December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: brokers as middlemen
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:48 PM 7/15/96, L. Detweiler wrote: >this reminds me of something else. the stock exchange as it now stands >is not the paradigm of true capitalism as some would have others >believe. in fact I see it as the paradigm of what might be called >"middleman capitalism", a version of capitalism that is rapidly >diminishing and disappearing in the onslaught of the information age. > >essentially, in the new version of capitalism, middlemen who do not >*add*value* to the delivery of a product are going to be increasingly >cut out of the loop. I am not saying *all* middlemen will be cut out, >but many that now exist will be. I agree with Vlad/Larry's points, and this is in one of the other recommendations for the NASDAQ, that it be even further electronic-mediated, with more information made available on bid/ask spreads. The rise of discount brokers, who provide essentially no advice to customers, is part of this "disintermediation." Ditto for electronic trading systems, such as Accu-Trade. >in my opinion, the *stock*broker* as his job is now defined is in many >ways the classic middleman that does not necessarily add value to the >information that flows through his hands. if he is just an agent for >carrying out the demands of clients, then I'd say that this role is >going to disappear as markets become more automated, or rather capital >moves toward stock exchanges that diminish this overhead. however, there >are many brokers that add far many more services than mere >blind investor response, such as analyzing company profitability, >forecasting, etc-- these are adding value imho. Agreed, and this is already happening. >I think the end result of the information age is going to be something >that could be regarded as the ultimate capitalist market-- something >that eliminates all "unnecessary" middlemen. I suspect the stock exchanges >of the future will *not* be regulated because they *cannot* be. it >will be a matter of buyers and sellers choosing the systems that >best suit them regardless of what governments feel is appropriate, fair, >or whatever. I emphatically agree! There is little need for regulation in this new environment, and "reputations matter." And regulation is becoming problematic. (To cite one example. Some are calling for registration and regulation of "investment advice," which is largely unregulated in the U.S. today. That is, I can self-publish a newsletter, "Tim's Stock Picks," and the First Amendment says this can't be restricted (Caveat: But I can't sell "Tim's Legal Advice," "Tim's Earthquake Safety Advice," or "Tim's Medical Advice" to clients...go figure). Some want investment newsletter writers "held accountable." Great, so I'll move my newsletter to Anguilla or Monaco. What do they do then? Stop U.S. subscribers from getting them? Set up postal stings, where illegal investment or medical advice is treated as illegal child porn from Denmark? Use key escrow to monitor received Net traffic?) >its interesting how the restrictions on stock buying and selling are >becoming quite orwellian in the way they are designed to limit >mere information transfer in many cases, it seems. TCM has written >about this far better than I could in previous posts. ("inside trading" >restrictions). Again, I agree. I won't quote anymore of Vlad/Larry's piece, as I agree with it all. (Vznuri should probably "reclaim" his Detweiler personna, so that such good messages as these accrue to his True Name's reputation.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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d.Comm: Your Login Information
by hotlists＠d-comm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thank you for logging into d.Comm. At d.Comm we believe a key part of any successful product, magazine or other, is a comprehensive knowledge of the market; in our case our readers. The information you provide us with not only helps us to fine-tune the magazine, but also enables you to manage your information content, through the hotlist section. We therefore wish to thank you once again for helping us to keep d.Comm dynamic. When your World Wide Web browser prompts you for a login and password use the following: Login: cypherpunks Passwd: 107084 URL: http://www.d-comm.com/ (note: your login is case-sensitive) You may end up back at the login when you try to enter a section of d.Comm that you attempted to enter before you received your username. If this happens, please click the reload button on your Web browser. If you have trouble and need some help, please send mail to: hotlists(a)d-comm.com Note: If you wish to change your allotted password, Password management is available at : http://www.d-comm.com/s-bin/hl_passwd If for any reason you encounter any problems, please do not hesitate to contact us. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Eddie Hold Editor d.Comm & Communicate The Economist Group http://www.d-comm.com/

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Re: Markoff on Clipper III
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:20 AM 7/15/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote: >At 3:50 AM -0700 7/15/96, Duncan Frissell wrote: >>At 09:35 PM 7/14/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote: >> >>>Did you miss the part in the Constitution about "provide for the common >>>defence" >> >>That's a meaningless part of the Preamble. > >Anyone who thinks substantive parts of the Preamble are "meaningless" is >deserving only of contumely. Perhaps you should review your high school >civics course--you did have one of those, yes? > >David > Welcome to the list. Yes my high school Civics class was good. So were my law school Con Law courses. Yes, David I would say you practice "contumely" -- Rudeness or contempt arising from arrogance; insolence. But then so do I. I'll say again, the Preamble speaks of the reasons the drafters of the Constitution had for writing the thing, it does not set forth any powers of the federal government. Goals not means. GAK is a means not a goal. DCF

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Re: CookieScan 0.0 rev 0
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:34 PM 7/15/96 -0800, Chris Hull wrote: >Do y¹all think there might be an interest in a >utility which would allow the user to deal with >browser cookies? There might, but it's a difficult problem, and implementation-dependent and doesn't always tell you much. While your browser may store cookies in a disk file to use between sessions, by the time the cookie gets filed on disk, it's long since cooled down and may have been written over multiple times. The interesting time to detect cookies is when they arrive - this means either watching the network data stream for cookies (non-portable, unless you use a cookie-proxy, which is the obvious way to implement it), or else grubbing around in the browser's memory (highly non-portable, unless you're modifying the browser source.) The "doesn't always tell you much" is because cookies often seem to contain encrypted or hashed data that isn't meaningful to the browser-user, only to the cookie-originators. The cute trick you can do with cookies, which is probably used by advertising sites such as doubleclick.com, is for the web page owner to include an IMG which is an href to a CGI program at a cookie company. The CGI program is able to look at the HTTP_REFERER variable, which tells what page you were last on, and can therefore create or use cookie information that tracks where you've been between companies (e.g. Alice can contract with Cookies Inc. to tell if you've been to Bob's site recently, if Bob also uses Cookies Inc.) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Re-delegate Authority!

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Re: How I Would Ban Strong Crypto in the U.S.
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:58 AM 7/15/96 -0400, Raph Levien wrote: >4. Thus, the best leverage for the TLAs to win is to guide the >development of a key management infrastructure with the following >property: if you don't register your key, you can't play. I believe that >this is the true meaning of the word "voluntary:" you're free to make >the choice not to participate. > >5. This is _important_. If you can't get the keys for your >correspondents, you can't use encryption. If they build a key management >infrastructure that actually works, people will use it. The obvious counter is to use the key management infrastructure for authentication, but use a technique like Diffie-Hellman to decide on a session key. I see two problems with this approach: (1) It still allows traffic analysis. (2) It will be difficult to implement for one-way transmissions (e.g. email). A more complex structure would overcome (2) above. Use you GAK key to sign your PGP key. Post your PGP key on the MIT server (or successors), and people who want non-GAKed communication with you would use your PGP key, with the benefit of government approved authentication. I still think this whole GAK thing is going to fail on the, "Which government?" question. I don't see either multi-nationals or their governments wanting to share their secrets with each other, and I don't see how to set up universal GAK to prevent that form of industrial espionage. Also, the key which decodes the GAKed data is just too valuable and too easy to steal. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The Internet may fairly be | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | regarded as a never-ending | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | worldwide conversation. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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WashPost: A "hate speech" horseman of a different color
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Search July 15th www.washingtonpost.com for "massive armamentarium" [sic]. With Innovative Use, the Web Empowers the First Amendment By John Schwartz Washington Post Staff Writer Monday, July 15 1996; Page F19 The Washington Post [...] Lately, though, I've gotten a nice, big dose of hope from watching hatemongers on the Net as they duke it out with the truth-squaders. In any intellectual combat, those who can support their arguments with facts are better armed. And guess what? The Internet gives us a new kind of arsenal. That might go against what you've been reading. A lot of journalists are discovering "hate speech" on the Internet -- racism, antisemitism, the whole vile package. It's the cover story for the current issue of Emerge, with the arresting image of a mouse cord tied in a noose. Such groups as the Simon Wiesenthal Center in California try to persuade publications to run stories on this loathsome trend, and they urge governments to drive those who spread messages of hate off the Net. [...] The on-line guest book at Nizkor is an evolving testament to the power of free speech. One visitor wrote: "As the child of survivors of the Holocaust I am particularly dismayed when intelligent and reasonable people are influenced by revisionist pap. I'm often frustrated to the point where I'd sooner tolerate censorship than the promulgation of neo-Nazi lies. Your work restores my faith in reasoned debate and the drive of honest people to find and spread the truth." Memo to the Founders: Thanks, guys. You got it right. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMeqQV5NcNyVVy0jxAQF8vAIAlGyi91nOxj1qhRN7GPXcChO9FOraJSc1 h/WyEC01HJj/W5uj51AxZbJIHjkz/eCcMb2AmjclfGeKIThrsSoY9A== =Olej -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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re: Organized Crime Home Page - Four Horsemen, No Waiting
by Charley Sparks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Well, with the UCMJ ( Uniform Code of Military Justice ) and the Oath >of Allegiance Military Personnel take on induction being re-written >to Support and defend the United Nations and to accept direct and >lawful orders from UN personnel, this doesn't surprise me.Soon, UN >Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, or someone like him will >repeal more of the amendments to our constitution. First our guns, >then our code. > >I'll give up my pass phrase when > they pry it from my cold dead fingers ! Charley Sparks Booz Allen & Hamilton http://www.clark.net/pub/charley/index.htm Public Key Available

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Someone can't read
by Charley Sparks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- So, I'm a member of something anyway... could be worse... I could be a politician... being a geek, at least requires "some" brains !! {Snip snip } > >As I recall the NRC members in DC said, in *EXPLICITLY* rejecting >the "If only you know what we know..." mantra, that if there was >something the [NRC] did not know, it wasn't cuz that had not asked >everyone involved. (Or words to that effect) > >So it appears the Admin was withholding data from the Congress.... > > I have here in front of me, documented proof that there > are crypto-carrying members of the Cypherpunk Party... > > >-- >A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz(a)nrk.com >& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX >Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 >is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCXAwUBMeq/9+J+JZd/Y4yVAQGmHgQKAmooJ6NLnY3CF08TmYPOYvS9nDIMsYvL cLDC7wGPo1nnWFmGHVgJzalDJgip2gDQZUdt4i96kCy4E4w1epJxerVkJW0b2edY BF8HaZGLRlqDGNQIJwl+18gupV0g9DuchSiNgG5hodxrS8n/bLlRPGKeAKabKJY5 jvSyqR+tg6nUpA== =L5pp -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > >

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Re: Markoff on Clipper III
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:30 PM 7/15/96 -0400, Mark M. wrote: >Nowhere in the Constitution does it say that firearms (or crypto in this case) >are a threat to national security. In fact, the second amendment explicitly >dictates that people have the right to own firearms. No, it says "arms," not "firearms." Firearms are a subset of "arms," which a nearby dictionary defines as "objects used as weapons." By that definition, chemicals and biologicals, as well as explosives of all sorts, are "arms." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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(fwd) krypt13i.zip Enkryptonator: Homonymous key encryption system, R. Newton
by frogfarm＠yakko.cs.wmich.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Anyone know more about this one? "Homonymous" in this context sounds a tad oily.] >From: mjk(a)reimari.uwasa.fi (Mika Koykka) Newsgroups: comp.archives.msdos.announce Subject: krypt13i.zip Enkryptonator: Homonymous key encryption system, R. Newton Date: 15 Jul 1996 11:32:39 +0300 Lines: 82 Thank you for your contribution. This upload is now available as 60605 Jul 2 22:10 ftp://garbo.uwasa.fi/pc/crypt/krypt13i.zip : Date: Sun, 14 Jul 1996 15:10:55 -0500 : From: Enkryptonator <enkrypt(a)flash.net> : To: pc-up(a)uwasa.fi : Subject: krypt13i.zip Homonymous key encryption uploaded : : I mailed a previous Email today, but it contained a typo in the file name : uploaded. : this message contains no such typo. : : File name: : KRYPT13i.ZIP : Enkryptonator: Homonymous key encryption system. : Replaces: : KRYPT12.ZIP : Suggested Garbo directory: : crypt : Uploader name & email: : Richard Newton, enkrypt(a)flash.net : Author or author company: : Richard Newton : Email address: : enkrypt(a)flash.net : Surface address: : Box 866292 Plano Tx 75086 USA. : Special requirements: : Developed on MS-DOS 386 platform. : Math co-processor recommended, but not required. : Shareware payment required from private users: : Yes, but not from students. : Shareware payment required from corporates: : Yes. : Distribution limitations: : None : Garbo CD-ROM distribution allowed without extra preconditions: : Yes. : Demo: : No. : Nagware: : No, Displays none of the behavior described in your : instructions. : Self-documenting: : Yes. : External documentation included: : Yes, about 70Kb (unzipped). : Source included: : No. : Size: : 60kb zipped. : 10 lines description: : : Enkryptonator is a newly developed encryption system based on the : principles of homonymous key cryptography invented by Enkryptonator Co. : Homonymous key systems are an exiciting, new breakthrough, that solve : the 'key management' problem without resorting to 'public key' : cryptography. No more unwieldy, impossible to remember, binary keys. : Enkryptonator is easy to use. Because of Enkryptonator's unique design : no one who intercepts your encryption in an unauthorized manner can : decrypt your file -- even if he knows the key of encryption! Everyone : has a right to privacy and Enkryptonator will provide you a means of : securing your personal and private concerns from unwanted intruders. : : Long description: : : This is the 1.3 International Shareware version of Enkryptonator. : The international version will only allow a single key of encryption : in order prevent running a-foul of US export control regulations on : the export of encryption technology. : : Version 1.3 introduces a 5% speed improvement and minor changes in : messaging. Version 1.3 is incompatible with version 1.2 and version : 1.1. These are the only code changes. The most significant reason for : releasing 1.3 is to provide users with more comprehensive and updated : user documentation. ................................................................. Mika Koykka, mjk(a)uwasa.fi http://www.uwasa.fi/~mjk/ Moderating at garbo.uwasa.fi http://garbo.uwasa.fi/ FTP archives Computer Centre, University of Vaasa, Box 700, FIN-65101 Finland -- "Your wish is my command, if you know what's good for you, bitch." - William Shakespeare (Or perhaps it was his brother Fred who said that.)

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Re: Word lists for passphrases
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:33 PM 7/15/96, David Sternlight wrote: >It is pretty easy to defend against dictionary attacks by using an expanded >character set--mixed caps and lower case; numbers substituted for some >letters according to easily-remembered personal rules. > >"Da5id" in "Snow Crash" by Neal Stephenson is an obvious example, since the >"v" is a roman numeral 5. Another is the "Compuserve method" of inserting >punctuation characters between words making up a password or key. Since the >length of the words used is unknown to the cracker, this makes his job >harder. > >That is--a dictionary which accomodates such things as the above will be >pretty large. With the number rule, there would have to be 10 additional >versions of the one-letter word, 10 versions of each leading character >making up a two letter word, and then it starts increasing combinatorially. >Might as well use brute force. In a "universe" of n-character passwords, whatever length n is, the use of English, German, Elvish, Klingon, whatever words can be looked as "galaxies." (That is, clusters in an otherwise uniform space.) Thus, "David" is one of the galaxies, and ""Da5id," "david," "Daphid," etc. are just some of the stars in this galaxy of "nearby" strings. Calculations of entropy and all. Be very careful. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: How I Would Ban Strong Crypto in the U.S.
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 15 Jul 96 at 9:58, Raph Levien wrote: [..] > Thanks to Dave for posting this URL. This is a _very_ important > document, and I would recommend that all concerned cypherpunks read it > carefully. Unlike many of its predecessors, it is clearly written and > quite upfront about the "administration's" goals. >From the document: "This framework will encourage commerce both here and abroad. It is similar to the approach other countries are taking, and will permit nations to establish an internationally interoperable key management infrastructure with rules for access appropriate to each country's needs and consistent with law enforcement agreements. [...]" With differing rules, I can't see how such a system can work. What happens when one country wants the keys from the citizen of another who is 'favored' by the other's government? (ie, say the US gov't wants keys that a drug cartel kingpin uses when he chats with the brother of the president of some other country...) And can one be sure that a country's LEAs request keys because a citizen is involved with 'organized crime', or is really a political activist of the unwanted kind? What's to prevent cooperation of the FBI with foreign LE's (such as in Russia) with looser search-and-seizure rules? Who is going to manage such systems? Private corporations in various countries? Will users have a choice as to which to use? (It would seem the institutions of some countries are less trustworthy than others for different people around the planet.) How many people would trust the UN? (ObHumor: I hear in the year 2000 the Olympics will have black helicopter races...) Global key management, even with universal rules, would seem unworkable. Managing BILLIONS of keys will involve a lot of complexity, in terms of locating keys, data integrity and preservation, authentication, etc. Methinks it's time for the administration to inhale... oxygen is good for the brain. I think the potential of import controls has a bit more hype than the admin makes it out to be. There's already a lot of strong crypto out there... so how much political strong-arming can the Admin do? I wonder how the Microsoft C[r]API fits in to this, since it mentions "export of cryptography-ready operating systems". Rob --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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d.Comm: Your Login Information (fwd)
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

password, limited to 8 characters is "cypherpu" Has anyone set a psuedo-standard for these things? Adam ----- Forwarded message from hotlists(a)d-comm.com ----- Login: cypherpunks Passwd: 107084 URL: http://www.d-comm.com/ Note: If you wish to change your allotted password, Password management is available at : http://www.d-comm.com/s-bin/hl_passwd ----- End of forwarded message from hotlists(a)d-comm.com ----- -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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Re: #E-CASH: PRODUCT OR SERVICE?
by Steven Seyffert 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- : From: bryce(a)digicash.com : To: David G.W. Birch <daveb(a)hyperion.co.uk> : Cc: Multiple recipients of <e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com>; cypherpunks(a)toad.com : Subject: Re: #E-CASH: PRODUCT OR SERVICE? : Date: maandag 15 juli 1996 15:36 : : : -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- : : I think it would behoove us all to clarify our terms. I call : Ecash(tm) coins "electronic cash" for several reasons. Ecash(tm) : has all of the following characteristics in common with : conventional cash, in descending order of importance: : : : 1. Unforgeability. Ecash(tm) coins have intrinsic value : because they are cryptographically impossible to forge. : forgery is possible in 'real life' and is possible in 'virtual life'(another discussion wright there). It all depends on the amount of control and need of insider knowledge to be able to crack a system. The existence of a system is defined by the possibility of a crack. : : : 2. Finality. Payments are cleared on the spot. No outstanding : payment obligations remain after a purchase. : You are from digicash aren't you? Isn't this the dutch experiment on Ecash?(could be wrong there). I've been asking around and it seems digicash is one system whilst it becomes more and more competitors(for example www.digipass.com) The main difference I've heard is the one about argument between customer and bank about the amount of money that was transferred from bank to ecash to the E-store. Digipass seems to be working with a code generator that includes the amount parameter in the algorythm that generates the code that is send back to the bank or whatever. : 3. Bi-directionality. Payers and recipients use the same : software and the same protocol. It is not necessary for : recipients to be specially trusted by the bank or by the payers. : The fact is, I think, that some major battle is going to take place on the grounds of ecash. We're going to have quite a lot of protocols and software used within different conglomerates of company's. Only time will decide with which protocol we are going to buy our pizza's. : 4. Privacy. The privacy of Ecash(tm) payers is mathematically : unconditional. : Just like the privacy of e-mail and the independance of the WWW once was. : 5. Composability. You can make large Ecash(tm) payments out of : a collection of smaller Ecash(tm) coins. This is in contrast to : a check-based system where you typically draw a check for the : exact amount and transfer only a single check. : You're wright, though I always seem to end up with fewer money than I thought I had at the beginning of each month : 6. Small payments. Ecash(tm) coins are cheap enough to use : that they are practical for small payments. : : (As a note, I do not use the word "micropayments" here, because : I am beginning to think that a good technical definition of : "micropayments" is "payments whose value is less than the cost : of using current electronic coins". This qualifies schemes like : Shamir's and disqualifies, well... current electronic coins.) : : : There might be other angles we should talk about here. : : : I think that the first quality is the defining one, technically. : : : So, could a knowledgeable person e.g. Mr. Birch tell us why : Mondex should be considered to be "electronic cash"? : : : And similarly I would like to hear an informed opinion about : why Ecash(tm) should not be considered "electronic cash". : I tend to agree that Ecash(tm) would be even _more_ cashlike : if it were cleared off-line, but I don't consider that : difference very fundamental. (_Any_ digital money based on : our current understandings will have to be cleared at a : central clearer eventually, since digital information is : perfectly copyable.) : : : Thank you for your correspondance. : : : Regards, : : Bryce : : Ecash 2.x Team : : : : -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- : Version: 2.6.2i : Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.1b2 : : iQB1AwUBMepI/UjbHy8sKZitAQEiJwL/VnpQEHL1rOQ6Hm9JIEgAfCGjSKOPaIiC : Jp7EVjvPoFYEsQAS4iUWybNLpxi/23uaqpXMCSNMrEwqd8WeC5ZSISldIEK/BnYE : 2bULeAeMhIqm92bP6o64ok1NBGPfvK5X : =ANO4 : -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Hardware RNG
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Got a geiger counter plugged into the game port Cool. As other people have noted, the game port may do timing things that can degrade the quality of your random numbers a bit, so don't use too many bits per sample unless you really understand its behaviour. > Weak radioactive source next to it (dont worry wont fry you) > Use a PRNG string to do create an RC4 S-box > Cycle through the S-box in a tight loop, each time checking to >see if the geiger counter got a hit, if it did, record that number in >the S-box as our first byte, do this 100 times, and we have 100 random >numbers. Other people have also commented that this is bad, unless you can show that the math behind it works well and usefully. >any thoughts? It seems to work well, no basic stat analysis reveals any >pattern, and physicists have backed me up on radioactive decay being >'the great randomizer'. The real randomness you have is from the radioactive decay intervals, plus or minus any gain from the game port hardware. No need to muck that up with RC4, especially in ways that may add predictability. Be very careful with statistics - if something's grossly skewed, the usual tests will pick it up, but they can't tell if there's a mathematical way for somebody who knows data point N to predict point N+1. If you look at the output of your geiger counter system, you'll probably see a roughly exponential distribution of time intervals between hits (which is the result of uniformly distributed events like radioactivity) modified a bit by your game port behavior (e.g. the times may all be multiples of 1ms or 17ms.) You can extract decent random bits from this by inverting the distribution; if you want really high quality randoms, at lower resolution, you can do something like pick two samples and return 0 or 1 depending on which one is shorter - especially useful if you don't trust the game port. Your generator can't give you more real bits than that; the RC4 just obfuscates it, makes it harder to evaluate the real strength, and evens out the distributions. You could still crunch the bits through MD5 or something, but only use as many bits of output as you're sure the generator is really giving you. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Re-delegate Authority!

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US versions of Netscape now available
by Tom Weinstein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The US versions of Netscape Navigator 3.0 beta 5 and FastTrack Server 2.0 are now available for download. Obviously, this is only available to US citizens or permanent residents. You can get it from http://wwwus/eng/US-Current/ There's only one machine serving this stuff right now, so please be patient if it's slow or you have a hard time connecting. -- You should only break rules of style if you can | Tom Weinstein coherently explain what you gain by so doing. | tomw(a)netscape.com

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WON_der
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

6-15-96. NYP, Book review: AFTER THOUGHT The Computer Challenge to Human Intelligence By James Bailey Illustrated. 277 pages Basic Books/HarperCollins. $25. ISBN 0-465-00781-3 Mr. Bailey, a former senior manager at the Thinking Machines Corporation, foresees an "electronic computing revolution" whose "intellectual impact will be greater than anything since the Renaissance, possibly greater than anything since the invention of language." In his view, the greatest challenge posed by the computer revolution will be for humans to trust processes of thinking they won't necessarily understand, such as neural networks spotting patterns without supplying proof "in any human-absorbable form." His main point is that we must become aware of the outmoded abstractions on which our sequential thinking is based and to jettison them in favor of parallel processes. He cites Alfred North Whitehead: "A civilization which cannot burst through its current abstractions is doomed to sterility after a very limited burst of progress." The wonder of Mr. Bailey's book is that he makes us aware of things abstract that all our lives we have been trained to think of as concrete. ----- http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/wonder.txt (7 kb) WON_der

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CookieScan 0.0 rev 0
by Christopher Hull 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Do y¹all think there might be an interest in a utility which would allow the user to deal with browser cookies? What I imagine is a little utility that would display the cookies stashed on a machine and give the user the option to either delete or <snicker> edit </snicker> any given cookie. (Hey, it¹s *your* computer, not the website¹s). This little app would also come with help text explaining what a cookie is (and is not). In future it might run in the background and alert the user when a cookie is being dropped and the user could give or deny permission (Netscape 3.0 will do this as well). As it is an ³anti-virus² type product it would be offered for free. I could just stick it up on Apple¹s (or Netscape's) website when finished. Do any such utilities currently exits? -Chris ... ... smtp: nozefngr(a)apple.com .. page: 1.800.680.7351 .. http: http://virtual.net/Personal/nozefngr/ .. icbm: lat37*21'.lon121*5' .. .. the kabuki project: http://remarque.berkeley.edu/kabuki/

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Re: Can't block caller ID in Massachusetts?
by Alan Horowitz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> There are businesses that _only_ list their 800 numbers, and you can't > find out the real phone number associated with them through directory > assistance. I'll leave it to others to call such a joint and give their name, address, and credit card number to such an establishment. > It's especially annoying when they've got an in-state or other non-nation-wide > 800 number, or when you're calling from outside the US, especially when > they're a business you'd like to be able to reach from anywhere, any time, > like the travel agent your office uses Your straining my credulity to claim that you can't get ahold of the regular phone number of them. Come on, are you 7 years old? > And they may _only_ have > the bank of phones that's got ANI service on it, and not have other phones. I don't think phone service is sold that way.

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ViaCrypt pgp v.4
by Thomas C. Allard 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, my site just got ViaCrypt pgp version 4 (Personel Edition) and it was the first I'd heard of it. None of my utilities that worked with the old ViaCrypt pgp 2.7.1 seem to work under version 4 (the script that checks signatures dies, as does the exmh interface which can no longer find my personal keys). I assume that these are mostly due to changes in the command-line options, although I can find no list of what exactly has changed. But my REAL question is will this version of pgp be compatible with the international versions? If not, I'd just assume revert to pgp 2.6.2 from MIT. rgds-- TA (tallard(a)frb.gov) I don't speak for the Federal Reserve Board, it doesn't speak for me. pgp fingerprint: 10 49 F5 24 F1 D9 A7 D6 DE 14 25 C8 C0 E2 57 9D

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Practical Solutions at USENIX SECURITY Symposium
by Cynthia Deno 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The 6th USENIX Security Symposium - Focusing on Applications of Cryptography - is coming to San Jose. You may want to attend. July 22-July 25, 1996 6TH USENIX SECURITY SYMPOSIUM Fairmont Hotel, San Jose, California Sponsored by the USENIX Association Co-sponsored by UniForum in cooperation with the Computer Emergency Response Team There will be refereed papers, panel presentations, invited talks, Birds-of-a-Feather sessions, and an informal Vendor Display. The symposium is offering two days of tutorials. Tutorial speakers include Ed DeHard, CERT; Dan Geer, Open Market; Jon Rochlis, BBN Planet; Marcus Ranum, V-One; Matt Bishop, UC Davis; and Bruce Schneier, Counterpane Systems. Practical solutions to UNIX security will be dissected, debated, and refined. New research on public key issues, electronic commerce, safe working areas, and secure communication. There will also be sessions on the latest version of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), Internet Firewalls, and the C2Net Privacy model. Tutorial topics include: Implementing Cryptography; World Wide Web and Internet Security; Comparison of UNIX Security Tools; and Security for Software Developers. UniForum has organized a track especially for managers. It offers a comprehensive overview of computer security as it relates to open systems from a manager's perspective. The UniForum panel sessions cover: Security and Privacy; Electronic Commerce; Cryptography Infrastructure; and Cryptography and the Law. Admission is free and open to the public for the small, table-top Vendor Display taking place Wednesday July 24, Noon - 2:00 pm and 3:00 - 7:00 pm in the Fairmont Hotel. Call Cynthia Deno 408 335 9445. Complete program and registration information is available on the USENIX home page on the Web at http://www. usenix.orgemail or email to info(a)usenix.org (state "send security conference" in body of your message). /-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/- | Cynthia Deno | USENIX | | Tel: 408 335 9445 | The UNIX and Advanced Computing Systems | | Fax: 408 335 5327 | Technical and Professional Association | | cynthia(a)USENIX.org | | | Check out USENIX on the Net..........http://www.USENIX.org | /-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-

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Encrytions over multiple platforms
by tangent＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know of a hard-drive/partition encrytion program that has been ported to both DOS and Linux/UNIX based systems? I am searching for a system that, obviously, allows both reading and writing of secure/encrytped data. You help will be greatly appreciated. -- Tangent <tangent(a)alpha.c2.org>

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Sternlight on C'punks
by David Lesher 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: maldrich(a)grci.com > (note that Sternlight actually had his OWN usenet newsgroup), there's the > fear that DS will start a flame thrower exchange with anyone, regardless > of topic. AND, he'll keep posting about it. Relentlessly. The solution to SternFUD infection is patience. Every single time, he gets bored & lonely after everyone kill-files him. Then he goes in remission [or maybe it's back to the SternFord Clinic...] for weeks; reappearing somewhere else. > God bless 'em, but it's time to add another line to the c'punks > net.loon warning file. Sure! But I'd not think that anyone here needed to be warned. Hell, even reporters know about him.... -- A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz(a)nrk.com & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

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RE: (fwd) krypt13i.zip Enkryptonator: Homonymous key encryption system, R. Newton
by geeman＠shellx.best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

And all those fools like Diffie and Rivest, Shamir, Adelman, etc, well I guess they missed the boat big time by missing this, huh? Hint: misplaced commas, are always a tipoff to, uhhhhh ... less than stellar shall we say, intellectual bona fides. Boy I'm sure glad I don't have to remember those orney key anymore! : Enkryptonator is a newly developed encryption system based on the : principles of homonymous key cryptography invented by Enkryptonator Co. : Homonymous key systems are an exiciting, new breakthrough, that solve : the 'key management' problem without resorting to 'public key' : cryptography. No more unwieldy, impossible to remember, binary keys. : Enkryptonator is easy to use. Because of Enkryptonator's unique design : no one who intercepts your encryption in an unauthorized manner can : decrypt your file -- even if he knows the key of encryption! Everyone : has a right to privacy and Enkryptonator will provide you a means of : securing your personal and private concerns from unwanted intruders.

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Re: Why <jf_avon@citenet.net> was blocked.
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 15 Jul 96 at 21:28, Anonymous Remail Service wrote: > >On 13 Jul 96 at 22:22, root(a)mail.demon.net wrote: > > > >Could you please explain me why my message was blocked? > > Because you're an asshole? Why in the world would you ask the > entire fucking cypherpunks list, instead of just > root(a)mail.demon.net, to "please explain me[SIC] why my message was > blocked?" You are constantly harassing, so you were blocked. Deal > with it. me Dear flamer, Obviously, you did not learn to read. Go back to school. I asked the root(a)mail.demon.net to explain why I was blocked and I asked CPunks to reply to the post "below", which was my original question. What I asked on the CPunks list was the following: Is the fact that a realdeal.exe /per (wiped with zeroes) processed drive weakens the idea encryption of a Secure Drive 1.4a'ed drive? So, dear anonymous coward, go to hell. Jean-Francois Avon - -- DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Limoges porcelain, silverware and crystal JFA Technologies R&D consultants: physicists technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i Comment: PGP Public key: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon iQEVAgUBMeqeosiycyXFit0NAQFgbQgAnsRkMewRP8VezehwytWIcIKh/ty2UVQo /rh8BhUW+VePXCpL1rudLzr9ZWaq6akPTkpA5HHmDLARGMw2fu/0ZSuS/OSlGgz6 sKSXbKtTHqVCn+mOvpl2+lBD5bt4LTIoanY9a/uQ6rt5pZG9B4m5ztyM945vY62C QVyfvqEh1c2Iqbbud9BmeLnmAoaM0cXQJdeyhOerZ/38k+2/sUXOWtVlz3h1Rf6g 3SptAJ9wdsbdDPBuy0AC3MIQHiTgGAClDDOZAbsIB3v4NapqedktdcyGXQj9XKpF O6qn6rEnWhek0JrDVFBwyXbXu9JgQfqNetd7a5jvDM57bxBIpifA4A== =1T1A -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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