December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Call for Discussion - Time-Delay Protocol
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:07 AM 10/23/96 -0700, project_31(a)alias.cyberpass.net wrote: >Very simply put, it is desired to put an encrypted, paragraph-length >message into ubiquitous public distribution, contained in an explanatory >plaintext. >On a predetermined date stated in the plaintext, the passphrase is to be >released and the parties holding the message may decrypt the cyphertext >and know its contents. [Threats: content-leaks, counterfeiting/spoofing, alteration] > 1. A large-modulus PGP public key is prepared prior to the > experiment and placed on (a) the keyservers and (b) at an > "authenticating" website of neutral interest and good > reputation. This isn't enough - keyservers are NOT a substitute for the Web Of Trust. You probably need to have the authenticating key signed by other well-known-in-the-target-community keys. I don't know if you plan to use one authenticating public key for future jobs, or use a different one each time; in the latter case you'll also want to have a key to sign that one with. > 2. The critical message is encrypted conventionally (IDEA) in > ASCII format with a large passphrase and included in the > explanatory plaintext, which also includes the > authenticating key ID hexnumber and fingerprint, and > instructions on how to obtain the authenticating key. Fingerprint is critical - otherwise you're subject to the "0xdeadbeef" attack. You could also include the key itself in the signed message, if you don't mind a bit of extra volume. > 3. The entire plaintext message is clearsigned with the > authenticating public key, and the resulting textfile is > widely distributed. > 1. How may this protocol be improved? > 2. What are the security flaws in this protocol? > 3. May this protocol be simplified without compromising > security? The main alternative to PGP keys is Haber&Stornetta's "Surety" notary system - they use trees of hashes to establish that a given document was authenticated at a given time, making the trees publicly available, and the weekly master hash gets printed in the New York Times classifieds weekly. At minimum, you may want to notarize your PGP key that way. http://www.surety.com/ # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

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Re: Random numbers for DES search.
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I wrote: > > Yep. You don't need unpredictability or other attributes that > > are usually necessary for crypto PRNGs. Basically all you > > need is a good uniform distribution. A quality PRNG like the > > ones used for simulations and games will work fine. No need > > to use Blum-Blum-Shub or other fancy (and slow) generators. > > A linear-congruential generator or an LFSR would probably do > > the trick. This really doesn`t seem a good idea to me seeing as not only are we going to be wasting time on an LFSR runtime wise but we will be covering a lot of duplicate keyspace, if you look at the mersenne prime finding exercise which has its homepages somewhere on compuserve (i`ll give the address if you need it but I can`t remember it at the moment) they have a set of numerical blocks of exponent space that are allocated to people then removed from the list, not an option of course if we are going to be "stealing" runtime, unless we do it on networked workstations using some sort of UDP packet or similar. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Re: Netescrow & Remailers?
by Steve Reid 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Would it make remailers more reliable to use a netescrow >system, so that if a remailer goes offline, the others can request its >keys, and continue moving its messages? Do you operate a malicious remailer? Have you just recieved a message from a person, encrypted for another remailer? Want to know who this person is communicating with? Bomb the next remailer in the chain or do whatever else to force it to reveal it's keys. Once that's done, you can peel away that layer of encryption and then go to work on bombing the next remailer in the chain to obtain it's keys. Repeat until you've peeled off all the layers of remailer encryption and can see the final destination address. Tell us, what have you done with the _real_ Adam Shostack? ;P

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Re: Netescrow & Remailers?
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here were my thoughts on the subject when this was mentioned to me a month and a half ago. -matt [by the way, please note that I don't read cypherpunks, so please include me in any reply that you want me to see. Thanks.] ------- Forwarded Message To: Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> cc: peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Job for netescrow ? (was Secure anonymouse server protocol... In-reply-to: Your message of "Fri, 06 Sep 1996 14:22:23 BST." <199609061322.OAA01150(a)server.test.net> Date: Fri, 06 Sep 1996 18:50:00 -0400 From: Matt Blaze <mab(a)nsa.research.att.com> Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes: > >Peter Allan <peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk> writes on cpunks: >> In the talk about replyable nym-mailers I haven't >> yet seen netescrow mentioned. >> >> You DID all read this ? >> >> [Matt Blazes Oblivious Key Escrow paper] >> >> This all hinges on a policy to be followed by archive holders defining >> the conditions under which they release their shares. >> This could be receipt of a signed request from the owner (remailer). >> >> Maybe the table relating nyms to reply addresses could be stored in >> netescrow style so that captured remailers reveal nothing. The problem >> of operator coercion is not addressed by this. > >Just to clarify, if I understand correctly you are proposing a penet >style system with the database held in `netescrow'. > >The remailer in normal operation has access to the database by making >requests satisfying the conditions of the secret share holders. > >When the remailer is compromised the memory resident key is lost when >the machine is switched off, and the owner refuses to release the key. > >Is what you are proposing? > >It sounds like a cross between Matt's netescrow and Ross Anderson's >eternity file system. Your penet database is being stored in a >distributed file system, with shares, and the identity of the share >holders is concealed. However the aim is not to prevent others >censoring your publically available writings, but to allow a second >avenue of access only in the case of `mob cryptography'. > >This changes the system over storing the database encrypted on the >remailer machines own disk in these ways: [well-thought-out stuff deleted] This is the first I've seen this proposal to use Oblivious Key Escrow (OKE) as a store for a remailer database; apologies if all this has been discussed already (I don't ready cypherpunks very often these days). My original idea for OKE was as a way to backup long-term, slow-changing sensitive data without also introducing a single point of failure for either security or availability. The remailer model is a bit different, and I'm not sure it's a good fit, in particular because I haven't thought about the various new failure modes in this application. But let me think ``out loud.'' Suppose we want to build a persistent-reply address anonymous messaging service (like the late anon.penet.fi) with the following properties: a) The database that maps anonymous addresses to real addresses is secure against erasure or other permanent loss of availability b) The database is also secure against accidental or coerced disclosure. Requirement (a) implies backups and persistent storage. Requirement (b) implies that both access to both operational and backup copies must be carefully controlled, preferably by technical means. So far, this looks like a good candidate for distributed security, in the style of OKE, Mike Reiter's Rampart service, or Ross Anderson's Eternity service. Actually, I think the best solution would be for the remailer itself to be a distributed process, split among enough places to make it difficult for anyone to attack enough nodes to compromise or recover the address translation database. It is not at all obvious how to do this in practice, however, since any solution would need to combine secure distributed computation (to calculate the mapping for each message sent without revealing to any party, including the sender, what the mapping is) with anonymous networking techniques such as mixes to prevent traffic analysis from revealing the mapping. There are a number of unsolved theoretical and practical problems here, and I think working out the details of such a system would make for a good PhD thesis or two (quite seriously, and I'd be interested in talking with anyone who wanted to pursue such a line of research). So for now let's limit ourselves to existing tools and techniques, or at least tools and techniques that are close to existing. Let's say, for the moment, that we wanted to base the system on OKE. Assume an unconditionally trusted remailer operator whose goal is to construct a system that resists attempts to force him or her to UNILATERALLY reveal the database. That is, it should not be possible to force the remailer operator to reveal the database contents without also enlisting the aid of the (collectively anonymous) oblivious key holders. My (not carefully considered) first thought is that the address database would be encrypted and stored locally, using a key that is escrowed using OKE. The key would never be locally stored; preferably, the key would exist only in memory. The operating system on which the remailer is run would delete this key ``at the drop of a hat,'' e.g., any time the system was rebooted, any time someone logs in, any time unusual activity of any sort is detected. The key release policy is controlled by a public key, for which the secret key is stored in a more persistent manner (e.g., in the file system). Whenever the database key is deleted, the OKE recovery process is used to recover the key automatically, and the database is re-encrypted with a new key that is distributed to a new set of shareholders. Under normal operation, this might happen once a month or so, and might entail (because of policy-based delays and the time required to collect shares) a few days of downtime. Under unusual conditions that might precipitate some kind of coercive situation, the remailer operator (or some automatic process on the remailer machine) would delete the signing key as well as the database. It might be reasonable, for example, to delete this file any time someone logs in to the remailer machine (which shouldn't be needed ordinarily). The OKE share policy would require that the shareholder operator examine unsigned key requests manually before releasing them. If the keys were deleted because of a false alarm or machine failure, the remailer operator would send a message saying something to the effect of ``Hey, I blew it. Please send me the key shares once you're convinced no one has a gun to my head.'' In the event of a public safety emergency, the police are free to attempt to issue their own appeal for key shares, but the ability to for them to do this is not a design goal, but rather a side-effect of the design. I see a number of problems with using OKE for this. In particular, key recovery is moderately expensive and key distribution with the oblivious multicast protocol in my paper can be very expensive. If keys are deleted regularly, the downtime could be unacceptable. I'm not sure OKE is entirely workable for this application, but perhaps a more clever design could prove me wrong. There are a whole bunch of engineering issues here, particularly related to automatically detecting ``unusual'' situations. So can this scheme be improved upon? Is there a better way to run a persistent-reply-address remailer? These are interesting, and I think largely open, questions. - -matt NB The oblivious key escrow paper that I presented at the Information Hiding workshop at the Isaac Newton Institute in May, is available at: ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/netescrow.ps ------- End of Forwarded Message

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No Subject
by Butler, Anthony 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

22/10/96 WASHINGTON - US First lady Hillary Rodham Clinton unveiled a new Superman comic book for Bosnian children during an East Room ceremony Monday. The comic book, written in three languages, shows the mythical American hero flying down to save two little boys in Bosnia- Herzegovina. The comic books will be distributed throughout the country. With several Bosnian children standing nearby, Mrs. Clinton pulled the drape on a blown-up reproduction of the cover of the comic book. Mrs. Clinton said the initiatives show the United States' "clear commitment to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina." She said "Superman wlll bring a special message" to the Bosnian children.

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I'm Confused about Algorithm Patents in Canada
by janke＠unixg.ubc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have a library of crypto goodies that I would like to release, but am kinda stuck on the copyright: I read in a very new book that algorithms cannot be patented in Canada. In AC2, however, Scheneier mentions several of the algorithms as being patented in Canada. Today, I visited Ascom's home page and noticed that IDEA is not patented here, so I get the feeling the law might have changed just recently. If anyone can tell me anymore of what they know about the status of algorithm patents in Canada, or if they could point me to a good source of info on the net, I would be very appreciative. (Since my library will be free, you might be helping more than just me too. :) ) Thanks, Leonard (Visit http://www.interchg.ubc.ca/janke/index.html#lcrypt for an ouline of what I'd like to release, if you like.)

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Re: Holding Netscape's and Microsoft's Feet to the Fire
by Greg Kucharo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The truly frightening thing here is that Bill gates has come out more often on the strong crypto side than Netscape, Apple, IBM and just about everyone else. Why is this? Has Justice crapped on him once too often, and now he's looking for payback? At first I thought that it may be that Microsoft has big financial transaction plans. If this were true, they would probably get the leniency that banks and others get for crypto. So what is it? Here is my theory, if you will indulge me for a minute; It was a dark and stormy...uh middle of the afternoon in Redmond. Bill is at his desk reading the latest sales figures for Windows and Office 95. "600 million, hot shit! But I grow bored with commonplace software, I need new money schem..uh challenges". Somehow Bill finds his way into Building 666 on the Microsoft campus. The building is home to Microsoft's Security and Crypto division. He hails a young minion. "Here my son, what have you done for me today?" The young man gulps, "Uh well let me see Mr Gates...". Suddenly Bill notices the boy's shirt. It is black, on the front are printed the words; "This T-Shirt is a Munition". Under the words are a few lines of code. Because they are not Basic, Bill is confused. He blurts out,"Say that isn't Java is it!". "No Mr. Gates, it's Perl. This is the RSA code implemented in it." Bill says,"I see, carry on my boy". The young man scurries back to his office. Suddenly it strikes Gates like the first time he envisioned the DOS liscening scheme. "Munitions! Hot shit, weapons on a floppy I could make billions! I could arm the whole world with Microsoft weapons of software and dominate any governments who got in my way! Then I could have Larry Ellison and Marc Andressen and any other punks who made fun of me locked away". I'm sure it didn't happen just this way. It's quite possible that Bill gates never says "hot shit". ---------- > From: Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)got.net> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Holding Netscape's and Microsoft's Feet to the Fire > Date: Tuesday, October 22, 1996 8:59 PM > > At 4:11 PM -0700 10/22/96, Jeff Weinstein wrote: > >John Young wrote: > >> > >> 10-17-96, BuWi: > >> > >> "Apple, IBM, JavaSoft, Motorola, Netscape, Nortel, Novell, > >> RSA, and Silicon Graphics Announce PICA Crypto-Alliance" > >> > >> The PICA specification will also be designed to make the > >> task of developing differing domestic and exportable > >> security requirements much easier. [GAK alliance 2.] > > > > John, I think you are misreading the intent here. By making > >it easier to develop separate domestic and exportable > >versions of a product, we foil the government's attempt to > >force weak domestic encryption because it is too much work to > >maintain two different versions. > > Thwarting the True Intent of GAK by ensuring that domestic crypto is > completely unhampered, unhindered, unlimited, and unGAKked is terribly > important. A year or so ago, when Netscape folks issued assurances that the > "relative convenience" of having one "world version" would not be the > determining factor, and that Netscape would have two versions (times the > number of platforms they support), was an incredibly positive development. > > (And Bill Gates, of the Evil Microsoft, had already isssued scathing > denunciations of key escrow and mandatory crypto, so MS was already > effectively in our camp.) > > So, if PICA helps this (along with the Elites Alliance, a rival type), more > power to them. I wouldn't be surprised if the Feds try to exert pressure on > them to change this purpose that Jeff W. describes. Government will realize > that industry consortia are a way to "build consensus" on getting GAK built > in to even domestic products. (The renaming of Clipper/Tessera/etc. to key > escrow and then to "key recovery" is essential to this strategy....got to > convince U.S. software companies that Mr. Policeman is Our Friend...not an > easy sell.) > > But I wonder if the PICA Alliance will be allowed to pursue this "dual > strength strategy." Mightn't it be a violation of the ITARs merely to > _conspire_ to keep domestic crypto unhindered and strong? > > (:-} for the :-}-impaired.) > > Though this is preaching to the choir, it's imperative that Netscape, > Microsoft, and the Other Minor Players remain committed to _never_ > compromising the security of _domestic_ products....Europe and Asia will > have to take of themselves, as the true battle always has and always will > be about the U.S. government's desire to surveil us and tap our > communications at will. > > (Anyone who doubts this should reread the recent comments of Janet Reno, > Louis Freeh, Jamie Gorelick, and all the others talking about the need to > read the communications of criminals and suspected criminals. The real goal > is to head off crypto anarchy, as the summary by Black Unicorn made clear > just a day or two ago.) > > --Tim May > > "The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM > that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology." > [NYT, 1996-10-02] > We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. > ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- > Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, > tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero > W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, > Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. > "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." > > > >

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:57 AM 10/23/96 +0000, Matthew J. Miszewski wrote: > >> At 08:13 PM 10/22/96 -0700, Declan McCullagh wrote: >(snip) > >> Sure, you can't keep people from talking. However, one way to sabotage the >> usefulness of telling is to allow everybody else as well to make the same >> claim, with essentially no way for the candidates to tell who is REALLY >> giving the money. Make the lie just as credible as the truth, and the value >> of knowing the truth is destroyed. If nobody can trust anyone else's word, >> then no candidate could know who REALLY ought to be rewarded for a campaign >> contribution, breaking the circle of quid-pro-quo. > >Sorry, but this would depend upon equal access to a number of things. >Primarily, John Q. Public does not have sufficient real world access >to politicians to assert that he is the one who donated. Lobbyists, >OTOH, most certainly do. Secondly, access to the timing of donations >is something only the donor can know. > >"Wink, wink. Nudge, nudge, Senator. Look at your account balance >tomorrow. Never forget the National Association of Manufacturers was >there for you" (Obviously a completely random selection 8-) While I have worked through essentially none of the details, if the system can be implemented well enough, all this kind of information will be blinded into oblivion. Donations won't be tallied individually, and news of their arrival will be disguised, possibly by limiting the size that is credited to the candidate per day and thus in effect splitting up a donation to make it "arrive" over a period of a week or two. Only overall totals will be reported, possibly rounded to only two significant figures, and even then possibly only on a weekly basis. >> The candidate still gets the money, of course, and the contributor is still >> free to both donate and speak...separately. The thing that's been cut off >> is the association between the money and the speech...which is exactly what >> the problem is, isn't it? > >See above for why the connection is not. Try again. Rather than trying to prove that a system won't work, why not help develop one that will? >And the problem is >generally not money, but rather the delivery of votes. A candidate >will do whatever it takes to get elected. Often this means $$$ for >campaign expenses. More often it means vote delivery. But "vote delivery" can't be proven, or even demonstrated with a strong degree of assurance. >Get rid of the career politician and you get rid of the motivation >behind the pursuit of political money and vote delivery. I'd LOVE to "get rid of the career politician." And every other kind of politician, as well! > I hate to >actually advocate term limits, but a critical vote in Congress is >much harder to control when the rep is only interested in serving the >public because there is no chance of re-election. After all, it is >not donations that are the evil here, it is the control of gov't >action, right? What I consider wrong is that government affects way too large a fraction of our lives, without apparent Constitutional justification. If the government at all levels were only, say, 1/10th of its current size, there would be much less motivation for corruption. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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probability question for math-heads
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm too tired &/or busy to work this out, via Knuth --- maybe you can help, with some implications for the DES keysearch strategy. What is the expected distribution, in a "random" binary sequence -- with all the fuzziness that implies as to what _exactly_ is "random" -- of gaps between runs of same-bits. i.e. what is the expected distribution of sequence length between occurances of two (and only two) 1-bits in a row? how about sequences of 3 1-bits? ETc. We know that in a _truly_ random sequence, taken over a long enough period, there should be all possible values of "gaps". But what is reasonable to expect in a "random" sequence as to how those gaps are distributed? Is my question equivalent to Knuth's gap test? If anyone feels like proffering some education on this, if I find anything useful in my investigations I'll certainly credit the help! TIA, etc. -- and hey: doesn't Nickelodeon have a trademark on GAK?

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But first, something completely different... (fwd)
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know this forward is on the edge, but notice the request for increased wiretap capability. Besides, it is funny. --Lucky ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 23 Oct 96 11:10:26 PDT From: Bruce Erickson <be1(a)ElSegundoCA.NCR.COM> To: ca-firearms(a)lists.best.com Subject: But first, something completely different... Motorcycle gangs, Banditos and Hell's Angeles, in Scandanavia have been fighting for a couple years. A previous story in this paper described how Hell's Angles broke into a Danish prison to throw a hand grenade into the cell of the Banditos' president. Our friends who want to ban mouse guns don't know what trouble is possible. It is possible to get anti-tank missiles on the black-market. [story] "Nordic summit on Biker Violence" Saskis Sissons "The Eurpoean" 10-16 October 1996 Denmark's justice minister justice has called a summit to discuss a joint Nordic campaign against the biker gangs whose violent confrontations are posing an increasing danger to the public throught the region. Bjorn Westh, who is said to be shocked and furious at the latest violence which left 2 people dead and 19 ingured after a rocket attack in Copenhagen, will meet his cunterparts from Sweden, Norway and Finland to consider strategies against the gangs. A justice ministry spokeswoman said: "It will ve an exchange of ideas between the ministers. It's a very serious situation in Denmark at the moment abd these levels of violence could easily spread to other parts of Scandanivia. Westh is looking into the possibility of a total ban on the gangs but his priority is to secure the safety of civilians." Westh's initiative follows a meeting on 7 Octobe bwtewen Danish Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Tasmussen and Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson, who promised their countries would fight the bikers together. Calls for concerted national and regional action against the escalating gang warfare have been mounting. Only last week 1000 staged a demonstration outside the Hell's Angles compound at Titagade in Copenhagen's Norrebro district. A few days later were awakened in the early morning by an anti-tank rocket exploding in the bikers' clubhouse. [btw: this is the second missile attack on the HAs this year. the first was in the late spring] After months of prevarication the Danes have resolved to take tough action against the gangs. Parliament is this week rushing through legislation which will prevent members of the feuding Hell's Angles and Banditos meeting at their clubhouses in populated areas, and a national task force has been set up to combat the gangs. Commander Per Larsen, who is heading the new unit, said: "The new legislation is good news for us and we are pleased with the initiatives of the prime minuster and justiice ministers. But we would like to see parliament giving us further powers to bug and phone-tap suspects and to search houses secretly." The feud, which began in 1994, has claimed 9 lives and injured 50 people throughout the region. [end story] Diane: "We need stronger tank missile controls. Ban the sale of cheap easily concealed tank missiles. Require licensing and training classes. Store them at missile clubs" Tanya: "There is already total prohibition on the possession of tank missiles by private citizens and murder is still illegal." Diane: "Be quiet, this is a fund raising event."

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Montgolfiering aka P Information = P * log_base_infinity P (fwd)
by cypher＠cyberstation.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A cryptogram Montgolfiering aka P Information = P * log_base_infinity P What does it mean? First of all, I apologize for taking so much of many reader's time on the subject of whether the EUREKA algorithm is a "SOFTWARE" OTP or not. As I have restated over and over and over again, time after time, after time, it is a PRNG, it is a stream cipher, so we will leave it there. We are taking the OTP question off the table, but I am sure that the list eupatrids will continue to beat that horse forever. Accordingly, henceforth Eureka will be referred to as a stream cipher, a PRNG stream, and we will joust on their muddied pedantric playing field! I also want to apologize once more to all of the readers for having to go down into the gutter where PM insists on duking it out, but he leaves me no choice. I told you that I would fight no more with him, forever; but my word is obviously not as good as Chief Joseph's. He is wounding me by spreading his mendacious misrepresentations to the point that I must respond. He is also threatening me, with his malevolent baseness. That is the reason that he wrote that one message as private mail, not so that you readers would not have to suffer through more of his, and yes my, garbage. It is patently evident that he wrote that message so that he could threaten me and you readers would not know about it, and that is the only reason that I went public with it back to you. Then he tries to cover up his abhorrent conduct by trying to make you believe that he was trying to SAVE YOU from suffering as a labor of love. That is the only message that he has sent privately, and he did it so that you would not find out what he had done. I am sure that most of you can see through crass deception, you are smarter than that. And by the by way, thanks, to the many of you that have written in support, even if most of you do not want to take on the powers to be by expressing your feelings in public - keep it up, I will be most discreet. It takes a sick mind to do things like that. I further believe that Perry may be libeling me by asserting that Adam has already cracked my algorithm. Although I have now told him 22 times that is a falsehood, he insists on repeating it, even after it has been denied by Adam. That is a factoidal jactitation as evidenced below. One writer today told me that Adam, John Pettitt and Paul Bradley had cracked both my algorithms in one day, and that the new one was worse than the old one, and that Perry Metzger had personally confirmed it. At least, unlike some readers, he had part of the message right, the part about two algorithms. The current algorithm web page has now been visited by over 4,500 people and all of them know that Perry is engaged in some sort of propaganda campaign to spread disinformation for some purpose because the algorithm has almost nothing, just a tiny fragment, to do with what has been posted previously. And as all of you readers tuned in at that time know, you were told that that was not the algorithm and never has been. I question whether Perry may have a pecuniary interest in these affairs? Does Perry have an insider, or other position, or interest in one or more of the RSA interest? Does he have any interest in PGP, Inc., though I rather doubt that? I am making no allegations, I am only asking the question of why he would deliberately set out on a campaign of disinformation without arming himself with the truth, it is so easy all he has to do is go to the web site and see for himself. Instead, he ignores that and engages in propaganda. Why? At least Hal Finney had the intellectual, and moral honesty to disclose that he was now a part of the PGP Inc, team. In any event to clear up any misunderstanding, let us examine what my ALLEGED algorithm was, and compare it to the actual algorithm. > Adam > | > The algorithm is: > | > > | > for ( ; ; ) { > | > for (i=0; i<63; i++) { > | > a[i] = (a[i] + b[i]) % c[i]; > | > d = (d + a[i]) & 255; > | > *data++ ^= d; /* xor with data */ > | > } > | > } > | > > > As I have told Perry and Paul, both several times, at the time it was first reported and later, and indirectly to all of you several times, the above algorithm is not the algorithm posted at: www.netprivacy.com/algo.html All anyone would have to do to determine that is to take a few seconds and look. Yet Perry and Paul, did not do that, instead they spread the malevolent message around that they have broken the algorithm. In Paul's case, it may just be confusion resulting from Perry's incessant jabberwocky. To those of you who might want to know the truth, I have been forced into the position of taking your time to disclose the algorithm here, The algorithm to follow, is the only one that has ever existed, as most readers should know but do not because of nazi like propaganda. In a highly abbreviated form, only to show how stupid this argument about which algorithm is which, the actual algorithm is: A highly condensed version of the Eureka Algorithm: Given a key, user, message, etal specific parameter set derived from a truly random key, in this instance, 256 bytes long, 10^616 entropy, then : All of the parameters below, vary with each generator key, except where the variance is limited by range factors - for instance, there are only 49 to 79 possible Juncture Values, JV values, so that number must be one of those corresponding values. Starting values derived from the key, as modified by message number and other variables. That is slightly in excess of 2^54 possibilities for the initial D1, D2, D3, and D4 values, the differential variables. D1 = 1,691 D2 = 1,194 D3 = 3,564 D4 = 483 JV = 34 (I) A(I) B(I) C(I) 0 11908 7109 17581 1 2252 11863 16589 .................................. ................................. 51 14544 9349 17964 52 15759 11836 17021 And the three tables: DISP, Displacement Table - a table of the values 0 through 4095, randomly scrambled, by the hardware sourced truly random key. DIFF, Diffusion Table - a second independent table of the values 0 through 4095, randomly scrambled, by the hardware sourced truly random key. DETR, Determinate Table, a third independent table of 16 sets of the ASCII values, 0 through 255. EXKEY is an 8192 byte key expanded from the 256 byte key, thus only 2^2048 bits of entropy, at the most. IN PSEUDO CODE, the algorithm for medium level security, level 5, is: LEV5 SECURITY I=0 DO DO JV=JV+1 IF JV=53 THEN JV=0 REM JV<53 is for Level 5, it ranges from 49 to 79. A(JV)=(A(JV)+B(JV)) MOD C(JV) WHILE (A(JV) AND 16384) = 1 D1=(D1+A(JV)) AND 4095 D2=DISP((D2+D1) AND 4095) F=DETR(D2)<<8 D3=(D3+D2) AND 4095 BUF(DIFF(I))=BUF(DIFF(I)) XOR (F+(DETR(DISP(D3)))) D1=(D1+D3) AND 4095 F=DETR(DISP(D1))<<8 D4=(D4+D1) AND 4095 BUF(DIFF(I+1))=BUF(DIFF(I+1)) XOR (F+(DETR(DISP(D4)))) REMARK SWAP D1 AND D4, and D2 AND D3 so that the REMARK SELECTION COUNTERS ARE NEVER CONGRUENTIAL, EVEN REMARK FOR TWO SUCCESSIVE SELECTIONS SWAP D1,D4 SWAP D2,D3 REMARK SWAP VALUES IN BOTH THE DISPLACEMENT TABLE AND REMARK THE DETERMINATE TABLE TO INSURE THAT THE TABLES REMARK CONSTANTLY MUTATING - THEY ARE NEVER STATIC REMARK CANNOT CHANGE THE DIFFUSION TABLE UNTIL REMARK DIFFUSION HAS BEEN COMPLETE FOR 8192 BYTES SWAP DETR(D1),DETR(D3) SWAP DISP(D2),DISP(D4) REM REM - A NEAR DUPLICATE BUTTERFLY SECTION TO INSURE THAT REM - EVEN AND ODD CHARACTERS CANNOT BE BLOCKED REM DO JV = JV + 1 IF JV = 53 THEN JV=0 A(JV)=(A(JV)+B(JV)) MOD C(JV) WHILE (A(JV) AND 16384) = 1 D1=(D1+A(JV)) AND 4095 D2=DISP((D2+D1) AND 4095) F=DETR(D2) D3=(D3+D2) AND 4095 BUF(DIFF(I+2))=BUF(DIFF(I+2)) XOR ((DETR(DISP(D3))<<8)+F) D1=(D1+D3) AND 4095 F=DETR(DISP(D1)) D4=(D4+D1) AND 4095 BUF(DIFF(I+3))=BUF(DIFF(I+3)) XOR ((DETR(DISP(D4))<<8)+F) REMARK SWAP AS BEFORE EXCEPT USE DIFFERENT D VALUES SWAP D1,D4 SWAP D2,D3 SWAP DETR(D1),DETR(D3) SWAP DISP(D2),DISP(D4) REMARK CANNOT SWAP DIFFUSION TABLE VALUES BUT WE CAN REMARK MUTATE THE KEY SOME MORE, SO THAT WE CAN REMARK EVENTUALLY RESCRAMBLE THE DIFFUSION TABLE SWAP EXKEY(D2),EXKEY(D3) I = I + 4 WHILE I < 4096 REMARK IF JV<16 THEN RESCRAMBLE THE DIFFUSION TABLE REMARK THIS WILL HAPPEN APPROXIMATELY 30% OF THE TIME LONG IF JV < 16 I=0,M=4096 DO SEL=(SEL+EXKEY(I+2300)) MOD M SWAP DIFF(I),DIFF(I+SEL) I=I+1 M=M-1 WHILE I<4095 END IF Now I ask a candid world. Is that the same algorithm as the one Perry says that Adam broke, the first one above? Is it the same one that Paul claims to have broken as detailed in his message? Both claim that they are one and the same. Are they? You can see the answer know the answer to that. This is just an example of how the haughty eyed will use their malevolence to intimidate the rest of you. I belive that Perry is deliberately distorting the truth, as this proves. Paul on the other hand, may only be confused by Metzger's montgolfiering. The above algorithm has been condensed considerably to show that it is not the one that Perry and Paul are referring to at all. If you are going to analyze it in any depth, go to the web site and work with the full algorithm, that is URL: www.netprivacy.com/algo.html If you have questions from the brief description set out above, visit the web site and I believe that your questions will be cleared up. There are also almost 200 megabytes of raw encryptor stream output at the site, you do not need known plain text, it is there for all to see. What is the key that generated the text, or what is the next 100 characters of encryptor stream for messages 1 through 6? Bet you cannot figure it out! How about the cryptogram? Montgolfiering aka P Information = P log_base_infinity P Most of you have it figured out, n'est pas? With every best wish, Don Wood > >

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U.S. crypto-czar appointment -- "Crypto Imperalism" in HotWired
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 24 Oct 1996 03:50:17 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: U.S. crypto-czar appointment -- "Crypto Imperalism" in HotWired http://www.hotwired.com/netizen/ HotWired, The Netizen Global Network Crypto Imperialism by Declan McCullagh, Kenneth Neil Cukier, and Brock N. Meeks Washington, DC, 23 October The US offensive for international controls on strong encryption will soon become a fusillade. In the next week, the Clinton administration is set to create the position of a roving ambassador whose job will be to marshal international support for a controlling new US crypto policy, the Netizen has learned. The crypto-czar will lobby foreign governments to change their laws to comply with the US regulations announced on 1 October, which temporarily allow businesses to export slightly stronger data-scrambling applications if they pledge to develop a "key recovery" system. In such a system, a still-undefined "trusted third party" would hold the unscrambling key to any encryption, and could be forced to give it over to law enforcement officials with a warrant. The catch, of course, is that such a system permits continued government access to encrypted communications. But for that plan to work, an international "key recovery" framework must be established. "What we need to do very clearly is to spend a lot of time with other countries," William Reinsch, the US Department of Commerce's undersecretary for export administration, told The Netizen. Reinsch said the newly annointed crypto ambassador would be responsible for helping these countries move "in the same direction" as the US by "helping facilitate that process and helping to reach any agreements that need to be reached between us and them." Reinsch said the position would defy the label "crypto-czar," because the position isn't "a czar in the policy sense.... We don't envision this person as one who would be giving a lot of speeches on the subject and operating as a kind of public defender of the process." Rather, the person would work within "a context which is largely private, not public," Reinsch said. The president can confer the rank of ambassador on a political appointee for up to six months without Senate confirmation, the State Department said. And with ambassadorial rank, the czar will be able to speak for the president. The administration is currently considering a "short list" of candidates "in the low single digits," drawn from current government employees and private citizens, Reinsch said. If a current government employee is chosen, he or she would be at the ambassadorial level, he said, and the crypto duties would simply become an additional responsibility. If chosen from the private sector, it will be someone with "significant stature," Reinsch said. That person would have "a close association with the administration and the president and would be viewed by the other countries as a senior representative who could speak for the president with some confidence," Reinsch said. If a private citizen is chosen, they would "do it for free and we'd pick up the travel I guess." The announcement should come "fairly quickly," he said. "I would hope next week we could ice this one." This bypasses the ongoing public debate in Congress over lifting crypto export controls through legislation - Sen. Conrad Burns (R-Montana) has pledged to keep fighting next year - and in the OECD, says Marc Rotenberg, the director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center. "This is backdooring the backdoor." While others - notably Clint Brooks and Mike Nelson - have played the role of crypto spokesperson before, this move represents a redoubling of the administration's plans to impose its will internationally. Yet international observers say the United States may find its plans thwarted in the global arena, where many governments - already uneasy about America imposing its hegemony on regional politics - will likely resist another cryptocrat, even if the person comes with an ambassador's honorific before his or her name. "Europe would consider that unacceptable and arrogant, no question," says Simon Davies, director of Privacy International and a fellow at the London School of Economics. "There would certainly be a backlash, and it would cause immense suspicion. This whole business has become extremely sleazy, and the Americans appear to have taken it all very personally. I would be very surprised if it was taken seriously here." Viktor Mayer-Schvnberger at the University of Vienna Law School, an expert on international crypto policy, said that "if the US ups the ante and brings in a sort of a quasi-diplomatic person to push European countries further, I think we'll see tremendous arm-twisting." "It may backfire," says Mayer-Schvnberger. "The US put tremendous pressure on Europe and that is going to increase if the US government makes such a bold move as to appoint someone to do nothing but lobby for key escrow." Many countries, he said, "have been very apprehensive of the US coming in as the 'big guy' and telling the world what is good and what is bad" regarding encryption. ###

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ecash press release
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Thu, 24 Oct 1996 11:40:27 +1000 (EST) From: Andreas Furche <afurche(a)cs.newcastle.edu.au> To: Tom Wills <twills(a)commerce.net> cc: e-payments(a)commerce.net Subject: ecash press release MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-e-payments(a)python.commerce.net Precedence: bulk +--------------------------------------------------+ Addressed to: e-payments(a)commerce.net +--------------------------------------------------+ For General Release 24 October 1996 ADVANCE BANK FIRST TO PROVIDE DIGICASH'S ECASH(tm) SYSTEM IN AUSTRALIA Advance Bank and DigiCash Pty Ltd today announced that Advance will be the first bank in the Asia-Pacific region to issue electronic cash on the Internet. Advance will issue ecash denominated in Australian dollars in a move that will greatly benefit Internet commerce in Australia by making secure payments on the network a reality. The system will be piloted with Advance Bank and BankSA customers and merchants. Other licensees of the ecash system include Mark Twain Bank (USA), Deutsche Bank (Germany), Merita Bank/EUnet (Finland) and Posten (Sweden). Currently, shopping on the Internet usually requires the sending of credit card details over computer networks but credit card transactions are relatively expensive and therefore are not efficient for low value purchases. DigiCash's patented ecash system allows payment of amounts as low as one cent, and all payments are made with the security technology currently used by large financial institutions for international money transfers. "This launch in Australia represents an important collaboration between the premier electronic cash company and the leading Internet bank in a country that is very advanced in Internet usage," said Dr. David Chaum, inventor of electronic cash and founder of DigiCash. He added "Internet users have come to understand the unique ability of the ecash electronic cash system to empower them, using their own computers, to protect their own privacy. And leading banks in the region, and globally, are beginning to observe this and see the strategic importance of operating their own electronic cash systems." "Advance Bank is reinforcing its position as Australia's leading Internet bank with this move. Our customers can already use Internet Banking to access statements of accounts, transfer money between accounts and pay bills. Now, Internet Banking will be complemented by electronic cash, realising the concept of the virtual ATM on the Internet," said David Brown, Advance's head of Public Affairs. Ecash is the only Internet payment system that creates actual electronic cash. This concept increases security and reduces transaction costs. It gives more control to the user of the system and provides consumer privacy. It also helps the merchant, as payments are authenticated and finalised at the time of purchase, avoiding uncertainty and delays in payment. The system is a great opportunity for merchants selling low cost goods, information and services online. Andreas Furche, Managing Director of DigiCash Pty Ltd, said: "This is particularly good news for companies wanting to sell digital goods such as information, software, or database access. These merchants can set up shops that automatically provide services and collect money. "Since even low value payments are possible, newspapers could, for example, sell digital versions of their different sections separately, so that the user could choose to buy only the business and the sport sections, or even single articles at a time," he said. Advance Bank and DigiCash Pty Ltd expect to make ecash available to users of Advance Bank's Internet Banking system by Christmas. Advance Bank has prepared an information kit for merchants and companies interested in selling their goods and services for electronic cash over the Internet. This can be obtained from Advance's web site at: www.advance.com.au/advance/ecash/ Further Information: David Brown Advance Bank Head of Public Affairs Telephone: 02 9236 1050 Andreas Furche Managing Director DigiCash Pty Ltd Telephone: 02 9375 2316 DIGICASH BACKGROUND - www.digicash.com History and Mission Since beginning operation in April 1990, DigiCash's mission and primary activity has been: to develop and license payment technology products - chip card, software only, and hybrid-- that both show the true capability of technology to protect the interests of all participants and are competitive in the market. Founder Dr David Chaum, Chairman of DigiCash, received his Ph. D. in Computer Science from the University of California at Berkeley. He taught at New York University Graduate School of Business Administration and at the University of California, and headed the Cryptography Group at CWI, the Dutch nationally- funded centre for research in mathematics and computer science, before taking his current position. He has published over 45 original technical articles on cryptography and also founded the International Association for Cryptologic Research. DigiCash Products Blue: smart card technology for EMV 7 prepaid with dynamic public key Conforms to joint Europay, Mastercard, Visa specifications; multiple applications, including loyalty and closed systems; superior data integrity in case of malicious/accidental interference/interruption; requires only the smallest and most proven chips, e.g. SC-24 or ST601; mask technology licensing. Cafe: smart card and card-accepting electronic wallet project Consortium of 12 other members founded and chaired by Dr. Chaum of DigiCash; simulation, mask and first readers developed by DigiCash; technology trial at the EC headquarters building in participation with related open special interest group and partially funded by the EC. DyniCash highway-speed road-toll collection system using smart cards Chip card inserts into battery-powered dashboard unit; reflected backscatter microwave technology by industry leader Amtech; prepaid mode has user privacy; open and/or closed pricing schemes; tested extensively in Japan; non-exclusive licensing of the payment technology. Ecash* software only electronic cash system for Internet/email Users download software that can make and receive payments; protects users' money like travellers cheques and privacy like coins; now operational after testing by over twenty thousand users world-wide; Macintosh, MS-Windows and X- Windows; any WWW browser; currently Mark Twain Bank issues ecash* in US dollars and Merita/EUnet issues digital Finnish marks; Deutsche Bank has licensed ecash* to issue electronic Deutsche Mark. Posten has announced their license and intention to issue Swedish Kroner. Facility Card: complete facility management, smart- card/reader system Cash replacement, access control, and time/attendance system; now in schools, hospitals, industry, offices, recreation; interfaces to vending, point-of-sale, access control, copiers, phones, gaming; downloadable 7 upgradeable readers work on-line and/or off-line; over 100k cards in use in the Netherlands; Mars Electronics International will launch it globally later this year. How does ecash* work? Using ecash* is like using a virtual ATM (Automatic Teller Machine). When you connect over the Internet and authenticate your ownership of the account, you can withdraw money electronically. Instead of giving you bank notes, you are given digital cash which your software can store on your PC's hard disk. When you want to make a payment, you simply confirm the amount, payee and description of goods. Then with a mouse click you tell your ecash* software to transfer cash of the correct value from your PC direct to the payee. Merchants (ranging from casual participants in the global Internet bazaar to mega-retailers) can then deposit the digital cash into their accounts. Behind the user interface, your computer actually creates 'serial' numbers for the electronic cash based on a random 'seed'. Then it hides them in special encryption 'envelopes', sends them to the electronic bank for 'signature' and, when they are returned, removes the 'envelopes' (retaining the bank's validating digital signature on the 'serial' numbers). This way, when the bank eventually receives your cash, it cannot recognise them as coming from any particular withdrawal or account' because all cash are hidden from the bank during the withdrawal process. Therefore the bank cannot know when or where you shop, who you pay or what you buy. The serial number of each signed coin is unique, so that the bank can be sure that it never accepts the same coin twice. If you wish to identify the recipient of any of your payments, you may reveal the unique coin number and use your ecash* software to prove that you created it and set the bank to confirm who deposited it. Your software can also re-create the serial numbers and 'envelopes' from the 'seed' that you wrote down when installing your account, thereby allowing all your cash to be re-created if your PC fails. How safe is Ecash*? Security is fundamental to electronic cash. The cryptographic coding that protects every 5 cent ecash payment is the same as that routinely relied upon for authenticating requests to move huge sums between banks and even for national security. But in principle ecash goes beyond such communications security to achieve true multiparty security; no one (buyer, seller, bank) can cheat anyone else, no matter how they might modify their own software. Even if two parties collude, they cannot cheat the third. Replacing paper and cash with ecash* would make life harder for criminals. Because the payer's computer chooses the 'serial' numbers of the cash as mentioned above), users can identify receivers of their ecash*. Moreover, the privacy which ecash offers would be essential to widespread acceptance of any electronic payment system. -- Andreas Furche Level 29 Chifley Towers Managing Director 2 Chifley Square DigiCash Pty. Ltd. Sydney 2000, Australia e-mail: andreas(a)digicash.com ph +61 2 375 2316 mobile (0419) 385 569 (NEW number!) fax +61 2 375 2121 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This message was sent by e-payments(a)commerce.net. For a complete listing of available commands, please send mail to 'majordomo(a)commerce.net' with 'help' (no quotations) contained within the body of your message. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Your Inquiry
by WEB Tech #5 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dr. Mr. Random Nerd: We receive numerous inquires and apologize for the delay in response. So here it is...the long awaited reply.......

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In-Line Skating Safety and Courtesy
by WEB Tech #5 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Message: You have to do something about your products users. Some sort of responsible behaviour training. Here is a rant I made some months ago to a bicycle specific mailing list. (btw, my hand is still in pain) I am now convinced that there must be something about either cycling specific shoes, clipless pedal cleats, or perhaps the little mirror I have on my helmet that attracts users of inline skates so strongly that they crash into me. I used to think that it was a property of the bicycle, until last night. I went for an evening ride, and stopped to listen to some bagpipe players practicing in a local park last night. My bike was 10 feet away, leaning against a tree. I was standing off the path, on a place where the paving had been widened to accommodate a manhole. A skater was skating backwards, and ran into me, knocking me over. I jammed several fingers landing (officially hyperextention of a long list of Latin words). My hand is now in a brace, and since I already have chronic tendinitis, it may well be the better part of a year before it returns to its normal level of pain. I have no idea who the skater is, he picked himself up, and sprinted off, before I had a chance to get up myself, let alone time to offer my speculations on his parentage, and level of intelligence. (I suppose he was displaying some intelligence, for if I knew who he was, I would bring a charge of battery against him, in addition to a civil action that would include the maker of the skates. Not knowing who it was, or what brand of skates he wore makes such actions much more difficult.) I had to ride the remaining three miles home with my left (small favor, at least I can still write) arm on my lap. What particularly gets me about the clown last night, is that he was being spectacturaly irresponsible. This is a fairly popular park, and this was a busy time for a weekday. He shouldn't have been skating at speed on the path, let alone not facing the direction of travel. While I would have preferred that he instead have hit a brick wall, I at least had comparable mass to him, and still have reasonable bone strength, even if my tendons are in poor shape. Had he hit one of the parks frailer users, the result could have included a broken hip, or worse. (it is popular with seniors, who often take their evening constutional 4 abreast across the path.) I don't ride thru it normally (I'm not gonna take out someones grandmother), and in fact had walked my bike to listen to the pipers. When I have complained about problem interactions with skaters before, it was suggested that part of the problem was that I was using the bike path, as they aren't safe for bicyles any more. Well on Sunday, I came up behind two skaters on the road, in single file, climbing a hill. I made the usual "passing left" cry, and started to pass. The second skater was headphone equipped, and thus apparently didn't hear me. He started to pass the lead skater as my front wheel pulled alongside. His skate struck my wheel, luckily at ground level. That is when he became aware of my presence. We both managed to remain upright, and I swerved further out into the traffic lane (I had checked for oncoming cars before starting to pass. The skater didn't). Again, no apology was offered by the skater, I suggested that wearing headphones weren't a good idea on the street, he made an obscene reply. At this point, I am very tempted to switch from my current long wheelbase, fairly low bottom bracket recumbent bike, to a short wheelbase recumbent with a high bottom bracket (a design that places the pedals and chainwheels at the very front of the bike about 25 to 30 inches off the ground), and equip it with an extra "chainring", a 14" carbide tipped one from that well known bike parts maker Black & Decker. The electric bell that I have mounted inside the bar is clearly inaudible, even at times to those that aren't blocking out the world. I have heard speculation on a "lower pitch" air horn that operates off a water bottle filled with compressed air. (the message they convey is _LARGE TRUCK_ not bicycle). (of course that wouldn't have helped with the incident that prompted me to dictate this rant. Some of your users have clearly taken too many falls without a helmet. Others just don't have a clue about rules of the road. I repeatedly have problems with skaters that make sudden U turns without looking, nor was this the first time I have had a problem with a skater skating in the direction they did not face. (I was riding, they were oncoming, I was able to evade by putting my bike into the drainage ditch beside the path). SECOND Message: I just read your "asphalt bites" safety tips. NOT ONCE DOES IT MENTION OTHER VEHICLES AND RULES OF THE ROAD. It talks about saving the riders skin, but not that of the other users of the space they inflict themselves on. No mention is made about operating at night, etc. You don't suggest a mirror, and the "quiz" that tells people to ditch the headphones isn't mentioned on the page. This is truly irresponsible, and I hope some jury suitably penalizes you for your stupid actions. Since I wish to retain my anonymity, please send the reply to cypherpunks(a)toad.com, and I will see it. No, I don't want an apology, I want notice that the web page, and product packaging has been updated, stressing that inline skaters need to learn to a: share, b: be aware of other traffic (don't U turn into the path of another user, look before making any sudden change of direction or lane) c: don't come to a sudden stop in the middle of a mixed use "bike" path because a friend was coming the other direction, and you stopped to chat, d: operate "predictably" so if nothing else the other users can take steps to avoid you. e: ditch the tunes, f: have at least one set of eyes facing the direction you are travelling (yes, you can ride backwards, but you have to have someone spotting for you for the whole time) g: stay out of the lane that is for oncoming traffic -- if the path is narrow (like most rail trails) this means ride in single file. REPLY FROM ROLLERBLADE INC. Dear Mr. Random Nerd: Thank you for your e-mail message concerning in-line skating safety and more specifically, the "rules of the road". Public trails are used for many types of sporting activities (walking, biking, skating etc.). What the issue becomes is that all of us must learn to be courteous to other types of users, much like on public roadways which are utilized by cars, trucks, and motorcycles where everyone must adhere to a common set of rules. Regarding your issue with Rollerblade Inc., we feel that your anger towards us is misdirected. A good analogy to help me illustrate the issue for you would be this: if a person walking down the road throws a McDonalds wrapper on the ground, is McDonalds littering? It is up to us all to be skating (and biking) ambassadors who educate those who are beginners about the "rules of the road (trails)". Just as there are problems with uncourteous skaters, there are also uncourteous bikers out there who choose not to follow these rules. Rollerblade recognized early on the importance of safety education in creating this sport. We helped to create and, along with numerous other in-line skate manufacturers, heavily support an industry wide organization called the IISA (International In-Line Skating Association). The IISA has several programs like the Instructor Certification Program, and the National Skate Patrol that are aimed at educating skaters. National Skate Patrol members are much like National Ski Patrol members with obvious differences based on the specific activity. Members skate local parks and trails to be of assistance to skaters and to educate beginning skaters about safety and "the rules". The IISA also publishes "Rules of the Road" which gives tips to skaters about how to legally, and courteously skate. The IISA also helps to promote our "Asphalt Bites" Campaign which details the importance of always wearing protective gear while in-line skating. In addition to the efforts above, all your comments listed in points "a" through "g" are covered in the "Rules of the Road" on page 4 of our Owners Handbook that comes with each pair of Rollerblade skates. I have listed them below for your reference... 1. Always wear protective gear: helmet, wrist guards, knee & elbow pads 2. Take a lesson or learn in-line skating basics, such as controlling speed, turning, braking, stopping before you skate 3. Stay alert. Always skate under control. 4. Stay away from water, oil, debris, sand and uneven or broken pavement 5. Avoid areas with heavy traffic 6. Observe all traffic regulations 7. Skate on the right of the path. When you pass a walker, biker or another skater, move to the left. 8. Never allow yourself to be towed by a motorized vehicle or bicycle. 9. Avoid wearing headphones or anything that makes it hard to hear 10. Never wear anything that blocks your vision, and never skate at night or any time it is hard to see. I hope you come to find that we are as concerned as you about people enjoying public places and the outdoors. In most states, skates and bikes are wheeled vehicles that are subject to the same rules as motorists. Educating people to use public places takes an effort on everyones part. If you would like us to send a copy of our owners manual or any other safety information, please email us with your address. Thanks again...Skate (bike) the World!!! Webtech5 Rollerblade Consumer Service

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Re: NSA Report: Anyone seen this?
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just got off the phone with the NSA. "There are so many places in the NSA that deal with cryptology we haven't been able to find the document yet. We'll call you back once we locate it and let you know if it can be released or not. We've been getting phone calls about the document. Did you read about it on the Internet?" -Declan >--- begin forwarded text > > >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Date: Wed, 23 Oct 1996 16:50:18 -0700 >From: Somebody >Subject: NSA Report >To: rah(a)shipwright.com > > I don't recall seeing this report mentioned in any e$pam items, and > thought you might be interested. Thanks for all your work on the e$ > lists. > ><Somebody's .sig> > >______________________________ Forward Header >__________________________________ >Subject: 21st Century Banking Alert No. 96-10-17 >Author: "Ledig; Robert" <LEDIGRO(a)ffhsj.com> at internet >Date: 10/17/96 2:51 PM > > > >21st Century Banking Alert No. 96-10-17 >October 17, 1996 > >National Security Agency Report Raises >Systemic Security Issues Related to Anonymous Electronic Money > > > A recent report prepared by the Cryptology Division of the National >Security Agency's Office of Information Security Research and Technology >discusses the potential for security failures in certain electronic cash >systems and their likely consequences. While demonstrating concern over the >attributes of non-traceable electronic money, the report points out methods >that may be used to minimize security breaches and losses, including >limiting the number of coins that can be affected by a single compromise, >requiring traceability for large transactions or large numbers of >transactions in a given period, and the creation of a mechanism to restore >traceability under certain circumstances. The report contains an excellent >summary of basic electronic money cryptographic tools, electronic cash >protocols, authentication and signature techniques and related security >issues. > > > >Copyright 1996. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson. > All rights reserved. >21st Century Banking Alert is a trademark and servicemark > of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson. > > > >--- end forwarded text > > > >----------------- >Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) >e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA >"The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson >The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Re: Netescrow & Remailers?
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How about this idea for improving the remailer network: Every remailer is marked as either IN or OUT, not both. An IN remailer accepts mail from anybody but remails only to other remailers (IN or OUT). An OUT remailer never remails to another remailer, only to final recipient addresses. If an IN remailer finds itself as the last one in the chain then it picks an OUT remailer at random to send the message through. This way there would never be any abuse complaints on IN remailers because they are invisible. When an OUT remailer is taken out nobody gets hurt because OUT remailers will never be used in reply blocks. Matts

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RE: "Countless third world deaths"--who cares?
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hard Media <zaid(a)hardnet.co.uk> wrote: >Citibank is a major player in the third world debt crisis. [Thomas Bass interviewing Citibank's Walter Wriston] > goes on to ask if "Walter" has made any "bad loans" ie to >dictators and other nasty sorts >...jeez sorry but there's naivity and there's stupidity "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> wrote: >Money was lent for economic development projects...some worked, >some didn't. Lenders of money don't "cause" deaths. People are >responsible for their own actions, mostly. If their governments are >corrupt, they need to replace those governments. In Re: Stopping the buying of candidates "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> wrote >Our political system is already in thrall to various special interests; > [...] So be it. Let the highest bidder buy the government he can. In RE: wired wankers Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> wrote: >These are very serious folks [Wriston et al.]. [...] > Don't get in their way unless you have an angel on your side. >An angel with a bag of cash, actually. In Re: Timmy May is a jerk "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> wrote: >I guess I'm not much of a joiner. I never donated to the United Way "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> wrote: >If this sounds harsh, so be it. >Cypherpunks is not about redistributing wealth. Ahh, but you don't really believe this. Your vision of cypherpunks is all about redistributing wealth. Just not in the sense you speak of. There is naivete and then there is complicity. James "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> wrote: >People are responsible for their own actions, mostly.

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New On WWW.Infowar.Com Vol I #3
by Betty G. O'Hearn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

New On WWW.Infowar.Com Take a look. Pass it on. We thank our sponsors: National Computer Security Association Open Source Solutions New Dimensions International - Security Training Secure Computing Corporation HOMECOM Communications There is a lot included in this newsletter including the RELEASE DATE of Winn Schwartau's new book., "Information Warfare Cyberterrorism: Protecting Your Personal Security In the Electronic Age." _____________________________________________________________ On www.infowar.com: What's New **December 2, 1996** deadline and call for papers for the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy In Russia, they don't have Ghost Busters!! They say they've figured out how to crack DES and other crypto services. You have to read this important announcement. DoctrineLINK - the most comprehensive online guide to military doctrine currently available. PKZip Trogan Horse.... Distribute to your security personnel. Beware of the Answering Machine Scam!!! Read about the The Internet II Project which has begun. HOW THE CIA COMBATS INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM HUMINT STILL MOST IMPORTANT WHEN THWARTING TERRORISTS Deputy Attorney General speaks on computer terrorism SPA vs. Site with Hack links? Private Big Brother? Memorandum on 'Arab Intranet' to be signed next week. Phone Scams on the Rise $100 Return Phone Calls? E-Mail Bomber Prosecuted ************************************************************* Great News! You Asked Us For It! It is ON THE WAY!!! ************************************************************* Archives of C4I Inforwar.com has received permission to mirror the entire archive of the list C-4I. For those of you not familiar with this communication, C4I-Pro is an unofficial list run in a DoD school environment in the interest of an academic exchange of information and ideas as a means for advancement of C4I related issues. These archives will add value in your searches. ************************************************************* Announcing a new list: Infowar(a)infowar.com Many of you have signed up for this discussion group thru the web site. This list is about to be launched with in the next 10 days. If you have not signed up, go over to http://www.infowar.com and add your name and info! ************************************************************* Announcing Winn Schwartau's New Book - "Information Warfare - Cyberterrorism: Protecting Your Personal Security In the Electronic Age" BY WINN SCHWARTAU Thunder's Mouth Press, New York. 212.780.0380 ISBN: 1-56025-132-8 Released Date: October 30, 1996. WINN Schwartau's second book on IW, "Information Warfare - Cyberterrorism: Protecting Your Personal Security In the Electronic Age" is a *must* have, inclusive update on the subject. You will want this book in your library of Information Warfare AND INFORMATION SECURITY genre. ABOUT 1/3 of this book is taken from the original work on the subject, "Information Warfare - Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway". ( ISBN: 1-56025-080-1) 1994. Schwartau has added substantial material that brings us current in the EVOLUTION of the field of IW. In addition over thirty contributions from an international collection of authors with excellent and CONTROVERSIAL pieces relevant to the field. FOR EXAMPLE, THE TRUE STORY OF PGP AND PHIL ZIMMERMANN FINALLY COMES TO LIGHT. A GREATLY EXPANDED SECTION ON DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS CLEARS UP MANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS. A HIGHLY CONTROVERRSIAL PIECE IS ON HOW TO USE THE INTERNET AS AN ASSASSINATION TOOL. THE CONTRIBUTIONS SPAN FROM MILITARY TO CIVILIAN TO ANARCHIST. THE DISTINGUISHED Dr. John Alger, National Defense University authored the introduction, and validates Schwartau as one of the major players who brought Information Warfare into focus as "one that affected the primarily the economic infrastructure of the nation. ...And his taxonomy of Class 1, 2 and 3 information warfare is a meaninful organization of ideas upon which a serious study of the concept of information warfare - particularly where concern with economic infrastructure is concerned. Winn Schwartau's second edition of "Information Warfare - Cyberterrorism: Protecting Your Personal Security In the Electronic Age" examines IW in its broadest context." This book is a must for all teaching facilities on the subject of IW. Professor, Dr. Dorothy Denning is an example of distinguished academia from Georgetown University. States Denning. " I'll be using it in COSC 511: Information Warfare: Terrorism, Crime, and National Security". Among the contributing authors are LCdr. Robert J. Garigue, Martin Libicki, Daniel and Julie Ryan, Charles Swett, Carlo Kopp, Peter Radatti, Capt. Roger D. Thrasher, Matthew G. Devost, Simon Davies, Dr. Phillipe Baumard and a score of others representing a global view on the subject. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: THUNDER'S MOUTH PRESS 212.780.0380 YOUR LOCAL BOOKSTORE OR ORDER FROM THE NCSA AT 717.258.1816 **************************************************************** DIRECT REQUESTS to: list(a)infowar.com with one-line in the BODY, NOT in the subject line. Subscribe news_from_wschwatau TO JOIN GROUP Unsubscribe news_from_wschwartau TO LEAVE GROUP **************************************************************** http://www.Infowar.Com Managed by Winn Schwartau winn(a)infowar.com Interpact, Inc. 11511 Pine St. Seminole, FL 33772 813-393-6600 Voice 813-393-6361 FAX Comments, Content, Sponsor Opportunties Betty O'Hearn Assistant to Mr.Winn Schwartau betty(a)infowar.com 813-367-7277 Voice 813-363-7277 FAX

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by Matthew J. Miszewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >"Wink, wink. Nudge, nudge, Senator. Look at your account balance > >tomorrow. Never forget the National Association of Manufacturers was > >there for you" (Obviously a completely random selection 8-) > While I have worked through essentially none of the details, if the system > can be implemented well enough, all this kind of information will be blinded > into oblivion. Donations won't be tallied individually, and news of their > arrival will be disguised, possibly by limiting the size that is credited to > the candidate per day and thus in effect splitting up a donation to make it > "arrive" over a period of a week or two. Only overall totals will be > reported, possibly rounded to only two significant figures, and even then > possibly only on a weekly basis. Politicians need money to pay bills. If you are cutting off all prediction of money appearing (which is impossible unless you get rid of all special interests) no campaign can ever have the ability to plan. This is a major part of all campaigns. Resistance to this will be high (not that this wasnt expected.) > >> The candidate still gets the money, of course, and the contributor is still > >> free to both donate and speak...separately. The thing that's been cut off > >> is the association between the money and the speech...which is exactly what > >> the problem is, isn't it? > > > >See above for why the connection is not. > > Try again. Rather than trying to prove that a system won't work, why not > help develop one that will? Why don't you run for office. I did. Reality, after all, is far better than theory. > But "vote delivery" can't be proven, or even demonstrated with a strong > degree of assurance. Every candidate ever endorsed by the Firefighters Union in my town have been absolutely elected. Looking at the firefighters voting records and matching with their addresses shows a distinct pattern of voting in almost every election. They have sufficient numbers to win every time. > What I consider wrong is that government affects way too large a fraction of > our lives, without apparent Constitutional justification. If the government > at all levels were only, say, 1/10th of its current size, there would be > much less motivation for corruption. Power currupts. Not size of governement. I agree we need to shrink our gov't a whole lot. I believe whole heartedly in the Constitution. I advocate the entire Bill of Rights. I also support meaningful campaign finance reform. But ya know what? I lost. Change doesn't depend on changing finance laws. Much as in nature, these people will always find a way around it. It depends on helping people empower themselves. Making them know their vote DOES count. People who want real reform should fight actively for it. > Jim Bell > jimbell(a)pacifier.com Matt ++++==============---------------------------- Matthew J. Miszewski |The information revolution has changed wealth: |intellectual capital is now far more important mjmiski(a)execpc.com |than money. -Walter Wriston ----------------------------==============++++

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[NEWS]
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

American Banker, 10/24/96 Gonzalez pushing consumer safeguards for electronic banking Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez called Wednesday for aggressive congressional action to protect consumers in the emerging world of electronic banking. Releasing a blueprint for legislative action, the Texas Democrat urged Congress to: *Adopt public policy standards relating to privacy, disclosure, access, equity, and financial reliability for electronic banking products and services. *Hold oversight hearings to assess how well the industry is serving the consumer in these five areas. *Enact laws if the industry's performance falls below minimum congressional standards. *Define financial transactions to include the exchange of financial information as well as cash. *Consider revising current consumer protection laws. "Many of the federal consumer protection laws are nearly 30 years old, and they were not designed to deal with the effects of these new technologies," said Rep. Gonzalez, the House Banking Committee's ranking minority member. The report, "Connecting Consumers: Consumer Issues and Emerging Financial Technology," recommends subjecting banks and nonbanks to the same laws and regulations in this area. Republican committee members and banking regulators have been reluctant to issue rules that might hinder the development of new electronic banking products. [I.e., more regulation of electronic commernce. -DV] --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:32 AM 10/24/96 +0000, Matthew J. Miszewski wrote: >> While I have worked through essentially none of the details, if the system >> can be implemented well enough, all this kind of information will be blinded >> into oblivion. Donations won't be tallied individually, and news of their >> arrival will be disguised, possibly by limiting the size that is credited to >> the candidate per day and thus in effect splitting up a donation to make it >> "arrive" over a period of a week or two. Only overall totals will be >> reported, possibly rounded to only two significant figures, and even then >> possibly only on a weekly basis. > >Politicians need money to pay bills. If you are cutting off all >prediction of money appearing (which is impossible unless you get rid >of all special interests) no campaign can ever have the ability to >plan. No, I didn't say I was "cutting off all prediction of money appearing." But it would be a long shot from having particular donor's names associated with particular dollar figures. And, the system would simply have to adjust. Campaigns would have to adjust their spending to match the current realities, and donors would have to recognize that they're going to have to donate a bit earlier to accomodate the delay. >This is a major part of all campaigns. Resistance to this >will be high (not that this wasnt expected.) > >> >> The candidate still gets the money, of course, and the contributor is still >> >> free to both donate and speak...separately. The thing that's been cut off >> >> is the association between the money and the speech...which is exactly what >> >> the problem is, isn't it? >> > >> >See above for why the connection is not. >> >> Try again. Rather than trying to prove that a system won't work, why not >> help develop one that will? > >Why don't you run for office. I did. Reality, after all, is far >better than theory. I'd prefer doing something far more...uh...permanent than to merely REPLACE officeholders. >> But "vote delivery" can't be proven, or even demonstrated with a strong >> degree of assurance. > >Every candidate ever endorsed by the Firefighters Union in my town >have been absolutely elected. Looking at the firefighters voting >records and matching with their addresses shows a distinct pattern of >voting in almost every election. "Firefighter's voting records"? I _thought_ we had a secret ballot in this country. Maybe you're from some town that I don't know about! Besides, what you're saying can be considered a bit of self-fulfilling prophecy. Some cities ALWAYS vote one way, or another. Over time, public employees simply adjust their politics to match their wallets, etc. Remember, these are PUBLIC employees after all, which really just means the employeees of the thugs who get into office. It does not serve their interests to go against the winning candidate. If, one year, the party normally out of office appears to be winning, the Firefighters will simply adjust their politics accordingly. Simple. > They have sufficient numbers to win every time. Whichever candidate wins, "has sufficient numbers to win." Tell me something else I don't know. >> What I consider wrong is that government affects way too large a fraction of >> our lives, without apparent Constitutional justification. If the government >> at all levels were only, say, 1/10th of its current size, there would be >> much less motivation for corruption. > >Power currupts. Not size of governement. Size of government is evidence of the size of the corruption. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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to whoever runs the "best of security list"
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've noticed that frequently when I send a message to cypherpunks, someone forwards the message to some list called, I think, "best-of-security". I have no idea who runs this list or who is forwarding my messages to it, but the list appears to be badly misconfigured. Every time one of my messages gets forwarded, I get literally two or three dozen bounce messages from undeliverable recipients on that list. My guess is that the best- of-security list software incorrectly identifies the original message author, instead of the list owner, as the originator of messages, and so errors are sent to the wrong place. So to whoever is running the best-of-security list: please either fix your list software or stop forwarding my messages to it. Thanks -matt

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"So Says I", 10/24 ISIG Meeting
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Thu, 24 Oct 1996 13:58:24 -0400 (EDT) X-Sender: mcooley(a)tiac.net Mime-Version: 1.0 To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> From: mcooley(a)nethorizons.com (Marianne Cooley) Subject: "So Says I", 10/24 ISIG Meeting fyi >Date: Tue, 22 Oct 1996 15:45:27 -0400 (EDT) >X-Sender: mcooley(a)tiac.net >To: isig(a)bcs.org >From: mcooley(a)nethorizons.com (Marianne Cooley) >Subject: "So Says I", 10/24 ISIG Meeting >Sender: owner-isig(a)bcs.org >Precedence: bulk >Reply-To: isig(a)bcs.org > >Join us for a great evening at MIT, Building 6, Room 120 for the latest ISIG >meeting. Here's the scoop on the main presentation which starts at 7 pm: > >"So Says I**": Financial cryptography, microintemediation and the power of >reputation in a ubiquitous geodesic economy. < Actually, "I" is "Joe Nebuchannezar" ;-), RAH> >(That really means there's a whole lotta' shakin' goin' on in the area of >electronic money!) > > >** "I" is Bob Hettinga, the founder of the Digital Commerce Society of >Boston, and resident man with opinions on most aspects of e$$ > > >Obviously, the net is going to give us the ability for anyone, anywhere, to >buy anything. No matter where the buyer or seller is, or, for that matter, >where the thing being sold is. > >However, financial cryptography, the technology which underlies digital >commerce, will have much more profound implications than merely the >simplification of sales and distribution. It permits us to make anonymous >*cash* transactions for everything from a billion-dollar foriegn exchange >trade to possibly even switching internet packets themselves. > >If this promise is kept, it could change the fundamentals of our entire >society. It forces profit and loss responsibility further and further down >into organizations until they break up into smaller competing operating >units. It makes book-entry transactions like checks or credit cards >obsolete, and replaces them with strange stuff like digital cash and >personal digital bearer bonds. It creates cash-settled auction markets for >practically anything. People joke about routers and switches which save up >enough from their traffic-tolls to buy copies of themselves. About >micromoney as processor food. > >On a macroeconomic scale, all of government's revenue sources are >book-entry taxes, like those on sales, income, and capital gains. "What >happens when taxes become a tip?", some people have asked. That is, if >government can't trace transactions anymore, because of the very way those >transactions executed, how will government be funded? > >Disintermediation is a common buzzword in the financial markets. It is >usually meant to describe what mutual fund companies have done to banks. >What happens when mutual funds become microintermediated? > >In this talk, we'll look at all of this, and what the world might look like >if Moore's Law and strong cryptography do manage to create a geodesic >economy. > >>From 6:30-7pm, we had expected to have a demonstration of Black Diamond's >web video software, but we haven't quite solved the technical details...(it >is active X, and we can't get that on a UNIX machine yet ;) ) I am still >expecting that one of their representatives will be joining us. We will >also have the usual Q&A during that time. > >If you don't know where Building 6 Room 120 is, the simplest way to describe >it follows: > >Go to the main entrance of MIT on Mass Ave and walk up the steps into the >domed building. Go straight ahead into the long hall ("the infinite >corridor".) Keep walking until you reach the sign that says Building 6,to >the right. Turn down the hall to the right until you reach room 120 on your >right. > > >Looking forward to seeing you all! > >Cheers, >Marianne >********************************************************************* > > Marianne Cooley Internet Special Interest Group > NetHorizons Unlimited Coming Soon! A *new* Boston Group > mcooley(a)nethorizons.com > 617.433.0825 > >Join "Life at Internet Speed" on www.boston.com Wednesdays from 1-2pm! >For a chat topic reminder, send an email to chat-reminder(a)nethorizons.com > with your full name and email address in the body of the message. >********************************************************************** > > > > ********************************************************************* Marianne Cooley Internet Special Interest Group NetHorizons Unlimited Coming Soon! A *new* Boston Group mcooley(a)nethorizons.com 617.433.0825 Join "Life at Internet Speed" on www.boston.com Wednesdays from 1-2pm! For a chat topic reminder, send an email to chat-reminder(a)nethorizons.com with your full name and email address in the body of the message. ********************************************************************** --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Rollerblade Inc. Message
by WEB Tech #5 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today I responded to a rant per request of a cypherpunks(a)toad.com member. I now have been informed that the above news group is not a general use news group. I apologize for any extraneous, non-cryptographic related material that would have been forwarded to all of you earlier today. To illustrate my point, this situation would be similar to someone calling and leaving a message to return the call but deliberately listing the incorrect phone number. I have received numerous replies from many of you and have responded to as many as possible explaining the situation as best I can. Being a webtech for a high e-mail volume company like Rollerblade, topics in cryptography are becoming very important to me. You can bet that I will be visiting your Cypherpunks sites frequently to keep up with the latest trends in cryptographic technologies. Please excuse my oversight of sending an e-mail reply to an unknown news group, this situation has definitely opened my eyes to another important NETicate rule. Thanks for your understanding. Skate the World!!! Webtech5 Rollerblade Consumer Service

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