December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: PGP Employee on MKR
by mark＠unicorn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

whgiii(a)invweb.net wrote: > No their system does not. For what the FBI and NSA want much more needs to > be done. Really? Read the message I sent after that one. Let's suppose it's 2007, PGP have 99% of the crypto market. CMR compatibility is incorporated into all their products. The FBI announce that from today all Internet providers must support PGP SMTP enforcers on all mail passing across their links, and block all other SMTP connections. Regardless of whether your mail is spooled on your ISP's hard disk, it will always pass through their link. All encrypted mail must now be encrypted to the FBI's key as well as the end user's key or it will bounce. So, tell me why "much more needs to be done". Tell me again why this can't be implemented. The only reason it *can* be implemented is that PGP build the feature into their software. > Not to mention that *ANY* crypto system can be turned into GAK if > the FBI & NSA get congress to pass the laws that they want. Yes, but PGP WANT TO BUILD THIS INTO EVERY SYSTEM THEY SELL!!!!! I don't care that any Perl hacker can write a script which builds CMR into PGP 2.6.2, because those scripts are restricted to those who wish to use them. PGP ARE BUILDING THE FUNCTIONALITY INTO EVERY PRODUCT THEY SELL!!!! How hard is this to grasp? > What PGP Inc. did was provide what their *customers* , you know the ones > that pay their bills and keep them in business, wanted in a timely fashion > with little modification to their current code while circumventing some of > the more draconian requests. Really? Did their customers ask specifically for PGP's flawed CMR implementation, or did they actually say things like 'Well, we want to be able to recover mail if someone dies or leaves the company'? If it's the latter, don't you think that PGP should take responsibility for implementing it in such a GAK-friendly way? You seem be repeating the other pro-PGP mantra 'oh, you're not thinking of the company's point of view'. I certainly am, which is why I want to see that they get the best, most secure system without any GAK-friendly features. Here's a quick example of how cool CMR is... let's suppose that loser(a)foo-bah.com upsets a customer and is working for a CMR corporation. Mr Irate Customer downloads some of that kiddie porn that we're told is all over the Net, and encrypts it to loser(a)foo-bah.com, but doesn't encrypt it to the company key. Mr Irate Customer mails hundreds of these images to loser(a)foo-bah.com. Their system bounces them. The security personnel at foo-bah.com notice all these bounces and snarf some of the messages. The security personell take these messages to Mr Loser, and force him to decrypt them. Shock, horror, what a hideous, insane pervert Mr Loser must be to be receiving all these messages. Mr Loser is handed over to the cops and taken away. He might not go to jail, but he'll lose his job. With a more rational implementation Mr Loser would receive the messages and see that they're obscene, and immediately report them to the security personnel who could track down the sender. But when the security personnel find them first, they immediately assume that Mr Loser asked for them. Now, if you want to be able to get people sacked, this is cool. If you work for a company with CMR, this is really bad. It is also unneccesary. > >These are the important questions we should be asking and noone on the > >pro-PGP side seems interested in answering them. Why? > > They have been answered time and time again, you just have not been > interested in listening. They have not. All we've heard are 'oh, don't worry, it can't happen, be happy' assurances with no basis in fact. Is it any wonder we aren't listening? > If this is such a life and death issue why don't you and some of the other > Cypherpunks Philosopher Kings get off your armchair quarterbacking write, > test, debug, and *market* your superior system?? Duh, because PGP has name recognition, and because by the time it was finished they'd already have a large part of the market. But note: I'll be very surprised if PGP CMR gets into the OpenPGP spec. Which means that any other compliant implementation of PGP will not be compatible with CMR. > Perhaps because the majority of the "PGP Inc is evil" crowd > here couldn't make a buck in the business world if their lives depended on > it. Oh sure, ad hominem, ad hominem. What the hell do you think I do all day? Why the hell do you think I'm spending so much time trying to show people what CMR's problems are when I could be making money? > I also find it interesting how there is "much weeping gnashing of teeth" > over PGP 5.5 , which does nothing that couldn't be done with 2.6, while > Netscape, RSA and the S/MIME crowd put weak crypto on every desktop?? Better weak crypto than GAK. Key-lengths can be increased, government surveillance infrastructure cannot easily be removed. Mark

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Re: CMR versus GAK? (fwd) > Right to monitor
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: lutz(a)taranis.iks-jena.de (Lutz Donnerhacke) > Subject: Re: CMR versus GAK? > Date: 24 Oct 1997 13:01:12 GMT > * William H. Geiger III wrote: > >documents. This is the distinction between corporate access to plain text > >and GAK. The company *owns* the documents. They have a right to read them > >any time they want. If you don't want your *private* corrospondance to be > > The company *owns* all telephon calls mad from an to there office. So they > have a right to wiretrap and record all phone calls you does from the > company. If you don't want your *private* corrospondance be wiretraped and > recorded, prevent every phone call in private issues from the company. > Forbit your insurance agency to call you in the company, deny the school > attended by your children to phone you at work, if your childen is ill, ... It occurs to me that this entire question is really of much larger social import: - do babysitters in your home have an inherent right to not be monitored in case they harm the child? - do operators of vehicles on public roads have an inherent right to privacy about the vehicle? - do businesses have the right to monitor the uses that their systems are put to? - do public officials have an inherent right to privacy about their actions related to their office? etc. ad nausium... These various issues can be broken down into two simple questions that once answered genericaly can be applied to the specific cases. The bottem line is: Does the owner of a resource have an inherent right to control that resource and if so what are the boundaries? Does the user of a resource have rights outside the purvue of the owner of that resource and if so what are the boundaries? ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Internet Child Pornographers Convicted [CNN]
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > CNN logo > Navigation > > Infoseek/Big Yellow > > > Pathfinder/Warner Bros > > > > > Main banner AST. Working For Your Business. rule > > INTERNET CHILD PORNOGRAPHERS GET LONG JAIL TERMS > > October 23, 1997 > Web posted at: 3:24 p.m. EDT (1924 GMT) > > SAN JOSE, California (Reuters) -- Three members of an international > child pornography ring that used the Internet to transmit pictures > of children were sentenced to jail. > > The men were jailed for their part in a wide-ranging, Internet-based > conspiracy in which several children, aged 10 or younger, were used > in sexually explicit acts to produce pornographic pictures and > videotapes, the U.S. Attorney's office said. > > U.S. District Judge James Ware on Wednesday sentenced the three > members of the "Orchid Club" in a San Jose courtroom after a long > hearing that included poignant personal statements by the victims. > > The U.S. Attorney's office in San Jose said Ronald Riva, 38, of > Greenfield, California, was sentenced to 30 years in prison; David > Tank, 35, of Cheney, Washington, to 19 years and 7 months; and > Christopher Saemisch, 38, of Lawrence, Kansas, to 11 years. > > Copyright 1997 Reuters Limited. All rights reserved. > > > rule > > Related stories: > * Officials focus on Internet use in sex crimes - October 8, 1997 > * FBI: Internet pedophiles a growing threat - April 8, 1997 > * FBI cracks down on child pornography on the Internet - April 7, > 1997 > * 12 arrested in computer pornography sweep - September 14, 1995 > > Related sites: > > Note: Pages will open in a new browser window > * Crime on the Superhighway > * Child Safety on the Information Highway > > > > External sites are not endorsed by CNN Interactive. > > > _________________________________________________________________ > > Infoseek search ____________________ ____ ____ > > _________________________________________________________________ > > > rule Message Boards Sound off on our > message boards > > You said it... [INLINE] AST. Working For Your Business. rule > To the top > > © 1997 Cable News Network, Inc. > All Rights Reserved. > > Terms under which this service is provided to you. >

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Re: PGP Employee on MKR
by mark＠unicorn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk wrote: > We didn't say: "don't have disaster recovery for stored data." (Well > I didn't and I don't think Mark did either). Yep. While there are much better options, I think PGP's CMR would be a tolerable short-term solution for stored data. The problem is that it's not for stored data, it's for email (or so 'Commerical MESSAGE Recovery') would imply. Note that solely using CMR for stored data would not require that the CMR 'feature' be built into freeware or personal versions of PGP, but only into the corporate version. That in itself would be a big win. Mark

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Universal Piracy Service
by Dan Fabulich 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

While browsing I came across an announcement for the Eternity Service which mentioned that Eric Hughes gave a talk at DEFCON IV regarding a "Universal Piracy Network," but I couldn't find anything using web searches. Does someone have more information on this? -ACCEPT NO IMITATIONS-

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Re: PGP Employee on MKR
by mark＠unicorn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Kent Crispin wrote: >Words fail me. This is completely idiotic. Indeed. It's just as idiotic as people being killed for receiving encrypted mail in Iraq. It is, however, just as possible, and anyone who believes the contrary obviously hasn't worked for a big company before; I've seen them do far, far, more idiotic things in the past. Mark

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Re: PGP Employee on MKR
by mark＠unicorn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Gee, Mark, I thought it was the SMTP filter that did the enforcing. >Maybe if PGP didn't call it "CMR" but instead called it something >neutral like the "key link field". Duh, without the 'mandatory voluntary' encryption to multiple keys, the enforcer couldn't work. Sure, the Feds could say 'encrypt to the FBI key or else', but users wouldn't be able to do so automatically without getting scripts to do so and the revolt would be too large for even the FBI to handle. It must be done automatically in the software, or it won't work. >Let's see, your scenario involves putting super sniffers at strategic >positions throughout the net, and passing laws that not only supports >this, but makes it illegal to go around them. I suggest that if such >laws are passed PGP's software is the least of your problems. How is this significantly different from mandatory wiretap access laws which already exist? Since it only requires action on the part of Internet providers, it's not going to raise the kind of outcry that other more widespread laws would create. >To make it plain, Mark, I "explain it away" this way: fundametally, >your scenario assumes what it is trying to prove -- you assume that >incredibly draconian laws are in place, Incredibly draconian? In what sense? Having to set a bit in your generated PGP keys? It certainly would be draconian if the FBI passed such a law today and required everyone to dump their software in favor of new, GMR-enabled software, but all new copies of PGP are already GMR-enabled. In fact, the FBI could probably stage a public relations coup by giving away free copies of PGP to anyone who asked. Draconian would be coming around to your house and taking your keys by force. Draconian is not merely enabling an option which your software currently supports. The whole point of not wanting PGP to ship this system is that it would allow the FBI to snoop *without* truly draconian laws. Without the current CMR system the FBI would have to force everyone to change to new software; deployment wins. As I said, 'don't worry, it won't happen, be happy'. Nothing new. Mark

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Forgery
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forgery is the sincerest form of plagiarism.

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IW resources
by Steve Schear 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was cleaning up my HD when I came across a 43 page PowerPoint presentation by Carlo Kopp called "The E-bomb - A Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction." It contains a good amount of technology, use and threat assessment data for this sort of EW device. Very professional. It was given at IWC-V 1996. A good candidate for amateur experimentation ;-) A little alta-vista search brought up Kopp's home page (with links to the above paper) and a wealth of related material, in particular http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025, the Austrailian Air Forces Year 2025 look in to the future, with a link to http://www.xp.hq.af.mil/xpx, the US Air Force's Strategic Planning Directorate. Very good IW reading. --Steve

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RE: PGP Employee on MKR
by Fisher Mark 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Not to mention that *ANY* crypto system can be turned into GAK if >> the FBI & NSA get congress to pass the laws that they want. > >Yes, but PGP WANT TO BUILD THIS INTO EVERY SYSTEM THEY SELL!!!!! I don't >care that any Perl hacker can write a script which builds CMR into PGP >2.6.2, because those scripts are restricted to those who wish to use >them. PGP ARE BUILDING THE FUNCTIONALITY INTO EVERY PRODUCT THEY SELL!!!! But the changes to add GAK/GMR/CMR to PGP (or any other crypto product that permits multiple recipients) are close to trivial. Don't be fooled into thinking that if PGP takes this "feature" out (can't be a bug -- it's documented :) that that will make it a lot harder to add that feature back in once the appropriate laws are passed. Still, in retrospect, PGP's engineers and scientists should have thought about all the security implications of CMR -- they might have implemented CDR to begin with. ========================================================== Mark Leighton Fisher Thomson Consumer Electronics fisherm(a)indy.tce.com Indianapolis, IN "Their walls are built of cannon balls, their motto is 'Don't Tread on Me'"

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The spoofers have gotten more sophistocated!
by vcarlos35＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The people that have been spoofing Jason Bobier, Philip Zimmerman, and Randall Framer have recently become more sophistocated in their techniques. They started with barely disguised headers and moved to equally lame PGP signed messages (that nobody in their right mind would accept, since the public keys have NO TRUSTED INTRODUCERS). Next, they progressed to faking the server-bounce messages to avoid giveaway headers. For example, they did a very good forgery of a email message supposedly coming from PGP, even included the "shival.pgp.com" and "fusebox.pgp.com" portions with correct IP addresses and all. I have a feeling this problem will only get worse....

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Re: PGP Employee on MKR
by mark＠unicorn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

whgiii(a)invweb.net wrote: > There is a simple solution to that don't work for one if you don't like > their policies. I agree; that's why I don't. But I see an inconsistency here. PGP keep telling us that CMR isn't so bad because you can work around it, or superencrypt, or otherwise avoid the company's right to snoop on all communications. Yet you, who believe in this right, support CMR, which can be used to defeat that right, over simple escrow of employee's corporate communication keys. Why? Again, I'm not saying that the companies have no such right. Personally I'd rather escrow my corporate key than see widespread CMR in its current form. Mark

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Re: GMR in the talked-about form here would be unconstitutional
by mark＠unicorn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

tcmay(a)got.net wrote: > I agree that draconian crypto laws are afoot, but I don't discount the > power of constitutional challenges. That's probably true: that it's unconstitutional is almost certainly true, that it would be overturned seems less certain. The question is, is that grounds for complacency? I'd rather see people use technology which can't be used against them than hope that such laws would be overturned. Mark

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Re: Proof IE4 not an OS, was Re: Bill Gates, the Bully Savior
by Paul H. Merrill 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

James Love wrote: > > Nifty comment by Michael McMain on JavaLobbyCafe(a)iceworld.org > list: > > -------------------------- > > A friend at work made an interesting point about MS's claim that IE4 is > simply an OS extension and not an application. All the DA has to do is > turn on a Power Mac, start IE4, turn to MS and say "So what other parts > of your OS run on the Macintosh exactly?". The MS assertion is not that IE only works within the OS. Just that it is a part. PHM

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FYI: Tygar talk on Monday, November 3 at Harvard
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Sender: kentborg(a)pop.tiac.net Date: Fri, 24 Oct 1997 11:42:25 -0400 To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> From: Kent Borg <kentborg(a)borg.org> Subject: FYI: Tygar talk on Monday, November 3 at Harvard Mime-Version: 1.0 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Having recently come out of retirement (my temporary early retirement, longer than I would have dreamed I could have pulled off, was wonderful), I have not hit upon a smooth stride in my email reading techniques. Riding the bus (most) every day means that I am going to be running up to date on my Herald Tribune, Economist, Byte, Science News, Scientific American, etc., but I am behind on such things as the DCSB mailing list. So I don't know whether this has gone by on the list, you might want to send it out: >From: rivest(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu (Ron Rivest) >Date: Fri, 24 Oct 97 11:29:49 EDT >To: cis-seminars(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu >Subject: FYI: Tygar talk on Monday, November 3 at Harvard > > > > Harvard University > Computer Science Colloquium Series > > Atomicity in Electronic Commerce > > Doug Tygar > Computer Science Department > Carnegie Mellon University > > Monday, November 3, 1997 > 4 PM > Pierce Hall 209 > (Tea at 5 pm Brooks Room) > > >Abstract > >The explosion of the Internet has brought with it a >desire to allow information goods to be bought or sold >over the network. Several schemes for realizing this >have been proposed over the last year, and there are a >number of commercial ventures to support electronic >commerce. > >In the first part of this talk, I examine several >protocols for electronic commerce from the perspective >of the distributed transactions. Most models of >electronic commerce have presumed a highly-available >error-free network. I argue for a more realistic model >of commerce using notions of atomicity in electronic >commerce, and propose three levels of atomic >transactions. I will discuss how to exploit network >failures to explicitly attack commercially used >protocols and fraudulently obtain goods or money. > >In the second part of the talk, I will discuss two very >different approaches to achieving high degrees of >atomicity: the first, an internet billing system >called NetBill is being used to allow highly atomic >microtransactions of information goods. This >technology has recently been licensed for commercial >use. The second approach, Information Based Indicia, >uses secure coprocessor hardware to ensure atomicity, >and is being adopted by the US Postal Service to >address their problem of theft of postage through >counterfeit postage indicia. > > >Host: Professor Michael Rabin > > > > > > > > > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNFDB4dL/GwYma/g5EQIziQCbBjVOiEzn11yQKX0htHS2cVCPZJ8AoMXM aMpfEIV0cYxcgdmFgLV0gmD6 =jeyE -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Kent Borg kentborg(a)borg.org W: +1-781-768-2300 x1741 H: +1-617-776-6899 "The creative instinct has always been a stronger motive than mere profit to do truly new and revolutionary things." - Phil Karn --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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Re: Proof IE4 not an OS, was Re: Bill Gates, the Bully Savior
by Paul H. Merrill 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

James Love wrote: > > Nifty comment by Michael McMain on JavaLobbyCafe(a)iceworld.org > list: > > -------------------------- > > A friend at work made an interesting point about MS's claim that IE4 is > simply an OS extension and not an application. All the DA has to do is > turn on a Power Mac, start IE4, turn to MS and say "So what other parts > of your OS run on the Macintosh exactly?". The MS counter-assertion is not that IE is not a stand-alone piece of software, just that it is a part of the OS. (Personnally I can't stand it.) PHM

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GAK on the cheap
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

GAK fans! Here's a patch to PGP 2.6.2 to force it to encrypt all messages to the FBI key. Patch crypto.c thusly: 2339a2340 > ++i; /* Count FBI key */ 2368a2370,2372 > /* encrypt to FBI */ > keys_used = encryptkeyintofile(g, "<leaf(a)fbi.gov>", keybuf, keyfile, > ckp_length, keys_used); That's it. Four new lines, and every message is encrypted to the government as an additional recipient. Don't let the FBI see this. If so, we'll be <ominous voice> "one step from GAK". Add a few SMTP filters and we're doomed.

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None
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I don't think you know who I am, but I wrote this message. These are "my" words, but "I" am anonymous. So I am wondering - who owns these words? Who owns the words of an anonymous author, who is responsible for the actions of an unknown party, and who is to say that this is so?

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Access RC4
by vcarlos35＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Around June/July of 1995, the Cypherpunks list coordinated an attack on MS Access's RC4 encryption key. Does anybody know what happened with it? (I was found a partial archive of the RC4 attack, but it stopped around July 11, 1995)

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Re: Proof IE4 not an OS, was Re: Bill Gates, the Bully Savior
by Brandon Crosby 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > A friend at work made an interesting point about MS's claim that IE4 is > > simply an OS extension and not an application. All the DA has to do is > > turn on a Power Mac, start IE4, turn to MS and say "So what other parts > > of your OS run on the Macintosh exactly?". > > The MS counter-assertion is not that IE is not a stand-alone piece of > software, just that it is a part of the OS. > Odd thing, in fact. Of course, Win95 and Mac are almost the same. They run with all of the same controls, near exact features and functions. It should also be noted that while most Netscape releases come out on Win95 first, Mac versions are never far away. For that matter, Netscape has also been ported to X-Win. Does this mean Win is a Mac copy? Absolutely. Does it mean M$ is bad? Depends. MCI and Sprint provide the same service that AT&T used to, but with minor changes. Microsoft has done the same. Fare trade? Inability to place money into research&development? A sublime desire to have that apple pie that was gone by the time he got to it? Who knows what ethics are in Mr. Gates mind. -Brandon Crosby

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Re: PGP Employee on MKR
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > at 05:38 PM, harka(a)nycmetro.com said: > The "just don't work for them if 'ya don't like it"-argument > will last about 4 weeks...the approximate time a human can > survive without eating. (or a couple of weeks less, if you have > kids) > I.e. unless you are the super-duper, three-times > nobel-prize-winner (with lots of money in stocks), who can > AFFORD to choose employers that freely, you will be DAMN GLAD to > have a job AT ALL, regardless of their policies! -=> Quoting In:whgiii@invweb.net to Harka <=- In> Sorry, your sloth and lack of ambition is no excuse to deny me In> my rights. An employer only owes you to what is agreed on when In> you enter into a contractual agreement of employment. For you In> clock punching 9 to 5'ers that means you show up to work, you In> do your work, and at the end of the week you get your check. In> You don't like the company, or their policies, or the color of In> the bosses tie, too bad don't let the door hit you in the ass In> on the way out. In your excitement you might have misunderstood what I was trying to say: Implying, that the freedom of an (average) person does not get infringed by (privacy-intrusive) policies "because they can always choose a different company" is IMHO plainly incorrect and out of day-to-day reality for most people. (Also note, that I am not saying companies don't have the right to have such policies) The truth is, that even with proper (college and beyond) education and sincere effort to make something happen for yourself, it takes quite a bit to get to a point of being totally free to choose your employer based on mere policies. And that will probably not change for most people. [glorious deeds deleted] In> The reason people like you are "DAMN GLAD to have a job AT In> ALL" is because you don't do anything to make yourself more In> marketable in the corporate world. Do you really expect single mothers with 3 kids to have the time to do it to the degree of being able to _freely choose_ their employers?? Or even Joe Average, who just came out of College and has $100 000 school-loan-debt? My point being, that not everybody is in a position to make themselves "more marketable" to the point of having companies begging for you, even if they wanted to. And that applies to most people. (Congrats to the fortunate exceptions.) Ciao Harka /*************************************************************/ /* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */ /* PGP public key available upon request. [KeyID: 04174301] */ /* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ ... I have a byte, and I'm not afraid to use it. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBNFEsrTltEBIEF0MBAQGb+gf+KsL58w0CKuLLA1h2q62QNarQGjWzfi/u zdgdoNE1+29VHt3wuJ1ybCp6fcTg0RPjXagDb/kwh5WMCSCice7KnFNx9SKdLuPn /9/eRjjKyP+YWjM3zBILMRzf58HqNVy333CZRk7RtJcYt6e6aqlxrIh7T1F/ujMb wYP9n+teDuy0dxh1i3n8354Kg99lfndDS5VTMPCBoS1TmSHbtIGdvmJpc00VuTiw Kk3gJ0l53j4fC/hmWuXacqCypnCqh9M8s4j+6MzTY/tGcs2YJQuAeQ9gVzvSYBKf Oi+lHYxd4rTBGALYf6SOk+k92YvIA8zP99w401So9v9rLYvf7V9+yA== =H2nX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

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RE: Hair loss? Check this out!
by biz＠t-1net.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: PGP Employee on MKR
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Kent Crispin wrote: > Indeed. It's just as idiotic as people being killed for > receiving encrypted mail in Iraq. It is, however, just as > possible, and anyone who believes the contrary obviously hasn't > worked for a big company before; I've seen them do far, far, > more idiotic things in the past. -=> Quoting In:whgiii@invweb.net to Harka <=- In> There is a simple solution to that don't work for one if you In> don't like their policies. Sometimes it seems, as if the people advocating the "business-reality" are furthest removed from it. The "just don't work for them if 'ya don't like it"-argument will last about 4 weeks...the approximate time a human can survive without eating. (or a couple of weeks less, if you have kids) I.e. unless you are the super-duper, three-times nobel-prize-winner (with lots of money in stocks), who can AFFORD to choose employers that freely, you will be DAMN GLAD to have a job AT ALL, regardless of their policies! Ciao Harka /*************************************************************/ /* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */ /* PGP public key available upon request. [KeyID: 04174301] */ /* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ ... The facts, although interesting, are usually irrelevant. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBNFEPMzltEBIEF0MBAQFKogf+MyQ/DGjqtDzS/zFJzl1YX75OgDMi313x r4SJcWam4VW2fgSQ6Jq1CsX8IgTKJZkIJOWzf2HojFS6FLsdL5cRrf6O+dBcBa8t 2i+P5ZIi8zM6G5HqoHr+nGEPlT0MnoYqjeSVIMSdGVugBRuSzZV0R7trxXSvZkUc 9cDu5eOdUsfG3KB3LRy5puktfYhY/YQUwidqJz2TuICpj41EFtzLnHKgjBZ/B1eL 8i7uZCGD77oImmD7Cs3gzmYEwcjyw94lPgHZbory+J+CScFUddmLC8HsyVjUKytQ HPOqV0TOP828FVz/JrZ5KS+oZgvKSMPLY/Rv75XhIZB7uUGTnCt89w== =TL8Z -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

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FBI say San Francisco blackout sabotage [CNN]
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > FBI SAYS SAN FRANCISCO BLACKOUT WAS SABOTAGE > > Blackout October 24, 1997 > Web posted at: 10:10 p.m. EDT (0210 GMT) > > SAN FRANCISCO (AP) -- Utility officials increased security at power > stations around San Francisco on Friday after FBI investigators said > someone intentionally cut power to the city's downtown. > > "It was a deliberate act," said FBI spokesman George Grotz. "It was > not an accident, and it was not a computer intrusion." > > Robert Glynn Jr., president and chief executive officer of Pacific > Gas & Electric Co, declined to comment on whether authorities > believe it was an inside job. > > Grotz said there was no sign of forced entry into the locked city > substation, and agents are looking at records of about 75 employees > who had access to the building. Sabotage of an electrical facility > is a federal offense. > > FBI agents examined the switches and dusted the equipment for > fingerprints, Grotz said. > > The switches in the substation were toggled in such a way as to > maximize the power outage. The saboteur had cut power coming into > and out of the station, Grotz said. > > The effect was that a bank of transformers failed around 6:15 a.m. > Thursday, blacking out electricity to 126,000 customers -- about > 250,000 people -- in a five-mile, mid-city stretch from the Marina > to the Sunset districts for 90 minutes or more. > > The blackout stopped elevators and alarm clocks, knocked out traffic > signals and left commuters shouting and honking their horns in > frustration. > > Police spokesman Sherman Ackerson said the department held over its > midnight shift and put 450 police and parking patrol officers on the > streets to ease traffic headaches. > > Entire neighborhoods lacked public transit because much of the > city's bus system runs on electricity. Bay Area Rapid Transit trains > kept running, but two stations went dark and briefly closed. > > The city was back to normal Friday morning, with traffic and > omnipresent coffee machines humming as usual -- a far cry from > Thursday's chaos, said Joshua Larsen of the Coffee Roastery, a > bean's throw from San Francisco's famous Powell Street cable car > turnaround. > > He had just arrived for work and was preparing the morning coffee > when everything stopped. > > "Right in the middle of grinding coffee -- it was a blend of Kenya > and French roast -- the power stopped cold," Larsen said. > > Copyright 1997 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This > material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or > redistributed.

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Re: CMR versus GAK? (fwd) > Right to monitor (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: lutz(a)taranis.iks-jena.de (Lutz Donnerhacke) > Subject: Re: CMR versus GAK? (fwd) > Right to monitor > Date: 24 Oct 1997 14:01:04 GMT > >Does the owner of a resource have an inherent right to control that > >resource and if so what are the boundaries? > > He has this right until he touchs the rights of other people. So he have not > all rights he might want. > > >Does the user of a resource have rights outside the purvue of the owner > >of that resource and if so what are the boundaries? > > Do you own your house? If not, why do you stop your house owner from > snooping in your flat? It's his ressource. Why do you encrypt e-mails over > your provider's lines? It's his ressource. > > If privacy is outlawed in offices, nobody can work legally. If this is the best argument and explanation of them you can muster then quit now. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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