December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Mailing list liability (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From markm@gak Sat Nov 9 21:03:24 1996 > > Note that none of these say anything about any commercial service being held > liable for defamatory statements because the service cancelled a user's > account or prevented a user from posting in certain areas. I really don't > see why you consider unsubscribing someone from a mailing list the equivalent > of monitoring posts and exercising editorial control. It is exactly editorial control because it prevents, a priori, submissions by Vulis under that account. He is FORCED to resort to other means. That is what the courts will see, it is what the jury will see, and it is what will eventualy sink the list, and place its operator under financial burden for years. I joined this list under my own volition, I agreed to no review by the list operator at any time. I did not agree to not hurt his feelings with my comments or views. I did not agree to agree with the operator of the list. I did not agree to make him feel warm and fuzzy inside. I agreed to NOTHING other than my permission for him to put your submissions in my email box. The only way I can be removed from this list and not open the operator up to legal consequences is by my own volition or the total cessation of this list. This applies to every member subscribed so long as their is no proviso posted at subscription time. They were held liable for the comments of their users BECAUSE they demonstrated editorial control. In removing Vulis from the list he has demonstrated editorial control. Prior to this act he was immune from rantings and ravings of the various idiots on this list. Now he is not. The fact that it was a commercial service was irrelevant and not an issue in the court cases. What was involved was the responsibility of the service operators, the agreement between service and users, and who had editorial control (users v service). And finaly, if your contention is that if you set up a press and start cranking out flyers (digital or otherwise), which defame or otherwise liable, you are immune from prosecution unless you are a business then you are in for a very rude surprise. Sooner or later somebody is going to submit a posting which will go through. That posting will be pointed at a particular personality. That personality will take exception and sue the list operator, and because of this action will have a very high chance of winning. Not only does the list operator loose but we all loose because it is going to set a precedence that will take many years more to recover from. I seldom get personal but there are a few of you folks that have your heads up your collective crypto-anarchy asses. Here is a simple process whereby you can protect yourself from legal reprisals and you don't take it. God help you because the courts shure as hell won't. In case you people don't get it, the whole point is to REDUCE the influence and control of the government (local, state, and federal). NOT to give even more fodder to shoot. For a list operator a primary if not the primary goal is to avoid any legal involvement at all costs. Throwing people off lists with no subscription limitations is not the way to do that. To be a succesful list operator your scruples and the way you treat your subscribers MUST be beyond any reproach. The bottem line is that the act was not professional and impacts the image of mailing lists, Cypherpunks, its operator, and its members in a negative light. I have operated BBS'es and mailing lists since '76 and find such actions on the part of a fellow service operator to be insulting to the profession that I have enjoyed for 20 years. Those of you who contend that because there is no explicit contract between operator and subscriber this is sufficient to allow the operator to enact any policies they wish with no warning or other consideration are in for a nasty surprise. You will find that this will in fact prevent a list operator from doing anything other than upgrading software, buying more disk space, and paying the bills because that is the ONLY way they will be able to retain commen carrier style protections. Without that protection a list operator is faced with reviewing every submission to a list prior to redistribution or face the legal and financial consequences. I do not wish to see the Cypherpunks mailing list to become that litmus test. Consider this, the Cypherpunks mailing list is a very public list in many ways it is the vanguard of what tomorrows net will be like. Is this the sort of environment that can survive? With this as the current list policy I think we are all taking part in a dinosaur. Jim Choate

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Apartment complex burnt down... (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Sat, 9 Nov 1996 20:53:02 -0800 > From: nobody(a)cypherpunks.ca (John Anonymous MacDonald) > > Suppose Bob lives in an apartment complex. By accident the whole building > burns down. > > Bob manages to escape, but all his papers, including passport, IDs, > credit cards, acount numbers, etc etc gets destroyed. > > What can Bob do? Would the government help him? > > It seems like he'd be in a really unfavorable position... I was there 2 years ago. The Red Cross is about the only group you can count on other than family, friends and a church (if you happen to belong to one). Getting another drivers license was a easy operation. Head down to the local DPS office and request a replacement card for a lost license. The titles and such for property and auto were tedious but not impossible. I didn't need to show anything other than my drivers license and pay the requisite fees to obtain new copies of the deeds. In general the governmental types of documents and such were easy to replace. I personaly had all the necessary copies of the documents I needed within a month or so. The personal items were impossible to replace and caused the most emotional turmoil. In many parts of the country the Red Cross is delepeted both in operating funds and volunteers. If you can, please consider giving them your support. I personaly didn't use them but both my roomies did. Jim Choate

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Re: His and Her Anarchies
by drose＠AZStarNet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> wrote: [...] >While many, many >women have harrassed me on the road for my driving, they (unlike men, w/o exception) >have *never* tried to threaten me directly, as have hundreds of men. Might all these hundreds of threatening men and many, many harassing women be trying to tell you something? [...] >I would suggest to any man that if he lived >in a society where a whole class of humans (i.e., female) were more aggressive and >confrontational, more domineering, etc. than he and nearly every other man he knew, >he would probably learn how best to get along with that other class of persons without >constantly butting heads with them. Dale Thorn, meet Oprah, RuPaul, Hillary Rotten, Roseanne, Andrea Dworkin, Winnie Mandella, etc. Now back to S. Logan, Vulis, AP, whatever.

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Apartment complex burnt down...
by drose＠AZStarNet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 9 Nov 1996, John Anonymous MacDonald wrote: >Suppose Bob lives in an apartment complex. By accident the whole building >burns down. > >Bob manages to escape, but all his papers, including passport, IDs, >credit cards, acount numbers, etc etc gets destroyed. > >What can Bob do? Would the government help him? Why? >It seems like he'd be in a really unfavorable position... Umm-hmmm. Calling Sunkyong Moon-Yip (sp?): List please off him getts.

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ideal secure personal computer system
by tom bryce 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's a question: if one were designing for oneself a secure personal computer system, for use in, say, word processing, spreadsheet, communications, the usuals - what system would one purchase and how would one set it up? For example, on the Mac I would envision this as the ideal system: (1) Get a power mac (2) Partition the hard drive into two partitions: install the system folder on one and a copy of CryptDisk make this the startup partition and make it READ ONLY with aliases to folders you want to be modiyfable (such as Eudora Folder in the sys folder) place these folders on the encrypted partition (3) Completely fill the other partition with a CryptDisk file so there is no room for other stuff to be written. Adjust the partition size if needed. (4) Install a screen saver (such as shareware Eclipse) that will password lock the screen after a few minutes of inactivity, and set CryptDisk to dismount the external partition after a few minutes of inactivity (or longer) This would be a basic setup. If one had more complex ideas, such as setting it up so casual onlookers would not notice the system was protected, you could do things like have a decoy normal partition with system folder to boot from by default, to be bypassed with an external locked system folder disk, after which one could dismount the decoy partition and mount the encrypted partition. If locking the startup volume turns out to be too much of a pain, one could install trashguard from Highware software and set it to triple overwrite deleted files, and otherwise not lock the startup partition. How would things work on Windows 95? I imagine most of the old DOS-based encryption utilities may have compatibility problems with W95. What would a similar ideal system be for a PC? Tom

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Black markets vs. cryptoanarchy
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cryptoanarchy will have arrived when you can openly _advertise_ these services and still stay in business indefinitely. Most of the things we talk about - even Jim Bell's assassination market - already exist, but they cannot be advertised. You have to go looking for them, at some risk to both buyer and seller. If the seller is visible enough for you to find him, he is visible enough to get caught. For example, there is plenty of 'pirate' material on the net, but it tends to go away as soon as the addresses become well-known. Cryptoanarchy will be here when you can advertise yourself as a distributor of pirate software (or anything else you want to sell), do business with a publicly known contact address, and still not get caught. 'Black markets' exist due to the inability to do this. Currently the techniques of anonymity are limited to two: indirection for source anonymity and broadcast for recipient anonymity. We are more or less where crypto was before the invention of public key. You can gain security by spreading risk among multiple parties (key distributors for crypto, or remailers for anonymity) but you can't 'make your own anonymity' like you can make your own security with public key crypto. A theoretical discovery is needed particularly in the area of recipient anonymity. Good sender anonymity and weak recipient anonymity leads to 'hit and run' behavior such as spamming email and newsgroups, but not to anonymous markets. Mike > >Crypto-anarchy benefits the poor more than the rich. The underlings > >of society are going to love it. > > In fact, they basically already practice it. Not with computers, of course, > but in terms of not reporting cash income, not reporting tips, engaging in > barter work with others, and gambling in various non-sanctioned markets. > > (Numbers games and sports betting are huge markets. Interestingly, such > markets also validate much of what we say about "reputations." After all, > when was the last time you heard about a bookie being sued in court for not > paying up? And private justice is administered, as welshers are disposed of > directly, without a long, expensive trial. Nearly everything in "crypto > anarchy" has direct parallels in "underworld and black markets." Some say > they are really the same thing. Perhaps.) > > --Tim May

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RSA and me...
by gt＠kdn0.attnet.or.jp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

'Lo. Is the "RSA in 3 lines of Perl" a munition (under ITAR)? What if I got it as a tatoo? _______________ - 2[b]||!2[b], what's the question? It's a tautology! - PGP key now available on finer keyservers everywhere.

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Hello from the Brotherhood
by Darkened-Node 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello to everyone from the Brotherhood of Darkness Fellow Cypherpunks: Please visit our site at: http://www.ilf.net/brotherhood/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Darkened-Node Executive Member -THE- -BROTHERHOOD- -OF DARKNESS- Comments or Questions? Darkened-Node(a)Geocities.com ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: a retort + a comment + a question = [RANT]
by SUCRUM22_at_INDY-ADP＠smtp-gw.cv62.navy.mil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------------------------------------------------------------------- dave kinchlea wrote: >As said in "Hair" (the movie), "Don't do it for me man, 'cause >if the shoe was on the other foot, I wouldn't do it for you!" >It's a lie anyway, you do it for yourself. That's an _easy_ judgment to make (and i definitely have to stop adding anecdotes from my life in these things!), but you missed the point - the freedoms the Cpunks diligently try to preserve (or seem to want to create...) are protected _by_ the military. who was it that said: "law, without force, is impotent" -? keep in mind that even "bad" laws have to be enforced. you can scream all you want about "good, strong" cryptostuffs, but if the phone lines are slashed, the satellite links are down, the elcerticity is off and you've got a foreign soldier waving a .45 around - just how are you going to boot up that pretty little computer and make it encode information for you, much less get it anywhere? anarchy implies ruthlessness - you going to practice cryptostuffs from a prison cell? was i assuming that you've read the book and/or seen the broadway play, "Hair"? OHHHHH - i'm sorry - you saw the _movie!_ shame on me. ---------------------- SUCRUM22(a)cv62.navy.mil ----------------------- a calculated risk based on the possible consequence of an action is better than a haphazard one based on poor judgment or ignorance --------------------------------------------------------------------- Don't confuse my views with those of the DoD or the United States Navy

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Small question about the list
by MatriX Spider 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I've been around the Cypherpunk list for a couple of month now and it don't correspond exactly to what I've expect. I would be realy happy if someone could tell me the adress to remove my name from the distribution list. Could anyone send me the procedure on how to remove my name of the list ? Thanks for your time and for your help, MatriX.

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Re: Timmy
by .echo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) >Organization: Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y. >Comments: Dole/Kemp '96! You can remove Dole/Kemp from your email headers, since the election is past. =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= .echo echo68916(a)delphi.com

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Re: Black Unicorn exposed?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:30 PM 11/9/1996, Robert Hettinga wrote: >At 12:45 pm -0500 11/9/96, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >> We are hardly operating in a hostile environment. Yet, somebody >> who has apparently gone to some effort to have an anonymous >> identity has been exposed. The implications of this are worth >> considering. > Nope. Sorry, Pete. Hope you didn't throw out your sholder, swinging for the > fences like that. ;-). Phew! While this news leaves me looking foolish, I am relieved. Now for my real question: Does the One True Cypherpunk really have a black unicorn on his coat of arms? Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: Legal Deffinition of Encryption?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:17 PM 11/9/1996, Mark M. wrote: >On Sat, 9 Nov 1996, Benjamin Grosman wrote: >> I have absolutely no idea: this is a very interesting problem. Not for just >> compression and encryption differention legally, but also, well, ANY other >> data form. If one defines a new format for saving data (i.e a new image >> format), and then exports this technology from the USA, is this exportation >> of munitions due to it's unknown qualities? Or what? >> I know that in Australia there have been problems defining electronic data, >> especially pictures (usually porn), for the purposes of prosecution. >> Because, really, a pornographic picture is no more than 1's and 0's arranged >> in a different way by a different algorithm. >> Thus I think it most likely that the law would try and approach it from the >> direction of the algorithm that saved the data and the intent with which the >> algorithm was written. >> Otherwise, I don't know. > I can't define encryption, but I know it when I see it. They way it will be forbidden is by outlawing the execution of the algorithms. The algorithms (the secure ones anyway) are well defined as is executing them. The legal system has dealt with greater ambiguities than this. An analogy to the drug laws might be useful. We don't outlaw all drugs that cause you to have weird visions and to act strangely. That would be hard to define and would cover a number of legal drugs. Instead, the specific chemicals are forbidden as they are discovered. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: Pseudo-law on the list and libel (fwd)
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:21 AM 11/9/1996, Jim Choate wrote: > The real issue here is that folks on the net want the protection of the 1st > Amendment but they don't want the responsibility that goes along with it. > This list qualifies as a press. As a result it has a responsibility relating > to what it distributes. I don't find the word "responsibility" in the First Amendment. You and the courts may decide John has a responsibility to let other people use his computer, but the source of this idea is not the First Amendment. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Pyramid schemes and cryptoanarchy
by Clay Olbon II 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It seems that pyramid scheme spamming has increased of late (if that is possible!). In my lifetime, I can only remember a single snail-mail instance of a pyramid scheme - over the net it is an entirely different story (although the number of instances is probably proportional to the number of lists I subsribe to). With fully anonymous digital cash will come the ability to develop untraceable pyramid schemes. As a staunch believer in the free market, I find laws against these schemes distasteful, quite hypocrytical (i.e. Social Security), and soon to be unenforceable. Pyramid schemes could be a growth market in a crypto-anarchic world. It is yet another market such as gambling, or the lottery, that could be conducted with anonymity. And it appears to be much more widespread on the internet currently, even without anonymity. And unlike gambling or the lottery, the payoffs could increase greatly should anonymity be available. Now, what is the point of this discussion of pyramid schemes? It is to bring to light yet another area that will be untouchable by governments. And I think that it will help continue the development and proliferation of some of our pet projects, specifically fully anonymous digital cash and remailers. Remailer operators could even fund their operations through pyramid schemes (directly, or indirectly through digital postage stamps). I am not, however, advocating spam. I simply see it as a natural extension of current practice, that may actually provide tangible benefits in the near future. Clay ******************************************************* Clay Olbon clay.olbon(a)dynetics.com engineer, programmer, statistitian, etc. Dynetics, Inc. **********************************************tanstaafl

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Real Time Pads (chat modes)?
by kb4vwa＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone know if there is a software that encrypts DES, or triple DES in real time for ie, Chat modes? I think this be a very interesting idea if not already being used. I'm sure the government uses some form of real time pad. Comments? Ed

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Re: Information [for new PGP user]
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adamsc wrote: > On Thu, 07 Nov 1996 07:08:52 -0800, Dale Thorn wrote: > >> >> > I'm a new Cyberpunk! > >> Probably wearing a set of Ono-Sendai eyeballs.... > >> >> > Last, I would like to know once and for all, is PGP compromised, is > >> >> > there a back door, and have we been fooled by NSA to believe it's secure? > >> You can read and compile the source code yourself. > >Really? All 60,000 or so lines, including all 'includes' or attachments? > >I'll bet you can't find 10 out of 1,000 users who have read the total source, > >let alone comprehended and validated it. > That's not necessary - it's the fact that it's possible that matters; most > of us are content to trust the various people who actually have. However, > I'd probably be inclined to look into it seriously if I was going to use it > on anything incriminating or potentially linked to my checkbook... My main point, which is really difficult to make, since software issues are so complex today, is that I've been involved with projects on a similar scale as PGP, where several programmers contributed code to a particular executable program, and when this is the case (especially where the source is not obvious as would be data entry code and the like), it's just not practical for one person working alone, unpaid, to break the source down into manageable chunks and study it and make enough notes so that every portion of it is clearly understood and validated. People in the past have discussed 50 million line Fortran programs to set up jet training simulators and so forth, and by comparison a 60,000 line source in 'C' might look doable, as far as complete annotation is concerned. To illustrate the point, then, I recently had a chance to estimate the cost of converting a non-'C' program to 'C', which would result in a 'C' program of about 6,000 lines, or about 1/10 the size of PGP. My best guess was about 500 to 1,000 hours, and to analogize that to PGP, where I wouldn't be writing or converting code ostensibly, just annotating it, I would still guess 2,500 to 5,000 hours, if the job were done correctly and thoroughly. If the job is not practical/feasible, then IMO I can say it's not doable. OTOH, if some one or a handful of people wanted to make the source code of PGP really accessible to the masses (of programmers at least), they should start with a plan to make sure it's broken down into a heirarchy of functions so that: 1. No one function is too large (say, no more than 50 lines or so). 2. All functions use reasonably short variable names (ex: 'iTrapon'). 3. Variable names are consistent in capitalization. 4. Function names follow the heirarchy and are logically intuitive. 5. Constant and #define names follow a heirarchy as well. 6. Where a choice is possible between setting out a construct that (visually speaking) looks very complex and is difficult to follow, and making it simpler, take the simpler path.

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Proxies
by Vipul Ved Prakash 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there a list of http proxy servers one could go through? I think its a nice [rather sutle] way of achieving web.anonymity without using more apparent anonymizers.... Vipul -- Vipul Ved Prakash | - Electronic Security & Crypto vipul(a)pobox.com | - Internet & Intranets 91 11 2233328 | - Web Development & PERL 198 Madhuban IP Extension | - Linux & Open Systems Delhi, INDIA 110 092 | - (Networked) Multimedia

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Re: ideal secure personal computer system
by Joel McNamara 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

See the CryptoBook link at http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm While the concepts were originally developed for a laptop, they're easily applied to a desktop machine running Win95. Joel >Here's a question: if one were designing for oneself a secure personal >computer system, for use in, say, word processing, spreadsheet, >communications, the usuals - what system would one purchase and how would >one set it up? > >For example, on the Mac I would envision this as the ideal system: > >(1) Get a power mac >(2) Partition the hard drive into two partitions: > install the system folder on one and a copy of CryptDisk > make this the startup partition and make it READ ONLY with aliases to > folders you want to be modiyfable (such as Eudora Folder in the sys folder) > place these folders on the encrypted partition >(3) Completely fill the other partition with a CryptDisk file so there is no > room for other stuff to be written. Adjust the partition size if needed. >(4) Install a screen saver (such as shareware Eclipse) that will password lock > the screen after a few minutes of inactivity, and set CryptDisk to dismount > the external partition after a few minutes of inactivity (or longer) > >This would be a basic setup. If one had more complex ideas, such as setting >it up so casual onlookers would not notice the system was protected, you >could do things like have a decoy normal partition with system folder to >boot from by default, to be bypassed with an external locked system folder >disk, after which one could dismount the decoy partition and mount the >encrypted partition. > >If locking the startup volume turns out to be too much of a pain, one could >install trashguard from Highware software and set it to triple overwrite >deleted files, and otherwise not lock the startup partition. > >How would things work on Windows 95? I imagine most of the old DOS-based >encryption utilities may have compatibility problems with W95. What would a >similar ideal system be for a PC? > >Tom > > > >

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Re: a retort + a comment + a question = [RANT]
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy Sandfort wrote: A brilliant mini essay, which most succinctly answers Samuel P. Huntington's long essay in November Foreign Affairs. And recaps the ancient struggle between "public-governmental" in the "public interest" and "private-anti-governmental" in the "private interest." Those who argue that the public needs protection from internal and external enemies -- "national security" -- gloss over that this ideology has a long heritage as a big-time, self-interested business, or racketeer influenced organized crime, to be blunt. Colin Powellism breast-fed on Fight the Day's Devil milk, like two thousand generations of fundamentalist up-and-comers. For governmental and military and priestly careerism is no different that the profit or organizational kinds. Each have religio-philosophical underpinnings backed by shrewd legislative pie-slicing-and-distribution with crucial physical enforcement to fend off those who didn't get a slice and are hungrily pissed at the collusive exclusion. A lot of this smoke is PR machines blowing hard for each of the Big Bands: Gov, Mil, Com, Org, Edu, Etc. Blurring the distinctions, stealing from one another, swapping personnel and programs, doling out contracts, racing to copy the latest ploy, apology, attack, whine, while securing those ancient by-the-rule perks against the ruthless up-and-comers. Mafia, military, crypto shooters -- taking orders for small kisses of blessing/death, climbing the ladder of earthly reward. Still, global anarcho-bands of mercenary bandits, hmm, what's that 411 for International Terrorist Gun Show -- er, military-industrial showcases of megadeath?

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Cypherpunks, Inc?
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Now why don't the cypherpunks put together something like the item below? In fact, why don't we form some sort of Guild, trademark the term cypherpunks (I'll volunteer) and offer cracking and security products (like the one below) or services? A product security endorsement from Cypherpunks Inc. could carry a lot of weight :-) >From: security.admin77(a)safest.you >To: >Date: Sun, 10 Nov 1996 10:43:01 PST >Subject: Your Email Privacy Has Been Compromised > > > > >This Message Contains Important Information About Violations >of Your On-Line Privacy. > > > >*Email and Online Security Violations.* >Please be advised that information contained in email is similar >to a post card. It can easily be read in transit and does not go >directly from your computer, to the computer of the recipient. >Your message often passes through the hands of countless >computer systems on its path to where you sent it. Because of >this, it can easily be seen by many prying eyes on the way to its >destination. If you are mailing personal, business or financial >data it is unwise to use traditional email. There are many people >on the net who profit by snooping in the open "post card" style >email that most account holders utilize. Programs are readily >available to make this task simple. Additionally, many people >are purchasing mailing lists which contain your email address. >If you do not wish to receive unsolicited email, there are a >number of free and highly effective steps you can take to >recapture your privacy. > >The personal exposure spoken of is not limited to email. If you >make use of other internet services such as the World Wide >Web, your privacy is at even greater risk. Unless secure, any >information you enter on a form can be read in transit, just like >email. Additionally, most of the information providers you contact >on the web routinely collect information about you in high detail. >This information goes right down to where you are located, and >what kind of computer and operating system you use! > >To combat this problem, many countermeasures have been >developed of which most account holders remain unaware. The >on line criminals would like to keep it that way. Every net citizen >needs to learn to stop sending "Post Cards" and stop allowing >distant machines to accumulate large amounts of information >about who they are and their interests. > >There are many simple things you should be doing right now to >protect your privacy. Most of the best countermeasures available >are FREE. This is because there is still a very strong vein of >computer experts on the net who believe in an individual's right to >privacy. There are excellent, completely free programs that you >should be using right now to browse the web in an untraceable >and private manner, and send email that only the recipient can >read! > >You don't need to be a computer expert to use these tools. They >often take little or no additional time and are designed to be very >simple for the computer illiterate to use. The computer gurus >that designed these programs know that it is extremely important >that average net citizens make use of them. They have designed >and continually revised them with that in mind. > >My name is Jeff Martin, my associates and I have spent a great >deal of time researching this subject. It is my goal to provide you >with access to the best resources available to keep your >communications private. My information relates to both email >and other aspects of the internet such as the World Wide Web. >This information was put together because I don't feel that others >are making it available in this form of wide distribution, and it >needs to be done. The internet is just like a city in that you need >some street smarts to keep yourself as safe as possible. That's >the kind of information I wish would have been provided to me >when I began to go on line, and it is what I have tried hard to put >together to help you out. > >In my program you'll learn: > >*How to send email that cannot be traced. > >*How to send email to your friends and associates that cannot >be read in transit. > >*How to post anonymously to Newsgroups. > >*How to browse the web and download files anonymously. > >*Why you should (almost) never send financial information over >the net. > >*How to prevent your name from being gathered and sold for >bulk email use. > >*And Much, Much, Much, More .... > >My package is a treasure trove of valuable information collected >to guarantee your privacy! > >This is the first time I am making this information available. In a >short while, the program will be retailing for $59.95. However, if >you respond within the next 7 days of receiving this message you >will receive the special price of $19.95. Because of the amazing >expansion of the internet, I have decided to make this offer so >that everyone can afford to learn how to protect themselves from >the net's growing criminal element. After seven days you may >still order the program at its retail price of $59.95. > >Additionally, if you order within the next 48 hours, I'll include a >very special report about how you can get a free email address >and account to use from just about anywhere in the U.S. I'll >show you how, but you must order within the next 48 hours! > >HOW TO ORDER >I strive very hard to protect your security. I do not accept >unsecure credit card or check information by email, because it is >too easily intercepted. While this could increase my orders, I feel >that your security as a customer is more important. I am a small >business person and keeping up with phoned and faxed in orders >has proven to be too difficult for me. Therefore I now only accept >orders via postal (snail) mail. Please be certain to give me your >email address when ordering. I prefer to ship orders via email >so that you can have my information as soon as possible. > >To order send a check, money order, or credit card information >(Visa, MasterCard, Discover) to me at: > >Jeff Martin >POB 72106 >Newport, Kentucky 41072 > >Any credit card orders must use the attached form below. >Thank you very much for your time. > >Best Wishes, > >Jeff Martin > > >This information will always be held in the strictest confidence. > > Credit Card: Visa Mastercard Discover > > Card #:______________________________________ > > Expiration Date:__________________ > > Name on Card:________________________________ > > Please indicate amount $__________ ($19.95) or (59.95) > > > SIGNATURE:x________________________ > >DATE:x__________________ > > >Copyright 1996, Jeff Martin. All rights reserved.

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Rarity: Crypto question enclosed
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Sun Nov 10 15:03:35 1996 Sorry that this message doesn't include any flames, "outings", denigrations, or other stuff...... My simple question is regarding key/certificate distribution: Is there any particular reason that such can't be accomplished via on-line lists, and made available via a service on a port, using standard (textual) commands, like mail and such are now? The things that come to mind are a 'client' request for a key, a 'client' submission of a key, an external host requesting a key exchange, and the host itself requesting a key exchange with another system (only new/changed keys being swapped). The way I see it working is similar to (but not as slow as, or requiring the human intervention) of the key servers already existing. Granted that the first few such servers might carry a higher load, but I'd think that would taper off as the (presumably free) software became available, similar to the growth of remailer software (which would seem to be a fairly reasonable relationship....). Hooks into existing PGP-fluent software shouldn't be difficult with a standardized protocol, and I wouldn't think that the servers would be that difficult to code and implement on a 'standard' (consistently used, that is) port. I'm willing to have a try at the first server, if the parameters can be defined. Dave Merriman -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMoV+S8VrTvyYOzAZAQHlMQP/eU3F2JyaQcU6tQ+J5iCdAdPKiBNORJGT chgNauyaH/dHwj+DzcKZzhmjabsICGZjPbJvH+DIvnbGx3eGF1Y2HUAHvt5ab4ww gfPJ7xfjwNUJPyrTQtp7lXVdB5BVfSw/I2lHzSg1ssRvTo4iF+gIoAQypOT1Z617 Fo/c1h77KgA= =pkk/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Another possible remailer attack?
by Steve Reid 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> You want to know if Dimitri is the person regularly posting these >> messages. So, you use your powers as ISP to block his access to all >> remailers. If the public messages suddenly stop then you can be >> reasonably certain that Dimitri was sending them. > I'm not following something...just how to your "powers as ISP" affect a > remailer in, say, Holland, or one for that matter on another ISP? (As a Packet filtering at the ISP's router. If Dimitri can't connect to a remailer, he can't send anonymous messages. Sure there are a lot of hacks that could be done (like have sendmail on another system send it to a remailer) but such things could be detected and blocked by clever filters. In fact, the ISP could just claim to be "going down for maintenance" and completely block Dimitri from the internet for a while. > Just as the Nazis could isolate spy transmitters by selectively > turning off electricity to different neigborhoods, so, too, can various Isolating spy transmitters by selectively cutting power is exactly alalogous to what I have suggested.

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[IGNORE unless your name is Sandfort]
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mail to you currently bounces. Is an alternative address available? -- Forward complaints to : European Association of Envelope Manufactures Finger for Public Key Gutenbergstrasse 21;Postfach;CH-3001;Bern Vote Monarchist Switzerland

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RE: Pyramid Schemes
by John Fricker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Pyramid schemes invalidate the worth of one's word. By gaining financially from one's recommendation said recommendation becomes of dubious trustworthiness. Traditionally, personal experience and anecdotes about products, goods and services have served as reputable guides in consumer culture. By gaining financially from one's word, one is cashing in their reputation. --j ----------------------------------- | John Fricker (jfricker(a)vertexgroup.com) | -random notes- | My PGP public key is available by sending mail with subject "send pgp key". | www.Program.com is a good programmer web site. -----------------------------------

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