December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Tense visions of future imperfect
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com" "Bill Stewart" 11-APR-1996 00:21:15.87 >Personally, I find the idea that the government could hope to track the >economy so closely as to notice a $10M/year addition to the money supply to >be disturbing (though it was done in a science fiction story about >20 years ago :-) With digital cash, it's also unrealistic - we >finally have a technology for moving money around _without_ >them being able to track it all, if we want to deploy it. One related question is if the government would notice an underground fully anonymous digital cash setup - transactions disappearing from their "radar screen." -Allen

1 0

Re: Watch your language, Shabbir.
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:07 PM 4/13/96 -0400, s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca wrote: > >On Tue, 9 Apr 1996, jim bell wrote: > >> Look, very carefully, at the last paragraph quoted above. Mr. Safdar says, >> "No reasonable person is objecting to the FBI's right to conduct a wiretap." > >That's right. Because no reasonable person thinks they can convince Congress >or the Supremes otherwise. It isn't impossible, but energies are best spent >elsewhere, like getting the Burns bill passed. But that's not entirely the issue. Mr. Safdar's wording is critical, because it concedes FAR too much about what the government is assumedly entitled to do. Below, you've admitted that everybody here believes in what Mr. Safdar claims "no reasonable person" believes. Is Mr. Safdar saying we're ALL not reasonable?!? Are you? Further, I've read of multiple polls (Unfortunately, I can't quote a specific one) that show that a substantial _majority_ of the population objects to wiretaps under most any circumstance. (The figure I seem to recall was somewhere between 60% and 70%) If this recollection is true, and if the poll was accurate, there is no reason to believe that even your adjustments to Mr. Safdar's position is a accurate limit on reasonableness. I claim: 1. The vast majority of the population does not believe that the ability to wiretap is a government "right." 2. A majority of the population does not believe that the government should wiretap, even if it is assumed to have this authority. >Now none of us think wiretaps are a right and I presume Shabbir isn't >much of a fan either or he wouldn't take the trouble of supporting >something that makes wiretapping pointless (crypto). However, why did he make the claim the way he did? Is it just sloppy spokesmanship? Worse, why did no one else catch this gaffe? Is everybody else asleep? I saw no other commentary indicating that anybody noticed his statements. Are they ignoring Mr. Safdar's postings? Are they not reading them at all? Do these people not recognize that his comments practically grant the entire enchilada to the government? Why did he do this? And why hasn't he corrected what is apparently a huge mistake? > But we and he are >not Washington and there lies all the difference. Let's assume that my recollection is correct and most people don't want wiretapping at all. Why, exactly, should you believe that we're fated to get it anyway? (If you recall, I quoted part of a Brittanica article which said that from 1934 to 1968, a number of attempts to write wiretapping into law FAILED. Clearly, wiretapping wasn't inevitable then, and it doesn't have to be inevitable now.) Consider a hypthetical discussion with some Senator or Representative, where we point out that the public, as a whole, does not want wiretaps at all. "Why," we should ask, "should wiretaps occur when the public doesn't want them? Doesn't the majority get its way, at least in situations such as this? (It violates nobody's rights to NOT have wiretaps.)" The bigshot could come back and say, "But law-enforcement WANTS wiretaps!" Our next question should be, "Okay, but why does a tiny fraction of the population get more say in what happens than 70% of the public? Even if, arguably, wiretaps are beneficial, if the majority says they want to forgo this benefit, why don't they have this privilege?" At this point, the government sleazeball might not admit to the problem, but I doubt he'd have much of a response. >Do remember, Jim, that just 'cause most of this list is libertarian >doesn't mean that the rest of the world is. If, say, 70% or even 60% or 50% of the public doesn't want wiretaps at all, calling oneself libertarian is not required to share the opinion that government doesn't have the "right" to do them. Thus, I didn't couch my argument in terms that would require a libertarian to agree with them. This was intentional: I wasn't attempting to claim that the politicians are somehow obligated to follow libertarian opinions, but they damn well listen to MAJORITY opinions, at least when they limit what government should do! > I'm thankful that they can >occasionally agree with us horsepeople, despite the hysteria. Be polite. Hey, I _was_ adequately polite. However, unlike many of the people who are asleep at the switch around here, I am observant and I don't accept bullshit just because it is couched in terms that sound friendly. This incident, and particularly the failure of nearly all of the regular posters to see the problem with Shabbir's comments, has convinced me that a substantial fraction of the people who regularly post on CP aren't carefully considering issues such as rights of the population when they read this kind of material. You, at least, acknowledged that wiretapping isn't a "right." Where is everyone else's objection to Shabbir's statement? BTW, I'm not suggesting that I think that the majority of the population must necessarily have the "right" to do wiretaps if they want them: I'm saying that they have a right to NOT do wiretaps. There is a distinct difference between these two positions. The constitution may prohibit wiretaps even if the majority wants them; logic and history shows that the constitution does not MANDATE wiretaps even if the majority doesn't want them. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0

Lucifer & DES
by Jerry Whiting 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry My apologies for any misunderstanding in my original post. I was merely trying to point out IBM's historical compliance with govt suggestions for the design of the S-boxes. Please excuse me if my facts are adrift. My point was that this may shed light on IBM/Lotus' acceptance of the 40+24 work force reduction scheme. IBM may be receptive to working with the government yet again. Jerry Whiting jwhiting(a)azalea.com

1 0

Re: No matter where you go, there they are.
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"hfinney(a)shell.portal.com" "Hal" 11-APR-1996 18:06:18.51 >The method of using authenticated devices which provide timestamped >data from satellites not visible to the authenticating site does not >need to provide that data in real time. Even if it is delayed so it >comes in later than the data from the remote site, the verifying site >can still use it to calculate what the remote site should have been >seeing, and so get the benefit of using timings from all the satellites >visible to the remote site (again, assuming the remote site itself has >a low latency connection to the authenticating site). In regards to these timestamping devices... how do they know the correct time? It looks like that would be distortable, and with that, you could simply simulate the satellites to them via placing the device inside a metal box and piping in the appropriately modified signals. If it's getting its time information from the signals themselves, things get even easier. -Allen

1 0

Re: RC4 on FPGAs (Was: Bank transactions on Internet)
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?J=FCri_Kaljundi?= <jk(a)digit.ee> >Once someone gets this kind of cracking device ready, I think it would be >nice to make the information freely available, or start selling these for >nominal price. >This would also make an interesting device connected to Internet. In case >of fast device people could use it either for free or pay using ecash for >using it, and crack their SSL sessions. May be Netscape or Microsoft or >someone else (may be even Community Connexion :) lobbying the government >for allowing export of strong encryption could sponsor it. It should not >be so expencive. Much more useful than amazing fish-cam or coke machine on >Internet. It would make it kind of difficult to argue that 40-bit encryption was anything near the required level, yes. Of course, I'd advise setting it up _outside_ the US or any other country with a habit of disliking cryptography - otherwise they'd just find some excuse or another to shut it down. For instance, you'd probably have to set it up if it were in the US to check where a request was from, in order to not violate some arcane ITAR rule or another. -Allen

1 0

Re: Anonymous Remailer threat: Scientologists may subpoena
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:30 PM 4/13/96 -0400, s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca wrote: > > >On Wed, 10 Apr 1996, sameer wrote: > >> >> Frankly, I'm getting antsy. Is C2 going to get subpoena'd or >> not? I would be very disappointed if we don't. >> (Subpeonas envy!) > >All you have to do is call up CoS's lawyers. Let your fingers do the >walking... > >Seriously though, might it not be nicer (easier?) to establish some court >precedents on remailers vs. CoS rather than the government? Think of it as >a preemptive strike. Sounds like forum shopping/defendant shopping/plaintiff shopping. An excellent idea. The best part is that COS is one of the most unsympathetic organizations that could possibly be chosen, with the possible exception of the American Nazi Party or the KKK. The argument of CoS's religious copyright and trade >secrets don't seem to me be as emotionally effective horsemen as "National >Security Threats" or "Child Pornography". I really wouldn't want to see >Congress get away with legislating on remailers in a legal vacuum. I sure hesitate to "hope" that the COS thing gets turned into an SC decision, because that means that SOME defendant has to get pulled through the ringer until he eventually wins. Great for us; terrible for him. >Go for it Sameer. ;-) (Hope you won't be needing Jim's ISP-Aspol inc. >insurance against them pesky scientologists...[double ;-) ]) It's at this point that somebody usually observes that the COS could use AP to get rid of its critics. However, they're forgetting that with AP, its critics can remain absolutely anonymous and still punish COS. It would be no contest.

1 0

Re: Scientologists may subpoena anonymous remailer records
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: noring(a)netcom.com (Jon Noring) >On Wednesday afternoon, February 8th, three private >investigators visited the Caltech Security Office and the Campus >Computing Organization. The P.I.s wanted to know the identity of >the holder of the account "tc" on the Caltech Alumni Association >computer system (alumni.caltech.edu) They claimed to have >gotten the account name from the anon.penet.fi server via the >Helsinki police. Due to the unusual nature of this request, the >P.I.s were told that Caltech would need more information before >this type of information could be given out. Later that day, an >attorney representing the Church of Scientology called the >campus computing support office demanding the name of the >account holder. The attorney claimed that a document had been >stolen from a CoS computer system, and that the document had >been posted to the a.r.s newsgroup from alumni.caltech.edu via >the anon remailer. (The claim was the document was created on >Jan. 21 and appeared in a.r.s. on Jan. 24). The computing support >staff did not divulge the name of the account holder, and the CoS >attorney was referred to the Caltech General Counsel's office. Given that they didn't have a subpoena at this point, wouldn't the simplest way to solve this problem be to wipe the records? Somehow, I suspect that the judge is unlikely to put Caltech in contempt of court on suspicion that they're lying about the records being wiped. Now, contempt of court out of irritation... -Allen

1 0

carrick, Blowfish & the NSA
by Jerry Whiting 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One reason we chose to use Blowfish as the basis for carrick is that it _is_ a new algorithm. One has to assume that the NSA et al. has tools optimized to crack DES and possibly IDEA/RSA. At least let's give them something else to sweat over. In the short term there's a high probability that a cross-platform Blowfish-based encryption toolkit will muddy the waters and make life interesting for us and a bit more challenging for them. We're shooting for a May 1 release for Windows with the Mac and DOS 6 weeks behind and VAX/Sun a month after that. We're aiming for the stars: encryption, time/date stamps, signatures, message digests, etc. all based on Blowfish. We're doing a core engine with APIs, a standardized file format, and extensability for other developers. We're very committed to making the spec including the API and file format VERY PUBLIC. Like I said, we're aiming high. So yes, if we're successful Blowfish should be taken more seriously. And yes, when I outlined the above to the NSA while asking for an export permit, I was met with silence on the phone. I can't wait to meet with them mid-May when they come out to visit. My sense is that some junior level person(s) looked at Blowfish when Bruce originally published it in Dr. Dobb's and that their report was filed away waiting for the day when someone actually used it in the real world. Our marketing tag ("Encryption software so good, the Feds won't let us export it.") may well become a self-fulfilling prophecy. But that's OK because having others adopt carrick is our real goal. Building up a strong U.S. user base is OK while we wrestle with the NSA over how big a key length we can export. Their initial response was that 40-bit keys were specific to RC2 and RC4 and that Blowfish was another kettle of fish (bad pun intended). Either way we're going to publish an extensive FAQ on carrick that should allow someone to not only work with carick but perhaps clone our efforts. IANAL but my understanding is that publishing such a document, with or without source code, and making it publicly available to non-U.S. citizens is perfectly legal. So NSA if you're reading this: This may be yet another example of locking the barn door after the genie is out of the bottle. Prohibiting us from exporting carrick the product is pointless if we're allowed to fully document carrick the API and file spec. Jerry Whiting jwhiting(a)azalea.com 1 800 ENCRYPT

8 13

Re: PICS
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"frantz(a)netcom.com" 12-APR-1996 22:58:59.49 >I had a chance for a brief look at the PICS protocol, and it seems to have >a lot of cypherpunks relevance. It includes features such as: > Multiple third party rating systems No problem. Although it looks like the CDA-replacement bill would essentially require using one with at least as great anti-minor censorship abilities. > Digital signatures This is a problem, unless one simply deletes the signature on modifying a message, and takes the deny-everything-to-minors approach. -Allen

1 0

Re: Tense visions of future imperfect
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 11:33 PM 04/13/96 EDT, "E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH(a)ocelot.Rutgers.EDU> wrote: >From: IN%"stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com" "Bill Stewart" 11-APR-1996 00:21:15.87 > >>Personally, I find the idea that the government could hope to track the >>economy so closely as to notice a $10M/year addition to the money supply to >>be disturbing (though it was done in a science fiction story about >>20 years ago :-) With digital cash, it's also unrealistic - we >>finally have a technology for moving money around _without_ >>them being able to track it all, if we want to deploy it. > > One related question is if the government would notice an underground >fully anonymous digital cash setup - transactions disappearing from their >"radar screen." I wouldn't expect Gov't to notice any individual transaction, of course, but doubtless they would eventually notice that the expected amounts of money weren't where anticipated. At that point, I suspect things would get "interesting" (moreso than now :-) regarding currency tracing. Dave Merriman -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMW/Ii8VrTvyYOzAZAQEkdgQAqKqqbAAn3GIaW3/pdHKMWj8zN2FPuIa+ UEwJsz0Kjs4Whlt+UzjygJtKX1sXPnNjjf47l8tDQWqknrhxO1SDBlmsk1lHeM24 FPYFSwWH+y/zhlxjfj0mn2LlLngvN5UuWU7UG2Q7lKk0DjHvxqAYdbQDNfs1bXRm pxlXPaz1T2k= =rnwR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------- "Giving money and power to government is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenage boys." P. J. O'Rourke (b. 1947), U.S. journalist. <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> http://www.shellback.com/personal/merriman/index.htm

1 0

Re: Enforcing the CDA improperly may pervert Internet architecture
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:15 PM 4/13/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > Quite. It's interesting in that regard that, as well as differentiating >between homosexual and heterosexual content, the W3C PICS scheme includes a >filtration scheme for attacks on religions. One wonders if they considered that >Scientology is currently (probably unjustifiedly) considered a religion? The more the irrational and indefensible the faith, the more that the proponents of that faith view any sort of debunking attempt as "an attack". (It is not just Scientologists that suffer from this mentality. I have seen those of the more fanatical Christian varieties make the same claim.) What these schemes will do is shield children from anything resembling a "controversial" discussion. (I expect Cypherpunks to be labeled as "could cause criminal behaviour" or some such malarky by the more protective and clueless. (It may be true, but why warn them upfront? ]:> )) You will see the forces of "good" try and protect the little kidlets from anything that might get them to think for themselves. It is already happening in some sectors of public thought, I expect the net to become its next victim. Soon everything will be "Sanitized for your Protection". --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon

1 0

Re: Lotus Notes 24-bit sellout
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:21 AM 4/12/96 -0700, Jerry Whiting wrote: > >When Ray Ozzie announced the work reduction sellout at the RSA conference, >both he and Ms Denning (whom I spoke with about it later) mentioned that >there was something else in Lotus Notes 4 besides the 40+24 bit compromise. > >My thought is that the NSA gave them something else in exchange for the >mandatory escrow scheme they're all talking about publicly. Perhaps some >other crypto code the NSA had lying around unused. > >So looking for a common 24-bit subkey may reduce Notes' key to a 40-bit >brute force exercise but the 40+24 is probably not ALL that's in Notes 4. > >Definitely a deal with the Devil. Given that we're talking about IBM, not >Lotus none of this surprises me given IBM's Lucifer/DES history with spook >input years ago. Then again to be fair, I don't know if the 40+24 deal >was cooked up before or after the IBM/Lotus merger. What about the following idea, which I think might have been indirectly discussed a few months ago. Let's suppose "you" agreed with the NSA to limit their effort to 40 bits, and put 24 bits at the beginning of the file. The code to do this could be separated and highlighted and identified publicly, and a software patch could be engineered by somebody to NOP this stretch of code to death. The result is that those 24-bits simply don't appear; you've already gotten the export license. The NSA doesn't have any real reason to complain: _ANY_ program can be modified by suitably changing object code bit patterns. An even smaller change would be to put the number of bits to expose ("24") in a byte value ("00011000"), one that will be zeroed by a patch later on. I guess I'm not really suggesting this; I think that even appearing to come to some arrangement with the NSA is wrong. However, it would be an excellent way to give the finger to the NSA, because there is no way that they can ensure that a given program is "finagle-proof."

1 0

Re: Any examples of mandatory content rating?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:59 AM 4/13/96 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: >On Fri, 12 Apr 1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > >> >> I'm interested in hearing about any _actual_ examples where a government >> body in the United States has mandated that intellectual property (roughly, >> written words, magazines, motion pictures, CDs, etc.) be "rated" or >> "age-labelled." Before anyone out there fires up his "Reply" and tells us >> about movie ratings, magazine warning labels, and the like, read on. > >Well, my examples aren't all going to be in the United States, or >strictly intellectual property, or 'age' based, but here: > >Age rated, I don't think there are many examples. General ratings exist. >The best place to look for this kind of thing is e.g., FAA safety >ratings on potential aircraft/aircraft part designs. > >While at first it may seem a bad example, It is a poor example. Aircraft parts are not "intellectual property." They are physical objects. Their design may be "intellectual property", but they are not being rated BECAUSE of their intellectual property. In fact, they would be rated for aircraft application even if nothing about their design or construction was patented, copyrighted, or was in any way restricted. >> So, if anybody's still reading this, I am interested in _any_ examples >> where intellectual content (as opposed to food or drug packaging, for >> example) is required to be labelled. >Still, governments are quite talented at making ratings schemes look >voluntary when practically speaking they are not. You know, it's amazing how you fail to ask and answer obvious questions when they arise! Why, exactly, should the government NEED to "make ratings schemes look voluntary when practically speaking they are not"? After all, you would love to take the position that the government has this authority anyway. Is it possible you're just afraid to admit that the government(s) doesn't have this authority? Is it possible to don't want to acknowledge that the government(s) try to force people do things it has no right to? >> Such examples might shed some light on how these various proposals for >> "labelling" of Net traffic might work. And absent such examples, might show >> just what a tough road lies ahead for those advocating such labelling. > >I think it will end up much like motion pictures. The net will be asked >to regulate itself under the threat of government regulation, which might >be an empty threat if the First Amendment rights are applied. Most >people will comply, it being easier than making a fuss. Sounds like wishful thinking on your part. See, unlike movies and TV shows, which are produced by a relatively tiny number of companies which are easily targetable, Internet content will be produced by hundreds of thousands or even millions of sources. Nobody will have to "make a fuss," they'll merely FAIL to rate their material. No fuss, just no rating. And there will be people out here who will excoriate anybody who complies with such a ratings system. There will be essentially no pressure on the smallest organizations, because there will be far too many of them to target. Besides, since there will be no enforceable standards they will not be targetable anyway. Over time, ever larger organizations will refuse to rate, if they ever did. Eventually, and probably immediately, the whole system would collapse. At that point, there will be no government "threat" to regulate, because everybody will realize that the system is working just fine without regulation. Everyone will see an unregulated Internet, and nobody will see a powerful need to regulate it.

2 1

cyherpunks archive
by Kris Steven Shannon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I can't get access to the cypherpunks archive at berkeley Is there a mirror site anywhere? (I don't have FTP access but have been using ftpmail(a)doc.ic.ac.uk) Any suggestions very welcome! Thanx. -- Kris Shannon <kss01(a)cs.uow.edu.au> 1st year Bachelor of Computer Science.

1 0

Re: Digital Cash Escrow
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:51 PM 4/11/96 -0400, Jean-Francois Avon wrote: >Does anyone, especially in Canada, ever noticed that them or their local net >friends had their snail mail opened? > >A friend of mine has his regularly opened; he complained to Canada Post >three times, but it stills goes on AFAIK. He is pissed off at me, convinced >that the forwarding of Jim Bell's AP related articles is what justified the >mail opening. Actually, he does not even reply to my e-mails anymore. >We used to be great friends... >Neither of us ever engaged in any subversive activities or are involved in >illegal actions. It seems that FUD got him. ...sigh... It does sound like the guy is overreacting a bit. However, I don't know much about Quebec politics; with that close vote recently on separation, perhaps they are getting nervous about things. Is he in Quebec? I can say, however, that I've never gotten any kind of "official" feedback on the subject, not that I really expect it. I've gotten a few inquiries which on the surface appear to be innocuous, but which I suspect have hidden motives. This could be a little hidden official research, or maybe just self-motivated individuals trying to do a "good deed." It doesn't matter; my idea doesn't need any secrets in order to be successful.

1 0

Re: Watch your language, Shabbir.
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:34 PM 4/13/96 -0800, jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> wrote: >At 08:07 PM 4/13/96 -0400, s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca wrote: >> >>On Tue, 9 Apr 1996, jim bell wrote: >> >>> Look, very carefully, at the last paragraph quoted above. Mr. Safdar says, >>> "No reasonable person is objecting to the FBI's right to conduct a wiretap." >> >>That's right. Because no reasonable person thinks they can convince Congress >>or the Supremes otherwise. It isn't impossible, but energies are best spent >>elsewhere, like getting the Burns bill passed. > >But that's not entirely the issue. Mr. Safdar's wording is critical, >because it concedes FAR too much about what the government is assumedly >entitled to do. Below, you've admitted that everybody here believes in what >Mr. Safdar claims "no reasonable person" believes. [snip] No. Shabbir claims just what he said, AFAIK, that "no reasonable person is objecting..." A very different matter. What I believe and what I choose to object to through organized political initiatives may be two different things. If Shabbir's wording is so critical, why did you change it by adding "believes?" I don't believe government should be able to wiretap it's citizens, but I also don't think there's a snowball's chance in hell of taking that power away from the FBI. That's why I want strong crypto. There is a far greater chance of getting some decent crypto legislation enacted than of completely removing the FBI's authority to wiretap. It's a much more "reasonable" goal, in that sense. There are people much more deserving of cypherpunk scorn than someone who works as hard on these issues as Shabbir. It's pretty pathetic, Jim. Rich ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb See my Blue Ribbon Page at http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/blueribbon New EF zine "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

1 0

Re: Protocols at the Point of a Gun
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:33 PM 4/12/96 -0500, Scott Brickner <sjb(a)universe.digex.net> wrote: >Actually, I expect configurations like yours to become more widespread >in the near future. There are a lot of cable-modem designs that >basically put an ethernet port on your cable box. This leads to the paradoxical situation where your cable TV company can deliver you motion picture images of sex and nudity on the TV channel, but it's highly illegal for them to send you the same material as data.... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215

1 0

Re: "Contempt" charges likely to increase
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"unicorn(a)schloss.li" "Black Unicorn" 13-APR-1996 11:57:34.92 >Are you planning on affording them due process rights? Due Process rights are an interesting question in this regard. One, self-defense goes up against due process, particularly lethal self defense. One liberal justification for various bans or limits on lethal self defense (i.e., those against potentially lethal defense against property crimes - including preventing the criminal from making away with his stolen property) is that the criminal does not get due process. In such a case, it's usually reasonably obvious to the victim that self-defense is necessary, although others (such as, so far as I can tell, in the Goetz case) may not realize it. Two, who's going to apply the trial? As you've noted regarding overturning contempt charges, judges are very rarely willing to consider each other wrong (outside of the realm of appeals), much less sentence each other. Another instance of how judges tend to resist even the appointed mechanisms for removal can be found in the recent judicial commentary regarding a threatened impeachment for another judge; while they were correct in that case, the instance is instructive. This is a common tendency inside the government in general; cops are very loyal to one another, even when they're crooked. Seldom is anyone but an internal body (Internal Affairs) permitted to go after a cop (except with massive opposition by the police department), and even they are hated. >How about a trial, or does it merely take a single bidder with money to have >someone offed? The risk of innocents dying is a valid problem, and is the major reason that I have not "endorsed" assasination politics. The essential question is whether more innocents will die under such a system than do now, or under other proposed (non-violent) alternatives. The latter would be preferable, _if_ they work. As yet, I have hopes that they will; others, such as Mr. Bell, are more pessimistic. >Sounds like tyrrany of the rich to me. Unfortunately, it isn't. I say unfortunately because a tyrrany of the rich would be preferable to the tyrrany of the (incompetent) majority we've got currently; even the provisions in the Bill of Rights are removable by a super-majority. Of course, a tyrrany of no-one at all would be preferable, but I'm not sure if there's any way to do that. >> To whatever extent it exceeds those limits, and to >> whatever extent the public can't get justice to prevent those violations, >> why would the public be obligated to accept them? >Really Mr. Bell has recognized something important, though I'm not sure >even he realizes it. Specifically, that when his allies are so few in >number he must resort to general terrorism and low intensity conflict to >have any hope of success at all. This is essentially the moral problem of ends justifying the means; I do not regard this difficulty as solvable in any provable manner. >> To believe otherwise is to believe that the government has some sort of >> special dispensation to violate the law. I don't believe this; it wouldn't >> surprise me to hear that you do, however. Which is it? >I don't believe anyone has any special dispensation. It's all a question >of who can get away with it. For all your moaning and whining, you are [irrelevant material deleted] Essentially, can we stop _everybody_ from getting away with it, as you put it, or just some people? And if the latter, who should we stop? -Allen

1 0

Enemies R Us
by cpunk＠remail.ecafe.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

New York Times, 14 April 1996 Private Groups Lead Charge in War on Far Right By Michael Janofsky Washington. In the year since the worst terrorist act on American soil, the bombing of a Federal building in Oklahoma City that killed 168 people, the number of right-wing groups harboring anti-government sentiments has been estimated at mnre than 800, by some counts, and they now operate in every state. These are organized groups of militias, white supremacists, neo-Nazis- skinheads, survivalists and constitutionalists who are connected to each other with increasing frequency by the Internet, fax machines and a shared belief in Christian Identity, a renegade religious concept that. proclaims whites to be God's chosen people, Jews to be descendants of Satan and blacks to be subhuman. At the same time, however, as Federal agencies proceed with traditional means of intelligence gathering (as in the Unabomber case), and Congress ponders a new anti-terrorism bill (stalled by the gun lobby and civil libertarians), efforts to fight domestic terrorism are being supplemented more than ever by private human rights organizations that track the fringe right with their own networks. They willingly share information with law enforcement agencies, branches of the military and reporters. Federal law enforcement agencies, which were heavily criticized for their actions in fatal controntations in Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and Waco, Tex., appear to be trying a new, more patient approach in waiting for a peaceful solution to the current standoff with the anti-government group called the Freemen in eastern Montana. They have been criticized this time, largely by neighbors of the Freeman and local officials, for waiting so long to get involved, and for waiting at all. Undercover Work Most of the human rights organizations were actively campaigning against racism and anti-Semitism long before the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995 and the arrest of two suspects with links to militia groups. And with many of the right-wing groups now hiding racist views beyond a more acceptable veneer of anti-government oratory, the human rights groups say the need to collect information has become that much more critical. At least two of them -- the Southern Poverty Law Center in Montgomery, Ala., and the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles -- use undercover operatives. Both organizations had spies attend a convention last weekend in Lake Tahoe that attracted hundreds of Christian Identity followers to hear a speech by Randy Weaver, the white separatist whose wife and son were killed three years ago in a siege by Federal agents in Ruby Ridge. The Southern Poverty Law Center has computer files of more than 12,000 people identified as members of a far-right group. The Wiesenthal Center operates an extensive electronic tracking station, where researchers monitor television, cable and radio shows all over the world for racist and anti-Semitic content. When the Army recently conducted an internal investigation to learn how many soldiers were involved with skinhead groups, senior officers at the Pentagon twice conferred with Wiesenthal Center officials, and when Patrick J. Buchanan was running for the Republican Presidential nomination, they produced names of Buchanan supporters who once worked for David Duke, a former Ku Klux Klan member, or had affiliation with the National Association for the Advancement of White People. Law enforcement agencies have credited the human rights groups with helping the public become more aware of the beliefs, factions and heroes of the far-right fringe. The human rights groups see their efforts as a necessary antidote to the sympathetic treatment of far-right groups on conservative talk radio programs, and to the reluctance of some conservative politicians to criticize the extremists. But the work may have also produced some unintended consequences. Writing in The Jubilee, a publication of the Christian Identity movement, a former militia leader from Alabama, Jeff Randall, said the drumbeat of concern over domestic terrorism has served as a welcome recruiting device for militias and other right-wing groups. "Throughout all this," he wrote, "the militias became stronger and better organized. "Many people are wondering if the militia movement is still alive and well," he added. "The answer to that question is a resounding 'yes.' " ----- Full page ad: "False Patriots: The Threat of Antigovernment Extremists" Fast-Growing "Patriot" Movement Poses Danger of Domestic Terrorism Early Warnings In October 1994, Morris Dees warned Attorney General Reno that white supremacists were infiltrating the "Patriot" militia movement. He called the development "a recipe for disaster." Six months later, a powerful bomb destroyed a federal building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people. The country soon learned that Tim McVeigh, the prime suspect in the attack, had neo-Nazi ties and connections to the "Patriot" network, the combination that Dees had seen as so explosive before the bombing. Now, Dees and his colleagues at the Southern Poverty Law Center have again warned the Attorney General about the danger posed by the antigovernment "Patriot" movement. In an April 9, 1996 letter, Dees urged Reno to take concrete steps to counter the threat of further domestic terrorism. He also provided her with a copy of *False Patriots*, the Center's new report on the "Patriot" movement. This 72-page expose is the culmination of a Center investigation into the "Patriot" movement conducted since the Oklahoma City bombing. United By Hate The "Patriot" movement encompasses numerous elements of the American right, from certain Christian fundamentalists to the Ku Klux Klan. It includes tax protesters, survivalists and neo-Nazis, as well as radical anti-environmentalists and gun enthusiasts. The tie that binds those in the movement, estimated by some at five million strong, is a virulent hatred of the federal government. This hatred has been fueled in recent years by the passage of gun control legislation, the deaths of Randy Weaver's wife and son at the hands of federal agents on Ruby Ridge in Idaho, and the disastrous federal assault on the Branch Davidian compound in Waco. The False Patriots report reveals the people behind the "Patriot" movement, people like Louis Beam, a key Aryan Nations leader, and Pete Peters, a pastor of the bizarre Christian Identity faith. It identifies over 800 antigovernment "Patriot" organizations, including 441 unauthorized militia groups. It describes how "Patriot" paramilitary units are preparing for war with the federal government. It offers an inside look at guerrilla literature and the tools of terrorism. It documents crimes linked to the "Patriot" movement, including plots to blow up other federal buildings. It demonstrates that the "Patriot" movement poses "a clear and present danger" to the nation. Expect More Bombs Immediately after the Oklahoma City disaster, a spokesperson for the Militia of Montana predicted more antigovernment violence. "Patriot" groups flooded the underground book market and the Internet with manuals on bomb-making, railroad sabotage and the production of deadly chemicals. "Patriot" leaders openly suggested the need to kill government officials. Since the Oklahoma City tragedy, numerous "Patriot" terrorist plots have been discovered, including plans to poison federal employees in Minnesota and conspiracies to blow up a federal courthouse in Spokane and an IRS building in Reno. An AmTrak train was derailed by a group calling itself "Sons of the Gestapo." Over ten tons of explosives have been stolen from various locations around the country in the past year. Authorities suspect a large quantity has made its way into the "Patriot" movement. In December, a survivalist was arrested in the Ozark Mountains of Arkansas and charged with terrorism. He had produced 130 grams of the deadly poison ricin, enough to kill thousands. Secret Cells Formed >From California to Florida, "Patriots" are forming cells of five to ten men skilled in explosives, sniper fire, sabotage and terrorism. These secret cells operate without a chain of command to avoid compromising the larger movement. One cell recently uncovered in Idaho is financed by a wealthy businessman. These cells, like the one McVeigh is suspected of forming, are difficult to monitor and can strike when least expected. ____________________________________________________________ What You Can Do To Help Stop Domestic Terrorism You can take a number of steps to fight against domestic terrorists. + Contact your state attorney general's office Find out if your state has anti-militia and anti-paramilitary training statutes. If the answer is "Yes," insist that the laws be enforced. If "No," urge the attorney general's office to work for passage of such laws. + Support federal legislation to outlaw militia groups that are not authorized by state law These groups operate as a springboard for dangerous antigovernment activity. + Learn about the "Patriot" movement and share your knowledge with others The "Patriot" movement thrives on secrecy and citizen apathy. The *False Patriots* report offers the most complete way for concerned individuals to learn the full story of the "Patriot" movement. It was created by the Militia Task Force, a project of the Southern Poverty Law Center, and is available to those who support the Center's work with a tax-decutible gift of $15 or more. The Militia Task Force is leading the fight to expose the "Patriot" movement and protect those injured in hate crimes. The Center's Militia Task Force and its Klanwatch Project monitor "Patriot" groups, especially those with racist ties. Computerized investigative files contain over 11,000 photos and videos as well as data on 3,200 groups, 14,000 individuals and over 61,000 incidents. A quarterly "Intelligence Report" is provided free to law enforcement agencies and the media. This work has not been done without costs. In 1983, the Center's Montgomery, Alabama, offices were burned by the Klan. Its lawyers have received serious death threats. Just this past November, three members of the Oklahoma Constituional Militia were arrested in a plot to bomb the Center's offices. ____________________________________________________________ Support the Center and its Militia Task Force and Recieve *False Patriots* Militia Task Force A Project of the Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Avenue, Montgomery, AL 36104 Yes, send me a copy of the 72-page *False Patriots*. Enclosed is my tax-deductible gist to help expose the "Patriot" movement and protect innocent people from hate crimes and injustice [ ]$15 [ ]$25 [ ]$50 [ ]$100 [ ]Other $_____________ Name _______________________________________________________ Address ____________________________________________________ City ____________________________ State _____ Zip __________ ____________________________________________________________ A copy of the latest official registration statement and financial report filed by the Souther Poverty Law Center may be obtained by contacting Office of Charities Registration, 162 Washington Avenue, Albany, NY 12231. Y9604NYT

1 0

Re: carrick, Blowfish & the NSA
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Blowfish has not been broken in my opinion. I wonder if Perry is thinking of MacGuffin, the block cipher by Schneier and Matt Blaze based on an asymmetrical Feistel network. It was broken, and I think it was at Eurocrypt. Here is a message from sci.crypt a month ago where Bruce discusses the status of Blowfish. A weak key attack is known against a weakened version, but I think the weak keys are rare. > From: schneier(a)parka.winternet.com (Bruce Schneier) > Date: 1996/03/14 > MessageID: 4i907g$9lj(a)blackice.winternet.com#1/1 > > The most successful attack against Blowfish to date has been against the > weak keys (two identical entries in an S-box). These can be detected in > a 12-round variant, but not in the full 16 rounds. I still believe that > random S-boxes are better than chosen ones, and think that more rounds > is better than fewer rounds with better S-boxes. There are a few > things I would do differently if I was to write the algorithm from scratch > right now, but on the whole I am still pleased with the results. > > Bruce Hal

1 0

Re: Watch your language, Shabbir.
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:58 AM 4/14/96 -0500, Mike McNally wrote: >s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca wrote: >> > Look, very carefully, at the last paragraph quoted above. Mr. Safdar >> > says, "No reasonable person is objecting to the FBI's right to conduct >> > a wiretap." >> >> That's right. Because no reasonable person thinks they can convince Congress >> or the Supremes otherwise. It isn't impossible, but energies are best spent >> elsewhere, like getting the Burns bill passed. > >The choice of words was exceedlingly poor if that's what he really meant. >Though I agree that it's unlikely any LEA will give up capabilities it's >grown to imagine is has a "right" to have, I haven't stopped objecting. > Exactly! I think the issue is important enough so that we really ought to develop new wording, something that far more accurately reflects the bulk of our opinion towards wiretapping. For years, I've looked at it this way: Before the telephone era, "all" search warrants were probably issued for a specific address, and had to be served for a limited time period, a few hours or less. The owners of the location being searched were aware, at the time the search was going on, that the search was occuring. Moreover, once that search ended it was no more and those searched were aware of it. Unlike this, and quite unlike any warrants which preceded it, wiretaps: 1. Take an almost unlimited time period, compared to a 1-hour search. (Yes, they do come to an end, but...) 2. The users of the telephone line are not informed, while the search (wiretap) is being done. 3. To my knowledge, albeit limited, targets of wiretaps are NOT informed, subsequent to the tap, that they have been wiretapped. Therefore they are denied the opportunity to complain, even after the fact. I see no legal reason why wiretaps should have the "features" listed above. There is a certain practical reason they can: Due to the nature of wiretapping, it is not physically necessary to show up to do the tap, or tell those targeted, or tell them after the tap has been disconnected. However, it seems very unlikely that the mere fact that an invention allows a kind of search that was possible before, should automatically change the interpretation of the Constitution to allow that search. If a new invention allowed the cops to walk through walls untraceably, would that automatically mean that the normal protections that search warrants are supposed to provide are no longer valid? I don't think so! Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

2 1

Anybody know of a WinNT Remailer?
by Daniel Bender 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm not sure if this is really the right place to ask this, but... Does anyone know of a remailer that will work on Windows NT??? Dan

1 0

Blowfish ain't broken
by Jerry Whiting 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Jerry Whiting writes: > > One reason we chose to use Blowfish as the basis for carrick is that > > it _is_ a new algorithm. One has to assume that the NSA et al. has > > tools optimized to crack DES and possibly IDEA/RSA. At least let's > > give them something else to sweat over. > > Perry writes: > They won't sweat over it long. Blowfish was broken. My understanding is that Blowfish using only 3 rounds, not the full 16, has been broken. And yes, duplicate entries in an S-box are weak keys. carrick uses the full 16 rounds and we check for weak keys. I'll sleep at night. Jerry Whiting

1 0

Re: washington post notices archives
by medea＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Andrew K. Bressen wrote: >we here at HKS.net have today received a cease and desist >letter from the washington post regarding editorial copy >of theirs that was evidently posted to c'punks and then >abosrbed into our c'punk archives. IMO, if you didn't remove the material from your archives, the Washington Post wouldn't be able to press the issue any further. Email posted to a listserv enters into and becomes the possession of the public domain. If they ran a search looking for their material, then obviously credit was appropriately given to the quote. The Unabomber's Manifesto was posted on the Net. Since the Post published it in its entirety, then they have a right to tell me to remove it if I had downloaded it? Personally, I think the letter is full of the stuff one would step into out on the range where the deer and the antelope play. Medea ============================================================ +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + |---------------------------------------------| + + | The mind is its own place, and of itself | + + | Can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven | + + |---------------------------------------------| + +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

1 0

math patents
by tien＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In reply to the message excerpted below: I believe Jim's not looked back far enough. My recollection from law school is that the law was friendly to math patents in the period before the Supreme Court weighed in. There were some PTO denials, which courts reversed (I think the Court of Claims heard these back then). So I think the trend was toward patenting processes even if mathematical until Gottschalk v. Benson. It's a conceptually messy area because "processes" have long been patentable (like the Morse telegraphy/Bell telephony patents) but the Supreme Court saw the Benson application as violating the doctrine against patenting "laws of nature." Lee From: jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> Date: Sat, 06 Apr 1996 14:52:12 -0800 Subject: Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary? At 01:07 PM 4/6/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: >> I contend that had he talked to Phillip Zimmermann in 1990 or so, he would >> have told Zimmermann that "It's illegal to write an encryption program using >> RSA, because it's patented! You'll never get away with it!" > >I would have indicated that "you're going to face the prospect of >intellectual property litigation, and that can get nasty in the extreme." One thing I've never heard is an explanation of how computer software and especially mathematics went from "extremely not patentable" in the early and middle 1970's, to "patentable" once Messr's Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman invented a piece of mathematics that the government wanted to deny to the public. How convenient.

1 0