December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

FW: anonymous companies
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Wei Dai A company implies a particular kind of persistent structure, with a hiearchy of owners, managers, and employees. It is far from clear to me that this is the most likely organizational form in an anonymous digital economy. One possible alternative is to have no persistent organizations. Teams form spontaneously to work on individual projects. Each individual member jointly negotiates a contract with every other member, and these contracts are enforced through some arbitration system. ......................................................................................... This "virtual corporation" is something that I've read about (about 2 years ago) which is an idea already in use - someone has an idea for a kayak design, then he contracts out to other individuals all the different kinds of work he needs done to get it built. As soon as the project is complete, the company dissolves. But here is where I think the problems with an attempt at total anonymity will occur, as has been mentioned: where the virtual meets the actual, where the anonymous electronic interaction must meet the solid real to complete the transaction. The work of constructing physical things must be accomplished in an actual location. If the place is rented, rather than owned, the renter will be able to identify the rentee. Solid objects like kayaks need materials for construction. Someone must 1) get the particular kind of material which the kayak design requires, and 2) make it available for distribution to those who will want to use it. Material or parts buyers must be able to examine the stuff to make a purchasing decision. These must be delivered to an actual physical location. If large trucks are rented to deliver these things, then the drivers must know where that location actually is to deliver them. Once the kayaks are constructed, they also must be delivered to the owner or to a store or storage building. They must be inspected for quality and meeting design specifications. They must be sold where individuals can look at the kayak, perhaps sit inside, and compare it with other models elsewhere (I don't think just looking at a photo on a web page will do for every purchasing decision). Back stock requires storage and probably someone to guard the building. Perhaps the kayak purchaser will want lessons on using the thing, in an actual river. In all these situations, decisions must be made which require a physical presence and interaction with the material of construction, with the object of attention. This is a point where anonymity would be very difficult and loss of confidence possible (if someone reneged on their agreements). I can imagine total anonymity used most successfully when it is limited to activities which are totally electronic in nature, like programming, web design or ecash transfers. The more that a virtual company requires physical contact with the construction, storage, and movement of physical goods, and the more time that it engages the individuals involved, the more difficult it will be to keep away from everyone the knowledge of who is who in relation to those things and where everything is located in physical space. I was thinking that I couldn't see purchasing groceries anonymously (if I made the purchases myself). Perhaps with a certain kind of store design.....still, it would be difficult. *Someone* would see me walking out with the groceries (why does this sound so funny). .. Blanc

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Re: anonymous companies
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:42 PM 5/16/96 -0700, Wei Dai wrote: > > I'll just give one problem: the principal-agent problem. How do owners of > the company make sure the managers operate the company in their best > interest? Actually looting of companies happens a lot right now today, and very seldom leads to criminal charges. Twice I have lost a job because the company I worked for went under, apparently due to looting. > Solution: reputation. If the managers don't do the right things, the > owners arrange so that the managers lose reputation and won't get hired in > the future. Unfortunately the science of reputation is not so advanced > that we know this will actually work. At present venture capitalists seem to rely on the sniff-their-arses method. They talk to people and try and get a feel as to whether they are planning a robbery. This method is obviously likely to be less effectual as businesses move to the net. This problem is probably the major reason why Net startups are physically located in Silicon valley, rather than world wide or nation wide. Of course the problem is that if the venture capitalists can find them to sniff their arses, the bad boys can also find them to shake them down. In some businesses we can solve this problem by cryptographic control mechanisms, such as open books banking. In others, such as net startups, I see no solution other than increased reliance on personal individual capital. Athenian capitalism worked largely on personal capital. Because of their terrible arithmetic system, bookkeeping was really bad, and in consequence stock investments tended to go sour. Socrates lost a bundle in this fashion, which may explain his lack of enthusiasm for capitalists. > Solution: smart contracts. This is Nick Szabo's idea of building > contractual obligations into cryptographic protocols so that the parties > have no choice but to fullfil them. But again we don't know whether this > will actually work for this problem. It will work for many particular cases of this problem. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Zimmermann v. ViaCrypt??
by Mark Voorhees 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is a story @ http://infolawalert.com/stories/051796a.html describing how Phil Zimmermann is trying to retrieve all the rights to PGP from ViaCrypt in order to jump start his new venture, PGP, Inc. He's taking a sell out or get sued approach with ViaCrypt, which until recently has not had much success marketing PGP. Mark

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A cryptographic alternative to escrow agents (Matts' half coin)
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Black Unicorn wrote (was: Why does the state still stand) >> . What if a company does not pay as expected - other than adopting >> Assassination Politics, what method could an employee use towards >> getting their expected remuneration for work done? > >If payment is made weekly, it should be made in advance to an escrow agent >who would issue a certificate that the payment for employee r2dd54 has >been received. The payment would then not be released to anyone without >the consent of the corporation and the employee. > >Obviously the escrow agent would have to be trusted. It should be possible to avoid that trusted escrow agent using blinded ecash and Matts' half coin algorithm. Bob wants to buy a $100 service from Alice. Alice wants to get paid if she performs the service. Bob and Alice each create half of a $300 ecash coin. They send their half coins to the ecash mint for signing, with instructions to withdraw $200 from Bob's account and $100 from Alice's account for the signing of a $300 coin. When the mint has received both half coins, it signs the complete coin, withdraws the money and returns the signature to both Alice and Bob. Nobody can now use the coin alone because they don't know the other half of the random coin number. Next, Alice delivers the service to Bob. If Bob is satisfied with the service, he and Alice write a message to the mint requesting that the complete coin be credited with $100 to Bob's account and $200 to Alice'. Alice has now been paid. If Bob refuses to pay, Alice will never give him her half coin and he loses $200, but he got a $100 service, resulting in a net loss of $100. If Alice refuses to deliver the service, Bob keeps his half coin and she loses $100. Both participants lose $100 each if they don't complete the deal. That way they have the same incentive to come to an agreement. To simplify the messages to the mint you could use two coins. One for $100 and one for $200. That way there would be a one-to-one relation between deposits, withdrawals and coins. The algorithm described above (Matts' half coin) is copyrighted by yours truly Matts Kallioniemi. Patents pending. Matts Kallioniemi <matts(a)pi.se> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEVAwUBMZzMVBVFhWUyiUQRAQHs8Af/TQf8zLYfwictsXoqvOahCvQ1aJ4F6Dem w6PARUXIhb0XWIFYRZSiXGsRoUVpWiWtupSIf7PHG/dkGfAamvq0wgQpEJm3+7IP 6qSaOYovKnY19GxTo9QHkyHQ8LFu+CSVJMMPoZtX6tCJX62VkFuJapI1CLQOPb78 Ntqf8kNiX1/IpOfrqiF0Fx1YV2nTno417q4vaJYnZWQFJ+sYf5q0NG0xahDPlwUx I11AtFcpIGOCHek3GGAgH9KYSt6UpAOmk57bSne5+zMN5U78cGDsizLYm+MDtzAx Nt4FYoeYxM0gKs529ruUgTdfZNqVtsXjjeNlbVBi4hyfczs3b3I7ug== =oLLR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:02 PM 5/15/96 -0800, jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> wrote: [snip] >The copyright issue is probably irrelevant to the Scientology dispute, >anyway. The material on which the copyright is claimed almost certainly >wasn't marked, appropriately, as it would have had to be for the copyright >to be valid. While current law no longer requires the "circle-C" notation >long used for this purpose, the material involved is far more than old >enough to have been subject to this requirement, and once a copyright is >lost (or not claimed) I believe it couldn't be regained. I think you're wrong about that. You're confusing copyrights and trademarks, I believe. It's a trademark that you lose by not asserting it or defending it. Someone please correct me if I have this wrong :) There have been claims that the copyrights were not transferred properly from Hubbard to RTC, but they have yet to be proven in court. CoS won against Arnie Lerma in a summary judgement. Copyrights were definitely the issue in that decision. >The threat to remailers is one of the many reasons the Leahy bill sucked, >and that would have made it worse by imposing criminal sanctions on this >kind of thing. Ironically, with the way remailers are used, it would >actually have been possible for some copyright holder to fabricate a >violation of copyright law by posting his own material through remailers, >and then sue the final remailer, or have its owner prosecuted. The ugly provision in the Leahy bill had to do with obstruction of criminal investigations, didn't it? The CoS copyright cases have all been civil. I don't see how it applies. >I'm glad the people around here finally saw the light. That part of the bill stunk, I agree... Rich ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb See my Blue Ribbon Page at http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/blueribbon New EF zine "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

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RUL_net
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

May-June, 1996, Harvard Business Review. Two related articles which examine c'punks interests -- proposed business regulation of the Net; on-line security; copyright; encryption; authentication; E-cash; electronic commerce; protected communities to escape "frontier anarchy," and more. Executive summaries by HBR: "Ruling the Net." Debora Spar and Jeffrey J. Bussgang The Internet promises a radical new world of business. But for many companies, it has yet to deliver. Although doing business in cyberspace may be novel and exhilarating, it can also be frustrating, confusing, and even unprofitable. Debora Spar and Jeffrey Bussgang argue that the problems companies face have little to do with a lack of technology or imagination. Their problems stem instead from a lack of rules. Without the order that rules create, business cannot be conducted. The authors explain why the informal rules that have developed on the Internet since the 1960s are no longer sufficient. Businesses thinking of allowing millions of dollars of transactions to occur on the wide-open Net need specific assurances. They require clear definitions of property rights, a safe and useful means of exchange, and a way to locate and punish violators of on-line rules. The authors believe that the key to commerce on the Internet lies in the creation of managed on-line communities. Such communities can be formed by service providers -- entities that will restrict on-line options, fine-tune offerings to match a select group of users, and provide some means of recourse in cases of fraud or abuse. Under those conditions, they will draw new companies on-line and increase the productivity of those already there. And, say the authors, the rewards for service providers will be substantial: Companies that make the rules on the Internet's emerging frontier have the opportunity to reap the greatest profits. [40 kb] "The Real Value of On-Line Communities." Arthur Armstrong and John Hagel III The notion of community has been at the heart of the Internet since its early days, when scientists used it to share data, collaborate on research, and exchange messages. But how can businesses best use its community-building capabilities? Not merely by putting their products or services on-line, the authors contend. Real value will come from providing people with the ability to interact with one another -- from satisfying their multiple social needs as well as their commercial needs. Companies that create strong on-line communities will command customer loyalty to a degree hitherto undreamed of and, consequently, will generate strong economic returns. The authors present four different types of community: communities of transaction, interest, fantasy, and relationship. Examples of each type already can be found on the Internet or through on-line services, but the successful community of the future will incorporate all four -- or as many as possible. As for economic value, the authors see four ways for a company to generate returns: through usage fees, content fees, transactions and advertising, and synergies with other parts of its business. In the near future, new business definitions may emerge around the notion of owning a specific customer segment across the full range of its interests and needs; owning specific products and services may no longer be so important. The authors urge businesses marketing to consumers to make the small investment required to "buy an option" on electronic communities in order to understand both their potential value and the radical changes they may cause. [33 kb] RUL_net (for the 2, in 4 parts) ----- Reprints of "Ruling," No. 96309 and "Real Value," No. 96301 may be ordered from HBR for $5.00 each by email to: custserv(a)cchbspub.harvard.edu

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Re: Defeating fingerprints
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 03:19 PM 05/17/96 -0700, you wrote: >ON >> >> On Tue, 14 May 1996, Be Good wrote: >> > > Burglars and safecrackers sand the ridges off. >> > >> > This sounds like it'd work, but quite tedious. >> >> Belt sander and a light touch. > >I'm going to try this sanding experiment sometime. >When I get around to it, I'll post the results here. >(pressing hard with inkpad and paper) > >Shellac or epoxy glue does NOT work, if the thickness is at all managable. >Tried it, The ridges always find a way to get through. >It also provides a weaker bond to dry skin than you'd expect. >The thicker the more likelihood of peeling off. >Even Krazy Glue. (The UL BS is false.) Krazy glue _will_ glue fingers, if applied properly. I proved this to a fellow sailor in 1976 by gluing his thumb and forefinger around a JP-5 vent pipe aboard the U.S.S. Enterprise. Some folks might want to try liquid latex, contact adhesive, silicon sealers (RTV), or similar products. Soft, flexible, relatively convenient when applied, and can be 'layered' to the desired thickness. Liquid latex can usually be found in hobby/craft stores. Dave Merriman PS - Pls note new email address; old ISP proved to be unreliable. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMZ0MlcVrTvyYOzAZAQEkiAP7BCf2mrem6K6N/5dcbUeGLCUu/un2yEst nks1RZBUUeV8q2fojxm6d9y+WJI6NXDJWARkSCCt0YphA7oGQtJwiNzI08NWD5Ed EHM+yXW7BM+z68eZ+kIL8UNW/64CkGCoMZNkRW2v5ZKMqYOFri6qdgKFm7D40JIN z0BL1+dkLVE= =Z73q -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------- "Giving money and power to government is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenage boys." P. J. O'Rourke (b. 1947), U.S. journalist. <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> http://www.shellback.com/personal/merriman/index.htm

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Re: anonymous companies
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 14 May 1996, Hal wrote: > It might be interesting to make a list of all the problems people can > think of why this idea won't work, paired with proposed solutions and > workarounds - sort of a mini FAQ for this important (some might say > ultimate) cypherpunk model. Another interesting question is how you do personnel selection for an anonymous enterprise. One possibility would be anonymous reputation passing, but I don't know any protocols for this. A participant would also want to take any positive reputation accruing away when the enterprise finished. (And the rest of us would want any negative reputation to stick as well.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:38 PM 5/16/96 -0500, snow <snow(a)smoke.suba.com> wrote: [snip] > No, rich is a good excuse for _not_ doing it, unless it can be >done with total anonymity. If I set up a remailer, on my home computer, as >an individual, then I am a very little target. I have nothing (well, damn >little) for anyone to sue me over. What would be the point? They threaten >to sue me for what? They would spend FAR more than they could ever get out >of me, and as long as I don't violate any laws, I _might_ be able to get >"big guns" like the ACLU, EFF etc. on my side to make it a nasty fight for >no return. [snip] This assumes that they are trying to win. Hubbard said, "The purpose of the suit is to harass..." CoS has a huge legal coffer, and they've used it against people who weren't rich before. They're not after the money from the lawsuits, IMHO -- it's miniscule compared to the amount they make in their bait-and-switch scheme (where they sell people on Dianetics and then lead them down the path to ridiculous OT powers). That's what they're fighting to protect. >From this perspective, the person without money is a much easier target, IMHO -- they don't have the resources to fight back against sustained and intense legal pressure (as well as illegal harassment by PI's and other agents) and will probably cave. That's the return. Judge Brinkema, in an opinion last November in the "Church's" case against the Washington Post, DGS, and Arnie Lerma, wrote: "The Court finds that the motivation of plaintiff in filing this lawsuit against the Post is reprehensible. Although the RTC brought the complaint under traditional secular concepts of copyright and trade secret law, it has become clear that a much broader motivation prevailed--the stifling of criticism and dissent of the religious practices of Scientology and the destruction of its opponents. L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of Scientology, has been quoted as looking upon law as a tool to [h]arass and discourage rather than to win. The law can be used very easily to harrass and enough harrassment on somebody who is simply on the thin edge anyway, well knowing that he is not authorized, will generally be sufficient to cause his professional decease. If possible, of course, ruin him utterly." CoS are the biggest threat to the remailers right now, and it's a mistake to view their use of the legal system based on how you or I might use it -- their purpose is to crush their opposition by whatever means necessary. They have to handle things that way, because Hubbard said so. Paulette Cooper, whose "crime" was writing a book critical of CoS, had 19 lawsuits filed against her at the same time by the "Church." Your plan would work if tons of people set up remailers, but barring that, rich people are actually worse targets for CoS, IMHO, as they have the resources to fight back, especially if the suit doesn't have any merits. And the support of the "big guns" is definitely dicey -- they've not provided counsel for any defendant in a CoS case, AFAIK. Groups like ACLU and EFF don't have the resources to deal with every problem they'd like to, and people shouldn't expect to be rescued by them (you said _might_, I know :) I would encourage anyone who is concerned about the remailers, that doesn't have much info on CoS' legal tactics, to spend some time on alt.religion.scientology or on Ron Newman's excellent web site http://www.cybercom.net/~rnewman/scientology/home.html (he has a ton of info there and you can do Excite searches). I think that if people are not willing to stand up to CoS, the remailers are history. Rich ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb See my Blue Ribbon Page at http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/blueribbon New EF zine "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

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Remailers & what they get out of it...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: Alex Strasheim <cp(a)proust.suba.com> > Subject: Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST > Date: Fri, 17 May 1996 13:18:24 -0500 (CDT) > > The remailer net won't stand up to challenges of any strength because no > one gets anything for running a remailer. It doesn't matter if the > challenges are strong enough to win, or if they ultimately have any merit. > If you don't get anything for winning and you'll get burned if you lose, > the expected value of the game is negative no matter how unlikely losing > is. As long as the remailer is run a 'grins & giggles' affair you are right. The moment they are run as a business enterprise then the game changes. Several of the Austin Cypherpunks and myself have set up a remailer here in Austin (kourier.ssz.com) using MixMaster. The intent is that once we get out of testing the software and other mods we are in the middle of we will have a commercialy viable service. I am currently discussing with a couple of local lawyers possible strategies we can employ if CoS or others start legal motions. The idea that we are exploring is a defence by offence. One aspect is 'work in progress' protection of both our development mods as well as our customers work. I also hope to build part of the defence on the fact that to bring the remailer down denies access to the public key-server which is integrated into the remailer as a value-added service. (NOTE: don't waste your time trying to get to kourier over the next few weeks. A more public announcement is in the works) To me the biggest problem with the crypto work right now is that not enough professionals are involved. If more remailers and such were initiated as a business there would be legal avenues to explore. Also, in this vain is the apparent lack of support for commercial ventures by developers of such apps as MixMaster (whose license explicity prohibits commercial use). And for the record, yes, we expect to charge real $$$ for access. Our current plan is $10/month for each account. Money orders prefered. We have at this point pondered e-cash methods but it doesn't seem popular enough at this juncture. > If you want the remailer system to stand up you have to make the expected > value positive. The expected value of bookmaking is positive, even though > it's illegal to take sports bets in most states. As a consequence it's > not hard to find someone to take a bet. Individual bookies may come and > go, but the system will always be there. If the expected value of running > a remailer was positive, the remailer system would thrive even if it was > illegal to run one. > > To make the expected value positive, you have to (a) make it profitable to > run a remailer, and (b) set up a protocol that gives someone who runs one > a fighting chance of not getting busted. (a) is easy enough in theory, > but I don't know how you could do (b), at least not if you wanted to let > people do public things with the remailers (like post to usenet). > I agree with (a) completely. The way to make a remailer profitable is to charge for access. As to (b), step one is get a lawyer on board from the get go. One aspect of (b) is that it should be no more illegal for me to allow my users to post to usenet anonymously via my guest account than to do it via a remailer. In fact, one could argue that if anonymous remailers are truly illegal then so are 'guest' or other demo accounts on systems that don't get personal info (and verified at that) prior to accessing any system services. This means that systems such as l0pht.com or ssz.com are illegal to operate. Jim Choate \\///// "Don't have a cow, man" | | / (.) (.) ===========================oOO==(_)==OOo========================== Tivoli an IBM company CyberTects: SSZ Customer Support Engineer SOHO Consulting/VR/Robotics 9442 Capitol of Texas Highway North 1647 Rutland Suite 500 #244 Austin, TX 78759 Austin, TX 78758 Email: jchoate(a)tivoli.com Email: ravage(a)ssz.com Phone: (512) 436-8893 Phone: (512) 259-2994 Fax: (512) 345-2784 Fax: n/a WWW: www.tivoli.com WWW: www.ssz.com Modem: n/a Modem: (512) 836-7374 Pager: n/a Pager: n/a Cellular: n/a Cellular: n/a ===================================================================

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key signing at cyberpayments?
by P.J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

if anyone is attending the cyberpayments conference in Dallas June 17th or so and is interested in PGP key signing, please advise in private mail or to the list. Thank you. -- pj ponder

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Re: Any DLL's that handle Public Key Encryption or Key Exchange?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:40 AM 5/17/96 +1200, pgut001(a)cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: > The second is that if you're in the US you're probably going to run >into legal hassles using this code unless someone wants to do an >alternative RSAREF implementation which you can plug in in place of the >existing RSA code. There's an RSAEURO drop-in clone of RSAREF that's on ftp.ox.ac.uk, so you could write a version of your software that lets Yankees and non-Yankees drop in whichever version is appropriate without worrying about patent or copyright problems. Any* RSAREF system used in the US has the problem that it's limited to the "official" interfaces, which means you can't do fully general RSA without permission. (* There was one RSAREF version that didn't insist on this in its license; don't remember which one.) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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CDT Policy Post 2.19 - 27 Reps Urge President to Abandon Key-Escrow EncryptionPolicy
by bobpal＠cdt.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----------------------------------------------------------------------------- _____ _____ _______ / ____| __ \__ __| ____ ___ ____ __ | | | | | | | | / __ \____ / (_)______ __ / __ \____ _____/ /_ | | | | | | | | / /_/ / __ \/ / / ___/ / / / / /_/ / __ \/ ___/ __/ | |____| |__| | | | / ____/ /_/ / / / /__/ /_/ / / ____/ /_/ (__ ) /_ \_____|_____/ |_| /_/ \____/_/_/\___/\__, / /_/ \____/____/\__/ The Center for Democracy and Technology /____/ Volume 2, Number 19 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A briefing on public policy issues affecting civil liberties online ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CDT POLICY POST Volume 2, Number 19 May 17, 1996 CONTENTS: (1) 27 Representatives Urge President Clinton to Abandon Key-Escrow Encryption Policy (2) Join Sen Leahy At HotWired, Wed 5/22 to Discuss His Crypto Bill (3) Subscription Information (4) About CDT, contacting us ** This document may be redistributed freely with this banner in tact ** Excerpts may be re-posted with permission of <editor(a)cdt.org> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) 27 REPRESENTATIVES URGE PRESIDENT CLINTON TO ABANDON KEY-ESCROW POLICY A bi-partisan group of 27 Congressmen, led by Reps. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) and Tom Campbell (R-CA) on Wednesday (5/15) sent a letter to President Clinton urging the President to abandon the Administration's key-escrow encryption proposal and "instead immediately liberalize export controls on non-key escrow encryption technology." Expressing "serious concerns" about the impact of current U.S. encryption policy on individual privacy and US competitiveness, the bi-partisan group wrote: "The ability of companies and individuals to ensure that the information they send over communications and computer networks is secure is a prerequisite to exploiting the potential of the Global Information Infrastructure." The letter was signed by several prominent members from both parties, including Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), Tom Campbell (R-CA), Anna Eshoo (D-CA), Rick Boucher (D-VA), Bob Barr (R-GA), Pat Schroeder (D-CO), Carlos Moorehead (R-CA), and 20 other members. The bi-partisan call to President Clinton to abandon the Administration's key escrow policy is yet another encouraging sign of increasingly strong Congressional support for reform of US encryption policy. Congress is currently considering several bills designed to encourage the widespread availability privacy-protecting technologies for the Internet by lifting export controls on strong encryption: * HR 3011, the "Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act of 1996", sponsored by over 30 members including Reps Goodlatte (R-VA), Campbell (R-CA), Eshoo (D-CA), Boucher (D-VA). * S. 1726, the "Promotion of Commerce On-Line in the Digital Era (Pro- CODE) act of 1996, sponsored by Senators Burns (R-MT), Leahy (D-VT), Pressler (R-SD), Dole (R-KS), Wyden (D-OR), and Murray (D-WA) * S. 1587, the "Encrypted Communications Privacy Act of 1996", also sponsored by Senators Burns and Leahy. Hearings on HR 3011 (Rep Goodlatte's bill) and the Burns/Leahy S. 1726 (Pro-CODE) are expected in June. INTERNET SECURITY DAY - A NATIONAL DISCUSSION ON THE NEED TO REFORM US ENCRYPTION POLICY In July, CDT and over 25 other organizations will hold a daylong education event in California's Silicon Valley in July. The "Internet Security Day" will bring together industry leaders, members of Congress, encryption experts, and others to discuss the need to reform US encryption policy. Similar events, to be held throughout the US and on the Net, are also being planned. Sponsors of the event include the Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW), EFF, Americans for Tax Reform, AT&T, Pacific Telesis, America Online, Netscape, the Business Software Alliance, the Software Publishers Association, and several others. FOR MORE INFORMATION ON THE ENCRYPTION POLICY DEBATE & TEXT OF THE LETTER Background information on the encryption policy debate, full text of the various legislative proposals, detailed analysis, the text of the Goodlatte/Campbell letter, information on the July Silicon Valley event, and transcripts from online appearances by Senators on the Encryption issue, can be found at CDT's Cryptography Issues Page: URL:http://www.cdt.org/crypto/ Or at the Encryption Policy Resource Page: URL:http://www.crypto.com/ --------------------------------------------------------------------- (2) SENATORS GO ONLINE TO DISCUSS PRIVACY AND SECURITY ONLINE Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), the "Senior Senator from Cyberspace", ardent proponent of Net.Freedom and co-sponsor of 2 bills to repeal encryption export controls, will hold an online "town meeting" on Wednesday May 22 to discuss privacy and security online. DETAILS ON THE EVENT * Wednesday May 22, 4 - 5 pm ET (1 pm Pacific) on HotWired URL: http://www.hotwired.com/wiredside/ To participate, you must be a registered HotWired member (there is no charge for registration). You must also have RealAudio(tm) and a telnet application properly configured to work with your browser. Please visit http://www.hotwired.com/wiredside/ for information on how you can easily register for Hotwired and obtain RealAudio. Wednesday's town meeting is another in a series of planned events, and is part of a broader project coordinated by CDT and the Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW) designed to bring the Internet Community into the debate and encourage members of Congress to work with the Net.community on vital Internet policy issues. Events with other members of Congress working on Internet Policy Issues are currently being planned. Please check http://www.crypto.com for announcements of future events ------------------------------------------------------------------------ (3) SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Be sure you are up to date on the latest public policy issues affecting civil liberties online and how they will affect you! Subscribe to the CDT Policy Post news distribution list. CDT Policy Posts, the regular news publication of the Center For Democracy and Technology, are received by more than 9,000 Internet users, industry leaders, policy makers and activists, and have become the leading source for information about critical free speech and privacy issues affecting the Internet and other interactive communications media. To subscribe to CDT's Policy Post list, send mail to policy-posts-request(a)cdt.org with a subject: subscribe policy-posts If you ever wish to remove yourself from the list, send mail to the above address with a subject of: unsubscribe policy-posts ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (4) ABOUT THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY/CONTACTING US The Center for Democracy and Technology is a non-profit public interest organization based in Washington, DC. The Center's mission is to develop and advocate public policies that advance democratic values and constitutional civil liberties in new computer and communications technologies. Contacting us: General information: info(a)cdt.org World Wide Web: URL:http://www.cdt.org/ FTP URL:ftp://ftp.cdt.org/pub/cdt/ Snail Mail: The Center for Democracy and Technology 1634 Eye Street NW * Suite 1100 * Washington, DC 20006 (v) +1.202.637.9800 * (f) +1.202.637.0968 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- End Policy Post 2.19 5/17/96 -----------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Past one terabit/second on fiber
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:08 PM 5/15/96, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > One problem with the development of such high-end technologies is that >they tend to increase economies of scale to the point where it's impractical to >have anything but a monopoly or ogliopoly. As well as concerns about the degree >of control such an organization may be able to exert in and of itself (acting >like a government, in essence), there's also that such an organization is >easier to pressure than a lot of small providers. Anyone have a suggested >solution, or reasons that I shouldn't be so worried? Personally, I'm not terribly worried by such concentrations (for reasons I'll mention at the end). But I'll note that Eric Fair's recent post described the far-from-geodesic traffic situation, with a relatively small number of "super-nodes" (like "MAE-West" and her sisters) handling huge fractions of traffic. These super-nodes are obvious points of attack (in the nuclear war--or terrorist--scenario oft-cited as the motivation for packet-switching) and lessen the "geodesic" nature of the Net. Economies of scale may be pushing us away from the "full-distributed" geodesic nature toward super-nodes. The reason I am not really too worried is that encryption and remailers allow a kind of "meta-geodesic" network to be (virtually) layered on top of the physical network. (In the famous network hierarchy of network levels, it seems we can add a new level.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Why is hacktic going down?
by David Rosoff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know the reasons for the shutting down of the hacktic remailer? And also, are the other remailers at utopia.hacktic.nl going down with the remailer at remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl? Thanks David

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NOISE.SYS Info Distribution List
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've set up a distribution list for NOISE.SYS. If you want to receive periodic announcements about new versions, bugs, related utilities, etc., reply to <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> with the subject "add noise.sys-list" (NOISE.SYS is a crypto-quality RNG device for MS-DOS, similar to the random.c implementation for Linux. The latest version is 0.5.6-Beta.) Rob (aka "Deranged Mutant")

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Re: Senator, your public key please?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:01 PM 5/16/96 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: > >Secondly, the Ethics Committee was very interested in the issue. As of >now they have ruled that "exchanging" PGP signatures is an "exchange in >kind" and an ethics violation. Ms. Howell expressed exasperation over >this lunacy, but put it much this way: "No, you guys don't understand >what the issues are here, but I don't have 3 hours to explain it all to >you either." Apparently the ethics committee is concerned that a >signature from Leahy's key will constitute some sort of endorsement and the >"you sign mine and I'll sign yours" looks like influence peddling. > >Part of the problem was that several politically oriented groups >approached Leahy's office and descended like vultures on a carcass, >all of them wanting to certify his key. > >No signing from Senator's keys for the time being. She said the ethics >committee went so far as to prohibit them from soliciting signatures from >others as well. Her conservative (and reasonable) interpretation was that >she couldn't hand over a fingerprint of the key for signing purposes. > >As things stand now Ms. Howell intends to try and educate some of the key >Ethics members over the August break and have a decent signing policy >after the break itself. > >Welcome to the hill. Gee, isn't it too bad that nobody has thought of a solution for all these politician-problems? B^) Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Why the Poor are Mostly Deserving of their Fate
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 18 May 96 at 4:30, Duncan Frissell wrote: > 1) get a high school diploma > 2) get married > 3) get any job > > Only about 2 tenths of 1% of those who satisfy those three > requirements incomes below the official poverty line. > I try and keep in mind that 80-90% of the "take" in government > programs for the "poor" goes to unpoor government employees. > DCF Hi DCF. Can you please tell me where I can get such kind of information? Is there any databank of such facts? Would be great fun to have! Regards! JFA DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee; Limoges porcelain, silverware and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants; physists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

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NOTS posted to alt.religion.scientology
by hendersn＠zeta.org.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Maybe this is about something else (the NOTS materials), or >maybe the threat of legal action was enough to do Hacktic in, despite what >would seem to be a favorable precedent. It wasn't the Fishman Affidavit that was posted - it was the NOTS materials. The Affidavit material has been in a public court record for some years now, and was an important factor in the favourable Dutch ruling. The NOTS have never been subject to public scrutiny. In fact, the Church claims them as trade secrets as well as copyrighted materials. That may or may not have changed now that the NOTS have been viewed by who knows how many people. >It's not clear to me that Scientology is only concerned about copyrighted >material. That's what they claim, but then Hubbard said, "The purpose of >the suit is to harass..." Copyrights became the issue, IMHO, because they >have some legal ground to stand on there. Damn right! > >I think their goal is to make all their Net critics come out into the >open, and they're willing to use the legal system as a pawn towards that >goal. You can't threaten or intimidate anon posters as easily. You can't >send your private investigators to harass them and their families. The Church dislikes anonymous remailers intensely, despite exploiting their advantages themselves. The few comments that their PR reps have made indicate that the Church wants some way of stripping someone's anonymity away if they "abuse" this anonymity. I dislike that idea intensely. Everyone remember anon.penet.fi? >I appreciate the incredibly difficult position that all of this puts >remailer operators in, but I don't think CoS will be statisfied with just >stopping anon Usenet posts. IMHO, they more likely want the remailers gone, >altogether. Don't believe that this is about copyrights, just because >they say it is. Like it or not, posting the NOTS _is_ a violation of copyright. While many people think the Church of $cientology is abusing Intellectual Property laws in order to keep their secret materials secret, the remailers have the ability to violate _anyone's_ copyrights. I can imagine a scenario in which the NSA starts spamming wholesale copyrighted works anonymously in order to give the Government a compelling reason to legislate against anonymous remailers. >Rich Zed(hendersn(a)zeta.org.au) "Don't hate the media, become the media" - Jello Biafra PGP key on request

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Re: anonymous companies
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> At 06:42 PM 5/16/96 -0700, Wei Dai wrote: >> > I'll just give one problem: the principal-agent problem. How do owners of >> > the company make sure the managers operate the company in their best >> > interest? >On Fri, 17 May 1996 jamesd(a)echeque.com wrote: >> Actually looting of companies happens a lot right now today, and very >> seldom leads to criminal charges. Twice I have lost a job because the >> company I worked for went under, apparently due to looting. At 08:37 AM 5/18/96 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: > Be careful to distingiush "owner" from "employee." All to common a > mistake I fear. > Until someone passes a constitutional right to not be fired, well, you're > employeed at the will and by the good grace of the owners and your boss. I was of course referring to looting by the management, not the shareholders, as should have been obvious from context. >> In others, such as net startups, >> I see no solution other than increased reliance on personal individual >> capital. >Still, vulnerable to last round problems. Reread: Your above statement makes no sense in context. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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two people
by bryce＠digicash.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: CDT Policy Post 2.19 - 27 Reps Urge President to Abandon Key-Escrow Encryption Policy
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:35 PM 5/17/96 -0400, Bob Palacios wrote: > CDT POLICY POST Volume 2, Number 19 May 17, 1996 > >The bi-partisan call to President Clinton to abandon the Administration's >key escrow policy is yet another encouraging sign of increasingly strong >Congressional support for reform of US encryption policy. Congress is >currently considering several bills designed to encourage the widespread >availability privacy-protecting technologies for the Internet by lifting >export controls on strong encryption: > >* HR 3011, the "Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act of > 1996", sponsored by over 30 members including Reps Goodlatte (R-VA), > Campbell (R-CA), Eshoo (D-CA), Boucher (D-VA). > >* S. 1726, the "Promotion of Commerce On-Line in the Digital Era (Pro- > CODE) act of 1996, sponsored by Senators Burns (R-MT), Leahy (D-VT), > Pressler (R-SD), Dole (R-KS), Wyden (D-OR), and Murray (D-WA) > >* S. 1587, the "Encrypted Communications Privacy Act of 1996", also > sponsored by Senators Burns and Leahy. > >Hearings on HR 3011 (Rep Goodlatte's bill) and the Burns/Leahy S. 1726 >(Pro-CODE) are expected in June. You know, I really would appriciate it if CDT didn't present S1587 as if it is just another "relax restrictions on encryption" bill. We raked that bill over the coals, found it seriously flawed, and generally pro-encryption people don't seem to be defending it at all. It contained many aspects which have the prospect of future danger to the use of encryption. And, S. 1726 seems to contain most of the desireable aspects of S.1587, and few of the negatives. Add to that the fact that Leahy (as described above) seems to be supporting S. 1726, there is no need to make it appear to an uninformed person that S. 1587 that it is anything other than a mistake. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Crypto-News: Congress tells Clinton "Dump key escrow/Clipper schemes" (5/17/96)
by Voters Telecommunications Watch 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================================= ____ _ _ _ / ___|_ __ _ _ _ __ | |_ ___ | \ | | _____ _____ | | | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____| \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __| | |___| | | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\ | __/\ V V /\__ \ \____|_| \__, | .__/ \__\___/ |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/ |___/|_| TWENTY-SEVEN MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES URGE CLINTON TO ABANDON KEY ESCOW AND "IMMEDIATELY LIBERALIZE EXPORT CONTROLS ON ENCRYPTION PROGRAMS AND PRODUCTS" Date: May 17, 1996 URL:http://www.crypto.com/ crypto-news(a)panix.com If you redistribute this, please do so in its entirety, with the banner intact. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of Contents News Text of letter from House members to President Clinton Text of press release from Rep. Goodlatte How to receive crypto-news ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- NEWS Today a band of twenty-seven House members signed a letter to President Clinton urging him to abandon key escrow schemes, and immediately liberalize export controls on encryption programs and products. The letter argues that "a key escrow approach will not adequately address security concerns", citing security as a "prerequisite to exploiting the potential of the Global Information Infrastructure." Rep. Goodlatte led many of the signatories on the letter to introduce and cosponsor H.R. 3011, the Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act" earlier this year, which liberalizes export controls on encryption products. Copies of the letter to the President, the press release, and H.R. 3011 can be found on the Encryption Policy Resource Page at http://www.crypto.com/ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- TEXT OF LETTER FROM HOUSE MEMBERS TO PRESIDENT CLINTON Congress of the United States Washington, DC 20515 May 15, 1996 The Honorable William J. Clinton The White House Washington, D.C. 20500 Dear Mr. President: We are writing to ask you not to proceed with your Administration's key escrow encryption policy proposal and instead to immediately liberalize export controls on non-key escrow encryption programs and products. Many of us have sponsored H.R. 3011, the "Security and Freedom Though Encryption (SAFE) Act" which would ensure the continued ability of Americans to use and sell good encryption and would permit the export of generally available software with encryption capabilities and other such software and hardware under license when certain conditions are met. We understand that the Administration has developed a key escrow encryption proposal and is not at this time willing to ease export restrictions on encryption programs and products which are widely available from domestic and foreign companies and the Internet. We share the concerns of a wide range of businesses and privacy interests that a key escrow approach will not adequately address security concerns. The ability of companies and individuals to ensure that the information they send over communications and computer networks is secure is a prerequisite to exploiting the potential of the Global Information Infrastructure. For example, U.S. small businesses are beginning to harness the Internet to enter foreign markets. The Internet in effect lowers the barriers to entry for these companies. But they will not be able to rely on the Internet if their information is not secure. We also have serious concerns about the impact of the Administration's policy on the U.S. economy and job creation. (Indeed, it is our strong belief the U.S. economic interests must be a primary consideration in encryption policy discussions with other countries, the OECD, and in other forums. It is not clear that this has been the case in the discussions held up to this point). A recent report entitled "A Study of the International Market for Computer Software With Encryption" prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the National Security Agency indicated that U.S. companies will lose market share given the availability of stronger encryption products overseas. The Computer Systems Policy Project estimates that unless the U.S. relaxes out-of-date export controls, the U.S. technology industry will lose $60 billion in revenues and 200,000 jobs by the year 2000. As Congress begins to consider H.R. 3011 we would greatly appreciate knowing whether the Administration plans to publish a final rule implementing a key escrow encryption proposal or, alternatively, will relax export controls on encryption programs and products which do not have a key escrow feature. Sincerely, Tom Campbell Bob Goodlatte Anna Eshoo Eliot Engel Zoe Lofgren Bob Barr Carlos Moorhead Patricia Schroeder Barney Frank Sam Gejdenson Howard Coble Rick Boucher Fred Heineman Sonny Bono Vernon Ehlers Randy Cunningham Charlie Norwood Randy Tate Donald Manzullo Helen Chenoweth Thomas Davis Roscoe Bartlett Sam Farr Ken Calvert Linda Smith Joseph Moakley Lynn Woolsey ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE FROM REP. GOODLATTE NEWS FROM: Congressman Bob Goodlatte Virginia's 6th District 123 Cannon HOB Washington, D.C. 25515 Phone: (202) 225-5431 DATE: May 16, 1996 CONTACT: Doug Clark 202-225-5431 REP. GOODLATTE ASKS PRESIDENT NOT TO PROCEED WITH ENCRYPTION POLICY Congressman Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), lead sponsor of S.A.F.E., the Security and Freedom Through Encryption Act, was joined by Tom Campbell (R-CA), Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), Anne Eshoo (D-CA), Bob Barr (R-GA), Eliot Engle (D-NY), and a bipartisan group of 21 of their colleagues in the House in writing President Clinton asking him not to proceed with his Administration's key escrow encryption policy proposal and instead to immediately liberalize export controls on non-key escrow encryption programs and products. "I have received recent information that the Administration is circulating yet another version of a key escrow proposal for comments from selected individuals. In my opinion this proposal is a non-starter and will not do. It's just a back door approach for more big government intrusion into every American's privacy," said Goodlatte. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- HOW TO RECEIVE CRYPTO-NEWS To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com) or send mail to majordomo(a)panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body of the message. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- End crypto-news =============================================================================

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Re: Senator, your public key please?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:10 AM 5/18/96, t byfield wrote: > There's no reason that webs of trust of well-signed keys couldn't be >very fluidly incorporated into patronage networks, for example, or that >their incorporation would affect network dynamics in any notable way. One Keys, key signings, and webs of trust can be used in all sorts of ways. And I expect the "burrowcrats" will try to regulate the use. Imagine, for example, if I use a "web of trust" to help me decide who's trustworthy enough to negotiate the sale of my house to. Further imagine that I want to see keys signed by Tom Metzger, my buddy from the Aryan Nations. Guess what? No blacks will have their keys signed, and hence I'll have to tell them, "Sorry, you're just not in my web of trust." (Now, this is a hypothetical, meant to show that use of a web of trust can trigger such decisions, and could thus trigger legal challenges.) The web of trust may not be transitive, but the "web of taint" may be more so. New forms of blackballing, blacklisting, redlining, etc. And I fully expect that who signs one's keys, and whose signatures are found on one's keys, may become a political and legal issue in the coming years. What if, for example, Sen. Leahy _did_ end up in the web of trust for Aryan Nation? Even if he never intended it, this could have some severe PR repercussions. An exciting new world we're entering. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:44 PM 5/17/96 -0500, snow wrote: > How about this as an idea: > > Get a few (3 to 5) accounts in a high density market (i.e. lots of >ISP's locally) set up a unix machine on a cheap machine. Have the anon >messages get sent to the pop accounts. Once an hour (or less depending on >budget) have the unix box poll the different pop accounts mix the messages >and resend them the next hour. > This could be further obfuscated by batching the messages up and >posting a whole chunk of messages to a different similar remailer else >where, or by just plopping an encrypted tar'd file on a ftp site where >another remailer grabs them and splits and remails them. It seems to me that if we consider that there are two separate functions remailers provide: 1. Anonymization. 2. Jurisdiction swapping Then perhaps one way to improve the robustness of remailers against copyright-type legal attacks is to provide remailers with temporary (1-2 week) remail-only sites. All material would be processed by the front end, then delivered in bulk to the other site. This sounds similar to the idea you described. That way, the remailer's "front end" can stay around for years, developing reputation. Any attack on copyright would simply be an attack on the back end, which wouldn't last anyway. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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