December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Int'l Computer Law Observer #1
by Steve Schear 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Thu, 27 Nov 1997 00:59:32 +0200 >Reply-To: wgalkin(a)lawcircle.com >Sender: lawobserver Computer Law Observer > <LAWOBSERVER(a)MAELSTROM.STJOHNS.EDU> >From: "William S. Galkin" <wgalkin(a)lawcircle.com> >Subject: Int'l Computer Law Observer #1 >To: LAWOBSERVER(a)MAELSTROM.STJOHNS.EDU > > **PREMIER ISSUE** > ================== > =============================== > =========================================== > INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER LAW OBSERVER > December, 1997 -- No.1 > =========================================== > =============================== > ================== > > PLEASE FREELY REDISTRIBUTE THIS ISSUE!!! > >Welcome to the Premier Issue of the International Computer Law Observer >(ICLO). The ICLO is an e-mail report providing monthly coverage of >significant legal developments from around the world relating to computers, >technology and the Internet. Back issues and a listing of the Editorial >Board can be found at http://www.lawcircle.com/observer . The >Editor-in-Chief, William S. Galkin, Esq., is located in Ramat Gan, Israel, >and can be reached for comments at wgalkin(a)lawcircle.com . > [big snip] >--- SOUTH AFRICA --- > >[BOTTOM LINE] COURT GIVES NO SANCTION FOR ONLINE GAMBLING > >[WHAT HAPPENED] Johannesburg, Gauteng Province, South Africa - In South >Africa's first Internet related judgment, the Witwatersrand division of >the High Court of South Africa ruled in late October 1997 that it would >not sanction online gambling in its jurisdiction [Ruben Olivier v The >Minister of Safety and Security and the MEC for Safety and Security of the >Province of Gauteng] > >[WHY IT HAPPENED] The cyber cafe had brought an application to court for >the return of certain computer equipment comprising of a number of >networked personal computers, the network server and certain peripherals >following on the search of the cafe's premises and the seizure of the >computer equipment. > >In refusing the application, the Court held that it was lawful for the >South African Police to impound computer equipment owned by a cyber cafe, >which was allegedly being used for online gambling. > >In terms of existing legislation, Internet gambling is illegal and the >owner of the site is in contravention of national and provincial Gambling >Acts, where they exist. > >[THE SIGNIFICANCE] Many experts have indicated that this case is indicative >of the controversy and complexity surrounding the issue of regulating >Internet related transactions. Local gambling experts argue that the >proliferation of online gambling threatens to undermine the development of >a legal casino industry in South Africa at a time when companies are vying >with one another for casino licenses. Many such companies are investing >billions of rands in setting up in infrastructure development, but are >threatened with competition from Internet gambling site operators who can >set up shop online with ease. > >[INFORMATION SOURCES] Cape Times Newspaper, 27 October 1997 edition 2.) >Michael Silber - Werksmans attorneys > >[CONTRIBUTING EDITOR] Hofmeyr Herbstein Gihwala, Inc. - Contact: Lance >Michalson - e-mail: lbm(a)hofmeyr.co.za

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Updating the white bit
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May wrote: >And the original comment above, that cypherpunk technologies will be >a major force to eliminate racism is only part of the picture....the >technologies also allow race to be considered as participants choose. One benefit of making your living through a wire is that your end of the wire can be anywhere you like. So, if you want to be surrounded exclusively by members of Group X, you are free to go live in some commune populated exclusively with the members of that group and still make a living. To the extent that racism is caused by ignorance, the Net will tend to reduce it. But, is this claim really correct or is it simply a slur against racists? (The implication being that all U.S. racists live in the South and that Southerners aren't that smart.) I believe that many people are racists because they like to be that way and that more knowledge about other racial groups isn't going to change that. Knowledge about someone is not synonymous with liking them or forming a relationship with them. The people who are working themselves up into a panic regarding "hate speech" would appear to agree with me on this point. What they fear is that certain ideas will "spread". That is, as certain people are exposed to ideas and knowledge they did not have before, they will become racist or more racist than they already are. In other words, there are groups of people who cannot be trusted to think for themselves. >Ironically, an equivalent example, but one which is deemed >politically correct by many, is the example of "women-only" forums on >the Net. Oh, you mean the majority group? The majority group will always protect its own privileges. Look how many men are in jail when compared to women. Clearly men are an oppressed group. ;-) Seriously, people like to spend at least some of their time with people who are a lot like themselves. This is true of just about every person on the planet. A common theme in the United States at this time is that it is wrong for white males to behave this way, but it is not wrong for anybody else to behave this way. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm Subject: Updating the white bit To: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com 16A5942B6EED349ECF4594C784DFD177 [Cantsin Protocol No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Junk E-Mail Remover software
by Ed Bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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December's Phrase
by CypherPunks Chief SpokesPerson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

With November drawing to a close, WE will be winding down OUR use of the phrase, "ad hominem." The Official CypherPunk Phrase of the Month, for December, will be: "Ad gaolas deliberandas" Any disputes over the proper meaning and use of this phrase will be settled by Jim Bell's judge (once he comes out of hiding).

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Death Penalty Expanded
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What's next, the death penalty for unregistered crypto? No doubt Swinestein plans to introduce her own version of this in Amerika. --Tim # Date: Mon, 24 Nov 1997 6:43:53 PST # # TAIPEI, Nov 24 (AFP) - Taiwan brought in new heavy penalties # Monday to curb illegal firearm possession in an effort to tackle a # rising crime wave here. # Under an amended law effective from Monday anyone caught # manufacturing, selling or transporting illegal firearms faces the # death penalty. Previously the law stipulated a maximum penalty of # seven years jail. # The move comes just five days after the island's most wanted # fugitive gave himself up to police. # "The amened law is expected to emerge as a deterrent force to # effectively keep at bay illegal holding of firearms," President Lee # Teng-hui said. # In the past, nearly 80 percent of offenders under the law faced # only 18 months jail and were often released on parole after serving # a third of their sentence, official statistics show.

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Re: Another Anti-Privacy Bigot Heard From (was: The Guilmette/Burnore deba
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

gburnore(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > On Sun, 30 Nov 1997 03:48:14 GMT, eridani+spam(a)netcom.com wrote: > > : In article <c87feca75aa95fb3e51fe7ad0c72f17d(a)anonymous.poster>, > : Anonymous <Use-Author-Address-Header(a)[127.1]> wrote: > : [same ole same ole] > : > : Gary said THE anon asshole. That's you, bubba. Your writing style and > : your tiresome beating of the same old drum give you away every time. > : > : Don't try to make this into Gary L. Burnore (and me, of course, don't > : forget me) against everyone who posts anonymously. It wasn't that way > : from the start and it ain't that way now. This is about YOU and the > : smear campaign that YOU conduct from behind an anonymous remailer. > > The anonasshole is now working on his "way out of this". Expect many more of > his posts to contain bits of how more than one person posting anonymously is > making the accusations. All is falling down around the anonasshole. > > : <cue more lies and distortions from THE anon cretin> > > We'd expect no less. I do wonder how long it will take before those who > believe remailers are a good thing start to realise this asshole has it in for > them. Everything it posts could be used by the anti-remailer front as a > reason to shut them all down. > > > gburnore@netcom dot com or gburnore@netcom databasix com > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > How you look depends on where you go. > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Gary L. Burnore | ÝÛ³ºÝ³Þ³ºÝ³³ÝÛºÝ³Þ³ºÝ³Ý³Þ³ºÝ³ÝÝÛ³ > | ÝÛ³ºÝ³Þ³ºÝ³³ÝÛºÝ³Þ³ºÝ³Ý³Þ³ºÝ³ÝÝÛ³ > DOH! | ÝÛ³ºÝ³Þ³ºÝ³³ÝÛºÝ³Þ³ºÝ³Ý³Þ³ºÝ³ÝÝÛ³ > | ÝÛ³ 3 4 1 4 2 Ý³Þ³ 6 9 0 6 9 ÝÛ³ > spamgard(tm): zamboni | Official Proof of Purchase > =========================================================================== > PGPprint: C63B CF4E 1B71 4D7E C6F8 AF4E 338D 5CB4 > KeyID: 0x0F7EDBD9 (RSA) finger gburnore(a)netcom.com for public key > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- That was an impressive tantrum that you and Belinda just staged. I suppose you thought it would distract attention from the fact that you still refuse to reveal what your motive was for harassing Jeff Burchell this summer in a failed attempt to get him to turn over the logs containing the names and e-mail addresses of everyone who either sent or received an anonymous message through his remailer. Your attempt to spread F.U.D. (fear, uncertainty, and doubt) among the remailer user community is reminiscent of the "Church" of $cientology's similarly rabid anti-remailer tactics. Your fanciful posts about "anonymous assholes", "cyber stalkers", and other bovine excrement don't even make good fiction anymore. I'll take ElRon's sci-fi over yours any day. If posts from "anon assholes" really offend your sensitive feelings, then you might want to stay away from most of the NGs where you've been posting your blather. SUGGESTION: stick with "safe" groups like comp.org.cauce where anonymous posts are banned and content is censo^h^h^h^h^hmoderated to ensure an appropriate level of political correctness.

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Re: New free speech oriented civil rights site
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Anonymous <nobody(a)REPLAY.COM> wrote: >Cypherpunks need to build bridges to minority communities, to show >them how these technologies can advance their cause. Members of abused minority groups should be pretty much in sync with a lot of concerns held by cypherpunks. When we talk about police brutality and concentration camps, most of us, as well as our friends and relatives, have little direct experience. This is not true of many members of minority groups. Sounds like a nice project. Good luck! >Racist comments by supposedly respected list members are harmful and >must be countered in order to show that these views do not reflect >the feelings of most cypherpunks. If we do our job properly, the cypherpunk public image won't matter. ;-) >Cypherpunk technologies will be a major force to eliminate racism. >With privacy protected transactions, the color of a person's skin, >his religion and his ethnicity are no longer apparent. People will >be able to succeed on merit - and not the "good old boys" definition >of merit, where somehow only white males seem to have what it takes. White males are a minority group. Also, I believe you are overestimating the effects of racism when it comes to hiring talented technical professionals. If not, there is a tremondous arbitrage opportunity out there. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNHuIqJaWtjSmRH/5AQHkxAf/VzMTu+RlDclEyiBJQ+79rGjZDa+M2G9E cRoHdL42kxa4FBTHOa7v+unqBXI1tLuz2AqGJFuAPQTSu3FIh4xR3BfHj3q35qOX NpkqH7bVNNgY/DUnB6vIxjgCkEu+GNDEtIuuCuKU0wCW8IJBe/iDIBDLDQZQUuVt DJk19LnyZ0DO1cfmJquJiyh3hIECowEnXHODwhybM9hzHq+l0xrgjmQ5deIOhXuY KH7QiQn8nv5wEYeantDsfTfitHfUIZKge4eLrLNqeva4E8sgf7CQrt3vEw+rjhXP WLnvYbsCLOLQOdjIQA3c0DG9a0HU28oecHcUG0IeZ+sgwDWf61J+KA== =tuE3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Fw: Virus Warning!! IMPORTANT!!!!
by Crandall 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- : Date: Sunday, November 30, 1997 10:22:19 : From: THE.DUKE a.k.a. Perrin : To: Biscuit; my_bath_tub(a)innocence.com; parcha(a)hotmail.com; Jeff Crandall : (work); deanna(a)keylink.net; cjensen(a)smtplink.rockford.edu; yablo(a)hotmail.com; : Doug; Here; Denise; flood69(a)hotmail.com; Goddess; Guipe; : nailbomb666(a)hotmail.com; pierre(a)netins.net; jewlie(a)nwiowa.com; : mansonswonka(a)hotmail.com; jonesy(a)mindless.com; Luvdust; Me; Wales; Nick; : Nicole; philip(a)infospeedway.net; khanshaw(a)mindspring.com; Ryan; Sara Wilson; : shandave(a)hotmail.com; tabnit(a)hotmail.com; thetigress_(a)hotmail.com; Tom : Tindell; Tony Ortega; Yankee1428(a)aol.com; wrightk(a)tron.cochise.cc.az.us : Subject: Virus Warning!! IMPORTANT!!!! : : : : -------------------------------------------------------------------- : **************************************************************** : WARNING, CAUTION, DANGER, AND BEWARE! : Gullibility Virus Spreading over the Internet! : **************************************************************** : : : WASHINGTON, D.C.--The Institute for the Investigation of Irregular : Internet Phenomena announced today that many Internet users are : becoming infected by a new virus that causes them to believe without : question every groundless story, legend, and dire warning that shows : up in their inbox or on their browser. The Gullibility Virus, as it : is called, apparently makes people believe and forward copies of silly : hoaxes relating to cookie recipes, email viruses, taxes on modems, and : get-rich-quick schemes [perhaps conspiracy theories should be included : here]. : : "These are not just readers of tabloids or people who buy lottery : tickets based on fortune cookie numbers," a spokesman said. "Most are : otherwise normal people, who would laugh at the same stories if told : to them by a stranger on a street corner." However, once these same : people become infected with the Gullibility Virus, they believe : anything they read on the Internet. : : "My immunity to tall tales and bizarre claims is all gone," reported : one weeping victim. "I believe every warning message and sick child : story my friends forward to me, even though most of the messages are : anonymous." : : Another victim, now in remission, added, "When I first heard about : Good Times, I just accepted it without question. After all, there : were dozens of other recipients on the mail header, so I thought the : virus must be true." It was a long time, the victim said, before she : could stand up at a Hoaxees Anonymous meeting and state, "My name is : Jane, and I've been hoaxed." Now, however, she is spreading the word. : "Challenge and check whatever you read," she says. : : Internet users are urged to examine themselves for symptoms of the : virus, which include the following: : : * the willingness to believe improbable stories : without thinking : : * the urge to forward multiple copies of such : stories to others : : * a lack of desire to take three minutes to check : to see if a story is true : : T. C. is an example of someone recently infected. He told one : reporter, "I read on the Net that the major ingredient in almost all : shampoos makes your hair fall out, so I've stopped using shampoo." : When told about the Gullibility Virus, T. C. said he would stop : reading email, so that he would not become infected. : : Anyone with symptoms like these is urged to seek help immediately. : Experts recommend that at the first feelings of gullibility, Internet : users rush to their favorite search engine and look up the item : tempting them to thoughtless credence. Most hoaxes, legends, and tall : tales have been widely discussed and exposed by the Internet : community. : : Courses in critical thinking are also widely available, and there is : online help from many sources, including : : * Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory : Capability at : <a href=http://ciac.llnl.gov/ciac/CIACHoaxes.html>here</a> : : * Symantec Anti Virus Research Center at : <a : href=http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/index.html>here</a> : : * McAfee Associates Virus Hoax List at : <a href=http://www.mcafee.com/support/hoax.html>here</a> : : * Dr. Solomons Hoax Page at : <a : href=http://www.drsolomons.com/vircen/hoax.html>here</a> : : * The Urban Legends Web Site at : <a href=http://www.urbanlegends.com>here</a> : : * Urban Legends Reference Pages at : <a href=http://www.snopes.com>here</a> : : * Datafellows Hoax Warnings at : <a : href=http://www.Europe.Datafellows.com/news/hoax.htm>here</a> : : Those people who are still symptom free can help inoculate themselves : against the Gullibility Virus by reading some good material on : evaluating sources, such as : : * Evaluating Internet Research Sources at : <a : href=http://www.sccu.edu/faculty/R_Harris/evalu8it.htm>here</a> : : * Evaluation of Information Sources at : <a : href=http://www.vuw.ac.nz/~agsmith/evaln/evaln.htm>here</a> : : * Bibliography on Evaluating Internet Resources at : <a : href=http://refserver.lib.vt.edu/libinst/critTHINK.HTM>here</a> : : Lastly, as a public service, Internet users can help stamp out the : Gullibility Virus by sending copies of this message to anyone who : forwards them a hoax. : : ******************************************************************* : : This message is so important, we're sending it anonymously! Forward : it to all your friends right away! Don't think about it! This is not : a chain letter! This story is true! Don't check it out! This story : is so timely, there is no date on it! This story is so important, : we're using lots of exclamation points! For every message you forward : to some unsuspecting person, the Home for the Hopelessly Gullible will : donate ten cents to itself. (If you wonder how the Home will know you : are forwarding these messages all over creation, you're obviously : thinking too much.) : : ***************************************************************** : ACT NOW! DON'T DELAY! LIMITED TIME! NOT SOLD IN ANY STORE : ***************************************************************** : : : : ______________________________________________________ : Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com :

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Re: [RePol] Denizen
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rabid Wombat sayeth: >Harrasment of Dr. Grubor will be a demonstration sport during the next >Olympic Winter Games. Ah, another easy gold for the U.S. Would the people who had him disbarred be allowed to compete, or are they considered "professionals" in this event? GruborMonger

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launch memes
by Zooko Journeyman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Cypherpunks reject politics. They know that it is unnecessary, counter-productive, and wrong. Terrorism and violent confrontation are the ultimate form of politics. ------- Cypherpunks don't fixate on their enemies, real or imagined. Reactionary Christians do. Reactionary Muslims do. Wacko leftists do. Wacko rightists do. In fact, probably every penny-ante cult and fringe political movement does. Perhaps it makes it easier to avoid doubt by thinking and feeling about your enemies (real or imagined) in order to keep from thinking about your self. But cypherpunks don't fixate on their enemies. They have more important things to worry about. ------- Cypherpunks think strategically. Cypherpunks act strategically. -------

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Minsky skeptical of privacy
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bob Hettinga wrote that Marvin Minsky wrote: >>There's always a plausible reason that can be used to override >>whatever privacy policies and safeguards are designed into such a >>system. > >If the reasons really are plausible, then those overrides should be >added to the system design. There is a curious belief implicit in this statement. Nobody wants a backdoor in their own privacy. This means that the overrides will have to be mandated by law. Thus, what Minsky is arguing against is the right of people to protect their own privacy. >Perhaps, instead, we should try to design tracking systems that >include public review mechanisms -- so that whenever anyone (e.g., >your employer) accesses your record against the privacy policy, >they'll be subject to legal sanctions and damages. It is possible that Minsky is unaware of how ineffective these sorts of laws are. Today we have many laws regarding financial secrecy and the like. However, there are people who are able to get this sort of information fairly routinely. These people tend not to be poor. They tend to be close to employers. The tend not to advertise what they do. Not to mention the fact that legal systems and governments can flip into bad modes where they exploit the authority with which they have been entrusted. It is somewhat naive to claim that any government is not prone to this and that it hasn't happened repeatedly throughout all of human history. >Ed Fredkin once asked a number of people how they would feel about a >new device with which you could select almost anyone in the world, >and make the device produce a loud noise near them. They all >objected angrily. Then Ed said, "It already exists. It's called the >telephone." This is a cute line and I'm sure it was a hit with the crowd, but telephones are a major problem. We can tell how much illegal wiretapping is going on by the which authorities by how loudly they scream when people - people who have not been tried or convicted of any crime! - start encrypting their conversations. Incidentally, does anybody know what percentage of the research funding Marvin Minsky has used in his career was directly or indirectly related to the defense establishment? The interesting thing about the privacy "debate" is that there is an exceptionally high correlation between opposition to privacy and the consumption of public money. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm Subject: Minsky skeptical of privacy To: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com 16A5942B6EED349ECF4594C784DFD177 [Cantsin Protocol No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Re: Freemen and Serfs
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This model of "sheeple" doomed to slavery while cypherpunks comfortably live independent of the state is even less plausible than the original idea of crypto anarchy. It appeals to our elitist instincts and makes us feel comfortably superior, but it has little connection to reality. This idea overlooks the "fax effect", where the value of a technology rises in proportion to the number of people who use it. Cypherpunks will have to set up a virtual Galt's Gulch, trading only with themselves, and unlike in Rand's fantasy the limitations of such an economy will soon be apparent. Early cypherpunk experiments like "Magic Money" showed how pointless a virtual cypherpunk bank would be. Cypherpunk technologies create a protected boundary within which transactions can be conducted free of third party surveillance and tampering. Only by extending this secure boundary to include the masses will there be enough value generated within the secure region to be worthwhile. Cypherpunks who can only trade and work for each other will not be able to generate sufficient economic growth to survive. In an increasingly interdependent world economy, the only hope for cypherpunk technologies to succeed is to extend them as far as possible throughout society. This includes reaching out to foreigners and minorities, to the dismay of some cypherpunks. We must oppose the elitism and racism which some list members cling to, replacing it with inclusion and openness to members of other cultures. Making fun of foreign accents and calling for the deaths of innocents does not move us toward our goals.

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Defense of the Homeland
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The National Defense Panel is to release its study tomorrow, "Defense of the Homeland," which recommends that Defense focus on domestic protection from weapons of mass destruction: http://jya.com/ndp-wmd.htm In line with this, and Tim's NBC prognostications, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Emergency Prepareness has a new Web site which describes its domestic counter terrorism program: http://www.oep_ndms.dhhs.gov/oep/terrorism/terrorism.html These tidbits derive from the new list "Terrorism-L," which offers terrifying scenarios for apocalypse by friend and foe and voodoo doll, and survivalist tips for first responders: "There's nothing we could do." To subscribe, send E-mail to listserv(a)mediccom.org with the following text in the message body: SUBSCRIBE terrorism

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Re: Minsky skeptical of privacy
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Monty Cantsin wrote: >Incidentally, does anybody know what percentage of the research >funding Marvin Minsky has used in his career was directly or >indirectly related to the defense establishment? > >The interesting thing about the privacy "debate" is that there is an >exceptionally high correlation between opposition to privacy and the >consumption of public money. Monty's customary reasonableness goes bizarro with these statements. In that direct or indirect defense funding implicates just about every US citizen, even world denizen, not holed up in a treetop for the last half century of national security octopussing. This is not to say that that's the way it should be, just that defense funding has been the deep pocket for nearly every commonweal at least since WW II. And the same for the future appears to hold true as every federal state and local government eagerly calibrate their demands for urgent aid according to national and economic security guidelines -- dual use brought into the open as heretofore hidden by duplicity. Under national security programs DoD has funded through its pervasive tentacles scientists and mathematicians, libertarians and socialists, elite and trailer trash, Wall Street and underworld, on and on. Not a chance of stopping it any time soon. It is doubtful that any other more bountiful and widespread source of condoned bribery has ever existed, and it shows no sign of slackening, in the US or elsewhere, whether democracies, oligarchies, communist, or offshore outlaw, even allowing for the burgeoning private armies, cops, gun faith forces, each loading up with new and "surplus" arms. Curiously, when the details of how it all works is pointed out, no one seems to be bothered by it, except to comlain that others are getting too much, to wheelle more leads on how to leverage more for their affinity gang, and, to conceal sly avarice, to blame the competition for cheating better. So, Monty, for comparing to Minsky's well-known federal work at MIT, as with many here, how about demonstrating the correlation of your work with inescapable defense funding complicity?

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RC5-56 and 2048 Bit Keys
by cvhd＠indyweb.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

With the RC5-56 having been busted, I was wondering what the going estimated crack time was for a 2048 bit RC5 key like the one available with SecureWIN? TIA

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Re: how's it going?
by nimark＠mailexcite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Pasting in From:
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

gburnore(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > : Presently, cracker (and some other remailers) do not allow pasting in a > : From: header. As I have stated before, the purpose of an anonymous > : remailer is to be anonymous, so pasting in a From: seems contradictory. > : However, as has been pointed out, a lot of people like to do it to avoid > : sending through nymservers, or at least psuedo-identify themselves. > : > : So, I propose a compromise: What if I enable pasting of From:, but if a > : From: header is pasted in, a short disclaimer is added to the beginning of > : the body of the message. Would that mess anyone up? I think this would be > : sufficient to avoid most problems with "forging". > > Not a good thing. If you allow a valid address to be in the from line, the > results (regardless of the inside of the message) will be UCE baiting. > Posting a message to an mlm type group with someone elses' name in the from > line. The address cullers would not read the post to know the address was > false. > > A better comprimise would be to allow the From line to be altered but not to > form a valid email address. Like name <at> site <dot> com. > > At least make sure it doesn't allow the from line to be modified to a name in > your blocked list. Maybe when other ISPs, like Netcom where Mr. Burnore is posting from, impose similar restrictions it might make sense to implement them at the remailers as well. (Remailers might well be considered the ISP of last resort for those who consider the risks of posting controversial ideas from a traceable address to be an intolerable risk.) Remailer users should not be considered second class citizens, nor have their capabilities (such as header pasting) crippled to appease anyone who makes a demand. Right now, Netcom users can and do have the capability to put just about anything in the From: line (or other header lines) of their usenet posts. Presumably if that capability were such an open invitation to "forgery", Netcom would either have disabled it or Mr. Burnore would have cancelled his Netcom account in protest. Why single out the remailers? Andy Dustman's suggestions seem quite reasonable. When something is loaded with disclaimers that the identity of the author has not been authenticated, then it's not "forgery" -- not anymore than when celebrity impersonators on Saturday Night Live are engaging in "fraud" for pretending to be President Clinton, etc. If Gary Burnore is so concerned about "forgery", maybe he ought to start using that PGP key he keeps advertising in his .sig to actually sign his posts. Unless he does, he's still vulnerable to forgery from his fellow Netcom users who are still allowed to insert arbitrary From: lines in their Usenet posts. Actually, forging a post with Gary Burnore's name and address in the From: line can be much more convincingly (no disclaimers) done from a throwaway Netcruiser account, and with less effort than learning the proper protocol to do it through a remailer. Munging of addresses is better left to the discretion of the poster. Let those who perceive a need for this "capability" use it. At least one of the mail2news gateways implements that as an option for those desiring it. I'm in favor of leaving that choice with the poster. Mr. Burnore made a similar "forgery" complaint here several months ago and was advised to PGP sign his posts and request source-level blocking if he perceived forgery to be a problem. He has evidently not taken the trouble to implement the first suggestion and, assuming he took the second suggestion, he's posted no evidence to suggest that it's not been effective.

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Re: Death Penalty Expanded
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green wrote: >On a completely unrelated note, is there some interest in starting up >a "Cypherpunks Nuclear Physics Study Group"? I recently finished >reading "The Curve of Binding Energy". Fascinating book. How dare you inquire into the nature of physical reality! Officer, please arrest that man. ;-) Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm Subject: Re: Death Penalty Expanded To: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com 16A5942B6EED349ECF4594C784DFD177 [Cantsin Protocol No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Re: Quoting Portions of a Signed Document
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to everybody for their interesting contributions to the partial signature problem. Anonymous <anon(a)anon.efga.org> writes: >A more general approach calculates the document hash in a line >oriented way. Normally we start at the top and work down through the >document to get the hash, which is signed. Instead, we would >calculate a hash for each line of the document separately, and then >combine them using a tree. This approach looks like the best to me. It's a bit cumbersome for the person doing the quoting, but that's as it should be. Brian B. Riley writes: > I haven't been follwing this thread that closely, but skimming mch >of it and then rereading this whole post, I must concur that the >context issue renders much of the discussion moot unless you can not >only relate individual sub-blocks to the whole message it came from >in the proper order ... it seems to me we are right back where we >started, quoting referenced message(s) in entirety. > > It occurrs to me that if an issue is important enough that the >veracity and autheticity of a given passage is that critical, >including entire messages is of trivial concern. Now it could be >handled by the discussion participant quoting out of context and >'footnoting' his quote with a message ID. The message corresponding >to that ID has its entire text is signed and publicly stored and >accessible. If it needs to be checked then go check it, if not take >it on faith and read on. It's easy to see why we would want other people to sign with signatures which enable partial quoting, but it's less clear why we would sign our own messages this way. For instance, somebody might want to quote my private e-mail out of context where I say "Yes, I'm real glad I got rid of that guy. He was really a pest." But they might not want to quote the part of the message where I say "Thanks for the latest shipment of plastic explosives." In order to authenticate their claim they have to reveal the entire message. If they must quote the entire message for authentication, it will discourage tacky behavior such as relaying private messages. So, this is sort of a solution looking for an application. It seems like an interesting problem and I have a strong intuitive sense that a use for it will present itself at some point. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm Subject: Re: Quoting Portions of a Signed Document To: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com 16A5942B6EED349ECF4594C784DFD177 [Cantsin Protocol No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Re: Happy Thanksgiving and the Impending Murder of Usenet
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Russ Allbery <rra(a)stanford.edu> writes: > > So why doesn't he? For the same reason I often eat out even though I'm a > > pretty good cook - I know how to do it, but my time can be better spent > > doing something creative. Re-coding exploits for well-known holes, for > > which a dozen explots already exists, is not creative. > > Amen. Russ hees and haws; just a couple of days ago he was whining how we shouldn't publish exploits because users should be forced to write their own exploits. > > Russ clearly believes in "security by obscurity", so heinvents bogus > > arguments to waste everyone's time. > > Russ does? There are some forms of "security via obscurity" that actually > work or which have some benefit (hell, password systems are just security > via obscurity at their core), but no, I don't believe in it as a general > principle. That's from the same bootlixcking Cabal lackey who was whining and begging me not to release my cancelbot. [rfc 1036 rewrite] > > (The main purpose of the rewrite, by the way, is to incorporate some > > "anti-spam" language, and to remove the embarassing prohibition against > > forged cancels.) > > Actually, the main purpose looks more to be to roll in a bunch of headers > that had been in informal use, clarify a bunch of the language, resolve > differences between the mail and news formats, and so forth. Brad's > pushing hard for a variety of authentication measures, including an > authenticated Path header, and X-Auth will likely be rolled in in some > form. Bullshit. I'm on the list, I see the traffic, and all the whining about "spam" coming from the wannabe content censors. > > One Good Thing that might come out of masive attacks is the switch to > > IPv6. > > Maybe. That'll be a really hard one to get going. But it would actually make the net better in many ways. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Pasting in From:
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

no(a)no.spam (®Old Crab®) wrote: > >Andy Dustman wrote on Sun, 30 Nov 1997 14:03:39 -0500: > > > >>So, I propose a compromise: What if I enable pasting of From:, but if a > >>From: header is pasted in, a short disclaimer is added to the beginning of > >>the body of the message. Would that mess anyone up? I think this would be > >>sufficient to avoid most problems with "forging". > > > >Can't put the disclaimer in a Comments: header? > > Why make a test ??? > Put the disclaimer *every_time*. > People who want to authenticate their nym account have the thing > signed by the nym-server... > That if you consider that it is not *obvious* to everybody > that the "From:" from a remailer might be fake... > That BTW *any* "From:", from remailer or from anywhere; > might be fake... > Only PGP or such allows to be easily sure of the sender..... That's absolutely correct. That disclaimer should be implicit with EVERY post. Attaching it to anonymous posts, while technically correct, gives the false implication that posts without such disclaimers should be presumed to be genuine. That's a dangerous assumption. Anyone who wants to post an article with a phony From: address can do it far easier with a throwaway ISP account and news posting software that can be configured with an arbitrary From: address than going to the trouble of doing it through a remailer. Could it be that the enemies of privacy and freedom, if they can't ban anonymous posting altogether (at least not right now), would like to make sure that anonymous posts are stigmatized with the cyber equivalent of a yellow star? If some control freaks are to be believed, the only people who post anonymously are either "abusers", "cowards", or otherwise have sinister motives for not promiscuously broadcasting their names and addresses worldwide with every post. My theory is that what really galls them is that the precursor to the U.S. Constitution which guarantees freedom of speech (including anonymous speech) was the ANONYMOUSLY PUBLISHED "Federalist Papers", and they want to make sure it doesn't happen again. <g> > That *everybody* knows that should be controlled > when one getting a Usenet licenceá :-)) Don't give the Usenet control freaks any ideas! <g>

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Re: Digital Signatures
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Monty Cantsin writes: > You can't see it up here, but this is a signed message using a > protocol which is modestly titled "Cantsin Protocol No. 1". > Suggestions for improvement are most welcome. A very interesting idea! Please consider the following suggestions if you like, or feel free to ignore them. One problem with signatures which have no indication at the top is that two passes over the data are necessary: the first to scan and find the start-of-signature indicator, and another to go back and calculate the hash. Signatures such as S/MIME and PGP have enough information at the top of the signed message to allow one pass processing. > The first line is "16A5942B6EED349ECF4594C784DFD177 [Cantsin Protocol > No. 1]". The hexadecimal number was chosen randomly and is the > indicator that this is a Cantsin Protocol No. 1 signature. The number > was chosen randomly and it is somewhat unlikely that anybody else will > accidently choose it. You might want to think about what happens if the document itself contains (maliciously, or perhaps because it is talking about your signatures) the string in question (as yours does and this one does as well). This could throw off an automated signature checker. > The second line in the signature is an SHA1 hash of the public key. > The hash is computed on the concatenation of the hexadecimal ASCII > forms of p, g, and y respectively. There should be no leading zeros. > (Remember to leave off the newline!) Presumably you could use the key hash to look up the key to use for verifying the message. This has a mild denial of service attack. Someone else could create a key with different boundaries between p, g, and y but which would create the same string as this concatenation, and therefore the same hash. If you left the "p: ", "g: ", and "y: " in place it would prevent this. PGP's key fingerprints have had the same problem. > The fourth line contains an offset and a length to specify the area of > the text which is signed. The offset is relative to the signature > itself. That is, the first character of the Cantsin Protocol No. 1 > code is at position 0. As signatures are usually appended, the offset > will usually be the additive inverse of the length. It is intriguing that this can be used to sign a subset of the text. Presumably there could be multiple signature blocks each of which signed different subsets, possibly with different keys. One problem is that it is not obvious to the human reader what part of the text is signed. A nice effect with PGP and S/MIME signatures is that even readers who don't have the tools can have some slight confidence in signatures, because other readers will often report it when signatures don't verify. With a signature that only covers a portion of the text, people might assume that if there are no reports of failure, more of the text is signed than is the case. This is not a technical problem but is a social phenomenon which may not interact well with this signature format. You need to specify a canonical line ending format. Based on the count values in your document, it appears that you are counting line terminators as being one character long. Your count value of 1CB9 corresponds to decimal 7353, there are exactly 7353 characters from the first character of your message body to the beginning of your signature magic number, if line ends are one character. The specific characters for line endings need to be specified as well for the hash to be calculated consistently. Your hash appears to be calculated with LF as the line ending (although the hash program is broken, see below). Probably CR/LF would be preferable for the line endings as that is a widely used internet standard as well as being common on windows. > You also need to be able to compute SHA1 hashes. I've been using > something called "sha1file" which, I believe, originated at Adam > Back's web site. That program has a bug. The routine SHA1_update in the file sha1.c is missing a line: while ( ctx->mlen == 64 ) { convert_to_bigendian( (word32*)ctx->M, 64 ); SHA1_transform( ctx ); use = min( 64, data_len ); memcpy( ctx->M, data, use ); ctx->mlen = use; data_len -= use; *** data += use; *** MISSING *** } Correcting this will make your hashes be correct. > El Gamal is simple enough that the signature on this message can be > checked using standard Unix tools such as dc version 1.1. Let's say M > is the SHA1 hash of the message. It is checked by verifying the truth > of this equation: (y^a * a^b) mod p = g^M mod p. El Gamal is a rather lengthy signature, although the verification equation is relatively simple. DSS has a shorter signature. If you report not r,s, but rather r,w where w is the inverse of s mod q, then the verification is: r = g^(M*w) * y^(r*w) mod p mod q. It's not really much more complicated. There are some subtleties to choosing El Gamal keys, but with the 2048 bit values you have chosen you are pretty safe. You want to make sure that the generator g doesn't generate a small subgroup; to do this you need to look at the factors of p-1. Your p-1 has several small prime factors: 0x2^3, 0x3, 0x6b, 0x16f, 0x1f79b, 0x3533a1eb3. Beyond that is a 1978 bit composite which I can't factor. Chances are very high that a random g will generate a group of size which is a multiple of a large prime factor of this large composite value, so it is strong, although not quite 2048 bits strong. Also, you can't really justify using 2048 bit keys when your hash is only 160 bits. The hash becomes the weak link for keys beyond about 1024 bits, and unless you use a stronger hash your key strength is misleading. This is why DSS is only specified up to 1024 bits. -- A hasher to be named later --

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Re: Pasting in From:
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> : So, I propose a compromise: What if I enable pasting of From:, >> : but if a From: header is pasted in, a short disclaimer is a >> : added to the beginning of the body of the message. >> : Would that mess anyone up? I think this would be >> : sufficient to avoid most problems with "forging". News and email are two separate cases. For news, there's almost no reason for a poster who wants his real name and address in a message to use an anonymous remailer; maybe something like posting with your Juno email on the message rather than your work email. But you can put your real email address in the message body if you want to do that, so not having that feature in a remailer is no restriction on the legitimate user. There are lots of reasons to forge someone else's name :-) So if the remailers don't support From: pasting, it's no loss. Similarly, for Reply-To: and Sender: and Path: and Received: and maybe a few other occasionally-forged header fields. Adding a disclaimer to the beginning of the message is no problem; adding it to the headers is useless, since almost nobody reads them, especially the kind of shoot-from-the-hip flamers you want to avoid. For email, perhaps you don't want the address to be visible during the first few hops in an encrypted remailer path, but you do still want one of your addresses to be there for the recipient. Again, you can put it in the message body yourself. There's a little less risk of pasting in headers on mail to individuals, but forged mail to mailing lists and mail2news relays is still a problem, and you definitely can't expect remailers to recognize mailing lists. There are also minor problems, like forging the From: address on mail to president(a)whitehouse.gov, which are better avoided this way even if you do also add disclaimers. Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com Regular Key PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639

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Nuclear Physics Study Group
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green <shamrock(a)cypherpunks.to>: > On a completely unrelated note, is there some interest in starting up a > "Cypherpunks Nuclear Physics Study Group"? I recently finished reading > "The Curve of Binding Energy". Fascinating book. Is this really unrelated or does it represent growing ambition by the cypherpunks shooting club ? Will you be asking for anonymous donations of SNM ? I could be interested, but not in the manner of the above 2 sentences. A Nym To Be Generated Later

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Re: Pasting in From:
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) wrote: > > From: Andy Dustman <andy(a)neptune.chem.uga.edu> > > Newsgroups: alt.privacy.anon-server > > Subject: Pasting in From: > > Date: Sunday, November 30, 1997 8:03 PM > > [ ... ] > > > So, I propose a compromise: What if I enable pasting of From:, but if a > > From: header is pasted in, a short disclaimer is added to the beginning > of > > the body of the message. Would that mess anyone up? I think this would be > > sufficient to avoid most problems with "forging". > > What are the advantages of pasting a From: above pasting a Reply-To: ? For one thing, many newsreaders list messages by From: and Subject: line. By putting in a distinctive From: line, your posts will be identifiable without readers having to download and read each message body. By pasting in a From: header, an anonymous poster can thus make his posts recognizeable. Pasting in a Reply-To doesn't accomplish the same thing. In essence, pasting enables one to adopt a non-replyable pseudonym. Why burden the 'nym servers if the poster doesn't want e-mail replies to his posts? The alternative suggestion of posting from a replyable 'nym address does not really address the issue. If one wants to post with a From: address of "santaclaus(a)northpole.gov", why should a remailer make that any more difficult than doing it from a non-anonymous ISP? (If "jolly ol' St. Nick" is worried about his e-mail address being forged, he can always request source blocking.)

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