December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: (Fwd) Re: TCM: mafia as a paradigm for cyberspace
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:34 PM 5/20/96 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >>Second, everybody like Jim Bell who is pushing the AP scheme is doing >>so on ethical basis: that the coercion the government imposes on to >>the individuals by regulations, and guns backed taxation justifies the >>killings. I have to see yet any cypherpunks who seems to agree with >>AP that envision another use than govt control. > >right, and Hitler didn't have any other use for his government other >than to bring utopia to the masses, and used all the ovens for cooking >pizzas (after all, what else could an oven be used for?!?!?). > >the above sentence I find absolutely abhorrent: it justifies killing, >not merely because of the effect (the sort of "ends-justifies-the-means" >argument used by most here), but that in addition it is >supposedly "ethical". ethical?!?!? Then you've obviously dramatically mis-read my ideas. I don't claim that _EVERYBODY_ who will fall victim will "deserve" it by your or my opinions, or by generally-agreed-upon philosophy like the libertarian's "Non-Initiation of Force Principle" (NIOFP). Rather, I claim that the justification for any given killing must (and will, or won't, depending) come from some external fact having nothing to do with AP. For example, if you believe in NIOFP, then anyone who violates it has initiated force, and the victim of such force (or, perhaps, anyone else?) can legitimately use a system like AP to fight back. If you _don't_ believe in libertarian philsophy, obviously you won't necessarily agree with AP, but the source of your agreement is that, not something inherently wrong with AP. >the assassination politics is quite Hitleresque at its root. >"kill our enemies, and everything will be better. it is our enemies >that are the root of all evil in the world. extinguish them, and >you solve all problems automatically" THat's a false claim. If the "enemies" are enemies because of what they've actually done wrong, say violate your rights, then it should be your right to stop them. The method you choose shouldn't matter. >there is a trite saying, "two wrongs do not make a right" (trite >because most have mastered the simple truth of it in their pre-teen >years). a concept not grasped by some second-graders. some >require a lifetime of lessons to comprehend it in the end.. You seem to be assuming that if there are TWO "wrongs" here. But I've tried to make it abundantly clear that justification for the self-defense comes from the initial "wrong." Where, then, is the SECOND "wrong"? What, exactly, makes it wrong? If a person can't get justice any other way (not to be confused with merely a chance at justice) then why deny that person his rights? I acknowledge that if there is no initial "wrong" (the target didn't actually do anything wrong) then the act of targeting him is, itself, wrong, but you're apparently unwilling to back up this hypothetical. >I'm very disappointed that others have not chased Assassination >Politics proponents to take their trash somewhere else. of course >the real situation is that those that started this list have >sympathies for this kind of thinking, so no such thing will happen. It should be obvious to anyone around here that if AP "works," it will work regardless of whether it meets with your approval or any other subset of humankind. That makes it worthy of discussion even if you don't like it. >to Jim Bell and Avon: please read Machiavelli. read about ancient >assassination clubs and the history of bloody politics. if you want >to seriously further your ideas, start a web site with ample >historical research. your ideas are not new whatsoever. Your objections are invalid. The mere fact that SOME organized killing systems occurred in the past has essentially no relationship to the system I describe. The prospect of perfect anonymity, allowing the system to be open to anyone who chooses to contribute, will make it vastly different from anything that came before. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: AP
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:21 PM 5/20/96 +0000, Jean-Francois Avon wrote: >On 20 May 96 at 10:28, Jim Ray wrote: >> >And you'll also note that the anonymity issue generate more >> >interest from more CPunks because it (hopefully) will acheive the >> >same goal without any killing. >> > >> our >> anonymity-baby threatens to have govt. kill it in the crib, > >It is not yours, it only *is*. > >> with the support of the people. > >Here, again, Jim Bell would probably say that this sentence proves >him right... Absolutely! Even these days, what passes for "the support of the people" is simply the generally-agreed-upon position of the news media, which the public is supposed to accept as their opinion. Before alternative sources of information such as the Internet appeared, TV stations and print media could just about mold public opinion any way they wanted, within limits. >> I have not respected a US president in my lifetime, yet I get _pissed_ when they get >> shot/shot at. > >I somehow agree with you here. I could say, "I don't want to see any president get shot," but that's simply because I want them to resign instead. And it really isn't the president, per se, who is the problem: It's the entire political system which chooses the candidates, from which the public is only given a one-of-two choice in the matter. If the system were cleaned up, and massively reduced in power, we could have a figurehead president that nobody would even dream of harming, because he exercises no abusive power. And in any case, since I think it is legitimate for "us" (everyone else in the world) to pay for the death of (say) Saddam Hussein or Moammar Khadafi, it would be selfish of me to suppose that any system which could easily achieve that could somehow be tuned to ensure that "our" presidents are somehow immune. I would much rather see _all_ the leadership under the risk of the gun than none of it. >> Killing seems to be a first resort for some, >> and IMO ends do not justify means. > >Well, here, you are threading on a very difficult path. Of course, >the ends does never justifies the means in an *uncoerced* context. >But what JB says, is that AP would be a justified "self defense" >against coercion. That's right. However, I've noticed that the people who object to AP rarely want to talk about the self-defense aspect of the situation; they want to assume that nobody has done anything wrong enough to justify AP from being used against them. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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RE: Interactive Week exclusive - White House to launch "Clipper III"
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: Declan B. McCullagh >... Self escrow will be permitted under specific circumstances. The >escrow >agent must meet performance requirements for law enforcement access." .................................................................. (So I guess it wouldn't be kosher to use the Mafia....) .. Blanc >

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Re: Rumor: DSS Broken?
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 21 May 96 at 10:39, jim bell wrote: > It is at least arguable that the NSA might have a vested interest in > allowing an enemy to continue to use a flawed encryption system, as > in Enigma. Is is arguable? Maybe, but only if you specify the exact context. The Enigma stuff happened when the world was as war, and the peoples that would have used such things in the same context as DES is used now were non-existent. The case of covering-up knowledge of DES and Enigma are quite different because happening in different *contexts* . But maybe the govt is keeping the population in ignorance, not telling them that a war *is* going on *now* ? JFA Some peoples believe that words have an intrinsic meaning outside of their appropriate context. You can usually find specimens of this group either in political circles or in Voodoo ceremonies. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQEVAwUBMaH8NciycyXFit0NAQEIzAgAkDMyygi1ifl7ey580gvOMRreUnhbNUp4 vL19wWfvEtPr+svUMhV1px6TGDpJepdheqjyUwB3Qk4t0KHdEn0j35RviKznaD0X bUKBamIVRbTNtgvmm0LOmdykeywtNgZmFx9tvKKwF6cQTZ8e4uqfYp8dqjCuIG8j xmiJDoaDF9M5h40gCs95/DEwM3XX7O+FS7HSXBQ57vP4Y3N86OawTPe4Zx6Gxfeb qCYiEp0R0/5XjbzGUCJQrct3kjq7t8l3mQwhUc/UktMK1DacVs2QqqgqYCVEVYMg zfTg/5DdlBm+ozsomtnpByMsJ1kR3VZx8KeO9rX+SlZgNidE7hKSlw== =v+6X -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee; Limoges porcelain, silverware and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants; physists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 I reserve the right to post publicly any private e-mail sent to me. Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

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Re: Long-Lived Remailers
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An NSA operative with the code name 'tcmay(a)got.net' wrote... > Let's call the first site "Alice" and the emanation site "Bob." > > That is, all messages sent to the persistent site Alice appear to come from > the site Bob. > > The Church of Clams can simply send messages addressed to themselves > through the Alice remailer and see immediately that they appear to come > from Bob. Unless Alice will automatically rotate between some random set of Bob1, Bob2, Bob3... It also wouldn't be too difficult to set up a message that goes through several points before emerging at a randomly-chosen exitpoint, including a completely independent remailer. Actually, there's an Idea. Set up a single address; use added headers in the style of: :: Remailers-To-Chain: 7 Remailers-To-Avoid: remailer(a)nsa.gov Final-Destination: tcmay(a)got.net Each remailer could construct a message that decrements the remailers counter, preserving the other headers. The usual caveat on encrypting at each step would apply; but since remailers' pubkeys are available, that's a trivial concern. A lot more could be done with this general concept. One immediate problem is that the frontend address is a target, even though it can't be obviously connected to any objectionable messages. Packet sniffing is always a concern, etc etc... Flame away. dave ---- David Smith Box 324 Cape Girardeau MO USA 63702 http://www.prairienet.org/~dsmith dsmith(a)prairienet.org Reality is only for those lacking in true imagination... Send mail w/'send pgp-key' in subject for PGP public key

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NSA's Dual Missions
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:39 PM 5/21/96, jim bell wrote: >Yes...but... How can the NSA serve two masters? If the NSA has the >American public's best interests at heart, then it should have revealed the >flaw if it knew of it. (Otherwise, it can't be trusted...) Reminder: the NSA ostensibly has dual missions. First, the gathering of signals and communications intelligence. Second, the securing of American signals and communcations. This second mission is primarily military, diplomatic, and other governmental communications, but has also been extended to assisting in the securing of commercial communications. NSA's (and its daughter org, the NCSC's) involvement in DES fits in here. Some years back there was the "Commercial COMSEC Endorsement" program. Anyway, Bamford describes the dual missions, albeit for the world of 1982 and earlier. --Tim Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Long-Lived Remailers
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:31 PM 5/21/96, David E. Smith wrote: >Unless Alice will automatically rotate between some random set >of Bob1, Bob2, Bob3... It also wouldn't be too difficult >to set up a message that goes through several points before >emerging at a randomly-chosen exitpoint, including a >completely independent remailer. Sure, Alice can always herself add remailer steps. I explicitly mentioned this in my message last night, when I wrote: "(Hal, to use him as the example, could start using his own choice of remailer hops to accomplish much the same result. We've talked about this for a long time, too...." But this is just using more remailers. We know this works. What Mark Grant was suggesting was something different, a kind of "disposable final emanation point," designed to go away easily under legal pressures. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
by Ben Holiday 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 21 May 1996, Daniel R. Oelke wrote: > > Ben Holiday <ncognito(a)gate.net> wrote: > > At this point there are 2 options, which I havnt examined closely: The > > first is that you require them to send a request for their "consent-code" > > which can be used to decrypt the mail. Under this arrangment you could > > This could be done with no "storage" as well, by a slightly > different method and still require end reciepient acknowledgement. > The end reciepient could be required to reply and include the encrypted > message. The remailer would then decrypt the message and send back the > plaintext. Only storage would be the key vs. a message id database. Well, if we've gone that far, why not attach an encrypted copy of the key to the peice of mail, and eliminate all storage from the r-ops machine? > > The second is to simply include the > > consent-code along with the encrypted peice of mail and a legal notice > > stating that decryption of the mail constitutes your consent to receive > > the mail, as well as your agreement to hold the remailer-operator harmless > > By reduction - you could just do a rot13 on the message and > append the "legal notice". If all the information for decoding > a message is present in that message, is a different encoding > mechanism really any different from straight ASCII text? > (i.e. Netscape 9.13 might have auto decoding built it....) > Then, the user doesn't do anything "extra" - does this invalidate > the notice? Donno. IANAL. :) > I might be wrong, but I don't think that this second method would > gain you anything in the 2 situations where operators will get > hassled. 1) Posting of copyrighted material - the lawyers will > at least harass you no matter what kind of legal notice is up front. > 2) Mailing of "harassing" information - the person still gets > unwanted email, and has no way to stop it. [RANT MODE ON- skip to the next paragraph if you dont like politiks] Here we are back at step one again. In the end, it would seem that there isn't much that can be done about the worst forms of abuse, without filtering mail for content. However, someone pointed out that other package delivery services have acheived freedom from responsibilty for the content of the packages they deliver - and I beleive that a part of the explanation for this lies in the fact that they /do/ make attempts to limit abuse in-so-far as they are able. Part of limiting the remailers liability is tied up with legitimizing them as a useful service, and establishing to the public that we are concerned with abuse. Too many people beleive that the whole point of a remailer is to facilitate illegal and abusive communication, and unless that changes we can expect to be dealt with as criminals at worst, or at best as purposfully negligent. I'm not certain what the solution is, but I am certain that doing nothing isnt it... [RANT MODE OFF--] One idea that came up a while back was a sort of limited tracking of mail -- an example would be keeping a hash of the email address where mail was received from for 48 hours, with the hash value being attached to the peice of mail as a header. This would accomplish two things: We could source block an address without knowing the source; and if push came to shove an address could be backtracked to its original source, provided a complaint was made in time, and that the Bad Guy sent another mail from the same address. I think that legally there would be a good argument that the remailer ops had made a reasonable attempt and holding lawbreakers accountable, while still preserving the anonymity of non-abusers. Just a thought.. Ben.

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Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FA
by snow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 20 May 1996, David E. Smith wrote: > > I realize that this would be a civil case rather than a criminal > > one, maybe it would have to be child porn or something illegal to get that > > far, but if I were to set up a remailer under my real name, and the CO$ > > wifes approval for this, and I don't want to expose Suba to any liability > > in this. (So relax Alex). > > If you don't get the necessary approvals for that, I'd be I have approval to find out more information. NO, I GET TO BE THE MARTYR. > will at least get me away from my ex-girlfriend :) Sometimes it seems like it would be worth it. > Lest you jump for that delete key now, I'm serious. We'll see. Petro, Christopher C. petro(a)suba.com <prefered for any non-list stuff> snow(a)crash.suba.com

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The Twilight of the Remailers?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:59 PM 5/21/96, Alex Strasheim wrote: >I'm closing my mixmaster, nsa(a)omaha.com, on the 4th of June. > >There wasn't an incident that triggered this, but Hal's post about the FBI >sort of spooked me, as have the lawsuits. I don't have a lot of assets >myself, but I do have partners. My lawyer tells me that there's no >reliable way to separate my personal net activities from those of the >company my parnters and I own, and that I could even be exposing my >parnters to personal liability. > >I can't speak for anyone else, but for me the problem with running a >remailer is that it's an inherently altruistic enterprise. That in itself >wouldn't be so bad, but the liability makes the extent of the altruism >open ended. If I knew that the worst case scenario would be $1k or even a >$5k personal loss I could do it, but an open ended liability that's shared >by my partners is unacceptable. > >I'm sorry for the inconvenience this will cause. Between Hacktic going down, Hal's comments that he may shut down his two sites, and this, plus others who are more quietly making plans to shut down, I think the thread title "The Remailer Crisis" is more apt than ever. As to potential liability, it is very likely to be vastly more than the examples Alex cites, of $1K or "even a $5k personal loss." Lawyers don't get out of bed in the morning for such insignificant sums. Keith Henson has been a friend of mine for the past dozen years (and I actually met him first in 1976), and he has kept me informed of his fight with the CoS. He's being sued for $100,000 by the CoS. (And they asked him a lot of questions about remailers, and who runs them. He didn't tell them much.) I can't say whether they are likely to win their suit, or what the judgment might be. But make no mistake about it, if the CoS wins and Keith is ordered to pay.... It's one reason I won't run a remailer that can ever be traced back to me. (I also don't have a box on the Net and don't really trust running remailers on machines someone else has root to. And I'm not a Unix person. And....) I figure that there are some, such as Detweiler, maybe government types, maybe others, who would make efforts to "take me down." Posting some child porn through my site to a Usenet group and then alerting the media would pretty much do it. (Or if binaries are not allowed, posting solicitations. Or if Usenet posting is not allowed...well, there are still ways...) "The Twilight of the Remailers"? Ironically, "copyright violation" and "clam secrets" were not even on the list of "the Four Horsemen of the Infocalypse" that we thought would really put remailers under some extreme pressure. If the Scienotologists can shut down many of the remailers, imagine what the Horsemen will do! --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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alternative sites for NIST GAK 3 draft
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The computer at, and link to, www.isse.gmu.edu are slow and old. If you have trouble, copies are also at: http://www.epic.org/crypto/key_escrow/white_paper.html and http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Key_escrow/Clipper_III Other related stuff at eff.org will go here when available. (c.f. .../Key_escrow/Clipper_II and .../Key_escrow/Clipper, predictably). Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student http://www.isse.gmu.edu/~pfarrell Info. Systems & Software Engineering, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available on homepage #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Re: Remailers, Copyright, and Scientology
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:36 AM 5/22/96, Allen Ethridge wrote: >I've been following alt.religion.scientology mostly for entertainment >reasons, and occasionally to correct some of the false statements about >psychiatry made by Scientologists. There's more to the story than you >appear to be aware of. The extra-legal actions didn't originate with >the alleged copyright violations, nor are the legal actions of the cult >limited to protecting their copyrights. Now that the cypherpunks have >been brought to their attention it's entirely possible that the major >posters on this newsgroup will become the subject of Scientology's, or >rather Religious Technology Center's legal actions. Ironically, CoS was trying to determine my name, from Keith. If I'm subpoenaed, I think I'll tell them to fuck off. I'm not a party to the CoS business in any way, save for whatever influence I may have had when the first remailers were implemented several years ago (by others, not me) and whatever ideas I may have discussed here on this list. >Yes, the cult does have a legitimate interest in protecting their >copyrights. No, the cult does not have a valid reason for using the >heavy-handed legal tactics of which they are so fond. I'm not a defender of CoS, let's make this clear. I knew they were flakes since I first heard of them back around 1967, before most of you were even born. But there is an ongoing, vitriolic battle between the CoS and its critics, and the remailers are one of the main "weapons" being used. I take no sides whatsoever, merely noting that it is, in Bill Stewart's words, "unsurprising" that CoS lawyers are taking the steps they are taking. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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No Subject
by unknown＠example.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

! Theses peoples refuse to register their guns, although it is ! mandatory in canada (to be registered within 7(?) years...) There has been total firearm registration since 1968. ! > >> >You'll note that the psycho-epistemology necessary to ! > >> >commit murder is quite close to the one necessary to coerce ! > >> >poeples to pay taxes. You'll note that the psycho-epistemology necessary to commit murder is quite close to the one necessary to coerce poeples to pay rent. ! > Not really, only the time in history. Their property was ! > 100% taken, and they were marched to OK from GA. The IRS ! > may be bad...but they aren't THAT bad...[disclaimer: I ! > am (a tiny) part Cherokee. Consider that many whites feel guilty if they feel they don't have any afro-asian bloodlines. Consider the dangers of anti-racism to your self-esteem. ! You did not answer my question: When our local Mohawks accuse the ! white peoples to have stolen their land, I ask "when did I do that? ! I can't remember..." I refuse to be held responsible for things that ! were done several hundred years ago. Period. As I said, I *never*, ! not even in my early years, believed in original sin. Then you hold irresponsible refusals. ! > >Are you talking of an open war a la Bosnia? ! > ! > Hopefully not. Who can tell how far the anti-racists will go to establish their power cult. ! > and the legitimate self defense ! > options which are peaceful have not been adequately explored. IMO Racism. ! > >> Bottom line for me: "Two wrongs don't make a right." ! > > ! > >Please state the basic premise that make you declare what is ! > >"wrong" in the context of AP. They Always lie on racial issues. ! I am sorry, but I do not accept that as a valid argument. What if ! somebody came to take away your means of feeding your kids? ! What if somebody was menacing you or your kids? ! There are instances, as you seem to agree, when killing is justified. ! What is meant by the sentence is: Thou shalt not initiate lethal ! violence. Racism. ! > Taxation is theft, I fail to see your point. Well, depends. Anti-racism is theft.

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Re: Senator, your public key please?
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"unicorn(a)schloss.li" "Black Unicorn" 18-MAY-1996 14:43:54.95 >Well, this depends on what we assume a signature does. Quite. I've been considering what the _current_ (as opposed to the proposed) system of keys actually does. Signing a key says two things: A. I think that everyone who has the corresponding private key is willing, or was willing at some point, for all the others also with the private key to encrypt and decrypt using it. E.g., it hasn't been stolen; I'd thus be more willing to sign a security-conscious person's key (e.g., Perry) than a security-unconscious person's key (e.g., my mother). B. If there's a true email address attached, unless I'm doing this as a joke, I think that at least one entity capable of receiving (and probably sending) mail at that address has the corresponding private key. Neither of these appear to imply much patronage, unless Senators aren't allowed to send letters of reference for security-related jobs. (I'd think the Army could consult a Senator on whether to give someone a clearance...) -Allen

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Canada allows crypto exports
by M. Plumb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Several months ago I filed a set of export applications requesting permission to export cryptographic software from Canada. I learned a few things from these applications, my conversations with people at Export Controls, and my own careful reading of Canada's export laws. There are a few countries to which you may not export anything, without a permit. You need a permit to export most cryptographic software. It is legal to export Canadian software, even cryptographic software, which has no restrictions on distribution (this must be explicitly stated, not just implied by being available for public FTP). No paperwork needs to be filled out. Cryptographic software of U.S. origin may be exported, but you need to file paperwork. Cryptographic software from other countries may be exported without any paperwork. These are the Canadian rules. Canada interprets and enforces the U.S. export laws when they think it is necessary. While the U.S. government has sometimes objected to a Canadian interpretation, no Canadian exporter, acting with Canadian permission, has been charged by the U.S. government. The export of cryptographic software from Canada is under review right now. All of this could change at any time. A complete explanation of the process, and results is available from the Electronic Frontier Canada's web site at: <http://www.efc.ca/pages/doc/crypto-export.html> Marc Plumb mp(a)the-wire.com May 21, 1996

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Re: Senator, your public key please?
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"tcmay(a)got.net" 21-MAY-1996 04:37:46.63 >(ObCaveat: I personally think a free society cannot/should not outlaw >discrimination in any form, save that by government.) Agreed. >By the way, this issue has some echoes of another technogical issue: the >use of neural nets for loan approval software. Turns out that when a bunch >of things are entered into a NN loan package, including the all-important >default rate, the applicant's age, income, race, sex, education, employment ^^^^ >history, credit history, etc., that NN loan packages "end up" rejecting >many black applicants, more so than white or Asian applicants. (The NN >"concluded" that blacks were higher risks for default than whites/Asians.) >Even if no human being ever entered his or her biases and prejudices, the >NN spit out this result. >I recall there being talk about requiring "equality of outcomes," and that >such NNs might have to have deliberately-biased inputs fed in, but I don't >know what ever happened to this issue. The obvious solution in the above case is not to feed in the race information for governmental decision-making. I recall a similar issue when NN's were used for college admissions... while they didn't feed in the applicant's race, they did feed in the applicant's name, and the length of it turned out to have some correlations. (Why they were feeding in the name in the first place is another question entirely, although NN's and GA's tend to work the best when you don't understand the system at hand - which also tends to mean that you shouldn't try to interpret what information is necessary.) >In any case, I think this sort of issue, and the semi-related issue of >"discrimination via key signatures," to be likely important issues in the >courts in the coming years. It's related to that of the outlawing of IQ testing because of (I'd say for environmental reasons) blacks having lower IQ scores on average. The civil rights crowd are arguing for the PC egalitarian viewpoint that everyone _should_ be the exact same in capabilities (for some absurd view of "fairness"), and so want people treated the exact same despite obvious differences and the validity of such tests. -Allen

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Re: Instant Remailers
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"tcmay(a)got.net" 19-MAY-1996 08:03:24.32 >At 12:38 AM 5/19/96, Mark M. wrote: >>It is possible for someone to operate an anonymous remailer anonymously. >>Just get a UNIX shell account under a fake name, pay with cash, and set up >>the remailing software. The identity of the operator of such a remailer >>would be difficult, if not impossible, to discover. >Now, can a site which "offers" such accounts be held liable? If the site >drops an account when presented with _appropriate_ legal papers (a court >order, such as an injunction), and if it takes a "hands-off" policy with >respect to what customers run in their accounts, then it ought to be safe >from actual liability. Depending on the site (e.g., governmental), it may be ethical not to bother letting the site owner know that you're doing so anonymously. The ethics of this would also vary depending on whether the site owner is legally required to get ID or not. >Ideally, such remailers should require no involvement at all by the account >holder. Just a "start" command, by the account holder. (Not the site >administrator, as this could be construed as involvement by him.) >But an "instant remailer" (just add water) is needed. Recent questions here >on the list about what it takes to run a remailer may mean some advice is >needed. Quite. I'd appreciate it. -Allen

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Re: Senator, your public key please?
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"frantz(a)netcom.com" 18-MAY-1996 21:54:01.23 >This is exactly analogous to slanderous attack on someone's reputation. As >soon as people realize that the mere fact that a key has a signature does >not mean that the key-owner solicited the signature, the problem goes away. This is interesting in light of social networks analysis as applied to the web of trust (one interesting web-reference on such analysis is at http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/~lk/netvis.html; as well as some examples - use a graphics-capable web browser - it has some links to a FTP site with programs). One method of such analysis uses what is sometimes called "gravity;" under it, positions move to be close to those to which they are linked. This can be one-way or two-way; the above fact may imply that signing someone's key should move one closer to that person - and not the other way around. Of course, when analyzing the result, one should keep in mind that one may not have beneficial intent when signing a key; LD's signatures are examples. Thus, closeness on such a network may imply a high degree of relationship, but not a high degree of _positive_ relationship. -Allen

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Re: Remailers, Copyright, and Scientology
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:36 PM 5/21/96 -0500, Allen Ethridge wrote: >Yes, the cult does have a legitimate interest in protecting their >copyrights. I'm wondering whether they properly handled the copyright status of some of those (silly) texts. While it is somewhat nice of you (in regards to them) to say what you did, it is possible that they lost their copyrights decades ago by printing them (even internally) without the (then) appropriate "circle-C" copyright notice. Chances are good that none of this material could survive a genuine copyright test case today. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: MixMaster fair use
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"loki(a)infonex.com" 21-MAY-1996 17:19:02.59 >The problem is RSAREF. I can't chose license terms for that. Oof... I see the problem. No, it's not you, it's them. I've forgotten exactly what claims RSA has; patent (when does it expire?), copyright (can it be rewritten), or trade secret (wasn't it broken?)? Without some form of getting around this (or licensing from them), usage for pay will be kind of difficult. -Allen

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Re: NIST Draft Key Escrow Paper
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A few comments on the NIST draft. SUBJECT: Draft Paper, "Enabling Privacy, Commerce, Security and Public Safety in the Global Information Infrastructure" FROM: Bruce W. McConnell [Initials] Edward J. Appel [Initials] Co-Chairs, Interagency Working Group on Cryptography Policy > It would permit users and manufacturers free >choice of encryption algorithm, facilitate international >interoperability, preserve law enforcement access, and, most >importantly, provide strong system security and integrity. What if we don't WANT to "preserve law enforcement access"? What if we believe that, as individuals and as a society, we would be safer and better off to emasculate the government-employed thugs? > Recognizing that a robust infrastructure is not yet a >reality, we are also considering measures to liberalize export >policy for some non-escrowed products. Why restrict it at all? >Enabling Privacy, Commerce, Security and Public Safety in the >Global Information Infrastructure Too bad they weren't more honest and said, "Government employee safety." >Government >and industry must work together to create a security >management infrastructure and attendant products that >incorporate robust cryptography without undermining national >security and public safety. I don't believe this. Do you? > A policy for escrow of >cryptographic keys which provides a basis for bilateral and >multilateral government agreements must be determined so that >industry can produce products for worldwide interoperability. WRONG! This is NOT necessary in the least. Just allow free export, period. >Industry will participate in defining algorithms and protocol >standards, and will develop key escrow encryption products >suitable for the protection of both government and private >sector information and which will assure timely, lawful, >government decryption access. If this system is "voluntary" then why the "assure" part? > Government will help set >standards for the Key Management Infrastructure (KMI) and >deliver a market for robust security products. In other words, it will shell out stolen tax dollars to willing co-conspirators. No thank you! A KMI >infrastructure and attendant key escrow products will provide >many benefits, both domestic and internationally, as the US >begins to realize the advantages of the global network for improve commerce, security and public safety. Most if not all of these advantages have no need for a "key management infrastructure." > The nation's commerce is moving to >networking. With these enormous changes, means must be found >to responsibly raise the quality of cryptographic services >without jeopardizing effective law enforcement, imperilling >public safety. I wish they'd be a bit more honest and use "government safety" instead of "public safety." > Industry and government must partner in the development >of a public key-based key management infrastructure and >attendant products that will assure participants can transmit >and receive information electronically with confidence in the >information's integrity, authenticity, and origin and which >will assure timely lawful government access. Why, exactly, "must" industry do this? This whole system is supposed to be "voluntary," right? There is a more compelling rationale for the government to be a partner in the development of the KMI. Not only has the Information Age sparked fundamental changes in the way we interact, but reliance on information systems makes our institutions vulnerable to an unprecedented degree. Aha! "our institutions vulnerable to an unprecented degree?" You're catching on! But it's primarily the GOVERNMENT institutions which are going to be vulnerable. > Almost all >institutions upon which public safety and national security >depend, ranging from the power grid to military command and >control, are at severe risk because of their presence in and >dependence upon a global information infrastructure. Yes, you guys know you're gonna get your statist butts kicked, right out the door. (In case you couldn't imagine it, I'm grinning right now...) > Additionally, the widespread >use of encryption without safety features such as key recovery >can pose serious risks to society. No, not a risk to "society". A risk to government and its agents. > It will put at risk >important law enforcement and national security investigations >where electronic surveillance and search and seizure are >essential in preserving and prosecuting crimes, and more >importantly, in saving human life. I choose to forgo these investigations and their advantages. > Participation in the KMI will be voluntary. Key escrow in > the KMI will occur naturally through mutually trusted > authorities. What do you mean, "Voluntary"? >+ There will be a transition period during which legacy > equipments which do not support key recovery can be used > to communicate with users in emerging full featured KMIs. Huh? If this system is really "voluntary," this last paragraph doesn't make sense. > Self-escrow will be permitted under specific > circumstances.(1) Huh? What is the word "voluntary" supposed to mean, with relation to these statements? > Export controls on Key Escrow products will be relaxed > progressively as the infrastructure matures. Why not eliminate escrow controls on all products? (1) The escrow agency must meet performance requirements for law enforcement access. Again, whither "voluntary"? > To participate in the network a user needs a public key >certificate signed by a CA which "binds" the user's identity >to their public key. That's simply wrong. No certification is needed to use public-key encryption, as users of PGP well know. > One condition of obtaining a certificate >is that sufficient information (e.g., private keys or other >information as appropriate) has been escrowed with a certified >escrow authority to allow access to a user's data or >communications.(3) (As noted before, this might be the CA or >an independent escrow authority). The certificate creation >process is pictured above. Sounds like more abuse of the word, "voluntary." > For users to have confidence in the KMI, CAs must meet >minimum standards for security, performance, and liability. A >Policy Approving Authority (PAA) certifies CAs for operation. >The PAA sets rules and responsibilities for ensuring the >integrity of the CAs. The PAA is also responsible for setting >CA performance criteria to meet law enforcement needs. "Voluntary"? > If law enforcement has obtained legal authority to access >a user's encrypted data or communications, it would certify >that authorization to the escrow authority. The escrow >authority will then relinquish information sufficient to >access the user's communication. "Voluntary"? What if the user has already come to an agreement with the escrow authority that under no circumstances should any key be disclosed? What if the user only gives the escrow authority an encrypted key? >III. Some Issues > Difficult issues include i) how to refine the application >of export controls, ii) whether and to what extent to permit ?self-escrow, More "voluntary" abuse... >Export Controls > The task, then, is to find a method of applying >export controls that meets the interest of national security, >public safety, privacy, and competitiveness. Uh, have you forgotten about "individual freedom"? > Freedom to choose any mutually trusted certificate >authority may accommodate the above interests. How about "freedom to choose NO trusted certificate authority"? >(4) In addition, >allowing ready export of products of any bit length to markets >where the key management infrastructure, which complies with >statuatory constraints, is in place to permit government >access to keys, would provide both a level market for U.S. >manufacturers and higher quality security products for users. I don't want a "level playing field" here. I want a free, unrestricted, and open playing field. >Products that meet defined performance requirements and which >will not operate until the key is escrowed with an appropriate >certificate authority will address commercial, public safety >and national security needs. But they won't address individual freedom needs. (4) A mutually trusted authority is an escrow agent trusted by users to store keys and trusted by law enforcement to provive access upon certification of lawful authority. How can I trust any organization that will compromise my privacy on request by the government thugs? >Transition > We are working toward a policy that permits licensing of >key recovery encryption systems regardless of algorithm, bit >length, or whether implemented in hardware or software, once >needed infrastructure and government-to-government agreements >are in place. Don't bother. I have an easier system already. "Free and unencumbered exports for all software and hardware." There, that's easy. > In the interim we recognize that the policy must >make it worthwhile for manufacturers and users to invest in >escrowed KMI. In other words, you want to misuse the power of government to bribe them into cooperation. With these objectives in mind, and consistent >with applicable statutes, But ignoring most of the US Constitution... the interim policy will consider: Prior to formal government-to-government agreements: >+ Permitting export of products that use an escrowed KMI to > approved markets, e.g., Europe or Australia, consistent > with the policies of the destination country. What if "the politcies of the destination country" don't ask for ANY escrow system? Are you saying you'll support free export in those cases? > Continuing and expanding the administration's previously > announced key escrow initiative by permitting the export > of 64 bit S/W or 80 bit H/W key escrow products that meet > defined performance requirements, after one-time review, > to any destination if keys will be escrowed in the U.S., > or in foreign countries with which the U.S. has a > govvernment-to-government key escrow agreement. Not acceptable. How about 128-bit, non-escrowed softeware? That would be a good start. > Permitting the export of other products on a case-by-case > determination that such exports are consistent with US > interests. Maybe you meant, "government interests"? > The proposals for an interim export control policy are >founded on the assumption that the products will require the >use of an escrowed KMI in a country with which the U.S. has a >government-to-government agreement. Aha! So you're assuming THEIR country's thugs and OUR country's thugs will gang up on us? > The interim policy also reflects a judgment that overseas >escrow of key will generally be permissible with suitable >government-to-government arrangements. There is a concern that >U.S. products with keys escrowed in the U.S. will not be >saleable overseas. Hence, it may be possible to permit >overseas escrow in Europe, even before government-to- >government arrangments are completed. This exception is >possible since the European countries are already moving to >implement key escrow systems and we can reasonably expect to >enter into law enforcement agreements in the near term. Danger Will Robinson! Danger! >The >OECD's goal of negotiating multilateral cryptography >guidelines by 31 December 1996 is further evidence of European >intent and momentum in infrastructure development. YES! Gotta make sure you don't get your collective butts kicked out of power , huh? The interim policy reflects a differentiation between hardware and software products, i.e., hardware products with greater bit lengths are treated more favorably under this policy. Hardware implementations of products permit more confident binding between encryption and the key management, limiting the risk that the encryption can be easily stripped from the key management and used independently of key recovery. Uh, where's that "voluntary"? >Software does not provide similar protection. This >said, the interim policy to permit export of 64 bit software >key recovery products would reflect a significant increase >over the bit length restrictions applicable to non-key >recovery products. Self-Escrow > Self-escrow will be a principal concern of many large >corporations that want to provide corporate data recovery, >protect against loss of proprietary data from use of an >outside escrow agent, and simply for reasons of efficiency and >cost. Hence, self-escrow must be considered as an acceptable >option. How about "non-escrow"? > A solution is a national policy which allows CAs for an >organization to serve as escrow authorities if they can meet >necessary performance requirements. These requirements should >be determined by government in consultation with industry and >should address timeliness, security, confidentiality of >requests for, or release of, keys, and independence of the >escrow authority from the rest of the organization. To this >end, the government should seek legislation that would shield >organization certificate authorities from internal pressures >in the course of law enforcement investigations. In other words, you don't want "honesty" to affect the snitches? >Legislation > There is some consensus that the ultimate legislative >package should include provisions to criminalize the >unauthorized disclosure/use of escrowed key, provisions to >authorize civil actions by victims against those responsible >for the unauthorized disclosure/use of escrowed key, >provisions specifying the circumstances in which escrowed key >may be requested and released (e.g., death of a family member >or employee), and establishing liability protection for >certificate authorities who exercizes due prudence in the >fulfillment of their performance obligations. What about requirements that people whose keys are requested be notified immediately of such a request and are given an opportunity to challenge it, or even better given an opportunity to demand that the key is erased, or given an opportunity to FAIL to provide a decrypt key to unlock the escrowed decrypt key? >Government to Government Agreements > > There is an expressed need by all govenments to have >access to information affecting their own security Finally they admit it! > To demonstrate resolve and good faith, the United States >Government should immediately: > The only way the US government could demonstrate "good faith" is to disband itself immediately. 6. Negotiate with other governments arrangements for access to escrowed keys consistent with national sovereignty, national security, and public safety. As trusted partners, industry and government can share expertise and tackle intractable problems such as the insecure operating system. In times past, the cryptographic algorithm was the core of the solution: now it is the easy part. The debate over algorithms and bit lengths should end: it is time for industry and governments to work together to secure the GII in such a way that does not put the world at risk. We agree that "the debate over algorithms and bit lengths should end." We just think it should end with complete and total elimination of export restrictions. Period! Key Recovery Performance Criteria Key recovery provides for backup storage of a user's private keys. This backup capability helps ensure the availability of a user's data even after it has been encrypted. It also provides for an effective means for law enforcement access. Key recovery requirements whould be viewed from the perspective of the individual, the corporation, or governments that require access. Most of the criteria to be discussed have a dimension for key recovery on an individual basis as well as from a corporate or government perspective. The criteria can be grouped into three categories. + Confidentiality - Confidentiality must be maintained on all requests for release of key recovery information. WHY? If the system is VOLUNTARY.... [is there some reason that the bozo didn't include an email address?] Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"tcmay(a)got.net" 20-MAY-1996 06:17:52.64 >But any country that is "anti-Scientology" is likely to be repressive in >various ways we would find inimical to our goals. Germany is a prime >example: yes, they have placed restrictions on the CoS, but they have also >ordered crackdowns on Internet sites. >Whatever one may think of Scientology, or Catholicism, or Baalism, or >whatever, crackdowns by the government ("anti-Scientology," >"anti-Catholic," etc.) is not a good thing. I do not disagree with that countries shouldn't place any more restrictions on Scientology than they do on any other profit-making business. It's simply that a remailer operator would be more likely to win in court in such a country; if Scientology isn't _allowed_ in a country, this isn't good but they at least can't exactly do any nuisance suits. To a lesser degree, they might be suable back very easily if the judge & jury were sympathetic. I got the basic idea from the regulatory arbitrage section in your Cyphernomicon, as it happens. -Allen

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Re: Senator Leahy, your public key please?
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com" "Bill Stewart" 20-MAY-1996 03:34:34.06 >While I agree that keyservers don't need to validate keys - that's a >job for the web of trust, and the keyserver-admin could sign keys >if he/she/it wanted to - it may make sense for the keyservers to only >accept keys in messages signed by the key itself. (Just signing the key >doesn't help much here; you need to sign the key-plus-signatures.) >Does it make sense to include some similar capability in PGP itself? I would suggest that the keyserver should simply keep track (via keeping the signatures) of which signatures were with the key holder's permission (signed by the key holder) and which aren't. This won't be necessary for mutually-signing keys, of course. -Allen

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Re: Canada allows crypto exports
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:30 AM 5/22/96, M. Plumb wrote: >Several months ago I filed a set of export applications requesting >permission to export cryptographic software from Canada. I learned a >few things from these applications, my conversations with people at >Export Controls, and my own careful reading of Canada's export laws. > > There are a few countries to which you may not export anything, > without a permit. Except for trading with Cuba, same countries U.S. specifies. > You need a permit to export most cryptographic software. As per arrangements with U.S. > Cryptographic software of U.S. origin may be exported, but you > need to file paperwork. Canada is the 51st state, or possibly only a terrritory or possession. > Cryptographic software from other countries may be exported without > any paperwork. As with the U.S. > These are the Canadian rules. Canada interprets and enforces the > U.S. export laws when they think it is necessary. While the U.S. > government has sometimes objected to a Canadian interpretation, no > Canadian exporter, acting with Canadian permission, has been charged > by the U.S. government. Despite the above, just how could a Canadian exporter, in Canada, be "charged" by the U.S. government? Please explain. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Remailers vs Nyms - conflicting assumptions?
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"raph(a)cs.berkeley.edu" "Raph Levien" 19-MAY-1996 05:46:40.03 >Bruce Baugh wrote: >> What would it take to create a nym server that could route around the death >> or disability of any given mailer? >Well, that would be a serious problem. The big question is: who decides >the routing? With the existing nym setup, the client decides the entire >route. The nymserver knows only the first hop. For the nymserver to be >able to route around damage, it would have to know that there is damage, >and that implies knowing the route. Could a reply block be restructured so as to have a series of binary/trinary/whatever decisions embedded in it, in encrypted form? In other words, the remailer doing the remailing knows (transiently, hopefully) to whom it's sending. It would have a choice of two remailers to use for this, and would wipe the other reply block (replacing it with random gibberish). If two were down, it could do a random choice; if one was down, it would send it via that one; if both were down, you get the same situation as currently. Now, one problem that I can see is increasing the length of the reply block-perhaps greatly if it was done enough. Given the need for fixed lengths (e.g., Mixmaster) to really get around traffic analysis, this could be a problem. There's also the question (to be left up to the user) of whether you should try any remailers again in the chain if the choice had earlier said no. If the answer was yes, then you'd have a greater chance of it hitting a remailer that didn't realize another remailer was down. If the answer was no, traffic analysis would be helped by knowing - if a remailer was subverted - that it was less likely that a particular remailer was going to be used. Indeed, with subversion you could choose the easier-to-trace remailer to send messages through when you had a choice. -Allen

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