December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

For Smart People Only!
by hot8762＠hotmail.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Civil War Crypto Question... (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Sun, 21 Dec 97 21:46:22 PST > From: jim(a)mentat.com (Jim Gillogly) > Subject: Re: Civil War Crypto Question... > > Jim Choate skribis: > > On pp. 43 - 44 [of Hagerman's "The American Civil War..."] > > ... a 'cipher disk' whereby the Union was able to > > change their telegraph codes on an hourly schedule. It was apparently very > > effictive in dealing with taps and such. > > > > Anyone know of another source that discusses this disk? I looked in Applied > > There's a very brief mention of a disk in "Masked Dispatches: Cryptograms > and Cryptology in American History, 1775-1900", available from the NSA > Central Security Service. (Series 1, Pre-World War 1, Volume 1, United > States Cryptologic History), Center for Cryptologic History, by Ralph > E. Weber, 1993. Thanks for the reference. > On page 110 he says: "The North, on the other hand, adopted a handy "on-line" > means of changing the basic flag code by prearrangement or at will, even within > the act of transmission. This was done with a disk, in which the alphabet on > the inner disk revolved against an outer ring of flag combination, enabling an > instant change of code." > > My impression from this and from the chapter summary is that the disk was > used for flag codes but not telegraphy. For telegraphy the Union apparently > used a word-based route transposition that Friedman found unimpressive. Actualy it was used for telegraphy and flags. You see Mahan, the inventor of the disk had also just invented the first ever alphabetic flag system. Because of this system, instead of the wig-wag system others used, McClellan was the first general in history to change his orders of attack 3 times in 3 days *and* win the battle. The problem on the Peninsula was the land was too flat and the woods too thick to use it (see my original references around the same few pages). Friedman? Who the hell is Friedman? None of my references has anyone by that named listed, let alone involved. McClellan was the general in charge of the Army of the Potomac. Meyer was in charge of the Signal Corp, which at the time was responsible for tactical communications for McClellan. Originaly Meyer intended to use his new flag system but because the terrain, flat and wooded, on the Peninsula they found they weren't reliable. They were also using the balloons from the Union Aeronautic Department under Lowe. They were quite effective, haven't found out if they used Meyer's signal system. The flip side was the fully civilian Military Telegraph under Stager which handled strategic telegraphy was fighting Meyer for control of the various communications along technological boundaries. At this time, while they were fighting the South and each other, they brought in some Beardslee equipment (a rail-based portable telegraph system) which apparently didn't work well at all. The Beardslee system was the first use by an American army of portable telegraph equipment, it ran between McClellan's headquarters to Stoneman's at Mechanicsville. Apparently one of the chief problems was that wagons and people kept cutting the lines. Merry Christmas! ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord ?"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"cracker"} = "<remailer(a)anon.efga.org> cpunk mix remix pgp hash ksub esub latent cut ek reord post"; $remailer{'redneck'} = '<config(a)anon.efga.org> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"bureau42"} = "<remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"neva"} = "<remailer(a)neva.org> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub ?"; $remailer{"lcs"} = "<mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> mix"; $remailer{"medusa"} = "<medusa(a)weasel.owl.de> mix middle" $remailer{"McCain"} = "<mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> mix middle"; $remailer{"valdeez"} = "<valdeez(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"arrid"} = "<arrid(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"hera"} = "<goddesshera(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"htuttle"} = "<h_tuttle(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix reno winsock) (weasel squirrel medusa) (cracker redneck) (nym lcs) (valdeez arrid hera) This remailer list is somewhat phooey. Go check out http://www.publius.net/rlist.html for a good one. Last update: Thu 23 Oct 97 15:48:06 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hera goddesshera(a)juno.com ------------ 5:03:45 99.86% nym config(a)nym.alias.net +*#**#**### :34 95.82% redneck config(a)anon.efga.org #*##*+#**** 2:00 95.44% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++ ++++++* 19:18 95.27% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de -- ---+--- 2:34:19 95.16% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net *++***+ ++ 11:26 95.11% replay remailer(a)replay.com **** *** 10:06 94.93% arrid arrid(a)juno.com ----.------ 8:50:34 94.41% bureau42 remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org --------- 3:38:29 93.53% cracker remailer(a)anon.efga.org + +*+*+*+ 16:32 92.80% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca + +*-++++ 24:14 92.79% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -..-..---- 9:59:18 92.22% neva remailer(a)neva.org ------****+ 1:03:02 90.39% valdeez valdeez(a)juno.com 4:58:22 -36.97% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net 1:01:28 -2.65% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: Completely anonymous communications ARE only for "Criminals"
by Charlie Comsec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- gburnore(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > It's not clout, it's a capability. You can ask that many different types of > numbers be blocked. You can ask that incomming and or outgoing be blocked > _FROM_ _YOUR_ _HOME_ _PHONE_. If your local telephone company will provide you with that service, that's great. I suspect that it's not universally available, especially in Australia where the person I was replying to lives. But, as you pointed out, you can always ASK. The worst they can say is no -- or maybe "Chuck U. Farley", if you catch the customer "service" person in a bad mood. <g> > :Second, as you can probably tell from his return address, Politas is located > :in Australia, where different rules apply. > : > Indeed, that's true. Chances are however, that his phone company will catch > up with the U.S. sooner or later. :) Could be. I was only trying to deal with the options available to him here and now, just as I was dealing with the remailer network at it exists here and now. The big difference between the two is that he PAYS to be connected to the phone company's network, so that gives him a little bargaining power in asking for certain features. The remailers, in contrast, don't charge you for receiving mail and your two existing options are to use the net as it currently exists or disconnect yourself from it with a blocking request. It's sort of like public television. You've got a user community and a much smaller support community. Comments from users get considered, of course, but I'm sure that suggestions from actual supporters carry a bit more weight. > :Just don't sign up for pager service with a company that blocks calls from > :pay phones, then. > > The latest scoop is those that don't block will find another way to pass the > costs on to all subscribers. Those that _DO_ block will allow the unblocking > based on request from a user and that user's willingness to +pay+. Of course. One does have to make a decision whether its worthwhile to pay the extra fee for the convenience of someone being able to page him toll-free from a pay phone. Those who don't allow SELECTIVE blocking and who pass the costs on to all subscribers will eventually lose most of their customers who don't want to subsidize a service they don't want or use. Their prices will become non-competitive. > :I figure if an extra 18.5 cents is going to make that much of a difference to > :me, I probably didn't want to talk to that person that badly, anyway. So I'd > :either opt to not pay extra for 800 access, and let people page me at their > :own expense, or else be more selective who I gave my toll-free access > :number to. > > That would make _WAY_ too much sense now wouldn't it? Just like the internet, there are a lot of newbies to pagers, cell phones, PCS, etc. who don't know all their available options. That will change with time. But if you get your "expert advice" from the sales droid of the week at your local Radio Shack... > :I have a friend who has basic pager service with a local, non-toll-free > :access number. He also has separate 800 service that rings through to his > :pager number. The more expensive 800 number is given out more selectively > :than the local number. > > Precicely. However, the original discussion was not what pager companies > would or wouldn't want to do with the ability to block payphones, the issue is > whether it's not only possible (it is) but is it available to anyone. THe > answer to the second one is becomming yes in more areas as tine goes by. You > can even block anyone who doesn't display their caller id number. Of course, > then if you blocked your own number from displaying to protect yourself, your > friends who block unannounced numbers to protect themselves wouldn't get to > talk to you. > > > Oh, one other thing. It's NOT difficult to trace a phone number anymore. Even > though pressing *69 won't always give you the number that called you, the > phone company +can+ still track the number to it's source. Technology is currently progressing faster than our human protocols can keep up with. But I'm confident that the lag time will be relatively short. For example, people have now adapted their own sense of manners and propriety to deal with such things as unsolicited calls from telemarketers. When someone calls you, it's usually impolite to hang up on them. Many now make an exception for junk calls from telemarketers. Some phone company even offer a service where you can press a *xx code, hang up, and the telemarketer will be told that you don't accept such calls and be requested to add your number to his do not call list. There was an ongoing debate a few years ago when caller ID was first introduced involving the usage of caller ID, caller ID blocking, and even "blocker blocking". Ultimately when it's all sorted out we'll wind up with more choices than we had to start with. The phone number that you're calling from is now an item of data which can be OPTIONALLY transmitted along with the phone call. And the omission of that data, by way of caller ID blocking, is itself a data item. The technology exists to take certain actions based on that data interchange. The hardest part is DECIDING how one wishes to use that data. Will I accept calls with caller ID blocked? Will I block caller ID on my outgoing calls by default? Will I create an access list of calls of numbers allowed to ring my phone? Will I block the blocked calls altogether or merely divert them to my answering machine for screening? Perhaps this serves as a useful model in analyzing anonymous communications in general, particularly e-mail. Are people who e-mail anonymously or who call from pay phones to be considered "criminals" or otherwise viewed with suspicion? Should we require some form of positive identification, such as a government issued and escrowed crypto key, to authenticate all forms of communications, even calls from pay phones? As you've probably guessed, I'm against limiting those options. People who wish to communicate anonymously (truly anonymously, not the model suggested where you reveal your identity to someone and have to trust him to keep it confidential) should be allowed to do so. And people who don't wish to receive such communications should have the option of not receiving them. The unblockable call tracing technologies you've mentioned will make the use of pay phones more popular with people who value their privacy. Like unlisted numbers, the security of the data gathered by such systems is no greater than the willingness of a telco employee to refuse a bribe. Watch for even more proposals to make the use of pay phones less convenient or less private. It's already happening. Some large cities, for example, have strongarmed the phone companies to replace the normal push button pay phones with the old rotary dial style just to prevent people from using them to page drug dealers! Of course, you can't use them to page anyone else, either, or to access your own voice mail, or avail yourself of any service that utilizes data entry via DTMF tones. All in the name of "keeping us safe". - --- Finger <comsec(a)nym.alias.net> for PGP public key (Key ID=19BE8B0D) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNJ56kgbp0h8ZvosNAQFTWwf9Hhhwl1Q6SB42fWZzC1BdDOlmtR6W1+AU GxDOCU/2CEEnUVrF/9tsYk1eAPkPCgFmnevydb/7a+DOo1XpvX3itMwW4FOqSyPn rLzG6MbddEORGNRVcMQAD+aF+Uvqnh8cU5GrvEe0jp66p/wz6YvpeXwHcIzbmN20 A+pXz7KNrlB9RzVr/46QubjO/VrQe0JW60SMUbHpBXpV/rHv2MzN0Fla2qYqw5Ki kOnhI2+lCzLpKPvCvM4uHJ3fBLg79+m/LTRdL10uFvngB5wlEXaWffYZOfFk+SaX v0IxfpOZouLJ36iBfH960o6dcDtR/G69+LkgyJpsWCEB69jP9xON1g== =Ih9r -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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SPECIAL REPORT: Censorware in the Stacks
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

======= The Netly News (http://netlynews.com/) December 22, 1997 SPECIAL REPORT: Censorware in the Stacks by Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) Antiporn crusaders and free speech advocates have locked horns for years over whether public libraries may cordon off large portions of the Internet. A lawsuit to be filed today against a Virginia county promises to answer that question and set new guidelines for free speech in the stacks. Mainstream Loudoun, a local group, and 11 other plaintiffs are challenging Loudoun County's decision to adopt one of the country's most iron-handed Internet policies, The Netly News has learned. In October, the library board voted to buy software called X-Stop that forbids both children and adults from visiting many sexually explicit web sites -- and plenty of innocuous ones too, such as Quaker and AIDS resources. The plaintiffs hope to persuade a federal judge that X-Stop's overzealousness violates not just traditions of intellectual freedom in libraries, but the First Amendment as well. The 47-page complaint, which calls the restrictions "a harsh and censorial solution in search of a problem," also challenges a rule encouraging librarians to look over your shoulder and make snap judgments on which web sites should be off limits. [...]

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Re: Completely anonymous communications ARE only for "Criminals" (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: 22 Dec 1997 15:20:08 -0000 > From: Charlie Comsec <comsec(a)nym.alias.net> > Subject: Re: Completely anonymous communications ARE only for "Criminals" > Technology is currently progressing faster than our human protocols can keep > up with. Spin-doctor bullshit. Technology is *created* by people. When the day comes where we don't understand it we will quit making progress at the rate we are. It *is* true that if you spend your days watching Opra and your nites watching some cop-show then you will have no clue as to what is going on. To understand technology *requires* activity and participation, something that people are becoming less and less inclined to do when they can go flip on their PlayStation or play Quake 2 and claim to be on the bleeding edge... Posers, lamers, and wanna-be's. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Hate speech and censorship (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Mon, 22 Dec 1997 14:46:08 +0000 ( ) > From: Paul Bradley <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> > Subject: Re: Hate speech and censorship > Yes, those on the list a few months ago (around the time the list moved > from cocksucker John Gilmores toad.com to the distributed list format) Dude, that was well over a year ago... ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Civil War Crypto Question... (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: Date: Mon, 22 Dec 97 08:10:02 PST From: jim(a)mentat.com (Jim Gillogly) Subject: Re: Civil War Crypto Question... (fwd) > > used for flag codes but not telegraphy. For telegraphy the Union apparently > > used a word-based route transposition that Friedman found unimpressive. > > > > Friedman? Who the hell is Friedman? None of my references has anyone by that > > named listed, let alone involved. > In case you weren't being ironic or something, Weber was referring to William > F. Friedman, the star of the US cryptologic effort during WW2, who was > commenting on the strength of the Union cryptosystems long after it was too > late to do anything about them. I gather the word-based route transposition > was quite good enough to conceal the meaning from the Confederates, so I > suppose one shouldn't be censorious. Actualy that was so far out in left field that I didn't make the connection. Really couldn't care less about Friedman and his WWII views of the Civil War, not relevant to what I am doing. And further, if Friedman is claiming that this code wheel wasn't invented by the telegraphers, for the telegraphers then perhaps he isn't as historicaly accurate as some claim of him. It is clear that Myer invented the code wheel, per his and McClellans own documents, expressely for telegraphy as a direct results of the success of Myers new flag signaling system previous to the Peninsula campaign. Perhaps there is some confusion over exactly *which part* of the Union Army was using what. McClellan was using Myer and his techno-marvels at the tactical level and this had no relation to the strategic communications - the big boys might very well have been using some fancy transposition cipher. After Antietam McClellan told Myer: "When I start from this camp, I want to break loose from the regular telegraph lines and depend upon those under my command." The 'regular telegraph' was Military Telegraph which was the strategic minded folks. That McClellan had no stomach for them is clear. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________| ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: SPECIAL REPORT: Censorware in the Stacks (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: SPECIAL REPORT: Censorware in the Stacks > From: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) > Date: Mon, 22 Dec 97 15:33:03 EST > On the contary. when no library was state (meaning, taxpayer) funded, and they Get your facts straight. The US has a library that from day 1 has been citizen supported. Every state (that I am aware of) has a state library that is funded by tax payers. Furthermore, Texas & Lousiana have had localy supported libraries and schools before they were even states. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Hate speech and censorship
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On behalf of the non-racist cypherpunks, please accept an apology for Paul Bradley's racist message: > uneducated and foolish arabs such as Parekh should stick > to what they do best: running kebab shops and/or selling cheap fake rolex > watches to tourists. This does not reflect the mainstream view on the list. Cypherpunks understand that disparaging the racial background of others is a weak and invalid form of argument. While it may be appropriate to criticize actions taken during the list moderation experiment, casting the issue in racial terms only reveals the ignorance and bigotry of the writer.

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Only the Paranoid Survive
by Eric Cordian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Intel CEO Andy Grove was just named Time Magazine's "Man of the Year" for 1997. -- Eric Michael Cordian 0+ O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division "Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law"

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HOMEOWNERS: Cut your Pmts in HALF!
by 123pacific＠compuserve.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Frank Olson
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 12/22/97 4:46 AM, Bill Stewart (bill.stewart(a)pobox.com) passed this wisdom: >Mail covers have been legal for a long time as well - >as with pen registers on phones, they don't need a warrant to >track your traffic. They do however need a formal letter from some LEA person to the postmaster stating that your mail is of interest. Generally the USPS guys are pretty specific on those counts; they have been burned in the past. Further, if you should happen to be friendly with your postmaster or one of your postal persons (the joys of living in a small town) there is little to keep them from telling you that someone is watching your mail; except of course; the displeasure of the LEA, but its not covered by any laws, since they don't have a warrant. Of course if you are really doing something nasty and illegal being anything more than 'the guy in Box 213' to your postmaster might have its downsides. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNJ6e/j7r4fUXwraZAQGiTwf+OZuP5QleHtZS5bNBce2kyi2skNoSH30K uYiQ9+EMqr5IZq8KSGHM4E6QD7hjRZLEWtEelQ3A6SdRl/oXIEHDpi/rVTZOrYd4 +zyyXYbwjgk6voK4I0Em5Uus6qFUBLIRdASfQAXa7gMtQDilvcTsCq6SrlK5+pxt LOUEkk6INOGlaEdfxT3l/3CIq3G/7VTDWkNoycg+OLKHiuX7KiLKS22ZeujqULFp T3mRwZwD9uyehRtghPMT3KNaGqzV8CJXVTTBbEYctW0fBhjI24iUQ1/2bo6POjEO MD9lNya60BYlBDjDdg+pvtFqGMFRhMMd1LidOjNfLLeiIj/0nKjTnA== =DuQO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Brian B. Riley --> http://members.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "Do not go where the path may lead, go instead where there is no path, and leave a trail." - Ralph Waldo Emerson

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Re: Coercive Monopolism vs Wimpyness
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I will preface these comments by saying that I run two boxes here a Power Mac, on which I do most of my work, and a WinNT4/Linux dual boot box as well. On 12/22/97 4:50 AM, Secret Squirrel (anon(a)squirrel.owl.de) passed this wisdom: >>And, since Windows OS is so pitifully lousy, why do people continue >>to buy it, even without the computer attached; why do they continue >>to upgrade, even if it's so slow and bloated? Don't they realize >>Unix is better? Don't they realize they're just making Billg richer? >Want to play a game from the store? Windows 95. or a Mac (admittedly not as many hybrids or mac-only titles) >Want to install a new image in your Flash RAM on your motherboard? >DOS (Windows 95). on a Mac? who needs it? >Want to have vendor-produced drivers? Windows 95. or a Mac >Want to parse MS Turd documents? Windows 95 and MS Office. MacLinkPlus translators (bundled with OS) handles all WinDoze docs (often better than WinDoze itself!) >Want to use a Windows-specific bullshit class registration system >at your university? Windows 95. (ugh!) >Happened to buy a printer? It won't say "Yes! It works with >Ghostscript!" Infact it won't say anything about hardware >compatability. It'll just say "Windows drivers included" along with >a list of a bunch of software that Idon't want and don't need. So >if it happens that the printer is nonstandard...Windows >95. most of the top manufacturers have Mac drivers. Epson printers even come with Mac and PC interefaces built in >Have a bunch of people in the office who don't care about platform >compatability and pass around Windows-specific document types or >programs? Windows 95. same answer as above MacLinkPlus translators >Have a bunch of people in the office who, simply because Windows >and sometimes MacOS are taught as "computer education" in many >universities and public schools can't use anything else? Windows 95. point, to you, but, the aim is not to produce an extra 500,000 CompSci educated users. It is to provide a useful tool for the masses. Windows (who stole its interface from mac who stole it from xerox) type GUIs are easier to use than CLIs, it is only since the entrenchment of GUIs that they have come forth in the Unix/Linux world. >Have to use a university computer lab? The machines are probably >running Windows 95. So you wind up with an incentive to use Windows >95 elsewhere. So...again, Windows 95. another point to you. as a high school teacher in an area where there is a large IBM plant (read that as a lot of IBM employed taxpayers). I watched with dismay as more and more IBM and compatibles have grown to take over the lab. We have a fulltime hard wired Internet connection from the state of Vermont and yet its all but useless half the time because of one windows problem or another. The lab coordinator spends more time fixing WinDoze compatability problem than teaching computer use. >Want to have a working copy of PGP 5.0 while everybody else has >started sending out DH-encrypted/signed messages and rolled DH >keys? Windows 95. (Yeah, yeah. The source was released in book >form.) PGP5 Mac came out early also -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNJ6kLD7r4fUXwraZAQH0rAf+LgoBszMSgqJ2OSKOP0p5jCW1uTM/exeE O/C+V9VqMwnGbJjybMWU7arcqzntNlE/34matvXcm3Iz16gKt172rMfC46eewQ2W AQE/OC/lu2V8kBm9USsE7xwc7/ff26aJAwFVtZs5qE3vdkGaprsh15qwLEF9NPZM Kffg0sBhPxYvxAkZKUMqvGx44wt+qD/HYShEiAyd8UzBVWAFWKzZMA2v/ijd/YNJ uv+umnP2W1eNYw6SChVDZEFbtagtQ4TSqXPKON41UHAlkAQ0aNydSFzxDctOoYbf yozTSzQvzomL1gDK7bqqQnVSKvOxyLGaDoYEH7lb1H4ZgoNLZQtxMg== =ZGQU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Brian B. Riley --> http://members.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn, and relearn." -Alvin Toffler

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Re: Lock and Load
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Choate wrote: > Forwarded message: > > Not being a native English speaker, I do not understand the > > meaning and origin of the phrase "LOck and Load". > > It means to lock the rifles safety and load it's chamber in preperation for > firing at an enemy. It is usualy used in a military context but head-bangers > and such use it when talking about loading their bongs and I am shure other > groups use it as well in various contexts. > Wait a second, aren't we supposed to load first and lock later? How can you load a rifle if it is on safety?

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Re: Completely anonymous communications ARE only for "Criminals"
by Charlie Comsec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- gburnore(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > : I suspect that there is very little that can be done, and > :that holds true for non-anonymous posts as well. Just looking at some of the > :massive cross-posts with subject lines that say "So-and-so is a pedophile" > :(some of them with Netcom addresses who seem to be able to hang onto their > :accounts despite making such accusations), > > I think it's more that those who are "accused" are likely not suing because of > the cost and trouble. That's a decision each individual has to make. Usenet is full of blowhards that keep threatening to sue over real or imagined grievances, but never do. You're merely pointing out the impracticalities of Politas' suggestions about punishing usenet wrongdoers. Why go to the bother of implementing protocols which invade the privacy of innocent users just to catch the occasional law breaker if it's not worth the cost and trouble to sue the culprit once he's identified? > : I'd say that usenet is a different > :ballgame from the print media where for-profit publishers have deeper pockets. > > Exactly, deeper pockets. That and the fact that it's easier to prove actual damages via the print media because people tend to believe paper and ink more than they do usenet posts. Usenet posts are taken with a grain (or ton) of salt by most readers. > :The problem with tort laws is that to successfully sue for libel you have to > :prove damages as well as prove that what was said was false. Thus, you'd have > :to prove to a jury that someone made a defamatory statement about you that was > :false, that people believed it, and that your reputation has suffered > :measurably as a result. > > That's usually not difficult. One person says you did something you didn't > do. As soon as a second person repeats what the first person said, you've > proof that people believed it. That's reason enough to say your reputation has > suffered. You'd also have to prove that the person who repeated it didn't already think you were a n'eer-do-well prior to the post. If somebody already thinks you're a shady character and a post merely reinforces that belief, it'd be hard to make a case that your reputation had been damaged by that post. The case you'd have to make is that a person previously thought your character was impeccable until an anonymous post convinced him that you were a scoundrel. I suspect that would be a hard sell with most juries. Most people put the credibility of usenet posts (even non-anonymous ones) on par with things they find scrawled on rest room walls. > : Identifying the person who posted the message is only > :a small part of the problem. > > It's the biggest piece of the puzzle. Without it, the rest is useless. And it's not much better with non-anonymous posts. When confronted with making a defamatory post, one can always claim that it was forged, or that someone hacked his account, stole his password, or used a terminal that was inadvertently left logged in while the person was at lunch to make the defamatory post without his knowledge or consent. Without some reliable means of authentication, such as PGP signing, how are you going to prove that the person named as the poster really posted it? Inserting a remailer into this scenario only adds an additional link to an already tenuous chain of evidence. > :Moreover, if the plaintiff has attained the status of a "public figure", he > :has to prove additionally that the defendant KNOWINGLY and MAILICIOUSLY > :published FALSE information. > > That too would be easy in USENet. I say you did something you didn't do. You > say "post evidence or shut up". I say it again or even just follow up to your > "post evidence or shut up" message and I'm doing it knowingly. The person could easily justify saving the evidence to be used in his defense for a courtroom rather than revealing it on usenet, though. A "post evidence or shut up" challenge really does nothing to put a person on notice that his claims are false. It's always possible that the statements were true and that the challenger is bluffing in the hope that the accuser really has no evidence. Remember, the test is whether the poster KNEW his statements were false. > : Thus, if you said that Clinton sexually harassed > :Paula Jones, it's unlikely that the President could sue you and win. He'd have > :to prove that you knew the accusation was false and made it anyway with > :malicious intent. > > But if you're Paula Jones and it's proven that what you accused didn't happen, > you could be sued by the President. True. I was talking about the case of a third-party who could have been acting on his belief, perhaps wrong, that Paula Jones was telling the truth. Apply the rationale you previously suggested to this case. Suppose I say that Clinton sexually harassed Paula Jones and he challenged me to "post the evidence or shut up". Would that demand obligate me to shut up? Would it somehow put me on notice that Clinton was innocent? I don't think so. > :> Hotmail DOES know who signs up and uses their mail service (at least the > :> connection information such as IP and provider. > : > :That's probably reason enough for someone who truly needs anonymity to avoid > :such a service. The problem is that once it's known that the identifying > :information exists somewhere, the keeper of that information becomes a > :target for coercion, bribery, hacking, burglary, etc. > > Only if someone uses their site in an abusive fashion. Like any other > service. I would not assume the motives of a person willing to engage in such tactics to be honorable ones. It could just as easily be a person out to exact revenge on a whistleblower. Look at the person who blew the whistle on the tobacco industry. Imagine if he'd done it anonymously. Imagine if the next person in that position decides he doesn't want to become a target by revealing his identity. It's hardly a case of using a site in an abusive fashion, but it still might get the attention of someone wanting desperately to identify and silence a "trouble maker" like that. Requiring a remailer operator to store data that could later be used to prosecute an accused criminal also makes that same data vulnerable to compromise by those with no legally defensible need to gain access to it. A "black bag job" is often more expedient than going through the proper legal channels. > :> There's still no way to do something even if the law has already been broken. > : > :If someone has already been convicted of an offense that involved the > :internet, it might be possible to suggest that one condition of any probation > :or parole be to avoid using the internet, similar to what happens when one is > :convicted of drunk driving. Many jurisdictions allow victim input into the > :sentencing/parole process. > : > :(I'm not advocating this, merely pointing out that it's possible.) > > You skipped the apprehension and prosecution and jumped to after sentencing. I assumed that apprehension and prosecution would precede sentencing. You did state that "the law has already been broken", and that is a decision for a judge and jury to decide, so I assumed that it had already been made in a trial. > :The problem is that devising workable solutions to problems that don't yet > :exist is much more difficult that resolving problems that do already exist. > > Many say the problem does exist. I was dealing with Politas' specific concern. Not only did he state that the problem didn't exist, but he doubted that it ever would be a problem FOR HIM. I made no attempt to generalize the answer, only deal with Politas' concerns that were motivating his call for changes. > :And that's doubly true if the person refuses to implement the preventive > :measures already suggested. > > He can still only implement _SOME_ measures. Others are beyond his control. > He can't make the other person stop posting false information. I'm not sure about Australia, but that's true in the United States. The Supreme Court has ruled that prior restraint, based on what someone MIGHT do, is an unconstitutional infringement upon freedom of speech. > : It's sort of like saying, "Why should I be careful > :with that hot coffee? I'll just wait until it spills and injures me, then > :I can sue someone!" > > Only true for those things under his control. If the "attacker" never sends > him an email, it'd be hard to argue that the fact that he didn't block his > email address proved he didn't protect himself. And I've never been injured by spilling hot coffee in my lap either, but common sense dictates that I should take reasonable precautions to prevent it before it happens. You presumably lock your front door when you leave, even if you've never been burglarized, right? Remember, we're operating from Politas' premise that the only people who use anonymous communications are "criminals", so unless he has some reason for wanting to hear from "criminals", HE has no excuse not to pre-emptively block anonymous mail. YMMV, of course. > :I do too. But his premise was used to support his suggested remedy. If an > :anonymous user is NOT presumed to be a criminal, then you can't justify > :treating him like one. > > I still wonder about what to do about "suspects" on the net. How do you > investigate one suspected without harming those NOT suspected? If by "suspect" you mean someone that you have REASONABLE CAUSE to believe is committing a crime, you have a number of legal remedies. A US Attorney could get a search warrant for the suspect's computer(s), subpoena his ISP's access logs, perhaps even request a wiretap on his link to the internet. In a civil case you'd have to do the legwork yourself, but I'm sure that many of the same tools are available. But if you had an identifiable suspect in mind, then his attempts at remaining anonymous would have been for naught. Maintaining one's privacy requires more than just technology. If you didn't have probable cause, but had narrowed it down to a short list of potential culprits, then you might wish to engage the services of a private investigator with expertise on the internet to assist you. (You could also hire your friendly neighborhood hacker for a lot less, but you'd be assuming a lot more liability for any illegalities in his "investigation" than you would in dealing with a licensed, bonded professional.) > :Take "libel", for example. Let's suppose a law were enacted today to make > :defaming the President of the United States a criminal offense. How much > :success do you think you'd have in forcing a remailer in Libya or Iraq to > :aid in hunting down such an offender? > > None. That was my point. Politas' contention that remailers were being used to perpetrate crimes that are prosecutable in EVERY COUNTRY is hard to believe. There are crimes that fall into that category, of course, but I can't think of one that's possible to commit anonymously via a remailer. Most countries, I suspect, would be even less likely to intervene against an innocent third party, the remailer operator, to subpoena confidential data for the sake of a civil matter between two foreign individuals. The lessons of the Church of Scientology vs. Julf debacle have hopefully been learned and it won't easily be repeated. The fact that a single (vulnerable) individual stood between a dissident poster and a litigious organization served as a wake-up call to many remailer users. Many will now accept nothing less than REAL anonymity, not the snake oil "trust me, I'm from the government" approach to privacy and personal security that some want. - --- Finger <comsec(a)nym.alias.net> for PGP public key (Key ID=19BE8B0D) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNJ6iggbp0h8ZvosNAQHAHgf/SpLYO7EUHMg4Efh7jctXF04R3Aww5h8M QAWCv5vOSe/AOQ79303lMNRDeaiU5d5fN+3LyGAEEa+RujZ5s+YGALhDq54Vmjdi Zrq6UXdB4geFWvbm3vU2ODYIEAAPvxxQj6heL6zUvbjkBj5BwCxng7vCsp+uMa0L N7rRnx4MxblzxRzi/9ypniOHAHWPRr+1y6JTID1mxEy2TxfB7le4zL2nrh0b0SdH pPtCoxi4qwA+khPDqbZl0OSIj5DIar8LW862Zkk9fBPrxBKMGAoKx/V6K8VM2Rqg 9XUtEdRuETfL/TyGEG7aEFw0DEwdeflEGGrkVmls1pYzH17/5fqc2Q== =phEE -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Remailer Logs (and Accountability)
by Charlie Comsec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) wrote: > I've been reading about Cajones, and having logs demanded, and > about traceability vs accountability and so forth here. > > Do remailers keep a trace of whoever sends them mail? I sent > this message from my desk to Replay and on to a mail2news gateway, > can someone trace it back to my desk somehow? That would hardly > be anonymous, would it. Sorry if this is/has been covered somewhere, > but I can't seem to find a good nuts and bolts explanation of > just how secure anonymous remailers are. I suspect that if you polled remailer operators you'd find that some keep logs and some don't. I don't know about the Replay remailer. Perhaps Alex DeJoode (the operator of the Replay remailer) would care to comment. Nor can logs necessarily positively identify you. If kept, they would record when your message came in and when the post to usenet went out, but *PROBABLY* would not establish a conclusive link between the two. Many remailers maintain a "reordering pool" where forwarded messages do not necessarily get sent out in the order they were received. If you're concerned about backwards traceability via remailer logs, then encrypt and chain your posts through several remailers. If you do that, your identity is protected unless *ALL* of the remailers kept logs and their operators *ALL* cooperated in the effort to identify you. If even one of the remailers in the chain doesn't keep logs, then the trail back to you stops right there. IMO, any remailer operator that keeps logs is inviting trouble, but that's their choice. Some remailers are hosted on ISPs that automatically keep logs and it is quite beyond the remailer operator's control. If you sent this message directly to the replay.com remailer and didn't encrypt it, then anyone along the electronic path between you and the Replay remailer could have read it and known who posted it. If you PGP encrypted it, then it would take Alex DeJoode's cooperation to identify you, assuming he kept logs. If you had used encrypted chaining through at least three remailers, then no single person (except you) would know both the source and final destination of the message. The first remailer would know who sent it but not where it was headed. The second remailer would know neither. The third remailer would only know its destination (usenet) but not its source. - --- Finger <comsec(a)nym.alias.net> for PGP public key (Key ID=19BE8B0D) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEUAwUBNJ6uGAbp0h8ZvosNAQHKjAf41cqbqQP6A+JXmZXJ9qpCg6nSL5760ZU8 CNv/TheuBvbsbGQ1bBi7zeWVtkCq+MK8XhTFKKLHw6sfyukgAaQY5toM5H+zHtaY ITCQyGheSngySv/jD8RYYKNtHfk/aCEl9v8MYfTmiBotYp6eiSim3HZyTsNPH41L wRnQc/90zcDmPe5sB6fJY0DxSywX+w7yyobwlCSvlTGWUeVVBntJY65RZysVwtHy YbFplCehw3ygJ20OK1fWJUpVvYFUlY56SdnxPvZPaPO/5vO+zO6UTqvKX2WRfc23 DdF4OE45Y0DeVKgUkIzI3YeMn4WbVC1xLf7HCSYtsxRfwTjVdcj6 =7IdA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Freedom Forum report on the State of the First Amendment
by Lizard 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:55 PM 12/23/97 -0500, Colin Rafferty wrote: >Freedom of expression is not the same as freedom of oppression. How is someone 'oppressed' by my choosing not to deal with him for some reasons, but not for other reasons? Either way, he does not get my services. I refuse to hire you because you are black -- you are oppressed. I refuse to hire you because you're an Aquarius and my astrologer told me not to hire Aquarians -- you are not oppressed. I refuse to hire you because you're a Republican and I'm a Democrat, and I don't think we'll work well together -- you are not oppressed. But in all cases, you are not hired. Explain the logic of this to me. (Yes, it is perfectly legal to not hire someone based on star sign, political affiliation, or having freckles.) No human being has a right to compel service from another human being. If I do not wish to engage in trade with you, that's my right. Would you be less oppressed if I just closed up shop and refused to trade with ANYONE? The issue here is not expression, but association. (Obviously, this does not apply in any area where there is government involvement, such as civil service, access to public places, receipt of government benefits, voting rights, public education, and the like.)

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Fwd: THE ULTIMATE GOLF GIFT
by kozmo killah 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

note: forwarded msg attached. _________________________________________________________ DO YOU YAHOO!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com To: InternetUser(a)OnThe.Net Subject: THE ULTIMATE GOLF GIFT From: 42956274(a)hotmail.com Date: Fri, 19 Dec 97 17:00:10 EST THE ULTIMATE GOLF GIFT at http://www.cgagolf.com THE MONTHLY GOLF GIFT "THE GIFT THAT NEVER ENDS" COME VISIT THE CGA GOLF MALL FOR ALL YOUR GOLF NEEDS http://www.cgagolf.com

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Re: Question on CFB variant with c[i-N]
by Jim Russell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>> cfb Ciphertext feeback mode >>> c[i] = f1(K, c[i-1]) ^ p[i] >>> p[i] = f1(K, c[i-1]) ^ c[i] >Suppose instead of c[i-1] you use c[i-N] where N is say 10. Wouldn't the size of your IV have to grow as N grows? Jim Russell SynData Technologies

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globalization & the internet
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

some ranting & some food for thought.. ------- Forwarded Message Date: Mon, 22 Dec 1997 02:36:59 -0800 From: "J. Orlin Grabbe" <kalliste(a)aci.net> To: snetnews(a)world.std.com Subject: SNET: [Fwd: [OT] Information Highway: CLOSED?] - -> SearchNet's SNETNEWS Mailing List This is a multi-part message in MIME format. - --------------595A704A5EC1CF912EEA531B Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit - --------------595A704A5EC1CF912EEA531B Content-Type: message/rfc822 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline Path: news.alt.net!wnfeed!204.127.130.5!worldnet.att.net!newsadm From: Bill Nalty <CBasher(a)worldnet.att.net> Newsgroups: alt.current-events.clinton.whitewater Subject: [OT] Information Highway: CLOSED? Date: Sun, 21 Dec 1997 13:59:27 -0600 Organization: AT&T WorldNet Services Message-ID: <67jsg3$bbb(a)bgtnsc02.worldnet.att.net> Reply-To: CBasher(a)worldnet.att.net NNTP-Posting-Host: 12.65.209.91 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.0C-WorldNet (Win95; I) For education and discussion. Not for commercial use. tf mag January 1998 A Not So Hidden Agenda ... Closing the Information Highway By Richard K. Moore Domination of cyberspace is mission-critical for the masters of globalization By RICHARD K. MOORE Propaganda is an essential mechanism in democracy. It's the primary means by which the elite insure that their interests aren't overwhelmed by the "excesses of democracy" and "mob rule." In the see-saw struggle for power, ownership of media - to influence opinion and government policies - has always been used to advantage by economic elites. Popular movements also have effectively used the media, from time to time, but in today's concentrated media industry, elite control over public opinion is, essentially, total. So total that just as a fish isn't aware of water, it's easy to forget how constrained the scope of public debate has become. Even opposition to the status quo is channeled and deflected by media emphasis, as with the US militia movements, the Perot and Buchanan candidacies, and European nationalist movements. All these are used to "define" anti-globalist sentiment as reactionary, isolationist, Luddite, and racist. Demonization of government and politicians - in fact, blaming government for problems caused by globalism and excessive corporate influence - is perhaps the single most potent coup of mind-control media in undermining democratic institutions and promoting globalism. REVISION BY OMISSION Globalization itself exemplifies media propaganda's potency. The rhetoric of neoliberalism, with its "reforms," "market forces," and "smaller government," isn't just a "position" within public debate. It frames debate. Politicians rarely question whether to embrace globalization, but compete to espouse national policies accommodating it. As media is globalized and concentrated, it's no surprise that globalization propaganda is one of its primary products. Whether the vehicle is a feature film, network news, advertisement, panel discussion, or sit-com, the presumed inevitability of the market- forces system and the bankruptcy of existing political arrangements comes through - even when the future's dark side is portrayed. The barrage's success is especially amazing given the utter bankruptcy of the neoliberal philosophy. The experience of the robber-baron era is simply forgotten in public memory. In true Orwellian fashion, we're told that market forces and deregulation are "modern" efficiencies, the brilliant result of state-of-the-art economic genius. As a consequence of this historical revision by omission, we rarely hear that these policies have been tried before and found sorely wanting - that they prompted economic instability, monopolized markets, cyclical depressions, political corruption, worker exploitation, and social depravity. Nor do we hear about how generations of reform were required to re-introduce competition into markets, stabilize the financial system, and institute more equitable employer/employee relations. In fact, regulatory regimes created a generally reasonable accommodation between interests of the elite and the people. But, because of media propaganda, everyone now "knows" that regulations are just the counter-productive ego-trips of well- or ill-meaning politico-bureaucrats with nothing better to do than interfere in other people's business. Today's "reforms" dismantle reforms which moderated decades of market abuse. Yet, old wine can be presented in new vessels. As long as the message is repeated enough and facts that don't fit are never aired, the public can swallow it. IMAGE CONTROL The mass media is the front line of corporate globalist control. This adds extra urgency to the pace of global media concentration. The central importance of corporate-dominated mass media to the globalization process, and to elite control generally, must be remembered when predicting the Internet culture's fate once commercial cyberspace comes online. The mass media's treatment of cyberspace and the Internet to date lends some portending insights. Two quite different images are typically presented, one commercially-oriented and the other not. The first, frequently seen in fiction or futuristic documentaries, focuses on the excitement of cyber adventures, the thrill of virtual reality, and the promise of myriad online enterprises. This commercially- oriented image has a positive spin. Suddenly every product and organization on the block has a www.My.Logo.com, often with only symbolic utility. Madison Avenue is selling cyberspace, pre-establishing a mass-market demand for its future commercial version. The other image presents sinister hackers, wacko bomb conspirators, and luring pedophiles. Those who use the Net daily find such stories ludicrous and unrepresentative, but because we dismiss them, we may not realize that's about all the general population hears about today's Internet. The infamous Time article on cyberporn, for example, was pure demonization propaganda, and standard procedures were surreptitiously violated to get it printed. The effect wasn't undone by subsequent mild apologies. A recent US regulatory initiative (actually a censorship attempt), whose passage was assisted by that well-timed article, was fortunately rejected by the US Supreme Court. But the defamation campaign continues. The relationship between cyberspace and democracy is complex. Internet culture enables a renaissance of open public discussion - a peek at more open democratic process. But a tiny minority of the world's population experiences this phenomenon, which may not survive the commercial onslaught. On the contrary, as universal transport for mass media products, cyberspace may deliver even more sophisticated manipulation of public opinion. Rather than the realization of the democratic dream, cyberspace may become the ultimate Big Brother nightmare. When most significant events involve online transactions, and backdoors are built into encryption algorithms and communications switches, everyone's every move will be an open book to those holding the keys to the net's nervous system. From the accounting records alone, there would be a complete trail of activity, and the privacy of this information (from government, police, credit bureaus, advertisers, direct mailers, political strategists, etc.) is far from guaranteed. Systematic massive surveillance by government agencies would be easy. There's even the possibility of surreptitiously gathering audio and video signals from home sets presumed to be "off," and remote overriding of home security systems or automobile functions. Mandatory chip- based ID cards or implants may sound fanciful, but the number of initiatives in those directions worldwide is alarming. In short, cyberspace could become the ideal instrument of power for the globalist elite, giving precise scientific control over what gets distributed to whom, and full monitoring of everything everyone does. Some may insist, "It can't happen here." I would ask, "What is there to stop it?" Corporate domination of information flows is inherent to the globalization process. UTOPIA FOR THE FEW You can think of digitial cyberspace as an utopian realm, where all communication wishes can be granted. But who will run it? Net users tend to assume we'll use it for our creative purposes, just as with the Internet. But others have designs on it, too. We're willing to pay a few cents per hour, while complaining about usage charges, and our need for really high per-user bandwidth is unproven. The media industry, in contrast, can bring a huge existing traffic into cyberspace, with much higher value-per-transaction than e-mail, and bandwidth-gobbling web. We want to pay commodity prices, while the media industry willingly pays whatever it takes - passing on costs to consumers. >From a purely economic perspective, the media's interests could be expected to dominate the rules of the road. But economic considerations may not decide cyberspace rules. Continued mass media domination of information distribution is necessary for the media to play its accustomed role as shepherd of public opinion. This is mission-critical to the globalization process and elite societal control. The mechanisms of domination include concentrated infrastructure ownership, licensing bureaucracies, information property rights, libel laws, pricing structures, creation of artificial distribution scarcity, and "public interest" censorship rules. These tactics have been refined throughout the life of electronic media technology, starting with radio, and their use can be expected as part of cyberspace commercialization. Signs of these tactics are already evident. The US Internet backbone has been privatized; consolidation of ownership is beginning in Telecom and in ISP services; WIPO (World Information Property Organization) is setting down overly-restrictive global copyright rules, which the US is embellishing with draconian criminal penalties; content restrictions are cropping up, boosted by anti-Internet propaganda; pricing is being turned over increasingly to "market forces" (where traditional predatory practices can operate); chilling libel precedents are being set; and moves are afoot to centralize domain-name registration, beginning what appears to be a slippery slide toward ISP licensing. And these are still early days in commercialization. Consider the US Telecom Reform Bill of 1996. Theoretically, it encourages "increased competition." But consolidation is permitted both horizontally and vertically: A telco can expand its territory, and be sold/merged with content (media) companies. Prices and the definition of services are determined by "the market." There's also a transition period, during which it must be determined that "competition is occurring." After that, it becomes a more or less laissez-faire ball game, in a climate of deregulation and lack of anti-trust enforcement. There's no going back, no guarantee that if competition fades, regulation will return. Just as the media industry is vertically integrated (owning its own distribution infrastructure), so it will seek telecom acquisitions as the digital network nears implementation. Following awesome merger wars among huge conglomerates, a single media-communications mega-industry, dominated by a clique of vertically-integrated majors, is likely to emerge. Regulation will indeed govern cyberspace but - in accordance with the globalist paradigm - it will be regulation by and for the cartel. CONTROL OF DISTRIBUTION Monopolization is about creating an all-the-traffic- will-bear marketplace. This operates today, for example, in cinemas and video rentals. Films compete on the basis of consumer interest, not price. So, cyberspace majors will compete, but in content acquisition - seeking the most successful offerings and coverage - and in extending market territories. This competition may bring consumers ever more titillating entertainment, but the scope and "message" of their entertainment (and information) will be molded by corporations. International regulations being created for libel, copyright, and pornography combine to make Internet culture ultimately untenable. A bulletin board, for example, would not be run in open mode; in essence, staff would have to filter submissions to avoid prosecution liability. List owners would be forced to become censors, verifying contributor's statements like newspaper editors. The open universe of today's Internet seems destined for marginalization, just like CB-radio or public-interest broadcasting, thus completing the commercial domination of cyberspace and corporate domination of society. The ability to distribute media products at reasonable rates to large audiences translates into the ability to start up a competing media company, with production costs as the only major capitalization required. This is exactly what media cartels wish to avoid; discouraging start-ups is what "control over distribution" is all about. In the case of TV, scarce bandwidth translated into expensive licenses, and the cartel was easily maintained. In cyberspace, the cartel can maintain distribution control by defining services and setting prices, so that media distribution is artificially expensive and cost-effective only on a massive scale, requiring massive capitalization. What will it cost to send a message to one person in commercial cyberspace? My guess is that the "traffic will bear" about as much for a one-page message as a first-class letter. This may seem over-priced, but so what? I consider my voice phone service (and CDs) over-priced - c'est la vie under monopoly market forces. The advertising brochure will boast, "Get your message instantly to anyone in the world - for one flat rate less than a domestic postage stamp." At 25 cents per recipient, a 500-person Internet mailing-list carries a $125 posting fee direct from the poster to the telco. You can play with the numbers, talk about receiver-pays, and note that corporate users will insist on affordable networking, but monopoly-controlled pricing could totally change Internet usage patterns. The media-com industry will make plenty of money from 1-1 e-mail messaging, and plenty more from their own commercial products. Whether they want to encourage widespread citizen networking is entirely up to them, according to their own sovereign cost/benefit analysis. If they don't favor it, it won't happen - except in the same marginalized way of HAM radio. There likely will be some kind of commercial chat- room/discussion-group industry, but monopolized by online versions of talk radio, presided over by an Oprah Winfrey and Larry King - with inset screens for "randomly selected" guests. "Online discussion" will thus be a new kind of media product, its distribution economics structured to favor the cartel. The prospects surely seem dim for both democracy and cyberspace, and cyberspace itself may be more a part of the problem than a part of the solution. Following a career in computer software with Xerox, PARC, Apple, and others, RICHARD K. MOORE moved to Ireland, where he is developing a book, a documentary, and a grant-funded website. - --------------------------------- A Not So Hidden Agenda ... Date: Sun, 21 Dec 97 19:07:24 +0000 From: Brenda Jinkins <bjinkins(a)wspice.com> From: [www.FreeRepublic.com] Posted by: Boyd () * 12/21/97 10:37:09 PST - --------------595A704A5EC1CF912EEA531B-- - -> Send "subscribe snetnews " to majordomo(a)world.std.com - -> Posted by: "J. Orlin Grabbe" <kalliste(a)aci.net> ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Lock and Load
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Not being a native English speaker, I do not understand the meaning and origin of the phrase "LOck and Load". Please explain.

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Netly News Special Report: Censorware in the Stacks
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Netly News brings you a four-part exclusive report today on the first library censorware lawsuit, filed this morning against a Virginia county that installed X-Stop software. Also check out our upgraded Censorware Search Engine to see if *you're* censored in Loudoun County -- we now include databases from IGear and X-Stop. Censorware in the Stacks -- lawsuit filed: http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1649,00.html The Censor's Sensitivity -- X-Stop's woes: http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,1652,00.html Bob Corn-Revere to the Rescue: http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,1653,00.html Censorware Search Engine 2.0: http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/spoofcentral/censored/ -Declan

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Lock and Load (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Mon, 22 Dec 1997 12:41:31 -0800 (PST) > From: Mix <mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> > Subject: Lock and Load > Not being a native English speaker, I do not understand the > meaning and origin of the phrase "LOck and Load". It means to lock the rifles safety and load it's chamber in preperation for firing at an enemy. It is usualy used in a military context but head-bangers and such use it when talking about loading their bongs and I am shure other groups use it as well in various contexts. In short it means "get ready for action". ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Hate speech and censorship
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dimitri Vulis writes: > Perhaps the state shouldn't be in the business of providing library services > to begin with; then there will be no 1st amendment issue, and if you don't > like the censorware used by a private library, why, use another private > library, or start your own. > > (Nor would there be an issue with private libraries refusing service to > readers who smell bad.) How ironic that Vulis supports the right of private libraries to refuse service to bad-smelling readers, while whining about Gilmore's refusal to allow Gilmore's own private machine to pass Vulis' foul-smelling posts. Private actions are not censorship, and Gilmore had the right to do anything he wanted with toad.com. Likewise list members had every right to move to other hosts. Vulis's infantile name-calling is easily seen to be totally lacking in justification, unsurprising given his demonstrated lack of reasoning abilities on this issue.

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