December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Dr. Vulis
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:59 PM 11/5/96 +0100, Gary Howland wrote: >> > I recall we've been through this over a year ago, when I saw an announcement >> > of a cypherpunks physical meeting where someone was excluded for his political >> > views, and I said that I don't consider myself a cypherpunk. I'm glad that >> > John and Bill, the auhorities on cypherpunk membership, finally concur. > > >I think he is referring to the explicit and public non-invite of Jim >Bell to a cypherpunks meeting, due to some of Jim Bell's Assination >Politics posts. >Gary I'd like to correct this impression. Alan Olsen was, apparently, quite aware of my AP posts when I (and everyone else) was invited to the first Portland CP meeting. I had heard no objection to them from him. The meeting was advertised as being sufficiently confidential that he specifically requested that nobody take pictures or record the meeting, etc. Fair enough, I thought. I generally interpreted this to mean that the meeting was at least approximately "off the record." Arriving at the meeting, I detected no indication that Alan Olsen was at all disturbed at me, or anything I had said previously. At the meeting all went well, _or_so_I_thought_. It was all very routine. One thing I decided to mention, actually only hint at, was a technical capability that I was working one. However, I gave merely the broadest hints; What I did say would certainly have sounded technically at least implausible, if not quite impossible. (The situation was somewhat analogous to the old story about the blind men coming across an elephant; one touches only the tail and calls it a snake, the other touches a leg and calls it a tree, etc.) Intentionally, I didn't explain how I would accomplish the goal I described. Even so, there was still no indication from Alan Olsen that anything was amiss. And the meeting ended on that note. Much to my surprise, Alan Olsen blurted out over the CP list only a barely fair description of what I had said (which itself was only the hints I chose to describe) and called me various names, etc. I think he used the term "voodoo" to describe what I was planning to develop. When, eventually, I _do_ explain the whole thing, and I repeat exactly what I told the assembled group, it will become obvious why what I described _sounded_ so implausible, yet was quite doable given modern technology. I should point out that given how little I told, avoiding the REAL explanation, it could very well have been taken for voodoo. And it didn't surprise me that SOMEBODY would have come to that impression. The surprising and shocking thing about it was that he (Alan Olsen) violated the very confidentiality he had insisted on, without any sort of warning, and after-the-fact. Needless to say, I raked him over the coals publicly, on CP, for having done this, and he was severely chastized because of this. "Ripped him a new one" might describe it, although he certainly deserved the treatment. Obviously, a number of people on this list got the mistaken impression that this disagreement had something to do with my AP proposal. As far as I know, quite the contrary, it did not. But I saw two possibilities, after the fact: One, Alan Olsen hid his disapproval for AP, hoping to catch me in some sort of contradiction. Two, after he was embarrassed by my calling him on his bad behavior, he grabbed at the first thing he could think of to criticize me. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: WIPO Treaty: Worse than CDA- Deadline 22 Nov 96
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:22 AM 11/11/96 +0000, attila(a)primenet.com wrote: > WIPO Treaty: Worse than CDA > Deadline 22 Nov 96 for comment to Congress > WIPO was introduced this spring to Congress. It is not > understood by either the Clinton administration or the Congress and > few of the public are aware of the problem! [snip] > I am deleting the bulk of the report for brevity, including only > the definition of the "database" as it applies to WIPO. > >.WHAT IS A DATABASE? WHAT ISN'T A DATABASE? >.The treaty would protect "any database that represents a >.substantial investment in the collection, assembly, verification, >.organization or presentation of the contents of the database." >. >.This term should be understood "to include collections of >.literary, musical or audiovisual works or any other kind of >.works, or collections of other materials such as texts, sounds, >.images, numbers, facts, or data representing any other matter or >.substance" and "may contain collections of expressions of >.folklore." The "protection shall be granted to databases >.irrespective of the form or medium in which they are embodied. Somebody must have said, once, that the winner in an argument is the one who gets to define the terms. Notice how the term "protect" and "protection" are misused above. (not by Attila, of course; but by whomever he's quoting.) However, the term "protect" has long been misused by lawyers in just such a way. "Monopolize" would be a more appropriate word under the circumstances. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: a retort + a comment + a question = [RANT]
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:45 PM 11/10/1996, SUCRUM22_at_INDY-ADP(a)smtp-gw.cv62.navy.mil wrote: > ...and you've got a foreign soldier waving a .45 around... Ummm.... just a .45? Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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No Subject
by Mark Neely 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>PLEASE TAKE ME OFF YOUR MAILING >LIST!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! I'm sorry Jayme, but you didn't include the requisite number of !'s, so we cannot process your request. Mark Neely - accessnt(a)ozemail.com.au Lawyer, Internet Consultant, Professional Cynic & Author BizWeb: For Serious Intrepreneurs - www.maximedia.com.au/bizweb

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Re: a retort + a comment + a question = [RANT]
by Murray Hayes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 10 Nov 96 21:45:56 EST, SUCRUM22_at_INDY-ADP(a)smtp-gw.cv62.navy.mil wrote: >---------------------------------------------------------------------- >dave kinchlea wrote: >>As said in "Hair" (the movie), "Don't do it for me man, 'cause >>if the shoe was on the other foot, I wouldn't do it for you!" > >>It's a lie anyway, you do it for yourself. > >That's an _easy_ judgment to make (and i definitely have to stop >adding anecdotes from my life in these things!), but you missed the >point - the freedoms the Cpunks diligently try to preserve (or seem to >want to create...) are protected _by_ the military. who was it that >said: "law, without force, is impotent" -? The military's sole purpose is to destroy things and kill people. Freedom is protected by the poeple for the people some of which are in the military. The force is not nessasary to enforce laws in most circumstances. How many gun battles erupt at speed traps? Granted, there are instances where some force is required in arresting violent individuals, but it is still illeagal for the police to use ecessive force. > >keep in mind that even "bad" laws have to be enforced. you can scream >all you want about "good, strong" cryptostuffs, but if the phone lines >are slashed, the satellite links are down, the elcerticity is off and >you've got a foreign soldier waving a .45 around - just how are you >going to boot up that pretty little computer and make it encode >information for you, much less get it anywhere? anarchy implies >ruthlessness - you going to practice cryptostuffs from a prison cell? You are wrong about bad laws being enforced. Many laws are not enforeced by the police. Have you never been "let off" or "givin a warning" by the police? How many times have you seen people j walk in front of the police who did nothing? Computers are not nessasary to encode data, they just make it a lot eaiser and faster. Where did I put that secret decoder ring???? mhayes(a)infomatch.com It's better for us if you don't understand It's better for me if you don't understand -Tragically Hip

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GAK?
by Mark M. Lacey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Could someone please fill me in on what GAK stands for since it seems to be central to some of the on going conversations. Thanks, Mark M. Lacey <mml(a)halcyon.com> "Speaking for nobody but myself." [Finger mml(a)halcyon.com for my PGP public key.] [If you don't have 'finger', e-mail me for it.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMobmyB/Hx+OuZC/tAQGRTAf/R2t+/JC1k3lhQcqIcRWO2HyxHgf6+ko2 2ngQBXyMrInQtaXorcZ2LFrfie4GD68S0nLWKlwqaN09+/O72Bze1pyGd3dHBI4b vazgQZq1zxWuHcCYg1r5QDwt0NJOZg4tRHROHmUiuLLeNfFwusWPnW+RMI2nTo39 g/sXWhRUF83vhyztC5+zOKmxjEQOBf3Wxq0FLBAoSUjzuJKnRNV87Fnf2vzezqc4 cK+A8DcRN0c0kX/LuNO9pnXo+3J8gMMDsoZAOS5KAgWQjJT3fdroTLX4xmRcBVJ3 NanTSXWsFIMlnXAjBS7V+5S/3gAml+y5tqLiNJAhoVVD/nvyvQDmAg== =QyM4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Sifting data; looking for "strong crypto"
by Murray Hayes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As far as bit patterns go, is executable code random? mhayes(a)infomatch.com It's better for us if you don't understand It's better for me if you don't understand -Tragically Hip

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two bogus messages to this list
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I did not write the two messages below. I did have a small party yesterday, probably some of my guests did that... - Igor. @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ >From cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com Mon Nov 11 06:35:19 1996 Return-Path: <cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com> Received: (from root@localhost) by manifold.algebra.com (8.8.2/8.8.2) with UUCP id GAA16814 for ichudov(a)algebra.com; Mon, 11 Nov 1996 06:34:44 -0600 Received: from toad.com (toad.com [140.174.2.1]) by www.video-collage.com (8.8.0/8.8.0) with ESMTP id CAA20037 for <ichudov(a)algebra.com>; Mon, 11 Nov 1996 02:34:30 -0500 (EST) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id VAA01399 for cypherpunks-outgoing; Sun, 10 Nov 1996 21:49:52 -0800 (PST) Received: from www.video-collage.com (www.video-collage.com [199.232.240.107]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id VAA01394 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Sun, 10 Nov 1996 21:49:47 -0800 (PST) Received: (from uucp@localhost) by www.video-collage.com (8.8.0/8.8.0) with UUCP id AAA19874 for cypherpunks(a)toad.com; Mon, 11 Nov 1996 00:51:53 -0500 (EST) Received: (from ichudov@localhost) by manifold.algebra.com (8.8.2/8.8.2) id XAA15989 for cypherpunks(a)toad.com; Sun, 10 Nov 1996 23:47:00 -0600 Date: Sun, 10 Nov 1996 23:47:00 -0600 From: "Igor Chudov @ home" <ichudov(a)algebra.com> Message-Id: <199611110547.XAA15989(a)manifold.algebra.com> Subject: FUCK ME HARD Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Status: O FUCK NME HARD >From cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com Mon Nov 11 00:35:29 1996 Return-Path: <cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com> Received: (from root@localhost) by manifold.algebra.com (8.8.2/8.8.2) with UUCP id AAA16188 for ichudov(a)algebra.com; Mon, 11 Nov 1996 00:35:24 -0600 Received: from toad.com (toad.com [140.174.2.1]) by www.video-collage.com (8.8.0/8.8.0) with ESMTP id BAA19940 for <ichudov(a)algebra.com>; Mon, 11 Nov 1996 01:37:38 -0500 (EST) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id VAA00961 for cypherpunks-outgoing; Sun, 10 Nov 1996 21:03:06 -0800 (PST) Received: from www.video-collage.com (www.video-collage.com [199.232.240.107]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id VAA00956 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Sun, 10 Nov 1996 21:03:03 -0800 (PST) Received: (from uucp@localhost) by www.video-collage.com (8.8.0/8.8.0) with UUCP id AAA19793 for cypherpunks(a)toad.com; Mon, 11 Nov 1996 00:05:09 -0500 (EST) Received: (from ichudov@localhost) by manifold.algebra.com (8.8.2/8.8.2) id WAA15563 for cypherpunks(a)toad.com; Sun, 10 Nov 1996 22:36:03 -0600 Date: Sun, 10 Nov 1996 22:36:03 -0600 From: "Igor Chudov @ home" <ichudov(a)algebra.com> Message-Id: <199611110436.WAA15563(a)manifold.algebra.com> Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Status: RO manifold::~==>premail -t cypherpunks(a)toad.com Chain: haystack;jam Subject: I urgently need a lot of money. Please share your money-making secrets, I am in a desperate need for cash.

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Re: Pyramid schemes and cryptoanarchy
by Clay Olbon II 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:39 PM 11/10/96 -0500, Rabid Wombat wrote: >On Sun, 10 Nov 1996, Clay Olbon II wrote: > >> Pyramid schemes could be a growth market in a crypto-anarchic world. It is >> yet another market such as gambling, or the lottery, that could be conducted >> with anonymity. And it appears to be much more widespread on the internet > >How is it like gambling? If I get a pyramid letter instructing me to send >money to five people on the list, add my name to the bottom, send to 5 >people, or whatever, there's nothing stopping me from removing all the >names, adding my name and those of four friends, and passing the letter >along. With an anonymous system, I could easily be all five people, >without even the bother of getting five different post office boxes. I was not saying that chain letters are like gambling. My point was that they could be conducted with anonymity - like gambling and the lottery. Your other point is well made. Anyone have ideas on a protocol to prevent this problem? > >There's no gambling involved; only blantant stupidity. Agreed. Although I think gambling and the lottery are pretty stupid as well ("The lottery is a tax on people who are bad a math" - from a friend's .sig). >The "airplane" game was an interesting slant, though. Because of the >in-person "airplane" parties, people were able to make contacts and >network while participating. It was still the same old trick, but some >may have found the ability to "buy" (and "sell") face time worth the price >of admission (Some of the "airplane" games going around were to the tune >of $2500, rather than the usual $5). Your anonymous slant on >this removes the only economically viable excuse for participating, >though - I don't even get to meet the head of the umptysquat dept. in >return for getting fleeced. > >The "airplane game" was big around Washington about a year ago, and >involved a number of highly placed people who aught to have been able to >recognize a Ponzi scheme when it bit them in the ass. Makes me wonder how >many people are stupid enough to "play" these games. I'm not familiar with the airplane game. Sounds like a DNC fundraiser to me ;-) And yes, I think there are a lot of stupid people out there (ex. I started a new job recently and noticed that a warning about the "Good Times Virus" was posted on the bulletin board). I'm not sure that the game would even have to be close to fair for plenty of people to participate - especially if it involves digital cash and email, which may be much easier than snail-mailing letters. Clay ******************************************************* Clay Olbon clay.olbon(a)dynetics.com engineer, programmer, statistitian, etc. Dynetics, Inc. **********************************************tanstaafl

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:34 PM 11/10/1996, Adam Back wrote: >Peter Hendrickson <ph(a)netcom.com> writes: >>At 3:30 AM 11/9/1996, Adam Back wrote: >>>Peter Hendrickson <ph(a)netcom.com> writes: >>>> Where will you keep your secret key? Remember, when they go through >>>> your house they bring 20 young graduates from MIT who are just dying >>>> to show how clever they are and save the world at the same time. >>> Keep your secret key in your head. >> I think this is hard to do in practice. I have tried. > You could probably keep a hashing function around plausibly, then you > could do as usual and remember the passphrase and use the hash > function to construct the actual key. 9 words selected from a pool of 25,000 has an entropy of about 131 bits. I could probably remember that. > If your stego techniques are any good, the feds will never get beyond > that point. They will then be left with the option of doing random > `spot-checks'. Having been on the cypherpunks list probably would > increase your chances of having your system checked. Yes, if things go sour, I doubt many cypherpunks will be practicing cryptoanarchists. >>> Your real challenge is keeping your stego programs safe. Boot >>> strapping a stegoed encrypted file system while leaving no stego code >>> lying around isn't that easy. >> Excellent point, especially since you don't have an encrypted virtual >> disk. Can anybody resolve this? >>> rc4 in C: >>> >>> #define S,t=s[i],s[i]=s[j],s[j]=t /* rc4 key <file */ >>> unsigned char s[256],i,j,t;main(c,v)char**v;{++v;while >>> (s[++i]=i);while(j+=s[i]+(*v)[i%strlen(*v)]S,++i);for( >>> j=0;c=~getchar();putchar(~c^s[t+=s[i]]))j+=s[++i]S;} >> (Under 3.3) I would have a hard time memorizing these programs. This >> pretty much guarantees that the number of cryptoanarchists will be small. > That program is optimised for size rather than ease of memorizing. > RC4 is an elegantly simple algorithm, and I sumbit that you could > remember it. Barring that you could just leave around a few > cypherpunks archives, or sci.crypt archives or whatever, and cut and > paste it form one of my posts :-) I am willing to accept that I can remember it. > Because RC4 is a stream cipher, you shouldn't reuse the key. However > you shouldn't need to for this application. You just use it to boot- > strap the real code. You are beginning to convince me. >> (I am deeply envious of your legal right to post this code, however. >> Now, why was it that we broke away from the Mother Country?) >> I would like to see a longer exposition of your approach. Given >> a hostile environment, how would I operate a small anonymous perl >> coding service using your techniques? > Once you've bootstrapped to your cryptoanarchists toolkit, you can > have anything you want, even a virtual TCP/IP layer, a hidden level of > TCP/IP in stego data. TCP/IP itself is a likely candidate for a stego > carrier. Non-predictable sequence nos are required to stop things > like the spoofing attack, and so are perfectly plausible. > Once we get to everyone having enough bandwidth, lots of people with > permanent connections, lots of people using video conference software, > audio, downloading feature length films, etc. there's no stopping > crypto anarchy. The LSbits in that lot would make a fairly responsive > subliminal channel by todays standards. I am finding this all very persuasive, although I am still suspicious of stegonagraphy. It would be cool to have an exact specification and working machine. This might even be easy enough to operate that non-technical people could learn how to do it, which implies that there could be large numbers of practicing cryptoanarchists. What we need is an experiment. Let's pick a country with a near police state and design a system so that people in that country can freely and securely communicate with each other and the outside world with minimal chance of arrest. Once the system is available, we can see if it succeeds in the field. I'll leave others to suggest the target. >> Don't forget to tell me how I get paid and when I get to spend my >> "ill-gotten" gains and how nobody will notice that I am doing it. > You get paid in ecash, paid on the BlackNet bank. You take a holiday > to a tax-haven and get paid off by a getting "lucky" at a BlackNet > affiliated casino. The casino takes a their "currency exchange fee", > and you get US$. Translations into paper currencies, I'll admit are > the weak link if you need paper currencies. > However there are two ways to get anonymous electronic cash, either > you start with anonymous electronic cash, or you add the anonymity > afterwards via `privacy brokers', once there are a few dozen systems, > and trillions flowing around using these systems, it's going to be > hard to keep track of it all. I still think the eventual payoff is a weak point, but it does make me think that in order to stop cryptoanarchy, foreign travel and foreign communication would have to be tightly controlled. If steganographic evidence is the only evidence that can be collected (and RC4 is strong) then it would be necessary to give the authorities great flexibility. Which means that it is beginning to look more and more like a bona fide police state as Tim suggested. While payment is a weak point, there are many cryptoanarchic activities that don't involve payment, such as participating in mailing lists, which people may like to do even when their governments disapprove. Anyway, you have certainly given me a lot to think about. I still have some doubts about safety from tempest attacks and the like, but my basic claim that you can stop cryptoanarchy without full deployment of a police state is looking weak to me right now. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the cyber nymserver. The nym.alias.net server will be listed soon. See http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/n.a.n.html for details. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. Hopefully, this is fixed by now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 11 Nov 96 6:49:56 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ******** *** 14:49 99.77% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com -.--__..--- 17:21:56 99.28% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com * **+**- *** 7:35 99.23% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net + +*-- +** 39:50 99.18% replay remailer(a)replay.com +++* --- *** 22:22 98.78% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com - -- - -+ 1:18:14 98.56% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net ++#. + - *** 47:04 98.24% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de +----+-- +++ 2:15:31 97.94% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com +----- - 2:51:34 94.38% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu - +++-- +++ 42:54 93.75% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++ +++-- + + 56:13 89.49% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++-- -+ 1:10:46 84.64% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com ++# + - 10:34 43.55% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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RE: His and Her Anarchies
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> wrote: >Well, I think there clearly _is_ a gender gap on these sorts of issues. Technologies that matter make daily life less obnoxious, and you can leverage them all the time. The Net is going to start mattering in a significant way when it relieves people of the burden of dealing with the garbage inherent in the information flow of everyday life. The net is going to matter when I can rely on it to store the information I now keep on disk, and the computer is a completely transparent object. All the documents that are important to me are maintained by the Net with sufficient reliability that I can unplug my computer and smash it with a hammer without affecting anything. Under this scenario, strong, reliable crypto becomes similar to electricity. The entire infomration infrastructure is built on it, but hardly anyone gives it a second thought. What kind of people use the Net and what are their activities doing to the country, the world, the culture? It may sound like a parochial issue that women don't much like computers, but they don't, and the issue is a tremendously important one. They're not attracted to this world, certainly not to the extent that men are, and that's one of the reasons why it is such a spiritually impoverished world. Most reasonable sophisticated men are happier in an environment that included women. One of the problems with the computer society is that not only is it an almost all-male society, but it's part of a little-boy society, part of an ongoing infantilization of the society over the past half century. Excerpt from Digerati: Encounters with the Cyber Elite (HardWired 1996) where David Gelernter, a Yale computer scientist, comments on the Web. >This may sound sexist. But sexism, like other "isms," is often based > on plain old truth, however politically incorrect it may be to some. >--Tim May Galileo, you must recant. You are in blatant disagreement with the truth. Ciao, James

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Re: Pyramid Schemes
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Benjamin Grosman <bgrosman(a)healey.com.au> writes: > this is all well and good, but what I'd like to know is: do these schemes > actually work? In theory they same to... In depends on what you mean by "work". If you're asking whether MMFs result in substantial amounts of money being sent to the originators, the answer is, I don't know for sure, but I doubt it very much. (I've never tried it myself but I interviewed a couple of people who did, for the research I did a few years ago.) Similar MLM schemes (such as Amway or Herbalife) seem to result in substantial profits for the owners/folks at the top of the pyramid, and losses to most people who join later, as the theory would predict. So why do so many people stay in programs like Amway despite their financial losses? In my opinion, _all memetic communications work very well not as a scheme for making money, but in the sense that people in the professions that involve person-to-person networking (such as public relations, recruiting, real estate and other sales) use them as a pretext to remind their business contacts of their existence. E.g. a headhunter might pass on copies of the Craig Shergold appeal to hundreds of potential recruits, with a note on his letterhead saying "I'm passing this on on behalf of the dying boy". Moreover he'd probably pass along photocopies of half a dozen letterheads from the chain of people who passed the memetic letter along to him. Most recipients reaction can be summarised as "What a nice person, what a good deed he's doing, do I need a headhunter now"? And by the way the reaction of the vast majority of Americans to a MMF snail letter is "I'm so grateful to the sender for passing along this business / networking opportunity." :-) which is why they're spread so eagerly by high school kids in search of popularity. I'm convinced that the good-luck chain letters (which just ask for the letter to be passed along, with no money changing hands) and the various MMF variants and MLM schemes are more about making/maintaining contacts than about money. Likewise most Amway/Herbalife peddlers lose money but gain the satisfaction of personal contact with the purchasers (which could be used for something else) and also the sales experience that they can later use to sell something else. How would Internet memetics be affected by wider availability of anonymity? We observe that snail mail anonymity is available now, but is apparently seldom used for memetics distribution. In the running example the p.r. person already has the ability to make hundreds of photocopies of the Craig Shergold letter and to snail-mail them to everyone s/he knows with no return address on the envelope and the cover letter. I've never come across such behavior, which is consistent with my belief that the sender is really interested in distributing his/her letterhead more than in distributing the memetic letter. When John Doe multi-posts the Craig Shergold's letter to thousands of Usenet newsgroups (as was done again a few weeks ago), s/he's more interested in splattering his own name around than in getting postcards/business cards to the dying boy. (Of course the poster's intent is to be widely seen as someone doing a good deed on behalf of Craig Shergold; instead he loses his Internet account and is widely viewed as a clueless spammer. Such is life. :-) At present someone could (ab)use the remailers to post anonymous Craig Shergold appeals on Usenet and on various mailing lists. I believe that one of the reasons why this has never been done (as far as I know) is because this would deprive the poster of the satisfaction of having his own name splattered all over the network. MMFs are a slightly different story because the poster can't get money from the "downline" without revealing some contact address to send the money to. Out of curisority, I looked at several different MMF spams that came this way; in many cases the sender's e-mail address is crudely forged; the money is requested to be sent to a postal address that's often a P.O.Box; and the name associated with the postal address is often missing, obviously phoney, or just has the initials. There's clearly interested in anonymity on the part of MMF posters.

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Re: Movement Tracking Systems and Smartcards
by peter.allan＠aeat.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Sat, 9 Nov 1996 11:23:29 -0800 From: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> Subject: Movement Tracking Systems and Smartcards > helping to solve crimes. I expect the Big Three of credit-reporting > agencies are of course also in the loop....those movies where someone is > located because they foolishly used an ATM machine to get some cash or used > their credit card are not just fiction.) Exactly. I was interviewed over a terrorist double-murder in 1993 because of having used an ATM near the scene the same day. The fact that I did so AFTER the explosions by which time the terrorists would presumably be far away cut no ice. Nobody has been arrested for this AFAIK. They wanted to know which shops I'd bought what in so they could check said items were sold that day I suppose. As it seems nothing can be taken as read in some minds let me state I had nothing to do with that or other terrorist crimes. -- Peter Allan peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk

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Sports Statistics to Be Regulated Under WIPO Treaty (fwd)
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Sun, 10 Nov 1996 11:30:41 -0600 >Reply-To: telecomreg(a)relay.doit.wisc.edu >Originator: telecomreg(a)relay.doit.wisc.edu >Sender: telecomreg(a)relay.doit.wisc.edu >Precedence: bulk >From: James Love <love(a)tap.org> >To: Multiple recipients of list <telecomreg(a)relay.doit.wisc.edu> >Subject: Sports Statistics to Be Regulated Under WIPO Treaty (fwd) >X-Comment: Requests (UNSUBSCRIBE/HELP) to: listserver(a)relay.doit.wisc.edu >MIME-Version: 1.0 > >----------------------------------------------------------------- >Info-Policy-Notes - A newsletter available from listproc(a)tap.org >----------------------------------------------------------------- >INFORMATION POLICY NOTES >NOVEMBER 10, 1996 > > Government Proposes New Regulation of > Sports Statistics and other "facts" > > James Love > Consumer Project on Technology > http://www.essential.org/cpt > love(a)tap.org; 202/387-8030* > >November 10, 1996 > >This issue of INFO-POLICY-NOTES was formatted in 12 point >courier, with 1 inch margins. An HTML version of this note is >available at http://www.essential.org/cpt/ip/wipo-sports.html > > > INTRODUCTION > > Sports fans in the United States will be surprised to learn >that U.S. Government officials are pressing for the adoption of >an International treaty that will (if enacted) significantly >change the ways sports statistics are controlled and >disseminated. The treaty isn't specifically directed at sports >statistics -- it is a much broader attempt to create a new >property right in facts and other data now in the public domain - >- but it will have an enormous impact on the legal rights >exercised by the National Football League (NFL), Major League >Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association (NBA), the >National Hockey League (NHL) and virtually all other professional >or amateur athletic leagues. [The same treaty will radically >affect the way that stock prices, weather data, train schedules, >data from AIDS research and other facts are controlled, but this >note will focus on the issue of sports statistics, a topic that >illustrates the broad impact of the treaty]. > > This comes at the same time the NBA and other sports >franchises are stepping up their efforts to control the real time >dissemination of sports statistics through the Internet or with >wireless paging devices. [See, for example, >http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,3208,00.html] The treaty, >however, addresses different and much more fundamental issues >regarding ownership of information. > >If the treaty is approved and implemented, sports leagues >will have far broader powers to dictate the terms and conditions >under which sport statistics are reported and disseminated. >Nolan Ryan's Earned Run Average (ERA), the number of tackles or >quarterback sacks by Lawrence Taylor, Cal Ripken's career batting >average, Bobby Hull's career assists, the number of steals by >your favorite NBA point guard, and similar information will be >"owned" by sports leagues. According to the proposed treaty (and >legislation introduced in the 104th Congress to implement the >treaty), the NFL, NBA, NHL and MLB will have the right to prevent >anyone from publishing these and other statistics without express >permission from the sports league. This will include the right >to control access to the historical archives of sports >statistics, and even to dictate who can publish the box scores >from a game or print a pitcher's ERA on the back of a baseball >card. > > The proposals for a new legal environment for publishing >facts are outlined in a draft treaty on "databases" that will be >considered at a December 1996 meeting of the World Intellectual >Property Organization (WIPO), in Geneva, Switzerland. [See >www.public-domain.org/database/database.html] The proposal would >require the United States and other countries to create a new >property right for public domain materials. "Texts, sounds, >images, numbers, facts, or data representing any other matter or >substance," will be protected. [See the appendix for a more >complete definition]. > >The treaty seeks, for the first time, to permit firms to >"own" facts they gather, and to restrict and control the >redissemination of those facts. The new property right would lie >outside (and on top) of the copyright laws, and create an >entirely new and untested form of regulation that would radically >change the public's current rights to use and disseminate facts >and statistics. American University Law Professor Peter Jaszi >recently said the treaty represents "the end of the public >domain." > >Copies of the proposed treaty, a federal register notice >asking for public comment, and independent commentary can be >found at: > >http://www.public-domain.org/database/database.html > >WHO IS PUSHING FOR THE DATABASE TREATY? > > In 1991, the US Supreme Court ruled (in the Feist decision) >that the facts from a telephone "White Pages" directory of names, >addresses and phone numbers were not protected under the >copyright laws, and that in general, "facts" could not be >copyrighted by anyone. The Feist decision alarmed several large >database vendors, who crafted this new "sui generis" property >right that would protect facts, and just about everything else. >[The vendors have already succeeded in obtaining a directive on >database proposal from the European Union, although no European >country has yet passed legislation to implement the treaty]. The >most active supporter of this new property right is West >Publishing, the Canadian legal publisher. A West Publishing >employee chairs a key ABA subcommittee which wrote a favorable >report on the treaty. A number of very large British and Dutch >database vendors are also lobbying hard for the treaty. > >West wants the new property right to protect the "page >numbers" and "corrections" it adds to the judicial opinions it >publishes in paper bound books. Telephone companies want to >protect the names, addresses and telephone numbers they publish, >and other database vendors what to protect scientific data or >other non-copyrighted government information they publish. In >seeking to protect these items, the treaty was written to stamp >"owned by" labels on a vast sea of information now in the public >domain. Copyright experts J.H. Reichman and Pamela Samuelson >say it is the "least balanced and most potentially anti- >competitive intellectual property rights ever created." >[http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/iip/reisamda.html] > >There is an active debate within the Clinton Administration >over the proposed treaty. Bruce Lehman, the controversial head >of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is pushing for adoption >of the treaty this December. Most administration official don't >have a clue what the database treaty does. Some people think it >is a minor tinkering with the current copyright law. No one in >the government has sought to understand the significance of the >proposal in terms of the new rights to "own" facts, and until >recently no one was aware that the treaty was so broad that it >would change the way sports or financial statistics were >controlled. > > HOW WILL THE TREATY WORK? > > In Feist, the Supreme Court noted: > > (a) Article I, Sec. 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution mandates > originality as a prerequisite or copyright protection. The > constitutional requirement necessitates independent creation > plus a modicum of creativity. Since facts do not owe their > origin to an act of authorship, they are not original and, > thus, are not copyrightable. > [From the Syllabus of the opinion, at > http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/classics/499_340v.htm] > >Since facts cannot be copyrighted, the supporters of the >treaty have framed this as a new "sui generis" property right, >which will have a separate statutory framework. "Originality" or >"authorship" will not be required. "Texts, sounds, images, >numbers, facts, or data representing any other matter or >substance," will be protected. The information can be stored in >"all forms or media now known or later developed." Both published >and confidential information will be covered. The only thing >required is a "substantial investment in the collection, >assembly, verification, organization or presentation of the >contents" of the protected work. The "rightholder" will have >extremely broad powers to "authorize or prohibit the extraction >or utilization" of the information from the protected database. > >It takes a while for the implications of this new system to >sink in. Some facts can be independently gathered, like the >number of baseball games played in a year, the winners or losers >of a tennis match, or the scores of a football game. For these >data, there may exist several sources for the data. However, >other facts are, by their very nature, only available from a >single source, and will be controlled by monopolies. For >example, baseball leagues employ scorekeepers who determine if a >batter is credited with a hit or if a fielder committed an error, >if a hit is reported as a single or double, or if an errant pitch >is scored as a wild pitch or a passed ball. The league makes a >"substantial investment" in the collection and maintenance of >this data, which it disseminates to the press, and also stores >and maintains in a database, through an arrangement with the >Elias Sports Bureau. These data cannot be independently >collected - and under the proposed database treaty, the league >would own the facts themselves, and could dictate the terms under >which these facts are published or redisseminated. > >The NFL employs four persons who keep track of the play-by- >play action for each game. They write up four separate reports, >which are used to create a single official "box score." The final >product is supervised by the Elias Sports Bureau, as a "work for >hire" product, which is owned by the NFL. The NFL box score is >very detailed, and includes analysis of each play. It records >the league's statistics for the number of yards gained (or lost) >on each play, who is credited with a tackle or a quarterback >sack, or the number return yards on a kickoff or pass >interception, and many other items. While someone who attended a >football game could make an independent estimate of these items, >it would likely be different from the official statistics, due to >the inherent difficulty in measuring or assigning credit for >performance on the field. The NFL's box score is given to the >press, which uses the data to create its own news media reports. > >An attorney who represents the National Football League >(NFL) told us that the NFL has an interest in insuring that there >is an "official" source of the statistics, which are gathered >with an appropriate standard of care and that the NFL "protects >the official designation" of its statistics. These data are used >for making decisions on the Hall of Fame, and to create special >reports and information products, which the NFL provides to third >parties, often for a fee. > >Virtually all of the major league sports leagues have some >system for creating statistics, disseminating the information to >the press, storing the historical data, and marketing the >statistics commercially. Major League Baseball and the NBA work >with Elias, while the NBA and the NHL have their own in-house >system. There is little doubt the process by which these >statistics are generated will qualify for protection, under the >treaty's minimal requirement that the league demonstrate it has >made a "substantial investment in the collection, assembly, >verification, organization or presentation of the contents" of >database. The work-for-hire "media sheets," "box scores," and >other press handouts which report the statistics would be >considered database elements, and reporting of statistics from >these products would be subject to an entirely new type of >licensing and control by the leagues which is far stronger than >that which exists under copyright law. [See appendix]. > >The leagues have various methods of selling their "official" >branded statistics. There are also many competitors who build >databases from a variety of sources, including the published box >scores that appear in daily newspapers, and probably the books >and reports published by the leagues. The leagues do not >currently assert "ownership" in the statistics directly, even as >they try to prevent others from referring to the data as >"official" statistics, but they are trying to prevent real time >reporting of game statistics and situations over Internet or >paging technologies. > >The NBA told us that it permits accredited journalists to >report scores from NBA games three times each quarter, and that >it considers the minute to minute reports a "misappropriation" of >its ability to sell performance rights for the event. The NFL >takes a similar position with respect to its games. STATS, Inc. >is a firm that provides real time scores and play-by-play >descriptors to a variety of online and wireless information >services. According to the NFL and the NBA, STATS, Inc. hires >people to watch television broadcasts of the games, and type the >play-by-play information into personal computers, which are >linked to the STATS, Inc. computer network services. An example >of this type of service that uses STATS, Inc. as a supplier of >statistics is Instant Baseball, available at >http://www.InstantSports.com/. Disputes over the real time >Internet broadcasts of game situations and scores could well end >up before the U.S. Supreme Court, as a test of the first >amendment. In the NBA case involving Motorola, STATS, Inc. and >America Online, the NFL and other leagues have filed amicus >briefs in support of the NBA position, while the New York Times >has filed a brief in support of Motorola, STATS, Inc. and America >Online. > >About two weeks ago the NBA discovered HR 3531, a version of >the database protection proposal that was introduced in the U.S. >Congress last spring. The NBA is looking at HR 3531 to see if it >would provide a legislative remedy for their dispute with >Motorola, et. al. (Like the other leagues, the NBA wasn't aware >of the database treaty until last week.) > >At present, none of the leagues currently prevent anyone >from publishing statistics after a game is over, because it is >assumed that the statistics (facts) are in the public domain, >once the broadcasts are over. But this would likely change if >the database treaty is enacted. One league official told me, "no >matter how appalled I am at this proposal personally, as a civil >libertarian, my client may have interests as a rightholder that >it will want to exercise." A lawyer for the NFL said that the >NFL might not want to do anything - he thought the free >dissemination of statistics brought its own benefits, in terms of >increased fan interest. But he also said, the treaty would allow >the NFL to "do quite a bit of stuff," in terms of new licensing >arrangements or other ventures, if it wanted to. > >As a "sui generis" property right, the database proposal >does not incorporate the fair use principles from copyright that >reporters and value added publishers often take for granted. The >leagues would be able to require license to publish box scores or >other statistics in any media. One can imagine a world where the >leagues wouldn't require licensing of box scores to print based >periodicals like daily newspapers, but that a much more >controlled regimen would evolve on the Internet. The leagues >could require licensing of box scores and other statistics for >Internet publications, or linking to the leagues own web sites, >such as www.nba.com, www.nba.com, or www.nhl.com. The Internet >is, after all, a very easy place to locate and police violations >of intellectual property rights -- through a simple AltaVista >search. This would also likely lead to major changes in the >market for baseball (and other sports) cards, which typically >feature key statistics on the flip side of the card. The new >database extract rights would prohibit any unauthorized >extraction or reuse of data that had economic value to the >leagues (See discussion in Appendix). > >WHAT CAN YOU DO? > >The government is taking comments on the database treaty >through November 22, 1996. If you don't think the government >should rush into a new regulatory scheme for sports statistics, >let them know. You can email your comments to: >diploconf(a)uspto.gov. > >If you want to know more about his proposal, check out >http://www.public-domain.org/database/database.html. > >PS > >Of course, this treaty deals with a lot more than sports >statistics. It will do the same thing for information on stock >prices that is generated by a stock exchange. It will radically >change the market for weather information. There is concern in >Europe over the control over train schedules. Private Schools >could use the new data extraction right to prevent unauthorized >publication of data about its student's test scores or post >graduate placement statistics (both generated from a database). >The treaty would radically change the rights to use information >from gene sequencing, or hospital cost benefit studies. It will >obviously do much much more. > >Since I have tried to keep this note simple, a lot has been >left out. But consider this. The treaty, which was designed to >protect West Publishing's legal reporters, has been written so >broadly that it will define even the daily newspaper as a >"database" element. Since the new property right is additive to >to all rights claimed under copyright, every publisher will claim >the additional protection, by saying each issue of the newpaper >is a database element. (virtually all newspapers today are >archived in databases). The consequences of this are astounding, >since every fact and article in every newspaper will have the new >stronger form of protection, which will not include any public >fair use rights. > >You might ask your member of Congress what the heck is going >on with the treaty, and see if they understand it. > > James Love, Director > Consumer Project on Technology > 202/387-8030; love(a)tap.org > >* I will be out of the U.S. from November 11 to November 20, >attending a conference on the impact of international trade >agreements on intellectual property rights in New Delhi, India, >and will be hard to reach before the 21st. > > >Two law professors who have studied the treaty extensively are: > >Professor Pamela Samuelson, University of California at Berkeley, >Voice (510)642-6775, pam(a)sims.berkeley.edu > >Professor Peter Jaszi, American University, School of Law, Voice >(202) 885-2600, pjaszi(a)wcl.american.edu > > > > > APPENDIX >----------------------------------------------------------------- >Extracts from James Love, "A Primer On The Proposed WIPO Treaty >On Database Extraction Rights That Will Be Considered In December >1996, October 29, 1996, http://www.essential.org/cpt/ip/cpt- >dbcom.html] > > >WHAT IS A DATABASE? WHAT ISN'T A DATABASE? > >The treaty would protect "any database that represents a >substantial investment in the collection, assembly, verification, >organization or presentation of the contents of the database." >This term should be understood "to include collections of >literary, musical or audiovisual works or any other kind of >works, or collections of other materials such as texts, sounds, >images, numbers, facts, or data representing any other matter or >substance" and "may contain collections of expressions of >folklore." The "protection shall be granted to databases >irrespective of the form or medium in which they are embodied. >Protection extends to databases in both electronic and non- >electronic form" and "embraces all forms or media now known or >later developed. . . Protection shall be granted to databases >regardless of whether they are made available to the public. This >means that databases that are made generally available to the >public, commercially or otherwise, as well as databases that >remain within the exclusive possession and control of their >developers enjoy protection on the same footing." > > > >WHAT ARE EXTRACTION AND UTILIZATION RIGHTS? > >"The maker of a database eligible for protection under this >Treaty shall have the right to authorize or prohibit the >extraction or utilization of its contents." What is "extraction"? >Extraction is defined as, "the permanent or temporary transfer of >all or a substantial part of the contents of a database to >another medium by any means or in any form." "Extraction . . . is >a synonym for `copying' or `reproduction' . . . by `any means' or >`any form' that is now known or later developed." > >"Utilization" is defined as "making available to the public all >or a substantial part of the contents of a database by any means, >including by the distribution of copies, by renting, or by on- >line or other forms of transmission," including the right to >control the use of the data "at a time individually chosen by >each member of the public." > >WHAT IS A "SUBSTANTIAL PART" OF THE DATABASE? > >The treaty sets out tests for determining if an extraction is >"substantial," and these tests are both highly anticompetitive, >and extremely broad in scope. > >The "substantiality" of a portion of the database is assessed >against the "value of the database," and considers "qualitative >and quantitative aspects," noting that "neither aspect is more >important than the other . . . This assessment may also take into >account the diminution in market value that may result from the >use of the portion, including the added risk that the investment >in the database will not be recoverable. It may even include an >assessment of whether a new product using the portion could serve >as a commercial substitute for the original, diminishing the >market for the original." > >Then the treaty adds that a "substantial part" means any portion >of the database, "including an accumulation of small portions . . >. In practice, repeated or systematic use of small portions of >the contents of a database may have the same effect as extraction >or utilization of a large, or substantial, part of the contents >of the database." > >In the US implementing legislation, the only types of data use >that would not be regulated would be "insubstantial" parts, >"whose extraction, use or reuse does not diminish the value of >the database, conflict with a normal exploitation of the database >or adversely affect the actual or potential market for the >database." Under this language, a database owner could say that >it might in the future want to charge for each transmission of a >fact or an element of a database as part of its "normal >exploitation" of the database. With the Internet and digital cash >this claim is likely to be made. The public would not have "fair >use" rights, since fair use is only defined in matters involving >copyright. > >FOR HOW LONG? 15 YEARS, 25 YEARS, OR FOREVER? > >The Treaty would require a minimum term of protection (15 years >in the EU proposal, and 25 in the United States proposal) for the >database. But this is extended each time the database is revised >or enhanced. According to the draft treaty, "any substantial >change to the database, evaluated qualitatively or >quantitatively, including any substantial change resulting from >the accumulation of successive additions, deletions, >verifications, modifications in organization or presentation, or >other alterations, which constitute a new substantial investment, >shall qualify the database resulting from such investment for its >own term of protection." > >The provision on revisions raises the specter that protection for >many databases will be perpetual. This could indeed be the case >if the original versions of the database are only "licensed" by >the vendor for a limited period of time, so that the only >available versions would be the new ones, which would have a new >term of protection. [Database vendors write these restricted use >licenses now]. > >+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >INFORMATION POLICY NOTES is a free Internet newsletter sponsored >by the Taxpayer Assets Project (TAP) and the Consumer Project on >Technology (CPT). Both groups are projects of the Center for >Study of Responsive Law, which is run by Ralph Nader. The >LISTPROC services are provide by Essential Information. Archives >of Info-Policy-Notes are available from > >http://www.essential.org/listproc/info-policy-notes/ > >TAP and CPT both have Internet Web pages. > >http://www.tap.org >http://www.essential.org/cpt > >Subscription requests to info-policy-notes to listproc(a)tap.org with >the message: subscribe info-policy-notes Jane Doe > >TAP and CPT can both be reached off the net at P.O. Box 19367, >Washington, DC 20036, Voice: 202/387-8030; Fax: 202/234-5176 >+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >

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Re: Sports Statistics to Be Regulated Under WIPO Treaty (fwd)
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This was my response to the excellent Telecom Regulation posting by Mr. Love. [snip] >If the treaty is approved and implemented, sports leagues >will have far broader powers to dictate the terms and conditions >under which sport statistics are reported and disseminated. >Nolan Ryan's Earned Run Average (ERA), the number of tackles or >quarterback sacks by Lawrence Taylor, Cal Ripken's career batting >average, Bobby Hull's career assists, the number of steals by >your favorite NBA point guard, and similar information will be >"owned" by sports leagues. According to the proposed treaty (and >legislation introduced in the 104th Congress to implement the >treaty), the NFL, NBA, NHL and MLB will have the right to prevent >anyone from publishing these and other statistics without express >permission from the sports league. This will include the right >to control access to the historical archives of sports >statistics, and even to dictate who can publish the box scores >from a game or print a pitcher's ERA on the back of a baseball >card. [snip] > >The treaty seeks, for the first time, to permit firms to >"own" facts they gather, and to restrict and control the >redissemination of those facts. The new property right would lie >outside (and on top) of the copyright laws, and create an >entirely new and untested form of regulation that would radically >change the public's current rights to use and disseminate facts >and statistics. American University Law Professor Peter Jaszi >recently said the treaty represents "the end of the public >domain." > I couldn't be more pleased that sports and greedy corporations which are fixtures of American life are pushing for these draconian measures. I hope they pass with the strongest possible language and penalties and will support same. A broad section of the populace now takes this information for granted. They will be outraged their elected representatives pass measures which noticably limit their access to 'public domain' information which are part of their daily lives. This will serve to expose many of our elected as the special interest puppets they are and align the common citizen with the cypherpunks. This, in turn, will undermine confidence in our 'unrepresentative' government and its authority. Best of all it could lead to populist boomerang legislation which emasculates current copyright law and via widespread and flagrant 'civil disobedience' regarding copyright on the Net. I'm rubbing my hands in anticipation. PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Lamarr Labs | Voice: 1-702-658-2654 7075 West Gowan Road | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Internet and Wireless Development Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne, Libertarian, for President. http://www.harrybrowne96.org

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Computer hacker tries to hire rapist: Police
by reagle＠rpcp.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm sure many people will be pleased with the term "computer hacker" to describe someone with an AOL account getting stung...(those insidious hackers will stop at nothing...) BOSTON (Reuter) - A Vermont man who used a computer online service to try to hire someone to rape and sexually mutilate his wife unknowingly employed a policeman for the job, the Massashusetts Attorney General's office said Thursday. Harold Clarkson, 50, was charged with two counts of hiring someone to commit kidnapping and sexual assault. He faces a maximum of 10 years in prison, police said. Clarkson, identifying himself on the America Online service as ``Trudy21'', a 21-year-old woman from North Carolina, said he wanted to hire someone to kipnap his sister, beat her with a baseball bat, rape her with a champagne bottle and commit other acts, a spokesman for Attorney General Scott Harshbarger said. Massachusetts State Police Lt. Andrew Palombo, who works for the Attorney General's Office and routinely investigates on-line services, was also logged onto America Online while off-duty. Palombo contacted America Online and discovered 'Trudy21' was Clarkson and the victim was his wife, police said. Palombo then posed as a woman on the online service and contacted Clarkson, who described a variety of sexual torture practices that he would like to perform on a woman, said Robert Sikellis, the Massachusetts attorney general's chief of special investigations. Palombo arranged for a woman undercover police officer to meet Clarkson in Rutland, Vermont, where he showed up with handcuffs, rope, a blindfold and other devices and was arrested Wednesday, he said.

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ENT_ice
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

11-11-96. WaPo Page One: "Preventing Terrorism: Where to Draw the Line? With Militias, U.S. Adopts Preemptive Strategy" This strategy requires aggressive and potentially controversial tactics as investigators infiltrate groups and bring charges on the basis of allegedly criminal plans that are conceived but not carried out. Federal agencies are more willing to launch investigations when people talk about committing violent acts, and investigators are more prone to use ordinary citizens as informants. According to legal experts, the mere discussion of a crime, no matter how fanciful it may be, can constitute a criminal conspiracy. "The classic example is that you are guilty of a crime if you conspire with someone else to stick pins in a voodoo doll in the belief that your enemy will fall dead," said Albert Alschuler, a law professor at the University of Chicago. ----- http://jya.com/entice.txt (13 kb) ENT_ice

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Re: Hello from the Brotherhood
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: darkened-node(a)geocities.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Nov 11 12:20:44 1996 > Hello to everyone from the Brotherhood of Darkness > Oh, joy, just what we need..... How about if you folks go off and do your thing, and leave us to ours? Dave Merriman -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMoapqMVrTvyYOzAZAQFDSQQAoiPhXhSOSJR7nKcCrkiVhue1tIiI2q7n GLZlR5jaWZGV3ONJikWINt09mZqyaAZjuK3hbPqVNJnICOY8LtPYn0Z39oisxacO Kq+WHSavMRHstWqUm/sbknQOW24TINqi1NQs0Rn8nMrOTCYYxcugtmiLrSpgTNJa dt9DMKtOKAk= =AUie -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Rarity: Crypto question enclosed
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: mianigand(a)outlook.net, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Nov 11 12:31:25 1996 > > My simple question is regarding key/certificate distribution: > > > > Is there any particular reason that such can't be > accomplished via > > on-line lists, and made available via a service on a port, using > standard > > (textual) commands, like mail and such are now? > > It's possible to have a key-server listen on a port and accept > requests, then it would > fork a process, process the result, and return an answer set. > > But how many CPU cycles would it take for a machine to process a > request, ie going through > 1000 of keys? I am not exactly sure, it took a long while on my > pentium. > > In my opinion, if I were to run a key server as a service, with > clients connecting and requesting a key > it shouldn't take more than a minute to get a responce. > Agreed - a proper search algorithm should yield an answer in a few seconds, at most. > > The things that come to mind are a 'client' request for a > key, a > > 'client' submission of a key, an external host requesting a key > exchange, > > and the host itself requesting a key exchange with another system > (only > > new/changed keys being swapped). > > Had the exact same idea, but came up with an interesting concept. When > a person submits a key, a PGP process is spawned yeilding the > following information 1.) The name (peponmc(a)cris.com) 2.) The real > name (Michael Peponis) 3.) The key size 4.) Creation date of the key > 5.) Key finger print > > This information, along with the acutal key would be inserted into a > SQL Database table > > With a structure similar to this ... <deletia> ... The reason I brought the idea up here was in the hope that others on the CP list could help work out the fussy details of the protocol: what info would need to be included for what types of exchanges, what port(s) would be good to work with, etc. Platform/implementation would be subject to considerable variation - but the idea would survive (hopefully :-) > > It's not that hard, it's performance that's more of an issue. The > beauty of my approch would be that initially, there would be alot of > "Add" requests, resulting in many PGP processes running on the box, > but eventually, they would tapper off. Again, implementation on any particular platform using any particular OS would be up to the afficionados of said platforms/OS's. I'm more interested in the CP list coming up with the protocol/standards. Dave -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMoasIsVrTvyYOzAZAQEkTAP+JQtMdr5x+Wz4s6SXchgA4ow3+P9WLpzs JpjXRbNeHspJ2btlAe4pSgRqSp9oygqJ6Nxpa6DFOC4uB6sl3NaOw8tzcVVJm8GN +QsGP3KBoeTtRh1xE5yUsFoWmGWSqtDLLhu7bU34TaryLBU/Hvj2mOQXqwXhQlvE FhE5VETJJ2o= =LG7t -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:51 PM 11/7/96 -0800, Peter Hendrickson wrote: ... >In practice I suspect that good stego is hard. You don't have to be >right every time when you look for it, just some of the time. When >you see packets that seem kind of funny to you, the judge issues you >a warrant and you search the suspect's house and computer very carefully. >If stego is in use, the software that generated it can be found. Then >you hand out a life sentence. ... I have heard of trojan horses as being destructive little programs that are disguised as some other application. This is most certainly true. A scenario for you. The police gets that court order and they raid my house. They confiscate my files. They look over every piece of software. Alas, they find nothing, although there do seem to be some nice games. Unknown to them, when I run that little doom type game and come to the first switch, I press Ctrl, Alt 6 and I get a nice little stego routine that allows me to copy any file into any other file. They didn't find it because the program and associated files run for about 6 Kilobytes, All of the prompts are found in the game, ("Hint: enter your card key at the food processor for extra health." print characters 7 - 27), and the game isn't obviously designed for the manipulation of files, with the exception of those that come with the game. This would be a DESTRUCTIVE little trojan horse, even though it didn't destroy one file.

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Re: criminalizing crypto use
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:18 AM 11/8/96 -0800, Greg Broiles wrote: >At 04:43 PM 11/7/96 -0800, Tim May wrote: > >>* Intent. It's hard to imagine someone being imprisoned for using >>cryptography, except perhaps in wartime conditions. I may be wrong. Also, >>there are deep Constitutional issues we haven't been much discussing. > >One change I suspect we'll see sooner or later on the Federal side is an >amendment of the Sentencing Guidelines to include an upward adjustment for >the use of encryption to frustrate law enforcement efforts. This wouldn't >be a conviction for using crypto, but would result in harsher penalties for >people convicted of other crimes where they happened to use crypto in a way >connected with the crime. (Keeping child porn or records of a forbidden >business on an encrypted disk volume, using PGPfone to conspire across long >distances, etc.) > >As an example, less than a year ago, Congress directed the Sentencing >Commission (a sub-branch of the federal Judiciary) to amend the guidelines >to enhance the penalties by at least two levels for using a computer to >advertise or "ship" a visual depiction of child porn. Pub. L. 104-71, Sec. >2 (12/23/95). > ... I myself have heard of people getting tougher sentences for monitoring police bands during the commission of a crime. It seems that using a scanner while committing a crime is itself a crime, at least around here.

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:02 AM 11/8/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: ... >You know, I've always wondered, how did the genie get in the bottle in the >first place. Someone must have coaxed him in there. ... Yes, they told him that it was for his own protection and that if he didn't do it, no one else would either. They told him that it wasn't nice, but it was far better than what he would be enduring if he stayed outside. Upon being released, however, he had the insight of the confinement. You can fool a being once easy enough, everyone has to learn somwhow. Its much harder to fool that being a second time, they know better. Like someone said, the government has to act now before the people know better.

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FW: Validating a program
by James A. Tunnicliffe 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>> My question is as >> >follows: If PGP and DES are as secure as thought to be, then why is it >> >not ruled illegal software, just as they do with silencers, narcotics, >> >certain type weapons, etc..... > >[snippo] > >> Why does it follow that these must be crackable, or the government would >> have outlawed them? Despite recent moves to limit encryption, there are >> currently NO domestic (U.S.) restrictions on crypto. Nothing prohibits >> you from using a true One Time Pad, which is mathematically proven to be >> unbreakable, now and forever, even against infinite resources. If this >> is not prohibited (and it isn't), doesn't that refute your argument? > >Dale Thorn replies: >This is a misleading challenge. There's a helluva difference between the OTP >and a >Public Key system. If, for example, it can be proven that I can crank up PGP >to its >most cryptic level, and send the OTP overseas with "absolute security", so >that I >can now send messages with the OTP which was crunched with PGP's highest >security, >then that would mean something. > >My point here is that Ed was asserting that PGP, DES, etc., must be >crackable, otherwise the U.S. government would have ruled them illegal >(domestically). I pointed out that one can legally own and use a true OTP >with impunity in the U.S., despite its unquestioned unbreakability. >Therefore, his argument falls. If it made sense, the USG would have AT LEAST >outlawed OTP's (which they most assuredly cannot break). > >Just so there's no misunderstanding: > >1. The OTP is absolutely unbreakable. (if done correctly) >2. The OTP encryption cannot be decoded on the other end unless you can >deliver the > OTP to the person on the other end by a secure means. >3. PGP, which is not usually used at its highest level of security (for all >bits in > a message), *will* be used at its highest level of security to send the >OTP to the > person on the other end. >4. The OTP arrives on the other end, completely safe from snooping. > >Now you see the problem. #4 above can't be assured, and that is why Ed says >that PGP >is not shut off "right now", because it's probably not "really secure". > >I'm not sure what you're claiming here, or what point it is intended to >demonstrate. No matter the strength of PGP, delivering a OTP in this fashion >would render it no longer a OTP. Besides, this scenario makes no sense. In >any case, there is no restriction I know of in sending encrypted data (or >even One Time Pads) to whomever you choose, by whatever means. (Granted, if >you send encrypted traffic to khadafi(a)libya.gov, or dispatch couriers with >briefcases handcuffed to their wrists, you might invite suspicion...) > >Could you clarify the point you're making above? > >I'm amused to think that, in a nation armed with 20,000 or so nukes, the >paranoid of >paranoid nation-states as it were, some of the erstwhile intelligent citizens >think >that the U.S. military are just sitting around wringing their hands over the >"fact" >that the citizens have "unbreakable" crypto. > >Bear in mind the Scientific American articles on Public Key crypto back in >the 1970's. >The military knew the score back then, and if you think they just sat back >and allowed >all this to happen, well, sorry, I don't believe in Santa Claus or the Easter >Bunny. > >Well, while the feds are no doubt powerful, they ARE subject to the same laws >of mathematics as the rest of us. While it is _possible_ they know much more >about factoring than the rest of the world, I find it unlikely that they are >advanced enough to factor 2000-bit numbers. (I can't prove it, just as I >can't prove they don't know how to make their agents invisible.) > >And they didn't just sit back and allow this information out -- witness >Bernstein, et. al., and all the continuing ITAR/GAK fallout. Of course, I >expect that some will claim this is just for appearance's sake, so as not to >make it obvious that they can actually read all our thoughts directly, using >technology they got from the Greys from Zeta Reticulon... > >Tunny >====================================================================== > James A. Tunnicliffe | WWWeb: http://www.inference.com/~tunny > Inference Corporation | PGP Fingerprint: CA 23 E2 F3 AC 2D 0C 77 > tunny(a)Inference.com | 36 07 D9 33 3D 32 53 9C >====================================================================== > >

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DOUBLE the Reward for Errors in _Digital Cash_
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last week, I offered $10 for the first person to report any technical errors in the first edition of my book, _Digital Cash_. I got many good suggestions for additional topics to add to the book, but not one mention of any errors. So I'm doubling the reward. $20 for the first person to report a technical error to me. The details and restrictions follow this message. I would also like to encourage people to continue to send suggestions. If you thought some topics were covered too lightly, let me know. This isn't a technical error, but I reserve the right to reward you anyways. Also, I hope that any company with new or improved products will write. One of the biggest problems I've found in researching the book is finding the right person to contact in a company. So I encourage you to volunteer. --Peter Wayner (pcw(a)access.digex.net) 1) The offer may withdrawn at any time. Check my web page for any changes. 2) The offer could be increased at any time, but it probably won't be. So don't push your luck waiting for more money. 3) My decision on the "first" person to send me a technical error is final. I may choose to reward both people if it is clear that they found the error independently. The limitation is necessary to keep people from telling their friend, "You want $20? Just send this email message to this guy." 4) My decision on what constitutes a technical error is also final. Errors in grammar or word choice are not rewarded. But you're free to write about them. It's not that I don't want to hear about them. I just think that the concept of "grammatical error" is so ill-defined that I don't want to get in arguments in that domain.

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