December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Digital Postage (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Sun, 28 Sep 1997 15:52:22 -0400 > From: Anonymous <anon(a)anon.efga.org> > Subject: Re: Digital Postage (fwd) > Jim Choate wrote: > >> Ecash is in place right now. > > > >True, but there are only 3 systems and it is not clear at all which > >will dominate and be used by all parties. > > No, there is only one system which provides anonymity. It's called ecash. > The other systems do not have the features we want. Yes, but it does not have a clear market advantage. In fact the anonymity issue may actualy work against it. > There is a commonly held belief that one form of payment or another > must dominate. I can assure you that any business will not use multiple protocols unless their interface is the same for all of them. There simply isn't enough business to have very many systems. Ask yourself this, how attractive would the Internet have been if it had required users to install and manage multiple communications protocols for every connection? > This is an artifact of laws which require a society to > use one type of payment. Historically there have been a wide variety > of different currencies, just as there has been a wide variety of any > "commodity." Different currenciens don't mean different payment systems. Even though we have dollars, yen, rubels, etc. the things people do with them and the way the systems are built are pretty much the same. This is why international business works in the first place; they got banks, we got banks. If I can buy a Quarter Pounder (Le Royale) in the US I figure I can work it out in Russia. > >Also there is the issue of security in regards to maintaning > >anonymity when there is such a small pool of parties to use. Doesn't > >take a genius to figure out where to hang out and watch the action. > > Do you mean watch the bank and see who is using e-cash? That might > tell you who is using remailers, but not much else. But who is using the remailers is the point in traffic analysis if I'm not mistaken. Not very anonymous if they know who you are. > >> This is easily worked out between the remailer operator and the > >> customer. > > > >How? There is certainly no clear mechanism in place. Does the > >customer contact each remailer operator prior to sending the traffic, > >thus opening up N opportunities for anonymity cracking. > > Can do! Remailer operators can easily advertise what they sell and > how much it costs without compromising the customer the same way they > advertise their remailer and its features now. Can do what? Anonymity cracking or create a payment system that allows for the intermediate parties to be paid but doesn't over-burden the user? The point is not to have the poor end user have to create a half- dozen payment arrangements to get chaining. It becomes a real hassle to do at that point. We're talking about the people that drive the one block to the store to get more beer... > I recommend that people start pricing at a quarter per message per hop > because it is easier to move prices down than to move them up. This is the silliest thing I think I have heard so far in this discussion. A quarter a message per hop is about 2,000+ times too expensive to make anonymous remailers work. The key to anonyous remailers is not the cost per message but rather the amount of traffic to be carried. Anonymous remailers are beasts of mass markets measured in millions of recipients. And my experience is that prices move up and people expect them to. > >If the operators agree to a system how do we get there? Is it time to have a > >anon-remailer conference to settle on distributed payment schemes? > > Absolutely not. The remailers certainly don't have to charge the same > rates. Each remailer operator should use a pricing scheme that works > for them. But the system to post charges BETWEEN remailers must be pretty consistent to be acceptable. That is the key and it has NOT been discussed too any great degree. That inter-remailer traffic must be anonymous also or else traffic analysis can back-track. It seems to me that the remailers need some sort of anonymous payment server that is put in place for some other reason, that way they don't have to deal with the justification issue. The most obvious issue where anonymous purchasing would be of interest to the regular consumer is to prevent the collection of information about them through their purchases. Perhaps what we need is a business which purchases things as an agent of its members and then distributes them through some anonymous tracking system. That way the only stats collected by retailers are those of the aggregate purchasing requests. Then a member could request the purchase of some credit line on a remailer. The remailers could become members of such a system and purchase credit lines on each other to deal with chaining payment issues. > >Unless it is pertty serious nobody is going to pay such a fee just to > >send an email around. > > What is being sold is privacy and security, not e-mail transport. It > has great value to me and many cypherpunks. If you don't value it, > that's your business. What is being sold is anonymity. It does not necessarily provide privacy and may in fact decrease your security. > >The problem I see is one of scale. The infrastructure for handling > >physical mail is very 'bulky' and requires a lot infrastructure. > > >Email on the other hands effectively rides on the back of an existing > >Internet infrastructure for nearly free. > > You are confusing one cost of doing business with the price the market > will bear. How? What I am saying is that physical mail and the system developed for dealing with it went hand-in-hand. The design and advancement of the Internet technology is not driven by email or it's technology. That perhaps because of this difference perhaps we need to look at models other than the postage one. It in fact may be coloring our perception and a look at alternative models might help. > >Because of the historicaly low cost for email this would tend to in > >general indicate a low market value on anon remailers. > > Not to people who care about their privacy. But, I agree that the > price per hop will likely drop far below a quarter, not because people > won't pay more, but because they won't have to. If it's basically > inexpensive to provide remailer services (and it is), price > competition should reduce the costs. The remailer itself is cheap, it's the rest of the system that needs working on. Furthermore, most people who want privacy aren't going to be saying anything anyway, anonymous or otherwise. The people who will use anonymous remailers are people who have something to say but for one reason or another don't wan't it tied to them personaly. It's not privacy but 'plausible deniability' they are looking for. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Memo From Washington Gestapo Tyranny
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Igor Chudov wrote: >In misc.survivalism, Anonymous wrote: >... >FROM: Representative Karen Schmidt, Chairman [sic] > Organized Crime Advisory Board > >>SUBJECT: Paper Terrorism My hat's off to the genius who perpetrated this hoax. They got the government lingo down so well that for a second I actually thought it was real! Note the total disregard for the law: >>* Distributing the extremist Citizens Handbook to foster jury >> nullification. Or this wonderful excerpt which confuses real terrorism ("Assassination Politics") with paper terrorism, just like reporters and politicians do all the time: >* using the Internet to promote extremist ideas such as > "Assassination Politics" or predicting the date of death of > a law enforcement officer or government official to win a > cash price. Or this section, which is clearly intended as a parody of the FBI. (Brilliant!): >This new purpose may take ordinary ideas to extremes, rationalize >their problems into blaming government, and cause members to compete >with each other to make stronger statements. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNC6v5ZaWtjSmRH/5AQGbegf/VZb2OvJ1BlsN2hdUqFpol/kt9unZXyHq rcc6doRAaSJw95DHgcIDF7ZOCcTOQxUY8Zv8t6Vw6WtJ/lSnIQ2jWn5SQ8I1pyK3 +Zwh+ne5sC6k+ciabaUPaQxWhChdvoyGvoCm71tDOPEUyz2NBmcqXSSY+gE7CeG9 jJfNTQtM585oEssPl6AXUHMd8UTpfrcaCGRWaww2ZVoBdkssfWG/laG9hpkr+zmw OlWT+xlsr0OzrTD2Jq61aeh8xYzcG3OsnPJk3lORWTxThkrj331qoMlYSki2E5Bu 3y5RTgHnDsAb/A7r6tOUlvVvmzz6lsy6eEsAIgZsGugu7wj9Hagbwg== =ns+X -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Remailer latencies
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- David E. Smith wrote: >> If so, what accounts for these message losses? I would expect that >> if your machine was down, even for a couple of days, that the >> incoming messages would be queued up on other machines and none >> would be lost. > >It's more like "of the last 1000 messages sent, 9964 of 'em have made >it back to me." Because of the way I have to have things set up, >there are almost always a few messages in transit. I have, very >occasionally, actually seen my remailer listed at 100%; somewhere >over 99% is far more common. But, presumably Raph waits awhile for the message before deciding the machine is down? If I understand correctly, you are saying that messages don't actually disappear, but they are sometimes delayed for longer than the two days Raph waits* for them to come back. (* Assumption made on the basis that his timing data doesn't describe any delays longer than two days.) >For me, the remailer doesn't consume any exceptional new resources, >so the added cost to me of running a remailer is very nearly zero. >(Those are mostly the "administrative" costs of dealing with >complaints, adding people to the blocklist, and cleaning up after the >occasional spam bomb.) Others, with different circumstances, may be >more eager to pursue a profit-making solution. It could cover the cost of that second line. ;-) If you haven't tried ecash, you might enjoy it. Setting up your remailer to accept it is a lot easier than you might think. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNC6PkZaWtjSmRH/5AQEg9Qf9F+GGZF733IDPbjuRSpIqH5KhhTVJTDMQ JCbzZdwfqvjzRvv6El/xH1y0cMvpcd2xes+QF3HMxRL+XU9tGpQOUwyBHXvTi247 sXB5TfgXLYowOjeR/PbjnT06SBG1ygj2kxe+0CZc9OQWlWgliMQG0OxPw3p/A3On WR7fxnlweRlPiDMZdXq/DMMpDs/Se+ypFpKZriTeS6iWzBG2Bi+F+GKHBEa3V7M9 hnVxGiFE0TnirII0n/h8yFcpQ/ULTG/Z3wqOxyZOvkaVyZlPCAl4mM0AOIWgNeZt HeSk18TERHcRg5u+QeeDRKnNQepeN3UJ5g/NYCGzaRe79f3SMg83mw== =zom6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Remailer Attack
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Robert A. Costner wrote: >The downtime statistic is more an indication of when email has to be >sent more than once to get to Redneck. Apparently this is 17 out of >1,000 messages on the average. To be honest, I don't really know how >the stats program works, I'm just assuming this is what is being >checked. If the downtime statistic reflects connection failures it isn't that useful. This sort of problem is relatively common on the Net and is handled automatically. I strongly suspect it really does reflect disappeared messages. Does anybody know how Raph's stats are collected? Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNC6RMpaWtjSmRH/5AQEl1gf+JU8Pd3hC3J5LpEL4duLAUu9rL68XF3J2 j4f/hQx8ZzY0mDHLuQEIC5Z0S6yJzE26lydye3lZmGsA1WT2LSK7VoLKd3K1ajjD asnK2J3NIokk2ndicgPbzITiBYyL48qJc8nxsbXV6Thzl5nP3JadNyF0QWudibp0 xxOFvmK0xnWA2BXYu8prXqZmfHE4z5i+ccGeZVP2g+EFQ/Dy04KinoMW+IQFms+M iI7iVRKTUmPPCSIoKJ4HZpGzyCGhkaSDBeu/gKkA+AOR9P7B2ZUllE9BMhxv4OEb zrLfbp6fwyJKv36Sob48pm0XHsDeV8mdcT9qM7MtAghryu27J+MfQA== =cIpG -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Remailers and ecash
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Matthew Ghio wrote: >What people often forget is that these structures tend to evolve thru >incremental changes rather than the immediate adoption of entirely >new paradigms. The 'barrier to entry', is often the deciding factor. Good point. I appreciated the following detailed discussion. But, I disagree on a few points. >So, assuming that for-pay remailers are the goal, how do we get >there? If attaching chaum-cash to remailer messages were the answer, >everyone would be doing it. An economist was walking down the street and saw a hundred dollar bill. The engineer with him snapped it up. Later, the engineer asked why his friend hadn't taken the money. "Well, the economist explained, I knew that it couldn't really be there because if it was, somebody would have gotten it." >One potential scenario is "I'll let you use my remailer if you let me >use yours," where people earn remailer credits by remailing other >people's messages. These remailer credits allow one to send >anonymous messages via other remailers. Once these remailer-credits >become sufficiently valuable, they can be sold using whatever >monetary system is popular at the time. Think of ecash as "remailer credits", only somebody else has gone to the trouble of solving all of the hard problems (including infrastructure), and you can get remailer credits by doing any productive activity for anybody in the world who will pay you in dollars. Some people will get ecash (i.e., "remailer credits") by running remailers. Others will get it by working for Microsoft and converting part of their income to ecash. Ecash suits the bill perfectly and it is available and working right now. It is actually easier to use ecash than to write some sort of "remailer credit" system from scratch. >Both of the above scenarios provide the desired end, which is that >people pay for their remailer usage, and neither involves the >(unlikely) model where people attach digicash to their remailer >messages using the current system. Again, there seems to be this idea that it's hard to get set up using ecash. If it were, long discussions about how likely it would be to work with the remailers might be worthwhile. But, the fact is, it isn't hard to get a remailer to accept ecash. So, we should get a bunch of remailers accepting it and see how things go. It should also be quite easy to modify existing client software to put ecash into chained messages. Consider premail. Raph would have to add a keyword to his remailer description table which means "accepts 25 cents ecash". Premail could have a command line option to add ecash. The ecash itself could come from a file of blocks of ASCII ecash made out to cash, which are automatically clipped by premail and then pasted into the message. Easy, right? Nobody even has to interact with the ecash application from the program. So where do these files full of blocks of ASCII ecash going to come from? People with ecash accounts can generate them by hand or by having a program call the ecash software to generate them. Then they can give or sell them to their less fortunate friends who don't have an ecash account. If you don't use up all the ecash ASCII blocks, they can be redeposited. It's that easy. It will work. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNC66rpaWtjSmRH/5AQHVEAf+MZai7O4vzm18BQy8NDjRFzQcvGT8YT7Q lCdY8+NcTIKntsdoLET/u3nZIq8zv3CLKSQMJDwYpBXmgmQtLL4pOct+6noDa94a qTdPO+yqG0LMjBSPPfN0l5f1kggcWQcAHPdLgBu32NQRtQOwFT9sNky9Jb53Vwce 4UGDfZ96DplBVQXS3MP6v7rf0jRH5qnRUAfFLobrtmebDAG20X4OnoFNmbTYeUTw jY5CA7HvKClHHuUUf3p9f03RLq/KdRJ0pegsxx7mGNv0LU78f6yY+olaeyM31suk tq9mDJbJBwCMuIq9x7oHrOFcrifHLMGoll9vPdRZe+MTYxUHV3xpFg== =IPLp -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Digital Postage (fwd)
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Jim Choate wrote: >> No, there is only one system which provides anonymity. It's called ecash. >> The other systems do not have the features we want. > >Yes, but it does not have a clear market advantage. In fact the >anonymity issue may actualy work against it. We are not talking about an abstract "what will the market do" issue here. We are talking about how to get a working payment system up for remailers which gets us great service and provides privacy and security. The rest of the world may or may not catch on to ecash, but if it's going to start, it will start with a small group. I think it should be this one. >> There is a commonly held belief that one form of payment or another >> must dominate. > >I can assure you that any business will not use multiple protocols >unless their interface is the same for all of them. There simply >isn't enough business to have very many systems. Businesses use multiple forms of payment all the time, even in the United States where multiple currency use is legally discouraged. When I go to a restaurant I can pay in cash or use a variety of credit cards. And credit cards cost the establishment a substantial amount of money and headache, too. >> >Also there is the issue of security in regards to maintaning >> >anonymity when there is such a small pool of parties to use. Doesn't >> >take a genius to figure out where to hang out and watch the action. >> >> Do you mean watch the bank and see who is using e-cash? That might >> tell you who is using remailers, but not much else. > >But who is using the remailers is the point in traffic analysis if I'm >not mistaken. Not very anonymous if they know who you are. I hope we are all assuming that The Enemy knows who is using remailers, at least at the moment. There's no hiding those telltale PGP messages sent to a certain short list of suspected remailer addresses. Some day we will have good steganography and it won't be possible to tell who is using a remailer, but this is not the best problem to solve right now. > >How? There is certainly no clear mechanism in place. Does the > >customer contact each remailer operator prior to sending the traffic, > >thus opening up N opportunities for anonymity cracking. > >> Can do! Remailer operators can easily advertise what they sell and >> how much it costs without compromising the customer the same way >> they advertise their remailer and its features now. > >Can do what? Anonymity cracking or create a payment system that >allows for the intermediate parties to be paid but doesn't >over-burden the user? The point is not to have the poor end user have >to create a half- dozen payment arrangements to get chaining. It >becomes a real hassle to do at that point. No it doesn't. Watch carefully: $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek money25cents"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord ?"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"cracker"} = "<remailer(a)anon.efga.org> cpunk mix remix pgp hash ksub esub latent cut ek money25cents reord post"; $remailer{'redneck'} = '<config(a)anon.efga.org> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"bureau42"} = "<remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"neva"} = "<remailer(a)neva.org> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub ?"; $remailer{"lcs"} = "<mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> mix money25cents"; $remailer{"medusa"} = "<medusa(a)weasel.owl.de> money25cents mix middle" $remailer{"McCain"} = "<mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> mix middle"; $remailer{"valdeez"} = "<valdeez(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"arrid"} = "<arrid(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly money25cents hash ek"; $remailer{"hera"} = "<goddesshera(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"htuttle"} = "<h_tuttle(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; See if you can figure out which remailers accept money and how much they accept. Now, in figuring that out, did you do anything that would reveal your identity? Do you think a simple program could handle the task? Also, the remailer can still offer free operation, but it can give nonpaying customers lower priority, delaying their messages by a few hours, for example. This means remailers still have a low barrier to entry, but people can also pay a little money to get excellent service. >We're talking about the people that drive the one block to the store >to get more beer... You might be. I'm interested in smart people who want to protect their privacy. >> I recommend that people start pricing at a quarter per message per hop >> because it is easier to move prices down than to move them up. > >This is the silliest thing I think I have heard so far in this >discussion.... >...And my experience is that prices move up and people expect them to. Mind your manners. Then look around. For the last few hundred years just about everything has been dropping in price. And, in the computer and information industry in particular, prices drop like crazy all the time for decades, even when you adjust for inflation. Buy memory recently? >A quarter a message per hop is about 2,000+ times too expensive to >make anonymous remailers work. If you want to run a remailer and charge a fraction of a cent for each message, or for an account, or whatever, please be my guest. >The key to anonyous remailers is not the cost per message but rather >the amount of traffic to be carried. Anonymous remailers are beasts >of mass markets measured in millions of recipients. That is obviously untrue. Remailers are used by a small highly specialized market of perhaps a few hundred people. Some day, if we do good work, there will be millions of users. Can you think of any mass market which started out as a mass market? I can't think of a single one. But, there are lots of mass markets that started out with a small group of people paying fairly high prices. As time went by, the prices dropped, more people came in, and eventually a mass market developed. >But the system to post charges BETWEEN remailers must be pretty >consistent to be acceptable. Untrue. You just have to know what each remailer charges. That's about as hard as knowing what services it offers or that it exists. >That is the key and it has NOT been discussed too any great >degree. That inter-remailer traffic must be anonymous also or else >traffic analysis can back-track. I may be misreading this, but you do realize ecash is anonymous, right? Nobody can tell who sent the money, just who received it. Perhaps you are arguing that The Enemy would notice that you withdrew a bunch of coins and then make a guess that all those remailers making deposits three minutes later are depositing your coins? That is easily solved by generating the ASCII ecash certificates once a week or so and then pasting them into your messages when you send them. >It seems to me that the remailers need some sort of anonymous payment >server that is put in place for some other reason, that way they >don't have to deal with the justification issue. What justification issue? Ecash is available right now. You don't have to justify it to anybody, just use it. Hopefully, once the cypherpunks start using it regularly, it will begin to catch on with people peripheral to the group, and then with everyone. >> >The problem I see is one of scale. The infrastructure for handling >> >physical mail is very 'bulky' and requires a lot infrastructure. >> >> >Email on the other hands effectively rides on the back of an existing >> >Internet infrastructure for nearly free. >> >> You are confusing one cost of doing business with the price the market >> will bear. > >How? You seem to think that because the cost of transporting mail is inexpensive, the price for protecting somebody's identity can't be high. >What I am saying is that physical mail and the system developed for >dealing with it went hand-in-hand. The design and advancement of the >Internet technology is not driven by email or it's technology. That >perhaps because of this difference perhaps we need to look at models >other than the postage one. It in fact may be coloring our perception >and a look at alternative models might help. The only models that have been proposed so far require a lot of work and evangelism. Ecash doesn't require much work, and it will be easier to evangelize. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNC7PVpaWtjSmRH/5AQEt0wf8COJyUDKDbQCGVlbwKY5DuYaCdmAMQ6X2 7XmsVMzFdhMG0PifCslh5WhXyvFemLU93GSFvXBo/XS3WnzWei503prLWuz7VvEm nDPxTCxcGUYDDejlJbDm7aKtGkFaEnGa8kAExLTDGu/bXcHVetPO2dnSF6civHKe YT5uL7D6c2a+6eJqAmw79s6ClB0WEDG0rByKzO9Jd58SjSGcYmWAnb+SSJsNTgB3 jUgAC6SAJVWvRoKilH+71hEYV+199K0SLiqhmdUmzEntNktTJa6jZEjyfDi2TSJP M6V62Wjb3Y8W3RauUfHvGRRvYsyniG6dct36fQgq9Bdl0GF8VmdYyg== =r8Kc -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Encrypted terrorist plot information
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

V guvax vg jbhyq or pbby vs gur VEN be fbzr bgure serrqbz svtugre betnavmngvba oyrj hc Cevzr Zvavfgre Oynver sbe onaavat unaqthaf. V urneq gung uvf erfvqrapr vf ng: 10 QBJAVAT FGERRG V ubcr guvf yvggyr ovg bs vasb urycf. V'z rapelcgvat guvf zrffntr gb uvqr sebz Cuvy Unyynz-Onxre. Cyrnfr fraq $1 gb Frna Srva rirel gvzr Cuvy fnlf fbzrguvat. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Memo From...(4 of 7)
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Part 4 of 7) >* Challenging judges in an effort to disqualify them on a > current case and to repeat their motions to disqualify > these judges from hearing future cases by referencing > the prior challenges. Translation: "Doing the same kinds of things District Attorneys and U.S. Attorneys do all the time, but in reverse. Not fair! Only we can use procedural tricks and traps because we are the only True Weasels!" >* Scheming to avoid paying state sales tax during a purchase > by declaring to be a non resident and then filing claims > with the state's risk management section if refused. Translation: "There is some controversy over the definition of 'resident' and we will try to obfuscate by casting actions taken by resisters as asinine attempts to deny the obvious." >* Disrupting the court system by persuading fellow jail > inmates to defend themselves as Patriots, thus tying up more > of the courts and prosecutors time. Translation: "Spreading their political ideas to other inmates who then realize that they, too, may be political prisoners or victims of unconstitutional and abusive actions taken by officials. Having all these people wake up and begin asking difficult questions and filing motions we can't brush under the carpet all that easily is annoying our paid hit men and taking up their time." >* Distributing the extremist Citizens Handbook to > foster jury nullification. Translation: "Distributing completely factual and accurate information about the powers of jurors to thwart our use of bad laws." >* using the Internet to promote extremist ideas > such as "Assassination Politics" or predicting > the date of death of a law enforcement officer or > government official to win a cash price. Translation: "Using the bad-awful-whipping-boy Internet to promote the idea that public officials be held ultimately accountable for their actions. Only one or two people of the 250 million or so in the U.S. actually suggested such accountability but it's such a great scare tactic that we are going to hold it up as an example of how evil any of the other 249,999,998 are who resist total overnment in any way." >* Filing bogus claims in small claims court. Court TV (and its non-televised equivalents all over the country) doesn't count, I suppose. The government filing false claims against citizen-units for money they don't actually owe doesn't count, I suppose. >* Requesting information from courts, government > agencies, elected officials and businesses in > the form of frivolous questions in an effort to > consume employee's time. Translation: "We are laying the groundwork to be able to pile more charges on those we single out for suppression. Anyone who is prosecuted for political reasons will, in the future, also be prosecutable for ever having requested any information of any court, government agency or elected official, just as we now pile gratuitous 'mail fraud' and 'wire fraud' charges onto most of the hapless victims of the criminal federal just-us system. Or is that 'federal criminal justice system?' It's so darn hard to keep all these lies straight." > Tell-tale signs of Patriot extremists can often be found > in their conversation or written documents. So can tell-tale signs of ass-wipe would-be tyrants, but that's another memo altogether. (continued in Part 5)

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Re: Memo From...(6 of 7)
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Part 6 of 7) > without prejudice, A legal term found in any law dictionary. > UCC 1-207, A reference to some part of the Uniform Commercial Code. Terrorism can now consist of citing existing law. Great. > pro se, Defending onesself now earns the classification of "terrorism." > sui juris, Acting of one's own rightm possessing full social and civil rights, not being under any civil disability or power of another or guardianship, having the capacity to manage one's own affairs... is now "terrorism?" Since we have to presume that she is not prepared to sacrifice these legal terms for her own use we have to think that this is a redefinition of what is politically correct for a citizen- unit to write in his own legal documents. > united states, United States? As a common noun? Trying to demonize that one is a dangerous ploy for bureaucrats and politicians who are themselves largely functionally illiterate. "Make a mistake in capitalization or punctuation and GO TO JAIL!" God, wouldn't your 5th grade spinster teacher, Miss Anderson, have just LOVED that? "Johnny, fail this weekly quiz and you're going to the slammer for a month! Beverly, you're going to get the chair if you go down for the third time!" > Black's law. Oh dear! The common everyday law dictionary. Of course only nincompoop resisters quote Black's. Real Lawyers (tm) cite case law, not dictionaries, because they've been let in on the Great Secret (tm) that "law comes from the bench." No wonder we're in such trouble! We've been electing the wrong asswipes all this time! We've been electing legislators, thinking they make the law, when we should have been electing judges. Geez. > Analysis and Trends > > These anti-government extremists and supporters are > convinced citizens are being systematically oppressed > by an illegal, totalitarian government. Maybe that's because it's true. > They believe the time for traditional political reform > has passed, Traditional political reform seems to mean "no political reform." At least that's what it has meant all through MY lifetime. > that their freedom will only be secured by resistance > to the law and attacks against the government in several > forms. Sadly, there is probably a rapidly increasing number of ordinary citizen-units coming to this conclusion. To understand why, all one must do is watch the government. > Members of these groups bond to one another and lose > contact with other people who hold different opinions. Nice try! We've been to college, have we? We've taken Psych 101, have we? We fancy ourselves adept at Psychwar, do we? (continued in Part 7)

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RE: engineering infowar disasters (was Re: How the FBI/NSA forces can further twist SAFE)
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Phill warned Adam: >I suggest unless people want to hand the FBI an excuse >to harass everyone that they don't enter into this discussion. The WSJ reported recently on the comparatively lax security of the principal US nodes of the Internet -- MAEs and such. The reporter located the facilities and spoke to several of the sys admins, most of whom were surprised at being IDed, and were reluctant to discuss security. Some did, though, and shook their nogs at the ease with which the whole shebang could be trashed, claiming that for now it was only obscurity that saved the net -- or at least its facilities -- and asked the reporter not to tell the full story. A similar report was written in a mag a few months back, with a focus on the New Jersey facility (with photo), MAE, I think. There was a discussion here in 1994 or so on the location of the landing points of transatlantic cables, many of which come into New York City at obscure points along the coast, into huts and shacks, actually, easily located by following the cables shown on coastal maritime maps which neatly diagram every one of them to warn off shipping and dredging. At that time some of the cpunks associated with the telco and financial industries here (NYC) hinted at even worse security, especially the facilities kind, at the humongous hi-rise switching banks and highly accessible local distribution cablings into dank "secure" cells. I pray that none of these remarks are seen as darkly conspiratorial, but merely chit-chat, like Phill's bark. -- Now officially an EAR violation... Have *you* violated EAR today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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Don't RELY On Bulk Email Servers! Bulk Email WORRY-FREE!
by GoStealth＠DontRELYonAGIS.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: FCPUNX:In response to Declan's questions about crypto.com
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:09 PM 9/26/97 -0400, Jonah Seiger wrote: > 4. CDT continues to support efforts to relax encryption export controls. And that is where you are wrong: We need crypto legislation like we need nine inch nails hammered through our skulls. Any legislative attention to crypto is bad and dangerous, as we have been saying for years, and has just been dramatically proven once again. Business lobby groups are intermediaries, and therefore serve two masters, both the politicians and the businessmen, not one master. Frequently they serve the interests of the politicians at the expense of their donors, at the expense of the goals that the lobby group is supposed to pursue. > We also recognize the realities of politics. No matter how much any of us > might wish it to be true, members of the Commerce Committee were not > willing to stand up and simply oppose everything. This is a bunch of crap: It is highly likely that no bill will go through. Most bills die. This bill should die. Killing bills is always politically safer than passing them, doing nothing cannot get you into trouble. > It was not in the > cards. White and Markey offered them a chance to defeat Oxley while > throwing a small bone to law enforcement. We believe that passage of SAFE > with the White-Markey amendment, despite the problems with the criminal > provisions, is on balance, a step forward in the fight for encryption > policy reform. This is untrue and dishonest. No bill at all is the best step forward, and doing nothing is always easiest to attain. > As always, I am happy to respond to queries about CDT's positions and > tactics, but I am not interested in engaging in public flame throwing. The CDT is ultimately a business lobby group, because it gets most of its funding from businesses. It is therefore potentially subject to the same corruption as other business lobbies. Business lobby groups are intermediaries, and therefore serve two masters, both the politicians and the businessmen, not one master. Frequently they serve the interests of the politicians at the expense of their donors, at the expense of the goals that the lobby group is supposed to pursue. Suppose for example you have a lobby group that represents the widget industry. On the one hand, the CEO of General Widgets might ring them up and say: "We are being trashed by these great japanese widgets, and unless something is done about it we might have to reduce prices or improve quality", and the lobby organization has a little chat with some tame politicians about the terrible suffering the Japanese are inflicting on American workers. That is the way lobby groups are supposed to work, but seldom do. On the other hand sometimes the politician (or a gofer on his staff), rings the lobby and says: "I need a million dollars fast: What potential political action gets the chairman of General Widgets waking up in a cold sweat in the middle of the night? What could destroy the widget industry, and yet be politically feasible?" Shortly thereafter the lobbyist has a little chat with chairman of General Widgets about forthcoming legislation. The lobby group gets a big bag of money, some of which it passes on to the politician, and the threatened legislation evaporates until the next election. To be a successful lobby group, the CDT needs to get its fingerprints on legislation, so that it can make threats and promises to businessmen in the computer industry. Thus the CDT's best interests as an organization are contrary to our desires and contrary to the announced aims of the organization. Legislation, any legislation, is in their interests and legislation, any legislation is against our interests. Our interests, and the CDT's interest are opposed with no apparent mutual good possible. Now it is possible that the CDT is virtuously pursuing its supposed goals, rather than its practical interests. We should consider the available evidence in order to infer what it is in fact up to. According to Dave Barry the word "politics" derives from the Greek "poly" meaning many, and "ticks" meaning small disgusting bloodsucking parasites. In order to be well funded, the CDT needs government regulation of the net. The kind of regulation that would be most effective in ensuring large donations would be regulation that compels internet businessmen to lobby the government. for example regulations that make impossible, inconsistent, and contradictory requirements on those who provide software, hardware, and services, for example a demand that big companies police the net in ways that even governments would find extremely difficult, such as the British child porn crackdown, or legislation which if properly crafted would have the effect of giving some businessmen a monopoly of some aspect of the net, and putting other businessmen out of business, for example legislation that requires case by case approval of software, or legislation that compels the businessman to invade his customers privacy, and also prohibits him from invading that privacy unless he has a waiver issued by the state. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Don't go there...
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.xensei.com/users/hubcom/units.htm

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Re: write up AP for FC++
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In <3.0.3.32.19970927210451.006b202c(a)schloss.li>, on 09/27/97 at 09:04 PM, Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> said: >At 06:49 PM 9/27/97 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: >>Tim May wrote: >>>>I'm now mildly amused that Bell is being seen as the inventor of anonymous >>>>and untraceable murder markets, with clueless journalists seeking >>>>information on his discovery. But, hey, better he rot in jail than me. >> >>At 04:27 PM 8/18/97 -0700, Blanc wrote: >>> A presentation from you at FC98 would remind everyone of your own initial >>> writings on the subject and provide you with due credit (better credit than >>> a jail/rotting sentence). I can't think of anyone else who would be more >>> qualified for this. >> >>Freedom of speech is protected by nothing stronger than the cluelessness >>of our masters. >> >>If you publish your idea in appropriate forums, you can get away with it. >> >>If you go from forum to forum singing your idea like a broken record, >>and flogging it like soap, you will probably go to jail. >> >>I see no point in explaining our ideas so thoroughly and repeatedly >>that even cops and politicians start to understand them. >Try to keep in mind that Bell went to jail for crimes only semi-related >to his AP ranting. >The AP ranting is just the way he managed to attract attention. >Moral: If you're going to rant about AP you better be squeeky clean >first. Moral: If you're going to rant about AP you better have a system in place to take out the rat-bastards before they come looking for you. - -- - --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html - --------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a Charset: cp850 Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000 iQCVAwUBNC5TOI9Co1n+aLhhAQHvqAQAiFDWTe/75ncZKsw+1zqOYhHqa3Igat/c EtLaQK0syZdIJak//qHxuTbva6o7/S+MAeRpwzQIITFWwXqCIF8rdMCZQkm308Au eprjZa1rV8qxYdG7cJBYOUXp6oIk6rNTmK1s9wRG/rnkVXD3OMdW7n8XfAyCGTNV GUsA3iijYNc= =FfZc -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: write up AP for FC++
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:49 PM 9/27/97 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: > > If you publish your idea in appropriate forums, you can get away with it. > > > > If you go from forum to forum singing your idea like a broken record, > > and flogging it like soap, you will probably go to jail. > > > > I see no point in explaining our ideas so thoroughly and repeatedly > > that even cops and politicians start to understand them. At 09:04 PM 9/27/97 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: > Try to keep in mind that Bell went to jail for crimes only semi-related to > his AP ranting. Not too many people face a lengthy period of imprisonment without trial, followed by a lengthy period of imprisonment without sentence, for using a false social security number and possession of a stink bomb. Actually Jim Bell's greatest offence was being broke. I have seen some truly laughable convictions of people with public defenders. He who pays the piper calls the tune. If you are charged with politically incorrect crimes, and have a public defender, you have two prosecutors and no defender, and under those circumstances a prosecutor could convict a dog of being a ham sandwich, and have him sentenced to death by drowning in mustard. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Message
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 27 Sep 1997 21:04:51 -0500 Black Unicorn foolishly blurted: > Try to keep in mind that Bell went to jail for crimes only > semi-related to his AP ranting. > The AP ranting is just the way he managed to attract attention. Try to keep in mind that that is how the government plays the game, here and elsewhere. Even in countries that have laws against irritating the government a hip regime always now tries to prosecute for only semi-related or even completely unrelated "crimes." Maybe you, too, could be found to have engaged in juvenile activities like ordering noxious substances, much to your surprise and horror, after calling attention to yourself in a way that touches a sensitive spot on the body bureaucratic. Although Bell might in fact be a complete idiot and have given them the levers they needed to destroy him, it would be a grave mistake to assume that there is any truth at all to the charges. This is political prosecution a la 1997 in the land of the Freeh, home of the slave. In this climate the risk of expressing any opinion that touches government's hot buttons is that you will be investigated. Being investigated can easily ruin you, being charged almost certainly will -- both pre-trial punishments that make a mockery of the entire set of constitutional protections against prosecutorial and judicial abuses. The modern equivalent of the Crown's former ability to target someone with a law is the ability of the government to mine a rich cache of laws for the one that can circumstantially be applied to the victim. The odd thing that works in their favor is that anyone who practices as he preaches is more likely than others to have vulnerabilities of the sort government looks for when targetting him. It's one of those things that provides the black hats with a heavy strategic advantage. Not that they're satisfied with that, of course. They'll use it, but they'll also black bag you, maybe send in some orders in your name to chemical supply houses, whatever it takes once you get on their list.

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Re: Crypto Legality Question
by jim＠mentat.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Burnes writes: > ACME corporation, a mostly Canadian outfit with a major > subsidiary in the US, wants to roll out corporate wide crypto. > > Most of their network operations are in the US except one > of their offices in Ireland. > > Question (1): Can they buy a strong crypto package in the > US and physically roll it out to both Canada and Ireland. I suspect not. Re-exporting US crypto to Ireland without a license doesn't make it. Perhaps the fact that they're only using it within their company would make it OK, but I'd check with the attorneys. > Question (2): If Canada is OK, but Ireland is out of the > question, can Irish employees simply procure a compatible > strong crypto package from, say, Finland? This assumes Very likely. An American would want to be careful not to give any Sekrit Data to the furriners, but perhaps the rules are different for Canadians. Easier yet, they can buy Canadian-grown strong Crypto from Entrust, for example, and ship it both to their Irish and U.S. branches. A guy from Entrust told me last week that there was some consternation from Ft. Meade when they first started shipping overseas this year, and after they were shown the details and legalities they backed off. Jim Gillogly jim(a)acm.org

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Re: FCPUNX:CDT complains to my editors after post to cypherpunks
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:34 AM 9/26/97 -0700, Tim May wrote: > The larger issue is that the CDT/VTW "players" are showing their > willingness to trade away the civil liberties of us all for a few minor > tidbits thrown (they think) to corporate sponsors. In fact, the problem is not corporate sponsors. Rather the problem is that lobbying groups often tend to get captured by the government. They want to get their fingerprints on legislation, so that they can extort money from their corporate sponsors, and are therefore eager to do the politicians bidding in any way whatever in order that they can get their fingerprints on any legislation whatever. This problem is unrelated to civil liberties issues. Lobby groups for the milk industry, small business, etc, are infamous for selling out the interests of the businesses that support them. I am not saying that the CDT is guilty of this, but the fact it persists in trying to get legislation passed under present circumstances should not only alarm civil libertarians, it should also alarm big business. > Those who work near Washington tend to get pulled into this power vortex. > They become functionaries, advisors, consultants, lobbyists, or even, > sometimes, elected politicians themselves. > > This is probably why EFF belatedly realized that their soul was being lost > and got the hell out. That so few news magazines delved into this is > telling.] My congratulations to EFF, who I have vigorously flamed in the past. I hope that one day I will be able to similarly congratulate the CDT. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: Memo From... (1 of 7)
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Part 1 of 7) The latest spin document on resistance to tyranny from The People's Democratic Republic of Washington requires some translation to be understood by normal human beings: > State of Washington > Washington State Patrol > General Administration Building > P.O. Box 42600 > Olympia, Washington 98504-2600 > (360) 753-6540 > > ... > >FROM: Representative Karen Schmidt, Chairman [sic] > Organized Crime Advisory Board > >SUBJECT: Paper Terrorism A contradiction in terms if there ever was one. "paper terrorism," to be a meaningful term, would have to be something like the dropping of 500 lb. bundles of paper on unsuspecting, innocent people. "Terrorism" means violent attacks on the populace to instill fear and uncertainty. Unless someone is killing people with paper, the subject of this document is pure propaganda. > It has been brought to my attention that anti- > government organizations have been utilizing a tactic > called "paper terrorism" to effectively disable government. It is interesting that "they" can only think in terms of "organizations." It may not dawn on them until it is too late that the future is one of individual action. No meetings to spy on. No informants. No membership lists or memos to seize. "Called?" Called by whom? By government? Notice that this is an example of the definition of a new term to suit those attempting to suppress opposition. It is a standard tactic. Note that there seems to be a key admission in the previous sentence. She seems to be saying that the tactics she is about to describe actually work. > Commonly, public officials are personally targeted. See various works on the history of the American Revolution for perspective. > This widespread practice is accomplished by overburdening > our communications, business, or judicial systems with > frivolous or repetitive petitions, property liens, and > small claims court actions. I thought that those frivolous systems of the government were already overburdened by "normal" business. So now thay wish to suppress those whose politics they don't like by classifying their communications, business, court petitions, liens and small claims actions as not only frivolous, but "terrorism." Interesting. >Enclosed is a brief explanation of this process. If you feel you >are a victim of "paper terrorism," I encourage you to contact the >Washington State Patrol, Organized Crime Intelligence Unit, in >Olympia at (360) 753-3277, for assistance. Note that "Intelligence" in law enforcement means keeping files and lists of names. It means prejudicing victims in subsequent actions and proceedings. It means targeting victims for their efforts at 1st Amendment expression and defending themselves in administrative and judicial proceedings. (continued in Part 2)

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Re: Digital Postage (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Sun, 28 Sep 1997 21:03:59 -0400 > From: Anonymous <anon(a)anon.efga.org> > Subject: Re: Digital Postage (fwd) > Jim Choate wrote: > >> No, there is only one system which provides anonymity. It's called ecash. > >> The other systems do not have the features we want. > > > >Yes, but it does not have a clear market advantage. In fact the > >anonymity issue may actualy work against it. > > We are not talking about an abstract "what will the market do" issue > here. We are talking about how to get a working payment system up for > remailers which gets us great service and provides privacy and > security. That is exactly what we are talking about, he who predicts what the market will do AND invests somebodies elses money will win big. That 'abstract' market motion is EXACTLY what the market will do in practice. In other words it's the service you will be buying because the people with the money think it will make them money off your willingness to spend your money. As I have said before, privacy and security are not issues in remailers. Being able to plausibly deny any involvement is, a subtle but important difference. > The rest of the world may or may not catch on to ecash, but if it's > going to start, it will start with a small group. I think it should > be this one. It will not start with a small group. Anonymous remailers are big traffic - big buck operations in the long run. The price per message must be in the milli-cent range which means the traffic must be in the mega-message range to make money; simple multiplication. > Businesses use multiple forms of payment all the time, even in the > United States where multiple currency use is legally discouraged. It isn't a question of which currency you use - that is NOT the same as the economic system in place. Businesses may use dollars or dinars but at the end of the day they put them in a bank which at least at times follows international agreements on banking. This is why we can transfer money from one denomination to another. > When I go to a restaurant I can pay in cash or use a variety of credit > cards. And credit cards cost the establishment a substantial amount > of money and headache, too. Yes, but that is not a different system. You are still taking money from your bank account (on loan from a bank if through a CC) and putting it in somebody elses bank account. The banks define our system of economics to a great degree. Banks don't like anonymous transactions so whatever system we put in place must buy the support of the traditional financial institutions at some point. How do you convince a bank that anonymous cash transactions are in their best interest? > I hope we are all assuming that The Enemy knows who is using > remailers, at least at the moment. If they do then the users aren't anonymous anymore and hence any 'security' or 'privacy' they may derive is one of delusion. > There's no hiding those telltale > PGP messages sent to a certain short list of suspected remailer > addresses. Some day we will have good steganography and it won't be > possible to tell who is using a remailer, but this is not the best > problem to solve right now. Stego won't be any harder to detect than a PGP encrypted message. > >Can do what? Anonymity cracking or create a payment system that > >allows for the intermediate parties to be paid but doesn't > >over-burden the user? The point is not to have the poor end user have > >to create a half- dozen payment arrangements to get chaining. It > >becomes a real hassle to do at that point. > > No it doesn't. Watch carefully: > > $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; > $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; > $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; > $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek money25cents"; > $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord ?"; > $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; > $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; > $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; > $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; > $remailer{"cracker"} = "<remailer(a)anon.efga.org> cpunk mix remix pgp hash ksub esub latent cut ek money25cents reord post"; > $remailer{'redneck'} = '<config(a)anon.efga.org> newnym pgp'; > $remailer{"bureau42"} = "<remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent cut ek"; > $remailer{"neva"} = "<remailer(a)neva.org> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub ?"; > $remailer{"lcs"} = "<mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> mix money25cents"; > $remailer{"medusa"} = "<medusa(a)weasel.owl.de> money25cents mix middle" > $remailer{"McCain"} = "<mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> mix middle"; > $remailer{"valdeez"} = "<valdeez(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; > $remailer{"arrid"} = "<arrid(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly money25cents hash ek"; > $remailer{"hera"} = "<goddesshera(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; > $remailer{"htuttle"} = "<h_tuttle(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; I guarantee that neither your mother or mine will look twice at that gobbeldy-gook. Hell, I won't use it because I have to create such files every damn time I have to send a message. Too much work, too much room for errors. When you can arrange to chain remailers without the user having to touch the above you will have a winner. KISS > See if you can figure out which remailers accept money and how much > they accept. Now, in figuring that out, did you do anything that > would reveal your identity? Do you think a simple program could > handle the task? Actualy, yes I did do something to reveal my identity. I have to pass that entire list of chaining along to the first remailer who passes it along to the second minus the first entry and so on. If I can grab a single remailer in that chain I can back track because that remailer knows where that list came from. To really make chaining secure neither the user or the individual operators should have a say in it. > You might be. I'm interested in smart people who want to protect > their privacy. Then they won't use remailers at all. A smart person is not going to trust any 3rd party channel they don't have total control over. A smart person is not going to get involved in a conflict in the first place. The situation is sort of like the comparison between reasonable and un-reasonable men. Progress is caused by the un-reasonable man. If the commercial remailer is ever going to arise (which I doubt) it will be one of 'regular joe's' as users and must be about as complicated as getting a coke from a machine (which is a long way off currently). > >This is the silliest thing I think I have heard so far in this > >discussion.... > >...And my experience is that prices move up and people expect them to. > > Mind your manners. I am, that doesn't mean I can't call a spade a spade. I didn't say anything about you personaly, deal with it. > Then look around. For the last few hundred years just about > everything has been dropping in price. Really? I suggest you look at newspapers from say the mid-60's and compare them to now. Very few things will be anywhere close to where it was then in price, and the vast majority will not be lower. Bread went up, water went up, electricity went up, etc. > And, in the computer and > information industry in particular, prices drop like crazy all the > time for decades, even when you adjust for inflation. Buy memory > recently? No, prices don't drop the machines that used to cost the current price aren't made anymore. Any entry level machine costs about $1,000 just like it did 10 years ago. The difference is that you get a lot more hardware and a new os. Again, a minor but important distinction. Yes, I have bought memory recently - 64M as a matter of fact. The memory has dropped in price because the new machines don't take it anymore or else the motherboards with the new many-megs-required OS's won't work on 8M anymore. Theres no mystery other than obsolescence at play. Try buying one of the new 4G DRAM's.... > If you want to run a remailer and charge a fraction of a cent for each > message, or for an account, or whatever, please be my guest. I looked into it for several months about a year and a half ago. The result was the current economic, social, and legal environment simply aren't going to support such operations in the near future with anything like the indipendance that we would like. Hell, your the one offering $50 or somesuch for a commercial remailer. Take that $50 and set up your own site. Nothing like experience to teach a hard lesson. If you're right you should be making money in short order. > >The key to anonyous remailers is not the cost per message but rather > >the amount of traffic to be carried. Anonymous remailers are beasts > >of mass markets measured in millions of recipients. > > That is obviously untrue. Remailers are used by a small highly > specialized market of perhaps a few hundred people. Some day, if we > do good work, there will be millions of users. While remailers may be, commercial remailers still don't exist and are a completely different beast than some philanthropic enterprise. If you don't get the millions up front you won't be getting anyone. The other aspect you seem to ignore consistently is not the cost to submit the original message but the cost to send that message to the world, the real cost I might add. The purpose of commercial remailers (and I suspect all remailers) is to reach a mass market. If your market can't reach millions for pennies nobody will use it because you can't give them what they want. Whether its drugs, sex information, or political views the central party must reach a large group to succeed. > Can you think of any mass market which started out as a mass market? > I can't think of a single one. Once the pioneers worked out the technology: Cable television, music videos, automobiles, air transport, bicycles, telephones. > >But the system to post charges BETWEEN remailers must be pretty > >consistent to be acceptable. > > Untrue. You just have to know what each remailer charges. That's > about as hard as knowing what services it offers or that it exists. Only if you feel obliged to arrange payment between the remailers yourself, which provides a link between remailers and you further eroding your expectation of anonymity. The point, which you miss, is that the chaining remailers should know nothing of the original user which your system fails to do. > >That is the key and it has NOT been discussed too any great > >degree. That inter-remailer traffic must be anonymous also or else > >traffic analysis can back-track. > > I may be misreading this, but you do realize ecash is anonymous, > right? Nobody can tell who sent the money, just who received it. ecash is anonymous but it is not an accepted standard between remailers, let along commercial ones. Furthermore, under your system I as a user must contact each remailer and arrange payment to some account. So we know not only who received it but who sent it as well, otherwise how does the remailer know to take your payment and apply it to your account and not mine?. If we further accept your premise that mallet knows who is using those remailers then we are completely devoid of anonymity. > Perhaps you are arguing that The Enemy would notice that you withdrew > a bunch of coins and then make a guess that all those remailers making > deposits three minutes later are depositing your coins? That is > easily solved by generating the ASCII ecash certificates once a week > or so and then pasting them into your messages when you send them. I am arguing that under the current system the checks and balances are such that true anonymity can't be attained on a scale that is commercialy feasible. > >It seems to me that the remailers need some sort of anonymous payment > >server that is put in place for some other reason, that way they > >don't have to deal with the justification issue. > > What justification issue? Ecash is available right now. You don't > have to justify it to anybody, just use it. Really? How about explaining how I purchase a car or house anonymously with ecash? I can't. Also, you seem to have missed an important point. When we get a system where anon remailers can survive we will have created an anonymous money laundry, not something that a lot of people want or desire. > Hopefully, once the cypherpunks start using it regularly, it will > begin to catch on with people peripheral to the group, and then with > everyone. If this were true it would have already happend. The thousand or so people on this list might be involved in the technology and its application, I doubt that we will have any say in its eventual success. > >> You are confusing one cost of doing business with the price the market > >> will bear. > > > >How? > > You seem to think that because the cost of transporting mail is > inexpensive, the price for protecting somebody's identity can't be > high. First, you don't know what I think - ask questions don't make assumptions (speaking of manners). Please keep your ad hominims at home. What I am saying is that because the cost of individual mail is low I as a commercial business trying to make a living off each of those emails can't expect a lot from them, therefore I need a lot of them. > >What I am saying is that physical mail and the system developed for > >dealing with it went hand-in-hand. The design and advancement of the > >Internet technology is not driven by email or it's technology. That > >perhaps because of this difference perhaps we need to look at models > >other than the postage one. It in fact may be coloring our perception > >and a look at alternative models might help. > > The only models that have been proposed so far require a lot of work > and evangelism. Ecash doesn't require much work, and it will be > easier to evangelize. ecash is not what I am talking about here. Which by the way will take a lot of work to get people to use it as ubiquitously as needed by a commercial remailer. I am talking about the entire infrastructure that will be required to support commercial remailers. What will be required is not clear to anyone involved in the issues. I furthermore don't have any interest in religion (re evangalism) but rather in running a business and making money. I don't want to change your mind, I want you to spend your money with me (as an anon remailer operator) with the security that no matter what you submit it can't be traced back to you. Even your much vaunted ecash can't do that yet. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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InfoWar 23 (Part III of 'The True Story of the InterNet')
by Bubba Sho'nuff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Remailers and ecash (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Mon, 29 Sep 1997 00:43:20 -0400 > From: "Robert A. Costner" <pooh(a)efga.org> > Subject: Re: Remailers and ecash > The first answer I got was so that remailer reliability could increase. > The theory as I understood it was that remailers were run like a hobby, not > a business, so the money would be an incentive to bring in professionalism. > So I proposed, and documented, that the minimum level to achieve this > would be a $50K investment over a year's time. This is in fact, more or > less what the Cracker remailer takes to run. Most of the resources are > donated in some way, but this is their equivalent retail value. Even so, > with Monty's pricing structure and Cracker's current level of traffic it > would be enormously profitable. I have to disagree on the annual cost to run. Considering the load of remailers a simple ISDN would be sufficient. With that instead of a T1 it takes less than $1,000 a month to operate a machine full-time. Approximately 1/4 of your estimate. I agree further that remailers COULD make a profit under current conditions IF the financial institutions accepted anonymous transactions (let's not even get into the LEA's and tax agents) from both source and destination; they don't. I personaly found the legal issues the most daunting considering my income and cash reserves. It would not take more than one or two nuisance suites to put a small operator out of the game permanantly. One of the critical aspects of successful small business operation is a stable financial environment, I don't think you can have that visiting the lawyer every few weeks. > In my opinion, and I've been known to be wrong, this is a seriously messed > up comment. A quarter per message is too much, much less a quarter per > hop. A price of 1/100 of a penny per message is closer to a proper > valuation. This is larger than my guess at a fair market per msg value. Considering your price does your remailer get enough traffic to pay your $50k a year? > But the problem here is in the pricing model. It should not be > transactional unless to encourage the very casual user. A pricing model > should be flat rate. One price for a month, or even a year's service. Of coure it should be transactional and the only way to get it going full speed is to grab the casual user. Consider that an email is a transaction, it isn't like a phone line that may actualy handle many users over a given time. Email has one source and one to many destinations. The problem with flat rate is it underestimates the impact of large remailings when the population is itself millions. Furthermore, under a flat rate model each remailer in the chain gets less if the number of remailers grows. This runs contrary to what the user wants for anonymity retention which is a lot of links in the chain. The user should be the one to decide how many and how much that is worth to them. > The > net is based on a peering price structure, not an inter-lata structure. > Trying to compute or add charges at each hop is against the nature of > information flow for the net. It sounds to me like what you are saying is that since email (a one-time event) is a service of the Internet, however the Internet (a long-term structure of computers forming backbones with more transient leaf nodes) can survive flat rate pricing because the limitations of a piece of hardware are known and can be figured in. The number of users and the amount of remailing can't necessarily be known before hand. Furthermore, assuming a commercial model I would certainly have saturating my pipes a goal. > There is some truth in this statement. But there are also remailers run by > a variety of companies such as hotmail, juno, and the like. They encompass > millions of users. Millions of users who want a remailer, but will not > tolerate the level of entry required for a Type-I or Mixmaster remailer. > Until client software can be improved and made as easy to use as an > integrated spelling checker, the "advanced" remailers will have no true > market share. (Oh, I forgot. Most of the world uses email clients without > integrated spell checkers.) It further seems to me that to make that software simple and easy to use a lot of 'decisions' have to be made for me. That indicates to me some sort of standards and the implied organizations that set them for the remailers. And contrary to what some would have you believe, those organizations and standards do not necessarily imply great submissions on the part of the participants indipendance. Consider the types of questions that needed to be answered to get the CDR up and going. Such an organization would probably suffice for the initial boot-strap. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Memo From...(7 of 7)
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Part 7 of 7) > The isolation works to reinforce their views, which in > turn gives them new purpose. Translation: "We think we have a really, really clever protoargument here for nullifying the right to peaceably assemble. If we can characterize the resisters as nut cases we can make the argument that they cannot be allowed the right to assemble because they reinforce each other's illness. Isn't that neat-o?" >This new purpose may take ordinary ideas to extremes, rationalize >their problems into blaming government, and cause members to >compete with each other to make stronger statements. Translation: "Just as happened in the 1770's. We can't have anything like THAT happening here and now, can we? That was THEN, this is NOW! SHUT UP and SIT DOWN!" > Trend and Incident Reporting > > If you become victimized by paper terrorism, contact the > Washington State Patrol Organized Crime Intelligence Unit at > (360) 753-3277, extension 121. All acts reaching a criminal > level should be referred to your local law enforcement agency or > prosecutor's office. She never mentioned "Paper Terrorism" perpetrated by government agencies, did she? Would anyone care to hazard a guess as to the relative magnitude of government victimizing citizen-units vs citizen-units snapping at the heels of government by means of the tactics she lists above? 1,000-to-1? 100,000-to-1? Karen's definition of what constitutes "Paper Terrorism" is, basically, anything in the way of communication, court pleadings, cases, liens, etc. that the government doesn't like. If she wants to fly with a subjective definition then she can't very well argue against the subjective view of citizen-units who feel they are being terrorized by numerous and multitudinous, often false or frivolous communications, court pleadings, suits, charges, liens, seizures, convictions, sentences, fines, etc. Their subjective views are at least as valid as Karen's or the government's. (She's an elected ass-wipe, but she's OUR elected ass-wipe! If we want to elect someone on the Totalitarian ticket, that's our right. There's no law that says a Representative has to represent our interests.)

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Re: Memo From...(3 of 7)
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Part 3 of 7) > Paper terrorism has grown from a trend to a full scale > tactic used upon businesses, private individuals, > government services and elected officials. Translation: "There are signs the resistance is growing and becoming widespread." >Background > >Paper terrorism is designed to clog government services with >meaningless requests which consume time and disrupt schedules. >In the private sector paper terrorism is an attempt to extort >money, goods or services. As if the other requests they would like to be handling are not meaningless? Let's face it: Except as it provides them job security, bureaucrats regard all requests of any kind from citizen-units as meaningless, consumptive of time and disruptive of schedules. Nor can a government that is increasingly jailing its citizen-units and seizing their property without just cause or due process make even a thin claim to be concerned about "the private sector." > Some examples of paper terrorism activities: > >* Bogus liens placed upon personal property of government > officials and private individuals. Translation: "Last-ditch attempts to make officials accountable for their tyrranical actions. When citizen-units have been outrageously damaged by unaccountable officials they sometimes resort to filing liens against those responsible." >* Frivolous lawsuits filed in state and federal courts against > businesses and government entices [sic]. Translation: "Lawsuits with which those in power disagree." If it doesn't muss their hair they could care less if you sue someone for serving you hot coffee that's advertized as hot coffee or sue the manufacturer of a machine that has passed through 30 years of ownership and maintenance of dozens of third parties just because you were stupid enough to put your fingers in the gears. But sue a bureaucrat for being stupid, arrogant, abusive, vindictive and destructive of your rights and watch out! That's FRIVOLOUS! Apparently it's also now "terrorism." >* Drafting and passing counterfeit bank checks and other > fraudulent negotiable instruments aimed at defrauding > the financial community and businesses. Translation: "Devising well-researched instruments such as Public Order Money Certificates, payable the very moment lawful money is put back into circulation." She would have us think that resisters are out there writing bad checks, something only the government is allowed to do with impunity. >* Common Law Courts that issue homemade subpoenas > to citizens, businesses and government officials. Homemade? That's cute. Various common law entities have been created by various folk in the last 10-15 years in desperate attempts to put SOMETHING in place that would function lawfully and constitutionally. A few of those have been on the fringe, and those are the only ones that will ever be cited as examples, of course. Never mind that all the townships and other little political units all over the country were formed pretty much the same way. "That was THEN and this is NOW and WE ARE IN CHARGE! SHUT UP and SIT DOWN!" Don't you love government as we head into the 21st Century, the century which will see the final extinguishing of the light of freedom if people don't get off their asses and do something? (continued in Part 4)

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noise spheres
by Laszlo Vecsey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Are there any texts available on interpreting patterns found in noise spheres? - lv

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