December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [REBUTTAL] Censorship on cypherpunks?, from The Netly News
by Terry Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>It just "looks" that way on the net. I do live-fucking, newsgroup >flooding, mailbombing, vote-tampering and defamation all legally, >and OPENLY on the InterNet. > >The more you PGP, the worse you look. Nobody reads your e-mail, >so stop being so paranoid. > >-aga > > Who is this idiot?

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Key Escrow
by Rick Osborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For my Professional Ethics class I was charged to do an essay on something topical and analyze it using the three main systems of ethics (Utilitarianism, Kantian Rights, and Justice as fairness.) I have pretty much wrapped up the essay and was hoping I could get some feedback from you guys (and gals, to be PC) about it. It is supposed to stay under 5 pages, and is intended for Joe non-crypto-user, so I wasn't allowed to ramble on about crypto, but I would still like some feedback. Anyone who is interested can obtain the document at: http://www.spacey.net/oringer/rickoz/Ethics.htm and the original Word 7.0 version at: http://www.spacey.net/oringer/rickoz/Ethics.doc Thanks, Rick Rick Osborne / C++ VB Pascal HTML VRML Java / osborne(a)gateway.grumman.com ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ "Women like a guy who looks trim, neat. You got to be sharp. I look like I'm wearing a circus tent. Any minute now a little tiny car, with sixteen clowns in it is gonna come flying out my butt."

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National Emergency
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Michael Froomkin posted to the cyberia list a pointer to the Clinton administration's new export policy. He has a copy on his web site at: <URL: http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/nov96-regs.htm >. The thing I found interesting is that it refers to the fact that we are currently living under a state of national emergency! I searched on the whitehouse web site and couldn't find the executive order referred to (maybe it was classified) but did find this one: For Immediate Release June 30, 1994 Executive Order #12923 - - - - - - - Continuation Of Export Control Regulations By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including but not limited to section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("Act") (50 U.S.C. 1702), I, William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America, findthat the unrestricted access of foreign parties to U.S. goods, technology, and technical data and the existence of certain boycott practices of foreign nations, in light of the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.), constitute an unusual and extraordinarythreat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency with respect to that threat. Apparently this state of emergency is still in effect. This is what gives the President the power to unilaterally make changes in the export policy. It would be nice if our congresspeople would take some responsibility in this matter. Hal

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Re: Censor John Gilmore -- EFF is a disgrace!
by Bryondp＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

take me off this fucking list

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Executive order on crypto
by Peter D. Junger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ok, stop squabbling. Here is something important. The President has issued a couple of Executive Orders today that transfer crypto to Commerce (eventually) and that make things worse, not better, as far as I can tell at a quick reading. An important portion of the Executive Orders is a rehash of arguments that the government has made unsuccessfully in the Bernstein case and has also made in my case. I found out about the order from a posting by Michael Froomkin on Cyberia-L. The URL of the Executive Order, for today at least, is: http://library.whitehouse.gov/PressReleases.cgi?date=0&briefing=4 Michael Froomkin has also put up a mirror at: http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/nov96-regs.htm I will have a copy up on my web server (http://samsara.law.cwru.edu) before the evening is over. It seems (again just at a quick reading) that the government is now limiting, or pretending to limit, its regulations on the ``export'' of cryptographic software to communications over the internet or on bulletin boards. As I read the Executive Orders they require that the final regulations shall contain the same sort of restrictions on crypto information that the Computer Decency Act applies to indecency--if the CDA cases are upheld by the Supreme Court, I think that these provisions will be struck down on the authority of that decision. The Executive Orders are not yet in effect. That awaits the proclamation of final regulations, which may be hard to draft--or may be issued on Monday for all I know. And argument in Junger v. Christopher is scheduled for Wednesday. Law is fun! Peter -- Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH Internet: junger(a)pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu junger(a)samsara.law.cwru.edu URL: http://samsara.law.cwru.edu

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Re: National Emergency
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal Finney wrote: >I found interesting is that it refers to the fact that we are currently >living under a state of national emergency! [Snip] The same emergency was invoked for the same purpose in December, 1995, with citation of the elusive EO 12924 identical to the latest EO. See: http://jya.com/exporeg1.htm

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opinions on www.accutrade.com security?
by CaShaky＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Do any of you security knowledgeable people have any information on the security of accutrade? I opened an account with them prior to subscribing <sp? lol> to this list. I am now considering closing said account because of what i have learned from this list. How easy or hard would it be for a hacker to diddle with the accounts? To access the accounts all you need is a 9 digit account number and a 4 digit pin number. But from what I have gleaned from here is that the real leak in security is in attacking the OS directly. If this post is inappropriate to this list I apoligize in advance, but i have come to the conclusion that there are very bright and knowledgeable people on this list (once you filter out the noise) and would appreciate your opinions. Thank you CaShaky

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Re: A Disservice to Mr. Bell
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:43 AM 11/15/96 -0500, hallam(a)vesuvius.ai.mit.edu wrote: > >Jim appears to be arguing that the "common law" courts heis refering >to had judges appointed by the King. If so the right to appoint >judges to those posts passed to the US government under the treaty >of Paris. WRONG! One of the main principles of the US Constitution is that the government has no "rights," per se: It merely has specific authority granted to it by the people and the states of America. A treaty with a defeated monarch did not and could not grant authority to the Federal governemnt that it did not already have. Also, you've screwed up on the timeline: The Treaty of Paris was signed in 1783, and the US Constitution was finalized in 1787, four years later. Quite simply, the Federal government of the US didn't exist when the Treaty was made. No "rights" could be transferred to a non-existent branch of government. I suppose you'll now claim that the "rights" were transferred to the states, right? Well, the states did not have their own Constitutions, either. And unless those Constitutions mentioned commonlaw courts, it's pretty obvious that the public did not anticipate including those powers in those state governments. It is obvious that King George relinquished that power; what you'll be unable to show is that this power flowed to any entity other than the people of America, every one of them. >The Common Law in the UK was the kings law since the Norman conquest. >It is as any schoolboy knows judge made law. The doctrine of precedent >has become more and more prominent since the renaisance though, effectively >preventing judicial lawmaking except in areas where no law is believed >to exist. > >As a system of government I don't think very much of the idea of a >bunch of klansmen getting together to decide who they dislike. Sounds >much more like a lynch mob than a system of government to me. For every "bunch of klansmen" getting together, you'll have a few hundred bunches of far more reasonable people. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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-=/HaCk, InC.\=-
by L0rD gEcK0 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

join #hackinc or #hackteach on efnet and join the group, run by: L0rD gEcK0 HaRdC0Re ^TWiSTeR^ Painter Catgrrl larsk One Day... The world will be overcome by gEcK0's, and if you havent been kind to me, you WILL be sorry!!! ;) ***£Ø®ÐgË©KØ***

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Re: National Emergency
by silly＠ugcs.caltech.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> writes: >Use the source, young Hal! While the White House Web site may not have it >online, Alta Vista turns up 113 hits (though not all valid) to it. >Basically, this was one of the alphabet soup of Emergency Orders, National >Security Decision Directives, and Executive Decisions passed or enacted >(sometimes in secrecy) during the last 30 years of the Continuing Emergency. I've spent a great deal of time looking for an archive of these sorts of actions, especially executive orders, but in general *all* the crap that spews from the White House. Is there one? Most of my searches led to dead links. I know that the WhiteHouse.gov site has Clinton's EO's (searchable, or, with a little finagling, a list of them), but I want *all* of them. I'd love to see a site which has all these things. (me)

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Re: Playing Cards
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: ph(a)netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson) > A well shuffled deck of 54 cards has about 237 bits of entropy. This > is easy to use: the program asks the order of the cards, converts this > to a string, and runs it through a one-way hash. (Entering the cards > is a bit of a nuisance. Is there an easy way to have them read > automatically?) I heard that Bruce Schneier has devised a cryptosystem based on a card deck for a future book by Neal Stephenson. It is supposed to be simple enough for a person to use manually, but complicated enough that it can't be broken by computer. Your idea of using cards as a one time pad is somewhat similar, maybe, although I think Bruce's was designed to be useful for long messages, providing computational rather than unconditional security. > How the Lisp Code Works > ----------------------- > > Let's use as an example a deck of five cards numbered from 0 to 4. > There are 5! = 120 combinations of these cards. We can think > of each card as a "digit" in a slightly odd numbering system. This is very interesting; I've never seen this algorithm before. It is a nice way to turn a number into a permutation, and vice versa. > For an exercise, what is the value of (4 2 1 3 0)? (Answer at end.) This would be 4*4! + 2*3! + 1*2! + 1(was 3)*1! + 0*0!, or as you say: > ;; (Exercise Answer: (4 2 1 3 0) = 111) Hal

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IDEA patent
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

IDEA is a good algorithm much faster than 3DES and probably stronger but its not very popular outside of PGP because it is patented. I remember someone posting here or in another crypto list about a modified keyschedual to allow keys of weird size. My question is could this modification or something more proven like PRNG-generated subkeys be used to avoid the IDEA patent? Everyone says it only takes a small change to avoid a patent. The problem is a small change can break an algorithm. Some algorithms like Blowfish generate subkeys from a PRNG so it might be a safe change for IDEA. I'm posting this anonymously because I dont know what peoples feelings are on patent avoidance.

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Re: New Cryptography Regulations
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:05 PM 11/15/96 -0500, hallam(a)vesuvius.ai.mit.edu wrote: >The main change is that from now on the decisions are to be made >by the department of commerce and not by the department of state. > >This is probably good news since the commerce department has the >interests of industry as its primary mission. I am expecting them to use the Interstate commerce clause in the Constitution to enable them to enact whatever rules they want without that pesky "freedom of speech" thing getting in the way. I am sure that any commerce secretary that dare to loosen the export restrictions would quickly find him/herself out of a job. Clinton and Gore have both shown that they get arroused at the thought of being able to read everyone else's e-mail and listen to their phone calls. I don't expect them to do anything that would thwart that fetish. (Power is the ultamite turn-on. When you can pry into the details of every part of a person's life, you have a great deal of power. Clinton/Gore/etc have shown no resistance to that seduction.) I expect that this will add more bodies to the LaBrea ITAR pits, not take any away. >There is a third document I believe but its not yet been issued. Waiting for the third shoe to drop? --- | "Remember: You can't have BSDM without BSD." - alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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Re: ideal secure personal computer system
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>A friend of mine just got back from a kerberos conferance at MIT, at >dinner one night they were talking about fun-n-easy ways to extract >data from a machine. One of them mentioned that after a while, a "on" >Of course, no computer is "secure" without a thermite charge above the >hard drive, and a tamper-resistant case. >"Well, Billy, the Sevret Service is here, they want to take away your > computer (and telephone, and cassette tapes ,and etc.)" >"Okay, mom. It's right over here, Mr. Scarry Secret Service dude." ><lift> "Ffffffts" >"Hey, Billy, what's that smoke coming out of your computer?" > I discussed this seriously with an engineering acquaintence who has done drive design for a number of major companies. He thought this could be easily achieved technically but might present some significant hurdles for getting UL approval :-) Seriously though, there might be a market for an Mission Impossible drive retrofit kits which could be triggered by SW or HW. --Steve PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Lamarr Labs | Voice: 1-702-658-2654 7075 West Gowan Road | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Internet and Wireless Development Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne, Libertarian, for President. http://www.harrybrowne96.org

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Re: Playing Cards
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:04 PM 11/15/1996, Hal Finney wrote: >From: ph(a)netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson) >> A well shuffled deck of 54 cards has about 237 bits of entropy. This >> is easy to use: the program asks the order of the cards, converts this >> to a string, and runs it through a one-way hash. (Entering the cards >> is a bit of a nuisance. Is there an easy way to have them read >> automatically?) > I heard that Bruce Schneier has devised a cryptosystem based on a card > deck for a future book by Neal Stephenson. It is supposed to be simple > enough for a person to use manually, but complicated enough that it can't > be broken by computer. Your idea of using cards as a one time pad is > somewhat similar, maybe, although I think Bruce's was designed to be > useful for long messages, providing computational rather than unconditional > security. I, for one, am dying of curiousity. When I asked him about it, he said he would disclose it "soon". Peter

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Re: [POLITICS] Re: Members of Parliament Problem
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:31 PM 11/15/1996, Adam Shostack wrote: > So, if 'anonymous Senator' came out for legalization, it would > be declared that it was Kennedy, source of all Liberal Evil. Good > policy comes from leaders standing up and leading. Since they don't, > I'm a crypto-anarchist. To try and help the Congress become more > effective is not in anyones interest, except that class of person who > makes their living off the workings of government. > There are lots of variations on the argument that politics is > from the greek poly, meaning many, and ticks, a small bloodsucking > animal. My interest in creating new, consensual realities is that I > don't want to be forced to care about the congress. I may have misunderstood you, but when you suggested "disallowing" Congressmen to use anonymity, it did not sound consensual. Even blood sucking parasites should be allowed to benefit from cryptoanarchy. I for one, would be most interested in what Congressmen would have to say if they knew their words could in no way be traced back to them. I suspect that there are a lot of basketcases in Congress and that this would become clear from the horrible things they would have to say when they were sure nobody was looking. Peter

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Re: [REBUTTAL] Censorship on cypherpunks?, from The Netly News
by George A. Stathis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:19 ìì 15/11/1996 -0600, snow wrote: >> Hey man, do they sell "FREEDOM KITS" in American Supermarkets? :-) >> ROTFL! > > Nope, you have to make your own. The Kit is mostly Education, which >is available to all. Pity; I thought them kits came with a Free Modem Trial Offer! ROTFL! :-) Seriously, of course... You have a point there, but... who will educate our educators? -(if part of this "education" hinders and discourages our Liberty)? >> >> Just as suddenly, the classic anti-free-speech arguments of "if you >> >> don't like it, start yer own" begin to surface. (Anyone ever notice >> >> how this resembles the "love it or leave it" mentality of certain >> >> American patriotic organizations?) >> > It still isn't censorship. Censorship, at least in my dictionary,=20 >> >refers to censor, which uses the word "Official" several times. >> You mean that if... Dr. Dimitri Vulis hires a Mafia-man to kill ya,=20 >> (to silence you) this wouldn't be censorship, since it would not be >> "Official" ? :-) > > It would not be censorship, it would be Conspiracy to murder (I >believe, the Legal types could give you the proper charge) on Vulis's part, >and attempted murder on the Hit Man's part. Even Worse! Some dictatorships, as you know, use this type of murder continually... Even democracies in fact, if we remember JF KEnnedy et.al. In a _philosophical_ sense, such acts of violence are indeed censorship, (in the wider sense) of the most brutal kind. Of course, I agree that in a _dictionary_ sense, you are mostly right... HOWEVER: It is part our DUTY as Free Men to OVERCOME a serious FALLACY of most EDUCATION: equating Wider Truths with Narrow Dictionary Definitions. - I would call these Truths "broader" but I wouldn't like the joke about Open Minds liking... Wide Broads! (Ever heard it?) ROTFL!!! :-) >> e.g. Just as aga tolerates me and vice versa, so should Gilmore >> tolerate Dimitri Vulis.=20 > > It wan't his opnions, it was his actions. That is the difference. There is no difference. Aga is a great guy who in a moment of nationalistic misunderstanding, called me a number of bad names. And so did I. These are what you call "actions". They are completely harmless. I am more concerned about the... flies sitting on the surface of my monitor, hindering my eyes. So-called "unacceptable" (speech-)acts are less dangerous than FLIES! :-) Best Regards and Surrealistic Greek Greetings George

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Re: ideal secure personal computer system
by Ted Cabeen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:11 PM 11/15/96 -0800, you wrote: >Since others have mentioned Macs in this thread, and since I have a Mac, I >should point out that booting from a locked startup disk is possible, even >common. Namely, a CD-ROM. Next time you try booting off of a locked startup disk, try opening the chooser. It won't open because to use the chooser requires the startup disk to be unlocked. (Last time I checked) >What an OS would _like_ to write is not the same thing as what it _must_ write. Yeah, but on mac, some basic functions must write to the boot drive. -- ______________________________________________________________________________ Ted Cabeen http://shadowland.rh.uchicago.edu cabeen(a)netcom.com Check Website or finger for PGP Public Key secabeen(a)midway.uchicago.edu "I have taken all knowledge to be my province." -F. Bacon cococabeen(a)aol.com "Human kind cannot bear very much reality."-T.S.Eliot 73126.626(a)compuserve.com

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Time Digital: Crime Online
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The winter edition of this bi-monthly has an amusing article, pg 54-58, about how orgnaized crime is getting more organized with modern technology. Cases in point: * A Queens, NY bookie operation doing $65 million per year busted by taping the their faxes and decoding their hard drives at least one of which had a menchman's mother's name as the password. * Cali cartels using up-to-date data management, encryption and SIGINT methods. A CIA quote, "...the level of sophistication of the Cali cartel was about at the level of the KGB when the Soviet Union fell apart." * According to the article the cost of 'scrubbing' money costs about $0.20 on the dollar in volume. * The European Union Bank is mentioned as a possible safe haven for laundering. Among the criminal's tools of the trade, cell phones, scanners and PGP. -- Steve

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NT insecurity
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Given the recent comments about insecure machines, I thought it was interesting to note that you can clear *every* password on an NT box by using a diskeditor to corrupt the password file (Boot off of a floppy and use NTFSDOS if you have to). It'll reboot several times and then you'll be allowed to login. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Clinton Issues Exec Order on Crypto Export [long]
by Glenn C. Jones 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

November 15, 1996 TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary _______________________________________________________________ For Immediate Release November 15, 1996 TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE November 15, 1996 Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:) In order to take additional steps with respect to the national emergency described and declared in Executive Order 12924 of August 19, 1994, and continued on August 15, 1995, and August 14, 1996, necessitated by the expiration of the Export Administration Act (EAA) on August 20, 1994, I hereby report to the Congress that pursuant to section 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(b) (the "Act"), I have today exercised the authority granted by the Act to issue an Executive order (a copy of which is attached) to revise the provisions that apply to the administration of the export control system maintained by Department of Commerce in the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR Part 730 et seq. The new Executive order relates to my decision to transfer certain encryption products from the United States Munitions List administered by the Department of State to the Commerce Control List administered by the Department of Commerce. When I made that decision I also decided to amend Executive Order 12981 of December 5, 1995, which sets forth procedures for the interagency review and disposition of dual-use export license applications, to include the Department of Justice among the agencies that have the opportunity to review such applications with respect to encryption products transferred to Department of Commerce control. Also, in issuing the new order, I provided for appropriate controls on the export and foreign dissemination of encryption products transferred to the Department of Commerce. Among other provisions, I determined that the export of encryption products transferred to Department of Commerce control could harm national security and foreign policy interests of the United States even where comparable products are or appear to be available from foreign sources. Accordingly, the new order makes clear that any EAA provision dealing with issuance of licenses or removal of controls based on foreign availability considerations shall not apply with respect to export controls on such encryption products. Notwithstanding this, the Secretary of Commerce retains the discretion to consider the foreign availability of comparable encryption products in any particular case. Sincerely, WILLIAM J. CLINTON # # # THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary _______________________________________________________________ For Immediate Release November 15, 1996 November 15, 1996 MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY SUBJECT: Encryption Export Policy Encryption products, when used outside the United States, can jeopardize our foreign policy and national security interests. Moreover, such products, when used by international criminal organizations, can threaten the safety of U.S. citizens here and abroad, as well as the safety of the citizens of other countries. The exportation of encryption products accordingly must be controlled to further U.S. foreign policy objectives, and promote our national security, including the protection of the safety of U.S. citizens abroad. Nonetheless, because of the increasingly widespread use of encryption products for the legitimate protection of the privacy of data and communications in nonmilitary contexts; because of the importance to U.S. economic interests of the market for encryption products; and because, pursuant to the terms set forth in the Executive order entitled Administration of Export Controls on Encryption Products (the "new Executive order") of November 15, 1996, Commerce Department controls of the export of such dual-use encryption products can be accomplished without compromising U.S. foreign policy objectives and national security interests, I have determined at this time not to continue to designate such encryption products as defense articles on the United States Munitions List. Accordingly, under the powers vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, I direct that: 1. Encryption products that presently are or would be designated in Category XIII of the United States Munitions List and regulated by the Department of State pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 et seq.) shall be transferred to the Commerce Control List, and regulated by the Department of Commerce under the authority conferred in Executive Order 12924 of August 19, 1994 (as continued on August 15, 1995, and August 14, 1996), Executive Order 12981 of December 5, 1995, and the new Executive order except that encryption products specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified for military applications (including command, control, and intelligence applications), shall continue to be designated as defense articles, shall remain on the United States Munitions List, and shall continue to be controlled under the Arms Export Control Act. The transfer described in this paragraph shall be effective upon the issuance of final regulations (the "Final Regulations") implementing the safeguards specified in this directive and in the new Executive order. 2. The Final Regulations shall specify that the encryption products specified in section 1 of this memorandum shall be placed on the Commerce Control List administered by the Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce shall, to the extent permitted by law, administer the export of such encryption products, including encryption software, pursuant to the requirements of sections 5 and 6 of the former Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405 and 2406), and the regulations thereunder, as continued in effect by Executive Order 12924 of August 19, 1994 (continued on August 15, 1995, and on August 14, 1996), except as otherwise indicated in or modified by the new Executive order, Executive Order 12981 of December 5, 1995, and any Executive orders and laws cited therein. 3. The Final Regulations shall provide that encryption products described in section 1 of this memorandum can be licensed for export only if the requirements of the controls of both sections 5 and 6 of the former Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405 and 2406), and the regulations thereunder, as modified by the new Executive order, Executive Order 12981 of December 5, 1995, and any Executive orders and laws cited therein, are satisfied. Consistent with section 742.1(f) of the current Export Administration Regulations, the Final Regulations shall ensure that a license for such a product will be issued only if an application can be and is approved under both section 5 and section 6. The controls on such products will apply to all destinations. Except for those products transferred to the Commerce Control List prior to the effective date of the Final Regulations, exports and reexports of encryption products shall initially be subject to case-by-case review to ensure that export thereof would be consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives and national security interests, including the safety of U.S. citizens. Consideration shall be given to more liberalized licensing treatment of each such individual product after interagency review is completed. The Final Regulations shall also effectuate all other specific objectives and directives set forth in this directive. 4. Because encryption source code can easily and mechanically be transformed into object code, and because export of such source code is controlled because of the code's functional capacity, rather than because of any "information" such code might convey, the Final Regulations shall specify that encryption source code shall be treated as an encryption product, and not as technical data or technology, for export licensing purposes. 5. All provisions in the Final Regulations regarding "de minimis" domestic content of items shall not apply with respect to the encryption products described in paragraph 1 of this memorandum. 6. The Final Regulations shall, in a manner consistent with section 16(5)(C) of the EAA, 50 U.S.C. App. 2415(5)(C), provide that it will constitute an export of encryption source code or object code software for a person to make such software available for transfer outside the United States, over radio, electromagnetic, photooptical, or photoelectric communications facilities accessible to persons outside the United States, including transfer from electronic bulletin boards and Internet file transfer protocol sites, unless the party making the software available takes precautions adequate to prevent the unauthorized transfer of such code outside the United States. 7. Until the Final Regulations are issued, the Department of State shall continue to have authority to administer the export of encryption products described in section 1 of this memorandum as defense articles designated in Category XIII of the United States Munitions List, pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act. 8. Upon enactment of any legislation reauthorizing the administration of export controls, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General shall reexamine whether adequate controls on encryption products can be maintained under the provisions of the new statute and advise the Secretary of Commerce of their conclusions as well as any recommendations for action. If adequate controls on encryption products cannot be maintained under a new statute, then such products shall, where consistent with law, be designated or redesignated as defense articles under 22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1), to be placed on the United States Munitions List and controlled pursuant to the terms of the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Any disputes regarding the decision to designate or redesignate shall be resolved by the President. WILLIAM J. CLINTON # # # THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary _______________________________________________________________ For Immediate Release November 15, 1996 EXECUTIVE ORDER - - - - - - - ADMINISTRATION OF EXPORT CONTROLS ON ENCRYPTION PRODUCTS By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including but not limited to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), and in order to take additional steps with respect to the national emergency described and declared in Executive Order 12924 of August 19, 1994, and continued on August 15, 1995, and on August 14, 1996, I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of America, have decided that the provisions set forth below shall apply to administration of the export control system maintained by the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR Part 730 et seq. ("the EAR"). Accordingly, it is hereby ordered as follows: Section 1. Treatment of Encryption Products. In order to provide for appropriate controls on the export and foreign dissemination of encryption products, export controls of encryption products that are or would be, on this date, designated as defense articles in Category XIII of the United States Munitions List and regulated by the United States Department of State pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2778 et seq. ("the AECA"), but that subsequently are placed on the Commerce Control List in the EAR, shall be subject to the following conditions: (a) I have determined that the export of encryption products described in this section could harm national security and foreign policy interests even where comparable products are or appear to be available from sources outside the United States, and that facts and questions concerning the foreign availability of such encryption products cannot be made subject to public disclosure or judicial review without revealing or implicating classified information that could harm United States national security and foreign policy interests. Accordingly, sections 4(c) and 6(h)(2)-(4) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 ("the EAA"), 50 U.S.C. App. 2403(c) and 2405(h)(2)-(4), as amended and as continued in effect by Executive Order 12924 of August 19, 1994, and by notices of August 15, 1995, and August 14, 1996, all other analogous provisions of the EAA relating to foreign availability, and the regulations in the EAR relating to such EAA provisions, shall not be applicable with respect to export controls on such encryption products. Notwithstanding this, the Secretary of Commerce ("Secretary") may, in his discretion, consider the foreign availability of comparable encryption products in determining whether to issue a license in a particular case or to remove controls on particular products, but is not required to issue licenses in particular cases or to remove controls on particular products based on such consideration; (b) Executive Order 12981, as amended by Executive Order 13020 of October 12, 1996, is further amended as follows: (1) A new section 6 is added to read as follows: "Sec. 6. Encryption Products. In conducting the license review described in section 1 above, with respect to export controls of encryption products that are or would be, on November 15, 1996, designated as defense articles in Category XIII of the United States Munitions List and regulated by the United States Department of State pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2778 et seq., but that subsequently are placed on the Commerce Control List in the Export Administration Regulations, the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and Justice and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency shall have the opportunity to review any export license application submitted to the Department of Commerce. The Department of Justice shall, with respect to such encryption products, be a voting member of the Export Administration Review Board described in section 5(a)(1) of this order and of the Advisory Committee on Export Policy described in section 5(a)(2) of this order. The Department of Justice shall be a full member of the Operating Committee of the ACEP described in section 5(a)(3) of this order, and of any other committees and consultation groups reviewing export controls with respect to such encryption products." (2) Sections 6 and 7 of Executive Order 12981 of December 5, 1995, are renumbered as new sections 7 and 8, respectively. (c) Because the export of encryption software, like the export of other encryption products described in this section, must be controlled because of such software's functional capacity, rather than because of any possible informational value of such software, such software shall not be considered or treated as "technology," as that term is defined in section 16 of the EAA (50 U.S.C. App. 2415) and in the EAR (61 Fed. Reg. 12714, March 25, 1996); (d) With respect to encryption products described in this section, the Secretary shall take such actions, including the promulgation of rules, regulations, and amendments thereto, as may be necessary to control the export of assistance (including training) to foreign persons in the same manner and to the same extent as the export of such assistance is controlled under the AECA, as amended by section 151 of Public Law 104-164; (e) Appropriate controls on the export and foreign dissemination of encryption products described in this section may include, but are not limited to, measures that promote the use of strong encryption products and the development of a key recovery management infrastructure; and (f) Regulation of encryption products described in this section shall be subject to such further conditions as the President may direct. Sec. 2. Effective Date. The provisions described in section 1 shall take effect as soon as any encryption products described in section 1 are placed on the Commerce Control List in the EAR. Sec. 3. Judicial Review. This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch and to ensure the implementation of appropriate controls on the export and foreign dissemination of encryption products. It is not intended to, and does not, create any rights to administrative or judicial review, or any other right or benefit or trust responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable by a party against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person. WILLIAM J. CLINTON THE WHITE HOUSE, November 15, 1996.

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Re: THAT is what makes (ANY) "John" an ASSHOLE!
by George A. Stathis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Flames? What flames? Hm... I'm neither a fireman, nor a... pyromaniac! :-) ****************************************************************** Gradually, I came to the conclusion that "Flame wars" rage-on because of INTOLERANCE. Typically, they develop at a "meta-level" to the flames _themselves_, and escalate when people start talking about "getting offended" and that kind of shit, aiming at CONTROL. ****************************************************************** At 08:00 ðì 15/11/1996 -0500, aga wrote: >This whole thing boils down to John Gilmore not liking >"rants" or "personal attacks." What does that chicken-shit ************************** >punk hide behind in real life? When his terminal is not ******************************************************** >protecting him? *************** ^^^ VERY IMPORTANT ($1000-) QUESTION HERE! ( I've often wondered myself... ) i.e. (the wider issue) HOW does cowardice manage to *fake* power? Well, having lived outside my country for about 15 years, at first I tried to blame... some nationalities (such as the English) for possessing the cowardice which is the root of the problem. (-NOT true, in fact. Being "reserved" is not always "cowardly"). Then I blamed the... gullible Americans; then my... "buzuki-minded" Greek compatriots (those who've never been outside their villages). (BTW a "buzuki" is a fuckin-awful Greek/Turkish musical instrument I can't stand, which puts me in the minority over here)... :-) However, it's a deeper and wider problem than such narrow "national" explanations. Boils down to _personal_ growth, maturity, tolerance, and the ability to respond in a "tit-for-tat" basis, rather than a "look mummy what they've done to me" mentality-basis (TM/worldwide). Another way of looking at it is this: DO NOT carry guns when going to the... saloon (or to the Internet discussion)... :-) ( A list-owner's _only_ gun is "forcible unsubcription". ) Tit-for-Tat is simple enough, and does NOT always imply escalation; e.g. If someone calls me an asshole, I _also_ call the guy an asshole. It doesn't have to continue... Then (and only then) _if_ he and I calm down, we MIGHT buy each other drinks! The Anglo-Saxon way of Politeness and the Greek way of Expressiveness are not incompatible, BTW: Oscar Wilde said that "A gentleman is a man who knows _when_ to be rude". Of course, gentlemen ALSO make mistakes. (AND admit them, bravely; in direct contrast to the view that "a man admits no mistake"). But if you called me an asshole, and I REFRAINED from answering back, becoming friends again would be indeed humiliating: THIS is the Greek way, as I understand it; Insults can be *CATHARTIC*. Censoring insults is HIDEOUS, HOSTILE, and DANGEROUS. I can forgive ANY insult, but NOT an act of censorship. Either we speak as equals, or else we kill each other. And censorship is like _spiritual_ MURDER, philosophically. I also never understood why an insult offends the "insultee"; Is not "hurt" an indication that the "offensive" attributions are TRUE? Some of my English friends never understood why the Greeks burst out in laughter with some of the most horrifying insults... :-) >John Gilmore is connected with the corrupt >cabal boys anyway, so he should be dismissed as anybody having >any credibility any more. > >"Once you pull the first plug, you are forever more a whore," ********************************************************** >as the greeks would say. A ha ha! :-) Indeed (and it rhymes!) Minor Correction: (Once pulling a plug) one is a pimp, not a whore. A whore's worst problem is that she OBEYS her pimp. And we intend NOT TO become WHORES for the benefit of (would-be-) Net-pimps censoring us in order to hide their cowardice in REAL life. Regards George P.S. Why do I agree with Aga? My life outside the Net guarantees SOME sanity; E.g. the climate here allows me to swim nearly every day in the beach! :-) (except in December/January/February). So, I prefer to be liked for what I am, or what I do in _real_ life, rather than for my... scribbles in the Net (as I write for... pleasure mostly!) ************************************************************************* "A beautiful female ass is worth a thousand Buddhas". (Greek... Heterosexist Zen-saying). :-) ************************************************************************* P.S.2 (added later) Semantically speaking, the word "poutana"(whore) in Greek can also mean... someone really clever, ya know. So let's not underestimate whores! :-) Here is a list of a few WEIRD semantic connotations in the Greek language: "Big Whore" ("megali poutana") = Very shrewd clever guy; Shrewd salesman. "Big Faggot" ("megalos poustis") = Very Devious (or Secretive) Impauster. "Big Wanker" ("megalos malakas") = Very gullible stupid guy; Clueless fool. "Big Pimp" ("megalo-tavatzis") = Authoritarian or Censorous Media Director. The sexual connotations are often LOST; those listed above are more valid. :) Complaints about "political correctness" are irrelevant. You hear gay people call each other "poustis" and women call each other the same names too...

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Giving Kill Files a Workout...
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What a week! What is this? "Net Loon pig-pile on Cypherpunks day?" So far i have killfiled three people in the past two days. (That is the total number I filtered to trash before that date.) For those of you who are sick of wading through this mess, I am willing to show you what it will take to filter those of your choice to /dev/null or its local equivelent. (procmail can be your friend!) Maybe after some creative filtering, the list will settle back to the usual noise, instead of the net-loon noise. --- | "Remember: You can't have BSDM without BSD." - alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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Fat Cocksucker John Gilmore-ASSHOLE!
by aga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 15 Nov 1996, Mike McNally wrote: > Date: Fri, 15 Nov 1996 09:03:48 -0600 > From: Mike McNally <m5(a)tivoli.com> > Reply-To: freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org > To: aga <aga(a)dhp.com> > Cc: freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org, Dave Hayes <dave(a)kachina.jetcafe.org>, > declan(a)well.com, InterNet Freedom Council <ifc(a)pgh.org>, > cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Re: THAT is what makes John Gilmore an ASSHOLE! > > aga wrote: > > > > No it ain't; not after the list gets so big. Public newsgroups > > lose all rights of censorship by the owners, and that is law. > > Guffaw, guffaw. > PUKE , PUKE !!! You are a stupid bastard to laugh. > (So what if John decided simply to pull the plug on toad in order to > plug in a new hot tub?) > So what the fuck? That matters not. The point is that the cypherpunks is an "all or nothing" proposition. There is no "in between" allowed any more. After a certain level, EVERYTHING reaches the "public doamin," and that is the *common-law of cyberspace.* Like, why is the fatso John Gilmore out here talking about this? Steve Boursy says all of this should go to UseNet, so it goes. > ______c_________________________________________________________________ > Mike M Nally * IBM % Tivoli * Austin TX * How quickly we forget that > mailto:m5@tivoli.com mailto:m101@io.com * "deer processing" and "data > http://www.io.com/~m101/ * processing" are different! > We want John Gilmore to respond to this censorous matter on the net. -aga

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Re: Members of Parliament Problem
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Is there a way to take published public keys and combine them with > your own in such a way that your identity is not compromised, but > it is clear beyond a doubt that you control one of a set of public > keys? An obvious solution would be a shared public key/private key pair between a number of users then use them for digital signatures and route the messages through an anonymous server. You could also have an arbitrated blind signature protocol whereby trent shares a keypair with all users. bob encrypts his comment, M with the key he shares with trent. On recieving it trent carries out a blind signature on it and publishes it, as trent knows only bob has the shared key, K he knows bob said M but as it is a blind sigature and he is likely to be signing a lot of messages (trent is of course a computer program) he doesn`t know which message came from bob. Also Chaums group signatures could be used but unfortunately the arbitrator can find out who said what, but does not normally know. Also trent can forge digital signatures with this protocol. Chaum further mentions protocols for this sort of thing that do not even need an arbitrator but I don`t have the papers on this. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: cp850 iQCVAwUBMoyPCr5OPIRbv66xAQE6pQQAvs/NVY8s6Uid186CAQf8Q+iZucYtzRM7 iNjR0RkiNMnYACgHG0NO9UfkPgKGdomMQrGJFubH9O2/fnbMAIGZh8gv+k9P7iYl 5lMfCtCQe4AgeCyS2YRLMEYQiI6MAqWn4HoTzA58gWRbtOHeIZNpw/vc/hTqBbA7 3sDsOGYqqCk= =kiS8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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