December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Sameer should sue the SPA
by Matthew Ghio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Let's see, what can Sameer sue the SPA for... 1) Filing a frivilous lawsuit, of course. 2) Extortion. "Sign this or we'll sue." 3) Libel and Defamation. "SPA's false statements about Mr. Parekh have harmed his reputation as a software publisher, and cost him profits..." 4) Conspiracy to violate the ECPA by demanding logs and records which may contain private/confidential information. (Dunno about this one, but it's worth a shot.) 5) Anything else? How much $ in damages do you think he can get? Also, SPA is going after C2 because one of their customers allegedly had a link to a pirate site - but they have (apparently) not gone after the pirate site itself! Could someone explain to me how there can be a finding of contributory copyright infringement, when there is no direct copyright infringement? Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction is an often-cited case here. In this case, a lawsuit was brought against the swap meet operators only after action had been taken against the vendors of the illegally copied material. It does not seem logical that c2 could be liable for contributory infringement when no actual infringement has (yet) been shown to exist.

4 3

Re: COMMUNITY CONNEXION SUED IN FRIVOLOUS LAWSUIT
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:03 PM 10/14/96 -0700, Steven L Baur <steve(a)miranova.com> wrote: > http://www.spa.org/piracy/CODE.htm > ... > 8. Do not sponsor, endorse, or advertise access to infringing > software. I wonder how a "Hack Netscape" or "Hack Microsoft" contest fits in with this, to name two major public services run by C2...... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

1 0

Oregon DMV database online once again...
by Cerridwyn Llewyellyn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Oregon DMV database will once again be searchable on the web, in a few days, at http://www.notek.com/or-dmv. Suggestions on what sorts of privacy-related propaganda should be on the page are welcome (and encouraged: currently there's really nothing there...) Also, looking for a volunteer to write a quick press release we can send to Oregon media, regarding the reasons behind the page, etc. (I suck at such things, and would prefer if someone else with a talent for writing on cypherpunk-type topics would do it.) A few details, for those who want to know: the actual databases are stored on a 486DX/33 (the only machine I could spare for the task..) running linux 2.0.13 with 8 megs o' RAM. The search isn't quite as speedy as Genocide2600's (the previous home of the Web-Searchable dmv database), but it's reasonably fast. The license database is indexed on last name, the plates database is currently indexed on plate number, but when I can find more harddrive space, it will also be indexed (and thus searchable) by last name, which is a bit of an expansion on Genocide 2600. Anyway, all that's really left is a few hours of work tidying up the cgi/database server code and finishing the actual web page, which I should get to tomorrow or possibly the next day. I'll post a notice when the page is officially up, but in the meantime, please let me know what type of privacy propaganda/tools/info (if any) would be appropriate. Thanks... //cerridwyn//

1 0

AS2805.65 standard?
by Min-Ming Chin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, there, Anyone heard of the Australian security standard AS2805.65? Beats me...

1 0

GAK Naive or Shrewd?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ern Hua's letter is ultimate. ----- The New York Times, October 15, 1996. Is Clinton's Encryption Policy Naive or Shrewd? To the Editor: There is something strange going on with the Clinton Administration's policy on data-scrambling software and Secretary of Commerce Mickey Kantor's defense of it (letter, Oct. 11). If the Administration really wanted to prevent encryption software from falling into hostile hands, it would try to pass a law limiting the type of encryption that can be sold domestically, not just exported. The cumbersome system the Administration proposes may be a measure of its computer naivete. People who are familiar with computer encryption know that strong encryption can be readily had here in the United States over the Internet or telephone lines from dial-up computer bulletin boards. Not long ago I downloaded a copy "Pretty Good Privacy," a system similar to the Rivest-Shamir-Adelman "strong" public-key method. Anyone with a computer, a modem and a phone line could do the same. Or the Government may not be naive at all but merely Machiavelian. Suppose the code breakers at the National Security Agency had managed to develop efficient solutions to "strong" methods. Would it be in the Government's interest to keep that fact a secret and to create a distracting furor by pushing another, weaker (and exportable) encryption system it knows has not a chance being adopted? Then encryption usrs would be lulled into using compromised systems while the National Security Agency decrypts their mail. Warren Wetmore,Hazel Crest, Ill., Oct. 11,1996 ----- To the Editor: Mickey Kantor's Oct. 11 letter is unconvincing. Instead of trying to prohibit strong cryptography, governments should encourage its use. It is the best tool for defending our privacy on the information highway. Jeffrey Shallit, Kitchener, Canada, Oct. 11,1996 The writer is an associate professor of computer science at the University of Waterloo. ----- To the Editor: Mickey Kantor (letter, Oct. 11) says that your Oct. 4 editorial ignores the trend -- especially in Europe -- to require use of key-recovery products and bar the import of stronger encryption products. This ignores that no one wants mandated key recovery. Some important uses of encryption, like secure telephone conversations, do not need key recovery for any reason other than law enforcement intercepts. Mr. Kantor's point on other nations' barring imports is absurd. Since when do we tailor our export limits to the import limits of other nations? The "trend" Mr. Kantor refers to is artificially created by the United States through lobbying efforts. Mr. Kantor uses the word "trend" as if other nations were independently pursuing the key-recovery path, when, in fact, only a few are considering such a move. Some, like Japan, have opposed such a direction. Others, like Sweden, have considered such a move secretly because such a policy cannot withstand democratic scrutiny. Mr. Kantor's letter is a blatant attempt by the Administration to get what it wants for law enforcement and national security agencies without any concern for the nature of the technology or the economic effect of such policies. Ernest Hua, Sunnyvale, Calif., Oct. 11, 1996 The writer is a software engineer. -----

1 0

PINmail in the SCMP
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: somebody Date: Tue, 15 Oct 1996 15:13:07 +0800 To: rah(a)shipwright.com Subject: PINmail in the SCMP MIME-version: 1.0 (Created by TFS) Front page of the Technology Post section of the 15/10/96 edition of the South China Morning Post, next to a cheesy photo of the two men quoted in the article looking (peering?) through venetian blinds. Headline: Anonymous e-mail site launched. Byline: Keala Francis Highlights: "Hong Kong advertising agency Momentum has created an anonymous e-mail service for Internet users around the world." penet closed down "because it was perceived to be condoning child pornography. [Director] Tobin said PINmail (http://www.PINmail.com) was designed as an offshore address only for legitimate businesses, but the compay could not necessarily control its users." Tobin: "If there is proof of illegal activities, I would give up a name." "Momentum created and owns shares in AsiaFocus International, which owns PINmail." Access via Netscape 3.0. IExplorer due before December. (Uses CGI and Javascript in a way that is incompatible with IE3.0.) Daley (Momentum GM): "There are really no disadvantages to having your e-mail sit on a server rather than your PC." "PINmail can also allow you to maintain an anonymous address." "Momentum has set up three server sites in Hong Kong, California and Amsterdam to enable easier and more efficient access." PINmail = USD19.95/yr. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

1 0

Camelot PRNG
by inssdl＠dstn21.dct.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In the UK, the National Lottery is run by a company called Camelot (in case anyone didn't know) A while back, they introduced a new option, in that if you checked a certain box on your ticket, 6 numbers would be 'chosen' for you, presumably 'randomly' Does anyone have any info on how this system works? i.e. The PRNG used? Whether the PRNG is in the shop terminal or at the central computer @ Camelot? et cetera. (I am looking at the problems of PRSG for my Masters dissertation - hence the interest) Please reply either to the cypherpunks list or to my e-mail address if you think this doesn't have any crypto-relevance. Thanks in advance... ********************************************************************** David Lucas PGDip Software Engineering @@ BEng(Hons) Civil Engineering Postgraduate Software Engineer, University of Abertay Dundee, SCOTLAND @ E-mail: inssdl(a)dstn21.dct.ac.uk @ 2+2 = 5 for large values of two @ If you're not living on the edge, then you're taking up too much space Organisations can't have opinions, only people can and these are mine. Dave's Doorstep is back!!! - http://river.tay.ac.uk/~inssdl/index.html **********************************************************************

1 0

Re: FLY_not
by wa6ube＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John Young writes: > >On 10/14/96 09:30:38 you wrote: > > 10-13-96. CoWo: > > "Encryption confusion" > > Reminded of the secret Clipper algorithm, I sought > details from IBM. I asked a spokeswoman why the company > hadn't just put out a nice, snappy white paper > explaining its new approach to key recovery. "We spent > three months trying to do that, quite literally," the > spokeswoman said. "It's pretty confusing stuff, and > whenever we get it on paper, we aren't happy with it." > > 10-12-96. InWe: > > "IBM Coalition May Not Fly" [Thanks, WR] > > "The relaxation on encryption is in many ways an > extortion of industry," said Bob Gargus, president of > the Atalla. "If this starts to happen for export, how > many companies will be able to support two standards? I > think every American should be worried." But Greg Simon, > domestic policy adviser to Vice President Al Gore, said, > "We're not looking for an answer that's universally > popular. We're looking for a solution that's balanced > and fair." > ----remainder snipped----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I am curious, if there is this "coalition" of companies that have joined IBM on this new Key Recovery Plan, Has anyone yet found out who the other members of this coalition -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.0 Personal Edition iQCVAwUBMmOndMDUh3vt7LRPAQEsnQP8Cs9yUdETZjTdZPar236cavjWRspQI/vU 9W7DKgUu0QeknOVmmmfbhQSRx8o6W/NcelVG67hXzIE8Zui5LPBefOpOIr6qHOqc ySzLUXS7l0lq5a7Radc/+WoXM/WoHZXYHX6eU7HsJ7dosn7vZiMG2p75+06BBKA6 MCO5n68h2BU= =jy/0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Patricia Gibbons <wa6ube(a)ix.netcom.com>

2 1

AW: binding cryptography
by Eric Verheul 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On dinsdag 15 oktober 1996 14:09, Roy M. Silvernail[SMTP:roy@sendai.scytale.com] wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >In list.cypherpunks, everheul(a)NGI.NL writes: > >> BTW, some people on the cypherpunks list seem to think that you can't = >> fraude with a *voluntary* system. However, that is possible: when you do = >> not comply with the *agreed* rules of conduct then the phrase "fraude" = >> is appropriate. >If the system is *voluntary* and I do not *agree* to participate, then I >*cannot* be breaking any "rules". That is correct. Sorry that the BTW-statement is so evident. Some people did not understand that if you *do* agree, then you *can* be breaking any rules... >>> Can you imagine what would happen if governments would (help to) set up = >> a system that has no safeguards at all, i.e. that could give criminals = >> all the anonimity and confidentiality they need? Governments can't = >> probably prevent criminals and the like to use encryption to stay out of = >> sight of law enforcement agencies, but they should not facilitate them = >> either. In the next few years all kinds of "standard" commerical = >> software will come on the market with all kinds of standard security in = >> it. I don't want criminals to be happy with Custom of The Shelf products = >> for security, let them work for their security. > >Which they will, and presumably already do. Therefore, your proposal >does not and cannot hamper criminals. Therefore, your proposal only >hampers law abiding citizen-units' access to uncompromised crypto. I do not agree. For instance, the encryption possibilities of wordperfect, and MS-word are weak; my mail-system (ms-exchange) does not have any encryption at all. The security of these important Custom of The Shelf products can and will be enhanced.. >No institution can expect compliance from a sector of society that, >by definition, does not agree to or follow the social contract. >Therefore, any and all such attempts to do so must be for the purpose of >controlling those citizen-units that do abide the social contract. To >claim otherwise is absurd. The point is that public available systems should *aid* not them in their criminal activities, let them search for alternatives. Compare it with the legislation we have here on the sell of guns. You sort of say: hey, that does not help cause criminals will get it somewhere. I say, that is true, but it will make their lifes more difficult, or maybe I should say less easy. > >> The bottom line is that law-abiding citizens = >> always have to give up some of their freedom to stop criminals (that is = >> why you have to have registration plates on your car, a lock on your = >> car, bicycle, house etc.). That is a fact of life; one I hate. > >Registration plates do not "stop criminals". Locks do not "stop >criminals" (although they might slow a criminal down). Neither will >compromised crypto "stop criminals". But all the above impinge on my >liberty. Am I to give up yet another freedom? Our system slows down criminals too, or maybe I'd better say does not speed them up. Locking my house and my car, certainly limits my freedom too because it gives me the risc of losing the key (happened a few times). Finding the middle of losing freedom by law-abiding citizens on the one hand and stopping criminals on the other hand is an important issue in any democracy. We believe our system gives a solution in which every democratic country on his own implement to their middle, without losing connectivity with countries that think otherwise.

1 0

extortion via digital cash
by scottb＠aca.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I have been reading numerous threads on digital cash, and I have some questions I would like discussed. currently when someone does extortion (kiddnapping too), they have two choices; 1-pick up the cash personally (or via a stooge) 2-transfer the funds via bank Both ideas are bad, in that you stand a good chance at getting caught. I was wondering, what if you demanded payment via Ecash, through nym servers, aliases, etc. From what I understand, it is just like cash, ie: no record of transaction, but you get the added bonus of not having to meet the other party-like a fund transfer. Once you have your 1,000,000 Ecash, you could dump it on a disk, and close your internet account (unless you really really trust your privacy technology). And I also think that you would have the option to cash this into real funds at either the Mark Twain bank, or likely somewhere in the Caymen Islands (maybe through those online gambling houses). I am hoping that this will spark some discussion, and maybe slow down the dlv, TM spam war. Also, I was only wondering about this for mere discussion reasons :) /sb

7 8

Key Exchange Request
by Mike Babcock 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID pub 1280/FA4C5DB1 1996/06/13 Michael T. Babcock <mbabcock(a)tyenet.com> Michael T. Babcock <mbabcock(a)cyberbeach.net> - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.3i Comment: http://www.cyberbeach.net/~mbabcock/PGP/ mQCtAzHAhC8AAAEFAMG+C+yN8q7KDT5TUSdyQNZlDDlTGuF4vUzPEq52lrqx7NAA YwJuj0dtOnnU2GAAonNutYF7nbbsS5yjWWgENioKOzIdjgDpq+YBZDkX4kFTD/+5 PM5EZhS1kT54zDpbjlZHtu9ViL3xUD/vp5zmp7Mlxqdd5SbkM0bpIBlBIqfpij59 hOVgc837YtAMmAbuRzwzy06/5ne221MLA/pMXbEABRG0KE1pY2hhZWwgVC4gQmFi Y29jayA8bWJhYmNvY2tAdHllbmV0LmNvbT6JAJUDBRAx2dcPTeL4zy9PtLMBAZ0+ A/9T8thIB2MW/0X0H4HTPNQ5TJlXM/56wxEtWNrr0Veku+lJvMdm6JvCDHqIfNC8 lTsWCg1Hot7EyNWhtXPp29A2fgLK/8hVJiFDs55ClWk9E4x3ug2mLZESid3qJO6U 3AnnzbI1ZuAelcX6tzJAYtJlbUz3t2y0pUloDUz7Uj4oGIkAlQMFEDHAhI2lZOCu UMiZpQEBcr0EAJP1lU3gJCidTwyHNlc16kybaTfECQz/TV7W+OqOcdH3mD3HKxUk J5KHRqTL4mS/tiiTmFEuFnwJaa36f+8ARkjq2EgmUX74ItfpcdplU3Sxe04om7Oy 7XNrgqWWpt+dEqQQqOLEVCTfuwNQck96GLLu1hZUXfrgDkpBT0rsl6cMiQC1AwUQ McCEMNtTCwP6TF2xAQGj3AT/VMMu5yZZTychDeLMfxsMse/xQ1/Ioi2UzApBdyiQ 7EVXWWHG0q5GGwGMiIsPeIFcbvF39DwSBX2BsBcnQh90wERdRsCo2BkG7Sw9Pk5a 13FDiXv+5eUDRsc0Z7z874vvpurzV1afuL+LKCAgOlxJhinikKqbR89AVLx4xRzl /BAyE4OBUfZZNIpshmtJdhSO/027WEAd6jXEHu3IkIl4+LQsTWljaGFlbCBULiBC YWJjb2NrIDxtYmFiY29ja0BjeWJlcmJlYWNoLm5ldD6JAJUDBRAxwIpqpWTgrlDI maUBAXnqA/0X+RTykzFUl0IMVVfJeb1JPMTBlq4vMwAdsipYTtHPMNfWNfp7hsUO Sk4/v1IzX0pEysHvQhD/Q56s0MYDd+gxMV17v0JnBI36wTgIEjOITMKUKShlHyWx RGCs0KmCt8NJ958IwRErbCw9EIdObX9JChzXTvGA91kpXYxOwpr6XokAtQMFEDHA ij/bUwsD+kxdsQEBtc4E+wUYFsgqjThhUxpBFBdRc0k1oXKzbVl+itKUtdfqOH1d Wc99PMkdttqVi3ME0xLNOfVLYg0lROyZqR8xZKLfKCGLoFWUE8kOFoL+VuZQ/Nuz VS0bArNMk8+ghbSiC82IFScQkFcvISkuDgMOyaDviNPbeb2QMhjkhP20NDLaX5tW UNSXfjUMJLCp33yNaM9/fwGAs6V21qeViJh9IFxUh04= =OAVt - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- This message was sent by Pronto Secure Mail. Above is my public key. Please send your public key by return mail. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMmOzQyoZzwIn1bdtAQFCUQF9E1ggA7yYJ/mwRD98YF5ZFh+5yUz5YJy4 qCA7f+rprv4llxArrYTlZU/fAOwHmQ64 =OFUM -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: "Right to Privacy" and Crypto
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I'm of course just a layman, not a law professor or scholar. But I feel it >best that we not invoke a "right to privacy" to protect our crypto >abilities, when such a "right" apparently does not exist. > >However, certain things which _look_ like a "right to privacy" do exist: I agree with your analysis. It certainly matches what I was taught in law school. The rhetorical point I was making however is that a *practical* not constitutional right to privacy exists as long as your questioner eschews torture. I think it is useful to point out -- in response to government types who assert that "there's no absolute right to privacy" -- that they have actually set aside a zone of privacy by their rejection of torture as an interrogation technique. What this does is to remind listeners that coerced speech has an unsavory history and it turns the argument from one between absolute positions into one in which we are just arguing which sanctions should be applied when. DCF "Note that many governments have officially given up rape and torture as sanctions. (These were once universal.) All we have to do is get them to give up murder, imprisonment, and robbery as sanctions and we'll have civilized them completely."

3 2

Re: PLEDGES
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Paul, You wrote: > What the hell, I'll spring for $200. It would be the needed > excuse to leave San Diego anyway. Wah whoo! This, plus some other new pledges puts us over the $1000 mark. Now all we need is some show of intestinal fortitude from Dimitri. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

2 1

Re: extortion via digital cash
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Hi, I have been reading numerous threads on digital cash, and I have some >questions I would like discussed. > >currently when someone does extortion (kiddnapping too), they have two >choices; > >1-pick up the cash personally (or via a stooge) >2-transfer the funds via bank > >Both ideas are bad, in that you stand a good chance at getting caught. > >I was wondering, what if you demanded payment via Ecash, through nym >servers, aliases, etc. From what I understand, it is just like cash, ie: no >record of transaction, but you get the added bonus of not having to meet the >other party-like a fund transfer. Once you have your 1,000,000 Ecash, you >could dump it on a disk, and close your internet account (unless you really >really trust your privacy technology). And I also think that you would have >the option to cash this into real funds at either the Mark Twain bank, or >likely somewhere in the Caymen Islands (maybe through those online gambling >houses). > >I am hoping that this will spark some discussion, and maybe slow down the >dlv, TM spam war. > >Also, I was only wondering about this for mere discussion reasons :) > >/sb Although Digicash's ecash offers anonymity to the payor it does not to the payee. The reasons have to do with the way coins are blinded. So LE could, with the bank's cooperation, easily associate the two sides of a transaction. This was intentional on Chaum's part, either for moral or practical political considerations. Its probably only a relatively minor patch to allow one ecash purse (the kidnapper's) to generate the blind token values so that another (similarly patched) purse (the vicitim's) can submit them to the mint and return the minted coins to the kidnapper (e.g., by posting on a popular Usenet group). In this scenario the only reasonable way left to track the money is via linkage (the size and timing of deposits and withdrawls in the kidnapper's account). PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Snoop Daty Data | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Sacred Cow Meat Co. | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Counter-cultural technology development our specialty. Vote Libertarian. Just say NO to prescription DRUGS. "Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive." -- C.S. Lewis "Surveillence is ultimately just another form of media, and thus, potential entertainment." -- G. Beato

2 1

Re: Fuck Cyberpromo
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> It seems to me that every time I send a message to cypherpunks, I get a 10k > message entitled "RESPONSE FROM CYBERPROMO" from "abusebot(a)savetrees.com > (Mail AutoResponder)" . >[...] > I would expect that if everyone on this list who gets one of these things > -- which I suspect is everyone who posts here lately -- turned right around > and sent it on to this wallace(a)cyberpromo.com address, those, er, > caprophageous cretins, (thanks, DCF; don't sue me for copyright violations > ;-)) would get the hint in a hurry. > > I'm starting with the one I have, and, of course, I'll also do it for the > message I get from sending *this* posting. > > Cheers, > Bob Hettinga Those of us who occasionally dip into that Slough of Despond known as news.admin.net-abuse.misc are *very* familiar with Mr. Wallace. Check out, for example, news:// 32617de2.18341458(a)news.onramp.net, where he is ignoring a court order to stop spamming. Bouncing mail back to him may be emotionally satisfying, but I suspect he filters it. He also has a skin as thick as a rhino's. Peter Trei trei(a)process.com Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

4 3

RE: PLEDGES
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Sandy Sandfort Wah whoo! This, plus some other new pledges puts us over the $1000 mark. Now all we need is some show of intestinal fortitude from Dimitri. ........................................................ Well, hey - if Dimitri is feeling kinda weak & puny, I'll take his place. Youall can pay my airfare & hotel charge, and I'll think of something to talk about with you guys. How about: Imaginative, Non-Crypto-Related Ways to Avoid the Government. (Uni? I'd be delighted to discuss this in person). $1000 makes for a fine party! .. Blanc

1 0

RE: Re: extortion via digital cash
by scottb＠aca.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- >From: azur >Subject: Re: extortion via digital cash >Date: Tuesday, October 15, 1996 2:18PM > <SNIP> >Although Digicash's ecash offers anonymity to the payor it does not to the >payee. The reasons have to do with the way coins are blinded. So LE >could, with the bank's cooperation, easily associate the two sides of a >transaction. This was intentional on Chaum's part, either for moral or >practical political considerations. Its probably only a relatively minor >patch to allow one ecash purse (the kidnapper's) to generate the blind >token values so that another (similarly patched) purse (the vicitim's) can >submit them to the mint and return the minted coins to the kidnapper (e.g., >by posting on a popular Usenet group). In this scenario the only >reasonable way left to track the money is via linkage (the size and timing >of deposits and withdrawls in the kidnapper's account). I would tend to think that if you held on to the money long enough, you would thwart them tracking it via linkage-especially once it becomes more commonplace to do electronic transactions on the Net. Actually, if you wait long enough, you likely will run the risk of there being a crackdown on nym servers, remailers, etc, and maybe even specialy designed cancel-bots on usenet. /sb

1 0

extortion via digital cash (fwd)
by gimonca＠skypoint.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: scottb(a)aca.ca > Date: Tue, 15 Oct 1996 11:44:25 -0400 > Subject: extortion via digital cash > > Both ideas are bad, in that you stand a good chance at getting caught. > > I was wondering, what if you demanded payment via Ecash, through nym > servers, aliases, etc. From what I understand, it is just like cash, ie: no > record of transaction, but you get the added bonus of not having to meet the > other party-like a fund transfer. Once you have your 1,000,000 Ecash, you > could dump it on a disk, and close your internet account (unless you really > really trust your privacy technology). And I also think that you would have > the option to cash this into real funds at either the Mark Twain bank, or > likely somewhere in the Caymen Islands (maybe through those online gambling > houses). > The Digicash product only has one-way anonymity. Their own pages are a good place to start: http://www.digicash.nl/ecash/about.html --CG

1 0

Re: Service pays users (sort of) to read commercial e-mail
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:50 PM 10/14/96 -0700, Greg Broiles <gbroiles(a)netbox.com> wrote: >>From time to time we've discussed the economics of paying per-message costs >for E-mail, and/or systems where advertisers pay users to read their >messages. Someone seems to have set up a system like that. It's at ><http://www.aristotle.org>. They seem to be using voter registration as an >is-a-real-person credential. (Their idea seems to be that they'll charge Aristotle.org is run by John Aristotle Phillips. If you remember back in the 70s when a student at Princeton designed an atomic bomb as his junior physics project, that was him (he wasn't brilliant; he just needed a really good paper to bring up his low physics grades.) He's since gone into political consulting. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

1 0

Re: WOW!
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

bryce(a)digicash.com writes: > > > I already responded more times than this threat warranted > > > > I'm totally nonplused. Does anyone on the list have any idea > > what Dimitri is talking about? Has he posted a RESPONSIVE answer > > to my invitation? If so, I never saw it. > > > He responded two or three times, but I wasn't able to determine > whether he was saying "Yea" or "Nay". Perhaps he didn't believe > that your offer was serious. > > > > Does anyone have any idea why Dimitri uses the term "threat"? I > > have not threatened Dimitri and I have indicated that as my guest > > he will be under the mantle of my protection. He'll be safer here > > than he is in his own bed. > > > I believe he typo'ed "thread". > Yes - I mistyped "thread". My apologies. Once again: I already replied to this _thread_, and then I received a _threat_ of a libel lawsuit in connection with this _threat_. Sorry for the typoes and the resulting confusion. At any rate, if people are really willing to pay this sort of money to hear me speak, perhaps I should make a videotape of me giving a presentation about my Usenet cancelbot and send it to Sandy? Thanks to Bryce for the correction. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

3 2

Majordomo w/ built-in security
by Christopher Durfy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi guys, I'm new to the list, and it looks like a good one ;) I've got a question, and was hoping someone could point me in the right direction. Here's the situation: A large group of Doctors want to have an email list set up, but are concerned about privacy issues. Client's confidential patient info is likely to be talked about, and any interception of data would likely caused them to get sued =P Would the best way to get somehow incorporate PGP into the majordomo or smartlist (if it's possible) and either assign keys to all the doctors (or one key for ALL the doctors maybe, to cut on admin times....) Anyone ever run up against a situation like this? Any pointers, horror stories or solutions are very welcome! Thx. -Christopher Durfy, chris(a)alphawave.com

3 2

using TCP sequence numbers for stego
by Mark M. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Would using TCP sequence numbers to carry stegoed data be practical? The data would have to be removed at a lower level. This would mean kernel patches and extra system calls in UNIX. I have no idea what this would require under Windows or Mac. This seems like the ideal place to stego data because most OS's have started using random sequence numbers. Any ideas? Mark - -- finger -l for PGP key PGP encrypted mail prefered. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMmP7sSzIPc7jvyFpAQHlUQf+JwmltREsYq65f5YPOdubmr8hxAjfiOa+ zIX7VpP75qm+SgiZTxBaioN2pVzW0yCb36IqNKYuZuUww/ip8Bh/0aNnyzNguD+p jXVOLpzbfBeD33Q+NLag6N2R2PogZQT2yx2vfSwQ9zeyoZ1CYTxiKZHDq06czzAt gq3wszp0l9U1jr2xTnmprNYofYUrvWitpId41tTbyx336dmJ5lNKS1Nssu/+vCZC B9Gib+s/ayQz6BGuEDCVqr36cZY75uHYfUuMnIHnONYAsFC4qR1vNdJ/OnCXJJR2 D6Ns9POsb9NGCh0pFzGjDavpQKwIU9b/Br30vge1tKsPA30GByPJMQ== =NaaI -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Dmitri
by L.Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just pledged $20 for Dmitri's trip and want to publicly encourage him to attend. Dmitri, I can attest the cpunks and Sandy are gracious hosts. (lately Dmitri has been sending me mail intermittently about tcm) because of the extremely wide interest and "buzz" factor of this activity, I suggest this invitation of guests with donations be made a semi-regular feature of cpunk meetings, with discussions on the list about future guests. btw, I have recently tweaked my www site slightly for anyone who is interested. oh, and btw, there was a fantastic article on crypto in last week's newsweek by Steven Levy, I don't recall seeing mention of it here. it mentioned "crypto anarchy" and the 4 horsemen of the infocalypse. a very concise yet informative and current article. | /\ |\| /~ L~ L_ /~~\ | | \_ L_ http://www.csn.net/~ldetweil/

1 0

[TIMMY MAY] Timmy May doesn't like being exposed as a liar
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

More spam from FOTM (friends of Timmy May): >Received: from miafl2-16.gate.net (miafl2-16.gate.net [199.227.2.143]) by osceola.gate.net (8.7.6/8.6.12) with SMTP id HAA187758; Wed, 16 Oct 1996 07:13:05 -0400 >Date: Wed, 16 Oct 1996 07:13:05 -0400 >Message-Id: <199610161113.HAA187758(a)osceola.gate.net> >From: Jim Ray <liberty(a)gate.net> >To: root(a)bwalk.dm.com, postmaster(a)bwalk.dm.com >X-Priority: Normal >Subject: Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM >X-Mailer: Pronto Secure [Ver 1.10] >X-Prontosecureinfo: T=signed, P=x-pgp > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: text/plain >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit > >To: root(a)bwalk.dm.com, postmaster(a)bwalk.dm.com >Date: Wed Oct 16 07:10:45 1996 >Can you folks somehow get Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> to quit >sending anonymous messages to cypherpunks? I have killfiled him, but he >sends things with subject headers like "RSA" through the anonymous remailers >and it is impossible to killfile them and still get interesting anonymous >messages. > >He is evidently angry at another subscriber, Tim May, for showing the list >how much of a fool he was regarding economics in the past, but now he shows >how much of a fool he is. Below is an example, the subject was RSA, and it >could only have come from him, I assure you. [BTW, this is not a threat of >legal action on my part against you, it's just that you are lowering your >reputations by letting him continue spewing garbage, and now that even >killfiling him hasn't worked, I am trying to convince you to talk to him and >encourage him to please take his lithium regularly.] >JMR > >- -----Begin Included Message ----- > >Date: Tue, 15 Oct 1996 15:35:04 -0400 (EDT) > From: amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com (Anonymous) >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Cc: > >Timmy C. Mayflower was born when his mother was on the >toilet. > > > >- ---- End of forwarded message ---- >One of the "legitimate concerns of law enforcement" seems to be >that I was born innocent until proven guilty and not the other >way around. -- me > >Defeat the Duopoly! Vote Harry & Jo http://www.HarryBrowne96.org/ >___________________________________________________________________ >PGP id.E9BD6D35 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 >I will generate a new (and bigger) PGP key-pair on election night. ><mailto:jmr@shopmiami.com> http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray >___________________________________________________________________ > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: 2.6.2 > >iQCVAwUBMmTCum1lp8bpvW01AQHAugP/e/GTay0y778Ziy3JbWCGBb+tRxM8Q1Zi >Z3aIP97hNYYoD7QKi9yP1gS3ZRbg/9ZXJonWTi+zmZ7yUjmWndczmXJ2IAC+Rgpx >7MQmrhjU4htmiMCuawNmVLZRNZMl/+kNnX15taA8GdXTcuPXUsGN0y39oMbbqT5g >do3B4yicgrY= >=iix/ >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >

1 0

RSA
by amnesia＠chardos.connix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy C. Mayflower was born when his mother was on the toilet.

1 0