December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: E-Cash promotion idea
by Matt Carpenter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Lucky Green wrote: >At 23:19 7/22/96, Anonymous wrote: > >>How about getting the CyberCafes to accept ecash? Just pull out your >>Newton/HP48/PDA and point the IR beam at the cash register. Now that's >>an ecash application I'd like to see!! > >So would I. And one day we will. Though not not on the HP48. Actually I've been doing some more thinking about this recently, and it may be possible even on an HP48, if you're willing to limit your spending flexibility a little in order to gain the advantages provided by ecash. A couple months ago there was a similar thread on using ecash with Newtons, PDA's, palmtops, and so on. I mentioned an idea of having an "ecash ATM" on an online machine, which would allow you to download ecash coins to your portable device. You could then carry the ecash around with you. This way you wouldn't need a full blown ecash client on the portable, just a simple program that would ask you for the payment amount and send off the appropriate coins. The main problem with the idea seemed to be that I suggested getting change from the merchant. Ian Goldberg pointed out that with the current ecash protocol, accepting change not only eliminates your anonymity, but that you also have to go online to make sure you aren't being cheated. Anonymous's post got me to thinking about this again. Since I know many of you are more knowledgeable about ecash than I, let me know if you can add more detailed information or see any problems with the approach below (other than a certain lack of convenience, which may be the major issue with this approach). What if we just forget about change? One of the neat things about ecash is that it allows for coins of (fairly) arbitrary values. We can use this to our advantage, since we can guarantee that we can make a single payment of any value with a small number of coins. (People familiar with ecash know all this already I'm sure, but I'll describe it in some detail for others who may not have thought about it as much). Here's the basic formula: Number of required coins = ceiling( log2( P/L ) ) where P is the maximum payment amount available to spend on a single transaction, and L is the "loss limit", or the upper limit of money we are willing to lose on a single transaction. For example, if we want to be able to make a $50 payment to the nearest cent ($.01), we need: ceiling(log2( 50/.01)) = 13 coins So with only 13 coins, we are guaranteed to be able to make any single payment from $.01 - $50 to the nearest cent. Since we are dealing with base 2 logarithms, if we increase the maximum amount to $100, we only need a single additional coin. The algorithm to generate the coin values is simple. Basically you start at P and just keep dividing by two until you reach L. For the above example, we could use 13 coin values of: $25, $12.50, $6.25, $3.13, $1.57, $0.79, $0.40, $0.20, $0.10, $0.05, $0.03, $0.02, and $0.01. This actually gives us a total of $50.05 due to rounding, but we are guaranteed of being able to pay to the nearest cent any amount between $0.01 to $50.00, with multiple possible combinations for certain values. Now, I'm not sure what the average size of an ecash coin is (anybody?), but the few I've seen floating around the net in "ASCII armor" have been around 500-600 bytes (of ASCII text), I think. So guessing (hopefully conservatively) that the average coin size is about 1k or less, then we need about 13k worth of storage space to make any single payment of $50 or under. We can do a little better if we are willing to lose a little money in the transaction. For instance, if L=$0.10, then we only need 9 coins (and we will lose less than $0.10 in the transaction). For L=$0.40, 7 coins. Of course this probably isn't cost effective in most cases, but might potentially be useful, if you are tight on storage space or something. So, with a storage space of approximately 64k (close to 5 x 13k), we are guaranteed of being able to make any 5 payments of $50 dollars of less, to the nearest cent. Of course, we also need some software, but it should be fairly simple and small. Just a little database to keep track of which coins we have, and a simple user interface to prompt for payment amount, select the appropriate coins, and beam them off to the payee (probably also a transaction log, and encryption capabilities). A few points: * This should be doable with current technology. All we need is a fairly small storage space, say 128K or less (more gives us more flexibility), and something like IR, wireless, or even a serial port connection via cable to send the coins to the payee. This seems to allow things like Newtons, HP Palmtops (and perhaps higher end calculators), USR Pilots, etc. to be used as unconnected ecash "wallets". This assumes the payee is online, since they will want to clear the coins to make sure they are good. * This is less expensive than requiring both parties to be online. The payee doesn't need to provide a net connection to the payer; the payer doesn't need to utilize memory space (and possibly additional hardware) for more complicated software to carry out the online transactions and payment generation. All the payee needs (besides the standard ecash software and a net connection) is a method of receiving coins, like IR, and some fairly simple software. * Although one may be carrying around $250 with the above example, it is much safer than carrying cash. Ecash maintains the advantage of cash-like anonymity, but we can keep a back-up of the money on our home machine, and we can encrypt the coins we carry to avoid having them spent by someone else, in case our portable device is lost or stolen. (Of course we do lose a possibly expensive portable device.) * With the proper software and connections to the "ecash ATM" we can have our portable device automatically recharged when we get home (and also update the records of which coins were spent). The ATM also gives us complete control over our spending configurations. There could even be several default set-ups for frequently used cases, each assigned to a single button. Just connect your portable device, click a button, and you're ready to go. For example, if you are going to work, you might generally want to have the capability of several smaller payments for snacks, lunch, and such. For grocery shopping you may want a few larger payments, etc. Also the software could automatically keep track of your purchases (like a credit card statement, or checking account log, but you'd be the only one who has access to it). Plus you don't need to run off to find an ATM; you can get cash from "the comfort and privacy of your own home". * The main problem seems to be the loss of flexibility. After you make your maximum number of guaranteed payments you may have money left over, but it may not be useful for buying what you want. You may only have a $25 coin left to purchase that $1.00 item. Personally, as a possibly paranoid technophilic cypherpunk, I don't see this as a major problem. It means you have to plan ahead a bit, but it gives you the same anonymity as cash, with less chance of having you're money lost or stolen. Those with PDD (Paranoia Deficit Disorder (cypherpunks, are there drugs to treat this? :-)) may not have the same view, and be more likely to use less private, more "convenient" methods of payment. But with the proper software setup and user interface, this approach could probably be made acceptable to many. * I'm not sure how easy this would be with the existing ecash software. Browsing over the ecash API (http://www.digicash.com/api/Home.html) I see there is a EC_pocket_begin_withdrawal() function which looks like it may automatically do something similar to the guaranteed payment thing I described above (I've been salivating over the ecash API for a while, but haven't actually had to time to play with it yet). Things may get tricky if you pick funky values of L, the "loss limit". In any case, it seems like this would be possible, even on an HP48. Probably not all that useful/usable though until you move up to something a little more powerful (how much memory does the HP48 have? I have an old HP28S with 32k, so I'm guessing the '48 has more than that). Once I finish up my thesis, find a job, and find some free time (hopefully all within the next month and a half :-) I plan to play with this idea. Unless someone else beats me to it, or there is something important I'm missing. Comments? - --Matt - -- mcarpent(a)mailhost.tcs.tulane.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMfX32ijtJAMyBnp9AQGD+gf/TOe/ouunmhRz7jL+y65iqU57OaZAK1g0 gLIRDFQDTYMX7387FMBKlQ66RMJx4K80lW59oCAaa3/GyBDZR6Kn9bj2m7aZbYkL 4UDV7HoSJrV8qJv08HXnPibi7kmv+bAztHOAx7M7qo5qUayYCFrMeib65ksrrQYY nnlnCPfLWAPMHeFYUSA3fv9XwQB9NZVSCgr8Z2vhnfCAERqLLukaXHJq9InSPmWw XFIdU1x/cPzOUJx7rxth6qBonz5DD9AMof9Qqk8VY/AzohqHylKirog/IJRTefNl p1xEdI/iBhH3m3azvNhtkEIl0MAzBGU26hBIjB2P9P+08shtMfznow== =vR9P -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

When books are outlawed
by sparks＠bah.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Only outlaws will have books... Just watching the news here in Fl. and they are trying to hold a publisher responsible for a murder because they published a fictional account of a hitman and a guy says he used the book to kill some people. Would you give your 6 year old a book ? This is really getting out of hand.. Anyone have any property for sale in Idaho ? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCXAwUBMfTGneJ+JZd/Y4yVAQHLuQQMDQglhj5/SWlstlnGTnky47xkqIrm5gUK umCeV7tdlKlYjy/KprUx/UChy2GQ/fHd6rh14CIrnqIzV8I1WUOIbcLWYsOZxTmU sOa2vwISXuLvV7wDy50GgLq3kjGUh+BvhvAfxD/vrbyjOWYMCJB9KNRqE2TMpSn5 O6J/Pb0OYkQB6A== =A8SX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Charles E. Sparks http://www.clark.net/pub/charley/index.htm In God we trust, All Others we encrypt Public Key at: http://www.clark.net/pub/charley/cp_1.htm

1 0

Re: Responding to Pre-dawn Unannounced Ninja Raids
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:38 PM 7/23/96 -0400, hallam(a)Etna.ai.mit.edu wrote: >The facts are very clear, if you have a handgun in the house it is >far more likely to kill a member of the familly than stop an >intruder. The NRA know this which is why they have lobbied for the >CDC to stop research in this area - they do not like the facts. And most people who die after jumping out of airplanes have (defective) parachutes. Therefore it is safer to jump out of airplanes without parachutes. The CDC sucked suicides into the mix to cook the books and suicide by firearms is a *legitimate* use of same. Surely you believe in the "right to die," don't you? DCF

2 1

RE: No more stupid gun thread ...
by Bill Olson (EDP) 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alan Horowitz writes: > >How _can_ anyone say that "stupid guns" is ready for the trash-heap of >history? No one has called anyone a Nazi yet! I agree. >

2 1

WinSock Remailer Going On-Line Tonight
by Joey Grasty 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Y'all: I'm pleased to announce that the WinSock Remailer is going into operation tonight at 11:00 PM. Please feel free to test it. You can get the key by sending a message to winsock(a)c2.org with the "Subject: remailer-key". After about a week of further testing, I will be releasing the executables to everyone who sent me a note asking to participate in the alpha test. If you want to be included, please send me a note. Here's the info for the remailer-list: $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut ksub reord"; I'll be adding "post" to this list after I get a more thorough testing of the NNTP code that I added for authentication. "latent" is also pending. The remailer will run every 60 seconds from 12:00 AM to 8:00 AM every day and whenever I am online. c2.org automatically spools the messages when I am not connected. Note: alt.religion.scientology and alt.clearing.technology are blocked. I'm not interested in run-ins with either supporters or detractors of the Church of Scientology. Binary and picture groups are also blocked, but only because I don't have the bandwidth to support them. Anyone who has blocking lists that they want to share, please send them to me. Regards, -- Joey Grasty jgrasty(a)gate.net [home -- encryption, privacy, RKBA and other hopeless causes] jgrasty(a)pts.mot.com [work -- designing pagers] "Anyone who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is, of course, in a state of sin." -- John Von Neumann PGP = A7 CC 31 E4 7E A3 36 13 93 F4 C9 06 89 51 F5 A7

1 0

Re: Another fascist
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"david(a)sternlight.com" "David Sternlight" 23-JUL-1996 08:30:51.02 >One of the great friends of free speech on this list sent a forged cancel >message to the listbot to try to cancel my subscription. >The listbot, being reasonably well designed, ignored him and told me about >it, though I have no doubt less of a dunce could bring it off. >What a piece of slime! What do others think of this practice? You have my sympathies. Either I got logged off the list accidentally a bit back, or someone did this successfully to me. I didn't notice due to being gone for a bit, but I finally did and got back onto the list. I'd meant to email the list maintainer (Eric Hughes, as I recall), but haven't gotten around to it - lack of time. Any signs of who did it from the message? I would guess not. -Allen

1 0

Re: Brute-forcing DES
by Steve Reid 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Specialized DES-cracker chips have of course been considered. Diffie and > Hellman's nearly 20-year-old paper on cracking DES considered this. > Wiener's calculation of a few years ago did more that this: he also > architected a basic system. And the "how many bits is enough?" (sorry I > don't have the official name on the tip of my tongue) panel considered such > designs last year. Yep, I'm familiar with the issue. Bottom line is, it'll take thousands of times the CPU power of the RC4-40 crack. Probably not 2^16 times more; I think RC4 has a longer initialization. > But actually building a DES cracker entails a level of commitment very > difficult to achieve in an informal, volunteer effort. Not exactly > something that 10 or 20 people can work on usefully. > The advantage of the cracks done last year, the French and Australian > cracks, and the MIT cracks, were that the "entry costs" for joining the > project were low. I'm not talking about one individual or organization building one big DES cracker. I'm thinking that DES chips _could_ be used to supliment the PCs in a distributed crack. People with PCs would feed keyspace through their PCs and people with DES chips could feed keyspace through their DES chips. DES chips just happen to have a _lot_ more cracking power than PCs, so they could make a big difference. Adding one DES chip would be like adding hundreds of PCs to the effort. PCs will probably still be the main factor simply because they're ubiquitous. Even with a bunch of DES chips and a massive legion of PCs, this is going to take a long time. Perhaps we should be looking at the thousands of computers and many months, more like the RSA-129 crack than the RC4-40 crack. >From "The Magic Words Are Squeamish Ossifrage": > We believe that we could acquire 100 thousand machines without > superhuman or unethical efforts. If Lenstra et al know what they're talking about, then WE CAN DO THIS!!! ===================================================================== | Steve Reid - SysAdmin & Pres, EDM Web (http://www.edmweb.com/) | | Email: steve(a)edmweb.com Home Page: http://www.edmweb.com/steve/ | | PGP (2048/9F317269) Fingerprint: 11C89D1CD67287E68C09EC52443F8830 | | -- Disclaimer: JMHO, YMMV, TANSTAAFL, IANAL. -- | ===================================================================:)

2 1

Re: Distributed DES crack
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"mab(a)crypto.com" "Matt Blaze" 23-JUL-1996 09:38:21.11 >Personally, I'd rather someone finish up the Wiener ASIC to the point where >it could go out to fab, get some prototype chips made, design a board around >it, and publish the design, from board layout on down. This would be a >great Master's project, and some of us (maybe me, but I'll have to check) >might even be able to scrape up enough funds to buy enough chips/boards/etc >to build a modest size machine (say, that could exhaust a DES key in 1-6 >months). Initial engineering costs aside, the marginal cost of each >such machine could be well within the budgets of, say, a medium size crypto >research lab, and would make a scary enough demo to convince even the >most trusting management types of the risks of 56 bit keys. How about generalized FPGA boards? Some applications in computational biology (searching for similar genes or proteins using FASTA, etcetera) use those quite a bit - and they're available for only about 20,000 or so for quite a few high-level FPGA chips on a board. We've been looking into getting one such and renting its use out on the Web, but the initial investment costs are beyond what available grants will cover; maybe later. Given that at Rutgers is one of the people doing whole bunches of stuff on Web security - namely Simon Cooper - it should't be too difficult. But that will be at least a year or so. -Allen > - matt >(Please cc me on replies, as I'm not reading the list except when someone >alerts me to an interesting topic. Thanks.)

1 0

Re: Special Agent Safdar
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry Metzger writes: > Anonymous writes: > > FBI Special Agent Safdar is upset enough by the revelation > > of his true identity to issue a quick denial (on a sunday night, to get > > more OT no doubt), but he doesn't even bother to try to refute the > > central truth that his cover has been blown by a careless operator at > > his home office who verified his employment and offered to take a message > > for him. > > You really are on drugs. The question is, which ones? It could only be Ritalin, the Official Non-Stimulant of the Cypherpunks list.

1 0

Re: Netscape (foreign downloads)
by Arun Mehta 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:11 23/07/96 -0700, Jeff Weinstein wrote: > I certainly have sympathy for those who want to make a point >by uploading our US software to hacktic and other foreign servers, >but I think that my company will probably have to ask hacktic >and others to remove these copies. > And what are your plans for those outside the US who have downloaded from hacktic? While I'm sure your copyright allows you to do so, don't suppose you have any plans of going after them? Suppose I, as a foreigner, were to obtain a copy Arun Mehta Phone +91-11-6841172, 6849103 amehta(a)cpsr.org http://www.cerfnet.com/~amehta/ finger amehta(a)cerfnet.com for public key

2 1

[forwarded message]: IAB/IESG statement on cryptography (fwd)
by Jeff Barber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: IAB/IESG statement on cryptography To: ietf(a)ietf.org Date: Wed, 24 Jul 1996 08:21:59 +0200 (MET DST) From: Brian Carpenter CERN-CN <brian(a)dxcoms.cern.ch> IETF, FYI, the IAB and IESG have just requested the Internet Society to release the attached statement to the press on our behalf. (The copyright tag at the end is purely to protect the text against misuse.) We intend to publish this as an informational RFC for the record. Brian Carpenter - --- IAB and IESG statement on cryptographic technology and the Internet - ------------------------------------------------------------------- July 24, 1996 The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), the bodies which oversee architecture and standards for the Internet, are concerned by the need for increased protection of international commercial transactions on the Internet, and by the need to offer all Internet users an adequate degree of privacy. Security mechanisms being developed in the Internet Engineering Task Force to meet these needs require and depend on the international use of adequate cryptographic technology. Ready access to such technology is therefore a key factor in the future growth of the Internet as a motor for international commerce and communication. The IAB and IESG are therefore disturbed to note that various governments have actual or proposed policies on access to cryptographic technology that either: (a) impose restrictions by implementing export controls; and/or (b) restrict commercial and private users to weak and inadequate mechanisms such as short cryptographic keys; and/or (c) mandate that private decryption keys should be in the hands of the government or of some other third party; and/or (d) prohibit the use of cryptology entirely, or permit it only to specially authorized organizations. We believe that such policies are against the interests of consumers and the business community, are largely irrelevant to issues of military security, and provide only a marginal or illusory benefit to law enforcement agencies, as discussed below. The IAB and IESG would like to encourage policies that allow ready access to uniform strong cryptographic technology for all Internet users in all countries. The IAB and IESG claim: The Internet is becoming the predominant vehicle for electronic commerce and information exchange. It is essential that the support structure for these activities can be trusted. Encryption is not a secret technology monopolized by any one country, such that export controls can hope to contain its deployment. Any hobbyist can program a PC to do powerful encryption. Many algorithms are well documented, some with source code available in textbooks. Export controls on encryption place companies in that country at a competitive disadvantage. Their competitors from countries without export restrictions can sell systems whose only design constraint is being secure, and easy to use. Usage controls on encryption will also place companies in that country at a competitive disadvantage because these companies cannot securely and easily engage in electronic commerce. Escrow mechanisms inevitably weaken the security of the overall cryptographic system, by creating new points of vulnerability that can and will be attacked. Export controls and usage controls are slowing the deployment of security at the same time as the Internet is exponentially increasing in size and attackers are increasing in sophistication. This puts users in a dangerous position as they are forced to rely on insecure electronic communication. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS - -------------------------- KEY SIZE It is not acceptable to restrict the use or export of cryptosystems based on their key size. Systems that are breakable by one country will be breakable by others, possibly unfriendly ones. Large corporations and even criminal enterprises have the resources to break many cryptosystems. Furthermore, conversations often need to be protected for years to come; as computers increase in speed, key sizes that were once out of reach of cryptanalysis will become insecure. PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE Use of public key cryptography often requires the existence of a "certification authority". That is, some third party must sign a string containing the user's identity and public key. In turn, the third party's key is often signed by a higher-level certification authority. Such a structure is legitimate and necessary. Indeed, many governments will and should run their own CAs, if only to protect citizens' transactions with their governments. But certification authorities should not be confused with escrow centers. Escrow centers are repositories for private keys, while certification authorities deal with public keys. Indeed, sound cryptographic practice dictates that users never reveal their private keys to anyone, even the certification authority. KEYS SHOULD NOT BE REVEALABLE The security of a modern cryptosystem rests entirely on the secrecy of the keys. Accordingly, it is a major principle of system design that to the extent possible, secret keys should never leave their user's secure environment. Key escrow implies that keys must be disclosed in some fashion, a flat-out contradiction of this principle. Any such disclosure weakens the total security of the system. DATA RECOVERY Sometimes escrow systems are touted as being good for the customer because they allow data recovery in the case of lost keys. However, it should be up to the customer to decide whether they would prefer the more secure system in which lost keys mean lost data, or one in which keys are escrowed to be recovered when necessary. Similarly, keys used only for conversations (as opposed to file storage) need never be escrowed. And a system in which the secret key is stored by a government and not by the data owner is certainly not practical for data recovery. SIGNATURE KEYS Keys used for signatures and authentication must never be escrowed. Any third party with access to such keys could impersonate the legitimate owner, creating new opportunities for fraud and deceit. Indeed, a user who wished to repudiate a transaction could claim that his or her escrowed key was used, putting the onus on that party. If a government escrowed the keys, a defendant could claim that the evidence had been forged by the government, thereby making prosecution much more difficult. For electronic commerce, non-repudiation is one of the most important uses for cryptography; and non-repudiation depends on the assumption that only the user has access to the private key. PROTECTION OF THE EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE In some cases, it is technically feasible to use cryptographic operations that do not involve secrecy. While this may suffice in some cases, much of the existing technical and commercial infrastructure cannot be protected in this way. For example, conventional passwords, credit card numbers, and the like must be protected by strong encryption, even though some day more sophisticated techniques may replace them. Encryption can be added on quite easily; wholesale changes to diverse systems cannot. CONFLICTING INTERNATIONAL POLICIES Conflicting restrictions on encryption often force an international company to use a weak encryption system, in order to satisfy legal requirements in two or more different countries. Ironically, in such cases either nation might consider the other an adversary against whom commercial enterprises should use strong cryptography. Clearly, key escrow is not a suitable compromise, since neither country would want to disclose keys to the other. MULTIPLE ENCRYPTION Even if escrowed encryption schemes are used, there is nothing to prevent someone from using another encryption scheme first. Certainly, any serious malefactors would do this; the outer encryption layer, which would use an escrowed scheme, would be used to divert suspicion. ESCROW OF PRIVATE KEYS WON'T NECESSARILY ALLOW DATA DECRYPTION A major threat to users of cryptographic systems is the theft of long-term keys (perhaps by a hacker), either before or after a sensitive conversation. To counter this threat, schemes with "perfect forward secrecy" are often employed. If PFS is used, the attacker must be in control of the machine during the actual conversation. But PFS is generally incompatible with schemes involving escrow of private keys. (This is an oversimplification, but a full analysis would be too lengthy for this document.) CONCLUSIONS - -------------------------- As more and more companies connect to the Internet, and as more and more commerce takes place there, security is becoming more and more critical. Cryptography is the most powerful single tool that users can use to secure the Internet. Knowingly making that tool weaker threatens their ability to do so, and has no proven benefit. - ---- The Internet Architecture Board is described at http://www.iab.org/iab The Internet Engineering Task Force and the Internet Engineering Steering Group are described at http://www.ietf.org - ---- (C) Internet Society 1996. Reproduction or translation of the complete document, but not of extracts, including this notice, is freely permitted. (ends)

1 0

Re: Netscape
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jeff Weinstein wrote: > I'm also curious why these anonymous crusaders did not act > sooner? The US version has been available for sale in retail > outlets for about a year now. Was it not worth $50 to make > your point? If you look real carefully at ftp://utopia.hacktic.nl/pub/replay /pub/incoming you'll notice that the "commercial" 2.01 for Win32 has actually been uploaded. The reason that is was not done sooner is probably that it felt more like stealing to upload software that Netscape expected you to pay for. Now that Netscape is finally giving away strong crypto versions to anybody who asks for it (and claims to be an American) it isn't really stealing in the same sense anymore. It's just ITAR we're ignoring, not Netscape's commercial interests.

2 1

Re: A Global Village; an open letter to Bill & Hill [rant]
by Alex F 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> The world is everchanging and Mrs. Clinton is correct in that the > industrialized > countries have lost, most, of their extended families. This makes children > vulnerable to danger. This is such crap, and I'll tell you why. It is a classic example of political double speak. Here Hillary says that children are in danger because of lost family values. Absolutely true. Let me ask you then why is it that Bill(ary) signed an unconstitutional law? I am referring to the CDA and the telephony bill. What about the terrorism bill? They apparently support censorship on the Internet. They don't want "bigtitties.gif" on the net and accessable to little Johnny. They say that it is WRONG for little Johhny to have access to "bigtitties.gif," and that the GOVERNMENT should DO SOMETHING about this. What happened to family values? Just HOW the hell can you support and promote family values when you are telling the parents (who you want to pay more attention to their children, get more involved, and be kinder) "WE know what is best for little Johnny, and WE will make the decisions, NOT YOU" To me this sends a message of "The government knows best because most parents are stupid and uncaring." It is much more likely that little Johnny will go over to Sammy's house and look at the Playboys that Sammy's dad has hidden under the bed than collect nudie .gifs off of the net, but they wouldn't dare censor that. The Internet is another story, however. I got news for them, we had pornography LONG before the net ever existed, and there is NO solid psychological link to viewing porn and becoming a sex offender. Anyone who thinks so needs to realize that they are talking about something about which they have no clue. Anyway, getting off-topic again. I'll be quiet now :) Alex F =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Alex F alexf(a)iss.net Marketing Specialist Internet Security Systems =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

1 0

Re: Distributed DES crack
by Remo Pini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Wed Jul 24 16:31:44 1996 Has anyone thought about TI or Motorolas DSP-Eval-Boards (at 99$ a piece at 40 MHz with optimized assembler they might easily outrun a PPro200) Don't look at me that way, I know only little about DSP-Programming. By the way, using FPGA's (as suggested earlier) at around 100 MHz should be extremely fast (after all, on one 100000 Gate FPGA, one should be able to do lot of parallel things at one clock cycle -> test several keys at once...). I estimate, that at reasonable cost (lets say, <$500) you should be able to put enough FPGAs on a board to do enough keys in parallel to equal 1 key per cycle, i.e. 1e8 keys/sec. That would amount to: 7.2e8 secs ->8340 days If you build 100 such machines you win in 3 months (without any of the mentioned optimisations (2e55 instead of 2e56, etc.) - --------< fate favors the prepared mind >-------- Remo Pini rp(a)rpini.com PGP: http://www.rpini.com/remopini/rpcrypto.html - ------< words are what reality is made of >------ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMfYz0RFhy5sz+bTpAQGj0Af/Xto3KiZMxb4zybeRcGK3mOINTmgiBo3i Ewbzk5V0DRmNU0j6a1GFh0hmPnHwAZoopLr0VjdiBYRKCj73AEp2FHNuWxhRdp33 KKa4qfWATJM3ESGRpNTfTQr/ruCzxbkGTtDki/j0HC4UbRi/fdjy6MinstjaIJ3t eIcX18+SKOxmV+hzZ8qrJeHlEI3e2RPl0YscXSnHVGlHZNOFUiJB/jPz/Gs8ph9i aZR6bv+T8UVC36CzFF/B9Syxr6QFXVM5xcZ9tAui6VyAk7GOd/O5AKG8Z51jO+OK Nf77HxT3g3wovPz/9pC+6yr9haaokBYPDs4YrBNKA8Wtln2HgdTr3w== =OjX2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

RE: Distributed DES crack
by Andy Brown 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 24 July 1996 12:11, pjn(a)nworks.com wrote: > You are assuming that we will not get the right equasion/code/whatever > untill the very end. There is a good chance that it will only take > half that time...and a slim chance that we will get it with the first > try... My figures were based on 2^55 tries, which is exactly half of 2^56. - Andy

1 0

Pachinko Cards in WSJ
by moulton＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The July 24 1996 edition of the Wall Street Journal has a front page article about the "cashless Pachinko cards" in Japan which resulted in losses for several businesses. This was discussed in cypherpunks when the story originally broke months ago. The article in the WSJ relates how the cards were the results of fears that the money laundered from the pachinko halls was being sent to North Korea to fund the nuclear program there. The CIA provided intelligence about this to the Japanese authorities according to the article. Far too many details to summarize here, I suggest those who are interested read it. Fred

1 0

OPS_nuk
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The WSJ Page Ones a loser's game about the CIA's role in promoting Japanese pachinko cards to halt the surreptitious funneling of betting cash to the construction of a North Korean nuclear plant. And the op's nuking by the Kobe quake looting of card-reading mechanisms, cracking encryption codes, and counterfeiting not-so-smart cards for counter- tipping the house fix. Mondex, watcher bleedin arse. ----- http://jya.com/opsnuk.txt OPS_nuk

1 0

Brute Force attack Question
by ichudov＠galaxy.galstar.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, I've been thinking about brute force attacks, and there is something that I do not understand. Maybe someone could explain me where I am wrong. Suppose Alice sends letters to BoB, and they always exchange plain text ASCII data. Suppose also that they use DES for encryption. They are afraid that Perry intercepts their messages and tries to brute force their DES key. Perry has 100,000 computers (and 20,000 couriers alone:) and his brute force attacks are as follows: he tries all keys in succession, looks at the decrypted texts, and *if* the decrypted text looks like a potential message (has only ASCII characters for example) he looks at that key closer as it is likely that he has found the right key. What is Alice and Bob decide to obscure their letters and add random NON-ASCII characters at random places? They may agree to just ignore all non-ASCII characters, so these characters would never change the meaning of their letters. If they do that, Perry does not have any easy way to tell whether he really recovered the right plaintext or not, because even correct key would still produce a lot of non-ASCII characters. If percentage of ASCII characters in all 256 byte space is 40%, Alice and Bob may agree to put in junk characters to make up exactly 60% of the message. This way messages will look like random character data. Is there any good method for attackers to circumvent this obscurity? What is the general method to make a judgment whether the recovered text really is a plain text if Alice and Bob noisify their letters? I can think of this: we sift through all recovered plaintexts and remove all non-ASCII bytes, and then do some simple testing to see whether the remaining ASCII data resembles normal English texts. This kind of testing seems to be quite expensive though, compared to just testing for ASCII vs. non-ascii bytes. Anything else I am missig? Thanks. - Igor.

4 3

RE: Brute-forcing DES
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Count me in: Good reason to get the XT (!!!!!!) and the 12Mhz Vendex286 out of the garage ... We can throw in the Mac too if the code's portable. And the 486-100. And you can have McArthur, the P-133, after bedtime. And the 486-20 portable, why not? I'm also available for assembler coding/optimizing on a limited basis. Excellent project! On Tue, 23 Jul 1996 pjn(a)nworks.com wrote: > Date: Tue, 23 Jul 1996 16:25:44 -0500 > From: pjn(a)nworks.com > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Brute-forcing DES > > > Any one up for a distributed brute force attack on single DES? My > > back-of-the-envelope calculations and guesstimates put this on the > > hairy edge of doability (the critical factor is how many machines can > > be recruited - a non-trivial cash prize would help). >

1 0

Re: Digital Watermarks (long, getting off-topic)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:14 PM 7/24/96, Gary Howland wrote: >Timothy C. May wrote: > >> Pre-recorded DAT tapes were available for a while...they did not sell. I >> believe this was because DAT machine purchasers were sophisticated and new >> how to make CD-to-DAT copies, with or without SCMS. > >Don't forget that pre-recorded DAT tapes are at least an order of >magnitude more expensive to manufacture than CDs. The _selling_ price of DATs was only slightly higher than CDs, around $15 in the U.S. Some DATs were priced identically to CDs, and still didn't sell. (Not surprisingly to me, given the chicken-and-egg effect.) Manufacturing costs of CDs are very low--I've seen estimates as low as 10 cents or less--and the final selling price is dominated by royalties, overhead staff costs, distribution cost, and, of course, "what the market will bear." DAT manufacturing costs could be $1-2, but the above factors would still dominate. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Re: Kids and Computer Privacy Was Re: No more stupid gun thread ...
by David Rosoff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 03.48 AM 7/24/96 -0500, Scott Schryvers wrote: >Should kids have crypto? [weapons] Your analogy fails when I consider the simple point that crypto is not a weapon in and of itself, no matter what the misguided ITAR says. "... two plus two make five ..." >Under Itar crypto is a weapon. If a kid were to bring a disk >containing pgp to school could they be expelled for carrying a weapon? No, because crypto, *by itself* does NOT present a threat to any other kid or to any teacher or to the kid carrying the code. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMfZR5hguzHDTdpL5AQHqsgP5AcEWBP0SeGCWwgOKGgDVuzz4yJRXk218 lSepjhxa+OnK6Aw5Gxk/+ykJAZM++VPH4LKR3ztRP5X3CJMC8zJ+f4qatmqzRptU yKagSL8yF2/xN9ltwJcl6T3F4f88LJKD0vDpp4M+FeIX90zDosxPl0TYYv3niG2u v2ePUFTwWKI= =IlGz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

Re: Digital Watermarks for copy protection in recent Billbo
by Alex F 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >Yes, but concievably if (whoever would be incharge, FBI?) *could*, > >under law do this, even if they are wrong. It is a lot harder to > >prove that they intentionally harrassed *you* than it is for them to > >say that they were following leads and show evidence. Yes, this may > > To go to trial, an indictment would be needed. How likely is this? The likelyness is irrelevant to the point. Possibility is relevant. Probability is not. > Discussion of "in theory they could arrest you" points often neglects the > realities of the legal system. Does that really matter? . In REALITY, it will never be enforced. So what? The potential is still there, and in essence, that is ALL that matters! The discussion of "in theory...." doesn't neglect the realities of the legal system, rather it highlights the POTENTIAL for abuse. Even if the law is never enforced, could it not be used as an example to justify other laws that *may* be introduced? Does it not set a dangerous precedent? We are talking about dangerous empowerment here. Hmm. The arguement "well, we would never REALLY enforce it" just doesn't hold water with me, and makes me uncomfortable. > A large fraction of pawnshop items have questionable provenance, the items > having been stolen at some time in the past. Could J. Random Buyer who > walks in, sees an item he likes, buys it, and walks out with it be > handcuffed and taken down the lockup for the crime of buying stolen > property? Doubtful, in the real world. And defense would be ridicuously > easy. A defense would be easy, fine. But it would still cost $$$. Do you see what I am getting at? This is done ALL THE TIME (no, not at pawn brokers. I'm talking about taking advantage of either cost or time to get what you want). > A trivial increase in frequency, and still not allowing the hypothesized 30 > KHz signal to be added. DATs often sample at 44 and 48 KHz, switchably. The > CD standard is of course still what it is. That's not the point. What we are talking about here is a covert channel. Whether it is at 30KHZ, 22KHz or right in the middle of the audible range. Mine was ONE proposal, a theory of sorts, thought up off of the top of my head as a possible way of doing this. You can also add a digital serial number right in the audible range, if you like. Static that is recorded along with analog sound is at certain frequency ranges, typically. When you have a disk that holds 640Mb or so the serial number's size is trivial in comparison. Sending the whole number at once will barely be audible even if in a good frequency range simply because of speed. If you send it in bits and pieces during the song, and furthermore record this data in the middle of the frequency range where static is located, you won't hear it anyway. However certain devices will be able to read the data w/o problem. Similarly, you have a CD, let's say Beethoven's 9th symphony. You have ~640 MB on the CD. If you want to sneak someone an encrypted message, say a top secret document and it is compressed down to 1K, then putting this into the audio signal as described above is fairly trivial. The other end doesn't even need to know bit counts. The document can be spreadout, reversed, whatever and just signaled w/ a flag (much like PPP and other protocols). All the other end needs to decode is a flag at a set frequency range, both of which can be constantly changed. interestingly, Alex F =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Alex F alexf(a)iss.net Marketing Specialist Internet Security Systems =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

1 0

FTP Software Licenses Pretty Good Privacy 07/23/96
by reagle＠rpcp.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

HAMBURG, GERMANY, 1996 JUL 23 (NB) -- By Sylvia Dennis. FTP Software, the Internet/connectivity software company, has licensed Pretty Good Privacy's encryption technology of the same name (PGP). Plans now call for FTP to integrate PGP within its range of TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) software. Under the terms of the agreement, PGP has licensed its encryption software to FTP for use in OnNet32 2.0 for Windows 95 and Windows NT, both versions of which will ship in the third quarter of this year on both sides of the Atlantic. Tom Steding, PGP's chief executive officer, said that a critical piece of the company's business strategy is to proliferate the "seamless integration of encryption technology" within e-mail applications programs. "We see this partnership as a powerful combination of two leaders who, together, will use their considerable market weight and technical expertise to promote and enhance the PGP towards becoming a universally accepted industry standard," he said. According to Rebecca Buisan, product marketing manager with FTP, the company has made several enhancements to OnNet32 to integrate PGP into its basic functions. There is now a two icon system which allows users to access a tool bar, designating options to encrypt or decrypt a message, and make a digital signature. Mail messages can also be left on a server or computer in an encrypted format, to be decrypted and read at will. "Experience has proven that cryptography only works if implemented effectively, so that it is simple for the user," she explained. According to Buisan, FTP has conducted extensive human factors testing to fine-tune PGP's cryptographic software into a "flexible and intuitive application that people will be encouraged to use." According to FTP, its implementation of the PGP encryption software is interoperable with current freeware versions available for free download from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) or one of the many other FTP (File Transfer Protocol) sites that distribute the package. The MIT site is at http://web.mit.edu/pgp . PGP was originally developed in 1991 by Phil Zimmerman. The package allowed PC users, for the first time, to send information in a secure encrypted format without fear of intervention. FTP's Web site is at http://www.ftp.com . (19960722/Press & Reader Contact: Manuela Dorken, FTP Software, +49-89-614130, Internet e-mail manuela(a)ftp.com; PGP, 415-631-1747, Internet e-mail info(a)viacrypt.com)

3 2

Re: Digital Watermarks (long, getting off-topic)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:14 PM 7/24/96 +0200, Gary Howland wrote: >Timothy C. May wrote: > >> Pre-recorded DAT tapes were available for a while...they did not sell. I >> believe this was because DAT machine purchasers were sophisticated and new >> how to make CD-to-DAT copies, with or without SCMS. > >Don't forget that pre-recorded DAT tapes are at least an order of >magnitude more expensive to manufacture than CDs. Isn't it odd that when music is sold, CD's are MORE expensive than cassette tapes, even though you _know_ that the manufacturing cost of CD's is less? Another oddity: The price for a blank, standard-quality videocassette is about the same as that of a blank, standard-quality audio cassette tape, despite the fact that the volume of tape included in the former is probably about a factor of 10 higher. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

2 1

Re: When books are outlawed
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:36 PM 7/23/96, Charley Sparks wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >Only outlaws will have books... > >Just watching the news here in Fl. and they are trying to hold a publisher >responsible for a murder because they published a fictional account of a >hitman and a guy says he used the book to kill some people. > >Would you give your 6 year old a book ? > >This is really getting out of hand.. Anyone have any property for sale in >Idaho ? Deranged Mutant posted a summary of this on the list. (News item copied below for reference.) You have to be careful to separate out the issue of "lawsuits" from the issues of "prior restraint" and "censorship." There is no talk of prior restraint of Paladin Press, and no Office of the People's Censor to which books must be submitted for approval. Personally, I think holding authors responsible for other people's actions is wrong-headed. It opens the door to such things as holding "Hustler" responsible for rapes, "On Our Backs" responsible for scissor attacks, "Guns and Ammo" responsible for accidental shootings, and, of course, publishers of "The Bible" responsible for various acts of sodomy, bestiality, patricide, and genocide. "They made me do it!" should not be allowed to be a defense in criminal cases, nor should publishers, writers, and speakers be held liable for actions of others. (With the _possible_ of direct and immediate exhortations to commit some serious crime, e.g., a speaker yelling at his supporters to go burn down a building. And I am dubious even here; certainly holding a leading American Neo-Nazi speaker and writer responsible for the actions of someone influenced by him, actions committed far away, was wrong. In my view.) Here's the item supplied by Deranged Mutant: >From LI Newsday today, p. 18: Suit Follows Muder by the Book Publisher of how-to 'Hit Man' manual is blamed in 3 killings The Associated Press (Greebvelt, Md.) - James E. Perry committed muder by the book. Now the book's publisher is accused of aiding and abetting his crimes. In a case that legal scholars say could set a precedent in First Amendment law if allowed to proceed, a federal judge yesterday said he would rule in 30 days on a motion against the publisher of "Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors". [..] The $10, 130-page book has sold 13,000 copies since it was published in 1983 by Paladin Press of Boulder, Colo., a small company that sells mostly through mail orders from its catalog. [..] --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

3 2