December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Traffic Analysis (fwd)
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 10/5/97 1:18 PM, Jim Choate (ravage(a)ssz.com) passed this wisdom: >> Subject: Re: Traffic Analysis (fwd) >> Date: Sun, 5 Oct 97 11:59:53 -0400 >> >> On 10/3/97 10:49 AM, Jim Choate (ravage(a)ssz.com) passed this >> wisdom: >> >>>If the MTBF for a remailer is n then the MTBF for m remailers >>>is n*m. Inother words the remailer chain gets less reliable as >>>it gets longer. >> >> Jim, you want to take a look at that "n*m" again ... it >>doesn't wash. means MTBF goes *up* which means *more* reliable. > >Remember n is a fraction, failures/time_period ... > >If your MTBF is 1 failure per year for each system and you have 10 >systems your MTBF is 10 failures per year. Looks like multiplication >to me.... Maybe I have been away from hardcore engineering for too long, but last time I checked MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures) is measured in time (seconds, minutes, hours etc) not in failures per year that would be called 'failure rate' -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNDf4WMdZgC62U/gIEQJy/QCeKTFBl+4yLC4mDnr/32uh8w8rbLsAn086 Y+veBvWn4ULlxuJBT0+Bun4N =7xHN -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Brian B. Riley --> http://www.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "One of the deep mysteries to me is our logo, the symbol of lust and knowledge, bitten into, all crossed with in the colors of the rainbow in the wrong order. You couldn't dream of a more appropriate logo: lust, knowledge, hope, and anarchy." -- Gassee - Apple Logo

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ViaCrypt Fires Tim C. May
by ViaCrypt FiringBot 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: ViaCrypt FiringBot To: Tim C. May Dear Ms. May, We regret to inform you that your employment with ViaCrypt has been terminated, effectively immediately. In accordance with company policy we will outline the reasons for your termination below. 1. Records from your company supplied E-ZPass electronic toll booth pass indicate that you are arriving in the city over an hour before you begin work, leading us to believe that you are engaged in personal activities during this time which take away from the energy you have left to put into your company work. 2. The OnStar satellite-positioning service reports that your company supplied Cadillac was parked at the restaurant where you ate with your company supplied Visa card for an hour and ten minutes. Employees are only allowed one hour for lunch breaks. 3. The Teletrac global-positioning satellite has reported that you exceeded the speed limit twice in one day (32 mph in a 30 mph zone, and 56 mph in a 55 mph zone). 4. The passive tracking microchip on your company supplied ID card was tracked by our remote sensors in six parts of the city which we prefer that our employees not enter. 5. Your company supplied cellular phone was used to call someone not in our business database who used his MasterCard to buy condoms at a local pharmacy during a weekend when his wife used her Visa to take a trip out of town. This reflects badly on the company. 6. The company aerial drone reports that in several passes over your home, the presence of marihuana smoke was detected. 7. Surveillance of your company email indicates that you have been using company resources to include private messages such as "Have a nice day." in business email sent on company time. 8. Reports sent in to the company by the automatic modem software on your company supplied laptop indicate that you have visited websites which are not approved by CyberSitter, such as the City of SEXton community website. 9. Video surveillance of the Men's Restroom indicates that you have been wasting company resources by using more toilet paper than necessary, in relation to the amount of human waste monitored during your visits. Also, you twice failed to put the toilet seat down, as required by our company policy of sexual sensitivity. 10. Our monitoring of your user access to the company computer system shows that you accessed areas of the system which were not found to be in accordance with your security level. Our records indicate that ViaCrypt owes you $15,000,000.00 for your 1 day(s) of employment. This has been deposited in your Bank Account in Antigua, according to your wishes. Sincerely, (as sincere as a machine can be, that is) ViaCrypt FiringBot

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Re: Pretty Good Piracy
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ryan Anderson wrote: > Okay - the only difference between this and a normal version of PGP is that > it always encrypts to a certain key-id, in addition to all others. > > That's the only weakness you'll see in it. It's the only weakness that's needed to compromise all the keys. > So stop bitching about a feature that business is going to require before > rolling out PGP to the whole enterprise. I don't have any problem with the feature, only with the use of the PGP reputation capital to directly promote it. If they wanted to call it 'Pretty Corporate Privacy' then the name would reflect its purpose. Security, in regard to privacy, is an all-or-nothing issue. As such, I do not find it acceptable to apply the same standards of promotion and dissemination as with less important types of software. The fact of the matter is, the product has nothing to do with the privacy of the individual using it, only the privacy of the corporation. This is an important distincion which should not be subject to confusion with a product by the same name which is noted for providing a secure level of privacy for the individual. I would wager that promoting a false sense of security, or an incorrect view of the levels of security and trust involved in company software will do more damage than the occassional loss of keys will. Again, the product does not provide 'Pretty Good Privacy,' it does provide 'Pretty Corporate Privacy.' PrivacyMonger

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ADVERTISEMENT: Proudly Sponsored by the Electronic Forgery Foundation, http://www.eff.com ADVERTISEMENT: Digicash Software - Download Today! http://www.digicrime.com I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord ?"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"trustme"} = "<trustme(a)trustme.nsa.mil> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash crack latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"cracker"} = "<remailer(a)anon.efga.org> cpunk mix remix pgp hash ksub esub latent cut ek reord post"; $remailer{'redneck'} = '<config(a)anon.efga.org> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"bureau42"} = "<remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"recovery"} = "<remailer(a)biglouie.fbi.gov> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent mon cut ek"; $remailer{"neva"} = "<remailer(a)neva.org> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub ?"; $remailer{"payswell"} = "<remailer(a)digicrime.com> cpunk pgp pgponly launder hash cut mon ksub ?"; $remailer{"lcs"} = "<mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> mix"; $remailer{"medusa"} = "<medusa(a)weasel.owl.de> mix middle" $remailer{"McCain"} = "<mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> mix middle"; $remailer{"valdeez"} = "<valdeez(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"arrid"} = "<arrid(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"hera"} = "<goddesshera(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"mulder"} = "<mulder(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"scully"} = "<scully(a)fox.fbi.gov> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"htuttle"} = "<h_tuttle(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. president(a)whitehouse.gov is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix reno winsock) (weasel squirrel medusa) (cracker redneck) (nym lcs) (valdeez arrid hera mulder scully) The remailer list here has been out of date for some time, but should be up to date now. I'm still working on updating the web page. Last update: Mon 8 Sep 97 6:48:45 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime - ----------------------------------------------------------------------- recovery remailer(a)biglouie.fbi.gov ############ 0:01 99.99% payswell remailer(a)digicrime.com ############ 0:01 99.99% trustme trustme(a)trustme.nsa.mil ************ 0:59 99.99% mulder mulder(a)juno.com #*#*##*#*#*# 0:57 99.98% nym config(a)nym.alias.net ####**+#-## 7:03 99.95% hera goddesshera(a)juno.com ----_.---.. 14:56:18 99.95% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net *+*****++**+ 11:30 99.93% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ----------- 3:17:57 99.83% scully scully(a)fox.fbi.gov +-+-+-+-+-+- 0:57 101.00% valdeez valdeez(a)juno.com -__.-*+*-.- 7:50:19 99.81% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -----_..---* 10:10:24 99.81% bureau42 remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org ..--------- 3:33:37 99.31% arrid arrid(a)juno.com -- -------- 7:27:32 99.15% kgbvax remailer(a)kgbvax.demos.su . -- .. --- 99:59:59 19.84% neva remailer(a)neva.org -+*#+*--* # 25:21 98.45% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca + ++++++ 39:06 97.23% cracker remailer(a)anon.efga.org + +++ +++ 28:43 97.10% replay remailer(a)replay.com +**-++ +** 9:49 96.75% redneck config(a)anon.efga.org -*+* ++# 10:58 96.60% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net ++..+ * -- 2:32:31 84.34% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com **+*++*+ 1:14:29 58.44% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. launder Supports Matt Blaze's Packet-Laundry: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. escrow Provides message backup services to prevent accidental loss. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNDg5r0TMP00JT6s3EQKSngCdF5V1Ecd5ZA3Xa0gYUDHmHaklorAAn2os muMxWPxHj2VmK9uYtACtZhHx =eWmu -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Trademarking CypherSpace???
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sigh. A company called I-Planet is trying to trademark the term "Cypherspace", even though we've been using it for a couple of years in the cypherpunk community. They're doing an IPSEC Virtual Private Network, with friendly HTML administration; http://www.i-planet.com/P2cypherpb.html . Looks like interesting stuff, and I wish them luck except in TMing the name :-) I looked on AltaVista and HotBot, and the earliest reference I found was from a 1994 article by Tim May. I'd be interested in finding any earlier refs. There's also a line of comic books using the name, and a Java Applet from 1996, plus references from I-Planet in late 96 and 97. Anybody know if the term's been used in print in the dead-tree press? http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/6095/assorted-short-pieces/may-police-state.txt 05-Oct-94 http://www.pi.net/~mvheezik/cypher.html 20-Dec-96 http://infinity.nus.sg/cypherpunks/dir.archive-96.10.17-96.10.23/subject.ht… pointing to David Lesher's article Alice in Cypherspace http://www.insitecomp.com/webdev/java/javasites.htm 7-Dec-96 points to "Cypherspace", a Java Application on a machine I don't seem to be able to reach right now. ============================================================= ==== FROM http://www2.netcom.com/netcom/cypher.html and also ==== http://www.i-planet.com/P2cypherpb.html ======== Introducing i-Planet's CypherSpace As part of the i-Planet Solution product family, CypherSpace allows a company to securely link all of its locations together over the Internet by creating a Virtual Private Network (VPN). This represents an enormous cost savings especially for multinational organizations. ============================================================= Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com Regular Key PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639

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Risks of using usually-reliable information sources in your programs
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been thinking about building remailers and cover-traffic generators, and there's a need for a convenient up-to-date list of remailers. Raph Levien's remailer pinging service is definitely convenient, and even produces some of its output in perl for use by perl programs. However, it's important to be really careful when depending on information like this, e.g. when building it into programs, because otherwise it's easy to trick them into using bogus data, such as the crudely forged article sent to Cypherpunks earlier today. The natural implementation is to pick the more reliable remailers based on "Raph"'s statistics, so adding records for very reliable bogus remailers is a win. The security would be improved if Raph signed the weekly file, but that also requires people using the file to check it with PGP and not just grep out the relevant lines for their programs' use. >X-Sender: stewarts(a)popd.ix.netcom.com >X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.3 (32) >Date: Sun, 05 Oct 1997 18:06:56 -0700 >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: Raph Levien <raph(a)CS.Berkeley.EDU> >Subject: List of reliable remailers >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net >Reply-To: Raph Levien <raph(a)CS.Berkeley.EDU> >X-Loop: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Hash: SHA1 > >ADVERTISEMENT: Proudly Sponsored by the Electronic Forgery Foundation, >http://www.eff.com >ADVERTISEMENT: Digicash Software - Download Today! http://www.digicrime.com > > I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed >information about remailer features and reliability. .... >recovery remailer(a)biglouie.fbi.gov ############ 0:01 99.99% >payswell remailer(a)digicrime.com ############ 0:01 99.99% >trustme trustme(a)trustme.nsa.mil ************ 0:59 99.99% >mulder mulder(a)juno.com #*#*##*#*#*# 0:57 99.98% Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com Regular Key PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639

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Unicorn an NSA agent? WAS: New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dre
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Unicorn wrote: > borderline activity. It's hardly a settled point. That you are so quick > to advocate corporate ownership of potentially private e-mail out of hand > and without argument tells us much about your real position, Mr. > Moscaritolo. Three words: "Expectation of Privacy." Unicorn, In that piece of knowledge smashing, just as you do in most of your posts, you again mixed up things to make sure that everybody end up knowing less than when they started. It is peoples like you that ended up with using Expectation of Privacy out of it's rightfull context. Apart from various rulings of various judges that probably smoked various herbs, can you please tell me how anybody can rightfully expect privacy when everything that permits them to exchange information is *owned* by somebody else and that the use of this equipment is there *only* for the activities of the owner of the equipment? If it weren't of the business, the damn computer wouldn't be there. And beside, the employee is not paid to chat with friends, he's paid to work. If he doesn't want to work, just fine, but not on the company's pay... Somehow, you basic premises always blows my mind. I think that you are a *very* dangerous person. I've been watching you for almost three years over Cypherpunks and e$-etc and other forums. Virtually *all* of your posts have this blow-up-their-basic-premises-and-let-them-with-nothing-but-confusion style. Your style shows intelligence and skill in the way you do it, which rules out idiocy on your part. So, clearly, you have an agenda. I cannot help but having the nagging feeling that you're on some three-letter agency payroll because you have the uncanny habit of disrupting and diverting some important discussion. I always wanted to killfile you but always refrained to do so just to be able to read the last finely crafted basic premises-smashing abomination. So, again, which of the three-letter agency sends you a paycheck? Or are you doing is only for a secret decoration? jfa -- Jean-Francois Avon, Pierrefonds(Montreal) QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest of Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants physicists and engineers, LabView programing. PGP encryption keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon http://bs.mit.edu:8001/pks-toplev.html ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 ID# 5B51964D : 152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C

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Re: Trademarking CypherSpace???
by jim＠mentat.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An AltaVista search for "cypherspace" pulls up a Tim May rant on The Coming Police State dated 9 Mar 1994 on the topic, so it's at least 3.5 yrs old. Good historical reading, by the way... dates back to the Clipper era. Don't you hate it when the pessimists are right all the time? Jim Gillogly

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Re:New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dreamed of"
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Sat, 04 Oct 1997 03:35:12 -0500 > To: "George F. Mayhew" <mayhem(a)globaldialog.com>, > Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> > From: Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> > Subject: Re:New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dreamed of" > At 10:58 PM 10/3/97 -0500, George F. Mayhew wrote: > >I think PGP, Inc. has seen the need for corporations to monitor their > >transactions at all levels, and responded with a simple, effective > >method that keeps the core applications from becoming compromised, and > >thus less secure. As a private user, this doesn't bother me in the > >least. > > You know, you're right. Transactions at all levels on corporate property > can put the corporation at risk. As a private user, this doesn't bother me > in the least either. I think a simple effective method to prevent > potential liability might be to put video cameras in the restrooms on > corporate facilities. God knows what silliness goes on in there which > might get the company in trouble. Mandatory drug tests? Absolutely. > Seems to me that this is essential. Can't have recreational drug users > hanging around can me. By the way, alchohol is considered a drug by the > company. We'll be screening for that starting Monday. AIDS carriers? We > need to know. Never know when this might cause the corporation > embarassment, or, god forbid, liability. What if the local CPR expert > didn't know that Bill had the HIV virus and tried to preform CPR? Can you > imagine the potential liability? God, what about something more > communicable like TB? No, can't have that. We need access to all our > employee's medical records. Absolutely. > God you frighten me. Unicorn, as usual, you twist words like nobody but you (and a zillions politicians) can. You forget the fact that the association between a company and an individual is voluntary. As long as all the tests and surveillance done by the company is known by the employee, it can do anything it wants. Only, you are also free to find another employer. And in the old days of paper correspondence, what prevented a company to give five years of a given employee's correspondence to the FBI? As a business owner, I wouldn't put cameras in the bathrooms, but I would certainly *require* that an encrypting software be decypherable by the top management. Encryption is an envelope. Sometimes, it is justified that management open suspicious enveloppes. As long as a behaviour doesn't impair work performance, there is no reason to pick on it. And personnally, I'd maybe keep somebody with impaired work capabilities but negociate a pay reduction instead of firing him/her. He is free to find work somewhere. This is *NOT* coercion. Your thing about the cops having access to info is an entirely different story. If the company doesn't have the balls or the strenght to resist bullish tactics, then, it is their problems. The employee should simply have evaluated earlier if the company would sell him out to the first spook and choose to work for somebody else. What you seemed to imply when you wrote that precisionless paragraph is that, in the end, key escrow by the owners of the company and computer system is dangerous. But to the company, not having the possibility to decrypt the data they *own* and are liable for is even more dangerous. The data generated on company's time and pay is property of the company. There is no coercion. Everybody is free to act, find another employee or keep him, find another job or keep it. Period. Ciao jfa P.S. For which one of three-letter organization do you work Unicorn? -- Jean-Francois Avon, Pierrefonds(Montreal) QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest of Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants physicists and engineers, LabView programing. PGP encryption keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon http://bs.mit.edu:8001/pks-toplev.html ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 ID# 5B51964D : 152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C

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Re: Unicorn an NSA agent? WAS: New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dre
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:41 PM 10/5/97 -0500, jf_avon(a)citenet.net wrote: >Unicorn wrote: > >> borderline activity. It's hardly a settled point. That you are so quick >> to advocate corporate ownership of potentially private e-mail out of hand >> and without argument tells us much about your real position, Mr. >> Moscaritolo. Three words: "Expectation of Privacy." I missed the original post, but here are my $0.02. I encrypt all outgoing encrypted work email to my own key as well. I would be just as happy to encrypt it to the corporate key. If I was to send some private email from work, something that is not frowned upon at my place of employment, I would simply pre-encrypt it with just the key of the recipient. Meanwhile, I can understand the desire of a company to be able to read old outgoing email even after the employee quit or forgot their passphrase. After all, it might contain valuable information about details surrounding past negotiations with clients. Information that I would not want to be without. And PGP's Policy Enforcer has another side to it: have you ever forgotten to encrypt email that should have been encrypted? I have. With the Policy Enforcer installed, that can't happen. Which may well save big hassles in the future. All IMHO, of course. --Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. DES is dead! Please join in breaking RC5-56. http://rc5.distributed.net/

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Re: Unicorn an NSA agent? WAS: New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dre
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I'm not on cypherpunks anymore, anyone there who wants to put me through the wringer without having to endure my response might not want to CC: me.] At 10:41 PM 10/5/97 -0500, jf_avon(a)citenet.net wrote: >Unicorn wrote: > >> borderline activity. It's hardly a settled point. That you are so quick >> to advocate corporate ownership of potentially private e-mail out of hand >> and without argument tells us much about your real position, Mr. >> Moscaritolo. Three words: "Expectation of Privacy." > >Unicorn, > >In that piece of knowledge smashing, just as you do in most >of your posts, you again mixed up things to make sure that everybody >end up knowing less than when they started. > >It is peoples like you that ended up with using Expectation of >Privacy out of it's rightfull context. Apart from various rulings of >various judges that probably smoked various herbs, can you please >tell me how anybody can rightfully expect privacy when everything >that permits them to exchange information is *owned* by somebody else >and that the use of this equipment is there *only* for the activities >of the owner of the equipment? Remember when the phone company used to lease you your phone? Surely that doesn't make the data that goes over the phone their property? If my doctor calls me at work with the results of a critical test, you believe that data is no longer private? I hope not. You think whatever goes on in a rental car I drive is the property of the rental company? That if some company rented the car they are entitled to read whatever papers I have in there? What about a hotel? A leased apartment? A restraunt back room? I challenge the "ownership gives the owner the right to all that occurs or is produced on or in the property" premise because it is just not a valid one, legally or (in my opinion) ethically. >If it weren't of the business, the >damn computer wouldn't be there. I know of many companies, consulting, law firms, accounting firms, in which employees own their own machines, laptops for example, or PDAs. Even where this is not the case, I still resist the premise that ownership of a computer translates to ownership of all the data thereon. I'm sure hackers would love it if they got title to all the data they download. Unfortunately for this position it just doesn't work that way, nor should it. I suppose ISPs could take the position that encrypted data on their systems must also be encrypted with the ISPs root key. Are you telling me you'd not have a problem with that because the ISP owns all the data on its systems? >And beside, the employee is not >paid to chat with friends, he's paid to work. If he doesn't want to >work, just fine, but not on the company's pay... Actually, most large modern firms I'm familiar with approve of and expect some degree of personal business to be transacted in the work place. Some even state this explicitly in their corporate policies and define the level of personal business that is appropriate. Never have I seen one which insists that no personal business of any kind is to be tolerated. I doubt such a firm would have a reasonable retention rate either. >Somehow, you basic premises always blows my mind. I think that you >are a *very* dangerous person. I think I might take that as a compliment coming from someone who advocates the kind of data ownership views that you seem to. I hope to be thought of as dangerous by those kind of entities. >I've been watching you for almost >three years over Cypherpunks and e$-etc and other forums. >Virtually *all* of your posts have this >blow-up-their-basic-premises-and-let-them-with-nothing-but-confusion >style. Blame law school. If my position on this issue makes me some kind of troublemaker, you better point the same finger at Schneier, who (if quoted accurately) shares my view. >Your style shows intelligence and skill in the way you do >it, which rules out idiocy on your part. So, clearly, you have >an agenda I do. Unimparied privacy for individuals in all contexts. Now tell me how PGP5.5 contributes to that cause, particularly in the current political climate. The timing looks extremely suspect to me. Challenging the premise that corporates own the flesh and mind of every employee within the walls of their facilities doesn't really strike me as something pro-estlablishment or bearing the hallmarks of some sinister plot, unless perhaps one is on a law-enforcement or far right corporate-facist spectrum. P2, the italian corporate-facist movement, held similar views after the second world war, so your ideas are not new. My view is, however, that this is the wrong way for the world to progress. If beliving that employees don't sell their souls to large corporations because they accept their paychecks is evil, call me evil. At the same time I beleve that companies don't tell their soul to a given government just because they do business on a given "soil." This strikes me as consistant. Perhaps you will disagree. >I cannot help but having the nagging feeling that you're on some >three-letter agency payroll because you have the uncanny habit of >disrupting and diverting some important discussion. If correcting legal errors, highlighting the flaws in basic premises and pointing out general gaps in logic, which is what I think I've been doing for the many years I've been poking around on c'punks an elsewhere, is disrupting and diverting, perhaps the "important discussions" are on the wrong tact. Glazing over the messy details of any policy, which seems to be what your "disrupting and diverting some important discussion" clause is advocating, is a rather sly tactic really. "If all these privacy extremists would just shut up about the details of our plan, we could get something done without diversion and distraction." Sound familiar? Always look at those calling for silence with suspicion. >I always wanted >to killfile you but always refrained to do so just to be able to read >the last finely crafted basic premises-smashing abomination. Actually, I don't even usually proofread my stuff. I'm pleased it gives you the impression of some fine craftsmanship, or bears the indications of some grand conspiracy, but in reality its off the top of my head. The consistancy you see is probably because I don't waiver in my principles when it comes to privacy. >So, again, which of the three-letter agency sends you a paycheck? Clearly, any answer I deliver to this question only harms me. I've seen this trick before. >Or are you doing is only for a secret decoration? What kind of decoration? Are you offering me one? (Aside from "Snide Asshole Lawyer of the Year" or something I mean).

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Internet Kiosk New Revenue For ISP
by netpecker＠freemanchester.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Attention Internet Service Provides. NetPecker Inc. is now making a limited time offering for distributors of following equipment NetPecker VM4100 a free standing Internet terminal / kiosk ideal for shopping malls, hotel lobbies, restaurants, etc. Advertise your Internet service and collect cash at the same time. Cash and informational terminal / kiosk now available. Purchase lease options. Retail starting price $4995.00. Benefits: New revenues, leverage your infrastructure, increased name recognition. For more information visit: http://www.netpecker.com or return e-mail: ispinfo(a)netpecker.com

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No Subject
by shiatan＠workline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

F <shiatan(a)workline.com> R <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> (remote destination) X - Start Received: by soi.hyperchat.com id 017b00 at Mon, 06 Oct 1997 13:59:36 -600 (Mountain Daylight Time) Message-ID: <34394257.1CF8(a)workline.com> Date: Mon, 06 Oct 1997 15:56:07 -0400 From: shiatan <shiatan(a)workline.com> X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01 (Win95; I) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Zip drive security... Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit I was wondering if anyone can comment on what type of encryption is used for the passwords on zip disks..i've been seperated from the literature that came with it, but i seem to remember reading that the actual password info is kept in the hardware? and i was just wondering how secure it was (before you encrypt the information on the disk with your own encryption methods).. thanks..

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Sameer Parekh and C2Net offer a $50,000 reward for the killing of Zionist Vulis
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Allah akbar! God is great! Sameer Parekh and C2Net have placed a $50,000 contract on the life of the miserable Zionist Dimitri Vulis residing at: 67-67 Burns St Forest Hills, NY 11375 U.S. of A. Sameer Parekh is the official supplier of cryprographic software to the Palestine Liberation Organization and Hamas. Death to the Zionist aggressors! Death to Vulis! God is great!

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Re: New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dreamed of"
by Bill Frantz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:52 AM -0700 10/3/97, Robert Hettinga wrote: >Comments? > >From: Martin Minow <minow(a)apple.com> >"The new version also includes some of the most sophisticated techniques >for enforcing this policy through the corporation. The most novel may be a >new version of software controlling a company's SMTP server, the machine >that acts as the central mailroom for a corporation. PGP provides a >software agent that will read all of the mail to make sure that it complies >with the corporate policy. This may include requiring all messages to be >signed with digital signatures or include a backdoor that the management >can use to read the message. If the software agent discovers a message >violates the policy, it can either return it to sender or simply log a copy. I wonder if it can handle the following: (1) Encrypt real message (e.g. use PGP or Entrust). (1a) Strip the headers. (2) UUEncode the message. (3) Encrypt the message with the corporate system including CAK. (4) Send it thru the SMTP server. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | Internal surveillance | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | helped make the USSR the | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | nation it is today. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: Sameer Parekh and C2Net offer a $50,000 reward for the killing of Zionist Vulis
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous wrote: > Allah akbar! God is great! Sameer Parekh and C2Net have placed a $50,000 > contract on the life of the miserable Zionist Dimitri Vulis residing at: > 67-67 Burns St > Forest Hills, NY 11375 > U.S. of A. > Sameer Parekh is the official supplier of cryprographic software to the > Palestine Liberation Organization and Hamas. This would explain the "Infidel Inside!" sticker on the Stronghold software packaging. > Death to the Zionist aggressors! Death to Vulis! God is great!

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Transmission Management
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Lucky Green wrote: >And PGP's Policy Enforcer has another side to it: have you ever >forgotten to encrypt email that should have been encrypted? I >have. With the Policy Enforcer installed, that can't happen. Which >may well save big hassles in the future. (This feature is independent of the GAK aspects of the product.) It's probably a good idea to set up your mailer so that it discourages transmission of unencrypted mail. This could be as simple as a sequence of questions: "Do you want to do this?", "Do you really want to do this?", and "Are you absolutely one hundred percent sure that it is a good idea to put this message on tape at Fort Meade for eternity?" But, you could make more amusing warnings. For example, the mailer could convert your message into a front page article for the New York Times and show you what it will look like. Agencies which handle encrypted communications typically track every message sent. We should do the same thing. Most people probably do this in an informal way, but really slick tools for doing this would have their uses. This is especially true when managing an identity. Not only would it be nice to track every transmission in a nice easy to assess way, but also track exactly how it was transmitted, the precise time of transmission, and the remailers used to deliver it. This raw information would be neat to have, but it wouldn't get really useful without an analysis tool. For instance, you could see how much your identity depends on the security of certain remailers. If you use one remailer in your chains a lot, you might want to have something which warns you that you are becoming overly dependent on that remailer. Or, you might want to run "what if" scenarios to see if you would be vulnerable if a particular set of remailers were compromised. If the analysis tool were really good, it would hunt for weaknesses based on known remailer attacks. And, naturally, for proper identity management it would be important to keep a running score for the odds that each identity were compromised and by which threats. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNDh0V5aWtjSmRH/5AQFyFwf+OhIbig7B/njU1yTlDdIuBHs3jpYyH6Ol /+Cjk9X2MbFkYGec3vm8muf1alGI/8ZH+NV73cXry1rN8FqdIY/eoJX5OoRhTQpa ajQFNnSaufbY2xgx45o7S+jFCFGaasInjsvl7q78iH8JL2seXgG3t7HNsK/SZOqD lZynyUqCaVssiSTkDHiZx72TUPJbhUCOvkoKdiy5evQlN7PPyKNmajB9INbzin7z qKqfyyHyFR+Gu618IojassyZ9wuEzbjMStTRMf8TGOo8yJWaH0+W7KX9JHVF3Zdv EjINSw7EBxMAOk83AY9YP0nuLJnwaEoloKifX6D+MmQ+Jx9Js2ocuA== =HUZ7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Unicorn an NSA agent? WAS: New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dre
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Black Unicorn wrote: >Remember when the phone company used to lease you your phone? Surely >that doesn't make the data that goes over the phone their property? >If my doctor calls me at work with the results of a critical test, >you believe that data is no longer private? I hope not. You think >whatever goes on in a rental car I drive is the property of the >rental company? That if some company rented the car they are >entitled to read whatever papers I have in there? What about a >hotel? A leased apartment? A restraunt back room? I challenge the >"ownership gives the owner the right to all that occurs or is >produced on or in the property" premise because it is just not a >valid one, legally or (in my opinion) ethically. Mr. Avon is talking about agreements, I believe, although he is using the private property approach to argue that there is certainly a meeting of the minds between the two parties. It seems reasonable that employees may agree to give up their rights, for example their inalienable right to stay at home and watch TV, in exchange for employment. When the employment agreement is at will, as most are, it seems reasonable that the company may change it whenever it pleases: "If you wish to continue working here, you will have to let the company read your mail." This is complicated by the bizarre legal environment which employers face in the United States. In practice one would have difficulty terminating an employee by changing the "at will" agreement. More generally, it seems a good guess that Mr. Avon would not object to an agreement with a company in which the company was able to continuously monitor the employees communications or activities. (This is why the private property approach can confuse people: this is not the core issue.) >[I'm not on cypherpunks anymore, anyone there who wants to put me >through the wringer without having to endure my response might not >want to CC: me.] Guess you miss out, then. ;-) Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNDh325aWtjSmRH/5AQFfWwf/RfjQ38YvvqNAxkcSTWKhFM09fySjgCvG PlSrimP30jC/dWHAH3iZavS5fn8LE+rfHSHBy5UZyE6xyuyAsJHpMYXDjoQ7gMau vKWHCPCKoxNoi/UNFJ6FQXAEy3o+nBp1pRVupOr/gGFaegCd0tglEyzxCEiFguOf utUGX2X7C5wK2Lwhe+lVJqqlvzkwLXt9UKYzanJc8LZmlAjmcmrPySXC+KSnvfve YHGGqD6+jxxqNxqRVpvCpO4JeJ8O+95O3oCxrOKg7b5SwtOo21qnxkBkFNGyuTq9 YGzQJs/0Ha8Gr9Vk+QiT5CjUAdw+N/uahaPkNWjf1f4SztKpz3y0ZA== =FlvU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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MISTY encryption
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

MISTY Misty is a cryptographic algorithm developed by Mitsubishi Electric after they broke DES in 1994.It is designed to withstand linear and differential cryptanalysis, but has not yet been cryptanalysed. As it has not undergoneintensive peer review, the usual caution is recommended. It is being considered for inclusion into the SET 2.0 standard. http://www.mach5.com/crypto/algorithms.html ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Moderation Revisionism (Try to forget!)
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Those who are so quick to act as apologists for the C2Nut blitzkreig on the anarchistic freedom of the CypherPunks list forget that by the end of the 'moderation experiment,' the mailing list had lost an estimated 6 million Jewish subscribers. It is likely that we would have lost even more, had it not been for the valiant efforts of Dimitri Vulis to warn us about murdering Armenian bastards in our midst. When the Johnboot of Fascism descended on the CypherPunks mailing list, the evil Dr. Sandfort was given free reign to do bizarre experiments with twin mailing lists, severing parts of toad.com's electronic brain into seperate sections, and producing a mutant clone which was passed off as the original entity. Unfortunately, the Electronic DNA of the mutant strain of the list was not stable, and began to disintegrate, resulting in a denigration of the mutant list body to the point where parts of its electronic body began to become corrupted, even falling completely off, at times. After the nuking of toad.com and Nagasaki, the list CypherSpace was divided up among the winners, with the Eastern Block under control of Comrade Chewd-Off, the Western Block was apparently liberated under the flag of InfoNex (although their ties to the C2Nut secret government remain in place), and Texas, as always, remained a seperate CypherPunk nation just south of Intel, with Commander in Chief Choate launching a bandwidth race to keep ahead of the Eastern Block. Currently there are calls for crypto disarmament coming from the peace-loving folks in DC, in the interests of making the world a safer place, but they are meeting resistance from crypto-guerillas who refuse to recognize that the war is over and it is time for us to ask, "Why can't we all just get along (a long toilet plunger and shove it up somebody's ass)." DigiCash remained neutral during the moderation experiment and denies that they are in possession of large sums of eca$h left with them for safekeeping by the missing Jewish members of the mailing list. There have been rumors that many of the leaders of the attack on the CypherPunks list escaped to Anguilla, a small island in the Caribbean, where they plotted an even greater conspiracy to take over all of cryptography by seizing control of the financial cryptography arena, but Herr Hettinga claims that it was simply a meeting of the Bavarian Illuminati. He denies any claim that there were closed meetings in which a secret alliance was formed with the Japanese, but recent activity by Jochi Ito has led many to suspect that this is indeed the case. In my private meetings with the remaining members of the CypherPunks mailing lists, each of them confirmed that they are members of one three-letter organization or another, although most of them continue to deny it in public. Kent Crispin and Phillip Hallam-Baker asked me to please not blow their 'covers,' so I will not comment on them directly. I hope that this clears things up for everybody. Now just try to forget all about it. RevisionMonger

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Re: Unicorn an NSA agent? WAS: New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dre
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Lucky Green wrote: >Meanwhile, I can understand the desire of a company to be able to >read old outgoing email even after the employee quit or forgot their >passphrase. After all, it might contain valuable information about >details surrounding past negotiations with clients. Information that >I would not want to be without. I have never seen or even heard of an instance where it was necessary to go through an employee's electronic mail. Has anybody else ever witnessed such a situation? While we can construct hypothetical circumstances, in practice the need for this feature is rare. What, then, are some sources of the (alleged) demand? 1. PGP is preparing to compromise with The Great Satan, and to have a viable company after The Fall. 2. Secure software is becoming perceived as naughty. Given the insecure legal and regulatory environment in which companies operate, a perception as a naughty company can be expensive. 2.1 Drug testing is an example of similar behavior. In practice, few companies implement an effective drug testing program. External image, then, is the likely motivation. 3. Many companies have a corporate culture of dominance over their employees. This is yet another way of expressing their perceived position. (Perceived, that is, by the employees and the employers, but not perhaps by outsiders.) 3.1 Common drug testing techniques have sado-sexual overtones. 4. Companies may not wish to have their right to read employee mail challenged. (Were employees to commonly protect their mail from employers, the common practice could, in time, be transformed into a right, regardless of contractual agreements.) Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNDhuUZaWtjSmRH/5AQFflAf5AWr65whT2ZM9yzaHxs5lX9ViocBCqr6A O+1FG/2xPzk+o4hf9zeXMTThyKu+iQ5NgcCWd+ocRRPwIsIB3TJuAmxBJ2tgLISZ dqtgDkEyXmoD4Mq+ALpNy0wcJ0Z/q1LUhZErm6gGOPGhkVeVTn8Gscj+qDHJPu2M ji8/9v8pjYRKe1BsS8ZJlirNwMdC5Use6Ig/Z3uOHmEcnMh+jeZmbAyLcGupNzd9 hjh/q7hThyEIN7v5mJVjg16oXJ0ryN1SkbIvnMimx8b8dYs47z5C5HaUZYX2CZDc XicfmAv5w+Y87dE7HQh9hKmOH36c2Ajfw0hdbQTxWWkFmPys6hDdvQ== =cJtj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Pretty Good Piracy
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 10/5/97 6:37 PM, Anonymous (nobody(a)REPLAY.COM) passed this wisdom: >Ryan Anderson wrote: >> Okay - the only difference between this and a normal version of >> PGP is that it always encrypts to a certain key-id, in addition >> to all others. >> >> That's the only weakness you'll see in it. > >It's the only weakness that's needed to compromise all the keys. It seems to me that it should not necessarily compromise all keys, though it does in effect provide for a goodly number of 'known plaintext' objects. Could some of our hardcore crypto experts comment on IDEA's susceptability to known plaintext which then provides 'plaintext' to the DH/DSS or RSA keys and what is their susceptability to 'known plaintext' It occured to me while proofreading the above that in effect a digitally signed cleartext document provides 'known plaintext' every time its used, since the SHA-1/MD-5 can be computed the hash is a 'known plaintext' on the DH/DSS and RSA keys ... is this one of the reasons for the two key types in PGP5 ??? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNDgmJcdZgC62U/gIEQIvgwCg/kybc9ons3ji3cbi9jtSnQ3kptkAn3IC 90pwzjjpt2qqhpjn8VRlrOGR =IIkE -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Brian B. Riley --> http://www.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "Never ask what sort of computer a guy drives. If he's a Mac user, he'll tell you. If not, why embarrass him?" - Tom Clancy

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Zergo Report
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to Adam Back and Ross Anderson the full Zergo Report on encryption use by the NHSnet is online at: http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/ukcrypto/zergo.html (139K) There may be action by HMG to prohibit publication in the UK (and maybe elsewhere) so we've mirrored it at: http://jya.com/zergo-aba.htm Other mirrors encouraged.

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C2Net offers Vulis $100,000 for not talking about Stronghold
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sameer Parekh called Dmitry Vulis on the phone today and offered him $100,000 if Vulis promises not to publicize the security flows that Vulis has found in Stronghold, C2Net's only remaining product.

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord ?"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"cracker"} = "<remailer(a)anon.efga.org> cpunk mix remix pgp hash ksub esub latent cut ek reord post"; $remailer{'redneck'} = '<config(a)anon.efga.org> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"bureau42"} = "<remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"neva"} = "<remailer(a)neva.org> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub ?"; $remailer{"lcs"} = "<mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> mix"; $remailer{"medusa"} = "<medusa(a)weasel.owl.de> mix middle" $remailer{"McCain"} = "<mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> mix middle"; $remailer{"valdeez"} = "<valdeez(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"arrid"} = "<arrid(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"hera"} = "<goddesshera(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"htuttle"} = "<h_tuttle(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix reno winsock) (weasel squirrel medusa) (cracker redneck) (nym lcs) (valdeez arrid hera) The remailer list here has been out of date for some time, but should be up to date now. I'm still working on updating the web page. Last update: Mon 6 Oct 97 6:46:39 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nym config(a)nym.alias.net ##*+#*#**### :42 99.99% redneck config(a)anon.efga.org *###+***##** 1:33 99.98% cracker remailer(a)anon.efga.org ++++++**++*+ 17:20 99.97% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net ++******+++* 11:30 99.96% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ++***++++++* 22:36 99.89% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -.-----..-- 9:58:11 99.68% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com + -***+++++* 52:53 99.65% replay remailer(a)replay.com ** * ****** 3:36 99.57% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ----------- 3:06:27 99.44% neva remailer(a)neva.org --**-***+ + 1:15:50 99.17% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net - + ++++ * 36:51 98.65% hera goddesshera(a)juno.com ---- ------- 4:34:09 97.76% bureau42 remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org --- ------- 3:15:49 97.49% arrid arrid(a)juno.com - . ---- 10:06:05 79.88% valdeez valdeez(a)juno.com 4:58:22 -16.56% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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