December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

COMPLETELY ANONYMOUS POSTING & E-MAIL (fwd)
by William Knowles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Posted in one of the sex newsgroups... In article <4n02a7$ime(a)newsbf02.news.aol.com> shhhnet(a)aol.com (ShhhNet) writes: From: shhhnet(a)aol.com (ShhhNet) Subject: COMPLETELY ANONYMOUS POSTING & E-MAIL Date: 10 May 1996 14:35:51 -0400 COMPLETELY ANONYMOUS POSTING & E-MAIL Send and receive E-Mail and Post to newsgroups with TOTAL anonymity As you must know the government is getting ready to crack down on freedom of speech on the internet. Already people are being fined and imprisoned. Your service providers are being asked to turn over records and they are cooperating. Even if they don't want to cooperate the can be forced by the courts to release records to the authorities. Our New Service let's you send and receive E-Mail and post to newsgroups with no fear of your messages ever being traced to you. Not even a Federal Court Order will result in your identity being revealed. Finally total safety for your most confidential or controversial electronic messages. ShhhNET Will begin operating in late June and you can be a part of the only truly secure way to send and receive E-Mail or post to UseNet Newsgroups. For a limited time ShhhNet will be offered for only $50.00 per Year. If you are interested, Please send E-Mail to ShhhNet(a)AOL.Com We will respond with information about how our service works and how you can be totally secure in your Internet transactions.

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Re: Why does the state still stand:
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"frantz(a)netcom.com" 15-MAY-1996 22:39:50.97 >You could require daily payment and forgo the escrow agent. (Assuming you >are willing to risk a day's pay as an experiment in reputation.) Note that This could work for fixed payments. But what about things like profit-sharing? >What may be a problem for such a company is a social problem. All the >creative groups I have worked with have had close personal relations. >(Although they have not had wide agreement on significant non-work >subjects!) I don't know if good, creative, group-produced products can be >built without such a relationship. Does anyone know of an example of such >a product from an "anonymous" environment? No, but you might want to take a look at some psychiatrists & clinical psychologists who are doing some work over the Net, including anonymnity. It's discussed in the most recent or next-most-recent US News & World Report; I'll try to remember to bring my copy in to give the URLs mentioned. I did spot that they could use some boosts on the anonymnity and privacy side - they weren't using encryption, and the payments were via credit card. Someone from Mark Twain or Digicash contacting them would appear to be a good idea, as well as someone encouraging them to use Mixmaster-type anonymous remailers; I'd prefer if someone with more experience than I sent them an email about it. -Allen

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Re: Securing CDROM from piracy
by Vipul Ved Prakash 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > >Is there any way of making > >sure that the guy doesnt pull a fast on on us? Can we ensure that he cannot > >duplicate the thing and start selling it without sharing the profit. > > Well, I suppose you could get it copyrighted before you hand it over for > distribution. I'd also put my logo and other info somewhere in the code, > such as an "About" box. They would have a hard time saying it wasn't > yours. > You are missing the point. Lets say a firm X is marketing my product. Now if they sell 500,000 copies and tell me that they have sold only 100,000, I have no way of figuring out. -- .od8888bo. \|/ .d%::::88::888b. (@ @) .d888::::::::8:888%. ------------------oOO-(_)-OOo----------------- 88888:::::::88888::%. You walk across with your flowers in your hand d888888:::88;888888::b Trying to tell me no one understands 888888888:888888888888 Trade in your hours for a hand full of dimes Y8888888::::::888888%P Gonna make it baby in our prime. '8888888:::::::8888:%' ---------------------------------------------- '88888888:::888888%' Vipul Ved Prakash Fax : +91-11-3328849 '8888888::88888%' Positive Ideas. Internet : vipul(a)pobox.com '"Y88%B8P"' ----------------------------------------------

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Re: CyberTraveler Auction - Unsubscrive
by molecul1＠molecule1.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Dear Molecule, > > >Best regards, >Cathay Pacific Airways Limited >Los Angeles Marketing Department > >P.S. remove yourself from the CyberTraveler program, (should you wish to). >Simply go to http://www.cathay-usa.com/remove.html. Thank you. > >>>Dear Cathay, > >>> Unsubscrive Molecule1(a)electriciti.com > >>> In peace & wish the purest of wishes. >>> sincerely, >>> M1.

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Re: Why does the state still stand:
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 15 May 96 at 15:48, jim bell wrote: > I understand your...uh...caution. But as scary as it may be to > "us," it's going to be even more terrifying to those it is likely to > eliminate. Sort of the difference between two parachute jumps: With > and without a parachute! Mr Bell. Please do not refer to me as being part of what you call "us". The fact that I exchanged on the topic of AP, and more particularly on its intrinsical workings and logic does not mean that I endorse nor like it. Please read what I wrote and stick to it. Respectfully. JFA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQEVAwUBMZohdsiycyXFit0NAQE8HQgAj0YvSDLxlWVKiDVcHfMHRerNwNEc3qxa hu5GAqlyvHF493AGpahgtCnzj3qcvcJjqqp+AR1QLGeGhn6+CjxFpv5E3iEjNGb3 NXKc4Mk11m/bEeZF6xoK/1R+tXLzYoXvKS43s69tu7y7fY7jg/q+fIkUWAin2KqV u03iXapqndBT4lvr2HHYtzkHJosH7DFfvFDGpWhHNW6p/aEM8EjJdGKmNgQFB+QG 0cV3Chsdb6jjQui9OyfeYkn9IvsgbQk+4l0LhfMu8+XcNQ2jSQdXgoGGXqH67lJJ /ai49LqVXbT1tAePjziud5l8KG5+V4oFqLKRP/g7MgRRPxdAPtGrgQ== =z3tY -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Limoges porcelain, Silverware and mouth blown crystal glasses JFA Technologies, R&D consultants. Physists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

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Re: Rural Datafication (Was Re: Edited Edupage, 9 May 1996)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:10 PM 5/15/96, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > I've gone even farther than that - I don't bother with having a TV, I >just get my info from the net. There is the problem with the satellite net >links that it tends to concentrate data production & distribution into >relatively few hands, from which it can easier be taken by government and other ... Just to make it clear, the _least_ of _my_ reasons for having a satellite dish and televisions in general is to "get info." (Though even when I do want to "get info," I tend to turn to CNN, CNBC, PBS, etc., and not to use the generally short summaries that are carried on the Net, sans video of course.) I won't argue for television pro or con...I'm sure most folks here have met people who are religiously anti-television and who radiate superiority in pointing out that the last time they saw a television program was when "Nicholas Nickleby" was broadcast. Whatever. But having both a video/satellite system and, obviously, a Net/Web system, they are very different things. To each their own. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Securing CDROM from piracy
by Vipul Ved Prakash 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > On Wed, 15 May 1996, Vipul Ved Prakash wrote: > > > We have developed a multimedia resource that will be cut on a CD-ROM for > > retailling. Since we don't have our own distributers newtwork we will be > > collobarating with another firm for distribution. Is there any way of making > > sure that the guy doesnt pull a fast on on us? Can we ensure that he cannot > > duplicate the thing and start selling it without sharing the profit. Or > > alternatively is there any protocol we could follow that will ensure a fair > > game? > > > Think serial numbers that are cryptographicaly secure. If you're the > only one giving them out and only to registered users, nobody can pirate > without it being traced back to them. Basically have your softrware > disable itself after say 30 days unless a serial number is enterded. Enlighten me! keeping in mind that the distributer will be cutting the CD and the customer will never be in contact with us. Cheers, Vipul -- .od8888bo. \|/ .d%::::88::888b. (@ @) .d888::::::::8:888%. ------------------oOO-(_)-OOo----------------- 88888:::::::88888::%. You walk across with your flowers in your hand d888888:::88;888888::b Trying to tell me no one understands 888888888:888888888888 Trade in your hours for a hand full of dimes Y8888888::::::888888%P Gonna make it baby in our prime. '8888888:::::::8888:%' ---------------------------------------------- '88888888:::888888%' Vipul Ved Prakash Fax : +91-11-3328849 '8888888::88888%' Positive Ideas. Internet : vipul(a)pobox.com '"Y88%B8P"' ----------------------------------------------

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Re: Past one terabit/second on fiber
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:38 PM 5/15/96 -0400, Alan Horowitz wrote: >Hey, let's build faster and faster fiber-optic networks. Let's create >bandwidth so cheap that it won't even pay to meter it. > >Yes, the world's problems will be solved if we have more and more people >talking longer longer and longer on the telephone, sending each other >more and more pages of faxes and e-mails, creating more Web pages, >playing virtual reality games. Anything and everything must be done to >encourage people to occupy and consume bandwidth. > >Now that's progress, don't you think? Yes, I do! Because these activities don't just happen by themselves, they take the place of other activities which were formerly done in their place. The trivial example of sending letters has been replaced by email. Shopping (by foot or by car) is now a web activity. Telecommuting for many is an option, and will be more so in the future. In fact, I would say that one of the best results of Internet connectivity has been a strong increase in political awareness. We just recently had the "Tax Freedom Day" which should alert you that our own time has been co-opted by government for its own ends. Web activity is low-energy consuming, not particularly risky, and is actually fun for many. Eventually, people may take "Virtual Reality Vacations" where they can visit without travel. Since you spend more time at home, you are less subject to crime. Is this progress? Damn right it is! It saves gas, food, human lives, and what will eventually be a great deal of money that won't have to be spend on transportation facilities. It will eventually get us out from under the yoke of tyranny, which should be the ultimate goal. True, it's _different_ than what we're used to, but that's okay. If anything, that's why some people will resist it, but that doesn't make them right. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Any DLL's that handle Public Key Encryption or Key Exchange?
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Death rays from Mars made Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> write: >There's an RSAEURO drop-in clone of RSAREF that's on ftp.ox.ac.uk, so you >could write a version of your software that lets Yankees and non-Yankees drop >in whichever version is appropriate without worrying about patent or copyright >problems. I've already got a nice fast RSA implementation, so I think I'll stick with that. Besides, I'm not terribly keen on using a library which has stolen code in it. If anyone wants to create an RSAREF version, all you need to do is replace one module (lib_rsa.c) with an RSAREF-compatible version (that's why I mentioned plug-in encryption modules in the docs - you just unplug the existing code and plug in RSAREF instead). What you need to do is use RSAPublicBlock() and RSAPrivateBlock(), the rest is just wrapper code which you can base on the existing lib_rsa.c. My estimate is that it's about an afternoons work. >Any RSAREF system used in the US has the problem that it's limited to the >"official" interfaces, which means you can't do fully general RSA without >permission. I got permission from RSADSI to bypass the official interface to RSAREF for HPACK, my archiver which has PGP-compatible encryption, in 1993. However I suspect getting permission for the same thing in a general-purpose library, especially one which has RC2, RC4, and DESX[1] in it, may be difficult since parts of the library are essentially a free version of BSAFE (not by design, they just ended up that way). [1] Well, it will have DESX once I can get some test vectors to make sure I've got it right. Does anyone have some I can use? Peter.

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Re: Spending a year dead for tax purposes
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:35 PM 5/14/96 -0700, Hal <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> wrote: >I think the intention then is to create "fully anonymous" companies. >These would be organizations whose principals and employees are known >only by pseudonyms, even to each other. Their only contact is >electronic, via an anonymous network. And the employees are paid in >anonymous ecash, which they don't pay taxes on since it is unreported >income. ... >Such companies would be illegal, with everyone involved subject to >criminal penalties for tax evasion (and no doubt a myriad of other >violations). But because the anonymity is protected cryptographically, The companies themselves don't have to be illegal, and the principals and employees may have varying needs for pseudonymity, depending on how they're organized. On the other hand, the governments have different possible responses to different approaches. For instance, an Anguillan company Aliceco owned by a non-American could sell software products, either its own (produced by contractors from unspecified countries) or distributed for other vendors (Bobware, in an unspecified country, delivered via the net.) It wouldn't be illegal in Anguilla. Its developers/subvendors might be breaking local law by not reporting the digicash Aliceco paid them, but that's not Aliceco's problem - especially if Aliceco bought/hired them from Caribsoft, another Anguillan company. And Caribsoft may not know where they live - after all, _it_ doesn't have tax forms to fill out, and it doesn't care where Fred(a)Foomail.fi or JaneDoe(a)mailbox.Jersey.uk lives. If Yankees or US companies owned Aliceco and Caribsoft, they'd presumably have to report it for taxes if it made money, but a local owner making a few percent is in a different position. Now, the US government _could_ declare a 50% import duty on imported software (avoiding the uncollectability of income tax) which would of course be evaded. The government could respond to this by requiring all software to include a serial # and the TaxID number of the vendor (if the vendor is an importer, then she'd have to have Customs Receipts or other documentation of US origin to expense her costs for tax purposes.) In this environment, the employees would have to remain unknown to the US, but might be known to the Aliceco or Caribsoft. Of course, Alice may be a Fed, or Caribsoft employee Paul may be a Plant, so there are some benefits to pseudonymity; depends on how paranoid you need to be. Or they could declare Anguilla to be an Economic-Terrorist Enemy, covered by the Trading With The Enemies (Especially Cuba) Act. Restricting acceptance of foriegn digicash would be difficult. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:29 PM 5/15/96 -0700, you wrote: >What do I need to do to support a remailer that posts to non binary >newsgroups? (I do not have root control on a unix machine other than my >employers machine, for which I am unlikely to receive approval to use >in this fashion.) 1) You either need lots of patience, or you need to really _not_ care about people getting spammed from your remailer. The patience is because you'll get some flames, and you really should read the remailer-operators(a)c2.org newsgroup to keep track of spammers or spammees that you need to block. Most of the remailers make it easy to block based on origin or destination of messages by putting a pattern in their block files. Adding content blocking is just a Simple Matter of Programming, but it's getting to be necessary given some of the spams to newsgroups these days, such as posting hate articles with a victim's name attached. 2) You need a machine that will accept nntp news postings from you. It's probably much more convenient if you can get the postings to go out with your own domain on them (jim.com is fine; isp.net is okay, employer.com is bad, employer's-isp.com is less bad.) Play around with the machine you're getting your newsfeed from. 3) You need a news-capable remailer; I've got a modified ghio2 downloadable from http://idiom.com/~wcs/remailer.c ; modify the relevant #defines for your remailer's information, compile and go. 4) I suppose if you're going to hack the remailer anyway, you could add a feature that adds a trailer like ================================================================== This message was posted from the anonymous remailer at www.jim.com. Send any complaints to webmaster(a)www.jim.com . Please don't post any copyrighted material longer than fair use quotations. And did you know that Scientology's highly overpriced documents say that "<random paragraph quotation>" =================================================================== # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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RISKS: YANSF (Yet Another Netscape Security Flaw)
by stevenw＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reposted from RISKS: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 17 May 1996 17:11:34 -0400 From: Ed Felten <felten(a)CS.Princeton.EDU> Subject: Netscape 2.02 RISK SECURITY FLAW IN NETSCAPE 2.02 We have discovered an attack that allows a Java applet running under Netscape Navigator 2.02 to generate and execute arbitrary machine code. The attack combines a new security bug found by Tom Cargill with some ideas previously discovered by the Princeton team. We have implemented a demonstration applet that deletes a file. We are not yet releasing technical details. For more information, contact Ed Felten (felten(a)cs.princeton.edu, 609-258-5906), or see http://www.cs.princeton.edu/sip/News.html Tom Cargill Independent Consultant http://www.csn.net/~cargill/ Dirk Balfanz, Drew Dean, Ed Felten, Dan Wallach Dept. of Computer Science, Princeton University http://www.cs.princeton.edu/sip/ ------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | Weller's three steps to Greatness: | 1. See what others cannot | 2. Think what others cannot stevenw(a)best.com | 3. Express what others cannot

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"Too cheap to meter"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:38 AM 5/16/96, Alan Horowitz wrote: >Hey, let's build faster and faster fiber-optic networks. Let's create >bandwidth so cheap that it won't even pay to meter it. "Too cheap to meter"? Wasn't that what nuclear power promised in the 1950s? (I'm actually a supporter of nuclear power, for a variety of reasons, so this is not meant as just a cheap shot against nuke plants. But this was one of the "selling points" of nuclear, later shown to be a falsehood.) Alan's irony is well-placed. The most egregious repetition of the "too cheap to meter" nonsense is George Gilder's "dark fiber" vision...a vision of "infinite bandwidth" to all users. Guess what? If Gilder's "dark fiber" is ever built, there are a lot of folks who will "fill it" rather quickly. Canter and Siegel were just the beginning. "Too cheap to meter" goes away pretty quickly. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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RE: Why does the state still stand:
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- From: Self <Single-user mode> To: Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> Subject: RE: Why does the state still stand: Reply-to: jf_avon(a)citenet.net Date: Wed, 15 May 1996 20:47:38 On 15 May 96 at 21:19, Black Unicorn wrote: > Well then, AP will simply not work in the large scheme of things. It > cannot be used to enforce anonymous transactions. The scope of > transactions that can be made anonymous is so large so as to make AP > an incomplete justice system. Moreover it will simply motivate > others to use more anonymous transactions, and into the cycle of > AP's downfall we go. > > AP will have "An ever increasing share, of a shrinking market." > > This, in itself, may be enough to prevent AP's implementation. Well, you might have a point. And I hope so. The AP scheme finds its uses mainly against govts or non-anonymous large entities that are perceived as coercive in nature. I do not think that it will become prevalent in the inter-individual interactions. What I hate about the scheme is that I see it being used for pulling down peoples that are too good at what they do. I never pretended that petty feelings, jalousy and envy does not exists. I can see at least half of the business peoples putting a price on another half of a given field. I personnally believe that most peoples were thaught screwed-up ethics and that therefore, they are highly unpredictable. But I doubt that AP won't get started locally for various reasons and various uses. As for Jim Bell's opinion that it might overtake govt, it might be true. After all, the initial reason for anonymity, if not for conning somebody else but to protect oneself from government's point of view... An anonymous transaction system would become hunted down by govt pretty quickly. They could probably prosecute zip out of anybody but OTOH, they could very well make life a living hell for many individuals. The natural reaction for some of theses individuals would be to seek/set-up an AP server. And from that moment, the news and reward would be known around the world within a short time, even to peoples not connected to the net. JFA DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee; Limoges porcelain, silverware and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants; physists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

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Re: Why does the state still stand:
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>A related >problem is that of government agents signing on. > Both of the above are made more acute by the possibility that some >information, if revealed, might enable the government to disrupt activities - >even if it doesn't enable prosecution. Making sure that the participants have >a strong stake in behaving properly - e.g., shares in the outcome, ecash >deposits, and - most importantly in dissuading governmental intervention - >reputation riding on it. Remember the old saying, "The best defense is a good offense." Another way to say it is to notice that it's usually far easier to disrupt another person's intricate activities than to do them yourself: In a contest in a closed room between a person building a house of cards and another person trying to knock them down, the latter person can be expected to easily win. Making a profit or salary is work; compared to this, collecting taxes is like knocking it down, and the tax collector has an advantage. But if you turn this around, and attack the attacker, the advantage is now in the hands of those trying to paralyze the tax system. >The last is most important in dissuading governmental >intervetion because of the reserves of wealth the government is likely to have >for some time; they can afford to pay (using your and my tax dollars) for >the short-term costs to a subject. On the other hand, the government also has enormous "obligations" that keep it close to bankruptcy. It wouldn't take a great deal of interference in its ability to collect taxes to put it solidly in the red based on current receipts. And remember, if the individuals who populate government could be persuaded that their tenure would be forcibly shortened if they didn't resign, they wouldn't stick around. Once that cohesiveness of jointly sucking on the government tit is eliminated, I think they'll cut and run. These people are working for a fat paycheck and the promise of a retirement package, and it wouldn't take much convincing to show them that they won't get either for very long. I'm convinced that's why so many Senators and Representatives are leaving office at the end of their current term, for instance. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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RE: Edited Edupage, 9 May 1996
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry Metzger wrote: >As long as this is now CypherCesspit and not CypherPunks, I might as well play the game. Thinking of game theory, couldn't the prisoner's dilemma apply to this; where what is best for the group is not necessarily best for the individual. >Every year since World War II, expenditures in real dollars have increased per pupil at the government schools. Every year, average class size has gone down in the government schools. I would be curious to know your source for this information. The information I have indicates that in California when Ronald Reagan became governor, 80% of the funding for state universities such as UC Berkeley and UCLA came from the public purse. Last year, only 24% of the funding came from the government. I would have trouble believing that the overall school system was radically different. The teenage children of a visiting Brazilian professor commented that no other country was like Canada in the sense that people here received a low cost education and did not go destitute. Contrast this to their situation in Brazil where off duty police officers are often hired by merchants to get rid of the street urchins that disrupt their businesses. See current edition of french Photo magazine (cover Ayrton Sennas ex girl friend) for a pictorial. Scientific American (June 1995) has an article entitled The Arithmetics of Mutual Help - Computer experiments show how cooperation rather than exploitation can dominate in the Darwinian struggle for survival. To paraphrase, cooperation arises naturally in most biological systems. Lone defectors do well, but by spreading, defeat themselves. (See: CypherCessPool for example). I appreciate my free public education. I might not have been so forward thinking if I had to go deeply into debt to finance it myself. >Actually, I believe most people on this list argue for no government or so little that its decisions hardly matter. I agree. Unfortunately, that would seem to put me in the minority. James >Perry jbugden(a)alis.com What we do not understand, we do not possess. - Goethe

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Why the Poor are Mostly Deserving of their Fate
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:18 AM 5/17/96, snow wrote: >On Wed, 15 May 1996, Jim McCoy wrote: >> There are two kinds of libertarians, those who hate the poor and those who >> don't. I always seem to meet the former, I am beginning to suspect the >> latter don't exist. By the way, I certainly don't "hate the poor," as a class. More on this in a bit, but I certainly was not raised in a wealthy family, and I started my working career living in a tiny (and I do mean tiny) studio apartment in Santa Clara, CA. > Hi Mr. McCoy, My name is Petro, and I _am_ a poor libertarian >(well, sort of a libertarian, I tend to think they are a little short >sighted, and a little to authoritarian to me) Many of us ARE poor. We may >not _like_ being poor, and some of us are working to get out of that >situation, but most of us don't "hate" the poor. We (well, I) hate people >with their hands out. This is everyone from poor people who _won't_ try to >get out of their situation, to Multi-billion dollar corporations that >recieve government grants for over seas advertising to old people who >didn't plan for their "golden years" and expect us to provide the gold. Agreed. I was a libertarian (and a Libertarian, I guess, as I voted for the first LP candidate, John Hospers, in 1972) even when I was poor, in college. (No car, and I declined to attend MIT or Stanford, both of whom had accepted me, as their costs would've been an unduly-large burden on my parents.) Once working and ensconced in my tiny little studio apartment, I worked my butt off, working 10 hour days, 6 days a week, and sometimes some 16 hour days (no overtime). I made it a point to save as much as I could, foregoing various immediate gratifications that many in my cohort were partaking of. By the time I'd been working for 6-8 years, things really started to pay off, financially and professionally. I put the money I'd saved into small companies I thought would do well...companies like Sun, Apple, Genentech, and, of course, my own company, Intel. By the time I'd worked there for 12 years, I'd accumulated enough in savings and investments to never work again. So I bailed out and have lived the last 10 years doing as I please. (Still sounds good to me.) My point? Some of it was luck, some of it was hard work, some of it was my native abilities. But I saw some of my fellow engineers fail to invest, fail to save...and they are mostly still working. And of course I saw many in the "larger community" who spent their paychecks, who saw their earnings go up their nose (remember, this was the 1970s and 80s), and who found as many ways as they could to avoid hard work. An important point is this: it wasn't all "luck." At least not in the sense of luck at a roulette wheel. In fact, nearly all of my cohorts who worked hard and invested wisely really did well. (And people starting out can do just as well, perhaps even faster than my cohort did...look at the 3-10x increases in stock prices in less than 2 years of so many companies!) The effects are obvious: some of those who failed to study, prepare, work, save, and invest are now seeking to use "democracy" to take away the assets of those who did all these things. Many of them talk about "privilege" and claim that "white males" got all the benefits, conveniently ignoring that the same benefits were available to any of the Asians, women, or, indeed, coloreds, who similarly studied, prepared, worked, saved, and invested. Some of them now claim that we libertarians "hate the poor," that we lack "compassion." I'm tempted to say "Fuck them," but that would be rude. Instead, I'll say that those who think "the poor" are being victimized by "the rich" should take a close look at how wealth is actually created. It is only partly "luck" that is responsible for success. I look at the vast number of new markets and new fortunes that have been created since I stopped working, and I am more convinced than ever that anyone who is willing to work in a field which is in demand and who keeps up with developments, works hard, shows initiative, etc., will do extremely well. Sadly, about 60% of the adult population of the U.S. doesn't think this way, doesn't have "the culture of success," and instead looks to the government to give them benefits, handouts, and jobs. These people are headed for the scrap heap. Strong crypto builds walls against this unruly mob. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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[NOISE] Re:Rural Datafication (via RFC 1149)
by Steve Reid 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hmm... Maybe this could be a low-cost way to get rural areas connected to the internet? The RFC says it's primarily for metropolitan areas, but I believe it could be equally effective in rural areas. :) (BTW, this is a "real" RFC. I got it from ftp.internic.net.) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Network Working Group D. Waitzman Request for Comments: 1149 BBN STC 1 April 1990 A Standard for the Transmission of IP Datagrams on Avian Carriers Status of this Memo This memo describes an experimental method for the encapsulation of IP datagrams in avian carriers. This specification is primarily useful in Metropolitan Area Networks. This is an experimental, not recommended standard. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Overview and Rational Avian carriers can provide high delay, low throughput, and low altitude service. The connection topology is limited to a single point-to-point path for each carrier, used with standard carriers, but many carriers can be used without significant interference with each other, outside of early spring. This is because of the 3D ether space available to the carriers, in contrast to the 1D ether used by IEEE802.3. The carriers have an intrinsic collision avoidance system, which increases availability. Unlike some network technologies, such as packet radio, communication is not limited to line-of-sight distance. Connection oriented service is available in some cities, usually based upon a central hub topology. Frame Format The IP datagram is printed, on a small scroll of paper, in hexadecimal, with each octet separated by whitestuff and blackstuff. The scroll of paper is wrapped around one leg of the avian carrier. A band of duct tape is used to secure the datagram's edges. The bandwidth is limited to the leg length. The MTU is variable, and paradoxically, generally increases with increased carrier age. A typical MTU is 256 milligrams. Some datagram padding may be needed. Upon receipt, the duct tape is removed and the paper copy of the datagram is optically scanned into a electronically transmittable form. Discussion Multiple types of service can be provided with a prioritized pecking order. An additional property is built-in worm detection and eradication. Because IP only guarantees best effort delivery, loss of a carrier can be tolerated. With time, the carriers are self- Waitzman [Page 1] RFC 1149 IP Datagrams on Avian Carriers 1 April 1990 regenerating. While broadcasting is not specified, storms can cause data loss. There is persistent delivery retry, until the carrier drops. Audit trails are automatically generated, and can often be found on logs and cable trays. Security Considerations Security is not generally a problem in normal operation, but special measures must be taken (such as data encryption) when avian carriers are used in a tactical environment. Author's Address David Waitzman BBN Systems and Technologies Corporation BBN Labs Division 10 Moulton Street Cambridge, MA 02238 Phone: (617) 873-4323 EMail: dwaitzman(a)BBN.COM Waitzman [Page 2]

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Re: Past one terabit/second on fiber
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:09 PM 5/15/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > One problem with the development of such high-end technologies is that >they tend to increase economies of scale to the point where it's impractical to >have anything but a monopoly or ogliopoly. As well as concerns about the degree >of control such an organization may be able to exert in and of itself (acting >like a government, in essence), there's also that such an organization is >easier to pressure than a lot of small providers. Anyone have a suggested >solution, or reasons that I shouldn't be so worried? I think there are a number of reasons you shouldn't have to worry, at least about these technologies per se. What these technologies do is dramatically lower the cost of supplying the service, both allowing the usual providers to cut prices and in fact forcing them (via the market) to do so. Fiber, for example, lasts "forever," and effectively has an unlimited bandwith compared to most needs, which means that it has little cost other than the initial installation, amortized over time. You might as well forget about this 1 Tb/s fiber, for example. In order to justify such a thing, you need to have 1 Tb/s of information that you want to take from "here" to "there". A city of 1 million people would have to have a 1 Mbit/sec/person data appetite to fill that fiber, and you'd have to have a huge data infrastructure just to collect all that data in the same place. (Which would, in itself, require a mass of fibers of lower capacities.) There would probably be no need for this, either, since the data would probably not all be coming from/going to the same location. Probably the only place where 1 Tb/s fiber will be needed in the next 20+ years is undersea links, and even that is questionable. There's also the "all the eggs in one basket" problem. Send your data on 12, 80 Gb/s fibers and you have substantial redundancy. Send it on one fiber and you're more subject to downtime due to individual component failure. Secondly, fiber can be upgraded in an exceedingly economical, though granular way. As I observed a few years ago, a given cable way initially had only a single cable installed though it had capacity for three. And some of the fibers installed were probably not used immediately, due to lack of need. Finally, the fiber was probably only driven initially at a comparatively low speed (maybe 400 megabits/s, for example) but could have been later upgraded to 2.5 Gb/s, or perhaps even higher. Upgrading under those conditions is extremely cheap. The main thing we need to worry about is allowing those people with the fiber to exert influence over us to an extent greater than the cost of supplying that data-transmission service would reasonably allow. (The nosy landlord problem.) Ideally, they'd provide the fiber, we'd pay for it at a reasonable rate, and they'd be satisfied. The alternative, a busybody policy, is only practical to force on customers when the product being supplied is supply-limited. Since fiber cost is dropping like a rock, and capacity will outstrip demand for the forseeable future, there is no reason we should be limited to deal with only one organization. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Java & signed applets
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:02 PM 5/16/96, Lyal Collins wrote: >Signing anything is somewaht a waste of time, unless the verification >siftware is highly trusted, and there is good intergity/authenticity >control of the root public key(s). >So, in geneal - ho hum - until trusted hardware is available on the >desktop. Unless I am misunderstanding your message (terseness has its disadvantages), this is not really true. * Checking the signature on a signed applet is a kind of "sanity check" on the source of the software. It is rather unlikely, I think, that a malicious agent will corrupt or infect one's verification software so as to make untrusted applets looks trusted. (Ignoring what "trust" means for now.) * To wit, if you (Lyal Collins) run a signature verification applet downloaded, say, from Sun, and some time has passed and you have heard no reports that, say, Silicon Graphics broke into Sun and replaced all of Sun't applets with a malicious version, and if you have checked Sun's signature against published values (that is, you have used a public key widely disseminated, and not repudiated), then you can very probably "trust" this signature-checking procedure. (One can construct fanciful scenarios in which one's OS has been corrupted, one's microprocessor has been replaced, etc., but these are clearly fringe events. All security is economics....) (Note: I expect at least one person to argue that this is indeed a concern. Again, look to economics. How do you _really_ know that your "mother" is really your mother, and not a stranger who entered your life minutes after your birth? How do you _really_ know that a vending machine of Cokes is not able to detect your presence and give you a poisoned can of Coke?) * If one's basic signature-checking hardware and software is not compromised, signature checking works. If it _is_ compromised, you've got bigger problems. And no cryptographic system can really handle this issue. Oh, and I disagree also with the last point: "So, in geneal - ho hum - until trusted hardware is available on the desktop." What, for example, is "trusted hardware"? How does a user ever know that his hardware was not compromised at the chip factory, for example? (Not that I think this is a reasonable thing to worry about at this point, given much larger problems all around us, but I mention it to show that one gets caught in a recursive process in which one can of course never be absolutely certain of anything. The Solipsist view of things is internally consistent.) So, I'll take my chances that applet signing will be a welcome extra level of protection against malicious applets. Others are free, of course, to instead worry that their machines are insecure and the signature-checking software has cleverly been replaced by some agent trying to get them to download a malicious applet. (Of course, if They can corrupt one's crypto software, they can do all sorts of other bad things, and probably don't need to wait for you to download an applet to start doing them.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Past one terabit/second on fiber
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:23 PM 5/17/96 -0400, Alan Horowitz wrote: > >> >Now that's progress, don't you think? >> >> Yes, I do! Because these activities don't just happen by themselves, they >> take the place of other activities which were formerly done in their place. >> The trivial example of sending letters has been replaced by email. > > E-mail is cool. E-mail is lovely. I use it enthusiatically. It is >not the same thing as sitting down with a fountain pen and and some fine >stationary. I feel sorry for your significant other if your loveletters >go by e-mail. So you've found one specific instance where you don't think it's appropriate to send email. Big deal! Try again. >Yes, let's get people away from reading books. Hey, there's computer >games to play, burn that library down, will you? Want people to read books? Okay, first put the hurdle in front of them that they must go to the library. (This is particularly a hurdle for children, when not in school, because they can't drive.) Then, if the book(s) they want to read is already checked out, make them wait 1+ months until it returns. Make them come back to the library to get it, and make them return it the same way. See why some people DON'T read books? >Quantity of life is not the same as quality of life. You're misrepresenting form over substance. Information is no more valuable or trustworthy on paper than on electrons. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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The Crisis with Remailers
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:29 PM 5/15/96, jamesd(a)echeque.com wrote: >Some nyms are valuable, most are valueless by design. All remailers >should be valueless by design. The penet.fi remailer design is >unsatisfactory precisely because it penet.fi is valuable, hence a >target. If it gets shut down a lot of people lose their nyms, >causing much inconvenience. I agree with this point, and the similar points made by Hal Finney and by several others. We have far too few remailers, they are too tempting as targets, the use of "mail-to-News" gateways is formally separable from the function as a remailer, and there is generally a stagnation in the deployment of new and varied kinds of remailers and their modes of operation. We used to discuss remailer architecture, topology, functionality, and "ideal behavior" quite a bit a few years ago, but seldom do here on the Cypherpunks list anymore. Various reasons: same old discussions, commercialization of Mixmaster-type remailers (so I hear, and Lance Cottrell can clarify this if this is indeed a factor) may be inhibiting free discussion of planned features, and perhaps the discussion is going on elsewhere (on remailerpunks, or the remailer operator's list). (I'm surprised there have been no "Master's Thesis"-level analyses of remailers and the modeling of them. I had expected by now at least a couple of such studies. Even better, some even more advanced studies. The "theory of remailers" was partly laid out by Chaum in his 1981 "Untraceable E-Mail" short article--at the CSUA site at Berkeley, last I checked--but much has happened since then. A practical analysis is needed. Note: the recent paper on remailers by the SAI researcher and another is _not_ what I meant...that was just put together from Raph's page, other sources, and a few days worth of Web searches, as near as I can tell.] A much richer ecology of remailers is sorely needed. A factor of at least 10 or 20 more (100-300 remailer sites), less reliance on specific sites, an "everyone a remailer" capability (which has many elegant advantages!), more traffic, temporarily instantiated sites, digital postage, greater ease of use (especially with crypto and chaining), and such things as nominal terminal remailers choosing to add their own hops (so as to lessen their own target potential). Having some of these improvements will be a big help. In the past we have discussed many ideas related to this; I sure don't have the energy right now to recapitulate the points made over the years. Cf. my Cyphernomicon for some general features, at least as of mid-94. Also, the archives, if they ever become available again. Yes, things are stagnating at this time. Not because we discuss "off-topic" things (as we sure did in 1992-3, for example!), but for various other reasons. I suspect the enemies of remailers will sense victory and will try to force the remaining remailers to shut down or at the least to severely restrict operations. From a high of perhaps 25 remailers, we may soon be down to less than a dozen. These remaining sites will feel even more pressure. The upcoming War on Intellectual Property Piracy, with opening shots against China already fired, will put even more heat on remailers. (A remailer can't just "block" copyrighted material. It ain't practical. And digital mixes (remailers) should not, obviously, be looking at content of packets mailed. (Only the last, plaintext, message can be looked at if things are done right, but I surmise from comments by remailer operators that a lot of the traffic is not encrypted at all, and that the operators do in fact take a few peeks at what's flowing through their systems....more evidence that we are very far indeed from Chaum's ideal digital mixes.) Yes, a crisis has been brewing for months. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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HUGE denial of service attack against any ecash customer!!!
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ian Goldberg seems to be on a roll. First he figured out how to find out how anyone can determine anyone else's ecash mint balances, and now he does this. The man's a genius. If you don't believe it, ask me, I'll tell you. ;-). Cheers, Bob Hettinga --- begin forwarded text To: ecash(a)digicash.com Path: not-for-mail From: iang(a)cs.berkeley.edu (Ian Goldberg) Newsgroups: isaac.lists.ecash Subject: HUGE denial of service attack against any ecash customer!!! Date: 15 May 1996 16:09:29 -0700 Organization: ISAAC Group, UC Berkeley Lines: 42 Sender: owner-ecash(a)digicash.com Precedence: bulk -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- (Again Cc:'d to ecash-feedback, hoping for a security prize. I wonder who's keeping track... Also Cc:'d to cypherpunks, for fun...) So I had some more free time... (Dave cringes when I say that.) Here's a cute one: Give me an account number, and I can prevent it from being used until an arbitrary time in the future (of my choosing). How? Simple. Send a deposit message with 0 coins (well, any message will work, I think, but this is one of the simplest messages there is) with a timestamp of some future time. Messages stamped prior to that (such as everything coming from the actual user for that account, until the time comes) will be politely discarded. (Actually, I think the last reply to a withdrawal request is continually resent, but I'm not exactly sure of this.) In any case, the actual user will be unable to withdraw money from his mint until the time sent in the denial-of-service message. (Unless he forward-dates his computer's clock, or something...) I've tested this against myself and Sameer (with his cooperation, of course). Anyone else want to be locked out for an hour? (Actually, I could pretty effectively lock out _everyone_ for an arbitrarily long time, it seems...) - Ian "Right. I want the sources to the client and the server released. Now." :-) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMZpj3kZRiTErSPb1AQF0SAQAmOEZJTg0v3utWFodDXZ4iv4xa7I+QbNQ Nlsbkug8dtkdf+Jboe+vBtrs5IWSSff8bWntGwfODckct26NwzpVM9bUIXohVoRQ jOkRT9a8m/X00jUAoFOTq5O5Rz87a3Uw8MGFugP5Y4DCk+UqnTA70cuozyOCgb8m 8oke89V9Q0E= =ARMe -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "If they could 'just pass a few more laws', we would all be criminals." --Vinnie Moscaritolo The e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailers
by attila 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Addressed to: Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> Cypherpunks <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> ** Reply to note from Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> 05/15/96 6:29pm -0400 = I would really like to see a remailer that is somehow blinded. = on a message basis --it is not really possible if the logs are maintained or the fed are already monitoring the stream --which is probable if they are after something --and it will increase geometically if we get Bubba again. there are a number of very sophisticated ways to play the game, but each requires a real "Web of Silence" --what makes your counterpart reliable? where do we establish that "Web of Trust" which everyone bandies about. who are the two plants for our current chain? or is this just another case of sowing dissension by the feds? I only know two or three at most of the players on the remailers at all --and that is a passing knowledge, not acquaintance. = I don't know enough about how mail paths are generatered, but is it = impossible to conceal the origin of remailer postings? = impossible to conceal each orientation, but I have been playing with several easy techniques which are sufficiently obfuscatory that the Feds will not have the horsepower to break them unless someone provides them with the methodology --that in itself violates how we (cp) have always insisted on 'post it' and get on with the attempted destruction. even if they break the methodology, they gain very little v. the technique. = Postings made to remailernym(a)alpha.c2.org would be spit out = somewhere but = without accountability? = sure, possible if you wish to play the game with a "Web of silence." = Impossible? Would do wonders defeating traffic analysis. = no, not impoosible. just who wants to be responsible for something the NSA assholes can not own --and compromise? they get down right shitty when they kick your door down in the middle of the night as take your carcass away --if nothing else works, off to Springfield you go --without charges --lest we forget the crippled president or Hustler magazine --that is what they did to him _before_ they convicted him, _and_ after. = I'd consider running a remailer, but after listening to the response to = the anonymous poster a while back, it sounds like there are few if any = simple options which do not require major time and effort to setup and = run. = you can run it out of your client account on an IAP --there's nothing special about it in a simplified form. I could support a remailer point if I could manage to get the necessary "Web of Silence" counterparts --one them preferable foreign. BTW, it does not need to be complex to add another level of confusion. usually the best offensives are the simplest. == = Opp. Counsel: For all your expert testimony needs: jimbell(a)pacifier.com = is this subtle, crass, or just not? -- Overseeing first-rate programmers is a managerial challenge roughly comparable to herding cats.

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Re: Why does the state still stand:
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:34 PM 5/15/96 +0000, Jean-Francois Avon wrote: >On 15 May 96 at 0:45, Ed Carp wrote: > >> The problem, however, is twofold - (1) the government will >> play mind games on the rest of the population to make you look like >> a terrorist, or whatever turns the populace against you, > >Well, first of all, we should find how much of the population >*really* believe in what govt says. There is a difference between >the politically correct opinion that Joe & Jane Public give to a >poll interviewer and what they really think. > >Second, you suppose that Joe & Jane Public really like and approve what >they understand from what the medias say. I think that Ed Carp recognizes that these caveats were somewhat valid based on a pre-Internet era, when control of news and information was relatively centralized in newspapers and TV networks. Then, you were told what to think (although it wasn't quite phrased this way) and few people got an alternative story. But as you correctly point out, it is getting harder to pull the wool over the eyes of the public when they can get alternative information. >And finally third, this system does not work according to the will >of a majority. It wouldn't take too many peoples who believe that the >medias and their perceived lack of integrity is widely responsible >for the way the world goes right now, to have a substantial prize put >on the head of the medias. >Therefore, any journalist with two+ working neurons will realize >that sticking to the most objective facts available would be the best >way to build a great reputation while sticking to govt propaganda >would be a great way to attract a prize on his head. I don't think anybody in the media is going to have the guts to stick with the government as it sinks into the depths, torpedoed by its own technological inventions. The big names can just resign and keep their wealth; the small fish have no long-term credibility or hope to achieve the levels of their predecessors. >So, to see how AP will make the system evolve, you have to assess >the communication capabilities of govt vs the individual. This is >central to AP and the nature of actual govts. This is *why* the >internet is *so* dangerous to any govts that seek to either retain or >increase their power, even if it actually touches only but a tiny >portion of world population. > >For the first time in the history of humanity, we have a peer to >peer communication capability and an individual-to-world broadcasting >capability that is not controllable in practice by any other entity >(such as law, high finance, etc) > > >The explains fully why the various govts what to find a way to >enforce internet laws, breakable crypto schemes and non-anonymous >protocols. I expect that few government workers have any idea how dangerous the net is going to be to them in the next few years. The various proposals we've been seeing, such as Clipper and others, are probably the product of a very few strategists who began worrying in the early 1990's about the fate of centralized government systems. It will be interesting, someday, to talk to these people who monitor us, and ask them when they thought their position was hopeless. >JFA >PLEASE NOTE: THIS POST DOES NOT MEAN THAT I ENDORSE MR. BELL'S >SYSTEM. MY RATIONNAL CONCLUSIONS ABOUT IT'S INTERNAL MECHANICS >AND IT'S INTRINSIC LOGICS DOES NOT MEAN THAT I LIKE NOR ENDORSE >THE SYSTEM. I SIMPLY CONCLUDED THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREVENT >THE SYSTEM FROM BEING IMPLEMENTED. IMO, IT IS UNAVOIDABLE. I understand your...uh...caution. But as scary as it may be to "us," it's going to be even more terrifying to those it is likely to eliminate. Sort of the difference between two parachute jumps: With and without a parachute! Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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