December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: encryption laws
by Steffen Zahn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 15 Jul 1993, Allan Thompson wrote: > Would it be possible for a court to subpeona a encrypted file or key, > and order you to tell them the key ? > If you didn't would you be held in 'contempt of court' ? How about claiming that you used a OTP and then revealing the key? Or should I say a key? Regards Steffen -- home email: domain: berlin.snafu.de, user: zahn To send email to me combine user@domain above to construct my address. Use of my address for unsolicited commercial advertising is forbidden.

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Key Recovery War
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A couple of news reports on the Key Recovery critique by Blaze et al from NYT and C|Net: http://jya.com/krnews.htm Both cite Reinsch of BXA's counter-critique. And another report on Sybase getting BXA approval for export of 56-bit crypto without key recovery. However, it's only for data storage not communication. The story also reports that Sybase will be allowed to export 128-bit crypto with a key recovery plan. http://jya.com/krnews2.txt And, baiting another barb, Senator Kerrey has entered the outline of his crypto bill in the Congressional Record, along with a statement on natsec and commerce and privacy need: http://jya.com/kerrey3.txt So the Administration seems to be tickling the market, sending up balloons, wet fingering the air, pulling head out, and so forth, to see who might be induced to succumb to the strategem of bait-and-bribe, trot-line eager minnows of ga-ga commerce in the national interest, ahem, like those survivalist national labs, Bell Labs, Lincoln Labs, Mitres, SAICs, and, their patrons at National Security councils, departments of commerce, defense, state, energy, justice, et al. Tim and Blanc are right, it's no holds barred Dual-Use Civil-National Security War for the nation's goodies, no matter what fur's feigned to outfox the hounds and poachers and encroachers. It would be swell if the NLs truly competed with industry, but not likely with all those federal advisory groups eyeing and spying and lying each other.

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Re: Why I think Jim Bell is getting railroaded
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From what I have read, the elements of the conspiracy offence are a plan to commit a crime involving multiple individuals, and at least one overt act taken in furtherance of the plan. For example, if people get together and plan a kidnapping, then one member goes out and buys some rope, that could be enough to represent conspiracy to commit kidnapping. You don't actually have to do the kidnapping to be convicted on conspiracy. If Bell got together with his friend and talked about disabling government computers with "carbon fibers" (whatever those are), and he then goes out and buys a source of carbon fibers, a case could be made that this would represent the crime of conspiracy. (We don't know yet whether either of these thing actually happened, of course.) Now his lawyer can argue that the conversation was purely hypothetical speculation of the type which technically minded people commonly engage in, and the carbon fiber source (if it exists) was acquired out of curiosity based on the discussion. Then it would be up to the jury to decide whether Bell's actions actually were part of a planned crime or not. In this context his writings and hostile relations with government agencies could conceivably be used against him, if his lawyer did try to argue that his conversations were just innocent speculation. Hal

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Cypherpunk criminalization
by Michael Wilson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The occasion of Jim Bell's arrest provides an opportunity to consider a number of points: Are Federal Agents Evil? Why is there an attempt to persecute Jim Bell, one that has many similarities to the Olympic Park Bombing rush-to-judgment, Ruby Ridge, Waco, OK City, etc.? Are we to believe that government agents are 'evil,' or True Believers that _we_ (those who are _not_ true believers) are evil? I personally think not. I think we are seeing a phenomenon that is rather simple--government agents will tend to pursue cases that may get them recognition or promotion. People like Jim Bell pass some mobile threshold where their case is media 'hot' or sexy enough to make it worth pursuing--the Feds get a collar and media attention, a prosecutor gets similar benefits, judges are notoriously easy to inflame for the proper paperwork to be obtained, etc. Are the rest of the cypherpunks at risk? Looking at it with my game theorist hat on, I suspect not--while Tim May has been pushing the envelope recently, I don't think he's crossed any line would allow the appearance of a 'good bust,' nor has anyone else on the list (to my direct knowledge). I think we're witnessing a bit of the same mentality that literally did allow the operation of the Nazis--they're just doing their job, just following orders, just being part of their bureaucracy, with perhaps a few True Believers to leaven the mix. Technology vs. Public Relations/Propaganda Cypherpunks write code, we hear it often enough as the credo of the 'movement.' On the other hand, as valuable a social service as it actually has been, the war is being fought on other terms. Crypto has been characterized as 'offensive' technology, in two senses of the term--a regulated weapons technology, and a socially unacceptable act. This manifests in the 'what have you got to hide' mentality, coupled with the trotting out of the Four+ Horsemen. We're losing this part of the war, and the cutting of more code isn't going to help us one bit. We need to turn the public perception around. What we're seeing in this case is a rather rapid erosion of the legal principles of an expectation of privacy (I won't engage in the rather lengthy discussion of this, but I recommend the interested parties do take the time to read in a good law library, or hunt down the materials on the Bork nomination to the Supreme Court). We've become a society that is expected to publicly air our dirty laundry, to march onto a television talk-show and expose our faults, foibles, and felonies. We need to fight back in ways that communicate to Joe Sixpack, also known as the Common Man--we all have secrets, we all have things we don't want people to know. Build the database! Get the testimonials! Let me briefly mention some of the sorts of need for privacy, secrecy, anonymity that are socially acceptable, and which we need to use to reinforce our own message: --AIDS testing; --Illness diagnosis, such as cancer; --Financial information: credit card numbers, bank balances, net worth; --Dropping the dime on crime: mob witnesses, corporations, your noisy neighbor who abuses their kids but owns a shotgun; --Donations to needy causes, but not wanting everyone to have their hand out; --Personal habits: alcoholism, drug use, gambling addiction, sexual preferences; --Common law privileges: confessional, physician or attorney relation to their client. In short, we all have things we want to remain secret, and we certainly don't want them to be 'exposed,' or to fall into the wrong hands. We need to take the issue back from the criminalization of having secrets to a place where crypto is viewed as a defensive technology--we're entitled to it, and our privacy. Crypto vs. the Government This is the biggest area of contention. The cypherpunk case is that strong, unescrowed cryptography is essential--we have no reason to assume that government is our friend (pull out the file of long-term government abuses here, from using the IRS to pursue political targets to the mail-opening programs of the FBI/CIA), and more to the point, this isn't a 'local' issue that is categorized by a singular stance on the part of the U.S. government. The cryptosystems we build and promote are used in places where they protect human rights workers, economic security and competitiveness, privacy, etc. The Internet and the tools are global, so we're on a battlefield that also includes: -Europe, including the Former Soviet Republics and Bosnia, where strong crypto is critical for freedom-loving movements; -Asia, where users of strong crypto use it to prevent competitive intelligence or organized espionage programs from impacting on their business, in particular, from actions of those U.S. 'allies' Japan, Korea, China; -the Middle East, where strong crypto protects human rights workers, businesses, and individuals who have an un-Islamic taste for things like pornography, or news; see 'rogue' States like Iran, but also U.S. 'allies' like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, Kuwait, etc. And the global battle means that we have to set an example, allow access, and fight those efforts on our own turf (does anyone really think that Asian or European competitive intelligence or espionage efforts don't also take place on American soil?). The U.S. government has made good use of the insinuation that if we have things to hide, then in a free and open democracy, we must be actively engaged in criminal activity. Certainly, strong cryptography of many sorts is being used to protect criminal activity. It is also a principle upon which the American system is based that you don't deprive the rights and freedom of the majority, those who have not committed any crime, merely in an effort to pursue the felonious. This is why you still need a properly executed warrant to search an area which has an expectation of privacy (which _is_ being slowly eroded as a legal principle, which we need to point out as a trend). As Tim May likes to point out, there are an increasing number of laws that individuals can be pursued under, with ever more general levels of interpretation. Convictions make convicts. Bureaucracies tend to grow, seeking more power for themselves, until 'that which is not compulsory is illegal, and that which is not illegal is compulsory.' Students of history are well aware of what comes next in the cycle-- revolution. My only observation on this is that America has always been willing to speed through trend curves, and it looks like she is flooring the accelerator in this case--from growing State, to global Power, to dying Empire. Think of it like an organic system, and like any entity, it reacts poorly to what it rightly views as being a threat to its own survival--cypherpunks among many. Sign me: A Man With Many Secrets and Much to Hide Michael Wilson 5514706(a)mcimail.com

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RFC 2144 on CAST-128 Encryption Algorithms (fwd)
by cpunks＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

plz do not use bcc igor ----- Forwarded message from Adam Shostack ----- >From cpunks(a)manifold.algebra.com Thu May 22 13:12:32 1997 From: Adam Shostack <adam(a)homeport.org> Message-Id: <199705221736.NAA17266(a)homeport.org> Subject: RFC 2144 on CAST-128 Encryption Algorithms (fwd) To: coderpunks(a)toad.com (The Coderpunks list) Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 13:36:16 -0400 (EDT) X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4ME+ PL27 (25)] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk I hadn't seen this mentioned. This is to coderpunks, bcc'd to cypherpunks & cryptography. Adam ------ A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries. RFC 2144: Title: The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm Author: C. Adams Date: May 1997 Mailbox: cadams(a)entrust.com Pages: 15 Characters: 37532 Updates/Obsoletes: None URL: ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc2144.txt There is a need in the Internet community for an unencumbered encryption algorithm with a range of key sizes that can provide security for a variety of cryptographic applications and protocols. This document describes an existing algorithm that can be used to satisfy this requirement. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. ----- End of forwarded message from Adam Shostack -----

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News from the Front II
by news＠WEBSTER2.ffg.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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PKP-Lemcom License Agreement
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to John Gilmore we offer the 1992 License Agreement between PKP and Lemcom Systems filed as an exhibit in the RSA v. PGP suit: http://jya.com/pkplem.htm (41K)

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Press Release -- NetFortress Added to GSA Schedule (fwd)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 16:41:29 -0400 From: Gretta Bruce <gretta(a)dsnt.com> To: declan(a)well.com Subject: NetFortress Added to GSA Schedule FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: Gretta Bruce, 813/288-7388 May 21, 1997 or gretta(a)dsnt.com NETFORTRESS ADDED TO GSA SCHEDULE Breakthrough Network Security Solution Now Widely Available to Government Customers Tampa, FL.... Digital Secured Networks (DSN) Technology announced today that its advanced encryption product, the NetFortress, has been listed on the federal procurement schedule of the General Services Administration (GSA). The NetFortress was added to the GSA schedule of one of DSN's federal market VARs, Patriot Technologies Inc. The addition of the NetFortress to the GSA Schedule (#GS-35F-4363D) makes DSN's breakthrough encryption products widely available to customers throughout the federal government. Since the GSA Schedule functions as an approved, "one-stop shop" for federal purchases, it also will shorten the overall procurement process for federal purchasers. "Availability and affordability are the keys for federal buyers," said Raymond L. Weadock, DSN's President and Chief Executive Officer. "Purchasing NetFortress products through the GSA schedule will simplify the overall procurement process, and enable our federal customers to integrate our superior security solutions quickly and efficiently." "The GSA listing for the NetFortress is an important part of our federal sales efforts," Weadock continued. "We have seen a significant increase in federal customers as a result of the recent success of the NetFortress in tests at multiple government testbeds. We anticipate that the GSA listing will enhance the attractiveness of our product in many of these buying decisions." The NetFortress stands out from other network security products because of its unique combination of high-speed data throughput and fully-automated encryption, authentication and key management technologies. Its hardware-based design utilizes algorithm-independent encryption at the network layer (supports IDEA, DES, Triple DES and FEAL), enhanced by dynamic random key exchanges every 24 hours. The NetFortress offers superior security and high-speed performance in an easy-to-deploy, low-cost package. About DSN Technology: Digital Secured Networks (DSN) Technology was founded in 1995 by Dr. Aharon Friedman and Mr. Andrew Savas. Dr. Friedman, DSN's Chairman and Chief Technology Officer, invented the breakthrough encryption technology incorporated into the NetFortress product line. DSN Technology is a privately-held company. For further information, please visit the company website at www.dsnt.com. About Patriot Technologies: Patriot Technologies, Inc., develops integrated, turnkey Internet solutions for business, education and government clients world-wide. With more than 50 years of computer industry experience, Patriot specializes in the design and implementation of Internet applications for enterprise systems, with growing concentration in the area of network security. Key federal clients include the U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Justice, and U.S. Department of Energy. Further information may be obtained from the company website at www.patriot-tech.com or by calling 301/417-9899. ######

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Ecash API
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

X-Authentication-Warning: blacklodge.c2.net: majordom set sender to owner-dev-lucre(a)c2.org using -f X-Sender: jeremey(a)descartes.bluemoney.com Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 12:32:09 -0700 To: ecash-dev(a)digicash.com, dev-lucre(a)c2.net From: Jeremey Barrett <jeremey(a)bluemoney.com> Subject: Ecash API Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-dev-lucre(a)c2.net Precedence: bulk -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Given the absence of an API from Digicash, we need a high level API so make the task of integrating ecash into products really easy. So here's my stab. This is the current header from my ecash library, which is a wrapper for -lucre. -lucre is great, but it's pretty low-level, hence the wrapper. The documentation in here is pretty incomplete, with just basic descriptions of what functions do what. At some point it will be improved. I welcome comments, suggestions, questions, and feature requests. Currently, this lib handles socket transactions only, but ascii-armor support will be added. This library will be available in some form or another in the future, at the moment I'm just looking for feedback. Regards, Jeremey. /* Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 * The VeriWeb Internet Corporation. All Rights Reserved. * * Please view the full copyright at the bottom of this file. * * ecash.h $Revision: 1.2 $ (VeriWeb) $Date: 1997/05/21 01:48:50 $ */ /*==========================================================================* * * ecash.h * * Written by: Jeremey Barrett * * $Revision: 1.2 $ */ #ifndef _ECASH_H_ #define _ECASH_H_ #include <Vlib.h> /* utility header */ #include <lucre.h> /* -lucre header */ /*-------------------------------------------------------------------- * Types */ typedef struct _ECSocket ECSocket; typedef struct _ECPayment ECPayment; typedef struct _ECPocket ECPocket; typedef struct _ECConfig ECConfig; typedef struct _ECError ECError; /*-------------------------------------------------------------------- * Errors */ #define ECError_NONE 0 #define ECError_INVALID -1 #define ECError_ECSYS -2 #define ECError_SYS -3 #define ECError_TCP -4 #define ECError_READ -5 #define ECError_WRITE -6 #define ECError_BIGNUM -7 #define ECError_MSGNEW -8 #define ECError_WALLETCREATE -9 #define ECError_NOMEM -10 #define ECError_POCKETOPEN -11 #define ECError_POCKETPASSWD -12 #define ECError_NOBANKACCOUNT -13 #define ECError_WITHDRAWAMOUNTLOW -14 #define ECError_DEPOSITPAYMENT -15 #define ECError_DEPOSITALLPAYMENTS -16 #define ECError_DEPOSITRECDB -17 #define ECError_DEPOSITREJECTED -18 #define ECError_WALLETSTATUS -19 #define ECError_DEPOSIT -20 #define ECError_WITHDRAW -21 #define ECError_NOPOCKETPASSWD -22 #define ECError_ECMSGINVALID -23 #define ECError_SENDMSGCALLBACK -24 #define ECError_MAGIC -25 #define ECError_APPENDMSG -26 #define ECError_PAYMENTACCEPT -27 #define ECError_PAYMENTACCEPTBADAMOUNT -28 #define ECError_PAYMENTREJECTED -29 #define ECError_PAYMENTMAKE -30 #define ECError_PAYREQRECEIVE -31 #define ECError_PAYREQCURRENCYUNKNOWN -32 #define ECError_PAYMENTREQUEST -33 #define ECError_PAYMENTACK -34 #define ECError_PAYDB -35 #define ECError_NOPAYMENTS -36 #define ECError_WALLETCOINS -37 #define ECError_EXCHANGECOINS -38 #define ECError_EXCHANGEREJECTED -39 #define ECError_NOTENOUGHCASH -40 #define ECNoError ((ECError *)NULL) /*-------------------------------------------------------------------- * ECPocket APIs * * Very preliminary documentation (will get enhanced later, I'm just * documenting the less obvious here. * * EC_Pocket_open() - Open an existing pocket, with location and * passphrase set in the ECConfig *. * * EC_Pocket_openAccount() - Create a new pocket with the attributes * in the ECConfig *. This does _not_ open * the pocket. This is for pockets which * have mint accounts only. * * EC_Pocket_openNoAccount() - Create a new pocket with the attributes * in the ECConfig *. This does _not_ open * the pocket. This creates an accountless * pocket, so the mintAddr and mintPort of * the ECConfig * should point to the * moneychanger. Note that mintID is still * required. This will open a connection * to the moneychanger and retrieve currency * keys for the mint. * * EC_Pocket_withdraw() - Withdraw from a mint account. * * EC_Pocket_withdrawProtoCoins() - Complete and withdraw the coins in * the EC_M_Withdraw3 (a -lucre struct). * amt is the value of the coins being * withdrawn. * * EC_Pocket_deposit() - Deposit amount into mint account * * EC_Pocket_depositWithdraw() - Deposit coins and immediately withdraw * the same amount. This allows for exchanges * of coins and altering the stored * denominations. Call this when you don't have * the right coins on hand for a payment. * * EC_Pocket_exchangeCoins() - Exchange coins (via moneychanger), same as * above but w/o mint. * * EC_Pocket_getCoinInfo() - Returns information about the denominations * available for a given amount. max_avail is the * largest amount the pocket can make less than the * amount specified. min_dep is the smallest amount * to exchange which will guarantee the ability to * make amount, provided min_dep is withdrawn in * base units (i.e. 1 cent). * */ ECPocket *EC_Pocket_create( void ); ECPocket *EC_Pocket_copy( ECPocket *this ); ECError *EC_Pocket_destroy( ECPocket *this ); ECError *EC_Pocket_open( ECPocket *this, ECConfig *conf ); ECError *EC_Pocket_openAccount( ECConfig *conf ); ECError *EC_Pocket_openNoAccount( ECConfig *conf ); ECError *EC_Pocket_withdraw( ECPocket *this, Int32 amount, Int32 minPayments ); ECError *EC_Pocket_withdrawProtoCoins( ECPocket *this, ECSocket *sock, EC_M_Withdraw3 wd3, Int32 amt ); ECError *EC_Pocket_deposit( ECPocket *this, Int32 amount ); ECError *EC_Pocket_depositWithdraw( ECPocket *this, Int32 amount, Int32 payments ); ECError *EC_Pocket_exchangeCoins( ECPocket *this, Int32 amount, Int32 payments, char *host, char *port ); ECError *EC_Pocket_getMintID( ECPocket *this, UInt32 *id ); ECError *EC_Pocket_getCurrency( ECPocket *this, UInt32 *cur ); ECError *EC_Pocket_getAccountName( ECPocket *this, char **name ); ECError *EC_Pocket_getCash( ECPocket *this, UInt32 *cash ); ECError *EC_Pocket_getBalance( ECPocket *this, UInt32 *bal ); ECError *EC_Pocket_getCashStr( ECPocket *this, char **cash_str ); ECError *EC_Pocket_getBalanceStr( ECPocket *this, char **bal_str ); ECError *EC_Pocket_getCoinInfo( ECPocket *this, UInt32 amount, UInt32 *max_avail, UInt32 *min_dep ); Int32 EC_Pocket_isAccountless( ECPocket *this ); /*-------------------------------------------------------------------- * ECSocket APIs * * * Simple set of socket APIs. These functions manage the ecash TCP * protocol for you. Documentation later. * * EC_Socket_setCallbacks() - Sets send and receive callbacks for * sending ecash messages. These will be * called _after_ the message is encoded * with the ecash TCP header. */ ECSocket *EC_Socket_create( UInt32 type ); ECError *EC_Socket_setCallbacks( ECSocket *this, UInt32 (*sendcallback)( void *cbInfo, UChar *msg, UInt32 len ), UInt32 (*recvCallback)( void *cbInfo, UChar **msg, UInt32 *len), void *cbInfo ); ECSocket *EC_Socket_createFromFd( char *haddr, char *hport, Int32 fd ); ECError *EC_Socket_open( ECSocket *this, char *haddr, char *hport ); ECError *EC_Socket_accept( ECSocket *this, ECSocket *new ); ECError *EC_Socket_listen( ECSocket *this, char *hport ); ECError *EC_Socket_sendMsg( ECSocket *this, EC_M_Msg msg ); ECError *EC_Socket_recvMsg( ECSocket *this, EC_M_Msg msg ); TCPSocket *EC_Socket_getTCPSocket( ECSocket *this ); /*-------------------------------------------------------------------- * ECConfig APIs */ ECConfig *EC_Config_create( void ); ECConfig *EC_Config_copy( ECConfig *this ); ECError *EC_Config_destroy( ECConfig *this ); ECError *EC_Config_setAccountName( ECConfig *this, char *name ); ECError *EC_Config_setAccountPassword( ECConfig *this, char *passwd ); ECError *EC_Config_setPocketPassword( ECConfig *this, char *passwd ); ECError *EC_Config_setPocketDir( ECConfig *this, char *path ); ECError *EC_Config_setMintID( ECConfig *this, UInt32 mintID ); ECError *EC_Config_setMintAddr( ECConfig *this, char *host ); ECError *EC_Config_setMintPort( ECConfig *this, char *port ); /*-------------------------------------------------------------------- * ECPayment APIs * * The important functions here are accept(), make(), request(), and * variants. Note that this is all socket based, there will be ascii * armor variants soon, but not now. * * EC_Payment_accept() - accept an online payment. The this pointer * points to an ECPayment with the expected * amount set. This amount is checked and an * error will be returned if the incoming payment * does not agree. The ECSocket * is an already * open socket to the payer. This function will * automatically handle accountless pockets, so * explicitly calling the NoAccount variant is * not necessary. * * EC_Payment_accept1() - same as above, but the payment is _not_ acked * to the payer. * * EC_Payment_acceptNoAccount() - same as accept() but for accountless * pockets. Gets called by accept() if * the pocket is accountless. * * EC_Payment_acceptNoAccount1() - same as above, but the payment is _not_ * acked to the payer. * * EC_Payment_handle() - Unconditionally accept a -lucre EC_M_Payment. This * will _not_ check amounts. It will handle NoAccount * automatically. * * EC_Payment_handleNoAccount() - same as above except for accountless * pockets. Called by handle() if the pocket * is accountless. * * EC_Payment_make() - make a payment over the ECSocket passed. This * function _expects_ a payment ack. Use make1() if * none will arrive. * * EC_Payment_make1() - same as above, but does not wait for an ack. * * EC_Payment_receiveRequest() - Receive a payment request on the ECSocket * passed. Returns the information in the * this pointer. * * EC_Payment_request() - Send a payment request over the ECSocket passed. */ ECPayment *EC_Payment_create( ECPocket *pocket ); ECError *EC_Payment_setAmount( ECPayment *this, Int32 amt ); ECError *EC_Payment_setTimestamp( ECPayment *this, UInt32 timestamp ); ECError *EC_Payment_setSeqNo( ECPayment *this, UInt32 timestamp ); ECError *EC_Payment_setDescription( ECPayment *this, char *desc ); ECError *EC_Payment_setRecipientName( ECPayment *this, char *name ); ECError *EC_Payment_setRecipientMint( ECPayment *this, UInt32 id ); ECError *EC_Payment_getAmount( ECPayment *this, UInt32 *amt ); ECError *EC_Payment_getSeqNo( ECPayment *this, UInt32 *seqno ); ECError *EC_Payment_getTimestamp( ECPayment *this, UInt32 *timestamp ); ECError *EC_Payment_getDescription( ECPayment *this, char **desc ); ECError *EC_Payment_getRecipientName( ECPayment *this, char **name ); ECError *EC_Payment_getRecipientMint( ECPayment *this, UInt32 *id ); ECError *EC_Payment_accept( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket, ECSocket *sock ); ECError *EC_Payment_accept1( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket, ECSocket *sock ); ECError *EC_Payment_acceptNoAccount( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket, ECSocket *sock ); ECError *EC_Payment_acceptNoAccount1( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket, ECSocket *sock ); ECError *EC_Payment_handle( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket, EC_M_Payment payment ); ECError *EC_Payment_handleNoAccount( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket, EC_M_Payment payment ); ECError *EC_Payment_make( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket, ECSocket *sock ); ECError *EC_Payment_make1( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket, ECSocket *sock ); ECError *EC_Payment_receiveRequest( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket, ECSocket *sock ); ECError *EC_Payment_request( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket, ECSocket *sock ); /*-------------------------------------------------------------------- * ECError APIs */ ECError *EC_Error_create( void ); ECError *EC_Error_returnValue( Int32 errno ); ECError *EC_Error_returnTCPError( TCPError *err ); ECError *EC_Error_returnLibError( Int32 errno, Int32 libErrno ); #endif /* _ECASH_H_*/ /* <COPYRIGHT_PUB> * * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 * The VeriWeb Internet Corporation. All Rights Reserved. * * This is a published work of the VeriWeb Internet Corporation * ("VeriWeb"). Permission to use and/or redistribute may be * obtained upon prior written permission by VeriWeb, and * provided that the following conditions are also met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code, including binary forms, * must retain the above copyright notice, this list of * conditions, and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Documentation and/or other materials provided with any * redistribution must contain the above copyright notice, * this list of conditions, and the following disclaimer. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of * this software must display the following acknowledgement: * * This product includes software developed by * the VeriWeb Internet Corporation and its contributors. * * 4. Neither the name of the VeriWeb nor the names of its * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products * derived from this software without specific prior written * permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY VERIWEB AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS''. * THEREFORE, ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL VERIWEB * OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED, AND ON * ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, * OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY * OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * </COPYRIGHT_PUB> * * ecash.h $Revision: 1.2 $ (VeriWeb) $Date: 1997/05/21 01:48:50 $ */ /*eof*/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 5.0 beta Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBM4NNuS/fy+vkqMxNAQEzngP7BmDg16Cmnb9uqS30xlhBvA7FaZb4YPRA tulRHA+7FhRZttfBm/jL8gaOEzjdtPR4f7p3gGjB4YC2KvSAI1iTrpR9EYxdzHB7 0qMAjPAZbI0A08ZOPLkGDoOi9Qqs3jCgdimANjdVeTheYNNpcR1Ti4ez1CtdwmUo he0phYP1FBg= =qizj -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Jeremey Barrett VeriWeb Internet Corp. Crypto, Ecash, Commerce Systems http://www.veriweb.com/ PGP key fingerprint = 3B 42 1E D4 4B 17 0D 80 DC 59 6F 59 04 C3 83 64

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Re: The USA is the world's biggest terrorist state
by Steve Schear 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>The United States of America sits astride the world, holding the riding >crop and ordering the other nations of the world around in various ways. It >sends troops to distant parts of the world. It even takes on the main >"peacekeeping" (meaning: choosing a faction and suppressing the other >factions) role in Yugoslavia...surely a European problem, if a problem at >all. > The US is in very real danger of reaping the same sort of maelstrom that vanquished the Romans. They were also very powerful, with tentacles reaching almost to the limits of their known world, before a combination of internal decay and dissention and reprisal from those vanquished put them asunder. The government's recent emphasis on terrorism is apt since they have created so many enemies of ethnic, political, religious and social groups. Even paranoids have enemies. The internal threat is not near as great as they portray, but with increased emphasis on suppression and prosecution rather than addressing the ills, it will likely become a self-fulfilling prophesy. However, addressing the complaints of these militias is not under consideration because it would undo the very fabric of Federal jurisdictional excesses which provide the government's power base. Economics and the freedom, or lack, it entails is key. One reason our political system doesn't work is the Fed's right to tax internal economic activity as opposed to the excise taxes it was originally granted. Too much money (power) is concentrated in too few representatives who work in relative isolation (ever try and get a meeting with your rep.) for most of their term. If internal taxes could only be levied by states, who then were free to revenue share what they wished with the Feds (who would submit their requests and budgets to the states), power might be so diffused as to make nationwide lobbying too difficult and expensive and there would be a much closer adherence to local interest. We appear to be heading straight for a Whiskey Rebellion type showdown. In fact, many of the same complaints of retreat from the founding principles, which were ignored in the 1780-90s, are echoing in the writings and speeches of today's militia. In the 1790s it was wealthy and powerful eastern businessmen, mostly former Torries, who supported Hamilton and Washington against the frontiersmen. This time its the military industrial complex. This time I hope the resistance is much bettered prepared. --Steve

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Re: attila the hun (was Re: Wine Politics Again!)
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back wrote: > Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> writes: > > At 11:13 PM 5/20/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote: > > >On Tue, May 20, 1997 at 04:23:10PM +0000, Attila T. Hun wrote: > > [rant deleted - bill] > > >Speaking of power corrupting, notice how the power to speak > > >anonymously has destroyed this poor souls brain. When Attila T. Hun posts to the list, I can tell you how many hours, days and minutes it has been since his last post. I know when I see his name on a post that he has something to say. Perhaps the most telling comment I have heard about him was when a fellow cypherpunk said about Attila, "When he replies to one of my posts I never know if he's going to kiss me or rip me a new asshole. He doesn't respond to my _reputation capital_ or my perceived net persona--he responds to what I express in my posting." I don't have a problem with the opinions or points of view that Kent expresses on the cypherpunks list, but I do have a problem with the fact that his posts seem to reflect a pre-programmed world-view, with little thought given to the actual content and concepts expressed by those he is replying to. I find Kent's posts to be much like the ASCII art that is posted to the list--each post is slightly different, but predictable. The aspersions that Kent casts on those such as Attila and Tim serve no purpose other than to accentuate the fact that he is envious of their propensity for dealing on a real-world level with the concepts he addresses from an intellectual ivory tower. > > Attila's not anonymous - he's a regular poster, and has been > > for long enough to build up some reputation around his penname. There are people I have known for years--their _real_ name, where they live, went to school, the annual average rainfall in their hometown, etc.--but I know very little about who they really are-- how they think, what they believe, etc. I know a lot more about Attila T. Hun. His posts reflect who he is, where he's been, what he's done, and his perceptions about himself and the world around him. His posts reflect his persona. Kent's posts reflect, in my opinion, what he has "learned to believe." When I read Kent's posts, I don't feel like I learn who he is, but rather, I learn the "position" that he is taking on this or that point. Real name/anonymity aside, I see Attila as real and Kent as a shadowy figure. My advice to Kent would be, "If you're going to be an asshole, at least be a _real_ asshole." I enjoy the exchange of differing viewpoints (and genuine conflicts) on the cypherpunks list, because it gives me food for thought about positions and viewpoints that I have dichotimous feelings about, but I have little use for lukewarm, passive-aggressive exchanges. (I prefer the pissing contests between raving maniacs.) > In short I believe you picked on the wrong guy if you considered > Attila an example of someone with lots to say when hiding behind > strong anonymity. I have used a variety of "names" as a writer, musician and as a fugitive from injustice. Whenever I looked in the mirror, however, I always saw the same face. And no matter what "persona" I am using, I find that I feel most like "myself" when I speak and act honestly, no matter whether my stance is homeostatic or dichotymous. I have done traffic/personality/pseudonym analysis on the list for years and have uncovered a plethora of anonymous personas. Some use anonymity to "step out of" their regular list persona. Some use it to address issues that could not deal with under their regular persona because of a need to protect their perceived public/social image. Some use anonymity because of personal or business conflicts that could be used against them by those who feel threatened by honesty. Others use anonymity because it is fun to play "hide and seek" with list members who know them well enough to suspect who they _really_ are. I first encountered the "TruthMonger" persona in 1989 and have followed its evolution since that time. The better I got at tracking the various entities assuming the TruthMonger persona, the more I realized that those who claim to "know" or "expose" who a particular TruthMonger _really_ is are wrong about 90% of the time. The reason for this is simple. Once we form an "opinion" of _who_ somebody is and _what_they_ believe_, and _who_they_are_, then we "interpret" what they have to say in their posts in accordance with our learned perception of them. Accordingly, we fail to see the naturally occuring dichotomys and inconsistencies that are inherent in living, learning and adapting to the evolution of thought which comes with an expanding mental and emotional paridigm. When the same person posts anonymously, then those who know them and have an "opinion" of who they are and what they think can no longer categorize their post automatically and interpret it in the "usual" manner. Anonymity forces the reader to consider the content that is contained in the post, rather than automatically consigning it to the proper "box" according to the established persona of a regular poster. Many people are not comfortable with not being able to "assign" an anonymous persona with the author's appropriate mental "box" so they attribute this or that post with this or that list member and respond accordingly. I am posting this anonymously. Who am I? I am the person who believes what I have written here and who doesn't want what I am expressing to be classified according to what I wrote yesterday. I am: TruthMonger # -96

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Report: The Risks of Key Recovery
by Alan Davidson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An experts' study of the risks presented by key escrow and key recovery was released this morning and is now available on the Web at http://www.crypto.com/key_study/ Thought some of you folks might find this interesting. Regards, Alan ----------------- THE RISKS OF KEY RECOVERY, KEY ESCROW, AND TRUSTED THIRD PARTY ENCRYPTION Report By Leading Cryptographers and Computer Scientists Says Government Encryption Plan Is Risky and Impractical On Wednesday May 21, a group of leading cryptographers and computer scientists released a report examining the risks and implications of government-driven key-recovery systems. The report cautions that, "The deployment of a general key-recovery-based encryption infrastructure to meet law enforcement's stated requirements will result in substantial sacrifices in security and cost to the end user. Building a secure infrastructure of the breathtaking scale and complexity demanded by these requirements is far beyond the experience and current competency of the field." The report's authors, recognized leaders in the fields of cryptography and computer science, include Hal Abelson, Ross Anderson, Steven M. Bellovin, Josh Benaloh, Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, John Gilmore, Peter G. Neumann, Ronald L. Rivest, Jeffery I. Schiller, and Bruce Schneier. HOW TO OBTAIN A COPY OF THE REPORT The report is available online at http://www.crypto.com/key_study/ and printed copies will also be available through the Center for Democracy and Technology. FOR MORE INFORMATION If you have any questions or would like additional information, please contact Alan Davidson at CDT, 202.637.9800 <abd(a)cdt.org>.

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Re: Anonymous remailers: A call to arms wanted
by Cyberdog 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Anonymous remailers protect speakers from retaliation. The Founders used >anonymity, as the pseudonymous writings in the Federalist Papers show. > >Granted, some anonymous posts are drivel, some are even illegal. > >So? > The Antifederalist writers used pen-names too, and recent events make thier arguments interesting. http://colossus.net/wepinsto/rot/afp/index.html Index to the Antifederalist Papers Antifederalist No. 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION: A DANGEROUS PLAN OF BENEFIT ONLY TO THE "ARISTOCRATICK COMBINATION" Antifederalist No. 2 "WE HAVE BEEN TOLD OF PHANTOMS" Antifederalist No. 3 NEW CONSTITUTION CREATES A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; WILL NOT ABATE FOREIGN INFLUENCE; DANGERS OF CIVIL WAR AND DESPOTISM Antifederalist No. 4 FOREIGN WARS, CIVIL WARS, AND INDIAN WARS - THREE BUGBEARS Antifederalist No. 5 SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND - A CASE IN POINT Antifederalist No. 6 THE HOBGOBLINS OF ANARCHY AND DISSENSIONS AMONG THE STATES Antifederalist No. 7 ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION WILL LEAD TO CIVIL WAR Antifederalist No. 8 "THE POWER VESTED IN CONGRESS OF SENDING TROOPS FOR SUPPRESSING INSURRECTIONS WILL ALWAYS ENABLE THEM TO STIFLE THE FIRST STRUGGLES OF FREEDOM" ....

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One-time pads
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy C[reep] May sits at his terminal dressed in five-inch stiletto heels, fishnet stockings, a gold-lame mini-skirt, a purple halter with girdle underneath to keep in his flabby gut, a Fredericks of Hollywood padded bra also underneath the halter, a cheap Naomi Sims pink afro wig, waiting to yank his crank whenever a black man responds to one of his inane rants. ^. .^ ( @ ) c

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Re: Poison Pill Defense (fwd)
by Igor Chudov ＠ home 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----- Forwarded message from Peter Trei ----- >From cpunks(a)manifold.algebra.com Wed May 21 09:12:25 1997 Message-Id: <199705211410.KAA03539(a)www.video-collage.com> Comments: Authenticated sender is <trei@popserver> From: "Peter Trei" <trei(a)process.com> Organization: Process Software To: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 10:21:43 -6 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: Poison Pill Defense Reply-to: trei(a)process.com CC: trei(a)www.video-collage.com Priority: normal X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v2.42) nobody(a)huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) writes: > > I hear from anonymous correspondents that the following > technique has been successfully deployed among some militia > members and cypherpunks who fear raids on their private > property. Apparently the technique was originally invented > by a biotech lab that the FDA was planning to shut down in an > uncivil manner when Kessler first came to power. The > lab was never raided. > Preliminary: choose a suitable viral agent. [...] > Step one: immunize household members against this agent. Several things come to mind in reading this. 1. This has *no* crypto-related content. 2. This guy has been watching too many re-runs of 'Mission Impossible'. The scheme is Rube-Goldberg and full of potential failure modes, ranging up to and including the accidental death of the implementor and his/her household. The techniques involved are complex, difficult, dangerous, and expensive. 3. This is not a 'defense'. * It won't stop a raid; if it's deployment is kept secret, it's deterrence value is zero. If it's deployment is publicized, then it is ineffective, since the raiders will take appropriate countermeasures (and announcement of it's deployment is *very* good grounds for a raid). * It won't work to conceal whatever you had that was worth concealing, in the event of a raid. All it is a scheme for getting petty vengence, and even if works perfectly, will get you murder or attempted murder charges tacked onto whatever you were raided for. Only an idiot (such as our anonymous poster) would even think of deploying such a scheme. 4. If I were an agent provocateur, attempting to make the members of this list look dangerous, I'd encourage them to discuss topics like this. Jim Bell's advocacy of AP may have been legal, but it sure didn't endear him to LEAs. I seriously suspect that this thread may have been planted by someone with the intent of discrediting the list. Peter Trei Disclaimer: I speak only for myself. ----- End of forwarded message from Peter Trei -----

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Re: Hacked, Trashed and Out of Beer (fwd)
by Igor Chudov ＠ home 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----- Forwarded message from Peter Trei ----- >From cpunks(a)manifold.algebra.com Wed May 21 09:20:15 1997 Message-Id: <199705211417.KAA03928(a)www.video-collage.com> Comments: Authenticated sender is <trei@popserver> From: "Peter Trei" <trei(a)process.com> Organization: Process Software To: cypherpunks(a)manifold.algebra.com Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 10:28:32 -6 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: Hacked, Trashed and Out of Beer Reply-to: trei(a)process.com CC: trei(a)www.video-collage.com Priority: normal X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v2.42) Bill Frantz wrote: > At 6:21 PM -0700 5/20/97, se7en <se7en(a)dis.org> wrote: > >Well, I finally managed to catch up on all the email from this list, and > >managed to also get all of the hacked web sites thus far up on my web > >page at http://www.dis.org/se7en > > > >w-h-i-c-h includes: > > > >Amnesty International > >Central Intelligence Agency > >East Timor, Indonesia > >Kriegsman Fur > >NASA > >U.K. Labour Party > >U.S. Air Force > >U.S. Department of Justice > > Gee, your server sure wants to send a lot of cookies. I consider receiving > a cookie before getting a statement, or being able to guess (e.g. WEB > shopping), about their use to be an unfriendly act. > Bill Frantz Netscape 4.x (I'm using beta3, beta4 is now out) includes an option to silently refuse all cookies. That alone is enough to make me put up with it's instabilities. Peter Trei ----- End of forwarded message from Peter Trei -----

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Re: encryption laws (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 15:03:32 -0400 > From: tzeruch(a)ceddec.com > > If they had reasonable cause to believe you had knowledge of the key and > > were refusing to divulge it under direct order of the court you would be > > held in contempt until you were very old and gray. > > IANAL, but > > You could claim 5th ammendment priviledge - they would have to give > immunity from any prosecution relating to the contents. > The 5th ONLY applies if you are being accussed AND immunity is not granted. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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Re: encryption laws (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: frissell(a)panix.com > Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 07:45:35 -0400 > >If they had reasonable cause to believe you had knowledge of the key and > >were refusing to divulge it under direct order of the court you would be > >held in contempt until you were very old and gray. > Two years max. A lot less time if you followed my strategy of spamming the > court with daily (hourly?) screeds in which you assert in your finest Usenet > flame language the fact that you will never follow the judge's order. Your contention is that the longest a judge can hold you on contempt charges is two years? I would love to see a reference on this one. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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Free Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition on PointCast
by WSJ Interactive Edition Editors 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In the past, you tried The Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition through a special offer. We now invite you to get selected content from The Interactive Journal in a whole new way with PointCast! With free PointCast Network software and The Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition channel, you get top business news summaries from around the globe as well as several feature articles and columns in Editor's Picks. And PointCast broadcasts it all straight to your computer, along with personalized world news, stock updates, weather, sports, local news and much more. And when you subscribe to the Interactive Journal, you get the full story behind the summaries and comprehensive global coverage of the day's business news. For more information on how to subscribe to the Interactive Journal go to <http://wsj.com> Get The Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition channel now! Download the free PointCast software at <http://wsj.com/offers/pointcast.htm> Best regards, Jim White Marketing Manager maillist(a)wsj.dowjones.com _______________________________________________________________ Check out Small Business Suite, a new Interactive Edition feature covering issues that matter most to small business owners, entrepreneurs, and anyone who markets products or services to small businesses. http://wsj.com/edition/current/summaries/small.htm ________________________________________________________________ This is the New Features Alert e-mail list. If you do not wish to continue to subscribe to this list, sign on to The Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition and go to the following URL: http://wsj.com/user-cgi-bin/userMenu.html to change your account preferences. Or you can just send email to: stopmkt(a)lists.wsj.com Cancelling your subscription to The Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition will automatically un-subscribe you from any e-mail lists you might be subscribed to through our service. For further questions, please call our customer service department at 1-800-369-2834. __________________________________________________________________

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Re: encryption laws (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: encryption laws (fwd) > From: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) > > If they had reasonable cause to believe you had knowledge of the key and > > were refusing to divulge it under direct order of the court you would be > > held in contempt until you were very old and gray. > > Yes - the 5th Amendment is useless like all the other consitutional "rights". The 5th is meant to apply ONLY to persons being accussed of a crime, it is not nor was it ever meant to protect non-accussed persons from turning over evidence of criminal acts. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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Compelling a key (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi Tim, And here I was believing your speal about being in your kill file, oh well. It must be true that nothing is sacred. Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 22:33:35 -0800 > From: Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> > Subject: Compelling a key > >> Would it be possible for a court to subpeona a encrypted file or key, > >> > >> and order you to tell them the key ? > >> If you didn't would you be held in 'contempt of court' ? > > > >If they had reasonable cause to believe you had knowledge of the key and > >were refusing to divulge it under direct order of the court you would be > >held in contempt until you were very old and gray. > > Not necessarily. Mike Godwin, and others, have written about the > "compelling of keys." It is by no means clear that a key can be compelled. > Citing the Fifth is one approach, saying one "forgot" is another. Citing the 5th ONLY works if no immunity from prosecution for the results is offered. If the judge offers and you refuse, don't worry about buying toothpaste for many years. Saying you 'forgot' will not keep you out of jail on contempt. It might buy you sympathy from the jury but then again, they have nothing to say about contempt charges. > As to being held indefinitely, imprisonment as an inducement to cooperation > has limits. (I just saw a spiel by Alan Dershowitz and others on this > tonight, vis-a-vis how long Susan McDougal can be imprisoned for contempt > in the Whitewater investigation.) > > Basically, only until there is no reasonable expectation that the contempt > will be satisfied (or whatever the exact term is). > > In practice, I think the Washington, D.C. doctor, Elizabeth X, the woman > who refused to say where her children were, was held for about 2 years, and > that this was the all-time record for a contempt case. She was ultimately > released when the court concluded she had no intention of cooperating. Exactly! It is ENTIRELY up to the individual judge who issued the contempt citation. If they are pissed enough 2 years will be nothing. As far as I have been able to find there are NO statutes, other than that of a statute of limitation for a particular type of crime, that limit how long you can sit in jail on contempt. The only way you would get out in that case would be to file with the appropriate courts for a writ of habeas corpus. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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Swiss Consortium Chooses RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem for Next Generation Wireless Electronic Transactions (fwd)
by cpunks＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----- Forwarded message from Jack Oswald ----- >From cpunks(a)manifold.algebra.com Wed May 21 01:48:18 1997 Message-ID: <01BC6572.43D8F3A0(a)1Cust125.Max9.San-Francisco2.CA.MS.UU.NET> From: Jack Oswald <joswald(a)rpkusa.com> To: "'joswald(a)rpkusa.com'" <joswald(a)rpkusa.com>, "'maujacca(a)iprolink.ch'" <maujacca(a)iprolink.ch> Subject: Swiss Consortium Chooses RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem for Next Generation Wireless Electronic Transactions Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 18:41:20 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Also see recent press coverage in Infoworld: RPK announces deal for fast crypto with Swiss consortium http://www.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/displayStory.pl?97059.wrpk.htm=20 SET 2.0 on the way http://www.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/displayArchive.pl?/97/16/t04-16.1.htm=20 PRESS RELEASE For Release May 19, 1997 RPK, Inc.: Jack Oswald, +1 408.479.7874, joswald(a)rpkusa.com, = http://www.rpk.co.nz=20 ADESA, Inc.: Maurice Jaccard,+41 22.910.29.14, maujacca(a)iprolink.ch Swiss Consortium Chooses RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem for Next = Generation Wireless Electronic Transactions Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL) and ADESA, Inc. introduce = HAWK VLSI cryptography-enhanced processor San Francisco, CA - RPK, Inc. announced today that a consortium of the = Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL) and ADESA, Inc., a Swiss = application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) design firm have chosen = the RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem to provide strong cryptographic = security in a next generation wireless electronic transactions = application. At the same time, EPFL and ADESA unveiled HAWK a new = generation cryptography-enhanced microprocessor specifically designed = for use in high speed/low power embedded applications. "The RPK encryption technology won the design review after an extensive = evaluation of all existing cryptosystems based on well known and = understood cryptographic techniques," said Maurice Jaccard, Managing = Director of ADESA, Inc. "With RPK there are no compromises. We get = uncompromised security, high speed and low cost of implementation." "RPK is a strong encryption technology based on well know and trusted = cryptographic techniques," said Jack Oswald, President and CEO of RPK = Inc. "Having RPK chosen by the Swiss for this breakthrough = electronic-commerce application is the strongest endorsement we could = possibly achieve for the RPK technology." Wireless Electronic Transactions Application The collaboration of RPK, EPFL and ADESA has resulted in a prototype = application that promises to become the "wallet of the future". This = new wireless electronic transaction application may take the form of a = credit card, a watch or a key chain and will sport features analogous to = the leather wallets used today by billions of people worldwide. Early = designs of the system allow the user to withdraw and hold cash in = multiple currencies, as well as, purchase and hold vouchers for hotels, = planes and car rentals all through the use of wireless communications = technology. Officials in charge of the project envision that such = devices could also become a personal key chain for gaining access to = motor vehicles, offices and dwellings, in addition to traditional credit = card uses. ADESA concluded that performance of the RPK implementation in the = prototype far exceeded existing smart card implementations based on the = RSA and other algorithms. The RPK technology performs the necessary = encryption functions in less than 10 milliseconds using an 823-bit key = compared to the best performing RSA-based equivalents that require = greater than 100 milliseconds to perform the same type of function using = a much weaker 512-bit key. The application is not limited to 823-bit = keys. The design of the system, based on the new HAWK processor is = flexible and can accommodate and process various sized keys, smaller or = larger than 823 bits based on downloadable parameters. ADESA officials = explained that the simplicity of the RPK algorithm makes it much simpler = to implement than the popular RSA approach. It was RPK's simplicity, = offering a much faster and cheaper solution while providing even higher = security, that drove the choice over RSA for this application. =20 About the RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem RPK is a relatively new public key cryptosystem that is based on = mathematics widely used in cryptography today. It was designed to be = immediately commercially viable without the years of study that a new = area of mathematics normally requires, such as the Elliptic Curve = Cryptosystem (ECC). The source of the security for RPK is the same as = that of Diffie-Hellman key exchange, a widely used and well studied = cryptographic technique. RPK offers real advantages for high speed = networking, SmartCard, wireless communication applications as well as = high volume software processes such as credit card transactions.=20 RPK has at its core an invention called a Mixture Generator. In the = preferred implementation, three fairly long linear feedback shift = registers are used. This state machine has two modes of operation. One = that uses the shift registers for exponentiation and the other as a = generator of a random stream of bits used in a combining phase for the = actual encryption. Effectively, RPK allows for the amortization of two = "costly" exponentiations over the entire length of a message because the = core engine is used to initially establish a secure state of the machine = and then switches modes to perform very high speed encryption. This has = been referred to as a paradigm shift where the operation of encryption = does not require the costly calculations that an RSA or even an ECC = implementation would require for each block of data that is about the = size of the key. This mechanism can also be implemented in silicon = quite efficiently such that at high strength it is much cheaper to = produce than alternative technologies. Finally, it is also possible to = create a Mixture Generator that is made up of Elliptic Curve groups = which would provide a similarly speedy and efficient initialization mode = that could still produce high speed encryption as noted above. About the HAWK VLSI Crypto Processor The HAWK VLSI cryptography-enhanced processor is the result of more than = three years of research and development conducted at the EPFL in = Lausanne, Switzerland in the area of high speed compression and = encryption. The HAWK processor will benefit most cryptography = implementations but is particularly well suited for use with RPK. "The HAWK processor is the most innovative approach that we have seen = yet for implementing cryptographic processes in silicon," said Bill = Raike, Chief Technology Officer for RPK Inc. and inventor of the RPK = fast public key cryptosystem. "HAWK breaks the barrier for high speed, = low cost, low power and high strength encryption for embedded systems." Background RPK, Inc. is a supplier of next generation fast public key encryption = technology. RPK was invented and originally patented in New Zealand. = The company is therefore unaffected by restrictive U.S. export rules. = RPK has been successfully exported to virtually all countries of the = world at high strength. The company's headquarters are based in San = Francisco, California, USA, with an offshore research and development = center located outside of Auckland, New Zealand. http://www.rpk.co.nz=20 ADESA, Inc. is a leading ASIC design firm based in Geneva, Switzerland = with expertise in embedded and cryptographic applications. EPFL is a leading teaching and research technical institute in Lausanne, = Switzerland. The school is known for its work in advanced processor = design. *** ----- End of forwarded message from Jack Oswald -----

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Re: Just Say "No" to Congress
by David Gilchrist 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:26 PM 5/21/97 -0400, Ray Arachelian wrote: >On Sun, 18 May 1997, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: > >> R.A.: >> >You seem to be misinformed. You don't send your money to Uncle Sam. It >> >gets taken out of every pay check before you even see it. Then, come >> >April 15, you fill a piece of paper out with the hope you'll get some of >> >it back. But sometimes, Uncle Sam takes even more. Don't do it. Work for yourself. You make four payments a year. <snip> >I myself consult out. Consulting out means that the money isn't taken >out at all. You just have to pay it back come April 15. Day job, being >a full time job, money gets taken out automagically by the evil agents >of the IRS critters. Consulting money, come the 1099 form, gets taxed >after. Incorporate and you don't even get a 1099. > >So even if you manage to upturn this law and get to keep the money until >April 15, it wouldn't affect me much. IMHO it's much easier if the money >gets withheld, then having to pull hairs out doing tax forms come April. > Turbotax is hairless, painless and stupid proof. I know. I use it. >Now if you can somehow repeal income tax, that would be a useful >achievement. :) Consulting out is on the right track. While you are waiting for the income tax laws to change, _take advantage_ of what is lawfully available. Crispin wouldn't have a clue on this one. Incorporate. Any state. It's cheap. You can avoid some social security taxes for a system that won't be there in few years anyway. Remember when you could refile back a year or two if you had a bad year (income averaging)? A corporation can carry a loss back 15 years or *forward* , too, _and_ get a tax refund practically instantly. It is imho the levelest playing field available for the individual (wearing the impenetrable corporate cloak (no shit, bulletproof), impenetrable even by the irs) against taxation. As for tax forms in April, use Turbotax. You don't have to know shit and it does complicated things for you like depreciation. Depreciate your car, your home office etc. Own your assets personally and lease them to your corporation. Rents are free of social security taxes. Your car, your office etc. With a little imagination you may be able to make it fit your situation. If you're straight salary, _no_ other (reportable) income, you may be pretty much screwed but paying them when you don't have to doesn't make much sense. > <snip> >> I don't buy into the alienation and cynicism on this list peddled >> by TCM, truthmonger, et.al., and I suggest that anyone else who >> does is selling themself short, and in fact part of the problem and >> not the solution. That's my point, use them when you can. > >"If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate" -- >whomever.. Say, whatever you've been smoking, precipitate David

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RFC 2144 on CAST-128 Encryption Algorithms (fwd)
by cpunks＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----- Forwarded message from Adam Shostack ----- >From cpunks(a)manifold.algebra.com Thu May 22 13:12:33 1997 From: Adam Shostack <adam(a)homeport.org> Message-Id: <199705221736.NAA17266(a)homeport.org> Subject: RFC 2144 on CAST-128 Encryption Algorithms (fwd) To: coderpunks(a)toad.com (The Coderpunks list) Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 13:36:16 -0400 (EDT) X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4ME+ PL27 (25)] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk I hadn't seen this mentioned. This is to coderpunks, bcc'd to cypherpunks & cryptography. Adam ------ A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries. RFC 2144: Title: The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm Author: C. Adams Date: May 1997 Mailbox: cadams(a)entrust.com Pages: 15 Characters: 37532 Updates/Obsoletes: None URL: ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc2144.txt There is a need in the Internet community for an unencumbered encryption algorithm with a range of key sizes that can provide security for a variety of cryptographic applications and protocols. This document describes an existing algorithm that can be used to satisfy this requirement. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. ----- End of forwarded message from Adam Shostack -----

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RFC 2144 on CAST-128 Encryption Algorithms (fwd)
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I hadn't seen this mentioned. This is to coderpunks, bcc'd to cypherpunks & cryptography. Adam ------ A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries. RFC 2144: Title: The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm Author: C. Adams Date: May 1997 Mailbox: cadams(a)entrust.com Pages: 15 Characters: 37532 Updates/Obsoletes: None URL: ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc2144.txt There is a need in the Internet community for an unencumbered encryption algorithm with a range of key sizes that can provide security for a variety of cryptographic applications and protocols. This document describes an existing algorithm that can be used to satisfy this requirement. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

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