December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

(Fwd) Re: Secure anonymouse server protocol: comments please
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- From: Adamsc(a)io-online.com (Adamsc) To: "paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk" <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> On Mon, 2 Sep 1996 19:24:23 +0000, paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk wrote: >This system has 1 huge fault, we can encrypt a uses ID with the >servers public key to see what his ID in the encrypted database is >and therefore identify him, maybe we need two seperate server public >keys, and when IDs come in encrypted with key1 (the one it releases) >it decrypts with secretkey1 then encrypts with publickey2 (the one it >keeps secret) >or maybe we can just hash and sign the IDs in the database? >as I said it`s very sketchy, I made most of this up as I wrote it so >if you must tear it to pieces please do so constructively, it could >be the route to a secure system.... How about this: do the exchange *every* time. Never reuse a key. That way at most 1 message could be easily snagged (by seeing where it goes). It'd be processor intensive, but it avoids the whole reuse problem - where you store an ID to be used to retrieve all messages. Also, software could be written to do the key computation solely on the client - after all, the server doesn't care if they pass themselves a dud key, right? Let them crunch it. Put all those Pentiums to work! ... Better idea, I hadn`t thought of that, anyone else care to comment on a way to solve this? - how did the nymservers do it???? Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Http://www.fatmans.demon.co.uk/crypt/ "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey" -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAjH9j+cAAAEEAMBvREiQR0ot9dFCO0TiSCSunAYLv2g1Bc6I3bz8FzKXNH53 6mieJf/W4rD+CxJpT0q9RQaaoRtkHJLwbjfK2il3D7mEahMAyqvF/xRJNqkXfhM3 sRJM0Jh43l+W0M5vwokbEbk25/bxWWGspTsLD3YHbzKnG6pOcL5OPIRbv66xAAUR tCdQYXVsIEJyYWRsZXkgPHBhdWxAZmF0bWFucy5kZW1vbi5jby51az4= =riHc -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: What is the EFF doing exactly?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:52 AM 9/4/96, Jon Lebkowsky wrote: >At 07:44 AM 9/3/96 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: >>At 03:17 PM 9/3/96 -0700, Jon Lebkowsky wrote: >>> Not necessarily. The character of the anonymous speech is decisive. If you >>> use anonymity to cloak harassment, for instance, the anonymity (which >>> removes accountability) is a problem. The accountability issue is real and >>> should be addressed, not evaded. >> >>No: The harassment is the problem, not the anonymity that makes it >>possible. > >The harassment is one problem, the lack of accountability another. Which is >not to say that 'lack of accountability' should be 'fixed' by some sort of >blanket restriction...but it should be acknowledged as a problem. It has been. In many hundreds of articles addressing aspects of the issue. The fact that Esther Dyson and others think advocates of the right to be anonymous claim that these issues are not being considered just shows that Esther and others are not aware of these many articles. Nor can every brief post--such as the one James Donald made above--include a fully-nuanced, fully-balanced discussion of all issues. Saying that an advocate for a position has not considered the alternate positions is usually incorrect. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: 2^1,257,787-1
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:54 PM 9/4/96, John F. Fricker wrote: >Ok so maybe here in Organ we are a little behind the times but I just heard >about this 378,632 digit prime. Grab your HP11C's and crank out >2^1,257,787-1 courtesy of David Slowinski at Cray. The news sites on the Web I looked at had the announcement, but not the number. Thanks. I've already modified my .sig. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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How to use procmail
by Martin Janzen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Damaged Justice" writes: > Would some kind soul out there be willing to instruct a novice in the > mysteries of procmail? I've finally decided to start killfiling my mail > as well as my news. A fine idea. Procmail makes the Cypherpunks list infinitely more readable. 1) First, here's how to get it: ---------------------- A recent version can be picked up at various comp.sources.misc archives. The latest version can be obtained directly from the ftp-archive at: amaru.informatik.rwth-aachen.de (137.226.112.31) as compressed tar file: pub/unix/procmail.tar.Z <100KB or in compressed shar format: pub/unix/procmail.0?.Z ---------------------- 2) Build the procmail program and install it in a suitable location. I have no idea what your familiarity with UNIX and C is; you may want to have your sysadmin help you with this. Alternatively, you could use Alta Vista or equivalent to search for binaries for your system. 3) Create a file of procmail "recipes", which tell it how to process your mail. This file is called "$HOME/.procmailrc". Mine begins like this; fix up directory names as needed for your system: ----------------------- # # $HOME/.procmailrc - procmail recipe file # PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/ucb:/bin:/usr/bin:$HOME/bin/700o:$HOME/bin ME= janzen HOME= /Home/$ME LOGFILE= $HOME/.procmaillog MAILDIR= $HOME/Mail ORGMAIL= /usr/mail/$ME DEFAULT= $ORGMAIL TMP= $HOME/tmp SENDMAIL= /usr/lib/sendmail TMPFILE= $TMP/procmail.$$ LOCKFILE= $HOME/Mail/.procmail # toss out junk mail :1 ^Subject:.*unsubscribe /dev/null # sort mail from mailing lists into the proper folders :1 cypherpunks Cypherpunks ----------------------- The last part sorts all mail whose header contains the word "cypherpunks" into the folder $MAILDIR/Cypherpunks. Now the fun part -- writing your "recipes"! You can get as specific as you want: ----------------------- # kill a particular thread :2 ^To:.*cypherpunks@toad.com ^Subject:.*Workers of the /dev/null # ignore a particular user :2 cypherpunks patrickbc(a)juno.com /dev/null # I haven't tried this one, but any subject with too many consecutive # capitals is probably spam or worse. Separate it out, but don't toss # it just yet. :2 cypherpunks ^Subject:.*[A-Z][A-Z][A-Z][A-Z][A-Z][A-Z] ProbableSpam # search the whole message body, not just the headers, for probable spam :1HB ^dear friend ProbableSpam # put everything else in the incoming Cypherpunks mail folder :1 ^To:.*cypherpunks@toad.com NewCypherpunksMail ----------------------- Rules are evaluated in top-to-bottom order; first matching rule wins. Anything not matched ends up in your usual $ORGMAIL folder. 4) Run your incoming mail through procmail. To do this, most Unix systems let you create a file called "$HOME/.forward" with the following contents (including the quotes): "| IFS=' '; /usr/local/bin/procmail -p" (Replace "/usr/local/bin" with the directory in which you installed procmail.) 5) One thing to watch out for: procmail is executed on the machine which handles your mail. If this machine has a different architecture than your own machine, you must build procmail for the mail handling machine, not your own. Also, the permissions on your $HOME/.forward and $HOME/.procmailrc files must be set so that they are readable on the mail handling machine. If your home directory is NFS-mounted, this should happen automatically; otherwise, you may need to copy them to the mail handling machine manually. Finally, the procmail process may not have your userid, so you must make these files world-readable: chmod 644 $HOME/.forward $HOME/.procmailrc For the first day or two, check your $HOME/.procmaillog file frequently to see whether there are any problems. Check with your sysadmin to make sure that your mail isn't ending up "all over the floor". Send yourself mail to test "recipes". 6) Once it's running smoothly, you can get fancy and run the following shell script, which reads the $HOME/.procmaillog file and produces a nice summary, sorted by mail folder: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #!/bin/sh # Summarize the ~/.procmaillog file LOGFILE=${LOGFILE:=$HOME/.procmaillog} echo "Subject: Procmail Summary" echo " " sort ${LOGFILE} | /usr/bin/awk ' /^ Folder:/ { folder = $2; nbytes = $3; msgcount[folder] += 1; totalbytes[folder] += nbytes; } END { for (folder in msgcount) printf "Folder %s:\tsaved %d messages (%d bytes)\n", \ folder, msgcount[folder], totalbytes[folder]; } ' if [ "$1" = "-clear" ]; then rm -f $LOGFILE; fi ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- To arrange to have it run daily, I use the following crontab entry: 0 7 * * * /Home/janzen/bin/pmsumm.sh -clear | elm -s "Procmail Summary" janzen which means, "At 7:00AM every morning, run the pmsumm.sh script, use the Elm mailer to mail the output to me, and then clear $HOME/.procmaillog". See the "cron" man page for your system, and/or talk to your sysadmin, since this varies among different flavors of Unix. Hope this helps... -- Martin Janzen janzen(a)idacom.hp.com

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Protecting Web servers (was: Moscowchannel.com hack)
by smith＠sctc.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Could you illuminate me on this subject please? I am working with a >potential client who may need a fairly secure web server. Years ago, the government published some criteria for highly secure systems, notably the TCSEC or "Orange Book," which described requirements for protecting classified information on a timesharing system with uncleared users. Several vendors managed to build such systems, though very few were judged secure enough to really protect classified data from uncleared users. However, the underlying mechanisms of "mandatory access control" do manage to block a range of sophisticated attacks against the host computer. These are the systems given the various B and A ratings: B1, B2, B3, A1 (in ascending order of security). Also-ran systems that can keep honest people from tripping over one another were given "C" ratings, though "C2" is all you see any more. A few vendors are putting Web servers and such on systems with mandatory protection. I've heard talk of it from SecureWare, HP, Harris, and AT&T using B1 or B1-like systems. Pardon the plug, but our Sidewinder also hosts a protected Web server and uses mandatory protection to prevent Internet attacks from damaging it. In practice, I've found that most customers just want to demonstrate "due diligence" regarding security. They pick up whatever's popular in the marketplace that has some pretention of strong security ("We're C2 rated by the government!!"). It's a rare customer that actually takes the time to look at the security issues and consider whether they might need what mandatory protection provides. Rick. smith(a)sctc.com secure computing corporation

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San Diego CPunk Physical meeting this Thursday
by Christian Claborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- <<<<< NOTE! I have a new address!!! >>>>>> This Thursday!!! San Diego Area CPUNKS symposium Thursday, Sep. 5, 1996. Invitation to all Cypherpunks to join the San Diego crowd at "The Mission Cafe & Coffee Shop". We discuss cryptography and other related subjects, have the special cypherpunk dinner, and unwind after a long day at the grind stone. Don't forget to bring your public key fingerprint. If you can figure out how to get it on the back of a business card, that would be cool. If you want the suspicious crowd there to sign your key, bring two forms of ID. Hopefully Lance Cottrell will give us an update on Mixmaster and what's going on at San Diego's best ISP. You can also get the scoop on why I resigned from NCR. It wouldn't of course be because someone freaked out when I forwarded the cypherpunk e-mail titled "How to become in international Arms trafficker"... Place: The Mission Cafe & Coffee Shop 3795 Mission Bl in Mission Beach. 488-9060 Time:1800 Their Directions: 8 west to Mission Beach Ingram Exit Take west mission bay drive Go right on Mission Blvd. On the corner of San Jose and mission blvd. It is located between roller coaster and garnett. It's kind of 40s looking building... funky looking (their description, not mine) They serve stuff to eat, coffee stuff, and beer. See you there! New guy, bring your fingerprint. Drop me a note if you plan to attend... NOTE: My primary e-mail address has changed to use my own domain. You can reach me at "claborne(a)cyberthought.com". Permanently replace any other address that you may have for me. I am currently not subscribed to the CP list since my current internet connection is slow (I can't afford anything right now :) 2 -- C -- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.0 Personal Edition iQEVAgUBMi3ezYP1MBWQ+9udAQE/QAf/W/tdXCFx57p17tlXT0WbtZHPK2riMC2j 5golSBxmP5t0X6SbM0DYz9b8kq6FWrqTJ9hVKQhGHiiZVqRo6AcbYM9SlFM54x6E TFMKB6WzBp7h2DPqAeFZKuP2yGIhZaMns8fDS4EZIYHeH63DjEuhmwtM//iGe9KI txHFiQUKi0cQWGNfqeowpESfbO0HppFbsmgj9z9KTg2gFRpPpXQLP3vXJ9Dg0/IK gd5AiT+BTE2OOORS3OCmIUTC3vDI1acu/d2MNVOFuIBOkwH5y/mGf1pMndIW0++v eC+3j27wJyUbSumxM6+iVn+gu0mE7QB6YPllB9FbihkYNNfzWejyuA== =obLu -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... __o .. -\<, Claborne(a)CYBERTHOUGHT.com ...(*)/(*)._ Providing thoughts on your computing problems. http://www.CYBERTHOUGHT.com/cyberthought/ PGP Pub Key fingerprint = 7E BF 38 3F 24 A7 D1 B0 54 44 96 AA 10 D0 5D 51 Avail on Pub Key server. PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! Dreams. They are just a "screen saver" for the brain.

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Internet blamed in shoe-cam crimes, assailant free on $750 bail
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Toronto Sun, 04sep96 Sneaky photographer charged ... by Tom Godfrey A retired high school shop teacher has been charged after a man allegedly used a camera hidden in his size 12 shoe to secretly videotape up the skirts of young women at the CNE. Det. Mike Beauparlant said a man photographed up to 20 women with his "shoe cam," which contained about seven hours of footage when he was arrested at the CNE last Saturday night. Beauparlant said investigators believe he got the idea from surfing a voyeur news group on the Internet. He ordered a $400 fibre optic lens and fastened it in a brogue shoe, police allege. The Oxford-style footwear contained a false front and two small screws on the sole to which a bracket and lens were affixed. "I've never seen anything like this in my 21 years on the force," Beauparlant said. "This was ingenious." Beauparlant said the body of the camera was hidden in a waist pouch and connected to the lens on the shoe with wires that ran under a man's pants and through his sock. "He always photographed very attractive women in their 20s with short skirts," added Det. Const. Mike Dicosola. He said the man was detected by two couples who noticed him moving his foot under the skirt of a woman. They followed the man, held him and called police. Police ask women who feel they've been victimized to call 808-5289. George Walter Campbell, 62, of Cornwall, has been charged with sexual assault and mischief. He returns to College Park court on Sept. 10. He was released on $750 cash bail yesterday. -30-

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Re: How to use procmail
by Martin Janzen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Shostack writes: > Rule introductions of the form :# are depreciated. You should always > use :0, which means any line starting with * is a rule. > [...] > And :0: means use a lockfile on the folder. > [...] > :0 > *^Subject:.*unsub > /dev/null > :0: > *^TOcypherpunks > cypherpunks Thanks, Adam. I created my .procmailrc a long time ago, using the old 2.?? version, and now just cut and paste as required. New procmail users, listen to Adam! (And read the man page, even though it's a bit intimidating at first.) MJ

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Re: Anonymity (re: the Esther Dyson issue)
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In Tim's Cyphernomicon, he says - I have heard (no cites) that "going masked for the purpose of going masked" is illegal in many jurisdictions. Hard to believe, as many other disguises are just as effective and are presumably not outlawed (wigs, mustaches, makeup, etc.). I assume the law has to do with people wearning ski masks and such in "inappropriate" places. Bad law, if real. A lot of the motivation was to stop the Ku Klux Klan terrorism. On the other hand, the reason it was mentioned on the list a couple years ago was that a woman was arrested in some North Central city, probably Detroit, for violating it, because she was wearing a Middle-Eastern-style chador outfit that covered her face. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

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No Subject
by Squirrel Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Subject: How to send bogus mail to mislead traffic analysis? Hi How can I send messages to remailer so that they will get lost? I want to generate a more or less steady flow of remailer-processed, encrypted mail. Can I send to nobody(a)some_remailer.net? What are the guidelines for that? What are the best remailers to send to? Cheers Bugged - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2i mQCNAjItXH4AAAEEAL7znlceWxOboMgS5TJykI0LvxZ+nRwaUle05LyGdbQK8Tbv cnFb945OgUMxlWb+xpwYKpZIaZRJME86aO5OvMAI8IN5AQv1zx/e1v+l/6G8QyWN kRqtIxA++WlPO0co9DbckmED7IhtMabIto9S5vH7m6UzH/ASLE/d3JIQvo5FAAUR tAZCdWdnZWSJAJUCBRAyLVzhT93ckhC+jkUBAYnsA/9WGCWZvZXRibOs6Be9roWX fgTGhDl0rZhH13D5n7O77uQfAMCYf9ALbfn9UkbnMnAGtDyecPTp9TC3Ha65TkWv ald2LoLvMD01d6iS8SkvedcgHqojfh/Q55NkJ0wtO/Ne0jOtFVQzDEtF7awwypAx HZgIoEMsSLDrTT0EwTlTjg== =mlIT - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQCVAgUBMi1g10/d3JIQvo5FAQE70wQAsVZzVT9MrP5TuKcilJaehufve5O56B4y 0y5vaeax5fAAElZz9SxRV+meAgUNvRNTUu1afZIHYzoFUdJWoSAroLxMjSqbv1uT O95Qur+jJRLwgDoo+Kgse8DESDqlGdI2kab6KxDrSz2erkARYn9A5/JQTTI/L3I5 z1eW2fBec9c= =kDXU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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SG Spy Ring
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Financial Times, September 4, 1996, p. 4. Singapore looks to superhighway By James Kynge in Kuala Lumpur Singapore took another step toward its vision of becoming an "intelligent island" yesterday, announcing an initiative to link the city-state's main on-line networks. Mr Goh Chee Wee, Singapore's minister of state for communications, said the "internetwork hub" would link service providers of the Internet, government on-line networks, commercial networks and some others. Singapore's move follows an ambitious scheme announced by neighbour Malaysia last month to launch an "information superhighway" designed to attract the world's leading information technology companies to Kuala Lumpur. The perceived advantage in Singapore's initiative is that users will be able to access all networks using a single leased line, rather than the separate lines currently necessary. The hub will use a single set of national standards, meaning inter-operability between networks becomes easier. Mr Goh said the hub should be up and running by the end of the year. A mechanism to identify users electronically would be incorporated into the hub network next year, paving the way for secure operations such as payments, banking and confidential correspondence. The move is part of the Information Technology 2000 masterplan, a scheme which aims to accomplish the sometimes conflicting aims of exploiting the information superhighway to its full potential while continuing to insulate Singaporeans from undesired influences. From September 15, the city-state will implement its first big attempt to police cyberspace. From then all Internet providers must channel more than 120,000 subscribers on the island through "proxy servers" before they reach the net. These servers will check every Internet site a subscriber requests and block access to a about a dozen banned sites known to display pornography. The government has warned against material deemed politically subversive or inciting religious disharmony. [End]

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Re: What is the EFF doing exactly?
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >so in a very real sense, anonymity in >the phone system was considered a "problem" by some that has been >"solved" or "modified" by some recent advancements. (yes, most people >agree caller ID is an advancement). Yes, and that is why some companies (e.g., Private Lines) offer anonymous out-bound calling services. > >I think cpunks should hold the view that communication is a matter >of mutual consent between sender and receiver. if a receiver says, >"I don't want any anonymous messages", then should be able to block them. >this is essentially what is happening with the remailers *right*now*, >if you ask any remailer operator. people ask not to receive anonymous >mail, and are put on the blocking lists. imho only the extremists are arguing, >and have always argued, that they should have some ability to put >an anonymous message in front of someone else against their will. > >this basic rule becomes more murky when you look at public forums, >because you can't really say whether given individuals reading them want to >hear something anonymous or not. by designing the forum beforehand >to force the situation, you solve this problem. > I find most unwanted communications objectionable, anonymous or not. How about billboards. Should the fact that I choose to be outside or on a roadway make my eye a target for ads? (If so, then why not consider having an e-mail account in a similar vein?) The fact that I can immediately, or later, identify the responsible party doesn't keep me from initially seeing the ad and taking my time. If I object, what are my alternatives? The last thing I want is monetary compensation. I want my time back. Failing this, I want the abusers time (sorta' like in Zardoz). >I do believe that in the future there will be all types of forums: those in >which identity is required, those in which it is optional, and those in >which it is always cloaked. this is eminently reasonable imho. >those who argue against one of the >above's existence (such as saying it involves a ghettoization >of anonymity, that there should always be an ability to be anonymous >in any communication setting) are extremists imho. "The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man." --George Bernard Shaw PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear, N7ZEZ | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: flimflamery on anonymity
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >(last line is sarcasm for the sarcasm impaired) >a cpunk position I have seen repeated often. it goes along a very >simplistic line of reasoning that I have seen TCM evoke repeatedly. >it rather annoys me. it goes like this: > >cyberspace is merely discussion between people. anonymity should >be allowed anywhere there are discussions (its a free speech issue). >therefore it should be possible everywhere in cyberspace. > >this idea lacks a lot of subtlety in thought and to my mind is >tremendously simplistic. [snip] > >cpunks will also argue that anonymity can suffice for any >business transaction. that may be so, but what about a business >that simply says, "we choose to require identity among our >customers, and you can go elsewhere if you disagree". These attitudes create business opportunities for others who would seek to serve those who prefer anonymity. [snip] > >cyberspace as a whole is *not* going to lead to a totlal motion >away from physical identity. in some ways physical identity will >be more strictly enforced in cyberspace, in "some regions". >there will be other regions of cyberspace in which "anything goes". > As long as attractive, anonymous, alternatives sufficient for those (of a 'cyherpunk' mind) seeking to communicate, transact commerce, etc. exist it won't matter to whether others choose to enforce stricter identity adherence. [snip] >of course in the cpunk mailing list, who cares if there are >anonymous/pseudonymous participants? [snip]... but far more is at stake >in the "real world" and the risks posed by anonymity will be >adequately diluted because of this. and it won't be by people >who are all "f***ing statists"-- it will be by reasonable people >such as those who head EFF, who are interested in a civilized >society. > As always the market and the street will decide. PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear, N7ZEZ | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: desubscribe
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> desubscribe I`m sorry I can`t allow that Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Http://www.fatmans.demon.co.uk/crypt/ "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey" -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAjH9j+cAAAEEAMBvREiQR0ot9dFCO0TiSCSunAYLv2g1Bc6I3bz8FzKXNH53 6mieJf/W4rD+CxJpT0q9RQaaoRtkHJLwbjfK2il3D7mEahMAyqvF/xRJNqkXfhM3 sRJM0Jh43l+W0M5vwokbEbk25/bxWWGspTsLD3YHbzKnG6pOcL5OPIRbv66xAAUR tCdQYXVsIEJyYWRsZXkgPHBhdWxAZmF0bWFucy5kZW1vbi5jby51az4= =riHc -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: What is the EFF doing exactly?
by Jon Lebkowsky 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:02 PM 9/3/96 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: >At 03:17 PM 9/3/96 -0700, Jon Lebkowsky wrote: >>>> Not necessarily. The character of the anonymous speech is decisive. If you >>>> use anonymity to cloak harassment, for instance, the anonymity (which >>>> removes accountability) is a problem. The accountability issue is real and >>>> should be addressed, not evaded. > >At 07:44 AM 9/3/96 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: >>>No: The harassment is the problem, not the anonymity that makes it >>>possible. > >At 06:52 AM 9/4/96 -0500, Jon Lebkowsky wrote: >>The harassment is one problem, the lack of accountability another. > >So: > >Lucky Green and Dark Unicorn are not accountable. This is a problem? > >Because it is a problem "We" need to do something about it, Looks like you didn't quite finish yer msg...what is it that "We" need to do about it? -- Jon Lebkowsky http://www.well.com/~jonl jonl(a)hotwired.com

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Intelligence Community Briefing
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My security clearence has long since expired. Anyone on the list plan to attend and report back :-) ------------------------------------ AFCEA The U.S. Intelligence Community: Who Does What, With What, For What? October 8, 9, 10, 1996 #### This course is Classified SECRET. ### Sponsored by The Community Management Staff. Location: AFCEA International Headquarters, Fairfax, Virginia The U.S. Intelligence Community continues to undergo substantial changes. This top-down course provides an up-to-date understanding of the structure and functions of the Intelligence Community and its components, the changing threats and challenges with which they must deal, as well as resources and processes used. The course addresses intelligence programs structure and provides insight into relations between intelligence producers and policy consumers, as well as useful information about the interaction between U.S. Intelligence and industry. WHO SHOULD ATTEND This course is suitable for industry managers, designers and producers of security and intelligence systems and products, including software and special purpose products. The up-to-date coverage of the changing intelligence community is equally suitable for intelligence officers and operatives proficient in their own services or specialties who have or expect to have responsibilities involving other agencies and services, overview functions or supervision of interfaces between various agency efforts. Past attendance has been divided about equally between persons from the government and from industry. COURSE OUTLINE: Intelligence, Practice and Issues Background of U.S. Intelligence Definitions of Intelligence Intelligence Process Relationships between Intelligence and Policy Systems Intelligence Issues Components and Coordination of the Intelligence Community Organization and Components of the U.S. Intelligence Community The Role of the DCI DCI Special Staffs and Multi-Agency Activity Centers The Community Management Executive Director and Staff The National Intelligence Council Intelligence Oversight and Management within the Executive Branch Civilian Intelligence Organizations Military Intelligence Components Coordination of Counterintelligence Intelligence Budget Structure NFIP TIARA JMIP The Central Intelligence Agency Structure and Functions of the Changing CIA Intelligence Collection, Analysis and Dissemination CIA Support to Military Intelligence Operations Military Intelligence OASDC3I Organization and Functions Structure and Functions of the Defense Intelligence Agency Support for OSD, JCS, and Operational Commands Military Services: Organization, Roles and Missions Impact and Trends Resulting from Changing World Situation and Operational Experiences Overhead Reconnaissance and Surveillance National Reconnaissance Office Defense Airborne Reconnaissance The National Security Agency and Central Security Service Role in the Community Specific Functions Services of Common Concern Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Organization and Functions Law Enforcement Intelligence Functions Counter-Intelligence Relationships with CIA and Other Components of the Intelligence Community Counternarcotics Intelligence and the Drug Enforcement Administration The Problem The Counternarcotics Community DCI Counternarcotics Center Operational Counternarcotics Intelligence Activities Imagery The Central Imagery Office Relationships with Other Parts of the Intelligence Community Support to Operational Commands Intelligence Support for Arms Control and Disarmament Arms Control Intelligence Staff Non-Proliferation Center On-Site Inspections Nuclear Intelligence and Role of Department of Energy Intelligence Community and the Congress Functions of the Oversight Committees Legislation Affecting the Intelligence Community Trends Intelligence and Industry Relationship Between Intelligence Components and the Private Sector Opportunities to Market Services and Products Control Mechanisms Business Strategies Intelligence Developments in Private Industry Internal Intelligence System Risk Analysis Course Coordinator COL John D. Sitterson, USA (Ret.), is now a consultant to AFCEA and industry. His military career included assignments in intelligence and international security affairs, as well as combat and commands with extensive C3I involvement. He headed the Department of National and International Security Studies at the Army War College. Colonel Sitterson served on a White House Task Force, in operations coordinating elements under NSA, on a Presidential-Congressional Commission, and as a military member of two blue ribbon study groups at the Council on Foreign Relations. As a civilian he served 20 years in defense-related government and industry positions, including 11 years with HRB-Singer (now HRB Systems). Lecturers: Mr. Peter C. Oleson has had extensive experience in intelligence related positions in the U.S. government and industry, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He has been adjunct professor of Resource Management at the Defense Intelligence College. He now heads his own consulting firm. Other lecturers will be authoritative representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency; Community Management Staff; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I); Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Intelligence Services of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps; the National Reconnaissance Office; the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office; the Central Imagery Office; Department of State (INR); Department of Energy; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Drug Enforcement Administration; Arms Control Intelligence Staff; Non-Proliferation Center and the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Register by submitting the following information to: AFCEA 4400 Fair Lakes Court Fairfax, Virginia 22033-3899 Phone: (703) 631-6135 FAX (703) 631 4693 email = aafceapdc(a)aol.com until 1 October and then pdc(a)afcea.org Course Name or Number: Intelligence Course/ 203N Date Course Convenes: 8 October 1996 STUDENT: Rank/Honorific: Service: First Name: MI: Last Name: Title/Position: Company/Organization: Division: Mail Stop/ Suite/ Office Symbol: Street Address: City: State: ZIP: Country Telephone: (area code) Fax: (area code) Please indicate method of payment intended: Mastercard/Visa/AMEX/Diners Club/ DD1556/Voucher All registrations will be acknowledged. The acknowledgement letter will contain information on location of the course, housing and transportation details. Fees: Government Personnel $700 Industry $950 ### A Classified Visit Request must be submitted by mail or fax before the student is permitted to attend the course. This request should be received at AFCEA at least the week before the class convenes. ------------------------- PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear, N7ZEZ | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Reputations
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Regulation - which is based on force and fear - undermines the moral base of business dealings. It becomes cheaper to bribe a building inspector than to meet his standards of construction. A fly-by-night securities operator can quickly meet all the S.E.C. requirements, gain the inference of respectability, and proceed to fleece the public. In an unregulated economy, the operator would have had to spend a number of years in reputable dealings before he could earn a position of trust sufficient to induce a number of investors to place funds with him. Protection of the consumer by regulation is thus illusory." -- Alan Greenspan TCM, seems like a reputable source to support your views. -- Steve PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear, N7ZEZ | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Race Bit: C
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:47 AM 9/4/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 3:02 AM 9/4/96, James A. Donald wrote: >>At 10:33 PM 9/3/96 -0800, jim bell wrote: >>>>The Leahy crypto bill introduced early this year made (paraphrasing) "the >>>>use of encryption to thwart a law-enforcement investigation illegal." I >>>>immediately pointed out that while this wouldn't make _encrypted_ remailers >>>>illegal, per se, effectively it would because the moment an investigation >>>>(even a phony or trumped-up one) is started and is "thwarted" by the >>>>encryption used, the remailer operator became guilty of a crime. >... >>I believe that judges have a policy of interpreting deliberately >>ambiguous statutes in whatever way makes the most sense. The only >>sensible interpretation of Leahy's bill is that it criminalizes >>strong remailers, that it is intended to punish ANYONE, not just >>the criminals themselves, who obstructs investigations. > >As the recent discussion of knives, switchblades, and throwing stars >showed, such ambiguous laws are often used to keep the coloreds down. Perhaps the most ominous part of making "use of encryption to thwart an investigation" illegal is _not_ that remailer operators might be prosecuted, but that they might NOT be prosecuted in a deal where (in exchange for not being prosecuted) they continue to operate the remailer, "cracked" or sabotaged so that they share all the info with the cops. While even that won't make chained remailers totally useless, eventually suspicions of such a crack will surface, which will help sabotage the credibility of all remailers, not just the ones that have been "stung." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Browne and foreign tyrants
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: "George D. Phillies" <phillies(a)WPI.EDU> >Subject: Re: Browne & foreign tyrants >There is a section of the Geneva Protocols forbidding actions in occupied >territories directed against officers of political parties. Under that >section, the actions in Somalia against, e.g., the treasurer of General >Aidid's political party, were war crimes. No one seems to get very upset. > >> If there is such a treaty, the US has a long history of ignoring it. >> >> 0) Attempts to kill Hitler. >I don't think we ever tried this. And this was a real shame. Over 30 million people died in WWII, directly or indirectly. We knew that Hitler was going to be a problem well before 1936. Think how many could have been saved... If anything, WWII is excellent proof that AP is a good idea. Stauffenberg was the German who bombed Hitler's meeting in 1944 but failed to kill him. Stauffenberg knew as early as 1942 that Hitler needed to be killed, and a recent "60 Minutes" episode related how hundreds of people knew about this plot. The reason he failed was that while he was preparing the two bombs in a bathroom, he was interrupted. (The bomb's delay mechamism was acid dissolving a metal.) Rather than being caught, he left one of the briefcases in the bathroom and went to the meeting with only one bomb. Furthermore, he left the bomb at the meeting, but it was pushed behind the heavy table after he left, which shielded Hitler from much of the force of the explosion. If AP (or at least, some anonymous reward mechanism for Stauffenberg's family) had been available, he would have done "the honorable thing," and walked up to Hitler with the bomb and instantly detonated it right there, resulting in both Hitler's and Stauffenberg's certain death. At least hundreds of thousands or perhaps over a million people would have SURVIVED. As it happened, Stauffenberg's reticence caused not only his death after torture, but also the deaths of well over a hundred coup-plotters, but also the thousands that were yet to die in the last 6+ months of WWII. Question: Would you kill yourself to save a million lives? Even if you wouldn't, would you change your mind if your heirs would be anonymously paid an extra $10 million dollars or so? I'd say that's a pretty substantial motivation, wouldn't you? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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RE: rc2 export limits..
by Surya Koneru 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

RC2 uses a effective key size, so is it ok to use a key of 128 bits size with a 40 bits effective key size for export. Thanx --Surya >---------- >From: Simon Spero[SMTP:ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu] >Sent: Tuesday, September 03, 1996 8:33 PM >To: Surya Koneru >Cc: 'cypherpunks(a)toad.com' >Subject: Re: rc2 export limits.. > >It's the usual - if you want commercial jurisdiction, > 40 bits unescrowed > 64 bits (16 escrowed) > >Above that, you'll have to go through state on a per customer basis >(which I don't think is that easy to get if software is being shipped >outside the US, and is definitely going to be expensive.) > >Simon > > >--- >Cause maybe (maybe) | In my mind I'm going to Carolina >you're gonna be the one that saves me | - back in Chapel Hill May 16th. >And after all | Email address remains unchanged >You're my firewall - | ........First in Usenet......... >

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cypherpunks
by Chris Steinke 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

subscribe cypherpunks

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Secure remailers, was Race Bit: C
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At 04 Sep 1996 15:21:54 -0800, jim bell wrote: >Perhaps the most ominous part of making "use of encryption to thwart an >investigation" illegal is _not_ that remailer operators might be prosecuted, >but that they might NOT be prosecuted in a deal where (in exchange for not >being prosecuted) they continue to operate the remailer, "cracked" or >sabotaged so that they share all the info with the cops. While even that >won't make chained remailers totally useless, eventually suspicions of such >a crack will surface, which will help sabotage the credibility of all >remailers, >not just the ones that have been "stung." > Yes, that is why there needs to be a move to place all 'critical' portions of remailers and other important servers inside trusted hardware which is highly resistant to compromise. All access to sensitive information (e.g., keys) inside these modules should require multiple parties in several countries (not just the operator of the server) to cooperate. Properly structured (such controls could effectively thwart law enforcement compromise. PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear, N7ZEZ | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Paladin Publishing suit dismissed
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thank you; my memory isn't the best in the world (obviously). -Allen

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Re: Letter to the Observer [re: Internet paedophile]
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 4 Sep 96 at 14:44, Declan McCullagh wrote: > Jean-Francois, your comments are inspired! > > As a member of "such media" in that I still publish articles on dead > trees -- I have articles in fall issues of Wired and Playboy, for > instance -- I rejoice in your reasoned suggestion that you deny me > and my ilk access to the Net. > > But wait! I connect through wired.com, eff.org, or *.edu accounts. > How do you plan to kick me off my "ISPs?" > > No, you're not out to lunch. Well, I did not expect nor want to bar all of the ink spreader community, only, by giving some individual or some rags some trouble, they might get the message. *I* don't plan to kick any net-smearer scumbag off his ISP, I suggest/-ask if- ISP themselves would have advantage to do that./? I simply don't pretend to know it all, so I ask questions... jfa Jean-Francois Avon DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee; Limoges porcelain, silverware and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants: physicists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891

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Re: Reputations
by gregburk＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) writes: > Briefly, think of "restaurants" when thinking about reputations. If one > arrives in a new city, most restaurants may have the same baseline > reputation, e.g. "none." A few may be known by name, for their > "reputation," either good ("You have to eat at Louie's--the laser chicken > is incredible") or bad ("Blecch!). Positive reputations and negative > reputations are self-explanatory. And the reputations of others may affect > the reputations of restaurants ("John Gilmore says he likes the Burma > Burger on Castro Street."). Bad recommendations may affect the "reputation > capital" of John, for example. (We speak of "reputation capital" because it > can in some sense be "spent.") That part of the "reputation capital" theory has always seemed suspicious to me. "reputation capital" doesn't behave linearly. There's too much incentive to bottom-feed and too little incentive to shoot for the heights. As an "asset", it is extremely non-liquid. It is hard to spend it in a controlled manner. Too much incentive to bottom-feed: For example, let's say there's someone well-known who frequently speaks nonsense on crypto issues. We'll call her "Norothy Nenning". She makes a recommendation on some particular crypto issue, say "The government's Nipper chip is a safe and effective form of crupto". Plenty of naive people will credit her to some degree. True, fewer people than if she had carefully husbanded her reputation, and to a lesser degree, but still a lot more than zero. Notice that that's a zero cost/benefit ratio. She never does anything to husband her reputation, she just spends it every chance she gets. And while no single expenditure rewards her as much as it would if she made the same expenditure with a good reputation, she spends so much more freely that it is a good strategy for her on the whole. "Reputation capital" is hard to spend down to absolute 0 because it is significant work to distinguish valid "reputation capital" from worthless counterfeit, and it is easy to counterfeit... just talk. I anticipate the answer "Well, the work pays off". But that misses the point. Frequently the work required to tell the good "reputation capital" from the worthless is as much as would be required to find the straight dope yourself. Too little incentive to shoot for the heights: Suppose you judge that you've accumulated twice as much "reputation capital" as Joe. How do you get twice as much payoff? It seems to me that above the threshhold of credibility, minor side issues make more difference than your two-fold "reputation capital" differential. As an "asset", it is extremely non-liquid: How exactly would you "convert" your reputation into other capital? Would you accept bribes and tell lies? Seems to me you would only get a one-shot "conversion" and it couldn't possibly hope to equal your investment. As soon as you leave the information-broker business, you discover that your "asset" cannot be converted, sold, auctioned off, or much of anything else of value to you. It is hard to spend it in a controlled manner: See above. The single bribe-and-lie will spend your "reputation capital" down to below the threshhold of credibility, no matter how much you started with. Human discourse often tends to be absolutist. It is often very difficult to make people understand and retain a message of partial support or qualified support. Particularly on hot issues. Restaurants, sure, you can give 1 to 5 stars, but in many subject areas there is no such system. And any system you yourself invent tends to be ignored. So I think the latter part of the analysis is wishful thinking, or at least restricted to a small subset of subject-matter. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQBVAwUBMi4omrMyVAabpHidAQGGPAIAizIOktCC4B5gtVYPblaTi9FL6ZtwTfkP sAFHT626mMLz1f/ZKa2SLq3pdag09ACCklJLJ1djFwSFP4bvoijMfw== =rFti -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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