December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Produce 7 Hertz Frequency
by Jerome Tan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know how to produce a 7 hertz frequency?

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Re: CD Prices and Inflation
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:06 AM 7/26/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >So, what do we have now? Salaries are 2-4x higher, gold is at $375 an >ounce, a new 3-br house averages about $100K (and is 2x that in many >places), hamburger is at $2-3/pound, "Scietific American" sells for $3.95 >or $4.95, and paperback books go for $4.95. > >Roughly, then, everything on this list is 3-4 times more expensive than it >was in the late 60s. So, those LPs I was buying for $4-5 should now cost >$12-20, correcting for inflation/price rises. > >And yet I am able to find many CDs I want for $8.67 (Tower Records: "3 for >$25" sales). And they never wear out. And they usually have 60 minutes or >more music on them--at least the CDs I buy do--, compared to the paltry >35-40 minutes on most LPs of the past. >So, while I "wish" CD prices were even lower, I'm paying a lot less in >"real dollars" for more music today than I was paying 15 years ago or 30 >years ago. I think you're trying to hide a 5-year effect by immersing it in 30 years of change. Yes, we've had inflation, but the large spurt of post-Vietnam inflation was basically over by about 1983, when the CD was introduced. At that time, the explanations for the higher expense of CDs included the fact (then true) that they were costlier to manufacture due to the lower volume and lesser competition, as well as a lower production capacity. (all of these effects were essentially eliminated within 5 years or so.) At the time, I recall that most vinyl was around $7 or so, and CD's typically sold for $15. By 1988, therefore, CD prices should have dropped to the same as vinyl, plus whatever inflation had occurred in the 1983-1988 time frame. (20% total?) $9. Maybe. You'll respond, as you did, that SOME CD's are available for $9.00 Yes. A few. (But it's now 1996, and 1988 was 8 years ago, and back then $15 pricing rule was not frequently broken.) When they're on sale. But the vast majority are stuck, as if by glue, to the $12-$15 price range. I think most people understand, implicitly, that "there's something going on." We don't pretend to be able to quantify it, exactly, but it's there. Here's a proposal that I think would fix the problem. What if the copyright laws were amended to allow _anyone_ (individual or a company) to copy and sell any CD, paying the artist a royalty 20% greater than he'd get from the contracted record company, _and_ paying the originating record company, say, 50 cents royalty per CD. The company doing the "legal bootlegs" would still have to pay for its own production, distribution, and any other costs. This wouldn't be practical if the pricing by the main record company is reasonable; it becomes quite profitable for them if they are in competition with $15 discs. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- Game theory:)
by Erle Greer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:09 AM 7/25/96 -0500, you wrote: >Here's a puzzle for our game theorists. > >Twenty cypherpunks robbed a bank. They took 20 million bucks. Here's >how they plan to split the money: they stay in line, and the first guy >suggests how to split the money. Then they vote on his suggestion. If >50% or more vote for his proposal, his suggestion is adopted. > >Otherwise they kill the first robber and now it is the turn of guy #2 >to make another splitting proposal. Same voting rules apply. > >The question is, what will be the outcome? How will they split the >money, how many robbers will be dead, and so on? > >igor > Here's my guess: Eache robber is going to want the largest share of the money possible. Therefore The first guy dies automatically because that increases the share size. This continues on until there are only two robbers left. Robber #19 suggests that he receives the full 20 million and since his vote is 50%, he receives it all. 18 robbers dead. vagab0nd(a)sd.cybernex.net http://ww2.sd.cybernex.net/~vagab0nd/index.html Visit web page for public key.

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Re: remailer network/winsock remailers
by Joey Grasty 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sam wrote: > > Hi, > > I've been unsubscribed from the list for a while, and only recently > rejopined, so this issue may well have been addressed in my absence. If > not, though, here: > > It occurs to me that, with the invention of the winsock remailers, we > have the potential to establish a very widespread and distributed network > of part-time remailers. Specifically, it seems like there are a lot of > users who are only connected to the internet for short periods (PPP/SLIP) > or who only have full control over their machines for short periods. > These computers could not normally be used to run remailers as mail > would bounce when the computer/remailer software is down. > Actually, the way the WinSock Remailer works is that the user's ISP spools the mail and the remailer fetches it from the mail spool via the POP3 protocol. Thus, as long as the mail spool does not overflow, messages will not be lost. As I develop the remailer, one of the features I'm adding is the ability of the remailer to fetch only the messages with valid remail headers and leave the remaining messages in the mail spool. In this way, the mail spool is shared between the user and the remailer. The only disadvantage is that all of the improperly formatted messages end up in the user's mailbox. An annoyance. Another feature I'm adding is the ability to remail outgoing messages through another remailer to hide the origin of the message. This is to hide the presence of the remailer or to provide a discardable account that takes all the heat for spams, harrassment, etc. Thus, a limited stealth capability is achieved. A third feature is to accept inputs from a message pool, say alt.anonymous.messages, and remail them through another remailer. These are both attempts to increase the number of available remailers and to develop some way to make remailers more resistant to governments and other speedbumps on the internet. Regards, -- Joey Grasty jgrasty(a)gate.net [home -- encryption, privacy, RKBA and other hopeless causes] jgrasty(a)pts.mot.com [work -- designing pagers] "Anyone who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is, of course, in a state of sin." -- John Von Neumann PGP = A7 CC 31 E4 7E A3 36 13 93 F4 C9 06 89 51 F5 A7

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Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- Game theory:)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:03 PM 7/25/96 -0400, Simon Spero wrote: >On Thu, 25 Jul 1996, jim bell wrote: >> My guess? They all agree to kill whoever made that suicidal rule. >> Otherwise, all but two would end up dead. > >But the people at the start of the line know that if they don't >hang together, they will end up dead, and if that they act purely >selfishly only the last two will benefit. Because they want to stay >alive, a better solution for the first person to propose equal shares, >which would be opposed by the last two players, but supported by the rest. >He could also split the money only amongst the first half of >the gang, since he only needs half the votes. My previous answer was incomplete, of course. I continue to believe that the problem is unsolveable as stated, if for no other reason than the "weight" of the negative represented by dying is not stated. It's a VERY complex problem, unless there's some trick I'm not seeing. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Apps: Unix for Windows 95
by Jerome Tan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I want to play with Unix or at least be familiar with Unix. Unfortunately, Unix systems are expensive, if possible, is there any software that can be run in Windows 95 that makes you run Unix in your system?

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Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- solution (?)
by John Deters 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:13 PM 7/25/96 -0500, Igor Chudov wrote: >Igor Chudov wrote: >> >> Here's a puzzle for our game theorists. > >I forgot to say what the GOALS are. The goals of every individual >cypherpunk are (in from highest to lowest priority): > >1. Stay alive >2. Get as much money as possible >3. Keep as many cypherpunks alive as possible, all other things being equal. The first cypherpunk should propose a 10-way split: #s 11-20. It's the best offer #s 10-18 will be assured of getting without having to kill anyone. Once any one dies, I think the results will always boil down to #19 getting 100% of the money (when #s 1-18 are dead, #19 proposes that #19 gets 100% of the money and his vote is 50%, so he "wins". #20 kills him out of spite and takes it all anyway, though. No honor amongst thieves.) John -- J. Deters "Captain's log, stardate 25970-point-5. I am nailed to the hull." +-------------------------------------------------------+ | NET: jad(a)dsddhc.com (work) jad(a)pclink.com (home) | | PSTN: 1 612 375 3116 (work) 1 612 894 8507 (home) | | ICBM: 44^58'33"N by 93^16'42"W Elev. ~=290m (work) | | PGP Key ID: 768 / 15FFA875 | +-------------------------------------------------------+

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Limbaugh and "Soul Train"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:20 PM 7/25/96, Paul S. Penrod wrote: >On Wed, 24 Jul 1996 hallam(a)Etna.ai.mit.edu wrote: >> And why did the networks put Rush on so late? Could it be that >> he did not pull in the viewers? > >Syndicated shows are scheduled by the local broadcasters. They decide >when and if to run them. It only makes sense that if you have control >over your material but are at the mercy of the broadcaster, that is not a >sound business position to remain in. As an interesting point of comparison, the program "Soul Train," featuring predominantly black music, has been in syndication for more than 25 years. And it usually aired late at night. (I learned this by watching a "Best of 'Soul Train'" program on VH1. The show's creator and director pointed out that being on at 11 p.m. or 1 a.m. made it tough for many of the show's fans to watch it.) My point? Controversial material is often shoved to the end of a programming schedule. This makes room for the "Wheel of Fortune" and "Adam-12" shows in prime time. I'm obviously not arguing for regulatory intervention in scheduling, for either Limbaugh or "Soul Train," merely noting that shows with strong-but-limited appeal often find themselves playing second fiddle to "The Dating Game." Yes, I think Limbaugh has "limited" appeal. I watched him a few times. Sometimes funny, often controversial. But mostly for "dittoheads." --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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RE: Schelling Points, Rights, and Game Theory--Part II
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If crypto is going to become widespread, at some point it will need to enter the mainstream consciousness. We have already discussed the issue of "getting the word out" about GAK in comparison to video cameras in every home. "If people understood the issue, they would never accept GAK..." The stats on the average internet user are usually something like 85% male, US$50K average income, 30-35 years old, Univeristy education. It may come as no suprise then that Internet users as a group could have life experiences significantly different than a majority of the population. Similarily, their views may also be in the minority. On the other hand, they do hold a majority of the technological power. Revenge of the Nerds is one phrase that I have heard. tcmay(a)got.net wrote: >Even meant humorously (">;-)"), many of us would dispute the notion that >a voluntarily-taken job is a "McJob." Frankly, working at a fast-food place >is usually not a lifetime career, but is instead a [stepping stone] And what or who guarantees that this later, better job exists. Much of what I read today suggests that McJobs may become the norm for many. >>jbugden(a)alis.com >>As soon as those with power are not able to see a situation where they >>could become like those without power, there will cease to be motivation >>to maintain a "safety net" of rights or economic means to protect the >>"losers" of our society. >What are "those without power"? Can you image working at a low paying job for your entire life. I personally can't. I work hard and am doing well for myself. Like most of those here, crypto would be a benefit for me. On the other hand, unlike most of the population, I could join Mensa if I applied. My point: I'm not average and I suspect that neither are you or most of those here. How do you make the cypherpunks agenda (on the days that there is one ;-) of widespread concern to the average citizen? >The best way to help the "losers" of our economy is to allow voluntary >economic relationships to be formed. I always thought that feudalism was a voluntary economic arrangement. The vassals pledged allegiance and offered their labour while the feudal lord pledged protection. Here is where Phil could give better examples. If we are not prepared to maintain some lowest common denominator (a.k.a. safety net), what will keep our individual freedoms intact if the concerns of the "average" citizen drift unchecked towards simple survival? I'm having a hell of a time getting my e-mail read because I'm too busy shooting at the food scavengers. They killed my dog! James

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Freeh Testimony 7/25/96
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is the written testimony of FBI Director Freeh before the Senate Commerce Committee on S 1726, the Pro-Code legislation. Freeh called for the adoption of an universal key escrow system that would facilitate law enforcement access.Several Senators were critical of Freeh's testimony and asked why he and the other panelists believed that savy criminals would use escrowed encryption. Others questioned the possibility to any kind of world wide agreement could be reached. Director Freeh admitted in responding to one Senator that he would seek legislation to ban non-escrow cryptography if it were not widely adopted. He said, "we are not at the point yet that volutary is not vialble. At that point, we would look at mandatory controls." He also stated that he would also ask for import controls to be imposed "if the country was flooded with foreign robust encryption." A html version of this document is available at http://www.epic.org/crypto/export_controls/freeh.html ------------ U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Office of the Director Washington, D.C 20535 STATEMENT OF LOUIS J. FREEH DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ON JULY 25, 1996 BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION UNITED STATES SENATE REGARDING IMPACT OF ENCRYPTION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee for providing me with this opportunity to discuss with you an issue of extreme importance and of great concern to all of law enforcement, both domestically and abroad -- the serious threat to public safety posed by the proliferation and use of robust encryption products that do not allow for timely law enforcement access and decryption. First and foremost, the law enforcement community fully supports a balanced encryption policy that satisfies both the commercial needs of industry and law abiding individuals for robust encryption products while at the same time satisfying law enforcement's public safety needs. On the one hand, encryption is extremely beneficial when used legitimately to protect commercially sensitive information and communications. On the other, the potential use of such robust encryption products by a vast array of criminals and terrorists to conceal their criminal communications and information poses an extremely serious and, in my view, unacceptable threat to public safety. Recently, the President of the International Association of Chiefs of Police sent a letter to President Clinton expressing support for a balanced encryption policy that addresses the public safety concerns of law enforcement. Additionally, the National Sheriff's Association enacted a resolution last month also expressing their support for a balanced encryption policy and opposing any legislative efforts that would undercut the adoption of such a balanced policy. Since 1992, when AT&T announced its plan to sell a small, portable telephone device that would provide users with low-cost but robust voice encryption, public policy issues concerning encryption have increasingly has been debated in the United States. Since then, people concerned about privacy, commerce, computer security, law enforcement, national security, and public safety have participated in the dialogue regarding cryptography. On the international front, this past December, the multi-national Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) meeting in Paris, France, convened an Experts Group to draft global cryptography principles, thus reflecting an increased global interest in and concern about the use and availability of encryption that can be used to endanger a nation's public safety and national security. In addition, several Members of Congress have also joined this public discussion by introducing legislation which essentially would remove existing export controls on encryption and which would promote the widespread availability and use of any type of encryption product regardless of the impact on public safety and national security. However, the impact of these bills, should they be enacted, has not been lost on other Members of Congress as reflected in the letters to the sponsors of both Senate encryption bills by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Senators Specter and Kerrey indicated in their letters that they had concerns regarding these bills and expressed the opinion, which I fully endorse, that there is a "... need to balance U.S. economic competitiveness with the need to safeguard national security interests." To that balance, I would also add public safety and effective law enforcement. Without question, the use of strong cryptography is important if the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) is to fulfill its promise. Data must be protected -- both in transit and in storage -- if the GII is to be used for personal communications, financial transactions, medical care, the development of new intellectual property, and a virtually limitless number of other applications. Our support for robust encryption stems from a commitment to protecting privacy and commerce. But we are also mindful of our principal mission responsibilities: protecting America's public safety and national security in the myriad of criminal, terrorist, and espionage cases that confront us every day. Notwithstanding the accepted benefits of encryption, we have long argued that the proliferation of unbreakable encryption -- because of its ability to completely prevent our Nation's law enforcement agencies from understanding seized computer files and intercepted criminal communications which have been encrypted and then being able to promptly act to combat dangerous criminal, terrorist, and espionage activities as well as successfully prosecute them -- would seriously and fundamentally threaten these critical and central public safety interests. The only acceptable answer that serves all of our societal interests is to foster the use of "socially-responsible" encryption products, products that provide robust encryption, but which also permit timely law enforcement and national security access and decryption pursuant to court order or as otherwise authorized by law. Law enforcement is already beginning to encounter the harmful effects of conventional encryption in some of our most important investigations: - In the Aldrich Ames spy case, where Ames was told by his Soviet handlers to encrypt computer file information to them. - In a child pornography case, where one of the subjects used encryption in transmitting obscene and pornographic images of children over the Internet. - In a major drug-trafficking case, where one of the subjects of one of the court-ordered wiretaps used a telephone encryption device which frustrated the surveillance. - Some of the anti-Government Militia groups are now advocating the use of encryption as a means of preventing law enforcement from properly investigating them. It is important to understand, as one can see from the cases I have cited, that conventional encryption not only can prevent electronic surveillance efforts, which in terms of numbers are conducted sparingly, but it also can prevent police officers on a daily basis from conducting basic searches and seizures of computers and files. Without an ability to promptly decrypt encrypted criminal or terrorist communications and computer files, we in the law enforcement community will not be able to effectively investigate or prosecute society's most dangerous felons or, importantly, save lives in kidnappings and in numerous other life and death cases. We simply will not be able to effectively fulfill our mission of protecting the American public. In a very fundamental way, conventional encryption has the effect of upsetting the delicate legal balance of the Fourth Amendment, since when a judge issues a search warrant it will be of no practical value when this type of encryption is encountered. Constitutionally-effective search and seizure law assumes, and the American public fully expects, that with warrant in hand law enforcement officers will be able to quickly act upon seized materials to solve and prevent crimes, and that prosecutors will be able to put understandable evidence before a jury. Conventional encryption virtually destroys this centuries old legal principle. There is now an emerging opinion throughout much of the world that there is only one solution to this national and international public safety threat posed by conventional encryption -- that is, key escrow encryption. Key escrow encryption is not just the only solution; it is, in fact, a very good solution because it effectively balances fundamental societal concerns involving privacy, information security, electronic commerce, public safety, and national security. On the one hand, it permits very strong, unbreakable encryption algorithms to be used, which is essential for the growth of commerce over the GII and for privacy and information security domestically and internationally. On the other hand, it permits law enforcement and national security agencies to protect the American public from the tyranny of crime and terrorism. We believe, as do many others throughout the world, that technology should serve society, not rule it: and that technology should be designed to promote public safety, not defeat it. Key escrow encryption is that beneficial and balanced technological solution. American manufacturers that employ encryption in their hardware and software products are undoubtedly the technology leaders in the world. American industry has the capability of meeting all of society's basic needs, including public safety and national security, and we, as responsible government leaders, should be sending a clear signal to industry encouraging them to do so. Key escrow encryption is "win-win" technology for societies worldwide. I know you agree that it would be irresponsible for the United States, as the world's technology leader, to move towards the adoption of a national policy that would knowingly and consciously unleash on a widespread basis unbreakable, non-key escrow encryption products that put citizens in the U.S. and worldwide at risk. Unfortunately, in recent months, the nearly exclusive focus of the public discussion concerning the encryption issue has been on its commercial aspects, particularly with regard to removing export controls. This narrow focus ignores the very real threat that conventional, non-key escrow encryption poses both domestically and internationally to public safety. We continue actively to seek industry's cooperation, assistance, and great expertise in producing key escrow encryption products as a critical part of an overall, balanced, and comprehensive encryption policy that would logically include an appropriate relaxation of export controls for key escrow products. As for export controls, we have had ongoing discussions with industry, and industry has articulated the view that export controls needlessly hurt U.S. competitiveness overseas. But once again we need to carefully consider the facts and balance a number of competing interests. Although some strong encryption products can be found overseas, they are simply not ubiquitous, and, as of yet, they have not become embedded in the basic operating systems and applications found overseas. Importantly, when the U.S. recently let it be known that it was considering allowing the export of encryption stronger than that now permitted, several of our close allies expressed strong concerns that we would be flooding the global market with unbreakable cryptography, increasing the likelihood of its use by criminal organizations and terrorists throughout Europe and the world, and thereby imperiling the public safety in their countries. Ironically, the relaxation of export controls in the U.S. may well lead to the imposition of import controls overseas. The international implications and likely reactions of foreign governments to the U.S. unilaterally lifting such export controls must be fully considered. Given the fact that the use and availability of robust encryption is an issue of concern internationally, it is important to understand what steps other countries are taking to address these concerns. Recently, France, Russia and Israel have established domestic restrictions on the import, manufacturer, sale and use of encryption products, as not to endanger their public safety and national security. The European Union is moving towards the adoption of a key recovery-based key management infrastructure similar to that proposed for use within the United States. This plan, based upon the concept of using a "Trusted Third Party," allows for encryption keys to be escrowed with an independent but non-governmental party, thus allowing for lawful government access to such escrowed key pursuant to proper legal authority. Lastly, we have heard the oft-repeated argument that the "genie is out of the bottle," and that attempts to influence the future use of cryptography are futile. This is simply not true; and we strongly disagree. If strong, key escrow encryption products proliferates both overseas and domestically which will not interoperate (at least in the long-term) with non-key escrow products, then escrowed encryption products will become the worldwide standard and will be used by almost everyone, including the criminal elements, in countries participating in the GII. It is worth noting that we have never contended that a key escrow regime, whether voluntarily or mandatorily implemented, would prevent all criminals from obtaining non-key escrowed encryption products. But even criminals need to communicate with others nationally and internationally, including not just their criminal confederates but also legitimate organizations such as banks. Accessible, key escrow encryption products clearly will be used by most if widely available, inexpensive, easy to use, and interoperable worldwide. In closing, if one considers the broad range of public safety responsibilities that fall upon the law enforcement community, there is only one responsible course of action that we as government leaders must embark upon -- to promote socially#031#responsible encryption products, products that contain robust cryptography but which also provide for timely law enforcement access and decryption -- that is, key escrow encryption. The entire law enforcement community believes not only that the removal of export controls for encryption products that are non#031#law enforcement accessible is unwise, but that such an action would jeopardize our national security and the interests and safety of law-abiding citizens worldwide. We look forward to working with you and your staff on this difficult issue and would be pleased to answer any questions you might have. _________________________________________________________________________ Subject: Freeh Testimony 7/25/96 _________________________________________________________________________ David Banisar (Banisar(a)epic.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * HTTP://www.epic.org Washington, DC 20003 * ftp/gopher/wais cpsr.org

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Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- Game theory:)
by eli+＠gs160.sp.cs.cmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal Finney writes: >I think the best way to approach this problem is to first try to solve >it assuming there are only two robbers rather than 20. Right. Of course, you're implicitly assuming not only that this bunch of bank robbers is rational, but that they're familiar with mathematical induction. :-> -- Eli Brandt eli+(a)cs.cmu.edu

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Re: Produce 7 Hertz Frequency
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, On Thu, 25 Jul 1996, Jerome Tan wrote: > Does anyone know how to produce a 7 hertz frequency? No, but hum a few bars and we'll fake it. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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www.anonymizer.com
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I had occasion to try www.anonymizer.com recently, and noticed that it does not make SSL connections to other Web servers, nor does it seem to accept them from the user. Is there some technical reason for this? If I wish to grep the Web without my browsing habits becoming known to someone monitoring my Net connection, https://www.anonymizer.com with 128 bit encryption would probably be a good thing to connect to. I realize that the anonymizer does perform its stated function quite nicely, namely that of preventing Web sites from collecting information on people who visit them. It just seems that this additional functionality would be useful and not particularly difficult to implement. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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INTERESTING ADS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Today while thumbing through POLICE CHIEF magazine, I saw some ads that have at least peripheral Cypherpunk interest. Two were for mobile communications software/hardware. One even had a Web page (though when I browsed it with lynx, there wasn't anything to see). Both give direct access to NCIC, NLETS, motor vehicle records, local police databases, etc. They both make a point of saying they offer encrypted links. In the words of one, "And unlike conventional radio communications, all transmissions are totally secure and unavailable to eavesdropping perpetrators AND INQUIRING REPORTERS." (My emphasis added.) Cerulean http://www.cerulean.com 508-460-4000 Premier MDT 800-966-7722 for brochure and free demo disk. ^^^^^^^^^ The other ad was for computerized polygraph equipment. It looks like a laptop with input units for respiration, galvanic skin response and blood pressure. It uses something called the "Johns Hopkins Polyscore Analysis Algorithm. US$5,700. Axciton Systems 800-460-2645 S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Anonymous Web Services Inc.
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Assuming your excerpt is accurate, it's either a bad joke, a scam on dumb users (possibly by equally dumb operators) or a sting. My $.02 worth. (Hey, imagine a day when eca$h for two cents is posted with a comment like that?) Rob On 26 Jul 96 at 0:17, J. Kent Hastings wrote: > Cpunx, ecashers, and others: > > Oh joy, these guys are good publicity for our side. :^( > Arghh!!! > > http://www.angelfire.com/pg1/digicrime/index.html > > Anonymous Web Services Inc. --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Twenty Bank Robbers -- Game theory:)
by Steve Reid 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Twenty cypherpunks robbed a bank. They took 20 million bucks. Here's > how they plan to split the money: they stay in line, and the first guy > suggests how to split the money. Then they vote on his suggestion. If > 50% or more vote for his proposal, his suggestion is adopted. > Otherwise they kill the first robber and now it is the turn of guy #2 > to make another splitting proposal. Same voting rules apply. I don't know the final outcome, but I do have a couple of observations... - The person at the front of the line, making the suggestion, will always vote for his own proposal, if only to save his own life. This is obvious. - The second-to-last person is in an interesting position. If everyone before him is dead and he gets to the front of the line, he will decide that he gets _all_ of the money for himself. If there's only two people left, his own Yes vote for his own proposal makes 50% and he automatically gets all the money. This is the best possible deal for him. So, I think the second-to-last person will vote No to every proposal except his own, in an effort to force this situation. Now that I think about it, solving this 'game theory' scenario has some parallels to cryptanalysis (disclaimer: I am not a cryptanalyst). By pointing out the above properties, I've removed a couple of 'bits' from the 'search space'. ===================================================================== | Steve Reid - SysAdmin & Pres, EDM Web (http://www.edmweb.com/) | | Email: steve(a)edmweb.com Home Page: http://www.edmweb.com/steve/ | | PGP (2048/9F317269) Fingerprint: 11C89D1CD67287E68C09EC52443F8830 | | -- Disclaimer: JMHO, YMMV, TANSTAAFL, IANAL. -- | ===================================================================:)

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Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- CLARIFICATION
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: ichudov(a)algebra.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Thu Jul 25 20:12:45 1996 > > I forgot to say what the GOALS are. The goals of every individual > cypherpunk are (in from highest to lowest priority): > > 1. Stay alive > 2. Get as much money as possible > 3. Keep as many cypherpunks alive as possible, all other things being > equal. Well, the existence of "3" changes the problem entirely, as does a system of prioritization. Under these rules, Robber 1 would propose an even split, eleven ways, and it would probably be accepted. That keeps a majority alive, and a majority get some money (~2M each). Without that, I'd tend to concur with the other answers (19 & 20 each get $10M). If we have to actually give a damn about each other... :) dave - ---- David E. Smith POB 324 Cape Girardeau MO USA 63702 dsmith(a)prairienet.org http://www.prairienet.org/~dsmith send mail of 'send pgp-key' subject for my PGP public key "I'm only a social smoker, just a few packs a day really" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Automagically signed with Pronto Secure for Windows. iQEVAwUBMfgbozVTwUKWHSsJAQE+jQf+OwCOcoyX9nyMO1ihLr/Jzzqr4c+FXDLl xWsAGKtr9Qr7afzCxeYRMjN5w5wGhSpXcNLa9oXgPlGRV0L2tH9vPvLifHWzzv7K nvOQIC8mBK6O7rbHY8koD6E32D1BQE6SiTRVo3b3L7HOceCIxeT40RvEQfhDKj7B RFaWehB4s1Aw1IdMh2rnIFpwY/vLDRx8/q8vXy6mAugOJmAvdoaeGQfbrKLIWSE0 D3X8F3O7fjQ3dda9oEE3xVhsJoRwuQ/Hcbk2eqrIomeLWSqeQO/OQl/vNHkNMAmX MrkdHNYlXZRhtwHS3mKfcli+iekFLKzXRpyhurUN8g3Ni14Q8I6BSQ== =eaX7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: CD Prices and Inflation
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:14 AM 7/26/96, jim bell wrote: >At 05:06 AM 7/26/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >>So, while I "wish" CD prices were even lower, I'm paying a lot less in >>"real dollars" for more music today than I was paying 15 years ago or 30 >>years ago. > >I think you're trying to hide a 5-year effect by immersing it in 30 years of >change. Yes, we've had inflation, but the large spurt of post-Vietnam >inflation was basically over by about 1983, when the CD was introduced. At No, I'm not "trying" to hide anything. What I said is what I meant: CDs today offer more music/dollar than LPs did in 1967. And, in 1975. And, in 1983. (In 1983 I bought my last "audiophile" LP, a direct-to-disk half-speed-mastered album that cost me something like $12.) The complaint that CD prices have not fallen faster than some would like, since 1983, is a different kettle of fish from what my point was, that CD prices in 1983 or in 1996 are a better "deal" than LPs were in the period I described. As for prices not dropping, if customers stopped buying, prices would drop very rapidly. That they are not, and that "mega-stores" are sprouting up all over place tells us that CD sales are exploding. Finally, and most convincingly, nothing in U.S. law prevents Jim Bell or anyone else from setting up his own CD company and undercutting the prices of the Biggies. Hey, if you think you can supply CDs to customers for a lot less money, go for it! --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Cyber Rights Non! -- French Net-Censorship
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Thu, 25 Jul 1996 20:38:22 -0500 To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu From: declan(a)well.com (Declan McCullagh) Subject: FC: Cyber Rights Non! -- French Net-Censorship Sender: owner-fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Attached is a portion of the lead article from today's HotWired on the French government's net-censorship. I'm pleased to say I just received word from a French correspondent that the French "Conseil Constitutionnel" has blocked the part of the law creating "Le Conseil SupÈrieur de la TÈlÈmatique" to decide what should be blocked online. (From what I've been able to gather, that court reviews laws to ensure they're constitutional. On June 27, the Conseil heard arguments from senators that the law violated articles of the French constitution.) I have more on other international net-censorship attempts at: http://www.eff.org/pub/Global/Dispatches/ http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~declan/international/ -Declan ----------------------------------- Read the full article at: http://www.netizen.com/netizen/ HotWired The Netizen Cyber Rights Non! by Jerome Thorel Paris, 24 July Early last month, at a time of day when typical netsurfers are just hitting their mouse-clicking stride - around 3:30 in the morning - the French Senate voted on the final version of the new Telecommunications Regulation Act. A little-remarked section of the act, introduced as an amendment a few days before, represents the French legislature's first plunge into the digital ocean. It creates a kind of administrative oversight of Internet speech, Web sites, and online services. The law's effect is to create a council - le Conseil SupÈrieur de la TÈlÈmatique (CST) - to dictate or arbitrate guidelines regarding Internet content. It turned out, however, that the move by Telecommunications Minister FranÁois Fillon, sponsor of the French Telecom Act, was a little hasty. France had been shaken this spring by two investigations into pedophilia and Holocaust revisionism (both considered crimes in France) on the Internet. For months, Fillon had promised French Internet service providers that they would no longer bear responsibility for the content they transmit. The law does settle that question. But no one imagined that this guarantee would include as its condition the creation of the CST. To be safe from indictment, ISPs will be obliged to follow CST's guidelines - a policy typical of France's strong tradition of centralized administration. [...] The French Net-regulation bill became law on 7 June - the same week that US federal judges declared the Communications Decency Act unconstitutional.... [...] Jerome Thorel, a Paris-based freelance reporter, writes frequently about technology and society. Andy Oram, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, contributed to this article. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- fight-censorship is archived at http://fight-censorship.dementia.org/top/

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Re: Produce 7 Hertz Frequency
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:18 PM 7/25/96 +0800, Jerome Tan wrote: >Does anyone know how to produce a 7 hertz frequency? Find an establishment that deals in peircing equiptment. Ask him to give you a "Prince Albert". This will give you the tone you seek. (You will also never lose your carkeys again.) You may need a tesla coil for repeated tones. Enjoy! --- |"Computers are Voodoo -- You just have to know where to stick the pins."| |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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Princeton University muzzles students
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Thu, 25 Jul 1996 20:33:38 -0500 To: fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu From: declan(a)well.com (Declan McCullagh) Subject: Princeton University muzzles students, from HotWired Sender: owner-fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Kudos to Brock for writing about Princeton University's attempt to muzzle student online speech -- by citing IRS regulations. Sure, Princeton isn't bound by First Amendment strictures since it's not a state university and there is no state action. Nevertheless, it should abide by the fundamental and long-standing principles of academic freedom. Especially as a supposedly leading institution of higher education, Princeton should stand head and shoulders above the rest in fighting for free expression on its campus. To its shame, it didn't. The university attorneys should have at least read the two relevant IRS revenue rulings (they didn't) before announcing such a restrictive policy. And this isn't the first overbroad censorial policy that Princeton has on the books. Carl Kadie comments on another one at: gopher://gopher.eff.org:70/00/CAF/policies/princeton.edu.critique The Justice on Campus Project (http://joc.mit.edu/) has similar info. When Princeton administrators claimed they followed the letter of the law, in truth they used the law as an excuse to muzzle their students. -Declan ----------------- Read the full article at: http://www.netizen.com/netizen/96/30/campaign_dispatch3a.html HotWired The Netizen Poison Ivy Campaign Dispatch by Brock N. Meeks Washington, DC, 24 July Princeton University is apparently prohibiting students from exercising their First Amendment rights by going after folks who set up Web pages in support of presidential candidates, Dispatch has learned. Princeton launched its preemptory strike against free speech on 19 July in a statement issued by its general counsel's office, which warns that a violation of the school's policy against politicking "will result in appropriate disciplinary action." [...] Small problem: the IRS disagrees. Although there is no direct IRS ruling involving the use of a university's computer resources by its faculty, staff, or students to set up political Web pages, agency spokesman Wilson Fadely said there are two previous rulings "that may apply." The first deals with a student newspaper that directly endorsed one candidate for office over another. Despite the fact that the newspaper was published with university resources, "that was deemed not to be intervention," Fadely said. [...] So where does Princeton get off riding its tax-exempt hobby horse as a de facto means to trample free speech? "No comment at this time," said Howard Ende, a Princeton attorney and co-author of the 19 July statement. When informed of the IRS rulings, Ende's reply was an enigmatic, "Oh, really." [...] The one saving grace of the scenario is the perverse pleasure one can take in realizing that an elitist Ivy League school is so anal-retentive that it makes the IRS look reasonable. Go figure....

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IP: NSA RESPONSE TO KEY LENGTH REPORT
by farber＠central.cis.upenn.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960718184201.0070667c(a)linc.cis.upenn.edu> Date: Thu, 18 Jul 1996 12:04:27 -0400 From: Matt Blaze <mab(a)research.att.com> July 18, 1996 There is currently being circulated, to members of Congress and possibly elsewhere, a four page document entitled ``Brute-Force Cryptanalytic Attacks'' that calls into question some of the conclusions of the ``Minimum Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers'' white paper [1]. The document bears no author or organization attribution, but we are told that it originated from NSA. The NSA document argues that ``physical realities'' make parallel key search much more expensive and time consuming than our white paper estimated. However, the NSA document appears to have been written from the perspective of general parallel processing or cryptanalysis rather than exhaustive key search per se. It ignores several elementary principles of parallel processing that apply specifically to exhaustive key search machines of the type that our white paper considered. In particular, NSA argues that interconnections, heat dissipation, input/output bandwidth, and interprocessor communication make it difficult to ``scale up'' a key search machine by dividing the task among a large number of small components. While these factors do limit the scalability of more general purpose multiprocessor computers (such as those made by Cray), they do not apply at all to specialized exhaustive key search machines. The NSA argument ignores the most fundamental feature of brute-force key search: the processors performing the search have no need to communicate with other components of the system while they perform their share of the search, and therefore the system has no need for any of the global interconnections that limit scaling. Indeed, there is no reason that all the components of a parallel search machine must be located even within the same city, let alone the same computer housing. We note that one of our co-authors (Eric Thompson, of Access Data, Inc.) designs and builds medium-scale FPGA-based key search machines with exactly this loosely-coupled structure, and regularly uses them to recover keys for clients that include the FBI. The NSA document also calls into question our cost estimates for ASIC components, suggesting that ASIC chips of this type cost NSA approximately $1000.00 each. However, our $10.00 per chip estimate is based on an actual price quote from a commercial chip fabrication vendor for a moderate-size order for an exhaustive search ASIC designed in 1993 by Michael Wiener [2]. Perhaps NSA could reduce its own costs by changing vendors. Finally, the NSA report offers estimates of the time required to perform exhaustive search using a Cray model T3D supercomputer. This is a curious choice, for as our report notes, general-purpose supercomputers of this type make poor (and uneconomical) key search engines. However, even the artificially low performance results for this machine should give little comfort to the users of 56 bit keys. According to NSA, 56 bit keys can be searched on such a machine in less than 453 days. ``Moore's law'' predicts that it will not be long before relatively inexpensive general-purpose computers offer similar computational capability. /s/ Matt Blaze Whitfield Diffie References: [1] Blaze, M., Diffie, W., Rivest, R., Schneier, B., Shimomura, T., Thompson, E., and Wiener, M. ``Minimum Key Lengths for Symmetric Key Ciphers for Commercial Security.'' January 1996. Available from ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/keylength.txt [2] Wiener, M. ``Exhaustive DES Key Search.'' Presented at Crypto-93, Santa Barbara, CA. August 1993. ========================================================================= [Transcription of document circulated to various members of congress and others in June, 1996, apparently by NSA] BRUTE-FORCE CRYPTANALYTIC ATTACKS Two published theoretical estimates of cost versus time to perform brute-force hardware attacks on selected cryptography key lengths differ between themselves and differ significantly from what we find when we buy or build computers to carry out such attacks. The differences lie in assumptions made in the theoretical estimates, which are not fully spelled out by the authors, and in scaling up hypothesized small machines to ever larger ones without accounting for physical realities. The factors not accounted for are: o R&D costs for the first machine, typically on the order of $10 million. o As more and more chips are added to a machine, two effects occur: o Interconnections increase and increase running time; o Heat from the chips eventually limit [sic] the size of a machine. o Memory costs are not included. o When get [sic] to the very fast processing speed estimates, machines can become Input/Output bound; so [sic] it cannot achieve the estimated speed. o Assuming every algorithm can be tested in same amount of time and key length is the only difference. Table 1 are [sic] the average time estimates made for a given cost done by Michael Wiener of Bell Norther Research in 1995. These are published in Bruce Schneier's Applied Cryptography book. Note that these are average times, one-half of the total exhaust time. Table 2 are [sic] the estimates for total exhaust times using Field Programmmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) and Application Specific ICs (ASICs) done for the Business Software Alliance by Blaze, Diffie, Rivest, Schneier, Shimomura, Thompson, and Wiener in 1996. In addition to the above factors not accounted for they have assumed ASICs cost as low as $10. We find ASICs more typically cost $1000 and their capabilities can vary considerably depending upon the specific task. Table 3 are out estimates based on our experience with a Cray T3D supercomputer with 1024 nodes. This machine costs $30 million. [Tables 1, 2, and 3 not transcribed here.]

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Fireworks expected, missed at Senate crypto hearing
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Thu, 25 Jul 1996 21:05:31 -0500 To: fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu From: declan(a)well.com (Declan McCullagh) Subject: Fireworks expected, missed at Senate crypto hearing Sender: owner-fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Contrary to the Reuters report excerpted below, there weren't any fireworks at today's ProCODE crypto hearing before the full Senate Commerce committee -- at least during the first panel when the spooks testified. (I skipped out before the second, which had industry folks.) Just more of the same, though we heard less about child pornographers and more about terrorists. And Sen. Slate Gorton (R-Wash) jumped on the committee staff for leaning too far *away* from national security interests in their summary of the legislation. Most amusing point: Sen. Larry Pressler waved a copy of the floppy with the _Applied Cryptography_ source and couldn't remember what it was called. "Um, I can't export, um, this, um," he mumbled. "Cassette," he decided it was. (Even his committee staffers smirked at that.) The FBI's Louis Freeh kept mouthing the same tired old line: "No reasonable person can envision a lawless information superhighway. It was never meant to be that. We need cops there, as we need them elsewhere. The problem is the proliferation of unbreakable encryption." He said it's "not too late" to stop the spread. After the first panel ended, a gaggle of a half-dozen camera crews waylaid Freeh in the hallway outside. The FBI director fled down the stairs. The crews split into teams. Half took the elevator and half pursued on foot. Downstairs, Freeh shot through the security checkpoint into the safety of a waiting Chevy Suburban. Why were they dogging the guy? They didn't care about crypto -- they wanted a comment about the TWA flight, and Freeh wasn't talking. He didnt' mention it at all during the hearing... -Declan -------------------- Fireworks Expected at Encryption Hearing July 25, 1996 WASHINGTON (Reuter) - After sailing through two quiet subcommittee hearings, a bill to relax restrictions on computer encoding faces a much choppier ride before the full Senate Commerce Committee on Thursday. The committee will hear from some of the Clinton administration's big guns on crime and national security, including FBI Director Louis Freeh and William Crowell, deputy director of the National Security Agency. Software manufacturers and some in Congress argued at earlier hearings that current export restrictions on encryption programs -- which code and decode information -- cost American companies billions in lost sales overseas. [...] Senate bill 1726, the Promotion of Commerce Online in the Digital Era Act of 1996, would abolish most export restrictions and prohibit mandatory key escrow. Vice President Al Gore told reporters at a press conference July 12 that the proposal, known as the ``pro-code'' bill, is ``unacceptable.'' [...] Clinton administration officials have said they favor less radical reform. Officials are expected to reject the conclusions of a study released in May by the National Research Council. The council concluded that encryption export restrictions should be relaxed and rejected key escrow as unworkable. [...]

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Re: Fireworks expected, missed at Senate crypto hearing
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:19 PM 7/25/96 -0500, Declan McCullagh wrote: >Just more of the same, though we heard less about child pornographers and >more about terrorists. And Sen. Slate Gorton (R-Wash) jumped on the >committee staff for leaning too far *away* from national security interests >in their summary of the legislation. What does that mean? As opposed to what? (Gorton's my Senator, and I'm going to give a little feedback to his local office...) >The FBI's Louis Freeh kept mouthing the same tired old line: "No reasonable >person can envision a lawless information superhighway." I guess that makes me an unreasonable person! > "It was never meant to be that." Well, that's just the problem...for _him_! Sometimes actions lead to hard-to-predict outcomes. >We need cops there, as we need them elsewhere. The problem is >the proliferation of unbreakable encryption." He said it's "not too late" >to stop the spread. Wishful thinking! Not only is it too late now, it was too late with Clipper I was proposed. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Produce 7 Hertz Frequency
by Paul S. Penrod 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 25 Jul 1996, Jerome Tan wrote: > Does anyone know how to produce a 7 hertz frequency? > > Well, you can pick up most any project book that deals with 555 IC timers and there is some kind of circuit there dealing with frequency counting or generating. The question really is how strong a signal do you want ? ...Paul

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