December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Game Theory and its Relevance to Cypherpunks
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Llywarch Hen wrote: > > > What Timothy May espouses is not the appearance of craziness but actual > > > insanity itself. James A. Donald wrote > > if you organize your nuclear forces so that any > > serious war is likely to escalate uncontrollably into the battle of > > armageddon, regardless of your intentions and desires, which is how > > the American government organized its nuclear forces in Europe, > > then you can pretty much guarantee you will not have to face a > > serious war. At 03:09 PM 7/27/96 -0700, Jon Leonard wrote: > This was, of course, the logic behind the alliances before World War I. > It was obviously suicidal to start a war with any of the major powers, > but it happened anyway. Your history is false: War was romantic and a big vote winner before World War I, and after World War I and before world war II the "intellectuals" were still big fans of war, just as they are still big fans of communism and socialism today, though World War I was sufficient to kick sense into most normal people. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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BOMB PLANS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, The Sunday San Francisco Examiner had an article about how simple it is to make a pipe bomb. It was syndicated from the Dallas Morning News. In the article a "federal bomb expert" opined: They're probably one of the more common explosive devices that are encountered. That's because the pipe not only provides a container, but fragments into sharapnel." ^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Now I don't know what takes to qualify one as a "bomb expert," but the standards must be pretty low. The reason hand grenades look like pineapples is because it's very difficult to get metal to fragment unless it is scored or otherwise predisposed to come apart in little pieces. What I've been told is that a pipe bomb just peals open at it's weakest place and otherwise stays in one piece. Don't know, but that's what I've heard. Makes sense to me. To put the fear of god in the readers the article dutifully chants the following mantra: Detailed instructions for making pipe bombs and other explosive devices are available for sources as varied as anti-government publications [what about GOVERNMENT publications?], pamphlets sold at gun shows and the Internet. Are we surprised? S a n d y P.S. On an odder note, the same paper had an article entitled, "Two-headed baby born in Tijuana." The article reported, "...the child (sic) had been born with two spinal columns and two heads" One of the more bizarre statements was, "It's not clear whether un-named girl--or girls--are Siamese twins." ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: E-Cash promotion idea
by Arun Mehta 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:15 24/07/96 -0500, Matt Carpenter wrote: >getting change from the merchant. Ian Goldberg pointed out that >with the current ecash protocol, accepting change not only eliminates your >anonymity, but that you also have to go online to make sure you aren't being >cheated. I'm sure it should be possible for the merchant to electronically give you an "IOU" for the amount of change s/he owes you, no matter how small, without loss of your anonymity. Next time you go to the same merchant, the IOU could automatically be adjusted against the new purchase. Arun Mehta Phone +91-11-6841172, 6849103 amehta(a)cpsr.org http://www.cerfnet.com/~amehta/ finger amehta(a)cerfnet.com for public key

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Re: your favorite poison recipes
by Lou Zirko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cjs(a)netcom.com, jimbell(a)pacifier.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Sun Jul 28 21:12:49 1996 You forgot 2oz of Grand Marnier(sp). Also the Creme should be Irish. Lou Z. > While > > I recommend: > > 2oz Kahula > 2oz Vodka > 2oz Creme > > Mix this with some ice in a glass, garnish with a cherry. > > If you use Midori instead of Kahula, it turns a really cool > shade of green. > > Drink. > > If ya don't like my poison, pick ya own. =) > > Christopher > > Lou Zirko (502)383-2175 Zystems lzirko(a)c2.org "We're all bozos on this bus" - Nick Danger, Third Eye -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 iQEVAwUBMfweNstPRTNbb5z9AQEikwf/ZuyH2o7oip3C8Tt14mi5Vkc2yLhndlM8 q6m6/+AmsyaS0wrba+Dc52mPsmDLRraalYBY+IX5rFW/WRbSYoFqSrydxNr6XH7x PFRmKr2eYHy4lia2jc2CyUahfu4HXn4kr9rJdEBb2mr/LOkrZJKnrFBgORvvbxMv bHBGWILa2EgAb7fBEXNgeoJlZbyOfj296SAw/bI5dkb3R+A53DouvUi6cTF7ZgKx nfZVRbb34qwH3oi6ey6S3buZBnEHjsl6sIBCEKxkM/blVafX2XiLwN6k7nmH7ZRh AXvvoNMi8JlGJMQGqZUzyZqMm9IRd27oPT19qVITOzcuUwYryZY1+w== =VFom -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: ALL OF YOU ARE CRIMIN
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Obviously this was someone trying to be anoying and someone that wasnt too serious.

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SET in Java
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Sun, 28 Jul 1996 11:40:33 -0700 From: tedg(a)doppio.Eng.Sun.COM (Ted Goldstein) To: set-discuss(a)commerce.net, bjueneman(a)novell.com Subject: SET in Java Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-MD5: nhtCOgaiveb2ol2V4sPdow== Sender: owner-set-talk(a)commerce.NET Precedence: bulk +----------------------------------------------------+ Addressed to: set-discuss(a)commerce.net +----------------------------------------------------+ JavaSoft is developing a SET implementation as part of the Java Electronic Commerce Framework (http://java.sun.com/commerce) For more information, feel free to contact me. Thanks, Ted Goldstein Chief Java Commerce Officer, JavaSoft, Sun Microsystems Inc. (408) 343-1675 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This message was sent by set-discuss(a)commerce.net. For a complete listing of available commands, please send mail to 'majordomo(a)commerce.net' with 'help' (no quotations) contained within the body of your message. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Re: BOMB PLANS
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

welllll pipe bombs do fragment. Years ago someone decided to try to put one under my step brothers truck tire....... needless to say...nothing happened to the truck or our house in front of the truck but next door and across the street..the houses were sprayed with metal fragments.

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FW: LOOKING FOR THAT SPECIAL SOMEONE?
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone else on the list goet this? ---------- From: mary[SMTP:mary@globalpac.com] Sent: Sunday, July 28, 1996 3:56 PM To: ml(a)aol.com Subject: LOOKING FOR THAT SPECIAL SOMEONE? Feeling sentimental? Would you like to get in touch with an old friend, loved one, family member or colleague? Do you need help in locating a (former) spouse for alimony or support payments? Does someone owe you money that you haven't been able to collect because you can't find them or their assets? Let me help. I've been doing this for twenty some years and am very good at it. My fees are reasonable and if I can't find what you need, there will be no charge. If interested, please reply to above. Thank you for your time. Mary Anderson P O Box 39362, Los Angeles, Ca 90039

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RE: Internet blamed for pipe bombs
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've heard that in a lot of cases, too, automobiles have been the vehicle used by the prep. to transport bomb-making materials and bombs to/from their target sites. I'm starting to get concerned that this type of personal transportation technology makes it just too damn easy to wreak havoc and destruction on unsuspecting innocents. I think they ought to pass some kind of legislation restricting the use of vehicles that do not have approved travel-itineraries on file with the Travel Escrow Bureau. >>> Across the country, latest figures from the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, >>> Tobacco and Firearms show a 20 percent jump in pipe bomb incidents >>> between 1990 and 1994. >> >>[...] >> >>> "We've been incredibly busy," said sheriff's bomb technician Judd >>> Holiday. "As crime in other categories is dropping, this is going up." > >The friendly Anarchist's Bookstore in San Francisco sells several books on >building bombs. No Internet connection required. I would like offer ano ther >possible explanation for the increase in pipe bombings. The People are >getting frustrated and a pipe bomb can be very useful device releasing >one's frustration.

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Re: e$: The Demographic "Transaction" (was Re: Schelling Points...)
by Arun Mehta 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 15:09 28/07/96 -0400, Robert Hettinga wrote: > >He said there are many hypotheses about what causes this decline in >fertility, including the commonly held one that people make babies as a >form old age pension income :-) That's true: when the state does not provide old-age pension, that's the only alternative, and surely not a bad one. >He also said that the obvious things like public health and education were >good ways to increase life expectancy, but that the very best way to cause >this "demographic transition" was a dramatic increase in personal income. As I see it, having more children makes sound economic sense when you have child labor. You feed the child for 4-5 years, after which it contributes financially to the family for the rest of its short life. More stringent enforcement of anti child-labor legislation would help. Increase in life expectancy is also good, because then you need fewer children as insurance. The spread of the Internet, and the ability to post anonymously should help in exposing instances of violation of child-labor laws, and increasing outrage. Hopefully, it will also make it easier to spread literacy, which is arguably the best way to keep population down. I'd really like to know who this "he" is whom Robert is citing. Arun Mehta Phone +91-11-6841172, 6849103 amehta(a)cpsr.org http://www.cerfnet.com/~amehta/ finger amehta(a)cerfnet.com for public key

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RPK Cryptography
by Dana W. Albrecht 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone on the list heard of this? Any opinions regarding its security? Dana W. Albrecht dwa(a)corsair.com --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > May 21, 1996 -- AUCKLAND, New Zealand -- A fledgling startup, RPK New > Zealand, today announced that a new public key encryption system, > known also as RPK, is available free, for review and evaluation on the > World Wide Web. RPK is inviting worldwide evaluation and scrutiny of > their new system with the goal of creating, for the first time ever, a > worldwide industrial-strength security and encryption standard. The > company is also offering a free version of an end user program > designed to be used for secure transfer of information to encourage > use and trial of the technology. > > RPK New Zealand is one of the new, very small, "worldwide entities" > that has benefited from the global market access provided by the > public Internet. Previously kept confidential while patent > applications were being filed in New Zealand and for the rest of the > world under international treaty, the RPK cryptographic system was > unveiled this week via the World Wide Web (http://crypto.swdev.co.nz) > where the technology's inventor, Bill Raike, has also offered a > US$3,000 "RPK SafeCracker Challenge." > > Raike, a mathematician and computer scientist who has dual U.S. and > New Zealand citizenship, combined some simple algorithms with well- > accepted higher mathematics to invent the world's fastest-ever system > for secure communications and he's betting US$3,000 that no one in > the world can break into RPK's Virtual Vault and thereby prove him and > his fledgling startup wrong.

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E-cash
by pluto＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Salve, As another idea to prevent the netizen from being a sitting duck for the gov and the big mailorder companys: Get an account at MarkTwain! Do it now! Pluto ********************************************************************** P pluto(a)inx.de P Free information! # G-> pluto(a)well.com <-G Freedom through knowledge. # P www.well.com/user/pluto/ P Wisdom for all!! =:-) # ********************************************************************** +--HI, I'm a signature virus :-) Copy me into your sign to join in. ---+

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Re:BOMB PLANS
by mccoy＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy write: > > The Sunday San Francisco Examiner had an article about how simple > it is to make a pipe bomb. It was syndicated from the Dallas > Morning News. In the article a "federal bomb expert" opined: > > They're probably one of the more common explosive > devices that are encountered. That's because the > pipe not only provides a container, but fragments > into sharapnel." ^^^^^^^^^ > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > Now I don't know what takes to qualify one as a "bomb expert," > but the standards must be pretty low. The reason hand grenades > look like pineapples is because it's very difficult to get metal > to fragment unless it is scored or otherwise predisposed to come > apart in little pieces. This is no longer true with respect to hand grenades and was not really accurate wrt the old pineapple grenades. Modern grenades are pre-scored to produce good fragments, in fact one reason for abandoning the old grenades was that they fragmented into only a few large chunks along the weakest stress lines of the pineapple gripping and this did not produce the desired effect (which is lots of little high-KE pieces, four or five big pieces with relatively low-KE were produced by the pineapple grenades...) An equivalent effect for a pipe bomb would be produced by mixing in a handful of brads, wire cut into 5mm lengths, or tacks, most "recipes" for such devices I have seen tell someone to mix in nails. This is really stupid if you consider that most people only have relatively big nails sitting around and coupled with the volume restriction of a pipe bomb you will get the same poor effects as the old hand grenades. jim

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Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- CLARIFICATION
by JR＠ns.cnb.uam.es 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I forgot to say what the GOALS are. The goals of every individual > cypherpunk are (in from highest to lowest priority): > > 1. Stay alive > 2. Get as much money as possible > 3. Keep as many cypherpunks alive as possible, all other things being equal. > > - Igor. > Most responses fail to consider "suicidal" behaviours. In many cases, when there are rounds left, it may be worth playing against your interests if that will yield later a higher benefit. The fact that anyone makes a proposal is of no interest to anyone else as long as goal#2 stands over goal#3 and there is enough people to stablish uncertainty of behaviour. As an example, if #1 proposes he gets all the money, all other things being equal, #3,#5,...#19 should theoretically vote for him since they know they can't win as long as there's a #2... But #19 knows he could win if only he and #20 were alive. It is in his interest to vote 'no'. If #1 dies, then he may get a chance, because #18 is in his same position and might do the same in the other rounds. Yes, you can follow it backwards and discover that goal #3 above then should take precedence. Should it? There's still goal #2 above. If the c'punks can't communicate among them then that's the end of it. #1 gets all. But if they can, there's another side: If you not only know the order of proposers, but also their proposals, then you can always play 'unfair' or 'against you' until the proposal that's better for you comes. Say #2 speaks to #20 and agrees to propose that he'll get some money too. Restriction #2 above takes precedence and proposer #2 knows he'll get #20 vote as long as he makes that proposal. It is in #20's interest to vote against #1 "all for me" in the first round since that way he'll get some money on #2's proposal. But then #3, #4, etc... can play the same game. The first one that can provide a proposal making happier most of the people will win... Say #1 proposes to even split between half of them. Will that work? If they can't cheat their vote that's the end of it. Then comes another point in place. Can they cheat? Obviously, under these arrangements, anyone proposing he gets all money, other than #19 risks his life for others can agree into a better split. But OTOH, #18 and #20 know that they can agree on something better than #19's proposal of he getting all. If #18 cheats, #19 can agree with #20 to split even and #18 is dead. If #18 doesn't cheat. then #20 has two chices: - believe #19 will not cheat and propose an even split. Vote against. - fear #19 cheating and the risk of not getting anything. Odds are all for #19, so he shoudl vote for #18 proposal. The only choice is for #18 and #20 to agree in an even split, where #18 can also cheat and ask for all money. But then he risks #19 and #20 agreeing on voting against him. So #18 must offer something to #20, and it must be enough for #20 not wanting to take the risk of #19 cheating too. Following back, everybody but #19 and #20 risk their lives. #19 is interested in everybody else being dead, and #20 in anyone giving him anything. Anyone who gives anything to #20 will get his vote. Anyone not giving anything to #20 risks #20 voting for someone else on the hope he'll get something on the next proposal. And everyone needs an agreement with #20 to keep his life. As you go back, #18 has a better chance of staying alive if he can ensure #19 and #20 won't agree because his offer is safer than the risks involved for #20. Work backwards. The point is, the expectancies of winning work at all round, and at every point you are interested in not dying. As you reach the end if you make an agreement and cheat you have less risk (there are less possibilities for new agreements), but if you have gone to that, it's because more and more people have cheated before, and confidence will be low. So you are more interested in not cheating to keep your life. I think the net result is that most c'punks will be offering even splits to ensure a maximum of votes. As people makes arrangements and c'punks dies, confidence and credibility on agreements in advance will fail, so the risk for the latests increases too... In the end all comes down to gullibility of the partners. If you assume they are not gullible, you'll vote for the first proposal of an even split to save your life. If they are, then you can play against while there remains gullible people, but then you know your cheating is your dead (except for #19 and #20) and you risk less by going even. That's more or less like real life: one can temporarily play against himself if that will yield later a higher benefit. But that comes at a cost in credibility, and the more you use it, the less useful it becomes. On a non-gullible environment, the first time you cheat your reputation breaks and it is in everyone else's interest to play against you. That's the ancient concept of honor. On a less-exceptic or more tolerant environment you may have a few goes before getting people absolutely exceptical again. The number of goes will depend on their tolerance level. Same for the game: there can be cheating up to a tolerance level. After that everyone will know that a non-even split proposal will take out your life. Where the border comes is a matter of circumstances. jr

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Re: cypherpunks vs hacker
by pjn＠nworks.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In> Rather than debate semantics of the definition of "hacker," or ask In> others to suggest definitions, it might be better for interested folks In> to read some of the various books on the topic and then decide for In> themselves. Some of them are: In> - Levy, "Hackers," of course Very good history. In> - Haffner and Markoff, "Cyberpunk" In> - Sterling's book on hackers Hacker Crackdown. In> - any one (but not more) of the several Shimomura v. Mitnick books I think that Markoffs book on the incident was written beter then the rest. I might also suggest: - Masters of Deception - The Cuckoos Egg by Stoll P.J. pjn(a)nworks.com ... Resistance is futile, taglines will assimilate your hard drive. ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.20 [NR]

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Re: WaPo on Crypto-Genie Terrorism
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 28 Jul 96 at 12:59, David Sternlight wrote: > >IMO, the US does not have a comfortable lead. It's already falling > >behind considering some of the stronger crypto programs available (at > >least as freeware) are made outside the US. Many of the stronger > >algorithms were invented outside of the US (IDEA for instance). > > This, and similar remarks by others, consistently misses the point which I > have been making for about a year now, and which Director Freeh finally > made explicit in his testimony last week. That is--the government is > concerned with mass market software incorporating robust crypto, used > overseas, and recognizes that they can't keep niche products off the [..] Really? The RAR archiver is getting quite popular (DOS and OS/2), and uses a variation of DES in the encryption (according to the authors). An Italian archiver called CODEC also uses DES. PGP gets more publicity than any crypto product around (CNN, NPR, Pacifica, NYTimes, etc.) and will likely get bigger as time goes on and as the arguments over escrow proposals get louder. MS's C[r]API and Netscape also make people more aware of strong crypto... > Though I've no connection with Freeh, it's interesting that his language is > almost word for word the same as what I've been using. Do you suppose some > of his staff reads my stuff? Actually, I don't care one whit. > >So why should criminals bother with using standards if they are > >readable by authorities? > > See above. Doesn't counter my question/argument. Serious criminals with a few braincells who care about wiretapping or protecting their files from the authorities will obviously not use anything that the government can read. Even a ban on unescrowed crypto worldwide will not help. Every copy of strong crypto software will not magically disappear upon the signing of such treaties and laws. [..] > >Are they going to magically erase all copies of strong software that > >is already currently available? (Side note: the Pacifica news report > >on Friday notes that while Freeh gave his testimony, over 100 copies > >of PGP were downloaded from MIT's site.) > > What he's saying is that US-exported copies of the Lotus Lockshens, > Microsoft Machayas, and Netscape Niguns of the world still do not contain > robust crypto the USG cannot read. So? People can use alternate programs to encrypt the software, such as PGP. [..] > >It's not clear that terrorism can be tracked, even if it's unencrypted. > >The OK and WTC bombings were apparently not encrypted, and there's > >some allegations that the authorities had advanced warnings of the > >latter. > > He says it can, and suggests following the banking trail among other > things. We know the government has already had good success with this [..] Apparently not successful enough, as the two examples I posted happened successfully. Banking trails will exist with or without escrow. [..] > >Particularly absent in the WaPo-ed is that many do not trust the > >authorities (in the US and elsewhere)--particularly the FBI, which > >has a long history of extra-legal surveillance. > > So as Netanyahu says at length we need to build in protections against > abuses, using both the legislature and the judiciary. 1. The damage is already done if rights are violated, irregardless of the law. If the police listen in on your phone conversations because of your political views, you may have legal recourse.... but they've already listened in. 2. Legislative/judicial protections are meaningless if judges don't follow up on them. Historically they give leeway to the police, and as of late judges that enforce the technicalities are lambasted publicly for letting criminals go free. 3. Israel isn't exactly a prime example of human rights, especially if you're a Palestinian. Rob --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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A Libertine Question
by Charley Sparks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- My opinions are just that, MINE but here's a question .. In the event that drugs are legalized like alcohol ( also a drug ) and tobacco and cafeine, who will take responsibility for housing and feeding those, who are now blameless, individuals who can't or won't take responsibility for themselves and work or whatever. With freedom and liberty come a lot of responsibility. Too many people today balme every damn thing in the world for their problems - and get away with it.... 1. My grear grand parents were slaves, I suffer because of that, so I killed 30 White people. 2. My momma didn't give me no tit so I raped those women and killed them and on, and on............... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCXAwUBMfysk+J+JZd/Y4yVAQEAaQQLBX5NMGRRbjP+uWSv4cxMJsI5jBq/QsIy k9Q9a4csLhfOvVJ1ZbLszIR9xsb0oQkaK2l/2oX3igVB8+jwN8SZL0p4RJp00Tf+ D5DYVKTcF/JdwsHSSGLpdGWRExpiPxJqKlaNS7oL0R1Zx6Cqz8LlRxRMnnLkUgCo lLNUKKkMJZ5FuQ== =a8IV -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Charles E. Sparks<sparks(a)bah.com> In God we trust, all others we encrypt ! http:/www.clark.net/pub/charley/index.htm Public Key At http://www.clark.net/pub/charley/cp_1.htm

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International Standards
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mr. Freeh, testifying at Thursday's hearing in favor of an optional key escrow plan, noted that the point is not to prevent all copies of uncrackable code from going abroad -- that's clearly impossible -- but to prevent such high-level code from becoming the international standard, with architecture and transmission channels all unreadable to world authorities. Looks like the fibbies (FBI) haven't been reading the "Proceedings of the IETF". Strong crypto is already an international standard. DCF

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Re: cypherpunks vs hacker
by pjn＠nworks.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> It is interesting to note that while both groups have opposite > objectives (Hackers want all information free, where cypherpunks want > everbody to be able to have privacy), and yet in there own ways, they > are both right. In> I don't entirely agree with this. I think both groups want In> information to be free, but also want people to be able to have In> privacy. Most hackers (used in the sense of people who break into In> computers) attack computers owned by such companies as TRW and the In> phone companies. Both of these systems have little regard for privacy. In> Most non-malicious hackers promote system security, but at the same In> time, don't like government-controlled monopolies and agencies to be In> able to keep secret information that should be free. A very In> interesting paper by Dorothy Denning (she used to be regarded very In> highly by the hacker community before she started to support Clipper) In> expresses some of the concerns and morals of hackers. It's called In> "Concerning Hackers Who Break Into Computer Systems" and is in Phrack In> issue 32. > I have read the file (I have all Phracks from the beginning. Crypt is good too, but they dont have the same level of information as Phrack) and I though that it was very inciteful (sp). > I think what we need to define is the diffrence between hackers and > crackers. A hacker breaks into a computer like a cracker (but the > similarities end there). The hacker just want to look and learn, > possably "map out" the system just to see how everything works with > everything else. Crackers break into computers for the sake of > destroying or stealing information or the system itself. In> That's debatable. I think many people incorrectly consider these In> terms to be mutually exclusive. There are many hackers (used in the In> sense defined in the Jargon File) who also break into systems and could In> therefore be considered crackers also. Most hackers definitely have In> the knowledge to break into computer systems, but many crackers aren't In> very well versed in programming and learn how to break into computers In> by using canned programs and G-files. I am saying that hackers do break into computers, but crackers are more malicious in their intent. And yes, pathetic hackers rely on programs. I have respect for hackers who do all the work themselfs. > > Both cypherpunks and hackers think that the government is wrong > in many things that they do. In> Agreed. P.J. pjn(a)nworks.com ... Sorry, the dog ate my Blue Wave packet. ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.20 [NR]

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Re: A Libertine Question
by Seth I. Rich 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>My opinions are just that, MINE but here's a question .. You mean "libertarian" -- not "libertine". Got me all hopeful for something juicy and fun. Seth --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Seth I. Rich - seth(a)hygnet.com "Info-Puritan elitist crapola!!" Systems Administrator / Webmaster, HYGNet (pbeilard(a)direct.ca) Rabbits on walls, no problem.

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 alpha) (flame replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 29 Jul 96 6:47:32 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nymrod nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com ######*-**-+ 13:54 100.00% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *####*#*##+* 2:27 100.00% replay remailer(a)replay.com *+********** 4:59 100.00% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ---+----+--+ 1:46:21 99.98% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ####*#####+# 1:44 99.97% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org -+*++++*++++ 1:43:56 99.94% c2 remail(a)c2.org -+++*+++++++ 1:53:47 99.89% winsock winsock(a)c2.org --..-- 7:27:06 99.89% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net -+---++-+--- 3:36:15 99.85% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com *#*#***-*#-* 18:48 99.84% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu ++++++++++ + 38:33 99.61% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ----------- 9:09:35 99.57% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net +##+#+*###+* 3:57 99.38% ncognito ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -.-_...--. 16:44:18 99.15% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com ---++---- - 3:24:07 98.92% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com + +++++++++ 44:40 97.98% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com *******+**** 30:09 97.48% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ---------- 9:40:29 93.46% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ***** *** 18:42 76.47% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net 4:18:14 4.27% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Secure drive?
by Geoffrey C. Grabow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greetings all, Does anyone know if the 1.4a version works correctly with Win95? If not, is there an updated version? If not, will there be one anytime soon? If not, will PGPLIB (aka PGP3.0) provide a similar function? If not... heck! G.C.G. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Geoffrey C. Grabow | Great people talk about ideas. | | Oyster Bay, New York | Average people talk about things. | | gcg(a)pb.net | Small people talk about people. | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------| |That which does not kill us, makes us stranger. - Trevor Goodchild | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: "privatizing" phones?
by Geoffrey C. Grabow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:26 07/28/96 +0200, Remo Pini wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Date: Sun Jul 28 12:24:57 1996 >> Even if they did change the frequency the call was on, >> it would be a simple matter to decode how the frequency >> change was negotiated, and "follow" the call (also easily >> accomplished with cellular calls). Failing that, there is >> a very limited range of frequencies allocated for cordless >> fones, and simply re-scanning for the conversation is a >> trivial inconvenience. //cerridwyn// >> > >Most of those systems do also change the order of the transmitted data, and >that's not limited to a few possibilities. If it's digital, they usually >encrypt it (only weak, but hey, you normally have to find the key real >time!) >> The key doesn't need to be found in real time! You can always record the call and decrypt it later. If the information deals with an event in the future, you could have plenty of time to crack it. G.C.G.

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(Don't laugh *too* hard now...) "Filter"software for moneylaundering
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Encoding: 17 TEXT Date: Mon, 29 Jul 1996 16:06:53 +-200 Reply-To: Law & Policy of Computer Communications <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> Sender: Law & Policy of Computer Communications <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> From: Andrzej Adamski <aadamski(a)CC.UNI.TORUN.PL> Subject: "Filter"software for money laundering Comments: cc: "comcri-l(a)man.torun.pl" <comcri-l(a)man.torun.pl>, "lacc(a)suburbia.net" <lacc(a)suburbia.net> To: Multiple recipients of list CYBERIA-L <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> Sorry for cross-posting this message: Dear All, Are you familiar with any software or any listing of producers of software to be used in tracking money-laundering? If so, let me know. Regards, Andrzej Adamski Chair of Criminal Law & Criminal Policy Nicolas Copernicus Univwersity 87-100 Torun, Poland aadamski(a)cc.uni.torun.pl --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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RE: Implementing DSS Fortezza KEA
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- From: source@iaccess.za[SMTP:source@iaccess.za] Sent: Monday, July 29, 1996 7:05 AM To: coderpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Implementing DSS Fortezza KEA We have almost completed our SSL 3.0 implementation, and are looking for the specs on Fortezza DSS and KEA and would like to know where it is available. >From the US National Security Agency. As another respondee said, the details of KEA are not available, but information on implementation of the protocol is. It's in the public domain.

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