December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: AP [was: Re: Kiddie porn on the Internet] [NOISE]
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Indeed it may not be practical to try such a program on current >computers. I've had thoughts for some time about an analogy where each >person in a civilization represents a cell in a single brain, and so on, >so perhaps AP is merely a portion of the program for this "brain". As >to what happens when you try to concentrate a disproportionate amount of >the programming task into a few hands, that appears to be the situation >we have now. For an excellent high-level coverage of 'hive' behaviour in man and machine see Kevin Kelly's, "Out of Control: the raise of neo-biological civilization" (also has significant coverage of us cypherpunks), Addison-Wesley, 1994, ISBN 0-201-57793-3. PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Snoop Daty Data | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Just say NO to prescription DRUGS. "Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive." -- C.S. Lewis "Surveillence is ultimately just another form of media, and thus, potential entertainment." -- G. Beato

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Re: Hallam-Baker demands more repudiations or he'll write!
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:49 AM 9/26/96 -0400, Brian Davis wrote: >On Wed, 25 Sep 1996, Jean-Francois Avon wrote: > >> On 25 Sep 96 at 5:59, Brian Davis wrote: >> >> > I disagree that that will be the response, but you should be willing >> > to allow one group of people to fight fire with fire. >> >> But generally, it has been found a much better solution to fight fire >> with water, and this is why I am not convinced of the ideological >> effectiveness of AP, although I don't doubt it's operationnal >> effectiveness at all. > > >If by "operation effectiveness" you mean some people will be killed, I >agree. I also agree with the fire/water comment (maybe in more ways than >one!); my comment related to my belief that AP-supporters shouldn't >complain about especially draconian measures taken against them by >governments, given their modus operandi. I think you totally missed Jean-Francois' point: Turn your last statement around, and that's how _I_ look at the operation of governments: "Government supporters shouldn't complain about especially draconian measures taken against them by AP, given their modus operandi." I for one would welcome a debate on just such an issue. Remember, to justify the status quo you need to defend not only the comparatively-free governments of a handful of western nations, but in fact each and every government on the face of the earth. Don't think you can just say, "This government is sorta okay," because what I am proposing fixes all the other governments on earth. You can't support the maintenance of an oppressive system most everywhere else, simply because (arguendo) they "sorta" got it right, here. (And I'd argue against that last claim!) Besides, I've long ago given up the idea that the leadership of the US will really, truly attempt to promote freedom around the world. No, they won't. They will continue to support the thugs. The problem they have with overthrowing the thugs is that "what goes around comes around," and they're well aware that they're gonna get kicked off their throne once the precedent is set with a few dozen foreign governments getting replaced. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Hallam-Baker demands more repudiations or he'll write!
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 26 Sep 96 at 10:49, Brian Davis wrote: > If by "operation effectiveness" you mean some people will be killed, > I agree. I also agree with the fire/water comment (maybe in more > ways than one!); my comment related to my belief that AP-supporters > shouldn't complain about especially draconian measures taken against > them by governments, given their modus operandi. I don't think that any of them will complain because they understand the nature of it. I think that Jim Bell (forgive me Jim...:) view that there will be only limited retaliation from government is not guaranteed at all. As I said somewhere previously, the whole thing will depend on how the authorities view AP as (non-) attackable. Here is the post I wrote earlier: ------- earlier post ------- jim bell recently wrote: > Local police action against an AP organization would, of course, be > deterred by the prospect of naming anybody who would go after it, > and soliciting donations against them. I don't agree here. It would all be a matter of timing, unless the number of AP servers would be sprouting out faster than police forces would be able to destroy them. You have to realize that if the money is seized, noboby will be willing to make a hit since the odds of being paid are not too good. Just play the game "Command and Conquer" for a while and you'll see. Money is fuel. Don't run off of it! For that reason, I think that any AP server, *at the introduction of the concept* would have to be a covert operation. Servers could come out in public light when their number be large enough to warrant a strike on anybody trying to eliminate them. Same for the publication of the name of the individuals operating the server. To me, this seems obvious. Comments? To go on along that line, I had the idea that a specific piece of software, a bit like Private Idaho, that would chain remailers but that would be specifically designed to handle predictions, would have be designed. (Pardon my ignorance of the net here) The server need not to be a unique address. Actually, the prediction and any accompanying documents could be splitted a la Secure Split, and sent to N differents servers, M (<N) of which would be required to re-assemble the original prediction. This assures that if one gets closed, the other can rebuild the message. If thoses servers were set up on *large* machines servicing tens of thousands of messages a day, preferably located at a busy remailer location, any exchange of information between them to rebuild the prediction at a central location would not be easy to track by any govt. Comments? ----- end of earlier post ----- Jean-Francois Avon, Montreal QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultant physicists and engineers, LabView programming PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891

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Call for Papers: The Economics of Digital Information and Intellectual Property
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text MIME-Version: 1.0 Date: Thu, 26 Sep 1996 00:13:30 -0400 Reply-To: Law & Policy of Computer Communications <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> Sender: Law & Policy of Computer Communications <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> From: Alan Lewine <alewine(a)DCEZ.COM> Organization: Representing Myself Subject: Call for Papers: The Economics of Digital Information and Intellectual Property To: CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM John F. Kennedy School of Government Center for Science and International Affairs and Center for Business and Government Harvard Law School Institute for Information Technology Law and Policy Harvard University Library Council on Library Resources Coalition for Networked Information The Economics of Digital Information and Intellectual Property Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA January 23-25, 1997 First Announcement and Call for Papers Harvard University is hosting this symposium to broaden and deepen understanding of emerging economic and business models for global publishing and information access and the attendant transformation of international information markets, institutions, and businesses. The goal is to provide managers in public, private, and nonprofit sectors with a practical framework for developing program strategies and assessing the efficiency and competitiveness of new information markets and institutions. It will address questions such as: --What will be the principal pricing models for information in an advanced global Internet? -- How will pricing models be affected by different technological factors and market environments? -- What will be the relationships between classic production costs, transaction costs, and the economic value of intellectual property? -- How will different pricing practices at lower layers affect the pricing of information? -- What are likely long-term trends and scenarios for different pricing models? What will be the effect of bundling or unbundling of information services? -- How will changing cost structures change the allocation of rights between authors and publishers and other intermediaries? -- How will markets for complementary products and services affect the pricing and use of information? -- What are the policy implications of different pricing models? -- How do these reflect policy values associated with different kinds of information? Background: The rapid growth of the Internet and the World Wide Web is trans- forming the way information is accessed and used in business, education, and the home. New models for distributing, sharing, linking, and enhancing information are appearing, often embodied in software or infrastructure. No change is more dramatic than the shift to user-initiated retrieval for text-based information formerly distributed in the form of physical objects by publisher-initiated manufacturing and delivery. A similar shift may be underway for sound and video. However, the considerable differences in bandwidth and storage requirements between text, images, sound, and video may dictate different cost and pricing models in the near and mid-term. As production and distribution costs decline, transaction costs and the value of intellectual property may assume greater prominence. On the other hand, standards and software may work to substantially reduce transaction costs over the long run. With barriers to entry reduced by technology, information markets may become extremely competitive, reducing margins and possibly lowering the economic value of many forms of intellectual property. The Internet and the World Wide Web are characterized by explosion of information along with an explosion of new tools for navigating information. Competition for attention intensifies as companies extend their marketing, sales, and support functions into the Internet. Useful or entertaining information may have greater value in attracting customer attention in an increasingly competitive marketplace for information. Accordingly, it has been argued that information will be valued less as intellectual property and more in terms of the access it provides to other markets and the value it adds to relationships. As a practical matter, copyright may be overshadowed by the growing use of contracts as a means of both securing value and defining expectations in continuing relationships. Positions in simple distribution chains are likely to erode as a result of disintermediation and intense competition. In particular, reduced production costs and the desire to avoid residual transaction costs may force vendors away from complex pricing models. For example, usage-based pricing may give way to subscription pricing. Such dynamics may lead to new institutional arrangements for managing life-cycle costs of information, especially in small markets where users are also producers. Similarly, as production costs decrease, the costs of information may be assimilated by the underlying infrastructure or assumed by users. This trend may be seen in the pricing of online services and in the massive volunteering of content on the World Wide Web. The Web, including software and servers, enables editorial and navigation functions traditionally performed by publishers and libraries to be performed in increased measure by individual authors and end users. Cost analysis in this environment may hinge on identification and evaluation of critical bottlenecks -- with the understanding that many technological limitations may be short-lived. Congestion may lead to new methods of supplementing point-to-point transmissions, such as caching, mirroring, and satellite broadcast. These new mechanisms may raise intellectual property and interconnection questions that may be addressed both as business and policy issues. Congestion may also hasten the implementation of type of service priority at either the network or server levels. Negotiation over quality and scope of service may become extremely complex, and vendors may be tempted to price to as many dimensions of value as possible. However, simple pricing models may have surprisingly strong appeal, as they have had in the analog environment. Sequential distribution windows for motion pictures illustrate the potential for simple price differentiation in a technologically complex environment. Price differentiation is now playing an increasingly important role in the marketing of software and databases. In fact, there may be public policy arguments for price differentiation, not only for reasons of efficiency but to enable some of level of access for those who cannot afford access under standard terms, just as public libraries have offered access for those who could not afford to buy. ***** The Information Infrastructure Project emphasizes communication and sharing of insight among scholars and practitioners with different skills and backgrounds. Papers should be written in a clear, non-technical manner (technical appendices may be permitted) for a mixed, interdisciplinary audience that will include publishers, librarians, economists, lawyers, and policy- makers. Prospective authors should submit short abstracts for review and comment as soon as possible. Extended abstracts or outlines should be submitted by October 15, 1996, to ensure consideration for the program. Acceptances of abstracts and outlines are conditional pending receipt of a satisfactory draft by December 15, 1996. Papers and supplementary material will be published as a volume in the Project's series with the MIT Press. Copyright assignment is not required, and parallel publication of individual papers in journals is encouraged. Please send paper proposals and requests for subsequent announcements to: iip(a)harvard.edu Or send mail to: Tim Leshan Information Infrastructure Project John F. Kennedy School of Government 79 John F. Kennedy St. Cambridge, MA 02138 617-496-1389 Fax: 617-495-5776 leshan(a)ksgrsch.harvard.edu -- Alan Lewine http://www.dcez.com/~alewine/ "[I]n sex as in other areas of life, beware governmental regulation." --Richard Posner, "Sex and Reason" (1992) --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Re: LACC: Encryption and Japan
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:46 AM 9/25/96 +0100, T Bruce Tober <octobersdad(a)reporters.net> wrote: >A few months ago I read an article concerning one of the encryption >gurus (other than PZ) setting up a company in Japan to create a new >encryption program as good as or better than PGP which since it was >developed in Japan, wouldn't be subject to ITAR. Jim Bidzos of RSA did a contractual deal with NTT, who have produced a chip with RSA and Triple-DES implemented on it. I'm not sure the details of the deal, but essentially it's a license to use the patented RSA technology. It's not that it's better or worse than PGP; it's hardware implementations of some of the building blocks PGP uses. The real win of PGP was taking the pieces (RSA public key key-distribution and signatures, hashing, and symmetric crypto (DES,Bass-O-Matic,IDEA)), putting them together into one relatively usable package, and distributing it. The Web Of Trust that you build out of the RSA signatures is also a win, since it lets you build non-hierarchical key distribution, which is especially valuable for non-government-approved lefties :-) as well as letting you build hierarchical military-style approval if you want. But that's all applications of the core technologies - NTT is providing the core pieces that you can build that sort of thing out of. The NTT deal means that non-US manufacturers can build crypto-phones, crypto-faxes, crypto-wide-area-network-muxes, etc., without annoying US local ordinances interfering. If they use it widely, and a flood of such products hit the US, ITAR becomes effectively dead, which may help it become really dead. And if they don't, you can at least get somebody in Japan to build a crypto-virtual-private-WAN router so your company's internal international email and phone network will be untappable. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

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Apology
by webwarrior＠infowar.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

OOPS! OUCH!!! CRASH!!! Yesterday our ListServ underwent emergency surgery and our Web Warriors say all vital signs are stabilized. A complete recovery is assured! We apologize for the inconvenience. Thank you for your understanding. Winn Schwartau and the folks at Infowar.Com Betty G.O'Hearn Information Warfare and InfoSecurity Assistant to Mr. Winn Schwartau http://www.infowar.com betty(a)infowar.com 280 126th Ave. E.#110 Treasure Island, FL 33706 813-367-7277 Voice 813-363-7277 FAX

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A Special Invitation to TV1 Users:
by TV1 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The best things in life are still free-and some of them get even better! Once upon a time, you registered to use TV1, the only personalizable TV listings site on the Internet. If you've been back to the site during the past week, you would have noticed gargantuan, earth-shattering additions to our humble old listings Web site. TV1 has been incorporated into The GIST, a full service home entertainment guide providing in-depth coverage of what's worth watching on TV and the Internet, as well as original features on everything from today's hottest television shows (with audio clips of stars) to reviews of the latest home entertainment hardware. If you've been to TV1/TheGIST lately, we hope you've been enjoying our service, and hope that you don't mind the fact that our graphic improvements now require at least a Netscape 2.0 or Explorer 3.0 browser. Stick with us, and you'll be seeing even more great enhancements during the next month. If you're one of those deprived Web surfers who hasn't seen the site in a few weeks, c'mon back--and see what you've been missing. Our new URL is www.theGist.com or you can still reach us at www.TV1.com. Thanks. We look forward to helping you with your home entertainment choices tonight, and every night. Your wannabee hosts, - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMkrm7SoZzwIn1bdtAQGILAF8DsqSWOeABIYPgOcXwyk6FLores03wa15 LGDwf//VqW+dwIj4XyNvPqGD/CpdE27L =2Ss2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Hallam-Baker demands more repudiations or he'll write!
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:27 PM 9/26/96 -0500, Jean-Francois Avon wrote: >On 26 Sep 96 at 10:49, Brian Davis wrote: > >> If by "operation effectiveness" you mean some people will be killed, >> I agree. I also agree with the fire/water comment (maybe in more >> ways than one!); my comment related to my belief that AP-supporters >> shouldn't complain about especially draconian measures taken against >> them by governments, given their modus operandi. > >I don't think that any of them will complain because they understand >the nature of it. I think that Jim Bell (forgive me Jim...:) view >that there will be only limited retaliation from government is not >guaranteed at all. As I said somewhere previously, the whole thing >will depend on how the authorities view AP as (non-) attackable. > >Here is the post I wrote earlier: > >------- earlier post ------- > >jim bell recently wrote: > >> Local police action against an AP organization would, of course, be >> deterred by the prospect of naming anybody who would go after it, >> and soliciting donations against them. > >I don't agree here. It would all be a matter of timing, unless the >number of AP servers would be sprouting out faster than police forces >would be able to destroy them. You have to realize that if the money >is seized, noboby will be willing to make a hit since the odds of >being paid are not too good. Just play the game "Command and Conquer" >for a while and you'll see. Money is fuel. Don't run off of it! Uh, okay, I didn't mean to suggest that attacks would be entirely eliminated. (The term "deterred" really needed to be quantified there, even for a native English speaker.) But my main point was that (as evidenced by Brian Davis' unwillingness to acknowledge that the people who run the system will engage in illegality to stop AP) there is a certain hesitancy on the part of the "ruling class" to abandon at least the facade of legality that they often promote. > Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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New alias server weasel.owl.de
by Johannes Kroeger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm running the Squirrel Remailer <mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> for some weeks now and finally managed to install a "newnym" style alias server (like nym.alias.net) with the hostname weasel.owl.de. Here is the PGP key: Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID pub 2047/B77F2491 1996/09/07 <config(a)weasel.owl.de>/<send(a)weasel.owl.de> -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.3ia mQENAzIxkrUAAAEH/1mg2l5pTFPwdJZp79M3g+aflsoRFd1QIebXktcg2SIcWc+K nBU0kHRPx53A3SHnUjtAj9ZOOL9LbmSaR6uwYw3voPnOF7cXsyMlG0dNjkJMzCZM UAWAaTB5OcUl2oUrbO+Ceasg94LrDjXCqWf6zxRNgb00SOOopKf+NBtm25wwX1wQ LawWkQeLLMhphCLYwbeLqrMexj9eNsKIxmmEHmD5//crkIa8GVlSatdOV3TDxeNv GOflltDnGXdGxkAu9ck7Wa7ixQwrTr5IxF5jaxTquUyz+qqni/y1/F4dr7brk7Fz VWaqBzlA54Q1oHAM9ptyJKgz+vNFPF2asbd/JJEABRG0Kzxjb25maWdAd2Vhc2Vs Lm93bC5kZT4vPHNlbmRAd2Vhc2VsLm93bC5kZT6JARUCBRAyRtqzvA9InihC/mkB ASScB/99663wchJb55cyiGkxzIvxF8HULc+PCUxY7Dd/+RF+N5vJlW9tG1cInF3+ LmMu9iIdEBj7FOnvSh65gGwiIEasVoFLcA4fXzaGC7Nds6OvwzmURbW4GhmDIPTt OPzUYc3vlyF3/iExRVL/aomL4aKMgMnRIagPkj2wT0G4YVuVvb6pAQ9Z/qDjgIok QEN+yy4NOlwCZQJ4V3TJ/35Fq8dKXkA7eyy4eEK97+VzJOK3ApldEqM71LE7jDtk JjbUBmTOfm0NQDbRlEUnfoSyF9yt/MCE7ranSQ2z0hRrw+z6i4XsxAQljPyE1CLD YX3nIIUhXumsBwSMPPZ7nfiuNFcaiQEVAgUQMkZ6FzxdmrG3fySRAQF0CAf8CMle kOnkwvriif+PdlKnf8rjRtL2H5fk3wg7LmdvpkRzGvJaEtGnToRALEWPujAEY9wg YUnDpMiLWkPEVN1cQz690bvzQdyGVb0x4gDsFbivUIuHA55k9c+9cV08tp+4VqB3 0IQ92p16HfCcLz7Ac+oYPXbLpOceG51mEZLCzu9xeEpk6CbsfQ+GMXXcahqRvJ7Y X1dwCwzHG+toPhC9a3+uLggeh72HJW2dI4ExIHYaKhIK5lO874B6G5XEWpdjnqUl MXIyoaEtYhUaoeEdBE49jKnyTtuQ8DDy+6xOrOE3F3Sc++8F2zNrY/ZJsLsUb5RG EI5u/40s+ASl56KVVw== =Ld7v -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- The following lines should be added to Raph's remailer list: $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; (weasel squirrel) Weasel.owl.de has MX records, but no IP address. You can finger addresses at squirrel.owl.de when it is connected to the Internet. My connection for email is via a UUCP link that is polled every 90 minutes, so do not expect quick turnaround of remailed messages. Please read the help file before using the remailer. You can get it by sending mail to <help(a)weasel.owl.de>. Reports of problems, bugs, abuse etc. should be sent to <admin(a)weasel.owl.de>. C'punks, please mail questions and comments directly to me, as I'm not subscribed to the cypherpunks list. - -- Johannes Kroeger <jkroeger(a)squirrel.owl.de> Send me mail with subject "send pgp-key" to get my PGP key -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: latin1 Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.4, an Emacs/PGP interface iQEVAgUBMkrY3bwPSJ4oQv5pAQGx1ggAxdcMtxQt1K45bijxqPxMQ+ajlIy3TeRB Y5bxSyr1Q0cTMbKx4ausilrzmaPNLpRU8drMuSk7dbRW4ca9Qs/5kiWhtvIluv70 ex2CgcSjJRLtbq3fEPxcRdOGVU0cxYusS9XP5QJSUJv+nHo5k3qWr7L3Ayk8kKhh lU4NJ535u+WX4v+/70d6Xk/9NF7JtN9sSfxjK7bY9vszMFtihXRCQ8fFoDKzjy84 Mgl1zOfeAJv7snhWt2k/CBsKRlFNsMCLSBDg9ADOqs9O+40KoY2+lpewRXvFLp4y VQv4f7wCcbxtnqTgFPeezEWIfO7xBbkhIUIOyETDzo8JeR7EZzEVYw== =N3Y/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Medical Data
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:28 AM 9/25/96 -0500, Phil Fraering <pgf(a)acadian.net> wrote: >Of course, one area where the doctor will continue to hold a patient's >records, instead of the patient, due to the nature of the current system: > >Prescription medication. >Of course, with the really big problems with this stuff, drug >interactions, there's still no system for a doctor to find out what you're >on thanks to another doctor. Which is why it's very important to always >use the same pharmacist. Pharmacists in the US use a nationwide system that keeps track of who's using what. Issues in a system like this include insurance-paid pharmaceutical plans and also tracking politically-questionable pharmaceutical purchasers. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

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ssh - How widely used?
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know if there are MS-Dos or Mac versions of the ssh client? How much is ssh used? I've not seen much discussion of it but poking around an ISP yielded this: Ssh (Secure Shell) a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbi- trary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. and Usage: ssh [options] host [command] Options: -l user Log in using this user name. -n Redirect input from /dev/null. -a Disable authentication agent forwarding. -x Disable X11 connection forwarding. -i file Identity for RSA authentication (default: ~/.ssh/identity). -t Tty; allocate a tty even if command is given. -v Verbose; display verbose debugging messages. -q Quiet; don't display any warning messages. -f Fork into background after authentication. -e char Set escape character; ``none'' = disable (default: ~). -c cipher Select encryption algorithm: ``idea'' (default, secure), ``des'', ``3des'', ``tss'', ``arcfour'' (fast, suitable for bulk transfers), ``none'' (no encryption - for debugging only). -p port Connect to this port. Server must be on the same port. -L listen-port:host:port Forward local port to remote address -R listen-port:host:port Forward remote port to local address These cause ssh to listen for connections on a port, and forward them to the other side by connecting to host:port. -C Enable compression. -o 'option' Process the option as if it was read from a configuration file. Looks like a nice little implementation. Comments anyone? -- I hate lightning - finger for public key - Vote Monarchist unicorn(a)schloss.li

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Internet plug pulled on Colombia's guerrillas
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Internet plug pulled on Colombia's guerrillas 3:05pm EDT, 9/26/96 BOGOTA, Colombia - A Colombian guerrilla group currently involved in a bloody offensive in the mountains and jungles, suffered a setback in its propaganda battle when its new-tech voice on the Internet was mysteriously silenced. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which has periodically paralyzed half the country with road blocks, found its route to the information superhighway barred. The Communist insurgents, who rose up in arms in 1964, embraced new technology last year in their fight to overthrow the government by launching a home page on the Internet. But in unexplained circumstances, which a spokeswoman for the Mexico City-based Internet provider Teesnet said may or may not be linked to external pressures, the plug was pulled on the service Monday -- a day after being publicized in Colombia's leading daily, El Tiempo. The FARC's Mexico City-based international spokesman Marco LeDon CalarcDa admitted the loss of the Internet page was a serious reversal but vowed the computer-age conflict was far from over. "This is an attack on freedom of expression because we were not doing anything illegal. I cannot say exactly how it happened but the hand of the Colombian government is in this," he said. "The FARC is used to difficulties and this is just the latest challenge. One way or another we will get back on to the Internet." The Colombian guerrillas used their worldwide web site to publish their political magazine Resistencia, whose distribution is banned in Colombia, and to offer explanations about their latest armed actions. FARC, labeled narcoguerrillas since the 1980s when U.S. ambassador Lewis Tambs highlighted the group's alleged connections with Colombia's drugs trade, have been dubbed Cyberspace guerrillas since their appearance on the Internet. "Cyberspace guerrillas may seem a fun name but I think it is pejorative and belittles what we're doing," said LeDon CalarcDa. "We are looking to topple the government and set up a new Colombia. "Using weapons naturally comes within the logic of the armed struggle. Just fighting through the Internet would be like shooting rubber bullets. Not using it would be like continuing to fight the army with a 12-bore shotgun," he said. In the four weeks since the FARC unleashed its latest offensive with an attack on a jungle base in southern Putumayo province, more than 150 soldiers, police and civilians have died.

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Re: ssh - How widely used?
by Dana W. Albrecht 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> writes: > Does anyone know if there are MS-Dos or Mac versions of the ssh client? There is no MS-DOS client. The authors claim that, "a Macintosh version is in the works, and first versions are expected to be available in August/September 1996." There are Windoze and OS/2 clients. > How much is ssh used? >From the FAQ: 6.2 How widespread is use of ssh? As with every piece of freely available software, this is difficult to find out. The best current estimates are that at least 1000 insitutions in 40 countries use it. This estimate is based on The number of people on the ssh mailing list, around 600, from 40 different countries and several hundred domains. Each week, the ssh home pages are accessed from roughly 5000 different machines, many of them web caches; also, these machines often are different from week to week. > I've not seen much discussion of it but poking around an ISP yielded this: > > Ssh (Secure Shell) a program for logging into a remote > machine and for executing commands in a remote machine. > It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide > secure encrypted communications between two untrusted > hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbi- > trary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure > channel. [ Snip ] > Looks like a nice little implementation. > > Comments anyone? For further information about it, see: http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh/ There is also a mailing list. Subscription requests should be directed to majordomo(a)clinet.fi with "subscribe ssh" in the message body. I think that it's technically a great program. However, I have heard some pretty unpleasant stories about legal issues using it in a commercial environment. Dana W. Albrecht dwa(a)corsair.com

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PGP interfaces for MS Internet Mail
by ! Drive 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know of any PGP programs that interface well with Microsofts Internet Mail (not Exchange mail) Thanks

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Public domain SHA-1 in C
by Steve Reid 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I've written an implementation of SHA-1 in C. Public domain, so you can hack it to your hearts content and/or use it however you want. You can download it from http://www.edmweb.com/steve/sha1.c It's not hard to use. Allocate a SHA1_CTX, initialize it with SHA1Init() run over the data with SHA1Update() and finally extract the result using SHA1Final(). Or just compile the program as-is and use it to hash files. It's reasonably fast (the 80 core SHA operations look good) but I'm certain that there's room for improvement. Tested under FreeBSD 2.1.0-RELEASE on an i486SX. The three test vectors from FIPS PUB 180-1 hash correctly. ===================================================================== | Steve Reid - SysAdmin & Pres, EDM Web (http://www.edmweb.com/) | | Email: steve(a)edmweb.com Home Page: http://www.edmweb.com/steve/ | | PGP (2048/9F317269) Fingerprint: 11C89D1CD67287E68C09EC52443F8830 | | -- Disclaimer: JMHO, YMMV, TANSTAAFL, IANAL. -- | ===================================================================:) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMksSsNtVWdufMXJpAQFV3AgApaK+upwWtBJZUwq5Pr4cpvjWQcxFHxv6 XEoZmwgwzR94lpjdEK5GPXt7U9HTp+xiwiaeQ7Hjg+iuR/qtofwZlZhQ5EmyBl2M 8rnFSRgwR4NH1y2PwAxQKSo2SaHU8JZ3X3D6Yk1WXAqk90vN8dzQAIa8B409IuhM tBPixrS6d0KsySSOHQkWO7Mqij43wZOnrgikJF3IDCvSf0us8gGC9wZjdIax3Rgr soswtQvT6QpZDZ/+39UiA2RSMFuER/S3NbZZSJdfIGK1XzUeU2MUC4NmURlc/ntz 3B1pd+jovxuHW1D/TQ2jHSIdg1Yol/zeu1OeuuhL37QOQAVkupgVUA== =B73M -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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CWD -- Wiretap In the Night
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 26 Sep 1996 16:32:01 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: CWD -- Wiretap In the Night CyberWire Dispatch // September // Copyright (c) 1996 // Jacking in from the "Smoked Filled Room" Port: Washington, DC -- Federal provisions funding the digital telephony bill and roving wiretaps, surgically removed earlier this year from an anti-terrorism bill, have quietly been wedged into a $600 billion omnibus spending bill. The bill creates a Justice Department "telecommunications carrier compliance fund" to pay for the provisions called for in the digital telephony bill, formally known as the Communications Assistance in Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). In reality, this is a slush fund. Congress originally budgeted $500 million for CALEA, far short of the billions actually needed to build in instant wiretap capabilities into America's telephone, cable, cellular and PCS networks. This bill now approves a slush fund of pooled dollars from the budgets of "any agency" with "law enforcement, national security or intelligence responsibilities." That means the FBI, CIA, NSA and DEA, among others, will now have a vested interest in how the majority of your communications are tapped. The spending bill also provides for "multipoint wiretaps." This is the tricked up code phase for what amounts to roving wiretaps. Where the FBI can only tap one phone at a time in conjunction with an investigation, it now wants the ability to "follow" a conversation from phone to phone; meaning that if your neighbor is under investigation and happens to use your phone for some reason, your phone gets tapped. It also means that the FBI can tap public pay phones... think about that next time you call 1-800-COLLECT. In addition, all the public and congressional accountability provisions for how CALEA money was spent, which were in the original House version (H.R. 3814), got torpedoed in the Senate Appropriations Committee. Provisions stripped out by the Senate: -- GONE: Money isn't to be spent unless an implementation plan is sent to each member of the Judiciary Committee and Appropriations committees. -- GONE: Requirement that the FBI provide public details of how its new wiretap plan exceeds or differs from current capabilities. -- GONE: Report on the "actual and maximum number of simultaneous surveillance/intercepts" the FBI expects. The FBI ran into a fire storm earlier this year when it botched its long overdue report that said it wanted the capability to tap one out of every 100 phones *simultaneously*. Now, thanks to this funding bill, rather than having to defend that request, it doesn't have to say shit. -- GONE: Complete estimate of the full costs of deploying and developing the digital wiretapping plan. -- GONE: An annual report to Congress "specifically detailing" how all taxpayer money -- YOUR money -- is spent to carry out these new wiretap provisions. "No matter what side you come down on this (digital wiretapping) issue, the stakes for democracy are that we need to have public accountability," said Jerry Berman, executive director of the Center for Democracy and Technology. Although it appeared that no one in congress had the balls to take on the issue, one stalwart has stepped forward, Rep. Bob Barr (R-Ga.). He has succeeded in getting some of the accountability provisions back into the bill, according to a Barr staffer. But the fight couldn't have been an easy one. The FBI has worked congress relentlessly in an effort to skirt the original reporting and implementation requirements as outlined in CALEA. Further, Barr isn't exactly on the FBI's Christmas card list. Last year it was primarily Barr who scotched the funding for CALEA during the 104th Congress' first session. But Barr has won again. He has, with backing from the Senate, succeeded in *putting back* the requirement that the FBI must justify all CALEA expenditures to the Judiciary Committee. Further, the implementation plan, "though somewhat modified" will "still have some punch," Barr's staffer assured me. That includes making the FBI report on its expected capacities and capabilities for digital wiretapping. In other words, the FBI won't be able to "cook the books" on the wiretap figures in secret. Barr also was successful in making the Justice Department submit an annual report detailing its CALEA spending to Congress. However, the funding for digital wiretaps remains. Stuffing the funding measures into a huge omnibus spending bill almost certainly assures its passage. Congress is twitchy now, anxious to leave. They are chomping at the bit, sensing the end of the 104th Congress' tortured run as the legislative calender is due to run out sometime early next week. Then they will all literally race from Capitol Hill at the final gavel, heading for the parking lot, jumping in their cars like stock car drivers as they make a made dash for National Airport to return to their home districts in an effort to campaign for another term in the loopy world of national politics. Congress is "going to try to sneak this (spending bill) through the back door in the middle of the night," says Leslie Hagan, legislative director for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. She calls this a "worst case scenario" that is "particularly dangerous" because the "deliberative legislative process is short-circuited." Such matters as wiretapping deserve to be aired in the full sunlight of congressional hearings, not stuffed into an 11th hour spending bill. This is legislative cowardice. Sadly, it will most likely succeed. And through this all, the Net sits mute. Unlike a few months ago, on the shameful day the Net cried "wolf" over these same provisions, mindlessly flooding congressional switchboards and any Email box within keyboard reach, despite the fact that the funding provisions had been already been stripped from the anti-terrorism bill, there has been no hue-and-cry about these most recent moves. Yes, some groups, such as the ACLU, EPIC and the Center for Democracy and Technology have been working the congressional back channels, buzzing around the frenzied legislators like crazed gnats. But why haven't we heard about all this before now? Why has this bill come down to the wire without the now expected flurry of "alerts" "bulletins" and other assorted red-flag waving by our esteemed Net guardians? Barr's had his ass hanging in the wind, fighting FBI Director Louis "Teflon" Freeh; he could have used some political cover from the cyberspace community. Yet, if he'd gone to that digital well, he'd have found only the echo of his own voice. And while the efforts of Rep. Barr are encouraging, it's anything from a done deal. "As long as the door is cracked... there is room for mischief," said Barr's staffer. Meaning, until the bill is reported and voted on, some snapperhead congressman could fuck up the process yet again. We all caught a bit of a reprieve here, but I wouldn't sleep well. This community still has a lot to learn about the Washington boneyard. Personally, I'm a little tired of getting beat up at every turn. Muscle up, folks, the fight doesn't get any easier. Meeks out... ------------ Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> contributed to this report. ###

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Re: An idle thought on CBC and block lengths
by craigw＠dg.ce.com.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well I do believe that your spam would be illegal if that was the case. And secondly there are no laws here in australia that you can use to prosecute me from the US for an email bomb, not that this is one, and if it is than so is your spam. >> It is illegal to use a invalid return email address. If this continues, I >> will >> be forced to prosecute the return email address - which they are >> making to look like you. >Is it? I beleive that if you look closely, you will discover hat all the >laws which would have made lying illegal on the 'Net have now been >repealed by more Federal judges than I can count on 1 hand... ,'~``. \|/ ,'``~. (-o=o-) (@ @) ,(-o=o-), +--.oooO--(_)--Ooo-----oOO-(_)-OOo-------oooO--(_)--Oooo.------+ | | | Soon, we may all be staring at our computers, wondering | | whether they're staring back. | | | | [Network Admin For WPA Business Products. aka doshai >;-) ] | | .oooO http://pip.com.au/~doshai/ Oooo. | | ( ) Oooo. .oooO ( ) | +-----\ (----( )-------oooO-Oooo--------( )--- ) /---------+ \_) ) / \ ( (_/ (_/ \_) Key fingerprint = 2D F4 54 BB B4 EA F1 E7 B6 DE 48 92 FC 8D FF 49 Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key. (if I want to give it to you)

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NIST conference
by P. J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Following is an announcement about a NIST conference on leveraging the distributed nature of the Internet to accomplish tasks that might be otherwise not feasible. The abstract notes that this type of activity has 'important economic, social, and political consequences'. This may already be old news, I was off the list for the past few days. Date: Thu, 26 Sep 1996 15:18:08 -0400 From: Liz Lennon <elizabeth.lennon(a)NIST.GOV> Subject: Cyber Conference Announcement To: csl-bulletin(a)NIST.GOV >Return-Path: <moline(a)sst.ncsl.nist.gov> >Date: Thu, 26 Sep 1996 15:00:46 -0400 (EDT) >From: Judi Moline <moline(a)sst.ncsl.nist.gov> >Subject: Cyber Conference Announcement >To: elizabeth.lennon(a)NIST.GOV >Cc: moline(a)sst.ncsl.nist.gov > > >Event: Conference on Leveraging Cyberspace > >Date: October 8-9, 1996 > >Purpose: People with shared interests are using the Internet to >solve problems, accomplish tasks, and create resources that would be well >beyond the reach of any one person or organization. The ability to leverage >the efforts of large numbers of networked users has important economic, >social, and political consequences. This conference is designed to explore >this phenomenon from both a technical and social science perspective. >Additionally, the closing session of the conference will cap off several >weeks of virtual discussions on the conference's web site. > >Location: Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) > Palo Alto, Calif. > >Keynote by: John Seely Brown, Vice President and Chief Scientist, > Xerox > >Program: Web: http://nii.nist.gov/cyber/cyber_conf.html > >Registration: $200 > >Sponsors: White House National Economic Council > Commerce's National Institute of Standards and > Technology > Xerox Palo Alto Research Center > >Technical contact: Judi Moline, NIST > (301) 975-4601 > email: jmoline(a)nist.gov > >Information: Web: http://nii.nist.gov/cyber/cyber_conf.html > >To register: Print registration form from web site and return with > payment to: > Office of the Comptroller > NIST > A807 Administration Building > Gaithersburg, Md. 20899-0001 USA > > Or fax to: > Lori Phillips, NIST > fax: (301) 948-2067 > > Or: > Lori.Phillips(a)nist.gov > > >

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Re: Hallam-Baker demands more repudiations or he'll write!
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:51 PM 9/26/96 -0700, Declan McCullagh wrote: >Anonymity and nonescrowed crypto are the linchpins of AP and its more >general case, Maysian crypto anarchy. The withering of the nation-state. >Whatever you want to call it. >To prevent it, governments will ban both. A criminal law, passed in the >wake of say a bombing this fall in Washington, DC, banning nonescrowed >crypto. (Freeh will assert he has evidence the terrorists used PGPhone.) >And another law banning online anonymity. >What then, Mr. Bell? While we should continue resist such developments, I (like many others) tend to believe that the government is going to have a great deal of difficulty implementing such restrictions, for reasons which have been discussed here ad nauseum. I happen to believe that the really crucial reason Clipper was proposed is so that it would exclude non-escrowed encryption using market forces, because they understood that banning encryption or non-escrowed encryption would be essentially impossible. Remember the VHS/Beta VCR wars? With a fairly equal market in about 1978, Beta died 10 years later because the market couldn't support two incompatible standards. It wasn't that one was dramatically better than the other, it was simply that having two standards forced the market to duplicate stocks, for the machines as well as tapes, particularly pre-recorded tapes. Notice, however, that VCR's are relatively "isolated": It doesn't really matter if you have one format and your neighbor has another, unless you want to swap tapes. But crypto telephones inherently require (in the long term) full intercompability. If you didn't have that, there'd be half a world of people you couldn't call! (This kind of situation is remeniscent of a recollection my mother has of a small town she grew up in, in which there were two competing telephone companies serving the same area, but customers of company "A" couldn't call company "B." The most popular girl in town was the daughter of a doctor, who as a consequence of his profession had telephones from both companies. That girl was constantly being called to relay information between people on opposite telephone companies!) The government understood this, and realized that the best way to derail the advent of a good crypto telephone standard was to produce one of their own, which they figured would pre-empt and kill off any competing system. It turns out that an essential element to this killing-off process is to ensure that the telephones aren't compatible, so I was a bit surprised to have to wait a long time to hear that one of the requirements for Clipper-phone approval is that they NOT co-operate with non-escrowed telephones. (I was surprised to have to WAIT to hear this, NOT that they said it eventually...) I think they realize that Clipper was their last opportunity to implement a de-facto market ban on good encryption, but it isn't working. As for a ban on anonymity I don't think that'll fly either. There are too many interactions we do today (off the 'net as well as on) which are already anonymous, even if we don't normally think of it that way. Visit a theater, pay cash, and nobody records your name, for instance. Buy groceries, pay cash. Throw coins in toll booth. Put coins in Coke machine, ride on bus, etc. It would be very hard to prohibit non-anonymous interactions on the net, with so many opportunities for unrestricted anonymity. There's even less reason to ID non-economic transactions too. Since most interactions on the 'net are not a financial transaction, there is even less reason to identify the people involved. So at the risk of being overly optimistic, I think the government isn't going to be able to pull off the kind of anti-crypto/anti-anonymity coup you describe. But nevertheless, I think that if they "progress" towards that goal against the odds, that could easily be an excellent justification for actions which you know they'll describe as "terrorism." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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NISSC
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The National Information Systems Security Conference in Baltimore on October 22-25 is bountifully described at: http://csrc.nist.gov/nissc/program Section No. 10, Solutions, will interest those who want a peek at what the Puzzle Palace gang is up to. The other nine sessions cover everything the info-sec gov-biz wants to do to make the infoworld safe from everyone except them.

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Re: CWD--Wiretap In the Night
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adding to the CWD wiretap alarm by Brock and Declan: The Washington Post, September 26, 1996, p. A30. Wiretaps and Money Bills [Editorial] Legislators who have pet projects but not enough support to get them passed have a way of turning desperate during the closing days of the congressional session. Their thoughts turn ineluctably to unrelated appropriations bills. Only last week, Rep. Frank Wolf used the transportation funding bill as a vehicle for usurping the courts' role in a specific domestic relations dispute. Now senators working on the Commerce, State and Justice appropriations bill have slipped in provisions relating to wiretaps that have been before the Congress for 18 months but have not been adopted. The law should not be changed by means of these stealthy riders. One of the substantive changes in the criminal laws ordered by the money committee, for example, would make it easier to obtain court orders authorizing "roving" wiretaps. This would permit putting taps on any phone a suspect might use -- including unspecified public phones -- without requiring, as the law now does, that the government show that the suspect is attempting to thwart a home or office tap by repeatedly changing phones. This may or may not be reasonable, but Congress considered and rejected it earlier this year. It shouldn't be shoved through on an appropriations bill. The committee bill also increased the number of crimes for which a wiretap can be issued, adding a list of new, relatively imprecise offenses related to terrorism such as "providing material support to terrorists" and "terrorist acts transcending national borders." Taps already are allowed for just about every major crime in which a terrorist might engage, including bombing, arson, murder, kidnapping, extortion, espionage, sabotage, treason, hostage-taking and the destruction of trains ships, aircraft and aircraft facilities. What, then, is the reason for adding these new elastic terms, which could include far less serious offenses that someone thinks might be linked to terrorism? The committees that dealt with the subject in April did not see fit to do so. Why now has the Appropriations Committee intervened? The competing values of security and privacy rights require a much better sorting out. It's best done by people who have had the benefit of relevant testimony and experience. The appropriations committees are the wrong setting to deal with such questions, which should not be presented in a take-it-or-leave-it package with the government's continued operation at stake. [End]

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Re: Cuba, Iraq, AP...
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:08 AM 9/26/96 -0500, Phil Fraering wrote: > Shortly after the Gulf War elements in the Iraqi military tried to > overthrow Hussein; they apparently tried to co-ordinate with the U.S., who > tried to co-ordinate with Saudi Arabia, who warned Saddam that there was > going to be a coup attempt; gotta stop that Ol' power vaccuum... > > The fact that the people who performed the Bay of Pigs were enticed into > it by promised but withdrawn U.S. military support is a matter of public > record; would Castro still be in power had the United States not > (intentionally? I don't know) destroyed the core resistance against him > in that fashion? Two rulers, one of whom is a communist, have more in common than two communists, one of whom is a ruler. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Is "Black Unicorn" a lawyer, or just a nym used by a lawyer?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May said, in a discussion on another topic While BU is a lawyer, and I am not, I maintain [........] Is it correct to say that "Black Unicorn is a lawyer", or only that the nym "Black Unicorn" is used by a person who's a lawyer under another name? "Black Unicorn" at least doesn't appear to be a _practicing lawyer_, though maybe [name used for legal work by person who also uses nym "Black Unicorn"] is a practicing lawyer. Tim's signature file no longer asserts that he's a Licensed Ontologist, but this seems to be the kind of question you'd ask a L.O. if you knew one. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

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a comment on AP vs. more peaceful resistance...
by Phil Fraering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You know, it occured to me earlier that all of this AP stuff flooding the list is overlooking one thing about cryptography: in a way, its use and dissemination represents to some people a means of nonviolent protest. Comments, anyone? Phil Fraering The above is the opinion of neither my internet pgf(a)acadian.net service provider nor my employer. 318/261-9649

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Re: Public Schools
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Phil Fraering <pgf(a)acadian.net> writes: >> > Without vouchers, you don't say anything about the intelligence of >> > your test subjects; to a _very_ large degree, intelligence isn't >> > genetic. Or Bag of shit wrote: >> That's the political correct thing to say, but do you have any >> scientific evidence to support this claim? At 11:19 PM 9/25/96 -0700, Dale Thorn wrote: > People have argued for genetic disposition to certain things, and I > think they are sometimes (most times?) confused [...] [Lots of meaningless hand waving hot air deleted] The key basic test of the power of genes is studies of identical twins raised in different families. They have near identical IQ's, and a wide range of very similar behavior. Identical twins raised in different families are more similar than identical twins raised in the same family, probably because of deliberate attempts to differentiate themselves. Except in the case of extreme environmental pressures -- starvation, neglect, and the like, genes count for just about everything, and environment for almost nothing. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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