December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

CypherPunk Insolence
by attila 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

#include <stdio.h> #include <signal.h> void insolence() { Discus unrelated central "Bellism" of your own (); if ( gun_control_issue ) respond to every message with the observation genetically superior tomatoes seem to play an important role (); else change_subject_again(); process_threatening_messages(); while (1) { if ( PerryGram ) break; else { respond_to_all(); argue_with_TCMay(); continue; } } } -- Now, with a black jack mule you wish to harness, you walk up, look him in the eye, and hit him with a 2X4 over the left eye. If he blinks, hit him over the right eye! He'll cooperate --so will politicians.

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"Utilization Review"
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I listened with horror this evening to a radio program which discussed the state of medical record privacy today. In one segment a doctor (psychologist) described an experience she had after a session which was covered by the patient's insurance plan. The doctor in question received a phone message with a 1-800 number and the request to return the call. On returning it she was connected with a very polite representative of the insurance company (who apparently had some experience in mental health, but not a M.D.) who proceeded to ask the most sensitive questions about the patient's session in order to conduct a "utilization review to determine medical necessity." Most alarmingly, the representative could be heard typing on a computer during the entire review. The program went on to indicate that among the provisions in the most recent health insurance reform bill there was a provision for information sharing among insurance companies to facilitate the transfer of insurance policies when the insured switches jobs. Among the more alarming suggestions in the legislation is the use of a "unique medical identifier." Many of you will see this coming. One of the currently proposed "identifiers" is the Social Security Number. Members of the list might also wish to consider that companies which self insure their employees for health benefits are entitled to all their medical records directly. The prospect of cradle to grave medical files as an everyday reality in the United States is but around the corner. In my view it is time for the foundation of an offshore insurance company which recognizes the basic tenant that client medical records are the property of the client, used in a license capacity at the pleasure of the insured, and not an entitlement to which the company is automatically privy. -- I hate lightning - finger for public key - Vote Monarchist unicorn(a)schloss.li

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Re: Why BlackNet *IS* a Data Haven
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:29 AM 8/19/96, Rich Graves wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >True, for controversial political and artistic materials whose >authors/distributors have an interest in disseminating. And artistic, political, cultural, etc. materials are of course one of the main markets, as the large number of bookstores shows. (And the success of "Primary Colors," by "Anonymous," shows that one need not the True Name of an author, obvious to all persons on this list.) >However, with neither a government to enforce contracts nor an identifiable >location/identity that can be used for the private enforcement of, ahem, >contracts, the barrier to entry for anonymous markets in real commercial >products seems rather high. How are buyers and sellers to trust each other? >How do you build reputation capital from zero? Once you have reputation, >transaction costs should be pretty low, but building it? Yes, a topic we've discussed many times over the years. I don't have the time to compose a new essay on this, so I'll refer folks to either the archives or my Cyphernomicon FAQ, which discusses reputations, third party escrow services, etc. (Imagine an equally anonymous "Ace Escrow Service," which holds the cash until a product is transferred. Essentially, this is what a _store_ does. For example, a Barnes and Noble or a Home Depot chooses which products to stock based on their own evaluations, tests, and reputation assessments...and they make good on defective products, etc. This lessens the risks to the consumer that he will be screwed by a vendor he has little recourse against. "Middlemen.") >If what you're selling is a physical product, you're ultimately going to >have a location. If what you're selling is information, how do you >demonstrate the worth and trustworthiness of your data without distributing >it? And once you have distributed it, what's to stop a "counterfeiter" from >redistributing it, stealing your profits before you have had a chance to >establish your reputation capital as the preferred source? Sure, these are all issues. (As the Assyrian merchant said in 1300 B.C. "This idea of a "store" you have...I can think of many problems. How will they all be solved?") >I don't see anonymous digital cash as the tightest bottleneck. Distributed >trust in an anonymous marketplace seems more difficult. I disagree, but this was obvious from the focus of my post. I believe we see "distributed trust" (though this is not the choice of words I would use) all around us. Too many issues to debate here. My point was that the BlackNet approach *is* like a physical data haven, except with some advantages. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: CS First Boston lawsuit
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:29 AM 8/19/96, Alan Horowitz wrote: >I suspect they are trying to get a judgement against "John Doe", in the >hopes of tracking him down later. > >Actually, if I had a sizeable judgement against such a John Doe, I could >probably find a private detective who would find the dude for a >contingent fee. Wow, a whole new class of factoring (commerce definition) >opens up. Get me a lawyer.... Lawyers out there can and should correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't believe either the criminal or civil justice system has the concept of a "John Doe" trial! The ability to have the advice of an attorney, to confront one's accusers, cross-examine witnesses, and mount a defense, and all that constitutional stuff. Rather hard to do if the trial is in the past tense. Can you cite an example of such a "John Doe" trial in the U.S.? (There may be trials "in absentia," more so in other countries than in the U.S., but not when no persons have been identified at all!) --Tim May, who hopes he is never identified as the "John Doe" indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced in 1979 in Washington County, Oregon, for the crime of unlawful foddering in a public place. Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Orbiting Datahavens
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 2 Jul 1996 17:06:47 -0700 (PDT), Brian Lane wrote: >> I'm not sure who would launch it - a Japanese launcher? (ESA is >> strapped for cash, which was one reason for the phenomenaly stupid move of >> putting space probes onto the maiden flight of the Ariane 5.) > > We'd want someone more reliable than ESA! I doubt that we could afford >to have a backup satellite in case of a disaster. Once the Delta Clipper >is functional the payload costs to orbit is supposed to drop tremendously. Or, who knows. NASA could finally wake up, really that the shuttle sucks as a cargo hauler, start using something like the Phoenix (They stonewalled it - would have made them look bad) to build orbital industry and then setup giant solar-powered launch lasers and have surface to orbit at pennies per pound. Oh well... Who'd have thought we'd go to the moon and stop. | Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> - Webpages for sale! Se habla JavaScript! | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp | Autoresponder: send email w/subject of "send resume" or "send PGPKEY"

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Re: "Utilization Review"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:22 AM 8/19/96, Black Unicorn wrote: >I listened with horror this evening to a radio program which >discussed the state of medical record privacy today. > >In one segment a doctor (psychologist) described an experience >she had after a session which was covered by the patient's >insurance plan. A friend of mine is a psychotherapist very concerned with such issues. There are many pressures on him to reveal information about patients, most of which are "unsurprising" in a world of what can only be called "socialized medicine." (I say "socialized" in that very few persons pay cash or their own money for medical care, psychiatric treatment, sports injury therapy, etc. Most are paying only a per-visit deductible, if even that, and the rest of the charges are picked up by their employers, their insurance plans through employers, the various social welfare institutions, etc.) Insurance companies want proof that the treatments are needed, or are working, and cannot merely take the word of a shrink, for example, that his services are needed. (I can think of some solutions, such as "second opinions" and "independent review panels," but, I can tell you, such things are not common with psychotherapy regimens.) >The doctor in question received a phone message with a 1-800 .... >about the patient's session in order to conduct a "utilization >review to determine medical necessity." Most alarmingly, the >representative could be heard typing on a computer during the >entire review. Let's hope the resulting entries did not show up on a Web page! (This has actually happened, accidentally. Only discovered when the search spiders found the data and others then found the records.) >The program went on to indicate that among the provisions in the >most recent health insurance reform bill there was a provision >for information sharing among insurance companies to facilitate >the transfer of insurance policies when the insured switches >jobs. Among the more alarming suggestions in the legislation is >the use of a "unique medical identifier." Many of you will see >this coming. One of the currently proposed "identifiers" is the >Social Security Number. First, Clinton's dormant Health Plan (her husband is not pushing it) would've _required_ such cross-linking of records. My friend the psychotherapist is a liberal, but was aghast at this and lobbied with his fellow mental health care professionals against this. He also got PGP as a result of this scare. Second, the "Social Security Number" worry is misplaced. They _already_ have enough identifiers to cross-link records til the cows come home. Thinking one is safe if the SSN is not used is "ostrich security." The real issue is having confidential medical or psychiatric or legal records out of the containment of a trusted holder. >Members of the list might also wish to consider that companies >which self insure their employees for health benefits are >entitled to all their medical records directly. Indeed, when I was at Intel an engineer was outraged almost to the point of quitting and filing a lawsuit when he learned that his "Human Relations" bimbo in a cubicle down the hall had the details of his vasectomy. I'm sure by now the news of his vasectomy is a hundred different file system in a dozen different institutions. An Alta Vista search should turn it up. --Tim May ObCrypto Relevance: One of the ways safes (the steel kind, not the alternative to vasectomies kind) got stronger was not through imploring and lecturing, as we in the crypto community do, but through _insurance_. Why? A way to discount future costs/risks to the present. A merchant who has never been robbed probably doesn't think about the security of his safe. But his insurer does. And he says to the merchant: "The charge is $2000 a year if you continue with your current safe, and $1000 a year if you get a Mosler Titan-2 safe. Your call." The same motivation is, I think, what will eventually get security and crypto more widely used. A hospital sued for multiple millions because its records got intercepted and placed on the Web will have its insurance company rethinking policies and rates, and setting procedures for protection of information. This will drive security in a way that lectures, rules, and even scare stories will not. Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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No Subject
by winsock＠c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DISCORDIAN SOCIETY SUPER SECRET CRYPTOGRAPHIC CYPHER CODE Of possible interest to all Discordians, this information is herewith release from the vaults of A.I.S.B., under the auspices of Episkopos Dr. Mordecai Malignatius, KNS. SAMPLE MESSAGE: ("HAIL ERIS") CONVERSATION: A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 STEP 1. Write out the message (HAIL ERIS) and put all the vowels at the end (HLRSAIEI) STEP 2. Reverse order (IEIASRLH) STEP 3. Convert to numbers (9-5-9-1-19-18-12-8) STEP 4. Put into numerical order (1-5-8-9-9-12-18-19) STEP 5. Convert back to letters (AEHIILRS) This cryptographic cypher code is GUARANTEED TO BE 100% UNBREAKABLE.

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Re:Why BlackNet *IS* a Data Haven
by mccoy＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May writes: > Without splitting too many semantic hairs about the precise definition of > "data haven," let me examine some ways in which BlackNet behaves > identically to a conventional data haven. I would be willing to concede the point if you would take a few seconds to examine the issue of complete lack of persistence in BlackNet. Your descriptions of BlackNet as a data haven seem to be completely based upon the presumption that an anonymous contact service and contract exchange is the functional equivalent to a data haven. Here are a few reasons why I would disagree: As a publisher of "naughty bits" I do not have the ability to just toss data up and assume that it will be there when someone wants it. I am forced to continuously monitor the appropriate newsgroups to find messages from people asking me to post the blueprints to the orbital mind control lasers or kiddie porn. I cannot put my data onto "the Net" with an expectation that any arbitrary user will be able to get the bits one month later. To maintain persistence I need to constantly repost my data, making it easier for authorities to trace me through simple taffic analysis if nothing else. > The classical data haven is closely identified with "place." To many > people, they naturally assume "data haven" = a haven for data, a "harbor" > (same IE root as haven) = a physical place. > > But is "place" important? No one has really claimed place is important, in fact the ideal data haven has no physical existence whatsoever. This is a given. As a practical matter it is a lot easier if you start off in a "place" because there are fewer complications but this has never been a necessity. > A person in the U.S. seeking the Necronomicon posts a message to BlackNet > (or any similar forum, using the same methods) asking for a copy of it, or > offering to pay for it. (Whether the information is free or for a fee is > not central to the idea.) This request is, of course, untraceable. > > Anyone, anywhere in the world, with a copy of this banned material on his > or her private machines may see this request and respond, either giving the > material away, or negotiating a fee. (As I said before, the absence of a > robust digital cash system, bidirectionally untraceable, is a known > limitation of all such systems.) Now you reveal the objection I had to BlackNet being a data haven. What if only one person has a copy of this banned material? It may not be in this publishers interest to have the data available to anyone for posting in response to the query ("Information does not want to be free, it wants to be expensive and liberated...") and some data is not widespread enough or of interest to enough people to assume that multiple copies exist to those who read BlackNet postings. Therefore the only way for a publisher to maintain availability of their data is to constantly monitor the appropriate newsgroups and republish for each request, persistence is maintained only through eternal vigilence (much like liberty, only requiring a lot more effort :) > It's a data haven. No, it is an anonymous contact service. To claim this is a data haven is like claiming that the classified ads in a newspaper are the equivalent to a mall; you could probably find the same goods if you looked long enough, but there is a reason that manufacturers sell goods through stores rather than just posting classified ads across the country. When one does not have the time to check the classified ads, wants to goods from a reputable source, and wants the goods in a timely fashion they will go to a shopping center. jim

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ETS Call
by Theodor Schlickmann 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The European Commission DGXIII/7 Security of Telecommunications and Information Systems has anounced an open call for tenders in the Official Journal as part of our preparatory work for ETS (the Europe-wide network of Trusted Third Party Services). The work proposed tackles the area of ETS infrastructure specification, design and implementation in the form of field trials or "pilots" as well as performing studies on communication and legal aspects. >From the above data, further details of the Call can be found on our Web site: http://www.cordis.lu/infosec/ For those who are unable to access the Web site, please send an e-mail request to Fiona Allan at the following address: fiona.allan(a)bxl.dg13.cec.be The identical information will then be mailed to you using the normal postal services. After reading the documentation, please direct any queries that you may have to Theodor Schlickmann at the following address: 73064.1247(a)compuserve.com Kind regards Theodor W. Schlickmann

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Re: Unix passwd-cracker online?
by couto＠oim.uem.mz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi Arnauld! Where can I get this file??? Is there a new version of Cracker Jack than 1.4? There is a whay of puting Cracker Jack to manage passwords bigger than 8 characters? Thanx in advance, cRaZy bYtE couto(a)oim.uem.mz On 17 Aug 96 at 22:53, Arnauld Dravet wrote: > Date sent: Sat, 17 Aug 1996 22:53:51 -0500 > From: Arnauld Dravet <scraver(a)mnet.fr> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Re: Unix passwd-cracker online? > there's a new cracker under dos called John the Cracker, and coded by > UCF96. It's optimized for Pentiumsand is better than cracker jack on a > lot of points : can work with or without wordlists, and u can modify all > what u want....approx 30% faster than cracker jack on a pentium (i run > it at usually 4000 cps on a P90/32Mb ram and a 25Mb wordlist (yeah it's > big)) > > scraver(a)mnet.fr >

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Re: [RANT] Death of Usenet: Film at 11
by tob＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

frantz(a)netcom.com (Bill Frantz) writes: > At 1:34 PM 8/19/96 -0700, Mike Duvos wrote: > > > Moderated newsgroups gain reputation from their moderation policies and > probably should not be included in this scheme. Actually, this was hashed out a long time ago on the late, lamented news.future. I'm pleased to see ideas I fought for coming to life again. Moderation could easily fit in. A moderation-stamp would be just one more field for the search to work with. Someone (I think it was me but it's been years since all this was said!) speculated that this would actually be an improvement in several ways: * If rejected messages were indicated by simply missing a signature of approval, voluntary not searched for by individual readers, it would be harder to claim moderator censorship. Or to accomplish it, for that matter. * Multiple independent moderators could work on the same newsgroup. * If the stamp of approval were dissociated from the message proper, messages could propagate without waiting for the moderator's receive-email-and-post cycle. The moderator's "OK" would catch up later, for those readers that wait for it. Imminent resurrection of Usenet predicted. Film-teaser at 5. Tom

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Re: (null)
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 17 Aug 1996 07:03:32 +0200 (MET DST), Anonymous wrote: >>There are many computer companies that are full of Bozos, >>Microsoft isn't one of them. Most of the people griping about >>Microsoft can't code any better. >Gee Phill, as I'm preparing to leave MS after 6 years, I have to >disagree with you. Mediocrity and bureaucracy have eatten away >at a lot of the core of the company. It is entirely marketing driven >now, and the coders have definitely gone down hill since I first >started in Apps. The "bozo" factor has steadily increased. Only >those new hires without a sense of history think it's a real cool >place to work. And, a few egocentric folks totally tripped on >power and greed. (Apologies to any MSofties on the list I don't >know personally.) That would match my general impression of the way things have gone. Originally Microsoft was a small company that *had* to write good code (anyone remember DR DOS?) to survive. At the time, they had to do tons of work producing usable products out of IBM's code. (Apparently due to optimization, at one point MS was writing a negative total codelines for OS/2 1.x) Now, IBM is writing good code (Warp/Merlin/etc) and making usable products out of MS blunders (Win-OS/2. It may crash (not quite as much as the real Windows - separate sessions) but it doesn't bring down the whole house... >Talk to HR about the turnover of people with 5.5 to 8 years >under their belts who are bailing with their stock options because >it ain't a fun place to work anymore. Testers, developers, UE, >you name it. > >I can gripe because I was there. I never seem to recall seeing >your name on any internal e-mail. > >Oh yeah, this is coming through a remailer, because I'm reading >the list at work. And I doubt BillG would appreciate my opinions >being sent out over MS resources. | Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> - Webpages for sale! Se habla JavaScript! | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp | Autoresponder: send email w/subject of "send resume" or "send PGPKEY"

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Unbreakable Hoax
by Remo Pini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Aug 19 11:55:19 1996 > > DISCORDIAN SOCIETY SUPER SECRET CRYPTOGRAPHIC CYPHER CODE > > Of possible interest to all Discordians, this information is herewith > release > from the vaults of A.I.S.B., under the auspices of Episkopos Dr. > Mordecai > Malignatius, KNS. > > SAMPLE MESSAGE: ("HAIL ERIS") > > CONVERSATION: > A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z > 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 > > STEP 1. Write out the message (HAIL ERIS) and put all the vowels at the > end > (HLRSAIEI) > STEP 2. Reverse order (IEIASRLH) > STEP 3. Convert to numbers (9-5-9-1-19-18-12-8) > STEP 4. Put into numerical order (1-5-8-9-9-12-18-19) > STEP 5. Convert back to letters (AEHIILRS) > > This cryptographic cypher code is GUARANTEED TO BE 100% UNBREAKABLE. I found an optimisation to reduce computation time: Replace steps 1 to 5 by the following step a: STEP a. Sort the string according to the alphabet. The properties of the algorithm are still the same, it's unbreakable (unfortunately also by the originator, but that's a petty detail). ;-) - ------< fate favors the prepared mind >------ Remo Pini rp(a)rpini.com PGP: http://www.rpini.com/crypto/crypto.html - ----< words are what reality is made of >---- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMhg6ChFhy5sz+bTpAQHlZggAwr3W4+XGpF+yqd2D/8YFbBK4v+ddjlSB Wgjd7xU4N+KB0bRcNLMZzdiHVyeLMoi6TMmxTNarhAzqTmn5dEjhwysSkWxWsKUo cK7T3pXO5A33r+Htv6L6W1mTlFhIW6neFM45P4NQgYdYwhPJAP8B+xMy0z0OIcoM BHwvmaDZFJVY6ps/T23gClzKDWQI8XDFbGyL8iNNefRXKWnwLS3YZgRXGKJD9BrX R/LtW1KzKJk63tPFWngehXItQc2WeuCdR/BhO9hCVN66j4B7t40d9e4mxCkr2f/Z kqhaI9Cl81BA/Xj508sLADgq3NGa6ps7dIFg6Js+UD7K9NIuAfg/jg== =qkkB -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: US Taxes on X-Pats (getting off topic)
by Stephen Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:24 PM 8/18/96 -0400, you wrote: >As I understand the proposal, the immigrant-benefits thing would be for >immigrants admitted AFTER the act was, uh, enacted. So, no ex-post-facto >problems. > > I know this is getting way off topic...but what I am not clear about is this: 1. Americans living and working in London used to be eligible for certain benefits from the British social security system, into which they are required to pay. There is a reciprocal arrangement between the US and UK on soc sec benefits and payments. The new US law seems to alter that, which could affect the US citizen living in London, as in, "sorry mate, you can't come in here with that knife wound, not without your cheque book you can't." 2. Making legal immigrants living in the US pay soc sec "taxes" without being eligible for benefits sounds pretty unfair, even "unamerican." Maybe someone who knows more about the law in these matters can clarify. Stephen

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 alpha) (flame replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 19 Aug 96 6:47:01 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com *++******** 3:33 100.00% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi .--..--...- 19:43:48 99.81% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com *********** 23:25 99.71% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca -*********** 1:42:22 99.70% winsock winsock(a)c2.org -__----..-- 10:02:35 99.67% replay remailer(a)replay.com ***+******** 4:30 99.51% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com --- ------ 3:51:56 98.85% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com ###-+ # 21:25 97.41% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ---------- 6:30:40 95.67% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -+---+++-++ 1:35:16 92.72% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +--+++++ ++ 1:01:56 86.82% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net --##**#* - 19:17 85.11% ncognito ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net --+ 7:57:35 15.59% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org . 5:24:22 7.71% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com + 53:57 7.27% c2 remail(a)c2.org . 5:59:32 6.81% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Indonesia detains democracy activist after post to mailing list
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 18 Aug 1996 21:23:29 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Indonesia detains democracy activist after post to mailing list Indonesia is joining the rest of the world in cracking down on online speech. Perhaps the lesson here is that no matter how much the Internet supposedly "routes around censorship," the most vulnerable points are the humans on both ends. More info on the global net-crackdown is at: http://www.eff.org/~declan/global/ -Declan --- http://www.hotwired.com/netizen/96/34/special0a.html HotWired, The Netizen 19 August 1996 Trouble in Paradise by Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) Washington, DC, 18 August Indonesian democracy activists have taken their fight for freedom to the Net, and the government doesn't approve. After distributing email messages about riots in Jakarta last month to an international Indonesian-politics mailing list, Prihadi Beny Waluyo, a lecturer at Duta Wacana Christian University, was arrested and interrogated by the military. Since then, the mailing list has been banned from the country and Waluyo has returned to his house, where he remains under surveillance. Until now, Indonesian cyberspace has been relatively free, with no regulations or laws explicitly restricting online discussions. By contrast, newspapers and magazines are subject to strict censorship, following a 1984 ministerial decree requiring the press to obtain licenses from the government. [...] "He [Waluyo] was arrested and accused of sending messages to Holland and printing out photocopies," said Sidney Jones, executive director of Human Rights Watch/Asia. "The army is out to stop any kind of discussion of the riots." The censor-happy regime of President Suharto tried to stop journalists from reporting on the outbreaks of violence - which shattered his carefully cultivated image of a stable Indonesia. The worst domestic disturbance in a decade, the uprising started after police stormed the headquarters of an opposition party and ejected anti-government activists from the building... [...] --- August 14, 1996 His Excellency M. Arifin Siregar Ambassador to the United States Embassy of Indonesia 2020 Mass. Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 Your Excellency: I am writing on behalf of Human Rights Watch/Asia to protest the arrest of Drs. Prihadi Beny Waluyo, a lecturer at Duta Wacana Christian University. Drs. Waluyo was arrested at his home by soldiers of the district military command. He was reportedly accused of distributing e-mail messages and also of sending messages relating to the July 27 riots to a destination in Holland. His arrest came after an unidentified person gave an officer photocopies of e-mail messages that were traced to Drs. Waluyo. The person claimed the printouts came from a store in Kebumen, a district of Yogyakarta. Following his arrest, Drs. Waluyo was interrogated by the military about his connections with the Peoples Democratic Party (PRD), which the government has accused of masterminding the riots, but he denied any involvement with the PRD. He acknowledged that he had sent messages over the Internet. Following his questioning, he was reportedly ordered to go to his home and was told to report to the district military command on a regular basis. He is said to be under strict surveillance. Human Rights Watch opposes actions by the Indonesian government to restrict electronic communication. As stated in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression: this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. We believe that such forums provide a truly unique opportunity for people from around the globe to share their views with an international audience. By allowing unrestricted communication, important issues can receive the benefit of serious discussion by the broadest cross-section of society. If the Internet is to achieve its potential to become a global information infrastructure, it is important, at the present moment, to agree to allow its unrestricted development. We urge that Drs. Waluyi and every other citizen be allowed to receive and transmit electronic mail without fear of harassment, intimidation, or arrest. Sincerely, Sidney Jones Executive Director Human Rights Watch/Asia cc: His Excellency Nugroho Wisnumurti, Ambassador to the United Nations --- [Thanks to Bruce Sterling for this excerpt. --Declan] >From the INDEX ON CENSORSHIP web site: http://www.oneworld.org/index_oc/ INDONESIA It was reported in May that the government has banned the book Bayang Bayang PKI (In the Shadows of the PKI). Published by the Institute for Studies on the Free Flow of Information (ISAI), it focuses on the 1965-1966 events leading to the assumption of power by President Soeharto. It is now a criminal offence for any person to process, publish, distribute, trade or reprint the book. (A19) The government has put pressure on the media to report positively on government-backed efforts to oust the leader of the opposition Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), Megawati Sukarno-putri. On 2 June army officers invited most of Indonesia's chief editors to attend media briefings where, among other things, they were told not to use the words 'unseat' or 'topple' in their reporting. A rally in Jakarta organised by members loyal to Megawati on 20 June was broken up by troops, who killed at least one of the protesters, and arrested hundreds. Erwin Hadi, photographer with the weekly Sinar, Iqbal Wahyudin of CNN, Tomohiko Ohtsuka of Mainichi Shimbun and Reuters photographer Enny Nuraheini were among the journalists injured by soldiers during the rally. Local stations were also banned by the government from broadcasting images of the protest or from helping foreign news agencies feed their pictures of the rally abroad. Megawati was finally ousted as PDI leader on 22 June. (Institute for Studies on the Free Flow of Information) The Supreme Court voted on 13 June to uphold the government's ban on the independent newsweekly Tempo (Index 4&5/1994, 3/1995, 1/1996). The Court ruled that the information minister has the right to revoke publishing licences since he also has the right to issue them. (Institute for Studies on the Free Flow of Information) Index Index incorporates information from the American Association for the Advancement of Science Human Rights Action Network (AAASHRAN), Amnesty International (AI), Article 19 (A19), the BBC Monitoring Service Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), the Canadian Committee to Protect Journalists (CCPJ), the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA), the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ/FIP), the International Federation of Newspaper Publishers (FIEJ), Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), International PEN (PEN), Open Media Research Institute (OMRI), Reporters Sans Frontires (RSF), the World Association of Community Broadcasters (AMARC) and other sources ###

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Re: [NOISE] Re: Stopped Clock. Was: Schlafly on Crypto
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:18 AM 8/16/96 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: >>>>Subject: Clinton Is Trying to be Big Brother -- Phyllis Schlafly Column >>It does seem really odd, doesn't it? But look at it this way: The only >>reason the knuckle-dragging conservatives are able to take the moral >>high-ground on this and other net-freedom issues is because the OTHER >>"unrependant liberals" have inexplicably abandoned the correct side of the >>argument. The fact that the conservatives are right may seem odd, but the >>behavior of the liberals is truly astonishing. > >Liberals? What Liberals? Clinton's certainly no liberal; >he's just a big-spending statist who likes to buy votes from >poor, middle-class, and yuppie voters rather than buying them >from defense contractors, not that he's above that. Well, I should have been more clear and said, "...what passes for a liberal these days." In any case, my opinion is that the WRONG airplane crashed a couple of days ago. <sigh!> Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Hackers invade DOJ web site
by Nick West 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:46 PM 8/18/96 -0700, you wrote: >> CNN online (http://www.cnn.com) is reporting a "breakin" by "hackers" >> to the DOJ web site. They don't elaborate exactly how thy did it. > >Did anyone save a copy of the altered web page? I would like to see >what the crackers did. > >Thanks. > > They showed a the page on CNN Headline News yesterday. They might show it sometime again today, stay tuned. Nick West nick(a)multipro.com Member of the National Wild Turkey Federation and The Libertarian Party of Tennessee http://members.tripod.com/~NWest/index.html PGP Fingerprint= F9 F7 92 D9 D3 0B 56 3E FA 2A 78 59 27 32 7D 6F Public key available on request.

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Re: Billy boy's satellites [Was - Floating DataHaven]
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:16 AM 8/19/96, Vipul Ved Prakash wrote: >> >> Vincent Cate wrote: >> Doesn't the low orbit part mean that the satellites will have a low life >> expectancy, meaning a new launch every couple of days? (where's Gerald >> Bull when you need him - oh yes, now I remember ...) LEO (Low Earth Orbit) is only relative to the main alternative placement for broadcast satellites: geostationary orbit, out in the Clarke Belt. LEO satellites are well above significant drag of the troposphere and are expected to remain in orbit far longer than their lifetimes as useful transponders. >The Iridium Project was pretty neat in this respect. I don't know what >is happenning with it as of now. It had some 230+ satellites, and some >smart routing techniques, if a satellite goes down. Actually, far fewer. The original number of satellites (not counting spares) was equal to the atomic number of iridium, hence the name (though maybe they altered the number of satellites to match the atomic number?). They later reduced the needed number by a few, but kept the name. An Alta Vista search on "iridium AND satellite" produces 1000 hits, so there's plent of information out there. There are also two major competing systems, also not yet deployed. One is the Microsoft-McCaw Cellular project, another is being done by an aerospace company working with Qualcomm, or a subsidiary. Again, the Web should produce the information for anyone interested. Which of the three (and maybe more) systems will actually get deployed, and which will succeed in the market, is an interesting question. There's some obvious crypto/GAK/New World Order issues: many countries may not care for a communications system which allows citizen-units or enemy agents to make phone calls from the middle of the Kalahari desert or from within the jungles of Burma. (The Israelis, for example, are insisting that all handheld units have Explosives Escrow, for detonation with appropriate official orders.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re:Why BlackNet *IS* a Data Haven
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:28 AM 8/19/96, Jim McCoy wrote: >Tim May writes: >> Without splitting too many semantic hairs about the precise definition of >> "data haven," let me examine some ways in which BlackNet behaves >> identically to a conventional data haven. > >I would be willing to concede the point if you would take a few seconds >to examine the issue of complete lack of persistence in BlackNet. There are various amounts of persistence, depending on which kind of "pool" is used: * Usenet newsgroups have a persistence of days to weeks, depending on one's particular site. This is enough for parties to find each other _if_ they are watching (or having agents watching). And of course Usenet archives are expected--Alta Vista and Deja News has Usenet articles going back several months in many cases. * Mailing list message pools (a la Cuperman) have an effectively infinite persistence, if parties archive the messages. * Web-based message pools, which to my knowledge have not been used yet, would have a persistence as long as the messages are archived...which could be very long. Rather than _persistence_, I'd say _access time_ or _latency_ is a more serious criticism of my approach. In contrast to a large library or bookstore, with access times of ~minutes, the access times for material on BlackNet may be ~days to ~weeks. Or, of course, "never." >Your descriptions of BlackNet as a data haven seem to be completely >based upon the presumption that an anonymous contact service and contract >exchange is the functional equivalent to a data haven. Here are a few >reasons why I would disagree: > >As a publisher of "naughty bits" I do not have the ability to just toss >data up and assume that it will be there when someone wants it. I am forced >to continuously monitor the appropriate newsgroups to find messages from >people asking me to post the blueprints to the orbital mind control lasers >or kiddie porn. I cannot put my data onto "the Net" with an expectation >that any arbitrary user will be able to get the bits one month later. To >maintain persistence I need to constantly repost my data, making it easier >for authorities to trace me through simple taffic analysis if nothing else. I grant that my version is not like a "Mega-Barnes-and-Noble" bookstore, with vast amounts of stuff available for browsing. It is more like a "stacks"-based library. (Many universities have lesser-used books, sometimes _all_ books, in "stacks," accessible only by qualified librarians, or by permission.) >> The classical data haven is closely identified with "place." To many >> people, they naturally assume "data haven" = a haven for data, a "harbor" >> (same IE root as haven) = a physical place. >> >> But is "place" important? > >No one has really claimed place is important, in fact the ideal data haven >has no physical existence whatsoever. This is a given. As a practical >matter it is a lot easier if you start off in a "place" because there are >fewer complications but this has never been a necessity. Some have focussed on "place," by focussing on ideas like offshore buoys, orbiting broadcasters, and, of course, on finding accomodating jurisdictions that will tolerate data havens in their midst. You and I may agree that data havens need to be virtual. I'm just proposing an architecture--and certainly not the final version!--that actually works. Others can suggest their own alternatives, or build on versions that are out there. >> A person in the U.S. seeking the Necronomicon posts a message to BlackNet >> (or any similar forum, using the same methods) asking for a copy of it, or >> offering to pay for it. (Whether the information is free or for a fee is >> not central to the idea.) This request is, of course, untraceable. >> >> Anyone, anywhere in the world, with a copy of this banned material on his >> or her private machines may see this request and respond, either giving the >> material away, or negotiating a fee. (As I said before, the absence of a >> robust digital cash system, bidirectionally untraceable, is a known >> limitation of all such systems.) > >Now you reveal the objection I had to BlackNet being a data haven. What if >only one person has a copy of this banned material? It may not be in this >publishers interest to have the data available to anyone for posting in >response to the query ("Information does not want to be free, it wants to >be expensive and liberated...") and some data is not widespread enough or of >interest to enough people to assume that multiple copies exist to those who >read BlackNet postings. Therefore the only way for a publisher to maintain >availability of their data is to constantly monitor the appropriate newsgroups >and republish for each request, persistence is maintained only through >eternal vigilence (much like liberty, only requiring a lot more effort :) What if only one person has a copy? Nothing in *my* concept of data haven says anything about information being free, or cheap, or widely available. Books aren't usually free, of course, so why should information be free The issue of what happens if someone buys an item and then republishes or redistributes it is, of course, orthogonal to the discussion here. It's a tough problem, and the basis of the "information wants to be free" aphorism. But not a key issue for differentiating forms of data havens, as I see things. >> It's a data haven. > >No, it is an anonymous contact service. To claim this is a data haven is >like claiming that the classified ads in a newspaper are the equivalent to >a mall; you could probably find the same goods if you looked long enough, but >there is a reason that manufacturers sell goods through stores rather than >just posting classified ads across the country. When one does not have the >time to check the classified ads, wants to goods from a reputable source, and >wants the goods in a timely fashion they will go to a shopping center. I agree with the "classified ads vs. shopping mall" distinction. In fact, it neatly summarizes the latency/availability issues. So be it. Until the "shopping mall" exists, I'll settle for the "classified ads." If BlackNet and similar systems function adequately as an anonymous classified ad system, this will be an improvement over what exists now, which is, of course, "nothing." --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Indonesia detains democracy activist after post to mailing list (fwd)
by gimonca＠skypoint.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Mon, 19 Aug 1996 07:05:33 -0700 (PDT) > From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)eff.org> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Indonesia detains democracy activist after post to mailing list > HotWired, The Netizen > 19 August 1996 > > Trouble in Paradise > by Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) > Washington, DC, 18 August > > Indonesian democracy activists have taken their fight for freedom > to the Net, and the government doesn't approve. > > After distributing email messages about riots in Jakarta last month to > an international Indonesian-politics mailing list, Prihadi Beny > Waluyo, a lecturer at Duta Wacana Christian University, was arrested > and interrogated by the military. Since then, the mailing list has > been banned from the country and Waluyo has returned to his house, > where he remains under surveillance. > [dan lain-lain...] Exactly which mailing list was "banned from the country"? All the Indonesian mailing lists I'm on, including apakabar(a)clark.net, are functioning normally, with no unusual complaints or interruptions.

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Re: Why BlackNet *IS* a Data Haven
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:03 PM 8/19/96, Hal wrote: >mccoy(a)communities.com (Jim McCoy) writes: >>Your descriptions of BlackNet as a data haven seem to be completely >>based upon the presumption that an anonymous contact service and contract >>exchange is the functional equivalent to a data haven. Here are a few >>reasons why I would disagree: > >I think part of the confusion here is the name "BlackNet". As I envision >the concept, BlackNet is not really an anonymous contact service, or in >fact a network of any sort. Rather, it is a vendor. It buys and sells >information. The name, while provocative, is a bit misleading in this >regard. (This is just my model, and may not actually correspond with >Tim's or anyone else's idea. But I think it more closely matches the >data haven concept, and in fact is more consistent with the original >announcement.) Hal is right that BlackNet was presented as a _specific vendor_. But the announcement also described how _anybody_ could set themselves up in the same way, by sending out a similar announcement with their own public key. My purpose was to: -- demonstrate the coming future -- use a concrete example, "BlackNet," to drive home the point (people often pooh-pooh an abstract idea until a concrete, reified version is produced) -- stimulate debate about anonymous information markets I'll comment on a few of Hal's points, but, to save space, will not comment on most of them. >BlackNet has a public key, and a known virtual location in the form of >certain newsgroups that it monitors. Anyone can initiate a >communication interchange with BlackNet by posting a message to those >groups, encrypted with BlackNet's key. Presumably in that message will >be included return address information in the form of a key and a set of >locations that will be monitored for replies. In this way ongoing >conversations can be maintained between BlackNet and customers who are >either buying or selling to it. Exactly. And this is how it was used for several two-way communications, back in Sept-Nov '93. An article on the cover of "Information Week" last summer triggered new interest, and a couple of new messages addressed to "BlackNet"--the ones I tried to read apparently used a spoofed key, or the one Dettweiler created and placed ahead of mine on the MIT keyserver (the shorter key that the MIT group was able to eventually break). >BlackNet would not be used (as I see it) for direct communication >between buyers and sellers of information. How would the BlackNet >public key fit into this model? The existence of a specific BlackNet >public key is part of what drives me to picture it as a vendor. >Rather, BlackNet will buy information (plus unrestricted rights to >disseminate that information), add it to its catalog, and then >advertise its availability and price. It could be used for direct communications, via pools, a la the classified ad analogy that Jim McCoy just used (and that, in fairness, I used to describe it in a talk at Hackers several years ago). There is "BlackNet the company" and "BlackNet the abstraction." Inasmuch as the recipe is easy to duplicate, "BlackNet the company" would face heavy competition. ....[stuff elided]... >This is a little different from my picture of BlackNet, as I wrote above. >I would see BlackNet as being a particular seller of information, who >will respond to this message. It could have competitors like SafeHaven, >StrongHold, InfoBase, etc., each of which will offer data for a price, >and each of which will have its own reputation for reliability. Exactly. Hal quoting Jim: >>Now you reveal the objection I had to BlackNet being a data haven. What if >>only one person has a copy of this banned material? It may not be in this >>publishers interest to have the data available to anyone for posting in >>response to the query ("Information does not want to be free, it wants to ... >Here is where BlackNet as an information middleman makes the most sense. >Its business model includes the costs of this sort of vigilance, which >after all can be automated. All sorts of automated vigilance can be done: scripts that scan newsgroups and message pools, even Alta Vista-type spider searches, agents, etc. Depending on the type of message pool, whether Usenet newsgroup, mailing list, Web site, etc., various kinds of automation are possible. Which will prove popular of course depends on a lot of factors. ...[more elided]... >Actually we now have "virtual malls" online. These are in their infancy >but eventually they could become as easy to use and reliable as regular >malls (for appropriate kinds of goods). All that BlackNet (as I picture >it) lacks is a WWW interface, and even that could be provided if the >gateway server could be made immune to legal pressure and if various >technicalities about anonymous WWW connections could be dealt with. Agreed. >As for reputations, if BlackNet is one of several vendors of >information, like its competitors, they can all develop reputations of >their own for reliability, honesty, availability, etc. There may be >problems if the testimonials of customers are all anonymous, but in >some cases such methods as signed transcripts of information exchanges >can be used by one side or the other to justify claims that the other >side has cheated. Again, agreed. Evolutionary learning will take place, reputations will be strengthened and weakened, as always. Certainly some fraud will occur, as in all markets. The point being that this information market will be anarchic, in that no government or official hierarchy will rule on legality of data. Various access mechanisms will be tried. The Usenet and mailing list pools are somewhat slow, but have already worked for things like "I'd like a copy of the Church of Scientology secret documents." (In fact, in addition to "alt.religion.scientology," for discussions and requests, there is the newsgroup "alt.binaries.scientology," for posting anonymized copies of restricted documents.) That the latency is not as low as some other markets seems to be more a function of nascency (is this a word? it should be) than intrinsic limitations. ---Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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lambda 2.10
by jt＠freenix.fr 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

netizen's --> Lambda Bulletin 2.10 <-- contents flash bulletin + French Constitution censors Internet control + Singapore and the Censorship Proxy Server + G7 and the EC take strong steps for Key Escrow Encryption * * * * * French Constitution censors Internet control As we speculated in our last bulletin (2.09), the French Conseil Constitutionnel, watchdog of the 1958 Constitution, censored 2 articles in a new telecom act which were intended to establish a kind of administrative control over Internet speech and online services. The nine "Sages" said that the creation of the Conseil Superieur de la Telematique, which would have make guidelines on Internet content, breaches article 34 of the Constitution which states that the Parliament can act alone to dictate rules concerning "civic rights and fundamentals garanties given to citizens for a fair exercice of public liberties". The CST could have undermine these principles, because the law didn't specify clearly how it would have taken its decisions. So the Conseil recognized the particular state of the Internet, which is not a basic medium. Only one section remains in the censored law : it obliges ISPs to give their clients "technical means" to forbid or select access to online services, software that allows a so-called "parental control". * * * * * Singapore and the Censorship Proxy Server A communique from SingNet, Singapore's main Internet Service Provider, states that "ALL SingNet customers will be required to connect to SingNet's proxy server by the deadline September 14th 1996, failing which you would not be able to access the web without the proxy. This applies to all dial-up, ISDN, and leased line customers (STIX customers are exempted). " The proxy server will ease the ISP to "Deny access to blacklisted sites supplied by SBA". SingNet said that "Access to sites banned by the SBA will prompt the message : The site you requested is not accessible For more information on Singapore's Internet regulation, please check http://www.gov.sg/sba/netreg/regrel.htm". On July 11 the Singapore government passed the Singapore Broadcasting Authority Act (Chapter 297) in which it announced a "Class Licence Scheme" aimed "to encourage responsible use of the Internet while facilitating its healthy development in Singapore. It encourages minimum standards in cyberspace and seeks to protect Net users, particularly the young, against the broadcast of unlawful or objectionable materials. ... SBA will focus on content which may undermine public morals, political stability and religious harmony of Singapore. However, SBA recognises that it is impossible to regulate the Internet fully. ... Singaporeans can help SBA in the identification of objectionable sites in order to keep cyberspace clean. SBA welcomes public feedback on objectionable content found on the Internet. Members of the public can write to SBA, call its toll-free hotline ... or post their views on the SBA homepage at http://www.gov.sg/sba. " China, which has created its own Internet regulations aimed at controlic data traffic and urged netizens to declare themselves to the authorities, approved the Singapore Act and an official was quoted as saying, "China has a lot to learn from Singapore's experience" (source : Fight-censorship mailing list). * * * * * G7 and the EC take strong steps for Key Escrow Encryption The European Commission's DG-13 division on information security (Infosec) opened on July 30th a "call for tenders" for "preparatory works" towards regulating encryption procedures. The plan is aimed to test the introduction of the Europe-wide network of Trusted Third Party Services (ETS). Observers saw in this move the so-called "guidelines" the EC was to propose last year, when press reports (Nature, Sept. 28, 1995) argued the Commission and the Council of Europe in Strasbourg were willing to regulate encryption use through the creation of TTPs. The Infosec call for tenders, which will end by September 30, is to "identify, define and verify ... operationnal, technical, regulatory and legal aspects ... to assess the effectiveness, economics and acceptability of Trusted Third Party Services." Other voices in European talks, however, said these "preparatory works" are to push for EU countries to adopt TTPs and the principles of key-escrow encryption. Nordic countries such as Finland, Denmark and Sweden, are said to be opposed to change encryption legislation, as France and Britain took steps in June and July to enforce the creation of TTPs in their own country. On July 30 G7 countries agreed policies that would "accelerate consultations on encryption that allows, when necessary, lawful government access to data and communications in order to prevent or investigate acts of terrorism, while protecting the privacy of legitimate communications". The EPIC, in Washington, DC, said "stronger measures sought by the US to restrict information on the Internet and limit the availabilioty of encryption were apparently not adopted by the G7 countries". Among other industrialised nations, Japan and Australia are said, like Nordic countries in Europe, to oppose key escrow as a mean to regulate the free flow of information. Remember the OECD talks in June, were the US tried to impose key-escrow legislation to the 27-countries' club of the industrial world (see lambda 2.09) ***** Soon archived on www.freenix.fr/netizen ----- Jerome Thorel =-= Journaliste/Free-lance Reporter =-= Paris, France =+= the lambda bulletin --> http://www.freenix.fr/netizen =+=

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Agents, Spiders, Linda, and BlackNet
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Key Phrases: agents, spiders, linda, blacknet, indexing, hierarchy, alternatives to hierarchy, emergent indexing, aptical foddering, tuple spaces, virtual communities, shared environments A swirl of terms, related in some interesting ways. This mini-essay is inspired by the debate whether BlackNet is or is not a meaningful instantiation of a data haven. How can information be retrieved from the Net? Is organization needed? Who does the organizing? As the ARPANet evolved, under various names, and as UUCP and other machine-to-machine protocols evolved, the Usenet came into being. The first "message pool." A basic classification existed, mostly of fairly reputable top-level topics (sci, soc, comp, etc.). Then came "alt," largely created by our own John Gilmore. There are of course now more than 20,000 newsgroups. Searches and greps of the newsgroup list are a way to find potentially relevant newsgroups for posting a message or finding messages of interest. (As is well-known, the Usenet Cabal gets its orders from the Bilderbergers as to which newsgroups fit in with New World Order sanctioned epistemologies.) Some are saying there is an alternate method. With the advent of search engines which can index messages on the Usenet (and in Webspace, but the idea is the same), why not this alternative: put your message in a bottle and just throw it into the "sea" of possible messages. Let search engines find the messages of interest (modulo a day or two of latency, as the spiders reach the space where the message was placed). No newsgroups needed. The "keywords" list at the beginning of this message would help the search process, though of course the body of the message should have sufficient keywords; a formal keyword list or field serves mainly to remind the author to add some keywords (Schelling points) that he might not have included in his message per se. Conversations and threads would take place in a virtual meeting place, even more so than today. This is of course largely happening already, and even more clearly with mailing lists which get cc:ed to other mailing lists, e.g, the way the e-spam list forwards some of our stuff to their list and then replies pull in the orginal author. (The connection with "Linda" is the connection with David Gelernter's "Linda" system, based on "tuple spaces" into which messages are placed. A kind of sea of messages in this tuple space. The connection with the Unabomber is left as an exercise for the reader.) Sometimes hierarchy is useful. Library call numbers and indices make finding books easier than searching at random; however, sufficiently fast "library crawlers" could find even randomly-placed books. (And friends of mine are working on small RF "localizers" which, if small enough, could be placed on books. One could type in "Find "Robinson Crusoe," and a book anywhere in the library could chip "Here I am." Obviously the problem is more easily solvable for data.) With the rise of more powerful search engines, of distributed geodesic networks, and with the decentralization of naming power, I see Linda-type seas of objects as more and more attractive. This helps BlackNet-type information markets and virtual data havens. Just some ideas. Nothing new, to me at least. But I thought some of the newer list members might not have seen some of these ideas, part of the assumed culture to we crypto anarchists. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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The "Best" as the Enemy of the "Pretty Good"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Pretty Good Privacy, Pretty Good Remailers, Pretty Good Digital Cash, Pretty Good Data Haven, ..... One of the main lessons of evolutioary learning theory (aka evolutionary game theory, market learning, Darwinian selection, and related variants) is that getting something out early is often more important than getting it "right." Rigor is important, but, interestingly, rigor is often best-established in an evolutionary learning environment. (We build machines and buildings not based on first doing exhaustive analyses for centuries, but on building actual instances and learning from mistakes...bridges that fail, buildings that collapse, planes that crash.) A recent example of this is the Xanadu project, whose members worked for many years (and spent something like $7 million) to get all the long-range, rigorous details of hypertext "right"...and were then "scooped" by Tim Berners-Lee with his simple and straightforward HTML/URL approach. (I am not basing this analysis on the hatchet jobs done in the press on Ted Nelson and the other Xanafolks, but on personal contacts with many of them, including an identical analysis from Mark Miller at an Extropaganza this past Saturday.) Another example is that of remailers. There is no denying that "DC-Nets" are a more elegant approach than "mixes," but mixes (remailers) can be easily implemented in Perl and deployed rapidly, while I know of not a single, actual, operational DC-Net. And of course we cannot forget Phil Zimmermann's "Pretty Good Privacy." Had a "pretty good" version not come out, where would we be today? (And "pretty good" does not mean PGP is weak or has been broken.) Just a reminder that often the best is the enemy of the good. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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