >suggesting what should and shouldn't be included; one must realize >that if the final file is too large, people will be discouraged from mirroring. Yes, Gilmore's proposal was to mirror the contents; URLs threaten no reg-makers. Yep, mirrors of everything would be very large. We've heard already that folks would like help in knowing what to mirror if they can't do large archives, or can't easily decide which are most important. My advice so far: mirror whatever you can until better advice comes forth. Prime need: many mirrors of the strongest stuff, especially anything above 40-bits, that is anything that now requires a US export license (which appears to be where Wassenaar wildebeests and the domestic US is being stampeded). What would help is a list from experts on what are the most gov-enraging programs. We'd like to offer a few of those on jya.com, to test BXA's up-and- running crypto-enforcement program, maybe get some jail and trial pleasure, it's been too quiet on Bernstein, Junger, Karn, et al, a deliberate gov-stall, awaiting Wassenaar.

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Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Authentication-Warning: toad.com: Host localhost [127.0.0.1] didn't use HELO protocol To: cryptography(a)c2.net, gnu(a)toad.com Subject: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls Date: Mon, 07 Dec 1998 15:23:54 -0800 From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> Sender: owner-cryptography(a)c2.net The US Wassenaar initiative is an attempt to deny the public not only all future strong crypto developments, but all existing ones. As today's message from Denmark makes clear, the freedom-hating bureaucrats are threatening to prosecute a citizen merely for publishing PGP on his web page. Let's at least ensure that they don't eliminate *today's* strong crypto, by replicating crypto archives behind each Berlin Wall they threaten to erect. Today we depend on a small number of archives (in a small number of countries) containing source and binaries for PGP, SSH, Kerberos, cryptoMozilla, IPSEC, and many other useful crypto tools that we use daily. Let's replicate these archives in many countries. I call for volunteers in each country, at each university or crypto-aware organization, to download crypto tools while they can still be exported from where they are, and then to offer them for export from your own site and your own country as long as it's legal. (The Wassenaar agreement is not a law; each country has merely agreed to try to change its own laws, but that process has not yet started.) And if at some future moment your own government makes it illegal for you to publish these tools, after all your appeals are denied, all the pro-bono court cases rejected, and all the newspaper coverage you can get has been printed, then restrict your web site so that only your own citizens can get the tools. That'll still be better than the citizens of your country having NO access to the tools of privacy! (I suggest putting these tools on a Web site on a machine that you own, rather than on a web site where you buy space from someone else. That way there'll be nobody for the freedom-squashers to threaten except you.) I'm sure that John Young's excellent http://jya.com site will be happy to provide an index of crypto archives around the world, if people will send him notices at jya(a)pipeline.com as your sites come up. (Each archive should locally mirror this list, so that we won't depend on a single site.) Rather than having their desired effect of squelching crypto distribution, perhaps their overbold move can inspire us to increase strong crypto distribution tenfold, by making it clear to the public that if you don't keep a copy on your own hard drive, the governments of the world will be merciless in scheming to deny you access to it. And if crypto developers have to publish on books, or rely on smugglers to get crypto from country to country, then at least each country will have its distribution arrangements already ready for when the book is scanned or the smuggler arrives. John Gilmore --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Mon, 7 Dec 1998 21:38:55 -0500 > From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> > Subject: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls > Subject: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls > Date: Mon, 07 Dec 1998 15:23:54 -0800 > From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> > The US Wassenaar initiative is an attempt to deny the public not only > all future strong crypto developments, but all existing ones. As > today's message from Denmark makes clear, the freedom-hating > bureaucrats are threatening to prosecute a citizen merely for > publishing PGP on his web page. And this is different from yesterday how? > Let's at least ensure that they don't eliminate *today's* strong > crypto, by replicating crypto archives behind each Berlin Wall they > threaten to erect. Are you offering to put up your monies to provide any and all legal and other support for any such site that participates? When is your site going up? ____________________________________________________________________ If I can put in one word what has always infuriated me in any person, any group, any movement, or any nation, it is: bullying Howard Zinn The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

5 4

LA Times article on Wiretapping
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here is a link to the LA Times feature story on the LAPD's use of wiretaps. An interesting read. Expect such things from the rest of the constabulary when examined. http://www.latimes.com/HOME/NEWS/STATE/t000111718.html --- | Bill Clinton - Bringing back the Sixties one Nixon at a time! | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | | | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com|

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Re: DSA for encryption
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 06 Dec 1998 22:25:57 -0600, Bennett Haselton <bennett(a)peacefire.org> wrote: >I'm working on an enhancement to a Web-based program that allows you to >circumvent proxy server censorship by sending a request for a Web page to a >computer in the outside world that is not blocked by the proxy, and having >that computer re-send a copy of the banned page back to you. Good idea! >Of course, any manufacturer of Internet censorship proxy server software >could easily add ians.ml.org to their list of blocked sites (as they have >all already done with Anonymizer), so the idea would be for people to get >their friends to set up port-forwarding programs on computers that were not >blocked by the censoring proxy, and those could be set up to relay requests >between the IANS server and the computer behind the proxy server. It may not be so easy to get people to set up port-forwarding programs. These could be a target for hackers seeking to cover their tracks as they try break-ins. Also, how many people in this day of commercial ISPs are able to set up port-forwarding programs? It would seem more promising to make your web page script be simple and portable enough that even users of AOL and free webpage hosts like GeoCities would be able to install it. >I am working on a JavaScript form that could be used on the client side to >solve this problem. We would like to use DSA to encrypt the requests sent >using IANS, since I've heard DSA can be used for encryption without >royalties, unlike, for example, RSA. DSA per se is probably not your best choice - unless you already have a DSA implementation which you want to try to use. DSA is a signature algorithm, and while it is sometimes possible to use a DSA implementation to do encryption, it is not particularly convenient. What you want to do is to use the mathematical principle behind DSA, which is the difficulty of solving the discrete log problem, and use an encryption algorithm which relies on that same math problem, namely Diffie-Hellman or ElGamal encryption. If you need to use DSA, Bruce Schneier describes in his book Applied Cryptography how to get the effect of ElGamal encryption. Here is what he writes, on page 490: : ElGamal Encryption with DSA : : There have been allegations that the government likes the DSA because it is : only a digital signature algorithm and can't be used for encryption. It is, : however, possible to use the DSA function call to do ElGamal encryption. : : Assume that the DSA algorithm is implemented with a single function call: : : DSAsign (p, q, g, k, x, h, r, s) : : You supply the numbers p, q, g, k, x, and h, and the function returns the : signature parameters: r and s. : : To do ElGamal encryption of message m with public key y, choose a random : number k, and call : : DSAsign (p, p, g, k, 0, 0, r, s) : : The value of r returned is a in the ElGamal scheme. Throw s away. Then, : call : : DSAsign (p, p, y, k, 0, 0, r, s) : : Rename the value of r to be u; throw s away. Call : : DSAsign (p, p, m, 1, u, 0, r, s) : : Throw r away. The value of s returned is b in the ElGamal scheme. You now : have the ciphertext, a and b. : : Decryption is just as easy. Using secret key x, and ciphertext messages : a and b, call : : DSAsign (p, p, a, x, 0, 0, r, s) : : The value r is a^x mod p. Call that e. Then call : : DSAsign (p, p, 1, e, b, 0, r, s) : : The value s is the plaintext message, m. : : This method will not work with all implementations of DSA. Some may fix : the value sof p and q, or the lengths of some of the other parameters. : Still, if the implementation is general enough, this is a way to encrypt : using nothing more than digital signature function. If you need more information about what the various values mean, or how to create a DSA and/or ElGamal key, just ask. Really, ElGamal is simple enough that if you have access to a large-number math package, writing your own is probably easier than trying to get DSA to do it. It is unlikely that you will find a DSA implementation which allows you to specify all the needed parameters above, particularly h and k. Usually h is forgotten after key generation and not used during signature, and implementions will probably want to choose k themselves since it is a very sensitive parameter.

2 1

PUTS MONEY INTO YOUR POCKET -- BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY AD
by jill567＠copacabana.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Information you need
by JCousino＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Sanarchist Cookbook Known as the world most forbidden information source and outlawed in many nations this book was thought to be banished from the face of the Earth. HUGE FORBIDDEN INFORMATION LIBRARY 220 pages of the massive book of Anarchy Learn the tricks of the trade written by the skilled hands of the Sanarchist. Including massive amounts of information on building home made weapons like the potato shooter to making dollar bills that can be used continuously in coke machines this book can pull you out of any jam. If you are interested in those great WWII bomb guides & handbooks this thing has them all! We are set out to distribute this book to anyone that is interested and it comes by mail(sorry we can't post it on the web because no web server will support us). We have been selling this product for almost two months now and have processed hundreds of orders. This book is great, we have had no complaints on it, and we will never have any complaints on it its so good. If this is the only product you ever order off the Internet then you have picked a good choice. Our price is low and the product is great! Send payment of $6.50 to the address below to receive your cookbook by mail. K.C. Smith 933 Birchwood Court Evansville, IN 47710 I am giving you my address and information so clearly this is not a sick scheme to take your money. I don't know about you but the last thing I wantis hundreds of people beating my car with a baseball bat wanting their cookbook. This is a great gift, I give you my word on that. Expect 3-7 Days to Receive your cookbook.

1 0

knapsack....
by Bernardo B. Terrado 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Where could I find the algorithm (per se) for Merkle-Hellman knapsack ? (if it is not for free just say so) :) I've read in Mr. Schneier's book that Chor-Rivest knapsack is secure (unless for some specializerd attack). Is it still as secure today as the latter years? Bernie

2 1

Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls
by x 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This brings to mind again a method of distribution that I've thought for some time and has probably been discussed on this list before. In this distribution method, as long as there is the opportunity to cooperate ahead of time and out of band, there is the potential for retaining the ability to provide access any binary data that would be subject to unwanted control. The scheme is just a variation of secret sharing and all that is necessary is for several different entities to replicate portions of the desired software, which portions in and of themselves cannot be subject to any control. For (a trivial) example take the image of PGP zipped up for download. Three different sites create a unique portion of that image for themselves, for example, each site takes every third byte, and throw in some additional obfuscation by each site XORing their portion of the image by some additional data available at a fourth site such as a collection of cypherpunk list text. It then is trivial to reconstruct the desired image from the independent sources, while none of the sources themselves can be subject to controls without having to go down the rat hole of having to define what really constitutes the restricted material -- either in all possible forms, or in terms of all possible transforms applicable to the partitioned source material. Otherwise it could be argued that there is a function and that takes the image of an ASCII representation of Herman Melville's Moby Dick into the image of PGP.ZIP and therefore Moby Dick is an export controlled item. Or is the transform the export-controlled item? Or what? Eh? At 09:38 PM 12/7/98 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote: > > >--- begin forwarded text > > >X-Authentication-Warning: toad.com: Host localhost [127.0.0.1] didn't use >HELO protocol >To: cryptography(a)c2.net, gnu(a)toad.com >Subject: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls >Date: Mon, 07 Dec 1998 15:23:54 -0800 >From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> >Sender: owner-cryptography(a)c2.net > >The US Wassenaar initiative is an attempt to deny the public not only >all future strong crypto developments, but all existing ones. As >today's message from Denmark makes clear, the freedom-hating >bureaucrats are threatening to prosecute a citizen merely for >publishing PGP on his web page. > >Let's at least ensure that they don't eliminate *today's* strong >crypto, by replicating crypto archives behind each Berlin Wall they >threaten to erect. Today we depend on a small number of archives (in >a small number of countries) containing source and binaries for PGP, >SSH, Kerberos, cryptoMozilla, IPSEC, and many other useful crypto >tools that we use daily. > >Let's replicate these archives in many countries. I call for >volunteers in each country, at each university or crypto-aware >organization, to download crypto tools while they can still be >exported from where they are, and then to offer them for export from >your own site and your own country as long as it's legal. (The >Wassenaar agreement is not a law; each country has merely agreed to >try to change its own laws, but that process has not yet started.) > >And if at some future moment your own government makes it illegal for >you to publish these tools, after all your appeals are denied, all the >pro-bono court cases rejected, and all the newspaper coverage you can >get has been printed, then restrict your web site so that only your >own citizens can get the tools. That'll still be better than the >citizens of your country having NO access to the tools of privacy! > >(I suggest putting these tools on a Web site on a machine that you >own, rather than on a web site where you buy space from someone else. >That way there'll be nobody for the freedom-squashers to threaten >except you.) > >I'm sure that John Young's excellent http://jya.com site will be happy >to provide an index of crypto archives around the world, if people >will send him notices at jya(a)pipeline.com as your sites come up. >(Each archive should locally mirror this list, so that we won't depend >on a single site.) > >Rather than having their desired effect of squelching crypto >distribution, perhaps their overbold move can inspire us to increase >strong crypto distribution tenfold, by making it clear to the public >that if you don't keep a copy on your own hard drive, the governments >of the world will be merciless in scheming to deny you access to it. >And if crypto developers have to publish on books, or rely on >smugglers to get crypto from country to country, then at least each >country will have its distribution arrangements already ready for when >the book is scanned or the smuggler arrives. > > John Gilmore > >--- end forwarded text > > >----------------- >Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> >Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> >44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA >"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, >[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to >experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' > > >

3 2

Re: Wei Dei's "b-money" protocol
by x 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

there must be something here that I'm missing. At the core of this protocol seems to be the establishment not of crypto anarchy but of a crypto elite. in this scheme only the processors of computing power have economic power. Now I realize that our current economic system is based on economic power being invested in a closed community of powerful elites, and is by no means egalitarian, but this looks to be like simply substituting one group of "haves" for a different group of "haves" I have to admit not being familiar with the Orthodoxy of crypto anarchy, but if the premise is a centerless self organizing system of free agents this protocol seems to miss the mark. or what is it that I am missing here? At 07:37 PM 12/5/98 GMT, you wrote: > > >Wei Dei recently announced (on cypherpunks) his "b-money, a new >protocol for monetary exchange and contract enforcement for >pseudonyms". > >Below is the text of his proposal. > >Comments to follow. > >Adam > >====================================================================== >http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai/bmoney.txt >====================================================================== > >I am fascinated by Tim May's crypto-anarchy. Unlike the communities >traditionally associated with the word "anarchy", in a crypto-anarchy the >government is not temporarily destroyed but permanently forbidden and >permanently unnecessary. It's a community where the threat of violence is >impotent because violence is impossible, and violence is impossible >because its participants cannot be linked to their true names or physical >locations. > >Until now it's not clear, even theoretically, how such a community could >operate. A community is defined by the cooperation of its participants, >and efficient cooperation requires a medium of exchange (money) and a way >to enforce contracts. Traditionally these services have been provided by >the government or government sponsored institutions and only to legal >entities. In this article I describe a protocol by which these services >can be provided to and by untraceable entities. > >I will actually describe two protocols. The first one is impractical, >because it makes heavy use of a synchronous and unjammable anonymous >broadcast channel. However it will motivate the second, more practical >protocol. In both cases I will assume the existence of an untraceable >network, where senders and receivers are identified only by digital >pseudonyms (i.e. public keys) and every messages is signed by its sender >and encrypted to its receiver. > >In the first protocol, every participant maintains a (seperate) database >of how much money belongs to each pseudonym. These accounts collectively >define the ownership of money, and how these accounts are updated is the >subject of this protocol. > >1. The creation of money. Anyone can create money by broadcasting the >solution to a previously unsolved computational problem. The only >conditions are that it must be easy to determine how much computing effort >it took to solve the problem and the solution must otherwise have no >value, either practical or intellectual. The number of monetary units >created is equal to the cost of the computing effort in terms of a >standard basket of commodities. For example if a problem takes 100 hours >to solve on the computer that solves it most economically, and it takes 3 >standard baskets to purchase 100 hours of computing time on that computer >on the open market, then upon the broadcast of the solution to that >problem everyone credits the broadcaster's account by 3 units. > >2. The transfer of money. If Alice (owner of pseudonym K_A) wishes to >transfer X units of money to Bob (owner of pseudonym K_B), she broadcasts >the message "I give X units of money to K_B" signed by K_A. Upon the >broadcast of this message, everyone debits K_A's account by X units and >credits K_B's account by X units, unless this would create a negative >balance in K_A's account in which case the message is ignored. > >3. The effecting of contracts. A valid contract must include a maximum >reparation in case of default for each participant party to it. It should >also include a party who will perform arbitration should there be a >dispute. All parties to a contract including the arbitrator must broadcast >their signatures of it before it becomes effective. Upon the broadcast of >the contract and all signatures, every participant debits the account of >each party by the amount of his maximum reparation and credits a special >account identified by a secure hash of the contract by the sum the maximum >reparations. The contract becomes effective if the debits succeed for >every party without producing a negative balance, otherwise the contract >is ignored and the accounts are rolled back. A sample contract might look >like this: > >K_A agrees to send K_B the solution to problem P before 0:0:0 1/1/2000. >K_B agrees to pay K_A 100 MU (monetary units) before 0:0:0 1/1/2000. K_C >agrees to perform arbitration in case of dispute. K_A agrees to pay a >maximum of 1000 MU in case of default. K_B agrees to pay a maximum of 200 >MU in case of default. K_C agrees to pay a maximum of 500 MU in case of >default. > >4. The conclusion of contracts. If a contract concludes without dispute, >each party broadcasts a signed message "The contract with SHA-1 hash H >concludes without reparations." or possibly "The contract with SHA-1 hash >H concludes with the following reparations: ..." Upon the broadcast of all >signatures, every participant credits the account of each party by the >amount of his maximum reparation, removes the contract account, then >credits or debits the account of each party according to the reparation >schedule if there is one. > >5. The enforcement of contracts. If the parties to a contract cannot agree >on an appropriate conclusion even with the help of the arbitrator, each >party broadcasts a suggested reparation/fine schedule and any arguments or >evidence in his favor. Each participant makes a determination as to the >actual reparations and/or fines, and modifies his accounts accordingly. > >In the second protocol, the accounts of who has how much money are kept by >a subset of the participants (called servers from now on) instead of >everyone. These servers are linked by a Usenet-style broadcast channel. >The format of transaction messages broadcasted on this channel remain the >same as in the first protocol, but the affected participants of each >transaction should verify that the message has been received and >successfully processed by a randomly selected subset of the servers. > >Since the servers must be trusted to a degree, some mechanism is needed to >keep them honest. Each server is required to deposit a certain amount of >money in a special account to be used as potential fines or rewards for >proof of misconduct. Also, each server must periodically publish and >commit to its current money creation and money ownership databases. Each >participant should verify that his own account balances are correct and >that the sum of the account balances is not greater than the total amount >of money created. This prevents the servers, even in total collusion, from >permanently and costlessly expanding the money supply. New servers can >also use the published databases to synchronize with existing servers. > >The protocol proposed in this article allows untraceable pseudonymous >entities to cooperate with each other more efficiently, by providing them >with a medium of exchange and a method of enforcing contracts. The >protocol can probably be made more efficient and secure, but I hope this >is a step toward making crypto-anarchy a practical as well as theoretical >possibility. > >====================================================================== > > >

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by wbclinic＠efn.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Quick ping about Surety Technologies
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Tue, 8 Dec 1998 00:17:17 -0500 (EST) From: <Somebody> To: rah(a)shipwright.com Subject: Re: Quick ping about Surety Technologies > *That*'s interesting. Haven't heard it before. If you want, I'll bounce it > around. If you would, that would be interesting. The patent info on their web site includes: Method for secure timestamping of digital documents. U.S. Patent No. 5,136,647, issued August 4, 1992. U.S. Patent Re. 34,954, reissued May 30, 1995. The initial patent issue covers a variety of fundamental technology and algorithmic components of digital timestamping. More specifically, the claims cover: * Any use of an outside party's digital signature to timestamp a document. * The "hash-and-sign" method in which the outside party receives the one-way hash of the document to be timestamped. I distrust software patents, but even that aside, these sound really broad to me. More info at <http://www.surety.com/patent_overview.html>. <snip> <Somebody's .sig> --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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