December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

KRF_eat
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A roundup of press reports on GAK: "IBM, other firms, in data encryption alliance" The consortium was initiated by IBM. "Export controls are a fact of life," said Jim Bidzos. "U.S. To Loosen Computer Code Restrictions" "It's wrongheaded, and it's going backward," Peter Harter, at Netscape, said. "U.S. Export of High-Tech Devices Planned" CDT's Danny Weitzner said U.S. companies' and citizens' encrypted communications sent over the Internet could be vulnerable to "improper foreign government access." The administration doesn't want that to happen and is working with major trading partners and other countries to adopt plans that are consistent with the U.S. plan and to expedite electronic key recovery by law enforcement, the CIA's Deutch said. "IT Execs, Lawmakers Reactions Mixed on Encryption Plan" Rick Cardona, a security technology engineer at security software maker TradeWave Corp., said the law doesn't go far enough. "I think this is part of a trend. It's only a matter of time before the government will allow exports of 128-bit key software." "NCR Corp. Joins Alliance To Develop Exportable, Worldwide Strong Encryption " "We also look forward to the rapid movement of the work of the alliance into an established standards- based consortium body." "TradeWave meets new government data encryption requirements" Although other Internet software security companies have announced their intention to support this new key-recovery requirement, no other Internet Web security software company currently offers this service to its customers besides TradeWave. TradeWave's current customers, which include over 350 electric power companies representing over 70% of the electric power industry, are using the TradeVPI software and services which include this key recovery feature. ----- http://jya.com/krfeat.txt (22 kb for 6) ftp://jya.com/pub/incoming/krfeat.txt KRF_eat

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Re: Fw: Re: ITAR satellite provision
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:09 PM 10/4/96 +0000, The Deviant wrote: >On Thu, 3 Oct 1996, Black Unicorn wrote: >[...] >> "A launch vehicle or payload shall not, by reason of the launching of such >> vehicle, be considered an export for purposes of this subchapter." >> >> Focus on "by reason of launching of such vehicle," >> >> Launching a vehicle alone is not export. It takes more than launch to >> make it an export. More than the launching is not much. >[...] >> -- >> I hate lightning - finger for public key - Vote Monarchist >> unicorn(a)schloss.li >> > >So.. if I were to take PGP, put it on a floppy disk, tape it to a model >rocket, and launch it across the mexican border, that's not exporting it >(although the FAA might complain)? That's _my_ interpretation. I look at it this way: Missile launches can 1. Return to the country of origin. 2. Splash down in International waters. 3. land on foreign soil. 4. Orbit for awhile and land "somewhere." 5. Orbit essentially forever. 6. Go somewhere in space other than an earth orbit. All this stuff is obvious to the people who wrote the regulation. In addition, it is not necessarily certain which of these outcomes will occur in any given launch. The terminology in the rule above does not distinguish any of these outcomes. In the absense of further clarification, it is logical to conclude that which particular route the missile subsequently takes is irrelevant to the applicability of the exception. This is particularly true, since the writers of that regulation were free to add clarification should they have chosen to do so. Further, that they DIDN'T "clarify" is logical, because if the outcome of any given missile may be uncertain, and assuming that this regulation was written as a mutual-suck-up maneuver between government and industry, it is reasonable to assume that the regulation would be interpretated to immunize the launcher regardless of the launch's outcome. One can reasonably suppose that Rockwell wouldn't want to be declared in violation of ITAR simply because the second stage of a rocket failed and dropped a crypto-carrying satellite onto China. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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ABA Likes GAK
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

10-03-96 at 19:09 EDT, American Banker Banks Like Export Plan for High-Power Encryption By Drew Clark ----- "Banks have really taken a leadership role in the responsible management of cryptography," said a senior Clinton administration official who asked not to be named. "Banks are already doing what we want other organizations to do: safeguarding their keys and providing them, when necessary, to law enforcement." "Providing 56-bit encryption with key recovery doesn't help us," said Netscape spokeswoman Chris Holton. "The government is saying that you can export it but you have to provide us with the keys. We feel that is extortion on the part of the government." "We are making the best of a bad situation," said Scott Schnell, vice president of marketing for RSA Data Security. ----- Bank technology experts have reacted favorably to the Clinton administration's proposal to liberalize the development and sale of strong data security tools. This week, the government said it would lift export restrictions on certain kinds of cryptography, provided U.S. companies agree to cooperate with a procedure that would give law enforcement officials access to the "keys" of such codes, upon presentation of a warrant. Banks were heartened by the announcement because many view the widely used Data Encryption Standard - a low-level form of data scrambling - as inadequate protection against the rising computer power of so-called hackers. Though banks can use a complex 56-bit data encryption key for financial transactions, sensitive communications with overseas branches are limited to a less powerful 40-bit standard. Banks hope that a loosening of restrictions in general will benefit them, too. "This policy announcement is better than anyone expected," said Kawika M. Daguio, federal representative at the American Bankers Association in Washington. "It is gravy for us, but it's the meat and potatoes for the hardware and software industries." "Banks probably won't be adversely affected," said Stewart A. Baker, a partner at Steptoe & Johnson, a Washington law firm, "and they will be left pretty much where they were before." The announcement by Vice President Al Gore said that controls over powerful encryption technology would be lifted as the government and private sector develop a "key recovery" system. (International Business Machines Corp. already has stepped forward to head a consortium dedicated to creating such a system.) Current law forbids the export of computer hardware or software that uses cryptographic codes with digital "keys" - randomly generated combinations of 0's and 1's - longer than 40 bits. The longer the key length, the more impenetrable the code. For three years, the government has said it would permit the general use of more complex cryptography only if the companies using it placed their keys in the hands of the government or a third party. "Key escrow," as it is known in the technical community, is needed in order to prosecute people who have stored evidence of illegal activity on the hard drive of a computer, officials argued. But the private sector - banks included - have balked at handing over such access to any third party. The disagreement gave rise to a compromise system known as "key recovery" in which companies would hold their own keys but could be required to divulge certain information about specific transactions when presented with a court order or warrant. "What is novel is that it doesn't escrow any keys," said Homayoon Tajalli, executive vice president of Trusted Information Systems, Glenwood, Md., one of IBM's consortium partners. "If the government comes and gets this data with a court order," explained Mr. Tajalli, "then they take a digital lockbox from the third party or parties that hold it, and they read the message." Kathy Kincaid, director of information technology for IBM, said the difference between key escrow and key recovery is analogous to the following approach to securing a house when its owner goes on vacation: Instead of giving a key to two neighbors, the owner gives each neighbor half the combination to a lockbox that holds the key. "You must have both halves and put them together in exactly the right sequence," said Ms. Kincaid. "This provides protection against a single point of attack." Companies participating in development of key recovery systems include: Apple Computer Inc., Digital Equipment Corp., Groupe Bull, Hewlett-Packard Co., NCR Corp., RSA Data Security, Sun Microsystems Inc., Trusted Information Systems, and United Parcel Service. And a government official said banks may even play a role. "Banks have really taken a leadership role in the responsible management of cryptography," said a senior Clinton administration official who asked not to be named. "Banks are already doing what we want other organizations to do: safeguarding their keys and providing them, when necessary, to law enforcement." Heidi Kukis, a spokeswoman for Vice President Gore, said: "This key recovery system is the proper balance between commercial interests and national security." But not all agree. Some argue that the key recovery system still gives the government too much control over information flow. "Providing 56-bit encryption with key recovery doesn't help us," said Netscape spokeswoman Chris Holton. "The government is saying that you can export it but you have to provide us with the keys. We feel that is extortion on the part of the government." "We are making the best of a bad situation," said Scott Schnell, vice president of marketing for RSA Data Security. "The bottom line is that the standard proposed by the government is an insubstantial step in the right direction," he said. "We want to make sure it is usable and prepare for the day that products will be available that do not have this key recovery situation." The government's announcement came three months after a National Research Council report on the role of cryptography in an information-oriented society. The report encouraged liberalization of government standards and questioned the feasibility of the key escrow system then favored by government. "We raised the issue about the security of key escrow systems," said law professor Kenneth W. Dam, chairman of the body that prepared the report, "and we said the government should work on it." "I take it this is an attempt to move in the way of key escrow, with the help of industry," said Mr. Dam. [End]

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[COMMENT][GAK] "GAK from KRAP"
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1) Thanks to Phil Zimmerman the world already has "Pretty Good Privacy." 2) Only an idiot, much less one of the 4 Horsemen would get caught using GAK from KRAP. 3) As the FOIA obtained documents from the Clipper I era indicated, the gubmint knows the only way to make this work is to ban other forms of encryption. 4) That and that alone would be "The Shot Heard 'Round the Net." Brian

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Re: MacGAK: Tim has a snit. Again.
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:30 AM 10/4/96 -0400, Robert Hettinga wrote: >It's interesting to note that the only person who is supposed to be in your >killfile is Perry Metzger, even though you respond to him anyway, >especially when he says something which offends your vanity. So, such a >killfiling claim is probably dubious. Since such luminaries as VZNuri, Dr. >Vulis, and Jim Bell are *not* in your killfile, evidenced by your >voluminous replies to them, Aw, C'mon Bob! I resent being placed in the same short list as Nuri and Vulis. While some people may consider my ideas to be similarly wacky, I try to not be NEARLY as rude as those other guys (singular?). Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: (Firewalls) Where is that Snake Oil FAQ again?
by Lou Zirko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: adam(a)homeport.org, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Fri Oct 04 18:15:25 1996 This is the same company that made the claim earlier on this list to "break our code and own the company for $1". It definately generated a lot of comments then, I think about six months ago. They changed their name to IPG midway through the process. This should be in the archives. Sorry about the late response to this but I have been unavailable for the last four days working on a project and am just beginning to catch up on sleep and mail. Lou Zirko Lou Zirko (502)383-2175 Zystems lzirko(a)c2.org "We're all bozos on this bus" - Nick Danger, Third Eye -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 iQEVAwUBMlWamctPRTNbb5z9AQGoAggAngPrYPYCOp+53BZ3Ns0XJtsI6O/PqUzQ sbxzpROa/blx9O3e1zIxbxPk1+aQcEwUXsnfFbDnciAjouaSnRzIfKG9XJ+cOy5y XRaLzBgZ3lQr3fIp7mHv5n+nsdtrj8mdgmUxYXpO9q+MwTuGL54n12Qw23rJ4KMq TSkBSgJWeqr7Mf1X2bI8ejaIbgImv9dCNFXIF+mUpKea2rarGej7lM1NOFd5FuyT umaFeOcH05pcmC8sYmaabe5i9kmDXztCiGaCD3O101a7JoIh8GOCNjg7blo7q/lZ rw77jyYpsI+3Ra67jWOMRK3p3WeBq9K8XqpP0b0Wo02R5nU1w5UnjQ== =eT3d -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Did HP get a sweetheart deal, too?
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ditto ... I expect Apple and the rest of the "gang" to announce something soon. Ern -------- From: San Jose Mercury (Breaking News) Hewlett-Packard wins $100 million NASA deals PALO ALTO, Calif. (Reuter) - Hewlett-Packard Co. said Friday that it won several contracts with a potential value of $100 million from the National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA). The contracts cover scientific and engineering workstation procurement contracts for mechanical computer-aided design and geographic information systems. The contracts cover a four year period. Hewlett-Packard will provide workstations, as well as peripherals, software, training and support services.

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Sun's GAK position
by Frank Stuart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I haven't been able to find a position statemnet from Sun Microsystems about the new GAK plan, but it looks like I did find a position. This is from "http://www.sun.com/corporateoverview/CorporateEmployment/LISTINGDIR/JobDeta…": >Created on Oct 01 1996 06:01. To return to: Employment Opportunities Home >Page. >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >Sun Employment Req#: AUF971004 > >SUMMARY > >Descriptive Title: System Engineer >Skills: Security & Cryptography Exp. >Functional Area: Engineering: Engineering >Location: Vienna, VA > >DESCRIPTION > >Extensive Security and Cryptography knowledge and skills, ability to >authoratatively present and advocatae security technologies at technical and >public policy levels, confidence and skill at writing and presenting >security documents and presentations. specific knowledge of government >security requirements. A US Government Top Secret SCI and potentially other >clearances will be necessary for this position. >The position of Principal Architect for Security and Networks requires an >individual with the following levels of education, experience and >specialized knowledge. A masters degree in a computer related field or a >bachelors degree in a computer technology and a masters degree in a business >oriented discipline is required. A minimum of twelve years of directly >related experience in computers, computer security and mission critical >systems design, and deployment is also required. Credit for four years >experience may be granted for a candidate with a masters degree in computer >science or computer security. Up to six years experience can be credited for >a PHD in somputer security. The condidate needs experience and >specializedknowledge in the areas of: >Government Security Requirementes, NSA MISSI and DoD DMS programs, Public >policy issues of cryptography and Key Escrow, Current workstation and server >hardware, Trends in network and systems security, Analysis of competing >security products and technologies. Hands-on experience with installing and >configuring computer hardward, Sun's product offerings in the security >arena, NCSC and Common Criteria evaluaations of trusted systems. Export >controls as they apply to encryption and security products. >To be successful in the position the candidatae must be able and willing to >write short analytical papers and long research documents. The position also >requires short notice or extemporaneous presentations on security, >technology and Sun specific subjects to groups of one to two hundred >customers or industry professionals. >A successful candidate must be capable of presenting themselves in an >authoritative fashion on many aspects of security in order to influence >product development in directions advantageous to Sun Federal. the candidate >must also be comfortable and confident when representing Sun and Sun Federal >in government and industry standards bodies and technology forums. >To be successful the candidate must be able to develop, define and >articulate a security vision and to develop support both within and external >to Sun for necessary technological and procedural changes necessary to >accomplish that vision. The condidate must either hold or be capable of >receiving US Government Security Clearances for Top Secret and Special >Compartmented Information. These clearances may require a CI Polygraph test. >This position will be locate in Vienna, VA and report to the Sun Federal >Director of Systems Engineering. >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >CONTACT: >Employment Agency resumes referred to this posting are considered >unsolicited; Sun does not accept unsolicted resumes. >To apply, please reference the requisition number of AUF971004 and email, >fax or mail your resume, attention Recruiter: Staffing45/OWSMI96, using: > > * Resume Submittal Form > * Email alias: Staffing45(a)bruin.corp.Sun.COM [ASCII ONLY, PLEASE] > * Fax number: 630-285-8177 > * Mail Address: > Sun Microsystems, Inc. > 2550 Garcia Avenue > Mountain View, CA 94043-1100 > Mail Stop: UITA01 > >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >Employment Opportunities at Sun > >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | (Douglas) Hofstadter's Law: | It always takes longer than you expect, even Frank Stuart | when you take into account Hofstadter's Law.

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Re: The Right to Keep and Bear Crypto
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Why is it "disturbing" that for administrative convenience a regulation >uses a shorthand term (in effect saying "treat crypto as if it was a >munition"), but that the courts say whatever convenient shorthand you use >for regulatory bookkeeping, it has no constitutional effect? > >What would be the advantage of having the government simply re-impose the >ITAR word for word identically for all materials that are not arms in the >constitutional sense? I guess this is the crux of the matter. I believe that most or all of ITAR's munitions should be constitutionally as arms. > >As for your argument that the 2nd Am should be read expansively, rather >than narrowly, personally I doubt strongly that the Framers would have >been unanimous on this. I doubt they were unanimous on most any issue. >Recall that the Articles of Confederation were >abandoned in part due to Shay's rebellion -- and the (majority) >Federalists (of whom the Jefferson you quote WAS NOT a part) managed to >push through a strong centralizing government. Yep, when they saw that some of the principles which help fuel the Revolution could be used to oppose a new order they adopted some of the same tactics and governmental view points of their former oppressors. The original calls for strong states rights and a weak central authority were swept away under Hamilton and early Supreme Court rulings. In some sense, the new government became just different clothing on the same old body. >Recall that the >constitution in its first draft didn't even have a bill of rights! I am >absolutely certain that the Framers recognized that things change over >time, and that they would have intended indeed did intend for us to >interpret the constitution with some degree -- but not too much -- >flexibility. As someone who believes in the importance of fidelity to >legal texts, I think we have a duty to make every word in the Constitution >count. I therefore place weight on the fact that the 2nd amendment is >*unique* in giving the policy reason for the limitation on government >power ("a well-regulated militia" being essential &tc.). This is ample >grounds to read the text as applying only in the context of an organized >militia -- not casual gun ownership -- **whether or not** this complies >with our best (and inevitably fallible) reconstruction of what certain >historical individuals may have thought the text meant, especially if the >historical evidence is mixed. [The Constitution preserves] the advantage of being armed which Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation [where] the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms. --James Madison The Federalist No. 46, 1787 >[PS. Why do you privilege the authors of the bill of rights over the >people who voted for it?] Many of the framers, their mentors (e.g., Machiavelli) and even dyed-in-the-wool pacificists (e.g., Mahatma Gandhi) feared a central authority which, after making arms unavailable to general population would commence to tyranny. If I did I appologize. It was not intentional. > >I might add that I personally find all discussions of plots to kill >people, or to watch gleefully while others seek to do so, so morally >repulsive that I now killfile everyone who takes part in them. I hope that includes all comuniques from our government's Executive branch (although they almost never discuss these things publitically, with the possible exception of our raid on Kadaffi). How about the popular U.S. consensus that the government aught to have killed Saddam? Seems to me that some of the natural rights the people gave the government need to be taken back (such as the perogative for personal actions affecting those outside the U.S.) Though I doubt that the government would ever allow it. Why should the government call all the foreign policy shots and have all the fun? Especially when you see what a poor track record they have. Seems they should step aside for while and let some direct democracy go to work for a change. Thanks for your informative responses. I don't expect a reply as you've undoubtedly placed me in your kill file (as some other may have already). -- Steve

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[Books] Kahn's *The Code Breakers*
by stainles＠bga.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- My room-mate just brought me the latest catalog from Uncle Hugo's Science Fiction Bookstore & Uncle Edgar's Mystery Bookstore. The updated edition of Kahn's *The Code Breakers* is listed as being expected by mid-November, with a cover price of $65. (No publisher listed.) Hugo's can be reached at 612-824-6347, or unclehugo(a)aol.com. No connection except as a satisfied customer. ==Dwight -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6ui iQCVAgUBMlW+rYY4AzhdF11FAQEfzwP5AXP/63of9MPefzguLX5n9byRVUPcXOKT cYJNdTGe9ErVb6skDNN7e4PiwlZPSV03OFgntsp9CBFed+2AN/d+EFI3kNyFWQ5p fwEZ2u6VYINaQ0PhYaxneoMrxa+U8gnB5PZ8sa/Pwq4hhf6XxcOk7vUwKsLPQmeX 2KBLVLKeWj8= =f5D5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Fw: Re: ITAR satellite provision
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:09 PM 10/4/96 +0000, The Deviant wrote: >So.. if I were to take PGP, put it on a floppy disk, tape it to a model >rocket, and launch it across the mexican border, that's not exporting it >(although the FAA might complain)? As I read the regs, it's not an export at the moment it's launched, but it's almost certainly an export when it reaches Mexican airspace or when it touches Mexican soil. The "rocket exception" is not useful vis-a-vis crypto. Period. I'm very sorry I ever had anything to do with this thread and I'm not posting about it again. -- Greg Broiles | "We pretend to be their friends, gbroiles(a)netbox.com | but they fuck with our heads." http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | |

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Re: legality of wiretapping: a "key" distinction
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:10 PM 10/4/96 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >>It didn't have to be this way. The SC might simply have said that wiretap >>warrants must follow the same rules all other warrants followed, meaning >>that the target is informed of the tap when it is placed. Sure, the police >>would howl, complaining that they'll never hear anything "useful" if the >>target is informed, but then again, the Constitution cannot guarantee that >>any particular search would achieve its intended results. > >but then again, if "we the people" didn't challenge a usurpation of >our rights when it happened, something's wrong here. I've read references to polls which repeatedly show that well over 60% of the public is opposed to wiretaps, period. But no, I'm under no illusion that even a legal challenge would be respected. > hence my >opinion that wiretapping should be challenged in court. Well, I agree it should be challenged, but if anything my point is that the reason it wasn't challenged was the fact that wiretap targets are never given the opportunity. (Note for the clueless out there: An after-the-fact challenge doesn't count. Apparently, "non-incriminating" wiretaps are essentially never announced to the victim...er...target. And judges are sufficiently biased, gutless, and brainless that they almost never throw out the _incriminating_ results of a wiretap warrant. THis is for the same reason Judge Ito didn't throw out the evidence the four crooked detectives got in OJ's house, after jumping the fence without a warrant, claiming that they were afraid somebody was in danger inside. As I'm fond of saying, "Fuhrman pretended to tell the truth, and Ito pretended to believe him.") >>Are police entitled to use thumbscrews if simply asking a question won't get >>the "right" answer"? I don't think so. > >very poor analogy. a rhetorical loser imho characterisitic of >painting the issue in terms of extremism. wiretapping doesn't involve >any physical pain to the surveilled. also it is barely analogous >to "search and seizure" in that there is nothing physical being >seized. (just playing the devil's advocate here) No, not at all. The point is that acknowledged illegal tactics (remember, wiretaps were illegal before 1968, but they were done!) may be unquestionably "useful," but that doesn't mean that they are acceptable. If anything, the fact that cops would use illegal tactics proves that they aren't very good judges of what tactics are appropriate. Furthermore, the fact that telephone companies ALLOWED cops to do illegal wiretaps before 1968 (and even assisted them) proves that you can't depend on them to limit these tactics to reasonable limits. >>One thing that was very important to those who wrote the US Constitution was >>the sanctity of contracts. > >well, if the person entered in a contract with their phone company >to provide protected communications, maybe you'd have a case there. >in fact such a thing is not such a bad idea. Since up until now people have not had a choice, I think it's appropriate to assume that every telephone customer would have been entitled to insist on an anti-wiretap clause, and got it. >>As I understand it, there is a principle in law that all affected parties to >>a dispute must be included in a proceeding. (To ensure that each can protect >>his own rights.) Obviously, targets of wiretaps have not been informed, and >>thus can't possibly have been included. > >on the other hand, there are clear laws that say you can't withhold >evidence. That's misleading. If a cop wants in your house to collect evidence but he doesn't have a warrant, not letting him in is "withholding evidence." But that's obviously okay. So you need to qualify that claim. >>While I'm sure that I will be corrected if this is wrong, somehow I doubt >>whether there has EVER been a "before-the-fact", full challenge of a wiretap >>order _including_ representation for the target of the wiretap. Further, I >>also doubt whether there is frequently ANY SORT of challenge to a wiretap >>by a telephone company, even when the target was not informed. Quite >>simply, the telephone company does not consider itself to be in the business >>of protecting the rights of its customers! And without real challenges, >>there can be no presumed validity to such warrants. > >no, you have it backwards; without real challenges, there >is no validity to anyone trying to defeat the status quo. That depends on whose burden of proof you think it is. Since: 1. Wiretaps were done illegally before 1968, demonstrating that the people involved (cops, government officials) don't think they have to obey the law anyway. This should destroy any presumption on your part that wiretaps are constitutional, because those people are the main ones pushing wiretaps. 2. 60% of the public opposes wiretaps, period. (I think it's arguable that if most of the public decides that society should do without wiretaps, they are entitled to do this. Otherwise, "Who's country is it?") 3. Wiretaps do not resemble ordinary searches, because the target is not informed, and he's not given a chance to challenge them. 4. Wiretaps have "never" been adequately challenged, precisely because the only outside people who know about them have no motivation to do them. (Primarily telephone companies.) I'd say the bulk of the evidence is that the legal system accepts wiretaps simply as a convenience, without genuinely believing that they are constitutional. > >[bernstein, etc] >>Since it has always been legal to use encryption (in the US), they're really >>not "challenging the cryptographic status quo." > >no, ITAR has been around a long time and they are challenging it. you're >mixing up the issue. No, YOU'RE mixing it up. _DOMESTIC_ wiretaps are being compared with DOMESTIC use of encryption. ITAR says nothing about wiretaps. The government is pushing Clipper et al based primarily on domestic wiretap issues. >>I don't know about you, but somehow I'm past the idea that it's possible to >>reliably get unbiased justice in court. Know what I mean? > >ah yes, we revert to the basic cypherpunk nihilist position oft repeated >by lucky green, tcmay etc-- "essentially, we're screwed" Not really. It's just that when there's enough evidence of dishonesty already in the treatment of this issue in the courts, there is no reason to presume that the right decision will be reached in the future. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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RE: DESCrack keyspace partitioning
by James A. Tunnicliffe 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>geeman@best.com[SMTP:geeman@best.com] writes: >Another thinking step: most real-world DES keys are derived from hashes. >Not (P)RNGs. >The distributions are **not** uniform. Oh?? >I am talking about FAMILIES of predictable bit patterns in keys, not any >specific pattern. >I'm doing the stats. [...snip...] If you've discovered significant biases in MD5, or some other crypto-strength hash, that could be exploited to speed a keyspace search, that would be newsworthy indeed. I'm skeptical, but please share your results with us. [For context, Mike McNally wrote, in part] >[...] a good >32-bit CSPRNG has only a 1/2^32 chance of producing any particular >bit pattern. Of course, another way of saying that is that it's just >as likely to get an "obvious" bit pattern as it is to get any other >one. You can't just throw away part of the keyspace based on such >bogus reasoning. (There may be other reasons to throw away part of >the keyspace, of course.) Tunny ====================================================================== James A. Tunnicliffe | WWWeb: http://www.inference.com/~tunny Inference Corporation | PGP Fingerprint: CA 23 E2 F3 AC 2D 0C 77 tunny(a)Inference.com | 36 07 D9 33 3D 32 53 9C ======================================================================

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ironic, no?
by nobody＠zifi.genetics.utah.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Dr." Vulis - KOTM whines: >What is the crypto-relevance of the above-quoted passage? what is the irony-factor in the above statement?

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Ignorance
by Santoyo, Felipe 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The topics inwhich are discussed here are interesting to say the least, but I need to be brought up to speed. So if anyone could help with this or suggest so good sources of information on this subject I would more than appreciate it. Thanks! Feshnicad(a)petersenpub.com

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The lesser-known presidential candidates' views
by travel23＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Article carried by the A.P.] Campaigning mostly in obscurity, these lesser-known men and one woman, have managed to get their names on most if not all 50 state ballots. Here they are: Harry Browne, Libertarian Party: A best-selling investment writer, he's on the ballot in all 50 states. He says the Libertarians ``believe in individual liberty, personal responsibility and freedom from government.'' The party seeks to end income tax and ``to reduce government to the absolute minimum possible.'' Browne, 63, opposes Internet censorship and supports a repeal of the assault weapons ban. The Libertarians have been around for about a quarter of a century. Their platform includes proposals to deregulate the health-care industry, privatize Medicare and Medicaid and legalize drugs. Ralph Nader, Green Party: Primary concerns are environmental, but Nader has long fought against large corporations in the role of consumer advocate. Nader's name is on 21 state ballots. The party hopes to increase that number to 30 and to encourage write-in campaigns in the remaining states. Nader, 62, plans to use his candidacy as the catalyst for starting an ``aggressive political force for the future.'' He says the two major parties have become so similar in their views that voters are left with little choice. When Nader was nominated to head the Green Party ticket, he said, ``It's time this country has a political alternative -- a progressive mainstream that defends consumers and workers against corporate welfare.'' John Hagelin, Natural Law Party: On the ballot in 47 states -- and still trying in New Hampshire, Georgia and Oklahoma -- the Natural Law Party hopes to ``bring the light of science into politics.'' Its platform includes prevention-oriented health care, renewable energy and sustainable agriculture without pesticides. The party also wants a cost-effective government with a safety net that promotes well-being, including a 10 percent flat tax by 2002. Hagelin, 42, is a Harvard-educated physics professor and one of the party's founders. In 1992 he garnered less than 40,000 votes. The Natural Law Party advocates transcendental meditation, contending it can lower the crime rate by setting up meditation groups in prisons, and can serve as a foreign policy tool by supporting groups who practice it in other countries. Howard Phillips, U.S. Taxpayers Party: Hopes to restore American jurisprudence to its ``heritage of biblical liberty,'' abolish the Internal Revenue Service and eliminate federal income taxes, capital gains taxes and inheritance taxes. Phillips' party also supports ending legalized abortion and reducing ``the reach, the grasp and take of the federal government.'' The party platform says that while the United States should be a friend to liberty everywhere, it should only invest and fight to guarantee it for the United States. Phillips, 55, supports dismantling the Education, Housing and Urban Development departments and end government support of the arts. He is on the ballot in about 40 states. Monica Moorehead, Workers World Party: Calls for tripling the minimum wage, making polluters pay for a clean environment, furthering affirmative action and ensuring equal rights for women, lesbians, gays and bisexuals. The party supports big cuts in military spending. Moorehead's party, which is on the ballot in 12 states, believes the election is dominated by the rich and considers the Workers World Party campaign an opportunity to bring working-class politics to a broad audience. It is opposed to capitalism, advocating socialism instead. Moorehead, 44, has been a leader in the party since 1979. James Harris, Socialist Workers Party: Stands for ``the struggles of the oppressed and exploited against the increasingly brutal assault by the wealthy minority the world over,'' according to the party platform. The Socialist Workers Party supports the right of Cuba to defend its sovereignty. Harris, 48, a former meatpacker in Atlanta, is on about 10 ballots. Harris criticizes the government's response to black church burnings, airline safety and labor unions. The Socialist Workers Party accuses the major presidential candidates of continuing ``their war preparations in response to the increasing world disorder, using threats or military force from Cuba to Liberia, from China to Korea, and by backing the Israeli regime's brutal assault on Lebanon.''

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Re: legality of wiretapping: a "key" distinction
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:04 PM 10/4/96 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: > >reponses to my last post were very illuminating and >interesting, and one key point by someone-or-other >caught my attention. > >he made the distinction of "search and seizure" made with >the knowledge of the person involved, and "search and >seizure" such as wiretapping done without the knowledge >of the person surveilled. > >if one were to try to say that wiretapping was unconstitutional, >it seems one would have to define why it is an *unreasonable* >kind of search and seizure. and this distinction might be a >great, prime candidate: because the participant is *unaware* >of the "seizure," there is too great a potential for abuse. I've been saying this for years! I think that one of the most telling arguments is that the main (if not the only!) reason that wiretaps are kept secret is that, for obvious technical reasons, they CAN BE kept secret! Pardon me for being facetious, but I see no principle in the Constitution that states "Anything the government can get away with is okay," so I think it's predictable that wiretap law would be constitutionally defective. If wiretaps had been somehow impossible to accomplish secretly, nobody today would believe that secrecy was somehow allowable! It didn't have to be this way. The SC might simply have said that wiretap warrants must follow the same rules all other warrants followed, meaning that the target is informed of the tap when it is placed. Sure, the police would howl, complaining that they'll never hear anything "useful" if the target is informed, but then again, the Constitution cannot guarantee that any particular search would achieve its intended results. Are police entitled to use thumbscrews if simply asking a question won't get the "right" answer"? I don't think so. >it seems to me many people's fears here boil down to this >fear of the government surveilling them without their knowledge, >of them being denied the right to choose to be in contempt of >court and reject handing over information when presented with >a warrant/subpoena. (is this a right? is it being broken by surreptitious >surveillance?) One thing that was very important to those who wrote the US Constitution was the sanctity of contracts. The idea was, presumably, that any citizen should be entitled to enter into agreements with others without fearing that the terms of those contracts would be abused/changed by the government. (assuming those terms were legal.) By its very nature, a (secret) wiretap warrant violates the right of a person to CHALLENGE the warrant, and it also requires the other person (telephone company?) to break what is or should be an implied right of user to private communications. >I am really amazed that there isn't much case law on wiretaps, which >have been around a long time. at least it is rarely quoted here. >what exactly is a legal wiretap? has anyone challenged the fundamental >authority of the government in making wiretaps in which subjects >are unaware of the metaphorical "search and seizure" going on? I think it's really very simple. Wiretaps in the US were illegal until 1968. Congress had repeatedly refused to authorize them, although they were done anyway but were not admissible in court. (proving that the same kind of people who will tell you wiretaps are "reasonable" apparently think it's "reasonable" to break the law for their own goals...) 1968 was a time of great (and well-justified!) turmoil in the country. And prior to and subsequent to 1968, until about 1983, telephone service (both local and LD) were monopolized, so the only entity which was aware of those wiretaps and could thus challenge them had a non-arm's-length relationship with the US Government. Even subsequent to 1983, local service is still monopolized, although that will shortly change. (This monopoly status has helped confuse the issue, because being a monoply a telephone company must deal with the government and is dependant on it, and morever a customer is not entitled to "shop around" for a more trustworthy source of phone service.) As I understand it, there is a principle in law that all affected parties to a dispute must be included in a proceeding. (To ensure that each can protect his own rights.) Obviously, targets of wiretaps have not been informed, and thus can't possibly have been included. There is, therefore, no reason to believe that the rights of wiretap-targets have been protected, and further it seems apparent that any relevant precedents which have been set in the wiretap era cannot be considered Constitutionally valid. Of course, some lawyers (who have been trained to accept the status quo with little or no challenge) will disagree! However, those same lawyers would have accepted the Dred Scott decision without question, Plessy vs. Fergusen, etc. While I'm sure that I will be corrected if this is wrong, somehow I doubt whether there has EVER been a "before-the-fact", full challenge of a wiretap order _including_ representation for the target of the wiretap. Further, I also doubt whether there is frequently ANY SORT of challenge to a wiretap by a telephone company, even when the target was not informed. Quite simply, the telephone company does not consider itself to be in the business of protecting the rights of its customers! And without real challenges, there can be no presumed validity to such warrants. >recent Bernstein and Junger cases are going to be fantastic milestones >in our legal system for challenging the cryptographic status quo. >I wonder if cpunks might be interested in challenging the >wiretap status quo!! it would seem like the first logical step. Since it has always been legal to use encryption (in the US), they're really not "challenging the cryptographic status quo." Rather, they are trying prevent the "cryptographic status quo" from being CHANGED to match the desires of the government. (naturally, the government tries to misrepresent this...) The government uses phrases like, "preserving law-enforcement access," implying that they're somehow maintaining the status quo, when they're actually trying to change it. What's changing now (for engineering reasons) is the practicality of encryption (actually, the expense!), not the legality. The government wants to change the law, in order to make illegal what was previously impractical. >the FBI has often said they don't want to expand their powers in >wiretapping areas. but are those powers they have right now legitimate? >if they are not, as many here seem to argue, >then they ought to be challenged in court ala the one-man-guerilla >attacks like Bernstein and Junger. (any takers? <g>) I don't know about you, but somehow I'm past the idea that it's possible to reliably get unbiased justice in court. Know what I mean? Even so, if there's one thing we need, it's a challenge to ensure that the "fully-caved-in" telephone companies precedent doesn't get automatically assumed valid for ISP wiretap orders. >anyway, I propose that cpunks try to collect all the minutia in the >case law about wiretaps and try to make the case that wiretapping >that the FBI has enjoyed is itself not legitimate, and therefore >any extension of it (such as Clipper) is also illegitimate. I like the first part of your comment, but let there be no illusion that failure to get the government thugs to admit that wiretapping is unconstitutional (per se or as done) somehow means that Clipper is legitimate. >more and more I wonder if this is one of the key differences between >libertarian and spook bureacrat's views on GAK, key escrow, key >recovery (let us put it all under the heading "key access"). the >spooks seem to emphasize that they should be able to get access >to communications without giving anyone the opportunity to refuse >or possibly even know about such access. libertarians seem to >insist that this is a violation of privacy and due process etc. However, one doesn't have to be a libertarian to conclude that wiretap law is disjoint from the rest of search-warrant precedent. Fortunately, the advent of good encryption should (if it is allowed to) make wiretap law irrelevant. In a sense, technology will be fixing a legal error. (This fix would have been far quicker and cheaper if it had been accomplished using firearms, but that's another story.) >I think there may be a legitimate argument here that might have >legal merit that a reasonable "search and seizure" ought to >involve the knowledge of the participant, and that unreasonable >searches and seizures often do not. hence, wiretapping without >suspect agreement may be illegal? (in all the other ways that >evidence is obtained through warrants/subpoenas, one needs >the cooperation of the suspect?) Well, they don't technically need the "cooperation," but they are still required to inform the target. For example, if they get a search warrant for a house that happens to be empty when they show up, they are obligated to leave notice of the search and lists of what was taken. Apparently they need to do this EVEN IF they would have been able to get into the house surreptitiously without leaving any trace. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Speaker Position Filled
by se7en 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks for all who responded to my request for a speaker on Computer Security Disaster Prepardness. I have filled the position and have two alternates. se7en ------------------------------------------- I will be speaking in nine different states over the next nineteen days. I will not be reading my email while I am gone......se7en -------------------------------------------

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pumpcon info
by Moroni 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone have info on pumpcon for next month? If so please send it to me email. I am looking for the hotel and the exact dates. Also is it open invite? Thanks in Advance, moroni

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Re: anagrams
by ! Drive 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I generally use wordsmith(a)wordsmith.org Its preety quick! ---------- : Subject: anagrams : Date: Friday, October 04, 1996 7:42 PM : Fast(est?) anagram generator: : : ftp://suburbia.net/pub/proff/original/gan/an-0.93.tar.gz : (unix source and dos executable) : : : Some Anagrams Found Using an-0.92 : ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ : Free Software Foundation - I'd fan out tons of freeware! : National Security Agency - Lusty yearning at cocaine. : President Dole - Led despite Ron. : Central Intelligence Agency - Langley: Inelegant, eccentric. :

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RE: WINDOWS NT ????
by John Fricker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An NT machine running off the shelf protocols and services is certainly more secure than your average linux install. Of course clueless administrators for either (any) platform can leave the door wide open easily enough. But what do you mean by secure? >snow (snow(a)smoke.suba.com) said something about Re: WINDOWS NT ???? on or about 10/4/96 2:57 PM > >> pclow wrote: >> > Adamsc wrote: >> > > > is Windows NT secured system ? >> > NT? Secured? hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahhahahahahahahaha >> 8-) >> How ? > > By turning off the machine, unpluging the ethernet, moving the >hard drive to another state... > > >Petro, Christopher C. >petro(a)suba.com <prefered for any non-list stuff> >snow(a)smoke.suba.com >End of message

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Re: The New GAK-Clipper Thing will Fail
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:41 AM 10/4/96 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: >At 03:07 PM 10/3/96 -0800, jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> wrote: >>The point, of course, is NOT to encourage these companies to support Clipper >>IV. Rather, goal is to suggest to them a "poison pill" which would make >>their cooperation meaningless in the end, while at the same time giving them >>a 2-year free 56-bit export. Think of it as a monkey-wrench they can throw >>into the works. > >A really _fine_ post! I'm also impressed by the way they announced it >just _after_ Congress ended its session, while they're busy losing the export >level in court. There's an uncomfortable "tactics" problem, associated with my previous suggestions. To say something like, "we think you ought to change that GAK proposal by [fill in the blank]", at least IMPLIES that it will somehow be "acceptable" should that change be made. Well, to me, no GAK will ever be acceptable. Even so, I think it would still be tactically useful to help sabotaging GAK by "improving it to death." I start by assuming that most of the companies who signed onto the Axis ("alliance") would really have preferred to NOT see GAK, everything else being the same. They want the goodies; they don't want the shit. I think they should be approached by pointing this out, and suggesting that if they want to limit the negative publicity they'll surely get from this plan, while at the same time collecting the goodies the government is offering, they can conveniently and publicly "interpret" their rights broadly, announce that they'll structure their systems in the least government-friendly way possible. All this should be possible, because of the fact that this proposal isn't really even settled. In fact, it doesn't even ask the participants to show their plan immediately, merely after two years or so. Insisting that the government pay for all legal challenges is a good start, and refusing to do any GAK transfer without a court challenge. Another thing they could do is to insist that 56-bits of key always remain non-GAK. (perhaps increasing at the rate of two bits every three years.) This would make GAK essentially useless for that drift-net fishing that's often talked about, because even a sudden policy change forcing "key-escrow" people to give up all their keys will still make decrypting a message a pain. It would also make it easier to use super-encryption, because finding that needle in that 2**56 haystack would make it impossible to prove which particular decrypt contained a further-encrypted message: Even if super-encryption were outlawed, it would become essentially impossible to prove that none of the other (2**56)-1 messages were not some valid, non-super-encrypted message. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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RE: WINDOWS NT ????
by John Fricker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Bill Stewart (stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com) said something about Re: WINDOWS NT ???? on or about 10/4/96 7:44 AM >At 07:47 PM 10/3/96 +1030, you wrote: >>hi, >> is Windows NT secured system ? > >Windows 4.x moves the graphics/windowing system into Ring 0, >where the "secure" parts of the kernel are. Bad. >This means graphics bugs can make the kernel insecure or crash. >I don't trust it, especially because Windows 3.1 crashes all the time >for me, and stupid bugs make Windows 3.1 behave badly for me. >So if they put the window system in the kernel, I don't trust it. >End of message Graphics bugs will not crash the system since graphics bugs still run in protected mode. (ie bugs in applications that screw up GDI). Buggy video drivers though can bring the system down. But this does not affect security, only stability. Security in NT can be defeated by any clever, out of work, bored, NT device driver author who brews up a stealth device driver replacement (perhaps a COM port improvement) that could run amok on the file system or basically do anything. Of course, any clever device driver developer is making enough money to not be bored nor even consider writing a backdoor into a driver. Right? --j

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Tietmeyer-Only banks should issue electronic money
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm sure they'd like to have it "applied to Internet network money.".... > FRANKFURT, Oct 3 (Reuter) - Bundesbank President Hans >Tietmeyer said on Thursday a new government policy to give only >banks the right to issue pre-paid cards, or ``electronic purses'', >should also be applied to Internet network money. > Tietmeyer said in the text of a speech to The Economic Club >of New York that G-10 central bank governors were addressing the >new payment forms because they may cause difficulties for >central banks to ensure the integrity of payments. > Tietmeyer noted European Union central bankers have agreed >that only banks should issue the pre-paid cards. The policy is >expected to be widened to include the rights to create and >maintain Internet-based electronic cash systems. > ``In our opinion, the same should definitely also apply to >network money,'' he said. > Tietmeyer said electronic forms of money tend to crowd out >currency and deposit money, which may increase the potential for >credit institutions to create money. > ``Electronic money may impair the supervisory functions of >the central bank, or, in other words, its function of ensuring >the integrity of payments,'' Tietmeyer said in a text of the >speech released in Frankfurt under embargo. > ``That would increase the risk of crises in one country >spreading out to engulf payment systems worldwide,'' he said. > Electronic purses are plastic cards with a built-in >micro-chip which stores the electronic cash value of an account >and can be reloaded at special machines. > The proposal to restrict such projects to banks is part of a >new German banking law which is still under preparation but >expected to be enforced in 1997. > Tietmeyer said it was difficult to create definitive >regulations for electronic money at ``this early stage''. > ``The evolution of electronic money is only in its infancy. >But it is a characteristic feature of today's world that >tomorrow's world will be upon us in no time,'' he said. > Electronic purses, also known as smart cards, are not yet >available in cash-dominated Germany but tests are being run on >several projects. > Internet banking is slowly gaining credence in Germany after >some of the top banks, including Dresdner Bank AG, launched >securities trading accounts via the Internet. _______________________ Regards, He who foresees calamities suffers them twice over. -? Joseph Reagle http://rpcp.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu E0 D5 B2 05 B6 12 DA 65 BE 4D E3 C1 6A 66 25 4E

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[SPAM] More "fuckhead" e-mail from Timmy May and his young friends
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy May has no life. >From: Troy Varange <varange(a)crl.com> >Message-Id: <199610050215.AA00807(a)crl5.crl.com> >Subject: Re: [VULIS] >To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) >Date: Fri, 4 Oct 1996 19:15:36 -0700 (PDT) >In-Reply-To: <FV67uD8w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> from "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" at Oct 2, 96 08:29:14 pm >X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >Content-Length: 7527 > >> >> I have no dog, nor any other pets. Timmy May (fart) reportedly has two cats. >> If you suspect that Timmy May (fart) sexually abuses his cats, or any other >> animals, you should promptly contact the ASPCA and also alert rec.pets.cats. >> >> (Frankly, I doubt that the old fart can get his dick up to sexually abuse >> anything, including his cats. Senility puts an end to sexual molestation.) >> >> >From: Troy Varange <varange(a)crl.com> >> >Message-Id: <199610021931.AA24883(a)crl11.crl.com> >> >Subject: Important >> >To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) >> >Date: Wed, 2 Oct 1996 12:31:21 -0700 (PDT) >> >In-Reply-To: <gqH3uD93w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> from "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" at Sep 30, 96 07:57:27 am >> >X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] >> >Mime-Version: 1.0 >> >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII >> >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >> >Content-Length: 6226 >> > >> >Dr. Vulis sucks his dog's butt. >> > >> >> Timmy May has no life. >> >> >> >> >From: Troy Varange <varange(a)crl.com> >> >> >Message-Id: <199609300441.AA10704(a)crl12.crl.com> >> >> >Subject: Re: Vulis FUCKHEAD sucks Timmy's Cock >> >> >To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) >> >> >Date: Sun, 29 Sep 1996 21:41:42 -0700 (PDT) >> >> >In-Reply-To: <LJV2uD91w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> from "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" at Sep 29, 96 11:58:09 pm >> >> >X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] >> >> >Mime-Version: 1.0 >> >> >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII >> >> >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >> >> >Content-Length: 5298 >> >> > >> >> >Vulis sucks Timmy's boyfriend's cock. >> >> >> >> >> >> Timmy May has no life. >> >> >> >> >> >> >From: Troy Varange <varange(a)crl.com> >> >> >> >Message-Id: <199609300332.AA09870(a)crl12.crl.com> >> >> >> >Subject: Re: [SPAM] More "fuckhead" fan mail from Timmy "peteur" May >> >> >> >To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) >> >> >> >Date: Sun, 29 Sep 1996 20:32:58 -0700 (PDT) >> >> >> >In-Reply-To: <ueP2uD86w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> from "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" at Sep 29, 96 09:45:41 pm >> >> >> >X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] >> >> >> >Mime-Version: 1.0 >> >> >> >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII >> >> >> >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >> >> >> >Content-Length: 4378 >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> berserk >> >> >> >> Timmy May has gone . Has he been eating speed? >> >> >> >> bananas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >From: Troy Varange <varange(a)crl.com> >> >> >> >> >Message-Id: <199609300138.AA08482(a)crl12.crl.com> >> >> >> >> >Subject: Re: [SPAM] More fan mail from Timmy "peteur" May >> >> >> >> >To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) >> >> >> >> >Date: Sun, 29 Sep 1996 18:38:05 -0700 (PDT) >> >> >> >> >In-Reply-To: <FFi2uD82w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> from "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" at Sep 29, 96 07:14:50 pm >> >> >> >> >X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] >> >> >> >> >Mime-Version: 1.0 >> >> >> >> >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII >> >> >> >> >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >> >> >> >> >Content-Length: 3442 >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What has Timmy been smoking? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ]From paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Sun Sep 29 19:03:40 1996 >> >> >> >> >> ]Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) >> >> >> >> >> ] via UUCP; Sun, 29 Sep 96 19:14:06 EDT >> >> >> >> >> ] for dlv >> >> >> >> >> ]Received: from disperse.demon.co.uk by uu.psi.com (5.65b/4.0.061193-PSI/PSINet) via SMTP; >> >> >> >> >> ] id AA25790 for dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com; Sun, 29 Sep 96 19:03:40 -0400 >> >> >> >> >> ]Received: from post.demon.co.uk ([(null)]) by relay-2.mail.demon.net id ac16129; >> >> >> >> >> ] 29 Sep 96 15:59 BST >> >> >> >> >> ]Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk ([158.152.120.223]) by relay-3.mail.demon.net >> >> >> >> >> ] id aa09441; 29 Sep 96 15:54 BST >> >> >> >> >> ]Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk by fatmans.demon.co.uk with SMTP >> >> >> >> >> ] id AA843903697 ; Sat, 28 Sep 96 09:41:37 +0000 >> >> >> >> >> ]Comments: Authenticated sender is <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> >> >> >> >> >> ]From: paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk >> >> >> >> >> ]To: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> >> >> >> >> >> ]Date: Sat, 28 Sep 1996 09:21:37 +0000 >> >> >> >> >> ]Mime-Version: 1.0 >> >> >> >> >> ]Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII >> >> >> >> >> ]Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT >> >> >> >> >> ]Subject: Re: Possible subs attack???? >> >> >> >> >> ]Priority: normal >> >> >> >> >> ]X-Pm-Encryptor: JN-PGP-P, 4 >> >> >> >> >> ]X-Mailer: Pegasus Mail for Windows (v2.31) >> >> >> >> >> ]Message-Id: <844008901.9441.0(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]> The lying sack of shit Timmy May <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> writes: >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]> The lying sack of shit Timmy May lies again, as usual. >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]Fuck you, >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]I am not Tim May, Check out the return path if you don`t believe me, >> >> >> >> >> ]if you still don`t here`s my PGP public key signed by the EFF, they >> >> >> >> >> ]don`t sign keys here and there without checking ID`s... >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID >> >> >> >> >> ]pub 1024/5BBFAEB1 1996/07/30 Paul Bradley <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- >> >> >> >> >> ]Version: 2.6.3ia >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]mQCNAjH9j+cAAAEEAMBvREiQR0ot9dFCO0TiSCSunAYLv2g1Bc6I3bz8FzKXNH53 >> >> >> >> >> ]6mieJf/W4rD+CxJpT0q9RQaaoRtkHJLwbjfK2il3D7mEahMAyqvF/xRJNqkXfhM3 >> >> >> >> >> ]sRJM0Jh43l+W0M5vwokbEbk25/bxWWGspTsLD3YHbzKnG6pOcL5OPIRbv66xAAUR >> >> >> >> >> ]tCdQYXVsIEJyYWRsZXkgPHBhdWxAZmF0bWFucy5kZW1vbi5jby51az6JAJUDBRAy >> >> >> >> >> ]NwfvNkCBjDT0xHEBATQPA/9TORmN/UjNecj03q4anpvdyCLiez5sKuNbnYK50RiP >> >> >> >> >> ]Jj4QpWWvST3smyQ0A86DrZY/re056MXwQmARESx0rFZxdnD0oORICl5r8dJLIy3b >> >> >> >> >> ]j8rbA5olXwZwKz73/X5s13v/pvHYX4cIsbVK8NHXqh5llSKt6TBAuGgkIGF29z5k >> >> >> >> >> ]C4kAlQMFEDI3B9mdtf/umVkv7QEBcRYD/1FBteLqsUmr81euxqqnnrpLlyHb58B/ >> >> >> >> >> ]9sdATuua4uSjX46hXDZ264YozspNrzSB4NEdrmXOWVX3fiE0ga6XkSSkIeF23V90 >> >> >> >> >> ]En37Z0BdbFzgF00FRYTFyTq8eezQrdg/+rBPUsZUmG5wpq3e12FKHQsX01i+1mB2 >> >> >> >> >> ]YmqqwCV5e95eiQCVAgUQMh8uSb5OPIRbv66xAQEqJwP/fxQyiCasjFcbDpsFfsYp >> >> >> >> >> ]put5cCC/9pOx6X3DlbKShPMpUOS+A9HsTEmJQN8Iawv1nSwPdtc2cR/GhW6ilVjW >> >> >> >> >> ]LSloGdMVLabm9pGpZZMkRaZlXFUkOv7VhfgsUiL+vIDryBCAwUZCzQiWycjt/cPi >> >> >> >> >> ]mUqFH41Z7NkyO8ZFdi5GGX0= >> >> >> >> >> ]=CMZA >> >> >> >> >> ]- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >> >> >> >> >> ]Version: 2.6.3ia >> >> >> >> >> ]Charset: cp850 >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]iQCVAwUBMkzuH75OPIRbv66xAQHSmQQAqw0F/lIsCcQwOpiSQDx4hMqOVVUVXbyR >> >> >> >> >> ]3RMWY20ECE0TpAtJ6hkAiqphsWUSBqiFj2kGHMh+jHSHXIMPF+m1qtwVbgutJC7B >> >> >> >> >> ]8VYWj0VP+bGu5dEUisLrVHDNj5ucEIDyK2GnqObiCiKARFUbOuZnMQOp9TDJqibh >> >> >> >> >> ]2Wqa5+h8R7g= >> >> >> >> >> ]=/M2U >> >> >> >> >> ]-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ] Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security >> >> >> >> >> ] Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk >> >> >> >> >> ] Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org >> >> >> >> >> ] Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ >> >> >> >> >> ] Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 >> >> >> >> >> ] "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey" >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >Fuckhead. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >Fuckhead. We know your behind Vulis, Cock-sucker >> >> >> >> >> >and he swallows >> >> >> > >> >Fuckhead.

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