December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

All Children Work in Sweatshops
by Eric Cordian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One of the interesting things about the child porn crusades is the terminology manipulation employed to officially describe more and more innocuous things as officially being "child porn," and by inference, describing those who object the slightest bit to the government's violation of the First Ammendment as "child porn supporters." Now the wonders of government terminology have been applied to a new problem, the "scourge" of child labor. While an historical review will clearly demonstrate that laws preventing minors from working and earning a living had their origins in times when adult unemployment was high, and were heavily pushed by the public school teachers labor unions and immigrant parents outraged that their children had an opportunity for financial independence, the myth that such laws exist to "protect children" instead of to economically and politically disempower them persist. Enter the current crusade, being heavily trumpeted by the media, to rescue children from "sweatshops." What is a sweatshop, you may ask? According to the official definition, a "sweatshop" is a workplace that engages in repeated labor violations involving wages, hours worked, or the age of its employees. So by the magic of government definitions, all unlawfully employed minors automatically work in "sweatshops," by virtue of their being illegally employed. All people arguing for the right of minors to work of course "support sweatshops," and all consumers and stores who buy goods produced by these illegally employed minors are purchasing "goods produced by children working in sweatshops." 290,200 children are alleged to have been employed illegally last year, (in sweatshops of course). And woe to anyone who doesn't support the call to liberate these children from their paychecks. (er, sweatshops) The US is now attempting to export its crusade against so-called "child labor" to third world nations, citing of course only the most egregious examples in the case histories it presents. The US still refuses to sign the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child because it prohibits the execution of minors, which many US states permit, and guarantees minors access to reproductive health information. -- Eric Michael Cordian 0+ O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division "Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law"

1 0

Invitation to Join "Nym"
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You are cordially invited to join "Nym," a new mailing list devoted to discussing anonymity and pseudonymity. The topics: anonymity's history, current politics, and proposals to regulate anonymous speech and commerce. Nym's primary, but not exclusive, focus is on anonymity and pseudonymity online. This includes the technologies of untraceability: digital cash, anonymous remailers, and public key encryption. It will be unmoderated but not widely advertised at first in hopes of preserving quality of conversations. Personally, I'd like to see folks join from many disciplines. I don't expect it to be very high volume. To sign up, or for more info: http://www.well.com/~declan/nym/ Or send "subscribe nym" to majordomo(a)vorlon.mit.edu. -Declan

1 0

Plot to Overthrow U.S.Government: three indicted
by ichudov＠Algebra.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wow, this is a colorful story. As usual, I am not sure how much of it is true. igor Three Indicted in Alleged Plot to Overthrow U.S. Government AP 13-DEC-97 LITTLE ROCK, Ark. (AP) Three men charged with planning a revolt against the United States government wanted to create a new republic limited to whites while allowing polygamy to build its population, prosecutors say. Chevie Kehoe of Colville, Wash., and Daniel Lewis Lee of Oklahoma City were charged Friday with murder, racketeering and conspiracy in a seven-count federal indictment. Kehoe, 24, directed the group, and Lee, 24, carried out the orders, the indictment said. Faron Lovelace, 40, of Sandpoint, Idaho, was charged with a single count of racketeering for allegedly being Kehoe's assistant. Prosecutors say Kehoe and the others wanted to create the Aryan Peoples Republic through a campaign of murder, robberies and kidnappings. Once the U.S. government was gone, their new country would grow quickly "by recruiting certain white people into the Republic and by engaging in polygamy so that the number of these white persons would greatly increase," the indictment said. The indictment did not detail threats or name targeted officials. Kehoe and Lee were previously charged in state court with the 1996 deaths of William Mueller, 52; his wife, Nancy, 28; and Mrs. Mueller's daughter, Sarah Elizabeth Powell, 8. Kehoe and Lee allegedly robbed Mueller, a gun dealer in Tilly, Ark., to support their cause, and the circumstances surrounding the deaths gave the Arkansas grand jury jurisdiction. Prosecutors said state murder charges would be dropped to allow the federal case to advance. Authorities say the Muellers and Kehoes knew each other and were associated through gun shows and militia group activities. Kehoe is accused of directing crimes that also include theft, interstate transportation of stolen property and money laundering. Part of Lee's job was to carry out four murders, and Lovelace's duties included one murder, according to the indictment. Kehoe and Lovelace are accused of transporting stolen goods from the white separatist community of Elohim City, Okla., to Spokane, Wash., in March 1995 and again from Arkansas to Washington after the Muellers were killed. Lovelace was convicted this year of killing Jeremy Scott, 23, in 1995 out of fear Scott was a government informant. Lovelace also has admitted kidnapping and robbing a Washington state couple in 1995. He held them captive for five hours after stealing their weapons and extorting several thousand dollars from them. Kehoe and his brother, Cheyne Kehoe, 21, made national headlines in February when they were allegedly involved in a shootout with Ohio police. It was caught on videotape by a camera mounted on a police car. No officers were wounded but a passerby was injured by a bullet fragment. Kehoe and his brother were fugitives until June, when Cheyne surrendered and told authorities where to find his brother. Cheyne was not named in Friday's indictment. Kehoe was being held in Ohio awaiting charges stemming from the videotaped shootout. Lee was jailed in Arkansas on capital murder charges, and Lovelace was being held in Idaho. Copyright 1997 & The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. `

3 2

No Subject
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

When posted MISTY algorithm source code, I hadn't read "A Cypherpunk's Manifesto" yet. Such a fee was set up as a result. ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

1 0

SHY?.....................................
by highjock＠yahoo.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FREE.....FREE.....FREE..... FREE FREE CALL! 011-678-77432 ( NEW !!! ) If you're OVER 21, Get Ready and HANG ON! Our young girls are SEXY & HOT (or HOWEVER you want), and are for real! >>>>>> LIMITED TIME OFFER <<<<<< Talk to them LIVE...... For FREE! NO 900's, NO credit cards needed! Just pick up the phone.But HURRY. You don't have too much longer. We want to introduce you to our girls and our new business, so we're charging NOTHING for the service, you just pay for normal small long distance charges. Shy?........Then sit back and listen in on live, sexy conversations with other callers. Get away from that computer, loosen your belt for a few minutes, recharge your batteries, and have some fun! They're waiting for your call, and will talk about ANYTHING you want! No holds barred. >>>>> LIMITED TIME OFFER <<<<<< FREE CALL! 011-678-77432 (Use your country code if 011 doesn't work) This is a one time mailing!! You will not receive any more ads from us. But if you'd like, hit reply and put "remove me" on the subject line.

1 0

$145 turned to $1300: BEST investment for ANYBODY
by woostp＠ns.interred.co.cr 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Friend: Earlier this week I sent you this very same letter and since I have not heard from you I imagined either it didn't get delivered or you accidentally hit "delete" on it. Or you simply just haven't gotten around it. I don't think you want to wait around much longer. Especially if like other friends of mine and business relationships, you are interested in MULTIPLYING SUBSTANTIALLY (and in a very short time) a very small investment. So here again, is a copy of my letter. Today I write you to share one of the most simple and beneficial investments I found in the last months. I waited effectively several months to verify the incidence of my decision and truly, I am so glad of this one, that I decided to share it with a selected handful of people. I was proposed to invest $145 minimum and $485 maximum to receive a basic $1300 in the first months with a program, by sharing it with a very few friends. (I took the $485 option). Conclusion: not only didn't I have to wait one year to see a 800% of return on my investment, but I had the surprise to receive this amount SEVERAL TIMES BY MONTH. It seems incredible, but it's true. The American Company offering this program is not only serious, but I could personally speak with the President and the CPA and they have been reliable for the few friends I shared the program with. So, if I awakened your interest just a little bit, this is the moment and opportunity to give a look to the complete information pulling the FAX ON DEMAND # 716-720-2106 or visiting the following WEBSITE: http://peopleschoice.com/STP/home.html And remember, do as I did by considering this opportunity as an investment, and, applying the program, it will give you the most secure and fantastic yield you can find. FOR ONLY $145 to $485. Just try it, contemplating that the risk is around zero and share it with two or three of your best friends just after you applied. To participate, you must indicate a sponsor number. I would be glad if you used mine, it is: # 983 registered under the name of my corporation, WOOSTER CORP. So don't hesitate on this opportunity my friend. You are getting today one of the most safe and simple ways to increase a very little capital SEVERAL TIMES. Just try it as I did. Friendly Jean Marc Gelot CEO / WOOSTER CORP.

1 0

Interview with Cindy Cohn
by Jim Gillogly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's an excellent but short interview with Cindy Cohn, the attorney on the Bernstein Snuffle case, on the San Jose Mercury site: http://www.sjmercury.com/business/center/cohnqa121597.htm She has a knack for getting to the crux in clear and logical steps. Good stuff -- should make it all obvious to the judges! -- Jim Gillogly Sterday, 25 Foreyule S.R. 1997, 07:34 12.19.4.13.12, 2 Eb 10 Mac, Second Lord of Night

1 0

M$: an about face for NYTimes editorial policy
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >>> an about face for the official policy at the NYTimes. prior to the decision, the NYT was acting almost like an apologist for M$; now they are placing the onus on M$: "It is in the public interest that Microsoft be required to show that its practices are not anticompetitive." should make life interesting; now that M$' momentum has been nicked, everybody will join in the great Muslim tradition of stoning Bill Gate$ to death. Gate$ predicted a year or so ago that M$ would suffer a near-death experience --well, BadBillyG, is the handwriting on your wall? you can fool all the people some of the time, you can fool some of the people all the time, you can not fool all the people all the time. who said that? http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/editorial/ December 15, 1997 NYTimes Editorial / editorial policy statement Saying No to Microsoft >>> NYTimes' policy change since the decision: A preliminary injunction ... ... is a smart step that preserves the competitive status quo while the court reviews the antitrust suit brought by the Justice Department in October. The injunction is needed, Judge Jackson pointedly wrote, because the probability that Microsoft will, through its licensing practices, reinforce its operating system monopoly and acquire yet another monopoly in the Internet browser market "is simply too great to tolerate indefinitely until the issue is finally resolved." ... ...Judge Jackson said Microsoft's idea of what is "integrated" would appear to render the consent decree provision meaningless. If Internet Explorer can be turned into a Windows component under the decree, so might other Microsoft products like Word and Excel. >>> the NYTimes real reversal of statement since the decision: ...It is in the public interest that Microsoft be required to show that its practices are not anticompetitive. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be iQBVAwUBNJTfY7R8UA6T6u61AQGfPAH/aYfZ25kL3xJBpJgX9CUYmeBM8EE57xno MLonOVNkvMNyVyuJS2X8N1x5higS8q/V4sOv89K9w6tq2u8Hud5SUg== =D5z5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: Who's afraid of an uncensored forum? Good riddance to forger
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

mj(a)creative.net writes: > > Tiny Tim is > >happy to bend over and let Declan (or Sandy or any other self-appointed > >censor) decide which of Timmy's rants are worth publishing. > > <snip> > > Look, I'm new to this list and don't know the history of these disputes - I > have neither information nor prejudices - but you must be aware that it's > difficult to take anyone who talks like this seriously. Or even to keep > listening. If you have a problem, you can killfile me or go to a modereated list. There are plenty of them. > <snip> > > > >I'm not the only victim of Declan's lies and forgeries. E.g., the Center for > >Deomcracy in Technology (CDT) complained to Declan's employer, Time Warner, > >about Declan's lies, forgeries, and misrepresentations of CDT's position. > > > > Can you document this? Yes, but I have better things do to. Search the list archives. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

1 0

Welcome to OANDA financial services
by webmaster＠olsen.ch 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Fred Cypherpunk, Thank you for registering with OANDA! You may begin to use your account (cypherpunks) immediately to access any of the following services: - OANDA's advanced financial forecasting services. Refer to our pricing plan to find out how to best use your free credit. Please note that starting December 1, 1997, all of our prices are handled in US dollars. - OANDA's Customizable Currency Converter. Now you can customize OANDA's popular 164 Currency Converter with the look and feel of your Web site. Feel free to try your own customization. It's free for designing and testing. Please refer to our Customizable Currency Converter for information about how to activate your customized currency converter. We would be glad to help with any questions you may have. Thanks again for using our services. Explore and enjoy! The OANDA Team e-mail: oanda-info(a)oanda.com http://www.oanda.com

1 0

The Best XXX Guest Area on the Net...
by 34705164＠25955.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Filled with the hottest XXX action on the net. See it NOW for FREE... http://www.fleshgrotto.com/guests/ We feature Streaming XXX videos, LIVE feeds, huge XXX galleries, adult toys, imports, and much more!!! Our LIVE CyberSex can't be beat, see the Newest Blondes in our stable.. Ashley and Brianna. Come see how the latest in technological wizardry can make hardcore XXX action EXPLODE on your screen. No other site gives their guests so much... Check It Out. http://www.fleshgrotto.com/guests/

1 0

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord ?"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"cracker"} = "<remailer(a)anon.efga.org> cpunk mix remix pgp hash ksub esub latent cut ek reord post"; $remailer{'redneck'} = '<config(a)anon.efga.org> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"bureau42"} = "<remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"neva"} = "<remailer(a)neva.org> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub ?"; $remailer{"lcs"} = "<mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> mix"; $remailer{"medusa"} = "<medusa(a)weasel.owl.de> mix middle" $remailer{"McCain"} = "<mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> mix middle"; $remailer{"valdeez"} = "<valdeez(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"arrid"} = "<arrid(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"hera"} = "<goddesshera(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"htuttle"} = "<h_tuttle(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix reno winsock) (weasel squirrel medusa) (cracker redneck) (nym lcs) (valdeez arrid hera) This remailer list is somewhat phooey. Go check out http://www.publius.net/rlist.html for a good one. Last update: Thu 23 Oct 97 15:48:06 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hera goddesshera(a)juno.com ------------ 5:03:45 99.86% nym config(a)nym.alias.net +*#**#**### :34 95.82% redneck config(a)anon.efga.org #*##*+#**** 2:00 95.44% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++ ++++++* 19:18 95.27% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de -- ---+--- 2:34:19 95.16% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net *++***+ ++ 11:26 95.11% replay remailer(a)replay.com **** *** 10:06 94.93% arrid arrid(a)juno.com ----.------ 8:50:34 94.41% bureau42 remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org --------- 3:38:29 93.53% cracker remailer(a)anon.efga.org + +*+*+*+ 16:32 92.80% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca + +*-++++ 24:14 92.79% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -..-..---- 9:59:18 92.22% neva remailer(a)neva.org ------****+ 1:03:02 90.39% valdeez valdeez(a)juno.com 4:58:22 -36.97% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net 1:01:28 -2.65% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

1 0

Re: Another of Gary Burnore's Lies Exposed
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

rashidk(a)mailexcite.com (Rashid Kaman) > X-No-Archive: yes > >Shades of McCarthyism.... > > Such big words, my my! :-) Sorry, I forgot you were from DataBasix, where most words are four letters in length. (Hint: I wasn't talking about CHARLIE McCarthy...) > >Strangely enough, a search of the public database of listed telephone numbers > >turns up nothing for you. > > Why did you look for it? To be a champion of privacy you first have > to respect privacy. Of course I respect privacy. Your phone number would only have been there if you'd CHOSEN to have it listed by the phone company, right? And if you'd chosen to have it listed, then it would be logical to assume that you WANTED people to have it. It's not like I went to your phone company and demanded that they turn over a listing of their unlisted numbers. (Your buddy Burnore, OTOH, did demand a list of all the users of the Huge Cajones Remailer from their logs. In case you're unclear on the concept, people use remailers so that people like Gary and Belinda WON'T have access to their e-mail addresses.) It was Gary Burnore and Belinda Bryan who've been denouncing "hiding behind" anything, so I found it sort of ironic that all of them have unlisted phone numbers while whining about my unlisted e-mail address. (Should I adopt Burnore's tactics and start calling the denizens of DataBasix "Unlisted Assholes"? Nah!) > >> >If remailers were shut down, I'd lose my ability to post. > >> > >> Why is that? > > > >For the same reason you'd no longer be able to post from mailexcite.com if > >someone decided to shut it down! > > That's not an answer, it's a cope out. "Cope out"? Sorry, I don't have a DataBasix-speak dictionary, and am not familiar with your in-house (or outhouse) jargon. Regardless of whether it is a "cope out" or not, it is an answer. Sorry if you don't approve. If the remailer I use for posting were to shut down, I obviously would no longer be able to utilize that resource, just as you'd no longer be able to use mailexcite.com if that were to be shut down. Something about that too difficult for you to understand? You might feel differently if Billy "Wotan" McClatchie had gone after Mailexcite rather than Mailmasher.

1 0

The closed Nym list
by Daniel J. Boone 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May wrote: > Declan decided that rebroadcasting articles out of Nym would not be > allowed, but he said nothing about not mentioning its existence. (Nor would > I have agreed to be on a list whose very existence I could not disclose.) > Anyway, tonight when I mentioned its existence as I was posting an article > here that I wrote for the Nym list, I half-expected some comments from > Dimitri. > > But I didn't expect someone to post the subscription instructions > (anonymously, of course). Hint: it wasn't I. > > Anyway, I suppose that by mid-morning tomorrow Declan is going to have to > decide how to deal with subscriptions by Vulis, Human Gus-Peter, Toto, and > all the others. The Nym list appears to be closed. (The web page says so -- so I didn't try.) This state of affairs may even be my fault. The history, for those who care, is appended. It's a shame -- if David Brin really is posting there as one of Tim's recent messages suggested I'd be very interested in seeing his posts. (Thanks, Tim, for reposting yours here.) I still don't think it makes much sense to have a conversation about the use of nyms and then try to protect the posters' words from public view. If posters are concerned about public scrutiny, why not use a nym? Not to mention the fact that one would have to keep the list closed to have a prayer of enforcing the no-repost rule. --Daniel Boone History: Robert Hettinga was briefly forwarding "nym" posts to e$pam, where I saw them. Declan publically requested that posts not be forwarded. I sent Robert a message asking if he was going to comply -- and expressed (to Robert) my lack of respect for a no-forwarding policy. Robert (that notorious cross-pollinizer that he is) forwarded my message to Declan, which was unfortunate -- as Declan no doubt considered my message insulting. (Addressed to Declan, it would have been.) I got a very chilly "response" from Declan about how he had no duty to entertain me with his list traffic. I took the opportunity to ask him how his no-repost rule would fare when someone using a nym started reposting the traffic publicly. He responded with "the list is now closed" or words to that effect. I realized too late he may have thought _I_ was threating to do the evil reposting deed.

2 1

No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If I live in the US and put the perl RSA code in my sig, then post in an international newsgroup, have I illegally exported encryption? If I put that same code on my web site, then post requests to view my site in an international newsgroup, have I exported it? What is the penalty for exporting powerful encryption?

2 1

Re: hashcash spam prevention & firewalls
by Antonomasia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk>: > How about this alternative which achieves the same functionality and > removes the juicy supeona target: > Turn on hashash database for all mails. That means hashcash gets put > in the database to prevent double spending. .... > So now when you reply to a message, on it's way out via the mail hub, > you remove that hashcash token from the double spending database. > This means that the sender can cache sent hashcash tokens, and re-use > them when after he gets a reply. Doesn't this invite the spammer to Bcc an accomplice with the target ISP ? The accomplice replies; thereby freeing the coin for reuse. > I am told by one subscriber to look at TIS firewall toolkits imap > program. You may have meant "smap". -- ############################################################## # Antonomasia ant(a)notatla.demon.co.uk # # See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ # ##############################################################

1 0

Encrypted Magic Folders
by Alex Woolfson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello! First of all let me go on record by saying that I really like the idea and the interface you've designed for your product, Encrypted Magic Folders. The interface is easy to use and efficient. Job well done! There are, however, some security concerns I'd like resolved before I would be interested in purchasing your product. You scramble filenames which is an excellent idea. I might suggest that you also scramble the directory names as well. When using the freeware program Directory Snoop 1.1 designed by Kent Briggs (www.briggsoft.com) in Windows 95, I was easily able to find the directories that EMF had hidden. I wasn't able to access them, but I could see they were there *and also what their names were*. I don't know if it is possible to hide these directories from such a program (although, obviously, that would be ideal), but it seems that we should at least be able to scramble the directory filenames so that little information is gleaned about which directories are worth attacking by cryptanalysis and which are not worth the attackers' trouble. On the question of encryption algorithms, let me add my voice to those who have been suggesting that you use strong and tested algorithms like IDEA or Blowfish. I feel very strongly that this is essential to any product that purports to provide true security to its users. If your product were meant to merely keep your kid sister from reading your files, then the security through obscurity your product seems to offer would be sufficient. But your marketing materials suggest that you wish to offer a greater level of security than that. Not being a cryptologist, I consulted with members of the Cypherpunk mailing list to aid me in evaluating the security of your software referring them to the "How Secure Is It?" section of your Help file. These guys really know their stuff. The verdict was unanimous--that the security of Encrypted Magic Folders was not sufficient for anything but the most casual uses. I have included below one of the more thorough and detailed of the replies in the hopes that it will be useful in improving the strength of your software. I would also feel more comfortable if you were willing to have the source code of your product reviewed by industry experts (such as Bruce Schneier of Counterpane Systems who wrote the very well respected Applied Cryptography book as well as Blowfish). If you are concerned about someone stealing your idea, non-disclosure agreements should be able to offer sufficient legal protection. Truly secure algorithms and programs can withstand this kind of scrutiny without compromising their security. Relying on the fact that your company is "too small and obscure" for an attacker to develop an prepackaged attack offers little comfort--if someone really wants to have access to my files, I imagine they'll devote the time to attempt to crack your product--copyright infringement notwithstanding! If you haven't already, I would strongly suggest that your developers read Schneier's book Applied Cryptography. It does a much better job of explaining the difference between true security and security through obscurity. And it's written for programmers who wish to use cryptography in their programs. It's not a bad read, either. :-) I am really interested in purchasing a product like Encrypted Magic Folders, but for such an application, security is obviously the biggest priority. I believe others who have not taken the trouble to write you feel the same way. If EMF makes use of strong encryption and is willing to have the source code of its product reviewed by industry experts, I would be interested in paying for it. For a $60.00 product, I believe it is fair to expect this kind of protection. Yours Alex Woolfson Below is the response of Ray Arachelian of the Cypherpunks list. There is a bit of sarcasm involved, but I trust you'll be able to see beyond it to the valid criticism he makes. I hope you find it useful. On Thu, 4 Dec 1997, Alex Woolfson wrote: > EMF's encryption offers good protection and excellent speed. It > hasn't been broken yet. It is, as far as we know, exportable. THERE > IS NO BACKDOOR. Should you forget your password there is nothing we > can do to decrypt your encrypted files. If it is exportable, then it is weak encryption by definition. The question is how weak. Reading their marketting crap provides more insights in just how lame this is: > Quite a few people ask us how big EMF's key size is. They've learned > from other encryption programs that the bigger the key the stronger > the encryption. This really doesn't apply to EMF. > > We developed our own encryption instead of using a standard because > we wanted EMF to be able to decrypt at the byte level. In this way > we only need to decrypt/encrypt the data your programs require and > not the entire file. In other words: security through obscurity. Smells like snake oil, looks like snake oil, it even has bits of snake scales in it. Heck, if they say that the key size is not important, it's likely very tiny, or regardless of what key size you'd use (if you had any choice), it's such a weak cypher that it wouldn't get you anything. > In theory, because we decrypt at the byte level, the biggest key we > could use would be 8 bits - which is a joke. So instead of > decrypting every hunk of data using the same key, as most other > encryption programs do, we developed an algorithm to vary the key > based on the data's location within the file. In this way we get > both high security and high speed. We are trying to patent EMF's > encryption method. Whoop. so the key is the location of the data? At most, this means a 32 bit key on most file systems, 64 bits on newer file systems. This assumes that your file is long enough for that. But as a key, this is totally useless as the key is the location which is visible to all. Likely they would be wise to "mix" this location key with the passphrase. This offers little more than CBC would. The only difference is that CBC is based on the previous block, where this is based on the location of a byte in the file (which is known) whereas a CBC depedns on knowledge of the previous block. If they did it the right way, they'd use the passphrase to build a lookup table of large keys based on the byte location within a file, but because this depends on your passphrase, your security is still that of the passphrase at maximum. There may be ways to weaken this. > Having said all that, truth is, most encryption isn't "cracked" by > breaking the algorithm, it's done by guessing the password. Brute > guessing of passwords tends to level the playing field tremendously. > We actually have an advantage because we aren't an established > standard. Because we're small and relatively obscure chances are no > one will take the effort to write a password guessing program (which > incidentally would violate copyright and intellectual property laws.) > Even if someone were to go thru all this effort we could easily > change the encryption method for the next update. This is total bullshit. It's Grade A, government approved exportable snake oil. Just because they are small and obscure it doesn't guarantee you any extra safety. Just because nobody has bothered to write a brute forcer for their code doens't mean nobody can do so. And no, this would not violate any of their copyright if the author of the brute forcer proggie wrote it without copying their code. It might violate intellectual property laws if they had a patent on it, but they can't get one since they're going by security through obscurity. They claim to be applying for a patent, but if they do, their code is published and their weaknesses will be displayed. It might violate trade secret laws if someone who has the source or the algorithm shares it, but not if someone reverse engineers it (depending on reverse engineering laws of course.) Just because they could "rewrite" the code in the next update against cracking or brute force attacks does not buy you security. FYI: If you use this crap and someone steals a copy of the encrypted files off your hard drive, it doesn't matter what new updates this company produces. The fact is you used the older breakable version, the attacker has your cyphertext and will decode it. > If we used an established encryption method like DES or Blowfish then > your files would probably have to be fully decrypted when opened, > would exist on disk as unencrypted while you're using them, and then > would need to be encrypted when closed. Translation: We don't use CBC, because that would be more work and slow down our crappy cypher. Deeper translation: break any portion of any encrypted file and you'll likely break the whole thing if not huge parts of it. "Established encryption methods (sic)" use CBC because it adds security. Their algorithms are well published and well known so people can find their weaknesses and publicise them. Whatever weaknesses there are in this thing are hidden from those who can't or won't reverse engineer it. But there are plenty of those who can and will, and have no qualms about releasing it anonymously, or worse: keeping the expolit to themselves so as to exploit those stupid enough to use this lame shit. It only takes one cracker with a good disassembler to reverse engineer their code and find all the holes, and they'll be out of business. If what protects your data is the cypher, and not the key, then breaking the cypher is all you need to do. Heck, I'd bet they use something really shitty like this: (since "key size is not important", and "depends on location".) char code(char *passphrase, char data, long location); { int i; char c; for (i=0; passphrase[i]>0; c^=passphrase[i++]); return (data ^ c ^ (char)(location & 0xff)); } Gee, I probably violated their "intellectual" property by guessing their code, heh. > This has multiple > disadvantages. First, if your computer shuts down while you have > "encrypted" files open, then those files would be unencrypted. This > doesn't happen with EMF as your encrypted files are always encrypted > as stored on disk. The second disadvantage is that it slows things > down tremendously. Not if you use an encrypted disk driver. then, all your data is encrypted all the time. (You get into other issues such as keeping the passphrase or key from falling into the pagefiles, etc...) [Meaningless babble deleted.] =====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos============== .+.^.+.| Ray Arachelian |Prying open my 3rd eye. So good to see |./|\. ..\|/..|sunder(a)sundernet.com|you once again. I thought you were |/\|/\ <--*-->| ------------------ |hiding, and you thought that I had run |\/|\/ ../|\..| "A toast to Odin, |away chasing the tail of dogma. I opened|.\|/. .+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|my eye and there we were.... |..... ======================= http://www.sundernet.com ==========================

1 0

You Could Earn $100 Every Time the Phone Rings!!
by 44096770＠15605.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Double your money to infinity! Let professional salespeople close your contacts! Fortune 5000 is a rock-solid program that pays big checks every Friday! Friendly pros offer great support! You'll get guaranteed lowest prices on over 250,000 name-brand products and services in time for Christmas giving. YOU CAN'T BEAT THIS PROGRAM!!! Call 800 811-2141 code #47990 for the details and start creating your fortune TODAY! Please don't allow yourself to miss this incredible opportunity! Fortune 5000 is head-and-shoulders above the crowd of other opportunities! Pick up the phone NOW while the thought is fresh in your mind and start earning a SUBSTANTIAL income. You will be HAPPY you did! Call (800) 811-2141 code #47990 and say hello to a bright future!

1 0

Re: The Joys of Being Canadian
by Matt Elliott 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Cable Company Rep: "What's your Social Security number? >Answer: "I don't have one. I'm Canadian." For my cable company I asked why they wanted it. For a security check when you call in was the response. Does it need to be an actuall social security number? No, just something you can remember when you call up. 012-01-0123 I replied. They were quite happy to use that as my "Social Security Number" in their database. As far as cable goes they don't want your social security number. I wonder how many others would be happy to substitute something. Matt <mailto:melliott@itmail.ncsa.uiuc.edu>

4 3

Super Cool Site!
by lori＠6t9.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I'm Lori. My girlfriends and I have created this way cool site. We would love you to check it out. http://www.6t9.com/dsnm/alpg/ Love, Lori P.S. Being new to this, we were told that if you NEVER want to hear from us again, reply with the subject "Remove" and you won't. That would make us really sad though.

1 0

Re: Identity, Persistence, Anonymity, and Accountability--Part I of II
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 12/14/97 6:54 PM, Tim May (tcmay(a)got.net) passed this wisdom: >But note that there absolutely is no requirement in the United >States for ageneral form of identification. Non-drivers need not >have any form of I.D. And as we have seen in court cases, a la >Lawson v. Kolender (where a blackman in dreadlocks used to like to >walk the streets of San Diego...the copsstopped him many times and >jailed him for not having I.D. on him...the court ruled that people >don't have to present credentials issued by the state to walk the >public streets). In New Jersey there is a criminal offense called "failure to properly identify" ... I don't know if its ever been tested, or if it is still on the books, but as of ten years ago it was there. I think it was a misdemeanor (in NJ the term is "petty disorderly persons offense) I cannot imagine it as a felony. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNJXIij7r4fUXwraZAQEMvAf9FzhcodfycwA3BSV4cB5nPAqyR+6+hguK 9VG1/b7CEvEyZleD1HzRbB7i8+ycwxvtZr959FPpume5LW3eWhSsVGLEb8A9EzW3 FQXqmxa6X6LLUcPIrhfSaO8JQdPV0LXOfXwW7ZZh7s02pUmTRgpXOuM5MdHSf0nG kKTGntI5JbaEmDgvyANXETV4EomZ/0Zm3zJiGw3M9G4aZpFl3LIgFPcOUSY1MwJI TMGbNCS/DveeAhmM2J+oa8DbUwqVYGGhA27YHNve5rtxqkDbobsF9OMY8ssU70D0 K0uHEq+ZoobSlNHHrFP+I52RxXiKtP4blGxn8riYmjBp8H4ih6Hsbw== =41Ml -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Brian B. Riley --> http://members.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "to be yourself in a world that tries, night and day, to make you just like everybody else - is to fight the greatest battle there ever is to fight and keep on fighting" - e.e. cummings

3 2

ENCRYPT XXX PICZ
by kozmo killah 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

D3AR S|RZ, H0W D0 | ENCRYPT NUDIE GIFS? W3RD _________________________________________________________ DO YOU YAHOO!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com

1 0

Security of Encrypted Magic Folders
by Secret Squirrel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "Alex Woolfson" <abdiel(a)worldnet.att.net> Subject: Security of Encrypted Magic Folders >I just downloaded Encrypted Magic Folders--a program that hides Windows 95 >folders and then encrypts them to prevent a disk utility from revealing >their content. In their help file, they try to answer the question "How >Secure is it?"--and, of course, they say *very*, but I can't tell if this is >so or if they're just blowing smoke. Particularly, their claim that key >size doesn't matter. (My mom taught me size always matters... ) If >someone with a stronger cryptography background than me could take a look at >this and let me know, I would greatly appreciate it. >* How Secure is it? > EMF's encryption offers good protection and excellent speed. It > hasn't been broken yet. It is, as far as we know, exportable. THERE > IS NO BACKDOOR. Should you forget your password there is nothing we > can do to decrypt your encrypted files. How do we know this? > Quite a few people ask us how big EMF's key size is. They've learned > from other encryption programs that the bigger the key the stronger > the encryption. This really doesn't apply to EMF. How do we know this? > We developed our own encryption instead of using a standard because > we wanted EMF to be able to decrypt at the byte level. In this way > we only need to decrypt/encrypt the data your programs require and > not the entire file. How do we know this? > In theory, because we decrypt at the byte level, the biggest key we > could use would be 8 bits - which is a joke. So instead of > decrypting every hunk of data using the same key, as most other > encryption programs do, we developed an algorithm to vary the key > based on the data's location within the file. In this way we get > both high security and high speed. We are trying to patent EMF's > encryption method. How do we know this? And why are they trying to patent a mathematical algorithm? (The fact they can do it is irrelevent. Patenting a mathematical algorithm, much like patenting something like XORing pixels on a screen, is stupid.) And is the fact that they're trying to patent it supposed to make us feel safer? > Having said all that, truth is, most encryption isn't "cracked" by > breaking the algorithm, it's done by guessing the password. Brute > guessing of passwords tends to level the playing field tremendously. Cool. But since we have to disassemble the program to figure out how your program really handles keys...how do we know this? > We actually have an advantage because we aren't an established > standard. Because we're small and relatively obscure chances are no > one will take the effort to write a password guessing program FUD and smokescreen. Security through obscurity. > (which > incidentally would violate copyright and intellectual property laws.) FUD and smokescreen. The fact that creating a password program allegidly violates intellectual property and copyright laws in some country isn't going to keep somebody from writing one. > Even if someone were to go thru all this effort we could easily > change the encryption method for the next update. I doubt it's much effort. For example it can take 3 weeks for a group of programmers to write a copy protection algorithm for their new PC game and about 8 hours for a cracker to break it. Further, if they're patenting this algorithm it will be public. FUD. > If we used an established encryption method like DES or Blowfish then > your files would probably have to be fully decrypted when opened, > would exist on disk as unencrypted while you're using them, and then > would need to be encrypted when closed. This has multiple FUD. Decrypt in relatively small pages and cache in memory. Since they've apparently added an encryption/decryption layer between the filesystem and the userspace libraries to begin with this shouldn't be too hard. Well, then again, considering this is Windows which is probably the worst attempt at an operating system this decade maybe it isn't. >disadvantages. First, if your computer shuts down while you have > "encrypted" files open, then those files would be unencrypted. This Not an issue if the operating system and/or encryption program are/is properly designed. > doesn't happen with EMF as your encrypted files are always encrypted > as stored on disk. The second disadvantage is that it slows things > down tremendously. As an example, let's say you retrieve your email > and your email program needs to add today's message to the end of > your 3MB email file. If we used a standard encryption method > requiring the decryption of the file before use then the entire 3 MB > file would have to be decrypted, your 300 byte message added to the > end and then the entire file encrypted again. With EMF, no > decryption would need to take place, and the only data needing > encryption would be the 300 byte message. MUCH faster. Around > 20,000 times faster in this example! Finally something which might actually be valid. > If you still think you'd like to see us use a standard encryption > method like DES or Blowfish, or have any other suggestions, let us > know and we will consider your input in future updates Unless these people have released source this program should be avoided. The algorithm is unknown, they aren't telling what it is or how it works, it hasn't been submitted for review by cryptographers (at least this list hasn't heard about it), and they aren't releasing source so you can see what's going on. They're hyping security through obscurity as a valid security method, while simultaneously applying for a patent on their security method and saying "Well, if it's cracked we'll just change to another algorithm whenever we get around to releasing the next binary-only distribution. Hope nobody gets your data in the meantime." Further, it is designed for use on an operating system which is notorious for insecurity, where everybody and everything is root (except under NT, where you actually have to make some syscalls to get admin privlidges from an unprivlidged account), where nobody releases source for anything, and where there is no source available for the OS so you can modify it to fix security holes or "features," much less add security enhancements of your own. This entire thing reads like this: "We've developed our own proprietary encryption method which nobody has ever heard of. We don't really know how good it is, but you should believe us when we say it's really, really good. In fact it's so good that we're patenting it just like RSA! Nobody will ever be able to break it because our algorithm isn't in wide use and we aren't releasing source! However if somebody actually does break it your data won't be in the open for long because we'll use some other algorithm which is just as good as the one we came up with originally and got a patent on. Hope you didn't need security in that interim and we hope that when somebody breaks this algorithm they'll tell us rather than taking advantage of all the (for them) plaintext data laying around."

1 0

Redmond to Judge [Expletive Deleted]
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- http://www.wired.com/news/news/business/story/9178.html hot off the wire an hour ago! Redmond to Judge - [Expletive Deleted] well, I would expect nothing less than "Fuck You" from Micro$lop --they consider themselves above the law. give Jackson credit for realizing the greater scope of the problem, and for appointing the special master. M$' attitude in and of itself is prima facie evidence of theit market intent --including tossing out the option that OEMs will still be able to but the _original_ version of W95 if they elect not to take IE4. damn white of them boys up there... Analysis: Redmond to Judge - [Expletive Deleted] by Kaitlin Quistgaard and Dan Brekke 4:20pm 15.Dec.97.PST It took two of Microsoft's biggest guns more than 60 minutes to utter a reply to US District Court Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson that most of us sum up in two hard syllables. The second of which is "you." For daring to draw a line last week and forbidding the company to cross for the time being, Jackson was treated to a marathon rebuke from Brad Chase, Microsoft's vice president of Internet marketing, and William Neukom, senior vice president for law and corporate affairs. ... Chase made it clear that neither Jackson nor anyone else would keep Microsoft from readying its planned spring release of Windows 98 - in which Internet Explorer 4.0 and the Windows desktop are inextricably bound. ... Neukom did mention one other alternative that actually merits the name, and one that government the company finds itself at war with might actually recognize as viable: Manufacturers could, he said, install a Netscape browser on their Windows/IE machines. >>> what a fuckin' joke. proves their intent to be a monopoly and fuck the public interest --it's my way, or no way! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be iQBVAwUBNJXd/LR8UA6T6u61AQG9bQH/fkE3TKRYOmc+y9RZTsLJYjuISYDYqB47 +G0axtsdcumv7Q09bTYOf8b3K36+ik8/RFdngce6HWXDGrrlmtbd4g== =UuqU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: wilkenrules.html
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This entire issue speaks to whether we neeed government or not. The power of the judiciary is part and parcel of the power of Government, and in many cases -this is an excellent example- is all that stands between The Oligarchy and Freedom. Imagine if there _were_ no government per-se, and it was the Disney, or Westinghouse, or GE, or whoever the fuck, corporate security forces taking action on their own against FRB. At 09:08 AM 12/14/97 -0600, Jim Choate wrote: > > JUDGE WILKEN DENIES FCC MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT!!! > > Press Release Follows. To Go Directly To The Full Text Of Judge Wilken's > Decision, Click Here > > > >National Lawyers Guild Committee on Democratic Communications > > 558 Capp Street, San Francisco 94110 > > FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE > > > COURT REJECTS FCC'S CONSTITUTIONAL CATCH 22 > > United States District Court Judge Claudia Wilken has rejected > another attempt by the Federal Communications Commission to silence > Berkeley Micro Radio Broadcaster Stephen Dunifer, founder of Free > Radio Berkeley. > > In a 13 page opinion released on November 12, 1997, Judge Wilken > once again rejected the government's motion for an injunction to > silence micro radio broadcasts by local radio pioneer Stephen > Dunifer. > > In 1995, Judge Wilken rejected the government's first motion for a > preliminary injunction against Dunifer's broadcasts. At that time > the Court found merit in Dunifer's argument that the FCC's ban on > low power, affordable FM broadcasting was a violation of the First > Amendment's guarantee of free speech to all in the United States. > > In a blatant attempt to avoid facing its First Amendment obligations > the FCC then urged Wilken to permanently enjoin Dunifer from > Broadcasting and at the same time argued that she could not even > consider the issue of whether its rules, which prevent him from > getting a license, are unconstitutional. In a Kafkaesqe argument, > the Commission argued that Wilken had jurisdiction to issue an > injunction, but no jurisdiction to hear Dunifer's constitutional > arguments. The government claimed that only the higher federal > courts could consider the constitutional question. > > In her November 12 decision rejecting the Government's position, > Judge Wilken pointed to the fact that the FCC had taken exactly the > opposite position in the 1994 case of Dougan vs FCC. In that case, > an Arizona micro radio broadcaster had appealed an FCC fine (for > broadcasting without a license) to the 9th Circuit Federal Court of > Appeal, and the FCC had argued that the Court of Appeal had no > jurisdiction over the case, and that it had to be heard by the > District Court. The Court of Appeals agreed with the FCC and sent > the case back to the District Court. > > Judge Wilken noted that the Arizona broadcaster had raised the same > constitutional arguments in the Court of Appeals that Dunifer is > raising. The Court ruled that in sending all of the issues in the > Arizona case to the District Court, the Appeals Court recognized > that the District Court had jurisdiction over all aspects of the > case. > > In denying the Government's motion for an injunction "without > prejudice," Judge Wilken ordered the Government to file a further > brief on the question of whether the unconstitutionality of the > FCC's ban on micro radio is a valid legal defense to an injunction > against broadcasting at low power without a license. Dunifer's > attorneys, Louis Hiken and Allen Hopper of San Francisco, will have > an opportunity to rebut the government's arguments on this point. > > In response to pressure from the commercial broadcaster's lobby, the > National Association of Broadcasters (N.A.B.), the FCC has in recent > months been stepping up its campaign of harassment against the > thousands of micro radio stations now on the air in this country. > Hiken commented "The broadcast industry is clearly afraid of these > little community stations which are speaking truth to its power. In > trying to do the N.A.B.'s bidding, the FCC demonstrates that it is > nothing but an enforcement arm of the commercial broadcast industry > and the multi-national corporations which own it." > > The National Lawyers Guild's Committee on Democratic Communications > has represented the Lawyers Guild, San Francisco's Media Alliance, > and the Women's International News Gathering Services as a "Friend > of the Court" (Amicus) in this case. In its Friend of the Court > brief the Lawyers Guild pointed out that FCC regulations make it > impossible for all but the very wealthy to even apply for a > broadcast license. This, they told the Court, is the equivalent of > saying anyone could speak from a soap box in the park, but the box > had to be made of gold. Guild attorney Peter Franck commented "In an > era when Disney owns ABC, the world's largest defense contractor > owns NBC and CNN merges with Time which merges with Warner, and when > 'public' broadcasting is told to get its money from corporations, > micro radio may be our last best hope for democracy on the air > ways." He continued "Judge Wilken's decision is a courageous > rejection of the Government's attempt to use a legal Catch-22 to > avoid facing the fact that its ban on micro radio flies in the face > of the Constitution." > > The legal team representing Dunifer and the Amicae are very pleased > with Judge Wilken's reasoned and thorough decision denying the FCC's > motion to have the case resolved without a trial on the merits. For > almost 70 years, the FCC has catered solely to the interests of > commercial corporate giants, through their mouthpiece, the National > Association of Broadcasters. These are the pirates, who have stolen > the airwaves from the American people, and who represent corporate > interests valued at more than 60 billion dollars. Only the Pentagon, > the Silicon Valley and the transportation industries possess the > financial wallop represented by the NAB and its constituents. > > Judge Wilken's decision represents a vision of what it would be like > for the American people to be given back their own voice. The > decision suggests the likely unconstitutionality of the entire > regulatory structure underlying the FCC's ban on low power radio. It > forewarns of the total failure of that agency to carry out its > statutory obligation to regulate the airwaves in the public interest > -- that is, in the interest of the American people, rather than the > media monopolies that control our airwaves. > > The legal team welcomes the opportunity to have a court identify the > real pirates of the airwaves -- not the thousands of microradio > broadcasters who seek to communicate with the people of their > communities, but rather the billionaire commercial interests that > control the airwaves as if they own them. Is it General Electric, > Westinghouse and the Disney Corporation that have the right to > control local community radio, or is that a right that belongs to > all of the American people, regardless of economic status? > > FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT: > > Peter Franck, Counsel for Amicus > 415-415-995-5055 > pfranck(a)hbmvr.com (days) > pfranck(a)a.crl.com(evs, wknds) > http://www.368Hayes.com/nlg.cdc.html > > Alan Korn, Counsel for Amicus > 415-362-5700 > aakorn(a)igc.org > > Stephen Dunifer, Free Radio Berkeley > 415-644-3779 > frbspd(a)crl.com > http://www.freeradio.org > > Louis Hiken > Counsel for Stephen Dunifer > 415-575-3220 > hiken(a)igc.org > http://www.368Hayes.com > > Allen Hopper > Counsel for Stephen Dunifer > 415-575-3222 > lazlo(a)igc.org > http://www.368Hayes.com > > >SEE THE FULL TEXT OF JUDGE WILKEN'S DECISION > > TO STEPHEN DUNIFER/FREE RADIO BERKELEY INFORMATION PAGE > > TO FREE RADIO BERKELEY LEGAL BATTLE PAGE > > TO NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD INFORMATION PAGE > > TO THE OFFICIAL NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD WEB SITE > > TO NLG COMMITTEE ON DEMOCRATIC COMMUNICATIONS PAGE > > TO FREE RADIO BERKELEY WEB SITE > >BACK TO LAW OFFICES AT 368 HAYES STREET > > >

2 1