December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

ACLU sues GA over net ban
by camcc＠abraxis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>X-Sender: ewatkins(a)pop.ipst.edu >Date: Wed, 20 Nov 1996 16:01:30 -0500 >Reply-To: Electronic Frontiers Ga Action Mailing List <ACTION(a)efga.org> >Sender: Electronic Frontiers Ga Action Mailing List <ACTION(a)efga.org> >From: Eric James Watkins <eric.watkins(a)IPST.EDU> >Subject: AJC [Atlanta Journal and Constitution] Front page Tuesday final edition >To: ACTION(a)EFGA.ORG > --------------------------------------------------------- >We made the front page!!! I don't have >permission to distribute this. I consider it fair use, and I did suggest >everyone buy a paper earlier. Note: The AJC does not archive these articles. >---------------------------------------- >ACLU sues the state over its ban on some Internet communication > >By Art Kramer >STAFF WRITER > > The ACLU filed suit against the state Tuesday, alleging that a Georgia >law barring the use of pseudonyms and anonymous communication on the >Internet is unconstitutional. > In the first court challenge in an ongoing campaign against >Internet-related laws in 13 states, the American Civil Liberties Union >alleges that when Georgia passed the law affecting the Internet, it >unconstitutionally encroached on the federal power to regulate interstate >commerce. > The suit was filed in U.S. District Court in Atlanta on behalf of >Electronic Frontiers Georgia (EFGA), Rep. Mitchell Kaye (R-Marietta), and 12 >other groups and individuals. > "The right to speak and publish using a virtual 'nom de plume' has its >roots in a long tradition dating back to the very founding of democracy in >this country," said Ann Beeson, staff attorney for the ACLU. > Beeson's use of the Constitution's "commerce clause," the first in an >Internet-related case, could invalidate many state laws affecting the global >computer network, said Trotter Hardy, a professor of law at William and Mary >Law School in Williamsburg, Va. > But Hardy said that approach could backfire by strengthening the case >for federal regulation of the Internet, a result civil libertarians may come >to regret. > State Attorney General Michael Bowers said Tuesday he had not reviewed >the case yet, but that his office typically pursues lawsuits against the >state vigorously. He has 20 days to respond in court. > The ACLU is among a coalition that in February challenged the federal >Communications Decency Act, which bars online content deemed indecent or >"patently offensive." A Philadelphia federal court's decision in June to >block enforcement of the law is on appeal to the Supreme Court. > China, Singapore, Australia, France, Britain and other countries are >debating or enacting curbs on Internet content, and several U.S. states are >considering or already have regulated online material. > The ACLU lawsuit also targets a portion of the Georgia law that the >group contends prohibits online use of trademarked material without >permission. The law went into effect July 1. > That could threaten the use of protected materials such as corporate >logos as links on the World Wide Web, a practice that is now routine, said >EFGA executive director Robert Costner. On EFGA's page, for example, >selecting the BellSouth logo takes the viewer to BellSouth's Web page. > But the law's author, Rep. Don Parsons (R-Marietta), called that >argument preposterous. > "It's just common sense. A link is not an attempt to make a visitor >believe your Web page is someone else's, which is what the law is meant to >prevent," Parsons said. > Kaye, whose use of the Georgia State Seal on his home page angered some >legislators, said he joined the suit to promote open, accessible government. > Kaye said the law has "given Georgia a black eye, sending a message to >the world that we do not understand and are inhospitable to technology." > Parsons said he's been unfairly characterized as an Internet know-nothing. > "I'm an advocate for the Internet's possibilities. To reach its full >potential, users must have real confidence that the sites they visit are >credible, that they are who they say they are. That's all the bill was >supposed to do." > One of the challengers, Avondale Web page designer Bonnie Nadri, said >she already has removed some links from her pages, including the logos of >Coca-Cola, Microsoft and Netscape Communications, because of the law. > The challengers say the wording of the law appears to prohibit >anonymity. Eric Van Pelt, president of the gay support group Atlanta >Veterans Alliance, said his organization joined the suit to shield the >identity of >two gay, active-duty military members of the AVA and to protect their >compliance with the Pentagon's "don't ask, don't tell" policy. > "We made them take an oath of confidentiality to join AVA; we don't want >to expose them to criminal charges just for sending e-mail," said Van Pelt. > RealAudio playback of Tuesday's press conference and the full text of >the lawsuit are available from EFGA.

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Re: Rogue Governments Issuing Policy Tokens
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:33 AM 11/20/96 -0800, John Anonymous MacDonald wrote: >Most "dual-use" items are export-restricted to Lybia. That means US >businesses will have trouble selling any computers or even things like >trucks to Lybia. For crypto tokens not to be available there does not >seem to be a huge deal, in comparison with everything else. Particularly since Libya bought a bunch of "oil drilling rig transport trucks" from Oshkosh Truck Corp in the '70s and hired a bunch of Brits to convert them into tank transporters. Didn't help them against the deadly Toyota pickups of the Chadian Defense Forces though. DCF

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SSLeay Legality FAQ
by cjh＠osa.com.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Folk, Here's version 1.4 of the SSLeay Legality FAQ. Additions since 1.3 are in the areas of import/export controls in various countries. Enjoy! ---------------------------------- Cut Here ---------------------------------- SSLeay Legality FAQ Version 1.4 Outline: Disclaimer Legality/Patent Rights table Export Considerations Patent Considerations References For more information Credits Disclaimer: This document may contain gross errors, and neither Clifford Heath nor Open Software Associates Limited accept any liability for same. Users should do their own research and receive professional legal advice. With regard to the legalities of using SSLeay, there is a number of geographical considerations, and a number of kinds of legal considerations. Legality/Patent Rights table: I've broken the legal considerations into "legal" (will the govt come after you :-) and "license" (who do you need to pay patent royalties to). Algor: Location: Purpose: Legal: License: Ref: DES world-wide any mostly# public domain RSA US indiv/free only RSAref free RSA RSA US commercial RSAref/BSAFE from RSADSI* RSA DH US ? mostly# Cylink+ DSA/DSS (based on Diffie-Hellman) RC4/2 US any mostly# from RSADSI RSA RC4 elsewhere any mostly# seems safe IDEA US/Europe/Japan indiv/free mostly# free ASCOM IDEA US/Europe/Japan indiv/commercial mostly# $US15, ASCOM ASCOM IDEA US/Europe/Japan company site mostly# from ASCOM ASCOM IDEA elsewhere any mostly# free SAFER world-wide any mostly# free Safer MD2 world-wide PEM only yes free@ rfc1319 MD5 world-wide any yes free@ rfc1321 SHA world-wide any yes free Any(!) France any only with (almost unobtainable) permit Any(!) Russia any only with permit Notes: * RSADSI's patent on RSA (#4,405,829) runs out on 20 Sep 2000. RSAref is free under certain terms, otherwise can be licensed through Concensus. BSAFE is stronger and has RC4 but requires purchase and royalties: $25K up front, royalties the larger of 2% or $2, royalty prepayment of $5000 per annum required in subsequent years covers 50% of royalties over the following year. + DH by itself cannot be used for digital signatures - the El Gamal extension provides this. CYLINK claim their DH patent covers El Gamal. The US patent #4,200,770 runs out on 29 April 1997. The Canadian patent (#1,121,480) registered 6 April, 1982, runs out in 1999. @ Acknowledgement is required - see the RFC. # Many countries have nominal export controls, including the UK and Australia, but I only know of them being enforced in the USA. MD2/5 and SHA are not subject to export controls anywhere that I know of. Export considerations: The USA has regulations under ITAR (International Trade in Arms Regulations) which categorises "cryptographic and ancillary devices" as munitions. Two classes of export licenses are granted: Distribution Licenses or DL's and Individual Validated Licenses or IVL's. To get an IVL you must say who the customer is and why he needs DES (or 3X DES, etc.). One may then use the IVL to export to the approved end user. Thousands are granted every year and very few applications are rejected. Systems which use cryptography for decryption only, authentication only (e.g. Kerberos authentication as available from Cybersafe and others), or can only be used for protecting financial data (e.g Cybercash etc., as long as it cannot be used for arbitrary messaging) are more-or-less readily granted a DL. DLs have also been granted for some implementations of RC4/40 bits (e.g Netscape). Canada has back-to-back agreements with the USA's ITAR controls, so it's easy to get crypto from the USA to Canada but you can't export from Canada. More information is available from Customs Canada (Revenue Canada) and Department of External Affairs and these URLs: http://axion.physics.ubc.ca/ECL.html - Excerpts from the Export Control List of Canada, and http://insight.mcmaster.ca/org/efc/pages/doc/crypto-export.html Canada's export controls. Many other countries have export controls (UK, Australia and others), but enforcement is less stringent than in the USA. In Australia, export of cryptographic software is controlled by Customs Regulations 13B (military technology) and 13E (Dual Use Technology). The regulations are administered by the Defence Signals Directorate - mail to "Director, Strategic Trade Policy and Operations, Dept of Defence, Anzac Park West Offices APW1-1-OA1, Canberra, ACT" or fax (06)266-6412 and ask for their "Australian Controls on the Export of Technology with Civil and Military Applications". The Australian regulations are also online at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp.pl/au/legis/cth/consol_reg/cer43… Software is defined as "one or more programs fixed in any tangible medium of expression", which explicitly leaves electronic shipment uncontrolled. Don't carry or mail media with SSLeay-based software out of Australia - email or FTP it instead! The UK Gov't is funding a project at Royal Holloway College which contains Key Escrow provisions. Watch for the EC DGXIII introducing European legislation under the banner "European Trusted Services", or visit http://www.modeemi.cs.tut.fi/~avs/eu-crypto.html, ftp://ftp.dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk/pub/Chris.Mitchell/istr_a2.ps, ftp://ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/euroclipper.ps.Z France disallows *import* and use of crypto technology without a permit, and Russia requires a permit for use also. Patent considerations: According to 35 U.S.C. 271 (a), "whoever makes, uses, offers to sell, sells or imports ... infringes the patent." In other words, you better ensure that you *compile out* and patented algorithms unless you intend to license them, even if the code is not executed. In fact, if you are in the USA, merely ftp'ing SSLeay into the USA is a breach of various patents. (Eric, you might consider splitting it into two ftp archives, one for the USA and an additional one for the rest of the world.) References: RSA: http://www.rsa.com/ CYLINK: http://www.cylink.com/products/security/ ASCOM: http://www.ascom.ch/Web/systec Safer: ftp://ftp.isi.ee.ethz.ch/pub/simpl/ For more information: http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/lawsurvy.htm - Crypto Law Survey Credits: Thanks to to Eric Young, Rich Salz, Donald Lewine, Holger Reif and Bruce Schneier (author of Applied Cryptography), Peter Trei, Remo Tabanelli, Ben Laurie, Ulf Moeller, Michael Taylor for their contributions. ------------------------------------------------------------ Clifford Heath cjh(a)osa.com.au Open Software Associates Limited 29 Ringwood Street / P O Box 401 Phone +613 9871 1694 Ringwood VIC 3134 AUSTRALIA Fax +613 9871 1711 ------------------------------------------------------------ Deploy Applications across the Internet and Intranets! Visit our Web site at http://www.osa.com

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Social Security workers in bribery plot
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Copyright c 1996 Nando.net Copyright c 1996 From staff and wire reports NEW YORK (Nov 20, 1996 4:42 p.m. EST) - Several Social Security Administration employees have been charged with giving confidential consumer information to credit card thieves in exchange for bribes as low as $10, authorities said on Wednesday. [...] The investigation began in February when investigators for Citicorp's Citibank found that a large number of Citibank credit cards had been sent to customers but never received. But the cards had been activated. [...] The Social Security Administration then conducted security reviews to determine if any employees had accessed files of individuals. Gimlett said the investigation was significant because it demonstrated "the reality that employees of government agencies or corporations who have access to personal information may take advantage of their position of trust to steal personal information and sell it for financial gain." [...]

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No Subject
by Giulio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Unsuscribe Cypherpunks Giulio <gexing(a)mbox.vol.it>

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Re: US supporting dissidents? (was Re: Rogue Governments Issuing Policy Tokens)
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:52 PM 11/20/96 -0500, Jeremiah A Blatz wrote: >Trademarks are not copyrights. There is no fair use for trademarks. In >addition, civil suits are not criminal trials. The USG can't throw >your ass in jail for making "big brother inside" stickers, but Intel >can sue your ass off. >In a related note, you may be safe from lible suits... Make you wonder how Mad magazine has gotten away with it all these years... (Maybe we could get Mad to print them! Would make an interesting cover...) ObSpyVSSpy: Mad TV (on Fox) has been running animated Spy V.S. Spy cartoons. (Usually one or two per episode.) Probibly best thing about the show. (I mentioned this because one "prominent Cypherpunk" at Orycon had not known about them.) --- | "Remember: You can't have BSDM without BSD." - alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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RE: FUCK YOU punk
by nobody＠zifi.genetics.utah.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

_______________________________________________________________________________ From: aga on Wed, Nov 20, 1996 15:24 Subject: FUCK YOU punk/was:Taking out the garbage To: freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >If you try to make or enforce any rules and YOU DIE cocksucker! You might want to watch yourself. It would be hard to *not* see this as a direct threat... >Your presents shall be totally eliminated form this InterNet! ^^^^^^^ Yeah, Lucky! You better watch out, or there'll be NO CHRISTMAS!! :-) >Your connection will be TERMINATED at once! Suddenly, agatha is everyone's sysadmin... >fuck you punk, and fuck all of your "rules" Whether stated or not, there _are_ certain guidelines (or rules) we all should follow, just so we aren't *ASSHOLES*... >-aga

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Re: Anon
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:06 PM 11/20/96 -0700, Roderick Simpson wrote: >Who has made the strongest case _against_ anonymity on the Net that you >have ever heard? Someone intelligent and theoretical rather than trapped in >some child porn or commerce pov. > >Thanks, >Rod Recruiting for a future Brain Tennis I take it? The Thursday Computer columnist for the WSJ (whose name escapes me) is a possibility. I don't know how strong he is but he is consistently opposed. I wouldn't recommend L. Detweiler though he is opposed to anonymity. How about Esther Dyson? DCF

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Re: Anon
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As I mentioned a couple of days ago, science fiction writer David Brin has an argument against not only anonymity, but _privacy_ as well. Where cypherpunks tend to think of privacy as both beneficial and inevitable, Brin sees it as harmful and doomed. He has an article in the December 1996 issue of Wired discussing his ideas. BTW cypherpunk Doug Barnes is also quoted several times in the long article in that issue by Neal Stephenson (Snow Crash, The Diamond Age) about the undersea cables that carry most transnational information traffic. Hal

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Re: Why I Don't Read SF Much Anymore
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> > The problem with straight SF for me is that computers and networks have > changed the future so much that (in the words of the motto of the SF > Writer's Association) The Future Ain't What It Used to Be. The science > fictional futures of my childhood are now dead as doornails. And I can't > enjoy contemporary SF that doesn't include a healthy dose of computers and > networking. I find this to be largely true as well. The cyberpunk genre does the best job at grappling with the impact of communications tech but it is traditionally dystopian. It would be nice to see a story about better living through crypto. What fiction can people recommend which presents crypto/privacy issues realistically? How about this new book that Neal Stephenson is working on, does anyone know what it's about? His short story, "Hack the Spew", a few months ago (in Wired, I think?) had a strong crypto flavor. Hal

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Re: Stewart Baker on new crypto rules
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law" <froomkin(a)law.miami.edu> > http://www.steptoe.com/oped.htm > > argues that industry won't accept any system that threatens to cut off > backwards compatibility after 2 years, hence DES export liberalization > will have to extend beyond the proposed period. I take a slightly different moral. Baker (former NSA attorney) writes: > If buying key-recovery encryption means customers must give up all > of their legacy encryption systems, key recovery products will carry a > near-fatal burden in many markets where encryption is now used widely. The > transition to key recovery will have to be gradual or it won't happen > at all. What I see this as is a call to come up with architectures that will allow transparent phase-in of government key access (so-called "key recovery") technology. The current HP proposal fits in very well with this model. The appear to be planning on using standard API's so that applications will be able to switch to using key escrow software without changing the applications themselves, just the OS. Maybe there could be a transition period where both the old and new crypto would both be accepted, then after a period of time the old wouldn't work any more. As Baker goes on to say: > Three years ago, no one in the PC world would have bought an operating > system that didn't run MS-DOS. Three years from now, we'll be happy to buy > an operating system that is backward-compatible with Windows 95 but not > with MS-DOS. And then, at last, we'll throw out all our old DOS programs. This suggests to me that we need to be vigilant in watching for systems that will allow for easy "drop in" of key escrow. Hal

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RE: Mass-market crypto phones
by Mullen Patrick 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

_______________________________________________________________________________ From: Clay Olbon II on Thu, Nov 21, 1996 15:20 >A while back, Eric Blossom posted a URL for a mass-market, phone encyrption >device (http://www.comsec.com/) The point of this post is to posit a The above mentioned crypto phone was incredibly expensive, if I remember correctly. What it basically was (Please keep in mind I may be thinking of a different product) a box containing a modem and a crypto-crunching CPU. Phone in one end, processed by said CPU, and send out other end. I have/had a similar idea, but I want to try make it a totally software product (assuming you have the necessary hw requirements on your computer) where you talk in through a microphone (can something be wired so you can use a regular phone plugged into your computer/modem/soundcard???) your CPU crunches code, and spits out the encrypted data. Obviously, the complementing steps would be done on the receiving end. Has anyone ever tried anything like this? >I think we need to keep a couple of goals in mind. The first, is to get >encrypting phones (or phone add-ons) into Wal-mart, K-mart, etc (where >probably most Americans now buy their phones). The prices need to be low >enough that people will want to buy them (<$100?). Is this technically >feasible? The comsec device from the above URL already demonstrates the >needed capability. Is the cost target possible? My guess is soon, given >the lowering costs and increasing capabilities of current processors. Goals sound good. I feel it *definately* has to be below $100. Personally, I use a phone bought at K-Mart that cost $12 _after_ tax... I wouldn't mind paying $50 for a techno gizmo that made my conversations, inane as they may be, private. The price would also have to be low to assure the other end has a similar techno-gizmo, or I would have wasted my money. Anyone else see the *immediate* need for a standard? >The second goal needs to be to push a similar product for cell-phones. If I'm not mistaken (and I've been known to be from time to time :-), cell phones are already encrypted between the phone and cell tower. That way, they are no less private than a regular phone. Of course, you may be referring to further end-to-end encryption built into the phone in addition to this, but as far as they being less secure than a house phone, I'm not sure about that one. >Given that these goals are met, I think widespread use of crypto over phone >lines would become almost inevitable. However, the fun part would be the >introduction of such products. The FUD coming from police, the government, >etc. would be amazing to behold. Agreed! > Clay >******************************************************* >Clay Olbon olbon(a)ix.netcom.com >engineer, programmer, statistitian, etc. >**********************************************tanstaafl PM USER ERROR: REPLACE AND STRIKE ANY KEY WHEN READY

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Re: U.S. CIA employee caught spying
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 18 Nov 1996 17:05:47 -0500 (EST), Tim Scanlon wrote: >This is on the local DC news; >Harold Nicholson age 46, a CIA employee was arrested for spying today >at Dulles airport. He allegedly has been working for the Russians >for the past 2 years. Here's a good question to ask: "Why are we getting security policy from the [un]intelligence agencies?" What will get mentioned, however, will be: "If he'd been using PGP we'd never have caught him. This is why we need GAK!" # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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CAVE Report
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We've put the CAVE-based report at: http://jya.com/tr453.htm (46 kb with 7 images) CAVE = Cellular Authentication and Voice Encryption algorithm. Nokia, for one, uses a CAVE algorithm to secure its latest toy.

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Re: Database law... silver lining??
by Richard L. Field 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am not suggesting patent-like protection. Rather, I'd argue that there is very little "independent creation" with respect to my personal database. Provided it is considered my database to begin with, information that I give on a warranty card, when I ask for credit, etc. remains mine under the proposed U.S. law. Just because a third party tries to assemble it from those sources doesn't mean it suddenly becomes free data, from a non-database source. By that line of reasoning, any protected database would lose all protection upon its publication by a licensee, so long as you copied it from the licensee and not the originator. This is not how I read the proposed law, and it is not how big database publishers would want it read. - Richard Field (Nothing in this line of argument is meant to imply that I am in favor of the proposal.) At 11:47 PM 11/21/96 -0800, Greg Broiles wrote: [my proposal snipped] > >Cute, but any such proposal is almost guaranteed to allow for independent >creation from a non-database source - e.g., warranty cards, info extracted >from you when you ask for credit, public records, etc. For example, one >comment to Article 3 of the proposed WIPO treaty on sui generis protection >of databases provides: > >"3.02 The protection provided does not preclude any person from >independently collecting, assembling or compiling works, data or materials >from any source other than a protected database." > >(see <http://www.loc.gov/copyright/wipo6.html> for more.) > >It's very unlikely that Congress (or the PTO) intends to do anything >that'll screw up what's already working well for big database publishers. >Your theory is similar to a patent flavor for databases, while the >proposals floated out so far are much more like copyright - e.g., >independent creation is OK, but copying is not, even with wide public >distribution, and long protection times. With patent, independent creation >is not OK, copying (the information, not the device) is encouraged/allowed, >and protection time is short.

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Re: 1996 Codebreakers
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Adam Shostack <adam(a)homeport.org> writes: >> I just got a review copy of the new (1996) ed. of Kahn's The >> Codebreakers from my local used bookstore. Its a little disapointing, >... >> & DH. Nothing on Cypherpunks, little on how privacy can be enhanced. The above was stripped from a reply made by Dr Dimitri Vulis. I have just one question, was the copy that you purchased hardcopy or paperback? I found the paperback in a school library and found that it said that the technical portion had been abridged to save space, (and money). I cannot say that I read the whole text, only the first half chapter and then some skipping around trying to find the RSA algorthim. I later found it in a periodical to which I am subscribed.

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Re: Anderson & Kuhn's "Improved DFA" paper
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

HP just announced their big new plans for international exportable crypto using tamperproof PCM-CIA smartcards with multiple tamperproof GAK plugins. Anderson&Kuhn just announced the latest in a series of attacks on "tamperproof" hardware crypto modules by Israeli, UK, and US cryptographers. Obviously it must be a conspiracy :-) It's also an opportunity for some well-timed press releases. Clipper 1's reputation was severely damaged by Matt's attack. Anybody know if HP's giving out samples, and if there are real or test GAK plugins for them? HP URL http://www.dmo.hp.com/gsy/security/icf/main.html The paper was posted to coderpunks, and it's on ftp://ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/dfa Here's the intro: --------------------------------------------------------------------- Improved Differential Fault Analysis Ross J Anderson, Markus G Kuhn In [1], Biham and Shamir announce an attack on DES based on 200 ciphertexts in which one-bit errors have been induced by environmental stress. Here we show an attack that requires less than ten ciphertexts. Furthermore, our attack is practical in that it uses a fault model that has been implemented in attacks on real smartcards. In [2], Biham and Shamir show how their method can be extended to reverse engineer algorithms whose structure is unknown. Our attack can also be extended to such cases and is more efficient there too. In [3], Boneh, De Millo and Lipton discuss how such techniques can be used to attack RSA. Again, their attack is theoretical only, We show how to do it in practice. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk # (If this is posted to cypherpunks, I'm currently lurking from fcpunx, # so please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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BIS E-money Report
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to IG, we've put a copy of the BIS report on E-money at: http://jya.com/bis_emoney.html Here's a blurb from the intro: Implications for Central Banks of the Development of Electronic Money October 1996 Since the end of 1995 the central banks of the Group of Ten (G-10) countries have been studying the development of electronic money and the various policy issues which it raises. Much of this work has been carried out by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) or by monetary policy experts from G-10 central banks. Electronic money was discussed by BIS member central banks at meetings in Basle in July and September 1996. In August, the BIS published a report on the Security of Electronic Money prepared by the CPSS and the Group of Computer Experts. This report provides a definition of electronic money and a description of its key features. It discusses the factors influencing the development of e-money products. Finally, it reviews the policy issues raised by e-money developments, as seen from a central bank perspective, and discusses the possible policy responses. --

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New Paper: Covert Channels in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite
by Craig H. Rowland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

All, I have released a new paper entitled: Covert Channels in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite This paper demonstrates several methods of encoding secret data into the headers of the TCP/IP protocol. Main topics of interest include: - Encoding data into IP headers. - Encoding data into TCP headers. Specific areas of focus allow encoding of data into the IP identification fields and TCP sequence number fields for clandestine transmission of data to a remote host. Packets of data appear normal to network sniffers and packet filters, yet can contain hidden messages in either plaintext or ciphertext. Other methods revealed include a new technique where forged packets can be "bounced" off any Internet connected site to establish a communication path that appears to originate from the "bounced" host. Additionally, several methods are discussed regarding bypassing of packet filters with encoded data for communication with hosts inside a protected network. This paper contains actual demonstrations as well as source code for Linux 2.x systems to allow encoded transmissions between sites to be tested. If you are interested in reading this paper, please visit my website: http://www.psionic.com/papers.html This site has VERY limited bandwidth so please be patient if it is slow. Thank you for your time.. -- Craig

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Re: Why I Don't Read SF Much Anymore
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:09 PM 11/20/96 -0800, Hal Finney wrote: >What fiction can people recommend which presents crypto/privacy issues >realistically? How about this new book that Neal Stephenson is working >on, does anyone know what it's about? His short story, "Hack the Spew", >a few months ago (in Wired, I think?) had a strong crypto flavor. "A Fire Upon the Deep", Vernor Vinge presents one time pads as the most valuable item in intersteller commerce. Crypto also plays an important role during the final battle. He also has a new take on exceeding the speed (of light) limit, and a well drawn group-mind species. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The lottery is a tax on | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | those who can't do math. | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | - Who 1st said this? | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: The Limey PUNK needs TERMINATED
by George A. Stathis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I saw what happened. It's very sad. George P.S. Nobody can threaten another site or another invidual and keep one's humanity for too long. I often regret angry emotions, as we all do. The saddening thing is when threats get _too_ far. I cannot control anybody's behaviour, nor have endless energy to explain things. I am but an ignorant little cog in the Wheels most of the time, and need an atmosphere of trust like everybody. I can see truth buried under a lot of people's rudeness, and I can see violence buried in a lot of people's politeness. Silence is sometimes the best policy. I do not enforce it on anybody. I take a vow of silence when saying anything makes things worse.

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anonymous proxy server in 100 lines of Perl (fwd)
by Martin Hamilton 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm sure this could be squeezed onto one line. Sheesh - comments even! :-) Martin ------- Forwarded Message From: Randal Schwartz <merlyn(a)stonehenge.com> To: libwww-perl(a)ics.UCI.EDU Subject: anonymous proxy server in 100 lines of Perl Date: 20 Nov 1996 20:21:43 -0700 No cookies. No referer. No From. All we need is a dozen of these around the planet. :-) Gisle, thanks. You truly are "the wizard of aas". :-) And yes, this is the code for the next Web Techniques magazine column. #!/home/merlyn/bin/perl -Tw use strict; $ENV{PATH} = join ":", qw(/usr/ucb /bin /usr/bin); $|++; ## Copyright (c) 1996 by Randal L. Schwartz ## This program is free software; you can redistribute it ## and/or modify it under the same terms as Perl itself. ## Anonymous HTTP proxy (handles http:, gopher:, ftp:) ## requires LWP 5.04 or later my $HOST = "localhost"; my $PORT = "8008"; sub prefix { my $now = localtime; join "", map { "[$now] [${$}] $_\n" } split /\n/, join "", @_; } $SIG{__WARN__} = sub { warn prefix @_ }; $SIG{__DIE__} = sub { die prefix @_ }; $SIG{CLD} = $SIG{CHLD} = sub { wait; }; my $AGENT; # global user agent (for efficiency) BEGIN { use LWP::UserAgent; @MyAgent::ISA = qw(LWP::UserAgent); # set inheritance $AGENT = MyAgent->new; $AGENT->agent("anon/0.07"); $AGENT->env_proxy; } sub MyAgent::redirect_ok { 0 } # redirects should pass through { ### MAIN ### use HTTP::Daemon; my $master = new HTTP::Daemon LocalAddr => $HOST, LocalPort => $PORT; warn "set your proxy to <URL:", $master->url, ">"; my $slave; &handle_connection($slave) while $slave = $master->accept; exit 0; } ### END MAIN ### sub handle_connection { my $connection = shift; # HTTP::Daemon::ClientConn my $pid = fork; if ($pid) { # spawn OK, and I'm the parent close $connection; return; } ## spawn failed, or I'm a good child my $request = $connection->get_request; if (defined($request)) { my $response = &fetch_request($request); $connection->send_response($response); close $connection; } exit 0 if defined $pid; # exit if I'm a good child with a good parent } sub fetch_request { my $request = shift; # HTTP::Request use HTTP::Response; my $url = $request->url; warn "fetching $url"; if ($url->scheme !~ /^(http|gopher|ftp)$/) { my $res = HTTP::Response->new(403, "Forbidden"); $res->content("bad scheme: @{[$url->scheme]}\n"); $res; } elsif (not $url->rel->netloc) { my $res = HTTP::Response->new(403, "Forbidden"); $res->content("relative URL not permitted\n"); $res; } else { &fetch_validated_request($request); } } sub fetch_validated_request { my $request = shift; # HTTP::Request ## uses global $AGENT ## warn "orig request: <<<", $request->headers_as_string, ">>>"; $request->remove_header(qw(User-Agent From Referer Cookie)); ## warn "anon request: <<<", $request->headers_as_string, ">>>"; my $response = $AGENT->request($request); ## warn "orig response: <<<", $response->headers_as_string, ">>>"; $response->remove_header(qw(Set-Cookie)); ## warn "anon response: <<<", $response->headers_as_string, ">>>"; $response; } ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Draft OECD crypto guidelines on WWW
by Robin Whittle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have obtained the OECD draft crypto guidelines from: http://www.quintessenz.at/Netzteil/OECD/index.html where they are a Word 6 file. I have converted them to HTML and put them at: http://www.ozemail.com.au/~firstpr/crypto/oecd_dr.htm This is probably not the absolute latest draft, but it is the best I can get. I think there is a lot of good material here, but they still seem wedded to the idea of key-recovery or some other means of governments accessing plaintext or keys. They seem to assume there will always be a copy of the key around the place somewhere. In general, in the future cryptographic exchanges will use fresh key-pairs for each session, so not even the user can get a copy of the private key. Maybe key-recovery techniques are designed to cope with this, but the question is why would anyone want to use such a system other than that the government (and some corporations aligned with the government) want them to? There is no reason why ordinary or criminal users should be interested in key recovery/escrow, or weakened key-spaces - what they need is simple to use, totally secure, end-to-end encryption. The whole aim is to make a bulletproof secure pipe that doesn't depend on any other data, technology or administrative actions. The draft guidelines have my comments at the start, including a suggested rewording of paragraph 88 which currently states that crypto systems *should* provide for lawful access to the plaintext/key. The OECD people do not seem to have considered the fact that criminals will wrap their material in a crypto system they can trust before putting it through the government mandated system that they don't trust. My comments include a more detailed discussion of this argument, particularly in the situation where criminals are communicating with non-criminals. In a nutshell, how is all the cost, risk, doubt and complication of key escrow/recovery etc. justified by its benefits for serious crime prevention/deterrence, when the great majority of criminals and a large number of ordinary private and commercial users will be applying their own strong encryption first? Does anyone know of writing that specifically tackles this question? This is a separate question from those about whether governments can be trusted, or about absolute rights to privacy etc. It is simply a cost/benefit analysis. To me the benefits for reducing serious crime seem slim indeed and the costs - not least the general feeling that people may be using daily a system specifically designed for tapping their communications - seem to be very high. - Robin . Robin Whittle . . http://www.ozemail.com.au/~firstpr firstpr(a)ozemail.com.au . . 11 Miller St. Heidelberg Heights 3081 Melbourne Australia . . Ph +61-3-9459-2889 Fax +61-3-9458-1736 . . Consumer advocacy in telecommunications, especially privacy . . . . First Principles - Research and expression - music, . . music industry, telecommunications . . human factors in technology adoption. . . . Real World Interfaces - Hardware and software, especially . . for music .

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Any RC4 attacks?
by Jim & Carla Rogers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Schneier claims that RC4 has not yet fallen to crypanalytic attack. Assuming that a sufficient length key is used (>= 128 bits), have there been any successful attacks? Jim Rogers

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Patent Fight Could Add to Cost of Inter
by Alan Pugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

By KATHLEEN SAMPEY Associated Press Writer NEW YORK (AP) _ A little-known patent could raise the cost of doing business over the Internet for companies selling software, video or other digital products delivered online. E-Data Corp. of Secaucus, N.J., is suing 17 companies, including McGraw-Hill and CompuServe, to collect licensing fees on the patent, which protects downloading of encrypted digital information. A court hearing is scheduled Dec. 6 in New York on the company's claims. Analysts said the patent will not significantly restrain Internet commerce, but would raise the cost of doing business on the Internet and cause headaches for small start-up companies. Some companies, including Adobe Systems and VocalTec, have grudgingly paid the licensing fee. Others intend to fight it. ``We believe it's important to draw a line in the sand and make them prove infringement,'' said CompuServe spokeswoman Gail Whitcomb. ``We think their claim is way too broad.'' Arnold Freilich, E-Data's president, said the company bought rights to the patent in 1994. He won't disclose how much the company has made from it, but said it covers digital products such as text, software, images, music and video transmitted through phone lines to customers. Companies that take orders for products over the Internet, then ship them by mail would not be affected. The patent was first issued in 1985 to Charles Freeny Jr. Freeny, an electrical engineer, held the digital encryption patent until 1989. Unable to make money on it, he sold it for about $100,000 to a company called Avedas Corp. ``I didn't foresee the Internet,'' he said. Avedas couldn't make money from it either and has since gone out of business. By 1994, when E-Data bought the patent for $290,000, the World Wide Web had come of age, and so had the possibility of enforcing the patent, which expires in 2003. Peter Tracy remembers making the acquaintance of U.S. Patent No. 4,528,643. His East Haven, Conn.-based company, MicroPatent, operates a Web site where users can search and download patent and trademark information for 25 cents a page. On March 22, he received a packet from E-Data saying his company might be infringing on the patent. He could either pay a fee based on the percentage of his Web site profits, or be sued. ``I felt like I had been sucked into (a) bottomless pit,'' he said. MicroPatent agreed to pay the licensing fee, which Tracy will not disclose. The cost of the annual fees range from 1 percent to 5 percent of sales under $1 million, according to David Fink, E-Data's attorney. For sales over $1 million, the rate is determined on an individual basis, he said. Several cases already have been dismissed because either defendants paid the fees or they were found not to be in violation, he said. Cases against Dun & Bradstreet, Decision Support and Meca Software were dismissed. Company representatives either could not be reached or refused comment. IBM spokesman Fred McNeese declined comment on questions about E-Data or the licensing fees. But companies such as McGraw-Hill are anticipating the December court hearing. ``We fail to see anything that we do in our businesses that infringes on this patent,'' said McGraw-Hill spokesman Steven Weiss. ``We've asked them continually what we've been doing, and E-Data has not told us _ aside from accusing us. ``We have no plans to pay them anything,'' he said. But Freilich said the patent is specific in its description of encrypted digital data, which is how many companies have sold such information since 1994. For example, a customer orders a digital product over the Internet, and pays for it through the Internet with a credit card. These types of transactions are not all that new, as in CompuServe's case. But once the product has been downloaded to the customer's terminal, an encryption code is provided by the seller to unlock the encryption, thereby allowing the customer to use the product. It is this added step that Freilich said the patent describes. Today's network organization also makes the patent enforceable, he said. In 1985 when the patent was granted, there was no such thing as an addressable computer or the Web. ``The technology has brought us to the point where anyone's computer terminal is addressable, where encryption is commonplace and that has led to the enforcement of this patent,'' Freilich said. Scott Smith, analyst at Jupiter Communications, predicted the case would not dampen Web commerce. ``I think it's a blip on the radar,'' he said. ``It may hurt some of the start ups. But larger companies face this kind of thing all the time. They'll be able to shake it off.'' While some may accuse E-Data of trying to stifle Internet commerce, Fink sees his client's efforts merely as a means to cash in on a legitimate, far-sighted investment. ``Besides,'' he said, ``3 cents on the dollar will not put any company out of business.'' AP-DS-11-19-96 2327EST * * * END OF DELIVERY * * *

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