December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Maybe the CypherPunks *do* have some heart
by Mark Neely 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just a quick note to say that Houghton-Mifflin has posted a request for people to _STOP_ emailing them! This wasn't a hoax, but they have reached their email target numbers > The Houghton-Mifflin Publishing Co.. is giving books to children's Mark Neely - accessnt(a)ozemail.com.au Lawyer, Internet Consultant, Professional Cynic & Author BizWeb: For Serious Intrepreneurs - www.maximedia.com.au/bizweb

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The Complete, Unofficial TEMPEST Information Page
by Joel McNamara 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Everything (well almost everything) you ever wanted to know about TEMPEST but were afraid to ask. Research papers, links to TEMPEST hardware manufacturers and consultants, military security manuals, monitoring devices, history, and more. http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm The page is devoted to presenting open-source information about TEMPEST and related topics. There is actually quite a large body of unclassified information available about this subject (much of it on the Net). My goal is to provide a useful reference for those interested in emanations security as it relates to intelligence, computer security, and privacy issues. Joel McNamara joelm(a)eskimo.com Disclaimer: I've never been involved with the TEMPEST community, had a security clearance for TEMPEST, or have access to classified material relating to TEMPEST. Like most good intelligence gathering, the information on the above-mentioned page is completely derived from publicly available, unclassified sources.

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Re: Securing ActiveX.
by Phillip M. Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Frantz <frantz(a)netcom.com> wrote in article <59721c$t8o(a)life.ai.mit.edu>... > At 7:19 AM -0800 12/17/96, Blake Coverett wrote: > >I would be happier running an ActiveX control with Peter Trei's signature > >on it > >than I would an unsigned control in a sandbox. (This kind of a trust decision > >is probably the normal case in the intranet world. ActiveX as it sits is > >quite > >sufficient for rolling out internal intranet applications.) > > While I might agree about Peter, I wouldn't agree if the signature was > Microsoft's (or any other large software vendor). There is just too much > room for bugs and or Trojan horses to enter via that route. I fail to see what the fuss is about. there are clearly advantages to having a good operating system architecture which provides protection for running applications and allows fine grained control over access to sensitive resources. The problem with the Java Sandbox model is that its all or nothing. In order to protect the user it allows the applet access to nothing that is important. As a result the applet can perform no function that is of importance. "Give us your corporate strategy and billing record and we will give you dancing beans on your screen" as one wag put it. I am still waiting to see a Java applet that does anything usefull. Most do no more than an animated gif would. The most elaborate are little more than carbon copies of the standard computer games. The download problem really is not that hard. The big problem is content. So far nobody appears to have the remotest idea how to use Java and I expect it to be about five years before the model emerges. From hypercard to the Web took ten so don't expect it to be overnight. The Microsoft bashing could be given a rest. Bill G. wins only because the rest of the market gave up. Stick a non computer litterate person in front of UNIX, Lotus 1-2-3 for MS Dos or Wordperfect for MS-Dos. If you don't realse then why Bill won you should try another career. MS-DOS and Windows are crappy O/S because they lack the type of memory protection that VMS and UNIX have. This was in part incompetence but mostly Intels disastrous design for the 80286. Meanwhile Apple managed to produce an inexcusably bad O/S without protection on a chip that had excelent provision for it. If you want your applet to do anything of use then the Java security model is inadequate. It is usefull for the software developer to have a rich security model since it makes it much easier to build secure software. Under VMS there are 32 different priviledges allowing fairly fine grained control. It is possible in some cases to access a wider range of resources by nafarious tricks but its hard to do something bad by accident. Phill

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Ping of Death?
by james＠hotwired.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone heard of the Ping of Death, aka the Ping Bomb. It's a large chunk of hostile code, disguised as a mere ping, that can lead to server rebooting. James Glave Technology Assignment Editor, Wired News, http://www.wired.com/ Producer, Packet, http://www.packet.com/ Phone: 1.415.276.8455 Fax: 1.415.276.8499

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UNIX crypt
by Anne Carasik 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm sure this has been discussed before, but this has come to mind recently. Has UNIX crypt been broken? If so, what was used to break the encryption? Are there any documented cases of it? Thanks for your help, AC --------------------------------------------------------------- /_ __ / Anne Carasik / Professional Services Organization / / /_/ / TN 919.460.2368 / Raleigh Sales Office / / Fax 919.460.2249 / stripes(a)m3142axc.ssr.hp.com All opinions expressed are mine, no one else would want them

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Van Eck's TEMPEST Paper
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As a supplement to Joel McNamara's exemplary new TEMPEST page, and thanks to Steve Schear, we've put Van Eck's 1985 paper on TEMPEST at: http://jya.com/emr.pdf (702 kb) It's a finely detailed paper on EMR snooping with copious graphics. As Joel and Seline note, it may be purposely misleading on TEMPEST, (as appropriate to TEMPEST legends; Seline's may be bent as well, but who knows what the disinfoes know). Read Joel's page for the bright light facts.

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Microsoft IE may not work without censorship files
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Thought you'd find this amusing. Some names may have been changed to protect the innocent. - -rich - ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 17 Dec 1996 15:24:36 -0800 From: Alice D'Anonymous <> To: win95netbugs-owner(a)lists.stanford.edu Subject: Inernet Eplorer I reqiure assistance in obtaining my internet explorer connection. I made an error while deleting cache, history and temp files which somehow prevents me from hooking up to Microsoft's Explorer. In the control panel I attempt to click on the Internet Icon and the following occurs: A Content Advisor box appears and states the following: Content advisor configuration information is missing. Someone may have tried to tamper with it. Check content Advisor Settings. End of quote. In the internet properties box, I tried to look for what they recommended but was not sure what to look for. I have the Windows 95 disk. Could you please advise accordingly. P.S. Netscape works fine. I previously had Internet Explorer woking before I cleaned house. Thanks... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMrcuKZNcNyVVy0jxAQF7dgH+JZt25esoFtkgsVx/p6iRJkvQVvkYpSDr OKoAL4PB01++okGIKOCGPdWC+Uxs9cQJTX+4ZW/8CTN5aHX/D2glmg== =qsrc -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Ping of Death?
by ! Drive 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

read about it here http://www.sophist.demon.co.uk/ping/ At 02:39 PM 12/17/96 -0700, you wrote: >Anyone heard of the Ping of Death, aka the Ping Bomb. It's a large chunk of >hostile code, disguised as a mere ping, that can lead to server rebooting. > >James Glave > >Technology Assignment Editor, Wired News, http://www.wired.com/ >Producer, Packet, http://www.packet.com/ >Phone: 1.415.276.8455 >Fax: 1.415.276.8499 ------------------------------------ pgp KeyID 3D932EA9 pub key available via mailto:pgp-public-keys@keys.pgp.net subject: get drink(a)aa.net

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Computer crime prompts new parole restrictions
by Lile Elam 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, I saw this article in the nando.net paper today and was interested in your thoughts on it. It looks like people on probation will be limited in there use of encryption and access to the Internet. To me, it seems like this could be equated to preventing people on probabtion from using something like a phone. I am having problems with it because I feel these limitations are too severe. I mean, a good way someone on probabtion to make a living is to learn how to use the web and prehaps get a job as a html coder. There is a hacker I know of (Kevin Poulsen) who is prevented from using computers during his current probation and it really has limited his options alot. I curated and maintain a website for him at URL: http://www.catalog.com/kevin/ where this issue is dicussed. It also seems to me that preventing people on probation from using encryption would be difficult especially when encryption is used in webservers (ie Netscapes Secure Server). One could accidentally access one and not know that he was sending/receiving information via an encrypted channel. thanks, -lile http://www.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/info/121796/info1_7523.html ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Computer crime prompts new parole restrictions ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright © 1996 Nando.net Copyright © 1996 The Associated Press WASHINGTON (Dec 17, 1996 07:42 a.m. EST) -- The U.S. Parole Commission has approved restrictions on the use of computers by certain high-risk parolees. The Justice Department announced Monday that the panel voted this month to authorize such restrictions as requiring certain parolees to get prior written approval from the commission before using an Internet service provider, computerized bulletin board system or any public or private computer network. Other restrictions would: prohibit particular parolees from possessing or using data encryption programs, require some parolees to agree to unannounced inspection of computers by probation officers, require some parolees to compile daily logs of computer use or to pay for equipment to monitor their computer use. "Unrestricted access to the Internet and other computer online services can provide sophisticated offenders with new opportunities for crime and criminal associations," said Edward F. Reilly Jr., commission chairman. "We cannot ignore the possibility that such offenders may be tempted to use computer services to repeat their crimes." The commission noted a surge in "how-to" information on child molestation, hate crime and the illegal use of explosives available on the Internet and on computer online services. Copyright © 1996 Nando.net Do you have some feedback for the Nando Times staff?

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The virus I got...
by Vincent Padua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There was an e-mail sent to the list that had attached to it a virus. Well lucky me I got. It was a .com file that apparently turns your files into directories. I can't boot into Win95 since it turned my HIMEM.SYS into a directory. So, I seem to have fixed that, but now it says "access denied" and then prompts me with C:\>. Did anyone else get it? Has anyone heard or fixed this virus? Thanks //Vince

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CERT Advisory CA-96.26 - Denial-of-Service Attack via ping (fwd)
by Genocide 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ok, fine :) here is the CERT on the "Ping of Death" G/T -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= CERT(sm) Advisory CA-96.26 Original issue date: December 18, 1996 Last revised: -- Topic: Denial-of-Service Attack via ping - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of a denial-of-service attack using large ICMP datagrams. Exploitation details involving this vulnerability have been widely distributed. The CERT/CC team recommends installing vendor patches as they become available. We will update this advisory as we receive additional information. Please check advisory files regularly for updates that relate to your site. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Description The TCP/IP specification (the basis for many protocols used on the Internet) allows for a maximum packet size of up to 65536 octets (1 octet = 8 bits of data), containing a minimum of 20 octets of IP header information and 0 or more octets of optional information, with the rest of the packet being data. It is known that some systems will react in an unpredictable fashion when receiving oversized IP packets. Reports indicate a range of reactions including crashing, freezing, and rebooting. In particular, the reports received by the CERT Coordination Center indicate that Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) packets issued via the "ping" command have been used to trigger this behavior. ICMP is a subset of the TCP/IP suite of protocols that transmits error and control messages between systems. Two specific instances of the ICMP are the ICMP ECHO_REQUEST and ICMP ECHO_RESPONSE datagrams. These two instances can be used by a local host to determine whether a remote system is reachable via the network; this is commonly achieved using the "ping" command. Discussion in public forums has centered around the use of the "ping" command to construct oversized ICMP datagrams (which are encapsulated within an IP packet). Many ping implementations by default send ICMP datagrams consisting only of the 8 octets of ICMP header information but allow the user to specify a larger packet size if desired. You can read more information about this vulnerability on Mike Bremford's Web page. (Note that this is not a CERT/CC maintained page. We provide the URL here for your convenience.) http://www.sophist.demon.co.uk/ping/index.html II. Impact Systems receiving oversized ICMP datagrams may crash, freeze, or reboot, resulting in denial of service. III. Solution First, since crashing a router or firewall may be part of a larger, multistage attack scenario, we encourage you to inspect the running configuration of any such systems that have crashed to ensure that the configuration information is what you expect it to be. Then install a patch from your vendor. Below is a list of vendors who have provided information about patches for this problem. Details are in Appendix A of this advisory; we will update the appendix as we receive more information. If your vendor's name is not on this list, please contact the vendor directly. Berkeley Software Design, Inc. (BSDI) Computer Associates, Intl. (products for NCR) Cray Research Digital Equipment Corporation Free BSD, Inc. Hewlett-Packard Company IBM Corporation Linux Systems NEC Corporation Open Software Foundation (OSF) The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. (SCO) Sun Microsystems, Inc. ........................................................................... Appendix A - Vendor Information Below is a list of the vendors who have provided information for this advisory. We will update this appendix as we receive additional information. If you do not see your vendor's name, please contact the vendor directly. Berkeley Software Design, Inc. (BSDI) ===================================== BSD/OS 2.1 is not vulnerable to this problem. It correctly handles large packets without any problems. Computer Associates, Intl. ========================== (products for NCR) Not vulnerable. Cray Research ============= Attempts to send oversized ICMP datagrams are rejected with appropriate error messages. We believe that oversized ICMP datagrams sent to Unicos systems will also be rejected without crashing. Digital Equipment Corporation ============================= MSG ID: SSRT0429 From DSNlink/DIA Database The following is important information concerning a potential denial of service issue which affects Digital UNIX Operating System, Digital UNIX MLS+, Firewall implementations, and Digital TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS AXP & VAX COMPONENT: System Security / Potential Denial of Service DIGITAL UNIX Version: 3.0, 3.0b, 3.2, 3.2c, 3.2de1, 3.2de2, 3.2f, 3.2g, 4.0, 4.0a DIGITAL UNIX MLS+ Version 3.1a DIGITAL TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS AXP & VAX Versions - 4.0, 4.1 DIGITAL ULTRIX Versions 4.3, 4.3a, 4.4, 4.5 DIGITAL Firewall for UNIX DIGITAL AltaVista Firewall for UNIX DIGITAL VAX/ELN For more information check the DSNlink/DIA Articles (keyword PING), or the URL http://www.service.digital.com/html/whats-new.html for the latest information. ADVISORY INFORMATION: Digital recently discovered a potential denial of service issue that may occur by remote systems exploiting a recently published problem while executing the 'ping' command. Solutions and initial communications began appearing in DSNlink/DIA FLASH/articles in late October, 1996. SEVERITY LEVEL: High. SOLUTION: Digital has reacted promptly to this reported problem and a complete set of patch kits are being prepared for all currently supported platforms. The Digital patches may be obtained from your local Digital support channel or from the URL listed above. Please refer to the applicable README notes information prior to the installation of patch kits on your system. DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION Copyright (c) Digital Equipment Corporation, 1996, All Rights Reserved. Unpublished Rights Reserved Under The Copyright Laws Of The United States. Free BSD, Inc. ============== We have fixed the problem in 2.1.6 and -current. Hewlett-Packard Company ======================= For HP9000 Series 700 and 800 systems, apply the appropriate patch. See Hewlett-Packard Security Bulletin #000040 (HPSBUX9610-040) for further details. The bulletin is available from the HP SupportLine and ftp://info.cert.org/pub/vendors/hp/ Patch Name(Platform/OS) | Notes --------------------------+---------------------------------- PHNE_9027 (s700 9.01) : PHNE_7704 must first be installed PHNE_9028 (s700 9.03/5/7) : PHNE_7252 must first be installed PHNE_9030 (s700 10.00) : No patch dependencies PHNE_9032 (s700 10.01) : PHNE_8168 must first be installed PHNE_9034 (s700 10.10) : PHNE_8063 must first be installed PHNE_9036 (s700 10.20) : No patch dependencies --------------------------+---------------------------------- PHNE_8672 (s800 9.00) : PHNE_7197 must first be installed PHNE_9029 (s800 9.04) : PHNE_7317 must first be installed PHNE_9031 (s800 10.00) : No patch dependencies PHNE_9033 (s800 10.01) : PHNE_8169 must first be installed PHNE_9035 (s800 10.10) : PHNE_8064 must first be installed PHNE_9037 (s800 10.20) : No patch dependencies --------------------------+---------------------------------- For our MPE operating system, patches are in process. Watch for the issuance of our MPE security bulletin. IBM Corporation =============== See the appropriate release below to determine your action. AIX 3.2 ------- Apply the following fix to your system: APAR - IX59644 (PTF - U444227 U444232) To determine if you have this PTF on your system, run the following command: lslpp -lB U444227 U444232 AIX 4.1 ------- Apply the following fix to your system: APAR - IX59453 To determine if you have this APAR on your system, run the following command: instfix -ik IX59453 Or run the following command: lslpp -h bos.net.tcp.client Your version of bos.net.tcp.client should be 4.1.4.16 or later. AIX 4.2 ------- Apply the following fix to your system: APAR - IX61858 To determine if you have this APAR on your system, run the following command: instfix -ik IX61858 Or run the following command: lslpp -h bos.net.tcp.client Your version of bos.net.tcp.client should be 4.2.0.6 or later. IBM SNG Firewall ---------------- NOTE: The fixes in this section should ONLY be applied to systems running the IBM Internet Connection Secured Network Gateway (SNG) firewall software. They should be applied IN ADDITION TO the IBM AIX fixes listed in the previous section. IBM SNG V2.1 ------------ APAR - IR33376 PTF UR46673 IBM SNG V2.2 ------------ APAR - IR33484 PTF UR46641 To Order -------- APARs may be ordered using Electronic Fix Distribution (via FixDist) or from the IBM Support Center. For more information on FixDist, reference URL: http://service.software.ibm.com/aixsupport/ or send e-mail to aixserv(a)austin.ibm.com with a subject of "FixDist". IBM and AIX are registered trademarks of International Business Machines Corporation. Linux Systems ============= We recommend that you upgrade your Linux 1.3.x and 2.0.x kernels to Linux 2.0.27. This is available from all the main archive sites such as ftp://ftp.cs.helsinki.fi/pub/Software/Linux Users wishing to remain with an earlier kernel version may download a patch from http://www.uk.linux.org/big-ping-patch. This patch will work with 2.0.x kernel revisions but is untested with 1.3.x kernel revisions. Red Hat Linux has chosen to issue a 2.0.18 based release with the fix. Red Hat users should obtain this from ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/redhat-4.0/updates/i386/kernel-2.0.18-6.i38… NEC Corporation =============== - -------------------------------------------------------------------------- OS Version Status - ------------------ ------------ ------------------------------------- EWS-UX/V(Rel4.0) R1.x - R6.x not vulnerable EWS-UX/V(Rel4.2) R7.x - R10.x not vulnerable EWS-UX/V(Rel4.2MP) R10.x not vulnerable UP-UX/V R1.x - R4.x not vulnerable UP-UX/V(Rel4.2MP) R5.x - R7.x not vulnerable UX/4800 R11.x not vulnerable - -------------------------------------------------------------------------- NCR ==== see Computer Associates, Intl. Open Software Foundation (OSF) ============================== OSF's OSF/1 R1.3.3 maintenance release includes a solution for this problem. The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. (SCO) =================================== The following SCO products are known to be vulnerable: SCO OpenServer 5.0.0, 5.0.2 SCO Internet FastStart 1.0.0, 1.1.0 SCO Open Desktop 3.0 SCO TCP/IP 1.2.1 on SCO Unix System V/386 Release 3.2 Version 4.2 The symptoms encountered vary greatly and seem to be related to the type of network interface device being used. Support Level Supplement (SLS) OSS449 is being developed for use with the following releases: SCO OpenServer 5.0.0, 5.0.2 SCO Internet FastStart 1.0.0, 1.1.0. This SLS will be available in the near future. Watch the following URL for availability information of SLS OSS449: ftp://ftp.sco.COM/SLS/README Should more information become available for either SCO's OpenServer or UnixWare products, SCO will provide updated information for this advisory. Sun Microsystems, Inc. ====================== We are looking into this problem. ........................................................................... - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CERT Coordination Center staff thanks AUSCERT, the Australian Computer Emergency Response Team, and DFN-CERT, the German team, for their contributions to this advisory, and we thank Mike Bremford for permission to cite the information he has made available to the community. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (see ftp://info.cert.org/pub/FIRST/first-contacts) CERT/CC Contact Information - ---------------------------- Email cert(a)cert.org Phone +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4) and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax +1 412-268-6989 Postal address CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 USA Using encryption We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. We can support a shared DES key or PGP. Contact the CERT/CC for more information. Location of CERT PGP key ftp://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key Getting security information CERT publications and other security information are available from http://www.cert.org/ ftp://info.cert.org/pub/ CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send your email address to cert-advisory-request(a)cert.org - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 1996 Carnegie Mellon University This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it is used for noncommercial purposes and the copyright statement is included. CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This file: ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-96.26.ping http://www.cert.org click on "CERT Advisories" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Revision history

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Re: Parolees limited from using computers, Internet
by rcgraves＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- E. Allen Smith wrote: [As title] When I saw the title, I though this was a parody, but sad to say, it's not. Why yes, the world has gone mad; it's not just Vulis. What's next, libraries? (Scratch that -- libraries are already censored.) - -rich -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEPAwUBMrdDQEFGBFr0lf2RAQFqAAfQtp9UwxMaq70WGp7AiXKekwPDGTy1CKvI xmJB/rICQVqaZZOLe40rIgDHVS7wPeIqtjpXoxEskR9qBOTkZwmNVTMMYzPNQlX5 SdVgm8ikfRQiSXM6HIuDIj6AdFjOz0SE5htR8ZGWFIbG8K3F30KF3lno0/oIr0I9 rMttYasUINoF6lObn0G/mObQ0OkG9u9t1vq7xbs1q7ro20BkXelA/x3/4aCYKg85 NUXR4ZeAAiS2NgfKAH8sLWjCo7CnUe1+yJFgqnhyS86nGucWMauSqtzHmMg+0WN4 1vLVCqq/AKF6tZSmSw2kIJbhzMw2eyQuwR3SIjA4NXVR8g== =d+pm -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Securing ActiveX.
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:41 PM 12/17/96 -0500, Phillip M. Hallam-Baker wrote: >I am still waiting to see a Java applet that does anything usefull. Most >do no more than an animated gif would. The most elaborate are little >more than carbon copies of the standard computer games. <http://www.ozemail.com.au/~geoffk/anon/anon.html> Try it now. It is not only good, it is fast. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred Make your mark in the history of mathematics. Use the spare cycles of your PC/PPC/UNIX box to help find a new prime. http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/justforfun/prime.htm

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Re: Computer crime prompts new parole restrictions
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:58 PM 12/17/96 -0800, Lile Elam wrote: [...] >It also seems to me that preventing people on probation from >using encryption would be difficult especially when encryption is used >in webservers (ie Netscapes Secure Server). One could accidentally >access one and not know that he was sending/receiving information >via an encrypted channel. [...] Note that the new rules require logging of computer usage. I would assume that means keystroke logging with nightly uploads to the Feds. What motto does the US Parole Commission have on their seal? May I suggest "Arbeit macht frei"? Who are these people anyway? I never heard of this commission... -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred Make your mark in the history of mathematics. Use the spare cycles of your PC/PPC/UNIX box to help find a new prime. http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/justforfun/prime.htm

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Maybe the CypherPunks *do* have some heart
by SUCRUM22_at_INDY-ADP＠smtp-gw.cv62.navy.mil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------------------ Begin Forwarded Message Text --------------------- The Houghton-Mifflin Publishing Co.. is giving books to children's hospitals; how many books they give depends on how many emails they receive from people around the world. For every 25 emails they receive, they give one book -- it seems like a great way to help a good cause. All you have to do is mail: share(a)hmco.com. Hope you can spare some time to write and then let your friends know. ------------------- End Forwarded Message Text ---------------------- Hey cypherpunks, just thought this might be of interest, forgive the spam, but remember, knowledge begins with reading. And no, don't go e-mail and ask what books the Co. is donating (i.e.. gov't supportive, procrypto controls etc etc) Its the Holidays, have some heart. And hey - if the number of books is related to the number of e-mails, i wonder if maybe we can enlist those "i'm sorry" spammers to fill those e-mail boxes <grin>. Happy <whatever-you-happen-to-celebrate>. ---------------------- SUCRUM22(a)cv62.navy.mil ----------------------- Don't confuse my views with those of the DoD or the United States Navy

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RE: Microsoft IE may not work without censorship files
by Blake Coverett 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> In the control panel I attempt to click on the Internet Icon and the > following occurs: A Content Advisor box appears and states the > following: Content advisor configuration information is missing. > Someone may have tried to tamper with it. Check content Advisor > Settings. End of quote. In the internet properties box, I tried to > look for what they recommended but was not sure what to look for. It's good to see they make at least an attempt at preventing the PICS filter from being turned off without a password. Of course the obvious answer is to give it to a teenage boy who wants to look at the dirty pictures and watch how fast it can be fixed with a little registry editing. regards, -Blake

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RE: Ping of Death?
by Blake Coverett 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Anyone heard of the Ping of Death, aka the Ping Bomb. It's a large chunk of > hostile code, disguised as a mere ping, that can lead to server rebooting. > Technology Assignment Editor, Wired News, http://www.wired.com/ > Producer, Packet, http://www.packet.com/ I read the two parts above and shake my head... A 'technology assignment editor' that has missed this story till now, and can't use a search engine to boot? -Blake (who should only look at the pictures)

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RE: Securing ActiveX.
by Blake Coverett 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ray wrote: > And I'd be happier running the signed ActiveX control, written by Peter > Trie, or anyone else within a Sandbox regardless of signature as it > increases security. We're in violent agreement here Ray. Sandboxes are good, signed code is good, having both is very good. We differ on the relative importance of the two techniques but I suspect that is because we are coming from different contexts. My work is all intranet so the users trust the software produced for them by definition. Obviously the factors are different on the net at large. > The above says that you wouldn't want to run ActiveX in a sandbox while > you would want to run Java in a sandbox. The difference between > technologies is that one runs native the other emulative. I wouldn't > want to run ANY foreign code outside a sandbox. Java or ActiveX. It's not a Java vs ActiveX thing for me at all. What is important is that some of the applets I write can't function in a sandbox, they need access to the disk and other resources for business reasons. For this type of thing signed code without a sandbox is the only choice. What I'd really like is the sort of thing Bill Frantz is describing on another branch of this thread. Signed code and an administrator defined policy that specified for a given signature exactly what types of resources should be accessible. Anything from don't execute and audit a security alarm to complete access to the whole machine. > The whole point of this was creating a distributed network of DES > crackers. Yes, but in good cypherpunk fashion I've hijacked the original topic into a new direction. :-) > > If you choose to run an unsigned control all bets are off. On a related note, > > I recently saw a Java implementation of a board game that recommended > > the user download the zipped up .classes and run it locally. How many > > average users realize this would disable the Java sandbox entirely? > > How many users know how to download the jdk and run the java vm locally? They don't need to. All they need to do is unzip the java classes into their classpath and all of the normal restrictions on an applet are ignored. Think it would be very hard to persuade a user to do just that in order to play a kewl java game? More importantly it shows that even expert users don't always know where the holes in the sandbox are. regards, -Blake

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Re: The virus I got...
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Uh..... My question is WHO in gods name trusts a uuencoded file that small especially from an address like that. Sounds like stupidity to me...

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Re: Computer crime prompts new parole restrictions
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:44 PM 12/17/96 -0800, Lucky Green wrote: >What motto does the US Parole Commission have on their seal? May I suggest >"Arbeit macht frei"? Who are these people anyway? I never heard of this >commission... See <http://gopher.usdoj.gov/bureaus/parole.html>; I dunno what's on their seal. -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. |

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[NOT NOISE] Microsoft Crypto Service Provider API
by roy＠sendai.scytale.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I just got my copy of the Microsoft Cryptographic Service Provider Development Kit, Version 1.0. It appears to support only Windows NT. A first glance reveals no built-in GAK (but I haven't examined it closely yet!). Dammit, now I'm going to have to build an NT box! - -- Roy M. Silvernail [ ] roy(a)scytale.com DNRC Minister Plenipotentiary of All Things Confusing, Software Division PGP Public Key fingerprint = 31 86 EC B9 DB 76 A7 54 13 0B 6A 6B CC 09 18 B6 Key available from pubkey(a)scytale.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMrdK4Rvikii9febJAQFXQQP/TUlEBwQpLNE3WBq45AXcbAzqc8RkmvkT 5mtz2FSwGleKvg5HRjB5JF3SjjyQ32nsGMpnt/J/r6K84Q7pJWPBHOPgcVzEGSqw ORqumCQlL8uUJKk552BdB9X92QNiDV33QkIIyKQv8An208jTnqEWrYvg1R1lwCXf lkne/kxf0po= =fQZX -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Parolees Can't Possess Crypto
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The new federal parole guidelines that will ban some cons from the nets will also ban them from posessing crypto software which will also make virtually any computer use impossible. "Main Justice" does say that with the Klinton Admins plans for universal access counter this proposal since the cons will have access at schools, libraries, etc. (not to mention Internet Cafes). DCF

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Re: Computer crime prompts new parole restrictions
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:58 PM 12/17/96 -0800, Lile Elam wrote: >I saw this article in the nando.net paper today and was interested in >your thoughts on it. It looks like people on probation will be limited >in there use of encryption and access to the Internet. One nit to pick - parole and probation are not the same thing. Probation is a sentence imposed by a judge, and parole is the administrative/executive modification of a sentence. They function in similar ways (e.g., people who have been convicted of a crime are not locked up but subjected to extra rules) but have some legally meaningful differences. The press release from the USPC is online at <http://gopher.usdoj.gov/gopherdata/press_releases/592usp.htm>. >To me, it seems like this could be equated to preventing >people on probabtion from using something like a phone. I am >having problems with it because I feel these limitations are too >severe. I mean, a good way someone on probabtion to make a living >is to learn how to use the web and prehaps get a job as a html >coder. This seems like a pretty fact-specific question; but it's not unusual for people convicted of crimes to be restricted from using tools similar to the ones they used to commit crimes, e.g., drivers' licenses are suspended where people are convicted of driving crimes, professional licenses are taken away when people have committed professional misconduct, and so forth. I agree that this can be counterproductive (it doesn't make much sense to seriously handicap someone and then blame them for not doing very well) but I don't think that computers and the Internet are meaningfully different in this way. >There is a hacker I know of (Kevin Poulsen) who is prevented from >using computers during his current probation and it really has limited >his options alot. I curated and maintain a website for him at URL: > > http://www.catalog.com/kevin/ > >where this issue is dicussed. My hunch is it didn't make a big difference, but his letter to the judge who accepted his guilty plea and sentenced him seems to suggest that he turns to computer crime out of curiosity, boredom, and obsession - motives which are probably still present. Three years without computers may force him to find some other outlet for his creative and exploratory drives. This seems like a long-term win for him. (I think denying him access to higher education is much worse than denying him access to computers.) >It also seems to me that preventing people on probation from >using encryption would be difficult especially when encryption is used >in webservers (ie Netscapes Secure Server). One could accidentally >access one and not know that he was sending/receiving information >via an encrypted channel. This sounds like a fact issue for a probation/parole revocation hearing, e.g., did the defendant intend to violate the terms of his or her release agreement? Depending on the situation, an unintentional violation of the terms of release might not result in revocation. (I'm inclined to think it never should, but I'm not having much luck finding any relevant caselaw quickly. I'm also handwaving here because different jurisdictions will probably apply different rules.) My impression is that the USPC was bamboozled (by the USDOJ?) into adopting unnecessary regulations - the press release mentions a "surge of how-to information" available on the Net re criminal activity; but I'm skeptical that such a surge has taken place, or that it's especially relevant to people on parole. The action may also have been unnecessary (viz, the restrictions on crypto) because people subject to parole and probation are already subjected to incredibly draconian restrictions - e.g., the terms of probation and parole usually specify that they must allow the supervising officer to search their home at any time, must report where they live and work, cannot form social relationships with people deemed undesirable, cannot quit their job or change residences, must report their income and expenses in considerable detail, must give blood/urine samples on a surprise basis, etc. People who are on parole or probation have no privacy and very little autonomy. It's not much of a stretch to "You must let the probation officer look through your house" to "You must let the probation officer see what's on your hard disk" - in fact, I think the first implies the second. (Obviously, there are a ton of fact-specific issues here (and I've written briefs arguing why parolees/prisoners should get more privacy), but at the "public policy" level, it's pretty clear that probationers and parolees have sharply curtailed Constitutional rights - which is usually OK with them, because they like that better than being locked up. In my perspective, it makes more sense to rethink the goals and methods of the criminal trial/punishment system, rather than focus on minutiae about computer crime. Lots of otherwise apparently decent people are subjected to relatively harsh punishment on a pretty regular basis, and many people think we aren't already mean enough to convicted people. Most of the people who think this have never had someone they cared about subjected to the penal system. But this isn't really C-punks material any more, so I'll stop here.) -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. |

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Re: The virus I got...
by Psionic Damage 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How come not everyone got it, did it depend on the x-mailer you are using? At 02:59 AM 12/18/96 -0000, you wrote: > > >----------geoboundary >Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit > > > ><HTML> ><BODY> ><CENTER> ><A HREF="http://www.geocities.com">Postage paid by: <IMG SRC="http://www.geocities.com/pictures/newgeobt.gif"></A></CENTER> ></BODY> ></HTML> > >----------geoboundary > > > > Delivered-To: reece-cpunks(a)taz.nceye.net > Delivered-To: reece(a)taz.nceye.net > From: "Vincent Padua" <vincent(a)psnw.com> > Date: Tue, 17 Dec 1996 16:41:57 -0800 > X-MSMail-Priority: Normal > X-Priority: 3 > X-Mailer: Microsoft Internet Mail 4.70.1155 > MIME-Version: 1.0 > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 > Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Precedence: bulk > > There was an e-mail sent to the list that had attached to it a virus. Well > lucky me I got. It was a .com file that apparently turns your files into > directories. I can't boot into Win95 since it turned my HIMEM.SYS into a > directory. So, I seem to have fixed that, but now it says "access denied" > and then prompts me with C:\>. Did anyone else get it? Has anyone heard > or fixed this virus? > >Yes. It's a deadly mutation of the GOOD TIMES virus. > >(People actually go to the trouble of stripping off the leading crap >from the uuencoded part and then *run a program* from someone called >Fuck(a)yourself.up? Furrfu.) > >----------geoboundary-- >

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RE: Microsoft IE may not work without censorship files
by Blake Coverett 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rich writes: > > It's good to see they make at least an attempt at preventing the > > PICS filter from being turned off without a password. > > True, but my point was stronger. > > The program *will not work* if there have been even inadvertent changes > to the self-censorship files. This person emailed me because he couldn't > get it to work after an unrelated change. My original response was really just meant as humor. (The other paragraph in particular.) I'm of the school that ratings are a profoundly useless idea for their supposed purpose, and dangerous in their possible misuse by the government. > This sort of contradicts Microsoft's claims that they don't require > ratings because they're turned off by default. If the file can't fix > itself, I'd say that's not "default." If a user randomly deletes parts of an application and it stops working I'm afraid the fault is entirely with the user. Reinstalling the damaged software would seem the obvious answer. > Sorry, I didn't get the context across. Read it again alongside this: > > http://pathfinder.com/Netly/daily/961213.html That article say in part, "Microsoft has indicated that future generations may well come out of the box with RSAC-i, by default, activated." I follow Microsoft's strategy and announcements very closely and as far as I can tell this is sheer fabrication. The closest thing they've announced (and shipped) is the IE Admin Kit that lets a corporation build a custom version of IE with the settings to their liking. I can't find any fault with that. regards -Blake (who's played apologist to Rich's MS-bashing before)

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