December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Christmas greetings from Pauline Hanson
by Global Web Builders 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Pauline Hanson's One Nation Supporter in NSW, 1997 has been an eventful year in Australian politics. 1997 will be remembered as the year when Australians at last said that they had had enough. Enough of the lies and deception churned out by the major political parties. 1997 will be remembered as the year that Pauline Hanson's One Nation grew from a fledgling party launched in April to a major political force with a branch network of over 200 branches. A quite remarkable achievement. An achievement which could not have been realised without the dedication and commitment of national director David Ettridge and his Manly office team. 1997 will be remembered as a year of intimidation. Intimidation by well-organised protesters with strong links to the Australian Labor Party. The violence of these protesters against the Australian way of life - giving everyone a 'fair-go' and the media's blatantly biased reporting against One Nation failed to destroy the will and desire of the people to support me. 1997 will be remembered as the year in which a few tried to cause a split in the One Nation party. They knew that the media would report anything negative about the party. And they did. No matter that in all cases it was just a handful of troublemakers who tried to hijack the party for their own political gain. They failed. Today One Nation is more than just a phenomenon it is a real living party. It is made up of people like you and me. It is part of the political fabric in Australia. Looking ahead we will face many challenges together. We must continue to fight for equality for all Australians. We must continue to fight to protect our country from becoming a slave to the multinationals and international bodies. During this Christmas break we all have the opportunity to look back and see what we have achieved and to look forward to see what has still got to be done in the coming years. I wish you and your family all the best over Christmas and the New Year. God bless and may all your dreams come true. Pauline Hanson

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Pitney Bowes Sponsors World's Only Center for AppliedCryptographic Research
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: clairew(a)mediaone.net Date: Mon, 15 Dec 1997 21:09:22 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: rah(a)shipwright.com Subject: Pitney Bowes Sponsors World's Only Center for Applied Cryptographic Research X-Priority: 3 (Normal) Pitney Bowes Sponsors World's Only Center for Applied Cryptographic Research STAMFORD, Conn.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Dec. 15, 1997-- Messaging Leader Teams With The University of Waterloo, Certicom Corp. and The National Science Education and Research Council of Canada In an age of explosive growth of electronic commerce, effective protection of data storage and communications is vital. Pitney Bowes Inc. (NYSE:PBI), is supporting and funding critical research into protection of electronic commerce at one of the most highly acclaimed academic sources of cryptographic knowledge, the University of Waterloo in Ontario, Canada. Pitney Bowes is partnering with Certicom Corp. of Toronto, to found the Centre for Applied Cryptographic Research at the University of Waterloo. Both companies are joined by the National Science Education and Research Council of Canada (NSERC) and Communication and Information Technology Ontario (CITO) in the creation of two Industrial Research Chairs in Cryptography. Cryptographic research delves into the process of coding data for its protection and secure transfer. Cryptography, in all of its applications including data confidentiality, data integrity, and user authentication, is an extremely powerful tool for protecting information. Increasing research and knowledge of cryptography can ultimately increase the efficiency with which businesses operate and open up new business opportunities. Cryptography is one of the keys to doing business in the 21st century according to Dr. Joseph Wall, chief technology officer of Pitney Bowes Inc. "We are proud to help create this research center and anticipate significant advances in the technology and its understanding. We look forward to combining these advances with our understanding of business applications to deliver solutions which enhance confidentiality, security and integrity in the electronic marketplace. "Pitney Bowes has been researching and using cryptographic applications to help customers securely transmit data and funds since the 1960s. Cryptography will continue to be one of our technological cornerstones as we design solutions which help customers manage efficiently in their information-rich environment." Pitney Bowes is one of the largest users of applied cryptography in the world. For example, cryptographic technology is an important component in the system which Pitney Bowes used to securely download over $10 billion in postage revenues worldwide in 1996. Known commercially as Postage by Phone(R), Pitney Bowes developed and patented the system in the 1960s, received U.S. postal approval to introduce it to the marketplace in 1978, and expanded its usage to a variety of applications in 18 countries. The chair at the University of Waterloo will be established in association with the Natural Sciences Engineering Research Council (NSERC). The NSERC/Pitney Bowes chairholder will be Dr. Scott Vanstone, a faculty member at St. Jerome's College, University of Waterloo and Chief Cryptographer of Certicom Corp. Professor Vanstone will take up the chair on Jan. 1, 1998. He is one of the world's leading cryptographers and is co-author of the 1997 book Handbook of Applied Cryptography. The other chair at the University will be sponsored by Certicom Corp., which researches, develops and licenses advanced cryptographic technologies. The Certicom/NSERC chair will be Dr. Douglas Stinson, author of Cryptography: Theory and Practice. With regard to mathematical cryptography and combinatorics, the University of Waterloo is the leading university in Canada and with the establishment of the Centre for Applied Cryptographic Research, will be one of the top research and educational facilities in the world. Along with the core research group of Dr. Vanstone and Dr. Stinson, Dr. Leon Pintsov of Pitney Bowes will be a member of the scientific advisory board of the Centre. Pitney Bowes is a $3.9 billion provider of products and services that support the efficient management of messages and packages in physical and digital form. for more information about the company, visit the company's Web site at: http://www.pitneybowes.com . --30--CB/np* JS/np RG/KDB/ny CONTACT: Pitney Bowes, Stamford Sheryl Y. Battles, 203/351-6808 --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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Re: Identity, Persistence, Anonymity, and Accountability--Part I of II
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 12/15/97 11:13 PM, Greg Broiles (gbroiles(a)netbox.com) passed this wisdom: >>>But note that there absolutely is no requirement in the United >>>States for ageneral form of identification. Non-drivers need not >>>have any form of I.D. And as we have seen in court cases, a la >>>Lawson v. Kolender (where a blackman in dreadlocks used to like to >>>walk the streets of San Diego...the copsstopped him many times and >>>jailed him for not having I.D. on him...the court ruled that people >>>don't have to present credentials issued by the state to walk the >>>public streets). >> >> In New Jersey there is a criminal offense called "failure to >>properly identify" ... I don't know if its ever been tested, or if it >>is still on the books, but as of ten years ago it was there. I think >>it was a misdemeanor (in NJ the term is "petty disorderly persons >>offense) I cannot imagine it as a felony. > >There's an important distinction between a requirement that you identify >yourself accurately, and a requirement that you carry a particular form of >identification. It is constitutional for the police to ask you what your >name is, under certain circumstances - and you can face criminal charges if >you lie. It is not, however, constitutional to require that you keep or >carry identity cards or documents. (Modulo, of course, participation in >activities like carrying a concealed weapon or driving. There are some >people who believe that carrying special credentials should not be required >when undertaking those activities, but very few or none of those people sit >as judges, so their beliefs are comforting or pleasing but also >insufficient to prevent conviction.) I guess I am curious about being required to identify yourself ... if the cops have no probable cause to arrest you then what right do they have to know who you are? ... and should they have probable cause, why should you have to help them know who you are. I could see circumstances where forcing you to identify yourself would come under self-incrimination. I am sure they have ways of dealing with this ... what legal precedents are there concerning this? Brian B. Riley --> http://members.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "One of the deep mysteries to me is our logo, the symbol of lust and knowledge, bitten into, all crossed with in the colors of the rainbow in the wrong order. You couldn't dream of a more appropriate logo: lust, knowledge, hope, and anarchy." -- Gassee - Apple Logo

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Re: Fw: Jim Bell Sentenced (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Mon, 15 Dec 1997 16:57:22 -0800 > From: Steve Schear <schear(a)lvdi.net> > Subject: Re: Fw: Jim Bell Sentenced (fwd) > > I think both you and Bell are in relatively good agreement on the problem,= > differing mainly on the means of a solution. Well that is the litmus test after all, not the goals but rather the means. > Although, like you I have= > never considerd engaging in acts of violence to right the wrongs in our= > legal structure, I wouldn't say that. I just can't justify them unless under direct physical attack. I am *not* a pacifist. > I also do not believe that the changes you wish can= > reasonably be expected to be achieved through legal and democratic means= > within our lifetimes. I hadn't really entertained the condition that the 'fight' necessarily has to end in my life time. It certainly didn't end in Thomas Jeffersons. I do know that if we don't try we have zero chance of gaining any of them, let alone all of them. And who knows what the future may bring. Personaly I give the US about 20 years before a general political - economic - societal breakdown occurs. I believe that it will be even less violent but just as radical a change as the fall of the CCCP. I further believe that movement will *demand* ethical and reasonably justifiable reference to the respective constitutional documents. I also believe that within about a period of 10 years there will be a significant increase in the number of federal amendments clarifying many of the very issues we discuss today. I believe many things will drive the change. Among them medical technology which will re-grow cloned organs to replace any damaged or diseased ones you may have. I suspect that instead of terra-forming people will clone themselves and geneticaly engineer the embryo to adapt to the relevant environemt (Hint: Dougal Dixon). I believe this technology will fine tune the legal issues we ponder today to a fine edge. I believe the 9th and 10th will be recognized for the defining tests of all federal, state, and individual jurisdictional issues. I believe that as a result of those changes individuals will benefit by being considered equaly with federal and state views. > Almost from the start of our nation, the actions of the Federal branches= > have proven that the Anti-Federalists were right, that the Constitution (as= > accepted) would not prevent their power grab. Wasn't it Article 2, Section= > 18 which was intended to prevent such abuse, and which was easily overcome= > by the SC's liberal interpretation in Maubery vs. Madison? =20 I believe that people will recognize the totality of the current issues as the exact same excesses. People will realize that the camp that demanded specific bills of rights have the right idea. As a result we will get through indipendant state action several amendments. Those movements will be very goal specific and short lived. They will further depend on the Internet for their existance. I believe they will start with individuals in specific points across the US getting in touch and defining a small and specific set of goals (ie Demonstrate constitutionaly that individuals have a right to doctor assisted suicide and that it is an invasion of individual privacy.). As those goals percolate via passive and active processes across the Internet a commen experience will grow. An important question to consider: How long must you hold a sufficient totality of state representation to consider and pass a constitutional amendment? > Little has changed, nor it it likely to, within the system. There's too= > much inertia and entrenched economic and political interest, including the= > electorate's acquiessence to limitations of their liberties in exchange for= > real or imagined protection from harm. I can think of no instance when= > changes, of the magnitude of which you speak, were made during a peaceful= > transition. Can you? No. However, that proves nothing. Simply because something has not happened is no guarantee it won't happen. In all of human history this is the first time that the Internet has existed, photon transportation didn't exist as a verifiable process until just recently, there is now a movement in the dog lovers camp to save clonable samples of favorite pets in the hopes of cloning their best loved pooch. Technology as succesful as ours breeds a technocracy if it doesn't kill us. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Radio Free Cypherpunks... (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Mon, 15 Dec 1997 15:49:40 -0800 > From: Steve Schear <schear(a)lvdi.net> > Subject: Re: Radio Free Cypherpunks... (fwd) > > Over a year ago I started a heated thread on the Telecom Regulation list,= > "Basis of FCC jurisdiction," which posited that the Commerce Clause basis= > for FCC authority might not hold for very low power and tens of GHz= > transmissions. My argument, in short, was that if a transmission couldn't= > reasonably be expected to be detectable (using common receiver technology)= > across state lines then the FCC shouldn't have jurisdition. So, are you considering such a broadcast? What I envision is a text-to-speech and/or a digital format. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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"where would you find"
by succuba97＠hotmail.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The latest virtual XXX entertainment that is as good...well ALMOST as good as the REAL THING? HERE http://www.succuba.com WARNING: 1. YOU MUST BE OVER 18 YEARS OF AGE 2. YOU MUST HAVE A STRONG HEART ;) 3. IT'S HOTTTTTTTT ;}

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Re: Identity, Persistence, Anonymity, and Accountability--Part I of II (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: Identity, Persistence, Anonymity, and Accountability--Part I of II > Date: Mon, 15 Dec 97 23:47:07 -0500 > From: "Brian B. Riley" <brianbr(a)together.net> > >identification. It is constitutional for the police to ask you what your > >name is, under certain circumstances - and you can face criminal charges if > >you lie. Where in the Constitution is the relevant sentence(s)? There is no mention of police rights in the Constitution and therefor they have no more rights than you do. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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A gauntlet thrown down by PC-Magic?
by Alex Woolfson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey guys Just FYI here is the response I got from PC-Magic. -----Original Message----- From: Scott Chaney <scott(a)pc-magic.com> To: Alex Woolfson <abdiel(a)worldnet.att.net> Date: Monday, December 15, 1997 4:02 PM Subject: Re: Encrypted Magic Folders >Thanks for the feedback. We are considering an established standard. > >BTW, for all the "crap" we get from supposed crypto experts no one has >come close to breaking our method. It does make for humorous reading >tho. > >Scott > > Anyone care to take him up on his challenge? Please say yes. :-) Alex

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Could you please PGP sign this MD5 sum?
by ichudov＠Algebra.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would like to kindly ask you to sign this md5 sum with your PGP keys, and return it to me signed. I would also appreciate a copy of your PGP key. Thank you very much. ``I testify that I did see this MD5 checksum around Dec 16, 1997. f3bffc327bf88846bc1d790c56da0ffb caleidoscope.fixed.txt. '' Signed, -

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UK spooks invent RSA, DH in 1973
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's an interesting paper at http://www.cesg.gov.uk/ellisint.htm which claims that UK spooks invented both RSA and DH in 1973 and 1974 respectively. The summary info is: >This paper by James Ellis was written in 1987. It was commissioned shortly >after his retirement to provide a first-hand historical account of the early >work by James and others in CESG, discovering the techniques that were later >to become known as Public Key Cryptography. Although there would have been >some academic interest in the paper back in 1987, it was decided on balance >to keep the record internal and accordingly the paper was given a low >classification and retained within CESG. > >Since 1987 there have been three aspects which have created enormous changes >for CESG. First, the growth in the need for secure communications for >confidentiality and authentication has vastly increased key management >requirements. Second, the increase in processing speed has enabled large >arithmetical computations to be practicable. Third, the 1994 RPS gave CESG >responsibility for the communications security of the entire UK government >market. PKC is now seen as the best if not the only method for allowing wide >area many-user secure communications. With this increase in CESG's external >visibility there has been a growing desire for greater openness. > >During the past 11 years there had been no urgency to publish the paper, but >the necessary spark came when Clifford Cocks solved an important problem that >had been highlighted at a recent 'RSA' conference. Cliff is presenting this >solution in a paper at the IMA Conference on Cryptography and Coding in >Cirencester. Since he was one of the main contributors to our early work it >was clearly the right opportunity to set the record straight. As the paper >was being prepared for publication we heard that James had become very ill. >He died before the paper was published. We now publish it as a testament to >his imaginative and ground-breaking work. (The paper was mentioned on a UK crypto list, but I've lost the original reference). Peter.

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http://www.nuyenta.com
by NuYenta 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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The Joys of Being Canadian
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Phone Company Rep: "What's your Social Security number? >Answer: "I don't have one. I'm Canadian." > >Power Company Rep: "What's your Social Security number? >Answer: "I don't have one. I'm Canadian." > >Cable Company Rep: "What's your Social Security number? >Answer: "I don't have one. I'm Canadian." > >Doctor to Seasoned Citizen: "I can't treat you privately or I'll be barred >from taking Medicare patients for two years." >Answer: "Sure you can. I'm Canadian." Now the question is: When they find out you lied will they care?

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Re: Comparing PGP to Symantec's Secret Stuff
by Vin McLellan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(I just posted this in a discussion on alt.security.pgp, and thought it might also be of interest to the List. _Vin) ALCO Jakarta <alcojkt(a)bit.net.id> queried the Newsgroup: > Could anyone give me a quick trun-down on the difference between these two > programs and which one is more secure? Is the latter more practical to use > than PGP 2.6.2? That's comparing real crypto vs a sophisticated version of the Captain Crunch crypto ring. PGP in all of its forms uses strong crypto, which is why it is difficult to legally export it from the US to any overseas entity, except branches and subsidiaries of US firms. (Thus, the effort to sustain the international version of PGP, and PhilZ's long travail while the US govt tried to investigate how those sneaky non-Yanks got their hands on this oh-so-useful RSA/IDEA utility.) Norton Secret Stuff secures the data using the 32-bit Blowfish encryption algorithm -- which is why it's approved for unrestricted export outside the US by the U.S. government. It's far better than, say, ROT13 -- but it would not provide meaningful confidentiality or security for anything of any worth, or anything which might otherwise spur a curious and clever grad student to spend somewhere between a couple hours (with a college computer lab at his proposal) to a few days (on a fast PC) doing a brute force search of all possible 32-bit keys. A more complex comparison would put PGP against Norton's YEO, but that too is an apples to oranges matchup, albiet with strong crypto on both sides. PGP was designed to be a mail encyptor. YEO -- with RSA + RC4, RC5, DES, DES3, and Blowfish too, I think -- was designed as a file and disk encryptor. Each is optimized for its primary function. The lack of published source code is an issue, but if you see such a product being purchased by multinationals or US defense contractors you can be certain the implementation -- which is the real arena of vulnerability, once the algorithm is chosen -- has been carefully studied by informed cryptographers. (For non-American product, look for similar purchases by government-connected agencies in the vendor's nation.) You don't sound like the source code is going to do _you_ any good, right? Like most buyers, you have to trust the judgement of talented pros somewhere. > > I use PGP and don't find it's use so difficult to master even as a rookie > in cryptographic matters. But this Secret Stuff program is commerical so I > don't trust it's degree of security to gov't snooping based on my suspicion > of corporate submission to gov't will. Is that a reasonable assumption? Actually, corporate or commercial products are better than that. Secret Stuff is overtly weak crypto. It's also free from Symantec. Norton YEO from Symantec, or any competitive heavy-duty product like RSA SecurPC, will be clearly labelled as to the relative strength (key length) of their crypto -- strong for domestic user; weak for the intl mass market -- in terms anyone with a basic understanding of crypto and crypto export regs can understand. Export permits for the strong domestic versions of products like these will be all but impossible to obtain for mass market sales to non-American individuals. (Neither of these firms probably sells or even tries to sell the export version overseas; the weaker products exist largely because US corporate buyers demand an interoperable product that _can_ be shipped to overseas associates.) Export permits to ship the strong-crypto version of these products American corporations will require that the vendor have a key recovery mechanism -- no big deal, since we are dealing with stored files, so backup access is a standard requirement for disaster recovery -- which is to be held by the US firm in a location which makes it accessible to legal US court orders. Any and all US firms will respond to a legal court order to provide information. (Commercial firms in other nations will provide any info they hold when confronted with a court order too, right?) It is always rash to expect any commercial firm in any nation to be either a martyr or an arbiter of moral or political issues. Corporate officers have fiduciary responsibilities and they can be replaced. Corporations get a set of rules from the society in which they operate, and then -- within the context of those rules -- they seek to maximize their profit and their stockholders' return on investment with a certain degree of ruthless intensity. That's the nature of the beast. When corporate self-interest and some corporate executive's personal philosophy line up, we get some interesting fireworks -- sometimes even heroic moments which dramatically change the course of a government's industrial policy, as in the US banks vehement rejection of the NSA's CCEP and Clipper programs. The apparent exception really validates the rule. It's really rare for the US govt to try to overtly challenge or crush an American firm like they did with RSADSI for a decade. The NSA tried to bully the US banking industry and got handed its collective head -- and got branded as naive and turned into something of a laughingstock as well. On the other hand, commercial vendors which provide a product for sale have to describe and warranty that product as having certain properties. If those products are used by individuals or commercial customers and fail to measure up to their advance billing, the vendor is thereafter liable for significant (even company-threatening) losses, in both recompense and punitive damages. That's commercial law in the US -- no matter what sort of mealy-mouth language might be in the shrink-wrap license. US lawyers get a blueprint of an altar upon which they can sacrifice such firms when they get their law degree. Corporate "submission to gov't will" is a real issue, particularly for vendors of privacy and security tech -- but for US firms, it is far more likely to play out formally (as with a court order for a message recovery key) or in some negotiated backroom deal where the government demands some feature added, or asks for some feature to be removed from free-market product, before the vendor is given some commercial advantage like a government contract, or GSA approval, or an export permit. You see the whole American IT industry being put through this sort of blackmail in the current US crypto export policy. Only vendors which have or agree to design key/message "recovery" mechanisms in file or communications crypto apps get export permits to ship their 56-bit versions of their crypto products -- or (among other vendors,) crypto-enhanced applications like RDBSs and operating systems -- to the international market. Nothing subtle or secret about that -- and historically, the model has probably been pretty much the same, if less blatent. US export controls in crypto exist to bludgeon the vendors, so that the US govt can obtain something it wants in that company's domestic or overseas product lines. (It certainly does not restrict the international bad guy's access to strong crypto, no matter what the latest Four Horseman propaganda is.) Today, I think this leverage is probably being applied more on the big US vendors of operating systems and networking software and major applications -- all of which require crypto for their commercial products today -- than it is upon the puny crypto vendors (who are, relatively speaking, small potatos and aren't allowed to sell strong versions of their products -- even with message-recovery -- to anyone interesting, anyway;-) In commercial encryption products, the hidden backdoors of myth and legend are far less likely, given the liability issue and US commercial law. Overt and well-labelled backdoors are a different story. <sigh> Surete, _Vin "Cryptography is like literacy in the Dark Ages. Infinitely potent, for good and ill... yet basically an intellectual construct, an idea, which by its nature will resist efforts to restrict it to bureaucrats and others who deem only themselves worthy of such Privilege." _ A thinking man's Creed for Crypto/ vbm. * Vin McLellan + The Privacy Guild + <vin(a)shore.net> * 53 Nichols St., Chelsea, MA 02150 USA <617> 884-5548

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Re: UCENET II and Peter duh Silva
by Charlie Comsec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Information Security <The(a)NSA.sucks> wrote: > : While that's technically true, it's even more true of non-anonymous e-mail > : addresses. Usenet posts are much easier to forge than PGP signatures, and > : it's quite simple to sign up for a throwaway e-mail account under an assumed > : name. It's not very secure from a privacy standpoint, but it's even less > : secure from a "positive ID" POV. > : > : At least with a PGP-signed anonymous post, readers are alerted up front that > : they are reading the work of an author who is withholding his/her identity. > : But if you read a post from "john_smith(a)hotmail.com", is it really someone > : named "John Smith" or not? > > I'm not following this...anyone can generate PGP keys, and digital signatures > are not necessary to indentify an account... Sure, anyone can generate a PGP key. It's almost as easy as generating a throwaway e-mail address. And what does posting from a certain e-mail address or signing one's post with a certain PGP key prove? It proves that the poster KNEW a certain piece of INFORMATION, either an account password or a PGP secret key. It's usually inferred that the person who possesses that information is the person who generated it. Of the two, guessing a PGP secret key is orders of magnitude harder than guessing someone's password, logging on, and impersonating them. In addition, PGP signing is "portable". No matter where I post from, if I sign my post with the same key, you can assume it's me who posted it. It's more difficult to do that with an e-mail address. Let's say that you have a common name like "John Smith" and you post as jsmith(a)someisp.com. Are you saying that's your "identity"? What if Someisp, Inc. suddenly files for bankruptcy and shuts down without warning? Did you lose your identity? You could open a new account as "jsmith" somewhere else and claim you are the same person who previously posted as jsmith(a)someisp.com, but so could anyone else who desired to impersonate you. If you were signing your posts with a PGP key, then all you'd have to do is make a post from your new ISP, sign it with the same key, and your "identity" is "transferred". - --- Finger <comsec(a)nym.alias.net> for PGP public key (Key ID=19BE8B0D) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNJahmQbp0h8ZvosNAQEqmAf+IG/gtP4flSv/RPP7530NuD5MeMgH8WGo 75E/o+3GkN5Ksl0hL0bdpUhDvqeHnwsdc2xO5j0UEzqIZGKapa1YvJGK0wrUU/FB UrUzcrHkvtXAdJD8GRTaA/Xgzjh2eJGOImzaIHbPOZBa4MPxYm7bEZaroHR2G2IP AkNFbJzBETP9nLmePupRSqmhN8GwC5BLRLjkXLDDXJ/9s04vNoBGUEsv4aA0iRad cdkHjHSs9FfOOTJPPG+GdDA+Z1LuyjnugcoTfYPtsu7PwgWE/tAxOCVPI6sHrhze I1a4KZSVn1AoNd0ii7Mcw4Fp73SUcuZ74+EJovToOyBu++bqZdOYsA== =jF0X -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: UCENET II and Peter duh Silva
by Charlie Comsec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- politas(a)dynamite.com.au (Politas) wrote: > Surely that isn't the important thing. More important is that the > person really has an email address of "john_smith(a)hotmail.com". Then > it's up to Hotmail to be able to trace that email address back to the > previous step, assuming that they are being forced to do so by a > warrant or some other legal reason. > > Personally, I think that all messages should be able to be traced to a > real person, although this tracing should not be possible without > legal action. Are you saying that Hotmail should be made a guarantor of the identity of its accountholders, or merely that they could be required, under certain circumstances, to divulge what information (if any) it possesses, regardless of its accuracy? AFAIK, the latter case is currently operative, since Hotmail's records are presumably already subject to subpoena (in the USA, at least -- I just realized you're posting from an Aussie domain). IOW, when you sign up for a hotmail.com account, you're presumably required to give them a "name". If I signed up as "John Smith", should they be required to verify that I'm really John Smith, or merely disclose that the account belongs to someone who identified him/herself as "John Smith"? If you're saying what I hope you're NOT saying, it would amount to a form of "identity escrow", and I suspect that Hotmail would probably choose to discontinue offering free e-mail accounts rather than take on that sort of responsibility. - --- Finger <comsec(a)nym.alias.net> for PGP public key (Key ID=19BE8B0D) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNJaaXwbp0h8ZvosNAQHqtQf+LGGPWLQFPGfGgwKIHKOTAXQ74S08rGqt i8yiuSY2RgC+CXzbXJaMmDQ9gAcPMmCKJqzc2O4bkresg+hz6/Cl6d+m+3FO4Nz+ HKeaEMlg3EXHuxTnhsx4vSAWubdbpC+OfkU6kQHf1YU1zWZnIV9c7SbWmSNeaYhq sXLl6+YlPFwwZ0N5bUBqNkOsAQQveNFd/91mYGAZBi2R6P95F+RDV3/Jv3elhXgu egBb2Igf7imK/U6zFhgm6+jCdFdpGOfJ030UAMulezFi/czaiNdLNR3jE4nnfrwQ 4qexxqUkwzNrNWX0M9T/YQ7wl+jIWi3KKj4s4QLHTKXhoHNDY7hPsw== =W6Zl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Clinton announces NEW GVT PROGRAMS to develop technology
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

WASHINGTON (AP) - Honoring 14 American scientists' "passion for discovery," President Clinton today announced $96 million in new government-assisted programs to develop chip-sized supercomputers, hand-held video phones and radio-transmitting ID cards to locate lost children. "Who knows what will be known in only 25 years," Clinton marveled, pointing to recent innovations on the Internet and human genome research. "We must rise to master the forces of change and progress as we move forward." The $96 million already provided by Congress for this budget year, combined with industry funds, would leverage roughly $200 million for research and development, Clinton said. "The discoveries of tomorrow will be made possible by the scientists of today and by our continued commitment to their passionate quest," Clinton said. The Defense Department and semiconductor industry are teaming up to pay for long-term university projects meant to eventually allow U.S. companies to manufacture fingernail-sized silicon chips containing billions of transistors. A Commerce Department initiative offers, through competitions, funds to small companies working on breakthroughs in areas such as portable video communications, radio transmitters to keep track of children and affordable DNA diagnostics. [...]

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NIST IPsec-WIT (Web-based Interoperability Tester) on-line
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Tue, 16 Dec 1997 07:48:46 -0500 (EST) To: ipsec(a)tis.com Cc: rob.glenn(a)nist.gov From: rob.glenn(a)nist.gov Subject: NIST IPsec-WIT (Web-based Interoperability Tester) on-line MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-ipsec(a)ex.tis.com Precedence: bulk The NIST IPsec-WIT (Web-based Interoperability Tester) is on-line and ready for use. IPsec-WIT is an interoperability test system built around the NIST Cerberus IPsec reference implementation and commonly available WWW technology. IPsec-WIT allows its users to remotely control and execute series of interoperability tests with the Cerberus prototype. Test case selection, configuration, execution and results analysis are all controlled remotely by WWW browser. IPsec-WIT is currently operational for IPv4 IPsec protocols (with over 60 test cases) and will soon support IPv6 as well as key management protocol testing. For access to IPsec-wit and additional information see: http://ipsec-wit.antd.nist.gov. It is recommended that you read through the tutorial before testing for the first time. Comments and recommendations can be sent to ipsec-wit-dev(a)mail.antd.nist.gov. Best Regards, Rob G. rob.glenn(a)nist.gov PS - Sorry if you have already seen this once. I sent it out yesterday afternoon and haven't seen it yet. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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OTP
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim C[ocksucker] May's abysmal grammar, atrocious spelling and feeble responses clearly identify him as a product of the American education system. 0 //\/ Tim C[ocksucker] May \/\ ... /

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The naming of the Presidential Pooch
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The stakeout before the press conference. Note the hard-hitting questions from DC political reporters: Q There he is. So what's his name? PRESIDENT CLINTON: Isn't he pretty? Q But what's his name? PRESIDENT CLINTON: Press conference. Press conference. Q (Laughs.) His name is "press conference"? PRESIDENT CLINTON: Huh? Q His name is "press conference"? PRESIDENT CLINTON: That's a good idea. That's probably what I should have called him. (To the puppy) Do you want to go see them? Q Mr. President, where does he sleep? Where does the puppy sleep? PRESIDENT CLINTON: Upstairs. Q Upstairs? Does he have his own little doggy bed? PRESIDENT CLINTON: He has a little house in the kitchen. He's sleeping in the kitchen right now. Q Does he sleep in a little dog house? PRESIDENT CLINTON: Yeah, he sleeps in a little dog house. And we got another - Q He is really trained? PRESIDENT CLINTON: You may get a chance to see here in a minute! (Laughter.) Yes, he's done quite well, so far. Hi, Jimmy. Q And what can he do? PRESIDENT CLINTON: (Commands the puppy) Sit! THE PRESS: Oh! All right! PRESIDENT CLINTON: (To the puppy) That's good. Very good. Q What's he eating, Mr. President? PRESIDENT CLINTON: A little dog biscuit. He's pretty well trained. And, you know, I get up in the morning and take him for a walk early, at 7:00. And then I give him breakfast, then we go for another walk. And then he has lunch and goes for another walk. Q Who takes him at lunch time? PRESIDENT CLINTON: Well, so far, I have. Q He likes the press, Mr. President. PRESIDENT CLINTON: Yeah, he does. So do I. Q He doesn't bother your allergies? PRESIDENT CLINTON: No. I've never been - yeah twice, three times. I'm trying to work this out. Q It's going to take awhile. PRESIDENT CLINTON: It's going to take awhile. It's kind of like peace in Ireland or the Middle East, you know - (chuckles) - it's - Q What happened when they met? PRESIDENT CLINTON: Socks was a little scared of him, I think. And yesterday - you could have had a great picture yesterday. She jumped way up - he jumped way up on my shoulder. Socks climbed right up and got up on my shoulders so that they would have an appropriate distance. But we're giving them items that the two of them have, you know, to try to get used to the scent. And I'll get it worked out. Q What's his name? Q He likes grass. PRESIDENT CLINTON: He can hang out in the - he can hang out nearly anywhere. We've got a little flexible cage back in the dining room now in the White House. He comes over to the Oval Office with me in the morning. He does fine. Q Without telling us the name, can you tell us if it came from a senator? PRESIDENT CLINTON: No. In the end, it didn't. It didn't. I'll tell you about - I'll answer questions about it at the press conference. Q What were your finalist names? Can you give us any of that? PRESIDENT CLINTON: I'll do that too, at the press conference. Yeah, we went through - we went through about - you know, we got thousands of names. It was great! And I had so much fun reviewing them. And then we went - (to the puppy) - don't eat that, you just had lunch! - (returning) - and we got down to about seven or eight, and then we got down to three and finally made a decision. (To the puppy) Come on, kiddo. Come on. Let's go. Q He's beautiful. PRESIDENT CLINTON: Thank you. I think he's beautiful, too. END

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m2n@alpha.jpunix.com is down
by John A. Perry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Now that I've posted that operating a mail2news gateway is a minimal effort, the m2n at jpunix.com has been under a steady spam attack for the past 72 hours. I fought it all day yesterday and came in this morning to find that the spammer had just moved to a different ISP and started spamming again. I have no choice but to shut down the m2n for now in order to stop the spam. If anyone is interested the body of the spam looks like this: Subject: Publicity agents are fun! Hoping you'll have a superly-NICE nite, a FUN day tomorrow, and the most excellent TIMES forever more. - -------------------------------------- This message was brought to you by MarketCom's MktAgent, the interNet's premier webwalking publicity engine. Locate over 100,000 Email penpals in only 5 days with our FREE demo model. http://www.MarketCom.com/MktAgent/ Of course everyone on USEnet is blaming jpunix.com for the SPAM but I knew that would happen when I first started the m2n. Anyway here's hoping that the spammer will get tired and move on and then I'll be able to start it back up. John Perry KG5RG perry(a)alpha.jpunix.com PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! Amateur Radio Address: kg5rg(a)kg5rg.ampr.org WWW - http://www.jpunix.com PGP 2.62 key for perry(a)jpunix.com is on the keyservers. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNJfAr1OTpEThrthvAQEdXQP/Sc7IVlvi1GbuVMZ+Nv3rWPluxybxZpuJ oSSNI0LObO20dBhI3IZIiWof5I3jpwoIuT8Ha/6IOLO7Rxmat9xj1h3E4j/Mrb6b diTaRiifPG1MiMeuNIYkPSefwqInlQrKSIQ28SEn3/Mc8WclWXEU3+8MQ/gsNc/c E3QZ71TegtM= =LH3k -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The main french PGP HomePage is now here : http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Bay/9648 The page is called "PGP POUR LES FRANCAIS" ("PGP for the french people") and is wholly in french language. You can find here a lot of informations about PGP 2.x and 5.x and a detailed PGP history. A bientot :) ----------------------------------------------- PGP pour les français http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Bay/9648

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Biometrics for the Masses
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Tue, 16 Dec 1997 16:05:08 -0800 From: jmuller(a)brobeck.com (John D. Muller) Subject: Biometrics for the Masses To: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: jmuller(a)brobeck.com (John D. Muller) December 13, 1997 Bank of America, Kroger, Mr. Payroll Agree To Test Automated Check Cashing Consumers and Retailers Benefit From Facial Biometric Technology <Picture> (Fort Worth, Texas) - Fort Worth-based Mr. Payroll Corporation , a wholly owned subsidiary of Cash America International (NYSE:PWN), along with Bank of America and The Kroger Company announced today they have entered into an agreement to test the Mr. Payroll automated check-cashing machine. The machines will be installed on December 16 in three Dallas area Kroger locations. Mr. Payroll, the world's first self-service check-cashing and automated teller machine, uses facial biometrics (the same technology now used to authenticate identity in the Pentagon) to identify users. This technology allows people with and without a bank account or photo identification to cash their payroll, government or personal check. "We're excited to have Bank of America and Kroger join us in providing consumers with 24-hour access to check-cashing services. This is a milestone for Mr. Payroll," said Mr. Payroll President Mike Stinson. "We're looking forward to testing this new check cashing technology in these Kroger locations," said Bank of America Vice President David McCary. "Providing financial services at popular retail locations enhances convenience for consumers." According to Manager, Store Services and Technology Jim Gehling, Kroger expects automated check cashing provided by Mr. Payroll to set a new standard in customer service in select stores. "To help introduce our shoppers to the machine, we're going to offer free check cashing through January 31, 1998," Gehling said. Consumers can look for the new machines in Texas at the Kroger stores located at 536 Centennial in Richardson, 235 E. FM 1382 in Cedar Hill, and 4142 Cedar Springs in Dallas. Mr. Payroll, which guarantees 100 percent of every check, has successfully cashed more than 25,000 checks since June 1997, when the first machine was installed at a convenience store in Fort Worth, Texas. To date, Mr. Payroll machines are operating in 18 convenience store locations in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Texas. Bank of America Texas is a subsidiary of BankAmerica Corporation (NYSE:BAC), which has nearly 2,000 branches in 11 states. At September 30, 1197, BankAmerica had assets of $258 billion and deposits of $171 billion. Mr. Payroll is a registered trademark of Mr. Payroll Corp. All products or service names mentioned are the trademarks of their respective owners. For help on using this list (especially unsubscribing), send a message to "dcsb-request(a)ai.mit.edu" with one line of text: "help". --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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A gauntlet thrown down by PC-Magic?
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 16 Dec 1997 at 00:02:27 -0800, "Alex Woolfson" <abdiel(a)worldnet.att.net> wrote: > Hey guys > > Just FYI here is the response I got from PC-Magic. >> Thanks for the feedback. We are considering an established >> standard. >> >> BTW, for all the "crap" we get from supposed crypto experts >> no one has come close to breaking our method. It does make >> for humorous reading tho. >> >> Scott > Anyone care to take him up on his challenge? > Please say yes. :-) > > Alex What fucking challenge? Is he or are you so dimwitted as to think that people have nothing better to do than provide Scott and his cretinous friends with a first-hand education? A "challenge" would be something like: "PC-Magic has encrypted a [file/message/whatever] containing ecash in the amount of $50,000, has deposited with [an arm's-length third party] the original text, the encrypted [file/message/whatever], the software that decrypts it and the [password or passphrase], and hereby agrees to leave the ecash prize current and unrepudiated until [deadline date], after which we will re-deposit the ecash and instruct the [third party] to reveal the message and demonstrate its decryption as a proof that the challenge was genuine." The prize amount would have to be relatively high since these people have not published technical information and no one has any real interest in investing time and money to demonstrate that people who appear to be idiots are, in fact, idiots. The $10K and lower challenges that have been issued in the past have mostly come from known entities with published algorithms. Scott's characterization, "the 'crap' we get from supposed crypto experts." is indicative that he really didn't read and understand much of the criticism. It is typical of the ignorant who have embarked on a flawed course to become annoyed at well-founded criticism and to belittle their critics. "...no one has come close to breaking our method" is indicative only of the lack of motivation on the part of qualified cryptanalysts, most of whom have much better things to do. It is the responsibility of the advocate of a cryptographic technique to raise the level of interest in testing it sufficiently high that it will in fact be thoroughly tested. To claim that a technique has never been compromised is to claim nothing at all. I have a message I encrypted when I was 16 that no one has yet cracked. I could challenge PC-Magic to crack it. If they were sufficiently introspective to be able to examine their reasons for ignoring my "challenge" they would understand why theirs is not a challenge. OTOH if they had that many brain cells to rub together they would already have understood the logic of the criticisms they so glibly dismiss. Perhaps a more satisfying exercise would be if PC-Magic were to encrypt a ton of the worst child pornography, hate literature and conspiratorial assassination plans imaginable, then present themselves and the computer containing the encrypted goodies to the office of the Bavarian prosecutor. CryptoMongerII

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Kremlin 2.0
by Mark Rosen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What's the use of encrypting your files if they remain unencrypted, lying around on your hard drive, reported as "deleted" space, ready for anyone to steal? And why bother to encrypt your sensitive documents if your word processor leaves scraps of these documents floating around your hard drive? Security in the Windows environment seems to be a futile effort. Kremlin 2.0 offers an easy-to-use solution to the problem of Windows data leakage. When you log off your computer, Kremlin can clear your computer's memory (both the RAM and the swapfile), wipe the unused portions of your hard drives (where temporary word processing files most often lurk), and erase all records of your Windows access (such as the most recent documents accessed, your Internet history, etc). And to securely delete a file or folder, just drag it to the Kremlin Secure Recycle Bin. Of course, the encryption in Kremlin is also first rate. You can encrypt a file with one of six algorithms (including IDEA, Blowfish, and RC4), just by right-clicking and choosing "Encrypt". And Kremlin can automatically encrypt your sensitive documents when you log off and decrypt them when you log back on, preventing unwanted access to your files. Kremlin has been peer reviewed by the best in the business: Chris Hall, from Counterpane Systems (Bruce Schneier's company), and Alexander Pukall have both examined the Kremlin source code. Kremlin is fast, easy-to-use, and secure; it's the right choice to protect your data. You can download Kremlin from: http://www.mach5.com/kremlin/ Mark Rosen Mach5 Software http://www.mach5.com/

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freeh/crypto/reno
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 15:36:21 -0800 From: "J. Orlin Grabbe" <kalliste(a)aci.net> To: snetnews(a)world.std.com Subject: SNET: [Fwd: FREEH SPEECH (repost)] - -> SearchNet's SNETNEWS Mailing List This is a multi-part message in MIME format. - --------------F4A2244C1A5A763B01795119 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit - --------------F4A2244C1A5A763B01795119 Content-Type: message/rfc822 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline From: softwar(a)us.net Subject: FREEH SPEECH (repost) Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 14:11:51 -0600 Reply-To: softwar(a)us.net Message-ID: <881784054.228196354(a)dejanews.com> Newsgroups: alt.politics.clinton,alt.politics.org.cia,alt.politics.org.fbi,alt.politics.org.nsa,talk.politics.crypto Organization: Deja News Posting Service Path: news.alt.net!wnfeed!worldnet.att.net!128.230.129.106!news.maxwell.syr.edu!nntp2.dejanews.com!grunt.dejanews.com!not-for-mail X-Article-Creation-Date: Wed Dec 10 20:00:55 1997 GMT X-Authenticated-Sender: softwar(a)us.net X-Http-User-Agent: Mozilla/3.0 (Win16; I) X-Originating-IP-Addr: 198.240.101.30 (host30.richmond.us.net) Xref: news.alt.net alt.politics.clinton:375281 alt.politics.org.cia:25294 alt.politics.org.fbi:13697 alt.politics.org.nsa:10505 talk.politics.crypto:20929 General Reno has declined to appoint an Independent Counsel to investigate campaign abuses by the Clinton White House. Several Congressional leaders have sputtered they are concerned about Ms. Reno's conflict of interest in the matter. Of course, the Republican specifics of her "conflict" never go past the fact that she was appointed by Clinton. However, the connections between Ms. Reno and the Clinton scandals are well known to at least one person inside the Beltway. One example of Reno's conflict is the Clinton China Crypto Scam. It was Reno's Justice Anti-Trust Division that authorized the merger of a major company backed by a big donor to the DNC. The companies, RSA and Security Dynamics, sought the merger in 1996 just after RSA Chairman James Bidzos signed a memo of understanding to perform "encryption research" with China. The donor, Sanford Robertson, paid $100,000 to the DNC just prior to the merger. Furthermore, Mr. Robertson was on the list of those called by Al Gore from the White House and the MONEY arrived just after Gore's call. In fact, $20,000 of Robertson's donation was split into a HARD money account by the DNC. Of course, Mr. Robertson's investment firm made a cool two million dollars on the merger deal, spurred in part by the lucrative RSA contract with the PRC. Yet, Ms. Reno was also directed officially by President Clinton to oversee the "encryption problem" and enforce policy. For example, according to recently declassified documents from the Clinton National Security Council, Ms. Reno was tasked by President Clinton in 1993 to oversee the Clipper project. Ms. Reno was directed by Clinton to purchase 9,000 Clipper phones for the FBI. In addition, Clinton directed Ms. Reno to prepare Clipper for export. Finally, Reno was tasked to convince the US communications and computer industry to voluntarily implement the Clipper "key escrow" back door into all US made products. Simply put, Ms. Reno was, and is still, in charge of bugging America's telephones. Yet, how far can Ms. Reno go? According to the Presidential Directive, "Should (US) industry fail to fully assist the government in meeting its requirements within a reasonable period of time, the Attorney General will recommend legislation which would compel manufacturers to meet government requirements." Thus, if we do not voluntarily give up our rights to privacy, Ms. Reno is tasked by President Clinton with drawing up the laws for "mandatory" government phone bugs. Yet, there is overwhelming evidence that Ms. Reno quietly turned her head as a major DNC backer managed a deal involving the Communist Chinese and advanced encryption technology. Other than approving the lucrative RSA merger/export, Ms Reno and the Justice Department are also major players in export policy. They are part of an Inter-Agency Working group specifically tasked to cover crypto and exports. As proof, Reno's Justice Department has written most of the Clinton encryption policy papers. In fact, some of the secret documents written by Reno's Justice Department on crypto policy were compromised by former DNC fund-raiser Ira Sockowitz. Sockowitz walked out of the Commerce Department with over 2,000 pages of secrets in 1996. Ironically, included in the Sockowitz papers are secret documents covering the 1996 RSA/China deal. Curiously, Ms. Reno has chosen NOT to look into the matter. The connections between Ms. Reno and the Clinton scandals are also well known to at least one person inside the Beltway. FBI Director Louie Freeh knows. He is aware of that advanced technology was being shipped to China while draconian laws banning the same technology were considered here. Director Freeh also knows that his boss, Ms. Reno, is deeply involved in criminal obstruction involving high tech exports, DNC donors, and her own Justice Department. He knows she is covering for crimes that she and her Department were charged to prevent. The question now is... Does Freeh have the guts to tell America? 1 if by land, 2 if by sea. Paul Revere - encryption 1775 Charles R. Smith SOFTWAR http://www.us.net/softwar Pcyphered SIGNATURE: 3B766150F4B90D30688C657BB44EE7016793781A184F584E7C129D2A8A03F3F5 0B833ABFCE759CC129AF6A33B104406F19EB68AF61050087B65A66C94EA8B0B9 1D70D66883BCA304 - -------------------==== Posted via Deja News ====----------------------- http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Post to Usenet - --------------F4A2244C1A5A763B01795119-- - -> Send "subscribe snetnews " to majordomo(a)world.std.com - -> Posted by: "J. Orlin Grabbe" <kalliste(a)aci.net> ------- End of Forwarded Message

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