December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Apple crypto engineer position available
by Mark Altenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 4/14/98, Robert Hettinga blathered on like this: >...Hint 1: Whatsisname Sidhu, > >who negotiated the world's first RSA license, and who probably could have >invented digital commerce on the internet all by himself if he only knew >what he had, already bought and paid for, wasted in a mail and LAN >protocol, buried in the bowels of the MacOS... >...Anyway, a more clueful Sidhu, (who, to be fair, couldn't have understood >what was coming) could have, with just a little of the right prompting :-), >taken some of the money you guys gave to, say, Steve, for instance :-), and >bought the blind signature patent at firesale prices from DigiCash ($10 >million is chump change, even to Apple, even then, :-)) at last year's >greater-fools exchange of ownership at "the world's greatest financial >cryptography company" (my name, not theirs).... > Quite amazing to look at all of the innovation that went on at Apple and wonder what could have been. From my perspective, the big mistake with Apple's first implementation of crypto was that it was part of an architecture (yep, PowerTalk). After close encounters with this and other wonderfully "flexible architectures", I've learned (the hard way) that this is one of the best oxymorons in computerdom. Architectures seem like wonderful, grandiose ways to solve a bunch of problems at once, but they usually lead a Titanic-like existence, eventually sinking into the abyss and taking almost everything with it, including products, businesses, reputations - you name it. Well, an amazing thing happened. Just before PowerTalk started taking on serious water, someone managed to throw DigiSign (Apple's digital signature technology based on RSA public keys) into its own life boat; Apple actually built a separate library for DigiSign that didn't require PowerTalk. But, unfortunately, there was leak in this boat, too. You see, the model for DigiSign's certificates was based on a heirarchy and required a certificate authority and all of the requisite infrastructure. No one had really done this yet so Apple had to do more than create DigiSign and put it into the Mac OS - they had to get this infrastructure in place, too. Now, even though Apple had the help of RSA and BBN, there was this even bigger problem of just helping people get it. The best way to help people understand technology is to make it accessible so almost anyone can play with it and use it. This is what Apple is known for - making technology so accessible that people just go nuts, doing things with it and taking it places no one ever dreamed. That's how Apple catalyzed the transformation of the publishing industry. Requiring a CA to make DigiSign work simply made this impossible. A peer to peer model, allowing people to create and sign their own certificates would have been far more appropriate for Apple's creative users. Then came PGP... C 'est la vie! Mark ---- mark(a)altenberg.com

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Re: Gary L. Burnore, Registered Sex Offender in Raleigh, NC
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

beep(a)ix.netcom.com (Pamela Gross) wrote: > >You're conveniently omitting a few details. He's not just "accused", but > >he was CONVICTED. His right to privacy went away when he committed a crime > >and was PUBLICLY tried and convicted by a court in Santa Clara, CA. That > >conviction is a public record, just like Ron Guilmette's tax lien that > > Is this who you are? > > What exactly is a tax lien? Why did Gary post yours? Were you having > a fight of some kind? Actually Gary Burnore's original beef was with an anonymous whistleblower who notified the victim's mother and school officials of Gary's pedophelia before he was ever arrested for it. (How would a mere troublemaker out to allegedly "harass" poor Gary have even known about Gary's sexual exploits before they became public? And how would he/she have known the identity of the victim which is still non-public information?) Back then he was accusing the poster of "libelling" him and "harassing" the victim. The situation only became public when Gary chose to publicly accuse an anonymous usenet poster of being the same person who had sent the private e-mails which tipped off the victim's mother and high school principal. Unable to track down the whistleblower and subject him/her to the typical DataBasix sort of harassment, he attacked the remailer that was being used, instead. See: http://infinity.nus.edu.sg/cypherpunks/dir.97.11.13-97.11.19/msg00432.html And, yes, one of Gary's forms of harassment against another person was to dig up a 10 year old tax lien on the individual and post it to usenet in an attempt to embarass him and intimidate him into silence with the threat "there more where that came from". See: http://infinity.nus.edu.sg/cypherpunks/dir.97.11.13-97.11.19/msg00424.html When the victim's mother evicted Gary Burnore from her home and eventually advertised for a new roomate in the ba.market.housing NG back on 5/8/97, someone made a followup remark on 6/5/97 which said: "XXXXX finally booted her pedophile boyfriend, Gary L. Burnore, out of the house! Last I heard, he was high tailing it for Raleigh, NC." Note that this was well before Gary ever registered as a sex offender in NC. Gary, never able to able to leave well enough alone, just had to follow up on the post, even though he has wisely chosen to have DejaNews delete his reply. I'm wondering if Gary is worried that someone will expose the fact that his girlfriend with whom he was living and sleeping and whose daughter he molested was also a high-ranking official at a public television station which did business with Gary L. Burnore's company DataBasix. Was that conflict of interest ever disclosed? And since this is the same Gary Lee Burnore who used to confidently declare "I have nothing to hide", I guess it was assumed he wouldn't mind if the truth about him and his sexual quirks were revealed using publicly-available records posted on a public website by the state of North Carolina. And, no, I'm not any of the individuals named above. Careful, Gary. False accusations of libel might just motivate some people to prove that the allegedly libellous statement were, in fact, true. You apparently bluffed and lost.

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RE: Apple crypto engineer position available
by Pablo Calamera 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bob, In general I agree with your points however your historical perspective on Apple Crypto is far from complete. You forgot to mention that while Apple was flailing there where key people who actually did crypto work and managed to ship great products inspite of Apple. Those same people tirelessly tried to evangelize/evolve the technology within Apple to no avail. We're talking pre-Vinnie and pre-Jon here. And in Gursharan Sidhu's defense, he knew exactly what he had when we got the RSA license! Pablo Calamera Security Architect WebTV Networks, Inc. voice: 650-614-2749 fax: 650-614-6442 -----Original Message----- From: mac-crypto(a)vmeng.com [mailto:mac-crypto@vmeng.com]On Behalf Of Robert Hettinga Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 1998 7:00 PM To: Mac-crypto(a)vmeng.com; net-thinkers(a)vmeng.com; cypherpunks(a)toad.com; cryptography(a)c2.net; dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Subject: Re: Apple crypto engineer position available Please note, this is *not* a flame. I'm not getting even *slightly* warm, here... :-). At 6:20 PM -0400 on 4/14/98, Somebody, Waay Up There at Apple, wrote to me, offline: > I don't get it. Yup. The old irony meter is pegged, alright... :-). > >At 12:00 PM -0400 on 4/14/98, Mike Barnick wrote: > > > > > >> Apple is looking for a senior engineer to work on providing cryptographic > >>APIs on the operating system. > > > >:-). > > > >I see the law of conservation of irony still holds... > > > >Cheers, > >Bob Hettinga Tell ya what, Somebody, I'll give you three hints: Hint 1: Whatsisname Sidhu, who negotiated the world's first RSA license, and who probably could have invented digital commerce on the internet all by himself if he only knew what he had, already bought and paid for, wasted in a mail and LAN protocol, buried in the bowels of the MacOS. We still haven't seen what's in that RSA license to Apple, but, given RSA's financial straits at the time the license was issued, I bet it reads more of a pornographic act than a legal agreement. :-). I for one would be interested how transferrable it *still* is. Like, if Apple builds a Mac crypto toolbox, does that mean that anyone writing code using the crypto toolbox has a license to use the algorithms therein? I bet so, but the world will never know. The technology, (RSA, anyway) has a countdown clock on it now, so it's almost moot. Don't even get me started on ECC, which is, of course, marvellous, but equally squandered. Anyway, a more clueful Sidhu, (who, to be fair, couldn't have understood what was coming) could have, with just a little of the right prompting :-), taken some of the money you guys gave to, say, Steve, for instance :-), and bought the blind signature patent at firesale prices from DigiCash ($10 million is chump change, even to Apple, even then, :-)) at last year's greater-fools exchange of ownership at "the world's greatest financial cryptography company" (my name, not theirs). Heck, if Apple had bought DigiCash outright, and just *fired* everybody, and only used the *technology* (kind of dumb to fire David Chaum, but, hey, it's my limb, and I'm not coming off of it), Apple could have put blind signatures into that Macintosh crypto tool box, and the world really *would* think differently. :-). That's because, someday sooner than most people think, all these cryptographic functions, particularly the financial crypto functions like blind signatures, and probably even something like MicroMint, will be buried deep in every operating system. Apple could have had crypto for the rest of us, same as it ever was, way ahead of schedule, same as they always do. But, no, they fired Sidhu, instead. Causing his whole staff, and every crypto-clueful person at Apple, to quit in disgust. :-). What's funny is, Apple *still* has this enormous competitive advantage if they still want it. Because, even though they're goliath, Microsoft can't do crypto very well right now. They've got this homunculus called the Justice Department's antitrust division sitting on their sholder, and they don't want to do anything to upset Dammit Janet. (I immediately have this ludicrous picture my head of Ms. Reno in wet underware, with Riff Raff [Carville, right?] leering at her.) Not to mention the Wrath of the Whole Rest of the Computer Business, voted through their pocketbooks on capital hill. ;-). Actually, Microsoft's trying to do strong crypto anyway, bless their hearts, but they're not going to do it for long, given all the flying monkeys headed in their general direction. Fortunately, compared to the antitrust division and their minions, the FBI is a mere gnat's fart, believe it or not. That's because, to torture dear Mr. Wolfe, "no Buck Rogers, no bucks": Digital Commerce *is* Financial Cryptography, and all that. So, all it really takes from Apple to have this huge advantage, crypto-wise, is for it to have more cajones than grey matter, which, unfortunately, is exactly the inverse problem at 1 Infinite Loop, the last I looked. Apple being a founding signatory to the Key Recovery Alliance Program is a marvellous example of that. Look, it's a complement, okay? You're *smart*, right? You just have no --, well, anyway, on to the next hint... Hint 2: Jon Callas, who was not only CTO for PGP, but, through being both clueful and at the right place the right time, ended up CTO for all of Network Associates. NA is now (or will be soon, after the TIS merger's done) the 900-lb cryptogorilla nobody's supposed to think about, but can't get out of their minds. Of course, this is the same Jon Callas who used to work for the aforementioned Sidhu, and who, for fun one day, thought up a really *really* spiffy, rock-solid way to extract real live entropy from the normal operation of any Macintosh. And I don't mean memory conflicts either. :-) What? What's entropy? Hmmm... Well, there's this book you can read, it's called "Applied Cryptography". It's by a former Mac maven named Bruce Schneier. You might want to look it up there. Entropy, of course, brings me to the the final hint, Hint 3: Vinnie Moscaritolo, the guy whose name is written all over Apple's new job discription for a crypto engineer. The guy who now works for Jon over at PGP-now-NA. Vinnie, who, while he was at Apple Developer Technical Support last year, asked you guys to set up a crypto engineering department, not to mention a crypto toolbox, not to mention a crypto API. Who left in disgust shortly after the aforementioned Sidhu, but not because you fired Sidhu, because, in typical Vinnie fashion, he practically venerated Sidhu's clueness about commerce, because Vinnie saw it as an opportunity (Marines are wierd that way). :-). Who is probably making waay too much money to come back now, and who would have probably taken a pay *cut*, even at *DTS* salaries, to do the job had you offered it to him even a year ago. Ironic, isn't it? In the final bit of irony, Somebody Else, in Apple Evangelism at the time, who was not even especially crypto-clueful back then, and who will also remain nameless :-), once bandied about the idea of an actual crypto *evangelist* at Apple. Maybe even a digital commerce evangelist, who, of course, would be one and the same (digital commerce being financial cryptography and all). The irony there is that said evangelist, if hired, would end up spending all his time evangelizing *Apple*, and not the developer community, who of course, are clueful and don't need evangelizing about such things. Such are things at the new Apple, I guess. Of course, Somebody Else also doesn't work at Apple anymore either. He works in, you guessed it, another financial cryptography company. I even yelled at him about his antics at Apple, even though he's not there anymore, while we were at the Hansa Bank party at Serenity during FC98 on Anguilla this year. :-). Now, what I said *then* was a flame, you better believe it, because back *then*, when Somebody Else was at Apple, it cost me actual money. This time, with you, Somebody, it's free of charge, and so I'm not nearly so worked up. Cheers, Bob Hettinga PS. To save you the cost of a white paper, Somebody, or maybe you can just pay us for it, already :-), go look at "Digital Commerce for the Rest of Us", a longish rant Vinnie and I wrote almost two years ago. For some strange reason, it's still pretty current. ;-). It's at <http://www.shipwright.com/rants/rant_15.html> Raines Cohen actually moshed it a bit and stuck it into the inaugural issue of NetProfessional magazine, god rest it's soul, so you might have seen some of it there as well. ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Cylink Corporation to Submit SAFER+
by David Honig 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.newspage.com/cgi-bin/NA.GetStory?story=b0414070.403&date=19980415 &level1=46545&level2=46549&level3=626 Cylink Corporation to Submit SAFER+ Algorithm to the National Institute of Standards and Technology April 15, 1998 SUNNYVALE, Calif.--(BUSINESS WIRE) via NewsEdge Corporation -- Non-Proprietary, Royalty-Free Algorithm will be Evaluated as a Replacement for Current Data Encryption Standard Demonstrating once again its commitment to deliver freely available encryption technology to the market, Cylink Corporation (NASDAQ:CYLK), a pioneer in commercial cryptography, today announces it plans to submit the SAFER+ algorithm to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST is reviewing encryption algorithms that will replace the current Data Encryption Standard (DES) which has been used for more than 20 years. The new standard is called AES, or Advanced Encryption Standard. The evaluation will take approximately two years. SAFER+ is a royalty-free, non-proprietary encryption algorithm. Developed by world-class and world-wide cryptographers, SAFER+ is an enhancement of SAFER, which was first published in 1993. Since then, SAFER survived the scrutiny of many of the world's top cryptographers. Built on the proven track record of SAFER, SAFER+ is designed to meet the next generation of security requirements. Cylink estimates SAFER+ to be five times faster than DES, and ten times faster than Triple-DES. "Once again, Cylink is delighted to offer break-through technology to NIST and the information security community," said Chuck Williams, chief scientist at Cylink. "SAFER+ is the most recent example of our legacy of pioneering the use of cryptography in practical business solutions, including public key, SAFER, triple-DES, key recovery." SAFER was originally developed by Professor James Massey, a Cylink founder, and funded by Cylink. SAFER+ was sponsored by Cylink and jointly developed by Massey and Dr. Lily Chen, chief cryptographer at Cylink Corporation. Cylink is recognized as a pioneer in commercial cryptography since its commercial implementation of Diffie-Hellman public key management in 1984. It has: -- Developed the first public key management co-processor application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) for public key management acceleration; -- Brought to market the first triple DES (data encryption standard) encryption algorithm ASIC, and the first high-speed triple DES encryptor. -- Introduced several new products including a certificate-based access control system, a certificate-based LAN security system, and the world's first asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) cell encryptor. About Cylink and Algorithmic Research Cylink Corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, Algorithmic Research, are leading providers of encryption-based network security solutions. Their products enable the secure transmission of data over networks, including local-area networks (LANs), wide-area networks (WANs), and public packet-switched networks such as the Internet. Cylink and Algorithmic Research serve Fortune 500 companies, multinational financial institutions, and government agencies worldwide. For more information, visit our web sites at http://www.cylink.com and http://www.arx.com. ------------------------------------------------------------ David Honig Orbit Technology honig(a)otc.net Intaanetto Jigyoubu Steel : Meatspace :: Encryption : Virtual space

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BXA Encryption Export Seminar - San Jose, April 28
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think some cypherpunk representatives should attend this seminar. It's often useful to hear what the BXA is saying when they talk to exporters instead of a court or the press. You will probably learn something about crypto export law, too. If you have a portable cassette recorder, see if you can record it for future reference "and for others at my company". I'd go, but I have a bunch of committments on that date. Let me know how it turns out! John Bureau of Export Administration - U.S. Department of Commerce presents ENCRYPTION CONTROLS SAN JOSE, CA April 28, 1998 * 8:30 AM - 5:00 PM Hyatt San Jose * San Jose, CA ENCRYPTION CONTROLS - As a result of the release of new rules governing the export of encryption items previously controlled on the U.S. Munitions List, the export licensing responsibilities were transferred to the Department of Commerce (except those specially designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified for military applications). This full-day program is being held to instruct and assist the exporting community with this change in jurisdiction. Representatives from BXA and the National Security Agency (NSA) will explain: the background and current U.S. policy, the main elements of the controls, License Exception KMI and the licensing process for encryption cases, and legislative initiatives and other issues to watch in the future. WHO SHOULD ATTEND? - This seminar is designed for exporters, freight forwarders, carriers, international trade consultants, attorneys, and others who support and advise exporters. If your organization is involved in a technology-related industry, especially computers, electronics, defense goods/services, etc., this seminar is a must. ENCRYPTION AGENDA 8:30-8:35 Opening 8:35-8:45 Overview of morning 8:45-9:00 Encryption Policy * What is it? * How does it affect your company? 9:00-9:15 Encryption Regulations * What's new? * What's different * How to classify an encryption product 9:15-10:15 Encryption Licenses and the inter-agency review process * Validated * Encryption Licensing Arrangements * Foreign Nationals 10:15-10:30 BREAK 10:30-11:00 Mass Market Encryption Software * Helpful Hints 11:00-12:00 License Exceptions: TMP - GOV - BAG for encryption items 12:00-1:00 LUNCH 1:00-1:45 License Exception Key Management Infrastructure (KMI) * Recoverable encryption items * Non-recoverable 56-bit DES with a plan 1:45-2:15 Key Recovery Agents 2:15-2:45 Exports over the Internet 2:45-3:00 BREAK 3:00-3:30 Next Steps 3:30-4:00 License practice/policy 4:00-4:45 Questions & Answers ABOUT THE INSTRUCTORS - The instructors are experienced export administration specialists and licensing officers from BXA's Washington, DC headquarters and Western Regional Office. The instructors - who played a major role in drafting the new encryption regulations - are available throughout the seminar to answer your questions. ACCOMMODATIONS - Special conference rates have been arranged with the Hyatt San Jose for those who need rooms. Please make your reservations directly with the hotel by calling (408) 993- 1234 or toll free (800) 233-1234. Mention the "BXA Seminar." Note: The hotel is conveniently located minutes from San Jose Airport and is also easily accessible by automobile. The Hyatt offers free parking. QUESTIONS?- For more information on the Encryption Controls topics, please call BXA's Western Regional Office at (714) 660-0144. For information about registration, contact the Federation of International Trade Associations at (800) 969-FITA or (703) 620-9098. REGISTRATION Note: Space is limited and will be accepted on a space availability basis . The Registration Fee for the Seminar is $125/person and includes continental breakfast, AM & PM breaks, luncheon and seminar materials. The registration fee is not refundable after April 22, 1998. Cancellation prior to that date is subject to a $25 administrative charge. To guarantee placement for the Encryption Controls Seminar in San Jose, FAX your registration to (703) 391-0159, and charge the fee on a MC, VISA or American Express, or mail your registration with your check payable to FITA-BXA to FITA, 1851 Alexander Bell Drive, Suite 400, Reston, VA 20191. Attendee Name(s): ____________________________________________________________ Company Name: ____________________________________________________________ Street Address: ____________________________________________________________ City, State, Zip: ____________________________________________________________ Phone: _______________________ Fax: _________________________ [ ] Enclosed is my check for $___________ ($125/person) [ ] We prefer to pay by credit card: ____ MC, ____ Visa, ____ AMEX Amount $_________ Acct #_______________________________ Expiry date:__________ Cardholder Name: ___________________________________________________ Cardholder Signature:________________________________________________ Sponsored by The Federation of International Trade Associations (FITA) (For information about FITA, call toll-free (800) 926-FITA)

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Commerce Secretary attacks crypto export limits
by Trei, Peter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,21120,00.html?st.ne.fd.mdh Crypto policy called a failure By Courtney Macavinta Staff Writer, CNET NEWS.COM April 15, 1998, 11:40 a.m. PT URL: http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,21120,00.html The government's policy restricting the export of strong encryption products has failed and is boosting the foreign market by hog-tying the U.S. industry, Commerce Department secretary William Daley conceded today. [...] But the software industry and privacy advocates were most intrigued today by Daley's admission that the administration's export limits on encryption (technology that secures digital communication) are hindering U.S. companies' ability to compete with global manufacturers. The export policy went into effect last January, and is overseen by the Commerce Department. Under the rules, software makers that are granted crypto export licenses must submit proof of their plans to build key-recovery features into their products after next year. Key-recovery systems make it possible for law enforcement agents--who have obtained a court order--to access computer users' private key that unscrambles their digital messages or files. "The ultimate result will be foreign dominance of the market," Daley said. "This means a loss of jobs here, and products that do not meet either our law enforcement or national security needs." There has been an ongoing fight to overturn the export limits. But a compromise hasn't been reached with law enforcement officials, who assert that access to keys is needed to combat a new wave of high-tech crime in which suspects can cover their tracks with crypto. [...]

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Commerce Report on the Digital Economy
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to Jay Holovacs we've put Daley's press conference remarks and an executive summary of the "The Emerging Digital Economy" at: http://jya.com/daley-ecom.htm And we offer the main text of the full report at: http://jya.com/emerg-dig.htm (164K, plus 11 images) It's available from Commerce in separate HTML chapters or the full text with appendices in PDF (300 pages) at: http://www.ecommerce.gov/emerging.htm

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NT
by nobody＠nsm.htp.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone know how to completely crash a NT workstation with no possibility of recovery?

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Entropy Gradient Reversals
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.rageboy.com/allthewords.html

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BioInfoWarFare? / Re: sorry
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mark Hedges wrote: > > *sigh* actually, that wasn't bad english, it was just accidental > >html email....i didn't realize netscape would do that and i apologize. > >ooooooooooooooooo > >colin the feeling that its > > cjm1(a)execpc.com all a lot of oysters > >maroney and no pearls. > >ooooooooooooooooo > > It's 'it's', not 'its'. > > Good English does not coherence generate. Sounds like a biological agraphia warfare attack, followed by a logic bomb... Hhmmm...I smell a Platypus?

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Hackworth
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

AN AMBUSHED MARINE Have a look at the following. A loyal, heroic Marine is being fed to the sharks. A letter to your congress person and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, with an info copy to your local newspaper, would help. For those who might want to help a good Marine financially he would be forever grateful. Tim Witham Legal Defense Fund c/o Robert Ferris Box 538 Jacksonville, NC 28541 SEMPER FI and perhaps the top brass in the Corps should refresh themselves as to what this wonderful expression means. Hack 14, March 16, 1998 NATION: "Criminal Injustice?" To judge from his military paper trail, Marine Sergeant Timothy Witham, a 33-year-old Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) specialist, is the embodiment of the Corps. A veteran of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Witham has also served with distinction in Somalia. Superlatives suffuse his service record: "Sergeant Withams professional achievement, initiative and loyal dedication to duty reflected great credit upon himself and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service," declared Lt. Colonel G.C. Cutchall in a citation issued when Witham received the Navy Achievement Medal. In a letter endorsing Withams application to become a Warrant Officer Candidate, Lieutenant Colonel E.M. Smith, his former commanding officer at North Carolinas Cherry Point Marine facility, praised Withams "seasoned leadership high degree of maturity poise, understanding and tact." In addition to his military service, Witham has also excelled in joint projects with civilian agencies, according to Smith: "He has established a tremendous rapport with outside agencies such as the FBI, various ATF state bureaus, Secret Service, DEA and other police agencies." Withams dossier includes a certificate of appreciation from the Secret Service for his work as part of a presidential security detail at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. He was also entrusted with similar security responsibilities during the 1994 Middle East peace talks and the UNs 50th anniversary in 1995. Abrupt Change of Heart Noting that Witham is "loyal, displays sound judgment, and is exceptionally reliable and trustworthy," Lt. Col. Smith recommended his application "with utmost enthusiasm." Withams current commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Ayala of Marine Wing Support Squadron 271, offered a similarly glowing endorsement last September. "[Witham] leads from the front. Superior knowledge of the EOD field. Can handle any mission and looks forward to challenging assignments," declared Ayala. "[Witham is a] true asset to his section and to this Squadron. His knowledge and expertise would make [him] an outstanding candidate for the warrant officer program." However, Ayalas opinion of Witham underwent an abrupt change just a few weeks later. "SSgt. [Staff Sergeant] Witham has proven that he is a threat to the good order and discipline of the Squadron and the U.S. Marine Corps," insisted Ayala in an October 17th memo. Ayalas radical reevaluation of Witham followed the October 16th arrest of Witham and five other Marines as a result of "Operation Longfuse," a 16-month joint sting operation conducted by the FBI, the ATF, and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). Witham found himself accused of "transporting a loaded weapon on base; conspiracy to commit larceny; larceny of military explosives, equipment, and firearms; wrongful disposition of military property; receiving stolen property; [and] federal firearms and explosives violations under the Federal Assimilated Crimes Act." Upon his arrest, Witham was designated "a flight risk," which led Ayala to support "continued confinement" until his pre-trial hearing which turned out to be a 79-day jail term. "Lesser forms of restraint would be inadequate to insure that he would appear at his hearing and court-martial," insisted Ayala. "This is not the first time that SSgt Witham has been involved in this type of incident." Curiously, in the same memo, Ayala noted that there had never been any previous disciplinary action taken against Witham which would suggest a serious delinquency on the part of his superiors if Witham had indeed been "involved in this type of incident" on earlier occasions. Just as curious is the fact that Form 1070 in Sergeant Withams personal file, which lists "offenses and punishments," is entirely blank. Literally in a single day, a model Marine with an unblemished record was transmuted into a felonious arms smuggler whose motivations were equal parts greed and radical "anti-government" views. Federal and military investigators have yet to find a particle of material evidence to prove that Sergeant Witham is the criminal they describe; their case depends entirely upon the testimony of three eminently impeachable witnesses a twice-convicted perjurer, a civilian ex-convict, and an ex-Marine of dubious integrity who served as a "confidential informant" for the feds during the undercover operation. Two of the witnesses peddled their testimony against Witham in exchange for lighter sentences. The "confidential informant" made an even better deal: He arranged for complete immunity before beginning his undercover work, and since October 17th he has been taken into the witness protection program. Last September, Staff Sergeant Timothy Witham was chosen from 20 very qualified candidates to become a Warrant Officer; now, after spending 79 days in jail, he faces the prospect of an April court-martial. Robert Ferris, a retired Marine officer and former commanding officer to Witham, told The New American: "I spent 24 years in the military, in the Army and Marines, and Ive never seen an abuse of power to compare with the treatment of this young man. He should be at Quantico going to school to become a Warrant Officer, and yet hes exhausting his life savings and seeing his career destroyed because the feds need to convict somebody to make a political point." The "political point" being made in the case of Tim Witham appears to be that mere suspicion of "anti-government" views is enough to destroy the career of a model military man. Extremist Spin The "Longfuse" investigation cast a net across several states, pursuing leads as far south as North Carolina and as far north as Massachusetts. Fourteen suspects were arrested on October 17th eight civilians and six Marines, including four stationed at Camp Lejune. Over the course of a year and a half, undercover investigators, focusing their efforts on gun shows, military bases, and gun dealers throughout the southeast, had purchased an estimated 150 pounds of plastic explosives, grenades, grenade launchers, shoulder-launched rockets, a handful of anti-personnel mines, and more than 50 machine guns. In the post-Oklahoma City bombing environment, the preferred spin of federal investigators was entirely predictable. Robert Ferris, who is now Withams next-door neighbor, was a witness on Withams behalf at two preliminary hearings: the "Magistrates hearing," which is held to determine if pre-trial confinement is necessary; and an "Article 32" hearing, which is the military equivalent of a grand jury. "The first thing out of the mouth of [military prosecutor] Captain [Michael] Richardson was Ruby Ridge," Ferris recalls. "They insisted that Tim was part of a ring of anti-government radicals who were stealing weapons and had sworn not to let the feds take them alive." Thus was Witham identified as part of the ubiquitous menace of "right-wing extremism." Initial press coverage of the "Operation Longfuse" arrests played up the alleged "anti-government" angle, and the feds did their best to abet such speculation at least in the beginning. "Federal agents seized truckloads of stolen military and civilian weapons yesterday in an expanding investigation into the theft and sale of machine guns, grenades and plastic explosives," screamed the October 18th Baltimore Sun. The paper reported that an anonymous investigator portentously warned that some of the civilian suspects arrested "have ties potentially to militia groups." The Raleigh, North Carolina News and Observer carried a similar warning: "A top official said he could not rule out the possibility that anti-government extremists were connected to the theft of military ordnance from Camp Lejune." "These are weapons that are of military use, very lethal weapons, and they were weapons that were in the wrong hands," fretted Treasury Department spokesman Jim Johnson at an October 17th press conference. "Thats the sort of thing all citizens should be concerned about." Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon added the disturbing observation that "C-4 was taken, which is highly dangerous and used by terrorists." For those who missed the message, the Dallas Morning News offered a useful summary: "Concern over the theft of high explosives has increased in military circles along with a broader anxiety about domestic terrorism, especially in the aftermath of incidents such as the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building." The "right-wing menace" is the medias favorite enemy, and ATF officials were careful to drop tantalizing hints that "Operation Longfuse" had uncovered something big. "You could outfit a small army with what weve recovered," claimed ATF special agent Mark Logan. ATF spokesman Earl Woodham primed the press for further dramatic developments: "The investigation has really just begun. Its like we just hit the base of an oak tree, and if we follow it up, we may find that it branches out very wide." Dubious Informant The man who planted the acorn that grew into the ATFs "oak tree" is a former Marine sergeant who had served as an EOD specialist with several of the arrested suspects. In early 1996, this sergeant reportedly instigated "Operation Longfuse" when he approached authorities at Camp Lejune to warn them that weapons and explosives were being stolen and sold at gun shows and gun dealerships. That his motives werent purely idealistic is suggested by the fact that he was careful to get complete immunity before taking an assignment as a paid confidential informant (CI). For the next year and a half, the CI worked numerous stings against Marines and civilian gun enthusiasts. The feds deployed other undercover assets as part of "Longfuse" and tried to tailor stings to the psychology of the suspects. In the case of Thomas Crawford, a Marine captain stationed in Massachusetts who was among those arrested on October 17th, the undercover agents reportedly posed as intelligence specialists who sought arms and explosives for deniable missions in Latin America "an Oliver North-type black ops project," according to one source. In the case of a second Marine sergeant who was caught in the sting and who became the second witness against Witham undercover feds reportedly posed as organized crime figures. "[The second Marine sergeant] wasnt going anywhere in the Corps," Sergeant Witham asserted to The New American. "He was consistently denied promotions; you might say he has more pass-overs than a satellite. I suspect that he had a real need to feel important, and the undercover agents were happy to feed his ego." From information made available during legal discovery, Witham relates, the second Marine "got involved in long drunken discussions with the undercover people in which he claimed to have been involved in all kinds of crimes, including at least one murder. He supposedly helped kill a guy and then disposed of the body with a woodchipper. Strangely, though, the prosecution didnt follow up on that particular story." The feds were willing to give credence to the second Marines alcohol-aided claims about Witham, which were covertly recorded. "They initially used those drunken boasts to make three charges against me," Witham recalls. "The first was that I had been involved in the theft of washing machines, dryers, and other appliances, as well as drywall and other things of that nature. The second was that I had been involved in forgery, and the third was that I had been involved in the theft of explosives. The prosecution dropped the first two charges but has stuck with the third." How credible is the second Marine as a witness? According to local press reports in North Carolina, he has twice pled guilty to perjury. Furthermore, he faced accumulated prison terms of up to 380 years on charges arising from "Longfuse" and reportedly made a deal with the prosecution in which he could peddle his testimony against others for a total of 12 years in prison with the possibility of parole after four. The third witness against Witham has served a prison term on firearms-related charges. He also reportedly made a deal for his testimony in a previous weapons theft case involving Army personnel. Casting a Large Net Given his own solid military background, and the dubious background of the witnesses against him, how did Sergeant Witham get entangled in this mess? Attorney Vaughn Taylor, who has acted as Withams legal counsel, believes that the sergeant was "caught in a very large casting net" thrown out by federal investigators. "There were two things that the government found very significant," Taylor related to The New American. "First, they were looking for people who had worked with Captain Crawford in EOD; secondly, they were looking at gun shows and people who did business at them. Of course, these two facts dont add up to a case, particularly when the suspect is someone like Tim Witham. As far as his military career is concerned, Witham all but walks on water; its impossible to imagine someone farther from the person described in these charges." Nor were the feds able to develop a material case against Witham. On October 17th, agents from the ATF and NCIS conducted a search of Withams home in Jacksonville, North Carolina; this included an examination of an adjoining building from which Witham, a federally licensed firearms dealer, sold guns and related merchandise. The October 20th "Report of Investigation" filed by special agent John S. Corpening of the ATFs Wilmington, North Carolina field office noted that "no machine guns or prohibited weapons were found" during the search of Withams home and business. The report did note that Witham was in possession of a stolen Ruger pistol. The gun had been brought to Witham for repairs; when he ran a check on its serial number, he learned that it was a stolen weapon, and informed the ATF. As instructed, Witham logged the stolen weapon in his Acquisition and Disposition record, and held it on behalf of the ATF. "Strangely, the ATFs search of my home was conducted, in part, by students of mine," Witham informed The New American. "For about three years Ive been involved with some of them in a drug interdiction program, so they knew me well before all of this." (Witham has also helped train ATF and FBI personnel in explosives disposal.) Despite the effort on the part of NCIS investigators and Marine officials to depict Witham as a danger to public order, the ATF did not seek revocation of his federal firearms license. "Even though I was in jail for 79 days and face court-martial, my firearms license is still active, and my inventory is still intact," observes Witham. "If I had done all of the things Ive been accused of, or any of them, would the ATF have left me with my weapons?" On December 19th, Major Robert Brubaker, the Judge Advocate General investigator who presided over Withams "Article 32" investigation, filed his report, which once again noted Withams sterling record and the poverty of the case against him. "Evidence was presented demonstrating that SSgt. Withams military character up to this point has been excellent," Brubaker pointed out. "He has a clean, in fact quite distinguished, service record." For a man identified as a "flight risk," Witham displayed little inclination to escape when presented with the opportunity. Brubaker noted that the "chasers" the MPs assigned to watch Witham were quite inept. "To say that their supervision of their charge was loose would be an understatement," reported the investigator. "I observed a couple of occasions when SSgt. Witham was alone without the chasers in sight. There was one occasion when SSgt. Witham himself tracked down his chasers to tell them he was going somewhere and they needed to be with him. To me, this rather strongly cuts against any argument that he is a serious flight risk." While Brubaker stated that "there probably is sufficient evidence to send the case to a court-martial," he also took note of the fact that "the government seems to be relying quite heavily on the statements of two witnesses of questionable integrity" to make its case against Witham. (Since that time a third witness has also offered to testify against Witham.) Abuse of Power It is possible that Withams impeccable service record belies his involvement in the felonious theft of military weapons and explosives. However, it is at least as likely that he is merely an exemplary serviceman who has been traduced by perjured statements offered in exchange for special prosecutorial considerations. His case serves as a precautionary tale about the federal governments increasing reliance upon paid undercover informants, especially in firearms-related investigations and other forms of covert operations against the "radical right." In his book Deadly Force, law enforcement analyst Carsen Stroud points out that in 1994 the Justice Department budgeted $100 million to spend on confidential informants, many of them involved in "quasi-criminal or actively criminal" enterprises. Also significant is the potential impact on military morale should Sergeant Witham prove to be the innocent victim of a politically motivated abuse of prosecutorial power. "I love the Marine Corps and have great respect for our federal law enforcement agencies," declares Robert Ferris, who was himself a respected field-grade commander. "But what is being done to Tim is simply wrong; its an abuse of power by corrupt and ambitious people who are, by God, going to get a conviction, whatever it takes to do so. In nearly a quarter-century of military service Ive never seen a comparable abuse of power." William Norman Grigg *************************************** Visit our home page at: http://www.hackworth.com Sign up for the free weekly Defending America newsletter on our website Snail mail to: P.O. Box 430 Whitefish, MT. 59937

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RE: Apple crypto engineer position available
by Anonymous Sender 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>PGP cut the gordian knot and demonstrated that it was _possible_ >to have a successful PKI application without a CA. But that is not >to say that a trusted third party cannot add value to an >application. PGP validated PKI generally but it did not invalidate >the CA concept - in the PGP system everyone is a trust provider, >everyone is in that sense a CA. PGP did in fact invalidate CA concept, very successfully. There is a world of difference between "everyone is a trust provider" and several centralized CAs. Authentication is an essential part of security. If one assumes wrong who she is talking to then all "strong crypto" used is irrelevant, since the middleman is browsing the plaintext. If there is a need, CA customers will be given middleman's keys and all traffic will be systematically captured, re-encrypted and forwarded to the intended recipient for as long as required. Maybe even keys with the same hash (id) can be generated to pass the verification. What percentage of users would do the non-automated, manual check anyway ? If trusting a secret key to escrowing entity (GAK) is a bad deal, how is trusting someone's identity to CA any different ? In both cases security is deposited with an organization that can be influenced in any number of ways. The CA concept does not work because security and privacy are inherently individual, and any forced insertion of third parties in the process is bound to miserably fail. The Fool

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The Great Internet Bandwidth Crisis
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It seems to me that the chief impediment standing in the way of the Internet becoming a propaganda and marketing tool suitable for use and control by a few rich and powerful business entities is the comparatively inexpensive and easy access of millions of users to the same technologies available to megacorporations. History itself leads me to suspect that the money and power moguls will use a variety of real and imaginary issues to place greater monetary burdens and access restrictions on many aspects of the Internet and Web, particularly those that have commercial potential. A current example is the attempt by various Telecos to raise the cost of access for other businesses, citing alleged burdens placed on their resources by ISPs at the same time that they are scrambling to enter the same market by undercutting their competitors. The Great Teleco Resource Crisis will undoubtedly be mirrored at some point in the future by the Great Internet Bandwidth Crisis. I suspect that although it will be as bogus as the Telecos' current imaginary crisis, it will come at a time when the major players have divided up enough of the infrastructure pie among themselves to be unanimous in their nod-and-wink agreement as to the severity of the crisis. Undoubtedly, this will be just one of a variety of crisis in which will require restrictive legislation and cost-increasing regulations that will save bandwidth for future children and protect adult citizens from the extreme danger of engaging in commerce with other average adult citizens such as themselves. It seems to me that the *only* way that the Internet can be kept from being used as just another tool for herding the masses into larger and more efficient feeding pens is to enable and empower the citizens to freely and safely control their own financial and commercial destiny in their Internet transactions. The more accessible and widespread the control over one-to-one monetary transactions, the more difficult it will be for a few entities to lead the citizens around by financial rings run through their noses. The government currently has a variety of budgetary axes held over the heads of the citizens, such as federal funding and grants in which money taken away from the citizens is returned to them on a statewide, local or individual basis only upon conditions that involve giving up rights and liberties that are due them. In order to resist being herded by a myriad of legal, licensing and regulatory 'axes' into increasingly global feeding pens, the citizens will need access to tools which allow secure financial transactions with differing levels of identity versus anonymity available to them. The reason that major business has not yet been able to divide up the financial pie available through the Internet is the excessive amount of resources that they need in order to compete for the attention of Internet users, given that average citizens are providing equal or better information and services for free or for a low cost. The sooner that the masses are able to engage in free commerce with one another via the Internet--whether it be giving Grandma Jones a dollar for her cookie recipies, or engaging a student across the continent in private research in return for money, for goods or for services--then the sooner the masses will scream loud and long when government or corporate entities threaten to take this ability to be self-sufficient away from them. Those who wish to circumvent the loss of privacy, liberty and freedom that they forsee as being possible on the Internet need to realize that most of those who are not currently empowered to manifest those possibilities in their individual life will little recognize or protest the 'present' loss of those 'future' possibilities. Unless there is a widespread dissemination of working tools accessible to the average citizen, then the future will be controlled by those with the funds and resources to limit financial transactions on the Internet to a self-defined 'way things are.' "Teach a man to buy his fish from you, and you'll feed yourself for a lifetime."

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IntenseWhore VidKid Sex Machine
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.pathfinder.com/time/magazine/1998/dom/980420/notebook.techwatch.… PLAY STATION Vidkids hooked on high-impact games with stereo sound tracks will have a tough time leaving their seats at next month's E3 convention. That's when BSG Laboratories will debut the Intensor, a $500 speaker-studded chair (with between-the-legs bass and separate subwoofer) to give hard-core players a body-thumping shot of visceral reality. It seems to me that enterprising children with mechanical ability should be able to use common household items, such as vacume cleaners, blow-driers, doorknobs and wax-fruit to 'enhance' the vidiot experience that BSG Laboratories will be pimping. It seems to me that an enterprising young Tom Cruise type might be able to combine an enhanced version of the IntenseWhore with a variety of adult MPEGs and pick up some major cash in between his friends' 'cumings' and goings. Sounds like something for the 'Got My Nut'ly News to pursue.

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RE: NT
by Brown, R Ken 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yeah, lots of people know. Mostly the ones who've read the NT manuals. > ---------- > From: nobody@nsm.htp.org[SMTP:nobody@nsm.htp.org] > Sent: 16 April 1998 04:25 > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: NT > > Anyone know how to completely crash a NT > workstation with no possibility of recovery? >

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NYT on Daley Deal
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times, April 16, 1998, p. D2. Commerce Secretary Seeks Compromise on Encryption Administration Reconsiders F.B.I. Position By Jeri Clausing Washington, April 15 -- The Clinton Administration's attempts to control encryption technology have been a failure and are forcing American software makers to concede ground to foreign competitors, Commerce Secretary William M. Daley said today. Mr. Daley's remarks, made in a speech here to the high-technology industry, were the strongest indication yet that the Administration was seriously considering parting ways with Louis Freeh, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other law enforcement and spy agencies over the issue of how data should be scrambled. "We are headed down a lose-lose path, and we have to get back to win-win," Mr. Daley said. He blamed both industry and law enforcement officials for the failed policy, saying that the two sides had failed to find a reasonable compromise between the need to monitor the activities of criminals and the need to offer consumers strong security for on-line transactions. The purpose of his speech today was to release the Commerce Department's first comprehensive report on the impact of electronic commerce on the nation's economy. The report shows that information technology, including business on the Internet, is growing twice as fast as the overall economy, employing some 7.4 million workers at salaries 64 percent above the national average. But while the report was full of impressive numbers and glowing predictions for the future, Mr. Daley said that strong encryption and a solid encryption policy were essential if electronic commerce was to realize its full potential. Mr. Daley's blunt comments marked the first public acknowledgment that the Clinton Administration's encryption policy had failed. And his remarks echoed what the industry has contended for years -- that foreign companies are fast taking over the high-demand market for products that protect the privacy of communications. The software industry is currently prohibited from exporting strong encryption programs, which scramble data in ways that make it difficult or impossible for unauthorized people -- including law enforcement agencies -- to decode. Such software is essential to electronic commerce, which requires that credit card information and other private data be encrypted when products are ordered on the Internet. The software industry has long argued that the export rules put American companies at a great disadvantage relative to foreign competitors not under such restrictions. Mr. Freeh and the National Security Agency argue that the threat of terrorists and other criminals scrambling data to thwart law enforcement is so great that the export restrictions should be removed only if the police are given keys to unlock encrypted data. At the end of 1997, Mr. Daley said, an estimated 656 encryption products were being produced in 29 countries outside the United States. Products from Germany, Ireland, Canada, Israel and Britain can compete with anything made domestically, he said, and can meet the needs of the world's computer networks. "Our policy, ironically, encourages the growth of foreign producers at the same time it retards growth here," Mr. Daley said. He called for a sincere dialogue between industry and law enforcement, but stopped short of saying that the Administration would withdraw its support of the F.B.I. and N.S.A. position. "There are solutions out there," Mr. Daley said. "Solutions that would meet some of law enforcement's needs without compromising the concerns of the privacy and business communities. But I fear our search has thus far been more symbolic than sincere. "The cost of our failure will be high. The ultimate result will be foreign dominance of the market. This means a loss of jobs here, and products that do not meet either our law-enforcement or national security needs." Mr. Daley declined to offer examples of what the Administration might be willing to give up to reach an agreement. Industry officials, however, said there was no room for compromise. "People want complete privacy," Peter F. McCloskey of the Electronic Industries Alliance said. Harris N. Miller, president of the Information Technology Association of America, said that companies were willing to continue discussions with the Administration, but he asserted that Government officials "think compromise is something in the middle; sometimes compromise is found outside of the box." Mr. Miller said that the solution needed to be a technical one, perhaps one that gave law enforcement better training and equipment to crack encrypted criminal communications without requiring that everyone hand over spare keys to their computer files. "Law enforcement has legitimate concerns," Mr. Harris said. "What we disagree with is their demand for unlimited access." [End]

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FINALLY, FRESH & CLEAN !!
by FRIEND＠hotmail.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

IT WAS JUST RELEASED!! INTRODUCING...MILLIONS VOL. 1 We took a total of over 92 million email addresses from many of the touted CD's that are out there (bought them all - some were $300+)! We added the millions we had in storage to those. When we combined them all, we had in excess of 100+ million addresses in one huge file. We then ran a super "sort/de-dupe" program against this huge list. It cut the file down to less than 25 million!!! Can you believe that? It seems that most people that are selling CD's are duping the public by putting numerous files of addresses in the CD over and over. This created many duplicate addresses. They also had many program "generated" email addresses like Compuserve, MCI, ANON's, etc. This causes a tremendous amount of undeliverables, and for those that use Stealth programs, clogs up servers quickly with trash, etc. We then ran a program that contained 150+ keywords to remove addresses with vulgarity, profanity, sex-related names, postmaster, webmaster, flamer, abuse, spam, etc., etc. Also eliminated all .edu, .mil, .org, .gov, etc. After that list was run against the remaining list, it reduced it down to near 16 million addresses! So, you see, our list will save people hundreds of dollars buying all others that are out there on CD and otherwise. Using ours will be like using the 100+ million that we started with, but a lot less money and alot less time!! We also purchased Cyber-Promos ($995.00) CD. We received it just prior to finishing production work on the new CD. We had our people take a random sample of 300,000 addresses from the touted 2.9 that they advertised. We used a program that allows us to take a random sample of addresses from any list. We were able to have the program take every 9th address, thus giving us a 300,000 list of Cyber's email addresses from top to bottom. We did not clean these, but we did create 3 seperate files named cyber1.txt, cyber2.txt, & cyber3.txt of 100,000 addresses each. This will give all people that use the list a opportunity to send mail to the list before deciding if their CD is all it's hyped to be. We also included a 2+ million "Remove/Flamer" file broke into seperate files for ease of extracting and adding to your own database of removes. "You can buy from the REST or you can buy from the BEST. Your choice. _____________________________ What others are saying: "I received the CD on Friday evening. Like a kid with a new toy, I immediately started bulking out using the new email addresses. Over the course of the weekend, I emailed out over 500,000 emails and I received less than TWENTY undeliverables!! I am totally satisfied with my purchase!! Thanks Premier!!" Dave Buckley Houston, TX "This list is worth it's weight in gold!! I sent out 100,000 emails for my product and received over 55 orders! Ann Colby New Orleans, LA **************************************** HERE'S THE BOTTOM LINE Here is what you get when you order today! >> 16 Million Email Addresses... 1 per line in simple text format on a CD. Files are in lots of 100,000 (no codes needed to open files). All files are separated by domain name for your convenience. PLUS you receive a tremendous REMOVE list! AND the a sampling of CyberPromo's HOT list. >>> NOW ONLY $149.00! This price is effective for the next seven days, thereafter the price will be $199.00 so ORDER NOW! All lists are completely free of any Duplicates. We also on a continual basis, add New Names and Remove Undeliverables and Remove Requests. The result is the Cleanest Email Addresses Available Anywhere to use over and over again, for a FRACTION of the cost that other companies charge. Typical rates for acquiring email lists are from 1 cent to as high as 3 cents per email address - that's "INFORMATION HIGHWAY" ROBBERY!. Don't even hesitate on this one or you will miss out on the most effective way to market anywhere..PERIOD! To order our email package, simply print out the EZ ORDER FORM below and fax or mail it to our office today. We accept Visa, Mastercard, Discover, Checks by Fax and Mail. _________________ EZ Order Form _____Yes! I would like to order MILLIONS Vol. 1 email addresses for only $149.00. *Please select one of the following for shipping.. ____I would like to receive my package OVERNIGHT. I'm including $15 for shipping. (outside US add an additional $25 for shipping) ____I would like to receive my package 2 DAY delivery. I'm including $10 for shipping. (outside US add an additional $25 for shipping) DATE_____________________________________________________ NAME____________________________________________________ COMPANY NAME___________________________________________ ADDRESS_________________________________________________ CITY, STATE, ZIP___________________________________________ PHONE NUMBERS__________________________________________ FAX NUMBERS_____________________________________________ EMAIL ADDRESS___________________________________________ TYPE OF CREDIT CARD: ______VISA _____MASTERCARD CREDIT CARD# __________________________________________ EXPIRATION DATE________________________________________ NAME ON CARD___________________________________________ AMOUNT $____________________ (Required) SIGNATURE:x________________________ DATE:x__________________ You may fax your order to us at: 1-704-784-5595 CHECK BY FAX SERVICES! If you would like to fax a check, paste your check below and fax it to our office along with all forms to: 1704-784-5595 ****************************************************** ***24 HOUR FAX SERVICES*** PLEASE PASTE YOUR CHECK HERE AND FAX IT TO US AT 1-704-784-5595 ******************************************************* If You fax a check, there is no need for you to send the original check. We will draft up a new check, with the exact information from your original check. All checks will be held for bank clearance. If you feel more comfortable sending payment through the mail, please send all forms and Check or Money Order to: CONSUMER CONNECTIONS 10223-B UNIV. CITY BLVD. #197 CHARLOTTE, NC 28213

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PGP and crypto News from France
by Anonymous Sender 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 - ---------------------------------------------------------- PLEASE REPLY ONLY TO : <pplf(a)usa.net> - ---------------------------------------------------------- SUBJET : PGP and crypto News from France Hi all, We're glad to announce an english "PGP and crypto News from France" on the PGP FOR FRENCH site, and a "beta" ;-) translation of our little PGP History, here : http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Bay/9648/pgpnews.htm Bye - -------------------------------------------------------------------- PGP pour les francais / PGP even for the French <pplf(a)usa.net> http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Bay/9648 PGPkey 14A0 4A67 0431 2402 684D 6EBA 537F 664D 3F80 0D58 http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Bay/9648/pplf.txt - --------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPfreeware 5.5.3i for non-commercial use <http://www.pgpi.com> iQA/AwUBNTRhsVN/Zk0/gA1YEQJQHACfWWAhaHVKblH2S0VSazSw94F8FXUAoPt+ bxFrPDrfbgcPQgLD3NgULSA2 =8Wr+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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eligable receiver
by David Honig 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

THE WASHINGTON TIMES April 16, 1998 Bill Gertz Computer hackers could disable military; System compromised in secret exercise Senior Pentagon leaders were stunned by a military exercise showing how easy it is for hackers to cripple U.S. military and civilian computer networks, according to new details of the secret exercise. Using software obtained easily from hacker sites on the Internet, a group of National Security Agency officials could have shut down the U.S. electric-power grid within days and rendered impotent the command-and-control elements of the U.S. Pacific Command, said officials familiar with the war game, known as Eligible Receiver. "The attack was actually run in a two-week period and the results were frightening," said a defense official involved in the game. "This attack, run by a set of people using standard Internet techniques, would have basically shut down the command-and-control capability in the Pacific theater for some considerable period of time." Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon said, "Eligible Receiver was an important and revealing exercise that taught us that we must be better organized to deal with potential attacks against our computer systems and information infrastructure." The secret exercise began last June after months of preparation by the NSA computer specialists who, without warning, targeted computers used by U.S. military forces in the Pacific and in the United States. The game was simple: Conduct information warfare attacks, or "infowar," on the Pacific Command and ultimately force the United States to soften its policies toward the crumbling communist regime in Pyongyang. The "hackers" posed as paid surrogates for North Korea. The NSA "Red Team" of make-believe hackers showed how easy it is for foreign nations to wreak electronic havoc using computers, modems and software technology widely available on the darker regions of the Internet: network-scanning software, intrusion tools and password-breaking "log-in scripts." According to U.S. officials who took part in the exercise, within days the team of 50 to 75 NSA officials had inflicted crippling damage. They broke into computer networks and gained access to the systems that control the electrical power grid for the entire country. If they had wanted to, the hackers could have disabled the grid, leaving the United States in the dark. Groups of NSA hackers based in Hawaii and other parts of the United States floated effortlessly through global cyberspace, breaking into unclassified military computer networks in Hawaii, the headquarters of the U.S. Pacific Command, as well as in Washington, Chicago, St. Louis and parts of Colorado. "The attacks were not actually run against the infrastructure components because we don't want to do things like shut down the power grid," said a defense official involved in the exercise. "But the referees were shown the attacks and shown the structure of the power-grid control, and they agreed, yeah, this attack would have shut down the power grid." Knocking out the electrical power throughout the United States was just a sideline for the NSA cyberwarriors. Their main target was the U.S. Pacific Command, which is in charge of the 100,000 troops that would be called on to deal with wars in Korea or China. "The most telling thing for the Department of Defense, when all was said and done, is that basically for a two-week period the command-and-control capability in the Pacific theater would have been denied by the 'infowar' attacks, and that was the period of the exercise," the official said. The attackers also foiled virtually all efforts to trace them. FBI agents joined the Pentagon in trying to find the hackers, but for the most part they failed. Only one of the several NSA groups, a unit based in the United States, was uncovered. The rest operated without being located or identified. The attackers breached the Pentagon's unclassified global computer network using Internet service providers and dial-in connections that allowed them to hop around the world. "It's a very, very difficult security environment when you go through different hosts and different countries and then pop up on the doorstep of Keesler Air Force Base [in Mississippi], and then go from there into Cincpac," the official said, using the acronym for the Commander in Chief, Pacific. The targets of the network attacks also made it easy. "They just were not security-aware," said the official. A second official found that many military computers used the word "password" for their confidential access word. ------------------------------------------------------------ David Honig Orbit Technology honig(a)otc.net Intaanetto Jigyoubu Clarke's Third Law: Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.

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---> How Can I Pay You For My Order
by 1-800-893-6001＠toll.free 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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None Re: Gary Lee Burnore, Registered Sex Offender in Raleigh, NC
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Gary Lee Burnore <gburnore(a)databasix.com> wrote: > In 11/96, I kissed a 17 year old girl. I'm not going to provide you > with a lot of detail because this isn't the place for it. If the girl's mother had heeded the earlier warning she received via e-mail about your behavior several months earlier (the one you called "harassment" at the time), this all could have been prevented. You're lucky that the 11/96 "kiss" is all you were arrested for. You were foolish to continue it knowing that Nancy had already been tipped off. In case you've forgotten, you whined: -> So now the cowards in Ronald Francis's corner (I'm outright expecting the -> culprit to be ronald francis himself) have taken to sending email to -> those who have names listed on databasix's web page. Sending comments to -> a 17 year old that they're going to tell her mother that she's having an -> affair with me. Telling her mother that I'm molesting her daughter. -> Having all sorts of fun. And you threatened to report the anonymous whistleblower to the authorities? What chutzpah! You're molesting a minor, someone tips off her mother, and you threaten to report the person who tipped her off about your behavior? Your claim has now been proven to be a lie. How would the mere fact that the girl had a web page at databasix.com have alerted an outsider to the fact that you were molesting her? Presumably she didn't post her diary on her web page, detailing your sexual activities towards her. Where would "Ronald Francis", or any other random "harasser" have obtained this information? You were too quick to dismiss the idea that all the alleged "harassment" and spam baiting might have originated from a DataBasix insider with detailed knowledge of your private life, as well as the complete list of all DataBasix employees and customers that Belinda Bryan claimed had been "spam baited". Who else is getting ahold of all this inside info, Gary? > I pass no > judgment on whether or not she instigated it. I held myself > responsible. That's why I went to see a counselor and offered to pay > for hers if she wanted to do the same. > > It was at the counselor's office that I learned what had happened was > considered a crime under CA law. I discussed this with the girl and > her mother; neither wanted to get law enforcement involved. But apparently it was serious enough that both your victim and her mother thought you needed psychiatric help. (Plenty of people on usenet could have told you that.) > To date, this ordeal has cost me nearly $30,000.00 in legal fees, lost > wages, and other costs. That however, is nothing compared to the > emotional stress of this. You spent $30K on what was supposedly a misdemeanor charge to which you pled guilty? Someone must have seen you "coming"? Was it Nancy? The maximum penalty for a misdemeanor is what? 6 months + $500? You spent $30K to get off with 3 years probation? On a 6 month sentence, you'd probably have been out in 3 months, and that's assuming you got the maximum sentence. Or was the $30K to get it plea bargained down from a more serious charge? > It goes on and on and on. I thought the shrink was to ensure that if didn't. > You know what's so damn frustrating about this? I chose to talk to a > councelor about this even though I knew it would bring charges. I was > doing the right thing. What statute in California makes it a misdemeanor to kiss a 17 year old girl? (It must make senior proms a lot of fun there if such a law really exists as you claim.) Or does it depend on what part of her body you "kissed" her? It's also interesting that when it was revealed that you had also been arrested in San Francisco for unlawful assembly in blocking traffic, you minimized it and called it a mere "traffic ticket", concealing the fact that you had already been convicted of something more serious. Then when someone finally reveals a second criminal conviction on your record, your sock puppets whine that it's a "half truth". Well, gee, Gary, you were content when the WHOLE truth was being concealed. So much for you "I have nothing to hide" boast!

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Re: eligable receiver
by CJ Parker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: David Honig <honig(a)alum.mit.edu> THE WASHINGTON TIMES Computer hackers could disable military; System compromised in secret exercise So when can we expect to hear the first announcements of high-level military resignations over the disgraceful state that they have let our national security fall into while wasting billions of dollars of our money? Please zipfile the announcements forwarded to the list, so that their massive volume does not swamp all of our email accounts. cjp ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Re: GSM cellphones cloned---Threats?
by Dave Emery 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, Apr 16, 1998 at 05:50:36AM +1000, Marc Briceno wrote: > > Several radio enineers I talked with speculated that it /might/ even be > possible to modify a standard GSM phone to act as a rouge "key reaper" > base station. I am not a radio engineer and have no way to verify this > claim. The modifications would be fairly major and rather difficult on a surface mount high density low cost phone PC board. A lot of the stuff required is in ASICs in a typical phone, and they are not in general easily adapted to playing a different role even if the full design database and phone schematics are available to the hacker which it would not be. On the other hand, some of the components of a standard GSM phone could be used to fill a number of functions in such an animal, and a couple of partially stripped GSM phone PC cards would certainly be useful as part of such. I would see such a probe base station as a briefcase size object run by a laptop or powerful palmtop spliced into two or three hacked up phone PC cards with some added signal processing logic in a FPGA or two (and maybe an added RF modem chip as well). Of course some older phone designs might be less ASIC intensive and more adaptable, although the 1.9 ghz PCS US versions are mostly pretty recent. And there may be some universal multi-standard brand that is much more software configured than others and might be an easier jumping off place - I certainly have not investigated this at all (nor do I expect to). On another topic - privacy... Your break suggests that A3/A8 may have been deliberately weakened to allow such SIM probing. Intelligence agencies are not in general interested in cloning, but for those without access to whatever magic hardware (or software) exists for cracking A5/1 at low cost in real time, the ability to once recover the SIM secret allows easy listening to all subsequent calls from that phone (or SIM) with no required cracking hardware time or access. And this is very valuable in lots of situations, such as covert operations out of hotels in foreign places where having highly classified A5 cracking boxes in tow would be a significant security risk. And for countries with GSM phone systems interested in spying on visiting diplomats, heads of state, or trade delegations who are using their GSM phones in a roaming mode and depending on the fact the GSM home switching office does not disclose their long term secret, such probing can be quietly concealed in the real traffic of a legitimate base station. The secrets recovered can then be used to crack traffic back in the visitor's home country where he may be trusting his local system to be secure. And the ability to probe the phones of visiting dignitaries from nearby hotel rooms and recover their secrets must be awfully useful to many even third rate intelligence operations - this allows listening to all their subsequent traffic without requiring an A5/1 cracking capability at all - let alone one that works real time from low cost portable units. And even if there is some sanity test in GSM phone firmware that would catch or prevent enough probes to crack the SIM secret, your physical access method allows black bag jobs to recover the SIM secret of phones left poorly guarded for a few hours. This alone is very obviously of great use to intelligence types (at least unless there is some hardware backdoor in the SIM to allow the readout in seconds rather than hours). -- Dave Emery N1PRE, die(a)die.com DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass. PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2 5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18

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woah
by ArtNoire 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: ArtNoire(a)aol.com Subject: woah From: ArtNoire <ArtNoire(a)aol.com> Date: Fri, 17 Apr 1998 00:53:09 EDT Organization: AOL (http://www.aol.com) <a href="http://members.spree.com/iconz/index.html">Click here to see my picture</a>

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DataFellows wins President's Export Award
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It's nice that _some_ presidents give awards for crypto export instead of trying to stop it! ------------------------------------ http://www.datafellows.com/news/finexpo.htm 4 February 1998 The developer of F-Secure data security products, Data Fellows Ltd., has received the President of Finlands Export Award. This award is granted annually to the most outstanding export companies in the country. This is the first time a developer of commercial software packages has been granted the award. ------------------------------------------------------------------- Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, bill.stewart(a)pobox.com PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639

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