December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

ar380-5.aip.html
by Julian Assange 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

AR 380-5 Appendix H Classified Document and Materiel Storage Standards and Information AR 380-5 Section I Minimum Class A, B, and C Vault Construction Standards AR 380-5 H-1. Consolidated masonry vault specifications These specifications are given in table H-1. =============================================================================== ================= Class Approved storage lev- Thicknesses el Floors Walls Ceiling A TOP SECRET 8"RC(1) 8"RC 8"RC B SECRET 4"RC 8"(2) 4"RC C CONFIDENTIAL 4"C(1) 8"(3) 4"RC ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- Legend: RC = Reinforced concrete; C = Concrete without reinforcement Notes: (1) All concrete used in vault construction will be monolithic cast in place, Class A, con- forming to US Army Corps of Engineers Specification C.E. 204 (minimum compressive strength of 3000 psi after 28 days of aging). Reinforcing will be by minimum 5/8-inch diameter steel rein- forcing bars (rebars) laid a maximum of 6 inches on centers, creating a cross-hatched steel curtain, to be sandwiched at half thickness of the concrete, parallel to the longest surface. Rebars will be anchored or imbedded in all contiguous walls/surfaces. (2) Class B vault walls will be constructed of masonry at least 8 inches thick, such as brick or concrete block employing adequate bond. Hollow masonry, only of the vertical cell (load bearing) type, can also be used, but if used, each cell will have from ceiling to floor 1/2-inch diame- ter or larger rebar inserted, and then be filled with pea gravel and Portland cement grout. Rebars will be anchored in both floor and ceiling to a depth of at least 4 inches. In seismic areas, 6-inch or thicker RC will be required. (3) Class C vault walls will be constructed of thick-shell concrete block or vertical cell clay tile and be not less than 8 inches thick. In seismic areas, 6-inch or thicker RC will be used. =============================================================================== ================= AR 380-5 H-2. Lightweight alternate Class A vault specifications Interim lightweight alternate class A and B vault specifications (for use above ground level only). Where building structural design factors preclude the use of a standard class A or B vault design at above ground level locations, a modular vault-ASTM type I, U.L. class-M approved under ANSI/UL Standard 608, dated 27 June 1983 or later, may be used. Until final testing of this product is completed, it will not be used in lieu of the conventional designed vaults, at or below grade. Existing steel lined rooms, built to previously approved specifications, will continue to be approved for use, but further construction of steel liners will be deferred in favor of the above specified ANSI/UL Standard 608 product. AR 380-5 H-3. Doors for both methods of vault construction The vault will be equipped with an approved vault door of the type presently listed on the Federal Supply Schedule. The Class 5 vault door will be used with reinforced concrete vaults. Where weight of construction is a factor and a steel-lined vault is used, a Class 6 vault door may be used, if obtainable. Normally, a vault should have only one entrance. When a vault exceeds 1,000 square feet of floor space or has more than eight occupants, it should have a minimum of two exits (one of which will be the entrance) for safety purposes. When more than one entrance is required, each must be equipped with the approved door, but only one door will be used for normal access. The use of a vault door for controlling movement into and out of a facility is not authorized as this continued use will create undue wear on the door and will eventually weaken the locking mechanism and cause malfunctioning. Therefore, a vestibule should be constructed at the entrance with an access door to achieve control when the vault door is open. Where building codes require that the vault entrance meet a specified fire rating, the vestibule and its access door must be of the required fire rating. Where permissible, the vault door optional day gate may be employed as the entrance control in lieu of the above vestibule. There will be no windows in a vault, and all ventilator openings or other access routes into the vault will be properly treated to deny unauthorized access. Sound attenuation will be fully employed and where inadequate, white noise masking will be added to prevent classified discussions from being overheard. AR 380-5 H-4. Additional security safeguards for vaults All vaults designated Class A or B will have intrusion and fire protection. In addition, when a vault is unattended, the areas contiguous to such vault will be supervised either by frequent routine guard patrols or electronic means so as to increase the depth of security and to allow early detection of trespass. Detection of trespass outside the vault is preferred to detection of vault penetration, since response to the former should preclude the latter. Detection systems that indicate attempted penetration (such as vibration sensors) are acceptable, provided they allow adequate response time before actual barrier violation. AR 380-5 H-5. Security assistance If requested in writing, additional technical advice and guidance relative to vault security problems, may be obtained from the Commander, Intelligence Materiel Activity (IMA), ATTN: AMXIM-PS, Fort Meade, MD 20755. AR 380-5 Section II Security Upgrading Via Construction-Buildings, Offices, and Rooms AR 380-5 H-6. Approved standards for security upgrading The following guidance is offered as a norm against which- a. To evaluate the adequacy of existing structural security safeguards. b. To provide security guidance for new construction in areas which will contain activities and material of foreign intelligence interest. AR 380-5 H-7. Hardware Heavy-duty builder's hardware should be used in construction, and all screws, nuts, bolts, hasps, clamps, bars, 2-inch-square mesh of No. 11 wire, 18-gauge expanded metal screen, hinges, pins, etc., should be securely fastened to preclude surreptitious removal and ensure visual evidence of tampering. Hardware accessible from outside the area should be peened, pinned, brazed, or tack-welded to preclude removal. The term ""2-inch-square mesh of No. 11 wire,'' which meets the requirements of Federal Specification RR-F-191d, 17 June 1965, hereinafter shall be referred to as ""wire mesh.'' AR 380-5 H-8. Interior walls Construction should be plaster, gypsum wallboard, metal panels, hardboard, wood, plywood, or other opaque materials offering similar resistance to, and evidence of, unauthorized entry into the area. If insert-type panels are used, a method should be devised to prevent the removal of such panels without leaving visual evidence of tampering. Area barriers up to a height of 8 feet should be of opaque or translucent construction where visual access is a factor. If visual access is not a factor, the area barrier walls may be of wire mesh or other nonopaque material offering similar resistance to, and evidence of, unauthorized entry into the area. AR 380-5 H-9. Windows Window openings 18 feet or less from an access point (for example, another window outside the area, roof, ledge, door, and so forth) should be fitted with 1/2-inch bars (separated by no more than 6 inches), plus crossbars to prevent spreading, or 18-gauge expanded metal screen, or wire mesh securely fastened on the inside. When visual access is a factor, the windows should be kept closed and locked at all times, and also should be made translucent or opaque by any practical method such as painting or covering the inside of the glass. During nonduty hours the windows should be closed and securely fastened to preclude surreptitious removal of classified material. AR 380-5 H-10. Doors Doors should be substantially constructed of wood or metal. When windows, panels, or similar openings are used in the door, they should be secured with 18-gauge expanded metal screen or wire mesh securely fastened on the inside. If visual access is a factor, the windows should be translucent or opaqued. When doors are used in pairs, a mullion insert anchored top and bottom should be installed between the doors. AR 380-5 H-11. Door louvers or baffle plates When used, they should be reinforced with 18-gauge expanded metal screen, or wire mesh fastened inside the area. AR 380-5 H-12. Door locking devices a. Entrance doors should be secured with either a GSA-approved built-in, three-position, dial-type, changeable combination lock; a GSA-approved combination padlock (per paragraph 5-101) as amended and as specified in paragraph 5-102d; a key-operated padlock or locking device with high security cylinder and hasp (see figure H-1) as described in the same paragraph; or a built-in 1-inch throw, deadbolt lock equipped with the GSA-approved high- security cylinder; or preferably a combination of these. Other doors should be firmly secured from the inside with a panic bolt (actuated by a panic bar), a deadbolt, a rigid wood or metal bar (fitted to preclude ""springing''), extending across the width of the door and held in position by solid clamps, preferably on the door casing, or other means approved by the cognizant OPSEC Support Unit and Fire Marshal. b. The new High-Security Padlock approved July 1982 became available within the supply system late fall 1982. It has the same Federal Stock Number as the Sargent and Greenleaf (S&G) Model 831B Padlock, which is being phased out of service. AR 380-5 H-13. Ceilings Ceilings should be constructed of plaster, gypsum wallboard material, panels, hardboard, wood, plywood, ceiling tile, or other material offering similar resistance to and detection of unauthorized entry. Wire mesh, 18-gauge expanded metal screen, or other nonopaque material offering similar resistance to, and evidence of, unauthorized entry into the area may be used if visual access to classified material is not a factor. When wall barriers do not extend to the ceiling, and a false ceiling is used, this false ceiling should be reinforced with wire mesh or 18-gauge expanded metal screen, alarmed and otherwise secured with heavy-duty builder's hardware. (This measure also applies when panels are removable, and entry can be gained into the area without visible detection.) When wire mesh or expanded metal screens are used, they must be secured to adjoining walls in a manner which precludes removal without leaving evidence of tampering. In those instances where barrier walls of an area extend to a solid ceiling, there is no need to reinforce a false ceiling; however, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) should monitor this otherwise unobserved area. AR 380-5 H-14. Ceilings (unusual cases) It is recognized that instances may arise where activities have a valid justification for not erecting a solid suspended ceiling as part of the area, especially in high-ceiling hangars. The activity may contend that the use of a suspended ceiling is impractical because of production methods, such as the use of overhead cranes for moving bulky equipment within the area. Cases also exist where the air conditioning system may be impeded by the construction of a solid suspended ceiling (such as ADP centers). At times, even the height of the classified material may make a suspended ceiling impractical. In such cases, special provisions should be made to ensure that surreptitious entry cannot be achieved by entering the area over the top of the barrier walls (for example, employ approved intrusion detection systems, sensors, and more frequent guard patrols). Areas of this type should be closely scrutinized to ensure that the structural safeguards are adequate to preclude entry via adjacent pipes, catwalks, and ladders, or to preclude observation, if visual access is a factor. AR 380-5 H-15. Miscellaneous openings Where ducts, pipes, registers, sewers, and tunnels are of such size and shape as to permit unauthorized entry (in excess of 96 square inches, for example), they will be secured by 18-gauge expanded metal screen, wire mesh, or where more practical steel bars at least 1/2-inch in diameter with a maximum space of 6 inches between the bars. The steel bars will be securely fastened at both ends to preclude removal, and will have 1/4-inch thick by 1-1/2-inch wide steel crossbars at 18-inch intervals to prevent spreading. When wire mesh, expanded metal screen, or steel bars are used, installation should ensure that classified material cannot be removed through the openings with the aid of any type of instrument. Care also will be taken to ensure that a barrier placed across any waterway (sewer or tunnel) will not cause clogging or offer obstruction to the free flow of water or sewage. AR 380-5 H-16. Approved alarm systems Information and limitation on use of approved intrusion detection systems, both commercial and DOD J-SIIDS equipment, can be found in DIA Manual 50-3, chapter III, dated 2 May 1980. Model designations of items specifically approved for use in protection of U.S. classified information and material are provided in that chapter, along with other pertinent information. All detailed information relative to an alarmed area and the electronic system protecting its classified defense information or materiel (i.e., electrical diagrams indicating wire runs, sensor and control placements, as well as sensor types and area of coverage, floor plans, and photographs revealing the position or existence of such items within the area), will be tightly controlled and marked For Official Use Only. Figure H-1. New high-security padlock

1 0

San Diego Cypherpunks Physical Meeting
by Chris Claborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

San Diego Area CPUNKS symposium Thursday, March 28, 1996 Invitation to all Cypherpunks to join the San Diego crowd at "The Mission Cafe & Coffee Shop" were I hope to get an update of Lance Cottrell's anonymous e-mail server, "mixmaster", exchange keys, and discuss other topical CP stuff. There's always the semi-topical discussions; Internet Service Provider in San Diego (providing, anonymous remailers and other privacy services), stelth communications, latest Cypherpunk goings-on, Internet happenings. Don't forget to bring your public key fingerprint. If you can figure out how to get it on the back of a business card, that would be cool. Place: The Mission Cafe & Coffee Shop 3795 Mission Bl in Mission Beach. 488-9060 Time:1800 Their Directions: 8 west to Mission Beach Ingram Exit Take west mission bay drive Go right on Mission Blvd. On the corner of San Jose and mission blvd. It is located between roller coaster and garnett. It's kind of 40s looking building... funky looking (their description, not mine) They serve stuff to eat, coffee stuff, and beer. See you there! New guy, bring your fingerprint. Drop me a note if you plan to attend. 2 -- C -- ... __o .. -\<, Chris.Claborne(a)SanDiegoCA.ATTGIS.Com ...(*)/(*). CI$: 76340.2422 http://bordeaux.sandiegoca.attgis.com/ PGP Pub Key fingerprint = A8 FA 55 92 23 20 72 69 52 AB 64 CC C7 D9 4F CA Avail on Pub Key server. Dreams. They're just screen savers for the brain.

1 0

Re: New Beta Test of PGPfone available WINDOWS '95 Included!
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:49 PM 3/23/96 -0500, Ted Garrett wrote: >>Will there ever be a Win32s version of PGPfone? I have one of those systems >>with non-(MS)DOS partitions that MS-DOS/Wind95 doesn't like, so until MS can >>deal with the fact that people use other OSs, I'm staying clean of Win95. > >Windows95 doesn't complain at all about other operating systems resident on your >machine, nor does it invalidate partitions which it can't read. You just can't access >the partitions. Win95 does alter the Master Boot Record on the drive. This tends to screw up previously installed boot managers. Reinstalling lilo (or whatever boot manager you use) usually does the trick. (The MBR changes do not seem to be a requirement. I have no idea why they do it. Maybe to make sure that you use *ONLY* Mr. Bill's OS.) I get around the problem by having removable drives. (Each one with a different OS.) Avoids having to deal with the chance of messing up all of my operating systems at once... --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon

1 0

Re: LET'S ROCK!!!!
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:26 AM 3/22/96 -0600, WThinker wrote: > Ok, here is the situation. I have a person mad at me in one of my mailing > lists. Turns out, this person was the owner of the mailing list! Well now > I'm stuck, knocked out of the list. The owner can not see any of my mail, > no matter how hard I try. I need some ideas to eather get through to her, > or really fuck up the mailing list. > > Any ideas? Life is short. Get a life. Of course you could simply spoof the identity of someone else in order send some exit mail. use the port 25 trick. A parting shot will work wonders, by alerting others that their views are likely to be censored, thus discouraging them from posting on the list, thus causing the list to die, but if you actually put serious work into this and make a big effort to keep up a conversation and keep on going and going then you are a total loon. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

1 0

Re: (X:x)e$ 's other use
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Gary - actually this comes up every 3-6 months. There are some fundamental problems with the using e$ as a new currency. At 02:33 AM 3/22/96 -0600, you wrote: >e$ would be a sound money replacement for the corrupt currency that >every large state in the world currently pushes. Especially if e$ >can be redeemed in something of real value on demand. E$ is a fine medium for exchanging certificates of whatever it is you're trying to certify, just as paper with pictures of dead politicians is. Printing paper is easy, and it's easy to add lots of zeros when you do. Printing 1s and 0s is also easy, and there are plenty of zeros out there. Digging shiny malleable ductile yellow metal out of the ground is harder. The tough part, with all these media, is getting somebody to give you real stuff in return for a certificate that claims to be worth 1000. The three basic ways certificate-issuers have done this are 1) Guarantee that they'll give you stuff or services in return 2) Convince a lot of people to exchange stuff or services for them, so you can usually redeem them without going to the bank 3) Threaten to beat people up if they don't accept them. Method 1 works if people trust you and you've got stuff to sell. Subway tokens and postage stamps have been used as money because most people want to ride subways and mail letters, and the subway and mail-carrying companies were big enough that you'd expect to be able to redeem them before the companies went out of business (or you moved out of town), so you can spend some money safely. Note that this method works both for stuff you have on hand, like shiny metal, or for services you're promising to do later and will have to get resources for. Banknotes work because well-behaved banks only issue enough promises to deliver shiny metal to cover the amount of metal they have; if they start making more promises than they can deliver on, the market gets annoyed at them and people stop accepting their paper in return for goods and services, and stop giving them shiny metal in return for convenient paper, and Method 2 fails for them. But if banks keep their promises, people trust them, and they make money. This works both in free markets and in government-controlled markets. As long as the banks are _honest_ about their policies for issuing notes, it doesn't matter if they're doing fractional reserve or printing the stuff outright; you can decide how much to trust them, or whether to do all your transactions with shiny metal. Method 3 you'll recognize. There'd be nothing wrong with the Federal Reserve if they only used methods 1 and 2; individual consumers can decide whether to trust them not to print a lot more zeros than they should. And they don't have a monopoly on currency - there are some kinds of taxes that apply to some private currencies, but you can go into the average bank today, ask them to write a cashier's check to someone (and probably still to "bearer"), pay them, and they'll be happy to do it for only a small commission, and American Express will do it as well. And people will take their paper, though in the case of traveller's checks it's sometimes a hassle to accept on an occasional basis. On line, of course, it's tough to use metal as a way to pay people, so technologies like e$ are necessary. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 pager 408-787-1281 # "At year's end, however, new government limits on Internet access threatened # to halt the growth of Internet use. [...] Government control of news media # generally continues to depend on self-censorship to regulate political and # social content, but the authorities also consistently penalize those who # exceed the permissible." - US government statement on China... "SigFiles of Unusual Size? I don't believe they exist!"

1 0

Java questions
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There has been a lot of discussion on coderpunks about implementing cryptography in Java. This got me thinking. We don't see every C++ compiler using the same back end. So why is everyone licensing Sun's Java implementation? As a consequence of this if there is a bug in Sun's implementation, then that bug exists in every Java implementation. Imagine a future scenario where a virus/worm takes advantage of a single Java bug and infects 90% of all computers attached to the Internet overnight. There may not be much we can do about this, but we should at least be more aware of the possibility. On a more positive note, has anyone thought of writting a remailer server or client in Java? It would be really nice if we could run or use a remailer by clicking a link on the web. Wei Dai

2 1

Noise sphere graphical tests of randomness
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've got a short program for the PC (w/TPascal source) that plots a noise sphere from a file of (pseudo) random data, if anyone is interested. Requires a VGA card that handles mode 5Fh (640 x 480, 256 color) though the source can be eaily recompiled to use something else, or standard Borland Graphics drivers. Send a reply with the subject "send nsphere" or check ftp.funet.fi in the /pub/crypt/random directory in a few days [the ftp site would be easier on my mailer ;] The source has a brief explanation of what noise spheres are and a reference to the Pickover article the program was based on. The source code is not copyrighted, and it would be nice to see it ported to other systems, or maybe a portable C version that writes the output to a .PCX file in RBG(?). [I'm not that fluent in C to write one...] I've gotten some *very* interesting results. Raw samples collected from fast timings between Windows message broadcasts do nicely with some of the randomness tests (compressability, Maurer, chi-sq) but clearly plots a spiral. Raw samples from the keyboard don't do as nicely in other tests (~50% compressability, <6 bits/byte Maurer, and "non-random" in chi-squared] but in the plot no discernable pattern shows up.... similar to plotting the output from /dev/urandom [even when /dev/urandom was configured *not* to use keyboard...] Needless to say this will affect sampling methoids in the next version of NOISE.SYS. take care, Rob --- Send a blank message with the subject "send pgp-key" (not in quotes) to <WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com> for a copy of my PGP key.

1 0

Re: protection on IoMega ZIP drives
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-03-23 05:19:55 EST, it was written for God and everyone to see: >> Has anyone tried SFS? It should work on the zip drive, though I've not >> tried it (yet)... > >If I recall some recent threads on alt.security.pgp (or sci.crypt?), >SFS doesn't work on ZIP drives (since ZIPs use the parallel port...). > >[Or do ZIPs use Scuzzies and the people who had problems were just >too lame to figure out that they had to load the driver before SFS?] The Syquest EZ drive (130MB twice as fast as the ZIP, a little cheaper too--around $200 for an internal drive and cartridge, with additional carts around $20, and a 1 GB version available for $500, + $100 / additional cartridge) comes in IDE, SCSI, and parallel flavors. You can get an internal IDE drive and DOS doesn't know or care that you can replace the cartridge. You can DoubleSpace the drive, (I have personally done this) so you should be able to SecureDrive it too. It is a full fledged IDE (or SCSI) drive. Jonathan Wienke

1 0

Re: protection on IoMega ZIP drives
by mch＠squirrel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mar 23, 17:28, JonWienke(a)aol.com wrote: } The Syquest EZ drive (130MB twice as fast as the ZIP, a little cheaper } too--around $200 for an internal drive and cartridge, with additional carts } around $20, and a 1 GB version available for $500, + $100 / additional } cartridge) comes in IDE, SCSI, and parallel flavors. You can get an internal } IDE drive and DOS doesn't know or care that you can replace the cartridge. } You can DoubleSpace the drive, (I have personally done this) so you should } be able to SecureDrive it too. It is a full fledged IDE (or SCSI) drive. The SCSI version of the ZIP drive is a "fully fledged" SCSI drive. I use one on a Sun workstation without any special software/drivers, and secure the ZIP disks with CFS. It isn't terribly fast, but one hardly notices when one is dealing with the overhead of encrypting and decrypting the data anyway. -- Mark Henderson -- markh(a)wimsey.bc.ca, mch(a)squirrel.com, henderso(a)netcom.com ViaCrypt PGP Key Fingerprint: 21 F6 AF 2B 6A 8A 0B E1 A1 2A 2A 06 4A D5 92 46 unstrip for Solaris, Wimsey crypto archive, TECO, computer security links, change-sun-hostid, Sun NVRAM/hostid FAQ - http://www.squirrel.com/squirrel

1 0

Unused WWW and anon FTP space
by janimmo＠ionet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greetings Cypherpunks: I have no idea if this is the appropriate place or way to broach this topic, but I have a great deal of space on my account that is just going to waste. I am allowed a www page, and in a couple of weeks my shell space quota will be upgraded to 20 meg, with anon ftp capability. As I said, this is just going to waste, so I was wondering if anyone had some faqs, files, or whatever that they wanted to distribute or if anyone needed space for a web page. Frankly, I've never written an html document, but I suppose I could learn. Please respond directly, as I'm sure that the rest of the list doesn't want to hear the responses. ___ ( > /) /) __/_/> // // janimmo(a)ionet.net / / (__//__//_ <_/ /> /> janimmo(a)aol.com </ </ Cypherpunk newbie and general dweeb

1 0

Pepsi World - $25,000!
by webmaster＠pepsi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey Squatter! Have you found the hidden "hot" spots and registered to win the Shaq/Pepsi World's Slammin' Techno Dream Contest? Deadline to enter is March 31st, only a few days away. Don't miss out on your chance to win a $25,000 Gateway computer shopping spree and a trip to Orlando, Florida to meet Shaq and catch the Magic in action. All ya gotta do is find the hidden "hot" spots. Seem impossible? Well, here are a couple of hints: "Shaquille O'Neal is his name, Movies and basketball are his game. So cruise by La La Land or Adrenalin to give your luck a try, And find the ball that Shaq has left behind." "Twinkle, twinkle little star, 25 grand could go real far..." Good luck!

1 0

email profit centre
by Julian Assange 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Who wants to take this site down first? [http://unix.lgn.com/email.htm] GET A JUMP ON THE INTERNET TODAY, BEFORE YOUR COMPETITION DOES! Can you afford not to??? The Email'ers Profit Center * Increase market penetration * Great for Multi-Level marketing * Virtually no mailing expense * $$ Save money $$ You will have access to 500,000+ Email addresses * Make your product or service known to thousands of people. * Save money. (To mail postcards to 500,000 people would run you over US$95,000.00). The Email'ers Profit Center is a mailing list of over 500,000 email addresses, all gathered within the last six months. It is available on your choice of CD-ROM or 100meg ZIP disk. They both contain the list in ASCII and .dbf. FREE MONTHLY UPDATES VIA TELNET! THE LIST IS EXPECTED TO DOUBLE WITHIN SIX MONTHS! The list is $500 for your own unlimited use. You may not resell, rent or loan the listings to any other person or company. _________________________________________________________________ For more information contact George. Phone: (209)276-1707 or E-mail: bubba(a)lgn.com -- "I mean, after all; you have to consider we're only made out of dust. That's admittedly not much to go on and we shouldn't forget that. But even considering, I mean it's sort of a bad beginning, we're not doing too bad. So I personally have faith that even in this lousy situation we're faced with we can make it. You get me?" - Leo Bulero/PKD +---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+ |Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union | |proff(a)suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = | |proff(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 | +---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+

1 0

CDA Court Challenge: Day #2
by Declan B. McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The DoJ also quizzed Donna Hoffman about anonymous remailers. They wanted to make sure that she wasn't an expert on them, had conducted no studies of remailers, and had collected no statistics on their use. -Declan ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CDA Challenge, Day #2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- By Declan McCullagh / declan(a)well.com / Redistribute freely ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- March 22, 1996 PHILADELPHIA -- At 2:21 pm today, one of the judges hearing our challenge to the Communications Decency Act finally "got it." "The folks in Luxembourg don't give a damn what our laws are. So my son, who's 10, can still view 'Sexy European Girls?'" asked U.S. District Court Judge Stewart Dalzell. "That's correct," replied Scott Bradner of Harvard University, who took the stand today to describe net.technology. Bradner told me afterwards he thought Friday's hearing went well -- he had come to Philadelphia to testify because this "is such an important issue." Judge Dalzell's remark hints that he, at least, is starting to understand the Internet -- and the consequences of the court's eventual ruling. This comes not a picosecond too soon for those of us who have been fidgeting in our seats, wincing as Department of Justice attorneys misuse technical terms and hoping the judges can sort through the cyberconfusion in just six days of hearings. Dalzell has a keen sense of humor and seems sympathetic to our arguments. In fact, I'd guess he's been doing some out-of-court web-surfing himself. In an _astounding_ question at the end of the day, he asked Bradner: "Isn't it true that the exponential and incredible growth of the Internet came about because the government kept their hands off of it?" Bradner gladly agreed. (What else would he say?) The other two judges aren't quite as reflective. In an incomprehensible decision last month, Judge Ronald Buckwalter granted us only a _partial_ restraining order preventing the Feds from enforcing the CDA. Now he's justifying his original mistake by taking a critical stance during this hearing -- that is, when he's not dozing. During one of his more alert moments, Buckwalter asked if labeling all online content is possible: "Your problems are technical and financial? If thse problems are solved and we agree on the definition of indecent, is it possible?" "Yes, it is," our witness replied. Buckwalter also asked earlier: "What do you mean by saying the Internet is a very democratic medium? Isn't there someone who steers discussion?" As proof, he held up a copy of a recent Atlantic magazine article that claimed the most popular USENET newsgroups are moderated and are therefore "quasi-authoritarian." I suggested to our attorney, Chris Hansen from the ACLU, that he clarify what percentage of newsgroups were moderated. On redirect, Hansen posed that question to Donna Hoffman of Vanderbilt University. She replied that most newsgroups are unmoderated. Later, Bradner of Harvard University added that moderated newsgroups amount to less than 10 percent of the total. Dolores Sloviter is the third judge on the panel. As the chief judge of the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals, she penned a sparkling decision upholding free expression in a phone sex case. In this hearing, Sloviter's questions are the most pointed and incisive. When Robert Cronenberger of Pittsburgh's Carnegie Library was testifying, Sloviter asked him if under the CDA "would something have to be removed from your collection?" Cronenberger replied: "We don't know. We would be afraid that someone might find something indecent or patently offensive." The Department of Justice attorneys are an interesting lot. Jay Baron is a short, heavyset man who tries hard to land roundhouse punches during cross-examination but instead comes across as prone to malapropisms. I think he was the DoJer who confused <http://www.eff.org/> with <http://www.itef.org/> and "ISP" with "IP address." Before the hearing resumed for the afternoon, I introduced myself to him. He recognized me as a plaintiff and said he included one of my articles on Marty Rimm as evidence (!) and used it during depositions. <http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~declan/rimm/> Tony Coppolino is more reserved and didn't say much when we chatted, except to say that his office is busy enough with this case that they won't be sending anyone to the Computers, Freedom and Privacy conference next week. I was impressed by the poise of Patricia Rosado, the DoJ's point person on porn. Yesterday she floated the MacKinnonesque theory that porn is harmful not just to minors, but also to women. Today she greeted our witnesses with a barbed, stinging cross-examination. Unfortunately for Rosado, she was up against Cronenberger, a likable gent who came across as a traditional librarian close to the judges' own ages -- not a net.geek like Donna Hoffman and Scott Bradner. (At one point, Judge Sloviter demanded that Bradner explain URLs and linking in English, not net-ese.) The judges gladly related to Cronenberger's description of the Net as a library -- finally, something they could grasp! The ACLU's Chris Hansen expanded on this in a brilliant redirect, pointing out that the concept extends beyond that of a traditional library, allowing a user to link "from the fourth floor of Wiedner Library in Boston to the third floor of the Carnegie Mellon University library in Pittsburgh." Rosado from the DoJ rallied with questions like: DoJ: "You can do a keyword search on the seven dirty words?" DoJ: "Would a search on Abraham Lincoln turn up articles about sex?" R.C.: "I've read many articles about his sex life, or lack of sex life. DoJ: "Would a search on travel turn up articles about sex?" DoJ: "Would a search on geology turn up articles about sex?" R.C. "Only if rock is put together with roll!" <laughter>) DoJ: "Would a search on food turn up articles about sex?" DoJ: "You exercise discretion as to what you make available. You don't carry everything, do you?" DoJ: "You select materials that reflect the local community standards?" Not surprisingly, the DoJ is trying to keep the hearing focused on porn and sex. (At least it keeps Buckwalter awake!) Not the truly extreme stuff that obscenity laws already ban online, but the softcore Playboy-style cyberpix that would be permitted in the absence of the CDA. The Justice Department asked Vanderbilt's Hoffman: DoJ: "You stated in your deposition that you were generally familiar with the web page called Bianca's Smut Shack?" Judge Dalzell immediately looked up, startled: "Bianca's WHAT?" DoJ: "Bianca's SMUT Shack." Judge Dalzell: "Oh, okay." Other DoJ questions included a passing reference to would-be cyberporn researcher Marty Rimm, who claimed that pornographers were using the Net to recruit customers. (Last month, the DoJ attached Rimm's study as an exhibit in their response to our complaint and cited it as evidence of the pervasiveness of nasty stuff on USENET.) Some examples: DoJ: "You will concede, will you not, that this law will not have a profound adverse effect [on password-protected smutty sites]?" DoJ: "Pornographers are using USENET newsgroups to advertise, are they not?" DoJ: "Tell us about bots and spiders." Judge Dalzell, trying hard: "That's an acronym, right?" My fellow plaintiffs are wonderful. Kiyoshi Kuromiya testified the first day, followed by Patricia Nell Warren. Warren and I had dinner on Thursday with Jonathan Wallace of the Ethical Spectacle; we talked about the political and social forces behind the push for the CDA. I asked Wallace why he came down from New York City -- he told me because "this is the most important free speech case in 60 years." Today I sat next to the DoJ's net.experts, who kept leaning forward to whisper technical data into the ears of the Justice Department's attorneys. One of the two experts was from Brigham Young University. The other was Steve Nesbitt from the Department of Defense. One or both likely will be testifying as expert witnesses for the DoJ, but Justice isn't releasing the list until April 3. Stay tuned for more reports. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- We're back in court on 4/1, 4/12, 4/15, and 4/26. The DoJ will be taking depositions from our remaining witnesses the week of March 24. For more information and breaking updates, check out: http://fight-censorship.dementia.org/top/ To subscribe to the fight-censorship announcement list, send email with "subscribe fight-censorship-announce" in the body to: majordomo(a)sojourn.com Other relevant web sites: http://www.eff.org/ http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~declan/rimm/ http://www.cdt.org/ http://www.aclu.org/ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 0

Re: DAZ_zle
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:53 PM 3/21/96 -0500, John Young wrote: > Foreign Affairs, March/April, 1996, features two policy > essays on "The Information Edge: A technological change is > transforming the nature of power and the United States is > clearly in the lead." [deleted] > He observes that misunderstanding of > revolutionary technology all too often has had unexpected, > disastrous, consequences: "A revolution in military affairs > is under way. It will require changes of a magnitude that > military people still do not completely grasp and political > leaders do not fully imagine." Sounds like this guy has been reading my stuff.

1 0

e$'s (mini-rant)
by Gary Lee Jeffers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

e$'s (mini-rant) I have some thoughts on John Humphrey's post. I thought the big problem with E$ was with the clearing house. Is it the consensus that it is the e$ patents? If the problem is that the inventors are sitting on their patents, then why can't we just RIP THEM OFF$ When the patent system was started in the U.S., it was done for the population in order to stimulate the invention process and so improve the lot of the people. Invention is a SPECIAL kind of production. It is not normal mass property! Patents are only property because it is considered that they are of value to the people rather than the owners! Patents pro- cess was started to give property to patent "owners" in order to persuade the inventors to invent for the people. If an inventor "SITS ON A PATENT", then it is ABUSE OF PATENT! Fuck the patent owner! Fuck him with bells on! RIP HIM OFF! its a noble cause! If this has become a serious problem then finding techniques of riping off e$ patent owners is a moral and practical undertaking. Then it should be a topic of Cypherpunks. I am not sure that hoarding of patents is the main hinderance of useful e$. What do other Cypherpunks say? patents? workable e$ schemes! clearing- houses? P.S. Maybe doing private Internet business while hiding from the owner of the e$ patent will be a new privacy concern :-) P.P.S. Thoughts for a rip-off technique. Take a good private e$ tech., restate it in different terms, throw in a few changes, options, extras so it doesn't look so much like the original. Then offer it to the public with a variety of very low cost deals - especially for start-ups. By the time the original inventor gets you into court, you'll have a ton of money he'll have nothing and with our system of "justice" you can bury him. :-) Even if he "wins" - with your privacy skills you can take it with you and hide it - talk to Duncan Frissell. Note: You'll have the money to talk to Duncan, the original inventor won't. :-) P.P.P.S Why not just take the best features of several private e$ tech.s and make a hybrid? It wouldn't even be plaguerism! (sorry, I lost my dict- ionary). Central power is stolen freedom. THE UNITED STATES "FEDERAL" GOVERNMENT HAS NO LEGITIMACY. The United States "Federal" Government - We'll be even more American without it. PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWAAAYYYY BBBAAACCCCK! BBBEEEAAATTTT STATE! Gary Jeffers

1 0

Re: e$'s (mini-rant)
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:00 AM 3/24/96 -0600, Gary Lee Jeffers <gjeffers(a)ns.htc.net> wrote: > e$'s (mini-rant) > I have some thoughts on John Humphrey's post. I thought the big problem >with E$ was with the clearing house. Is it the consensus that it is the e$ >patents? If the problem is that the inventors are sitting on their >patents, then why can't we just RIP THEM OFF$ Yes, it's the patents. Chaum owns them, and he's not Easy To Do Business With. On the other hand, a couple of banks _have_ recently started doing business with him - Mark Twain Bank in St. Louis, and Merita Bank in Finland - check the cypherpunks archives (www.hks.net / nntp.hks.net) for details. There were a couple of earlier attempts, in which one group discovered that there are an appalling number of banking laws which make it hard to get a real bank started, and another group discovered that it's much easier to be a Credit Union than a Bank under US banking law, but it's still hard to get a business model that's likely to make non-negative amounts of money that way. The reason you can't just rip them off (unlike, say, PGP's early relationships with RSADSI/PKP) is that electronic commerce can only work well if it's legitimate - if you want real businesses to deal with you, and real banks to handle money for you, they need to be assured that they won't lose their assets in a patent lawsuit. On the other hand, Doug Barnes posted some interesting articles on "agnostic banking", a variant on Chaum's digicash where the bank can run simpler digital cash protocols that don't violate Chaum's patent, but the bank can't tell whether the customer is using Chaum's blinded signatures or not, so the customer can rip off Chaum's intellectual property without the bank having to be knowledgeable or involved (nudge, nudge, wink, wink.) On a non-financial level, Chaum didn't complain about the Magic Money / Tacky Tokens demos that some of the cypherpunks did, and Digicash came out with a play-money version that some of us used before the commercial deal was done. > [patent rant] Yeah, yeah, many of us can rant against patents as well. Been there, done that, even invented stuff and found somebody else had previously invented and patented it. The League for Programming Freedom has some high-quality detailed patent rants, and if you give RMS a grant for airfare he'd probably be happy to go picket Chaum's company for you :-) As far as Chaum hoarding the patents, he's always been willing to deal, but since he's mostly an academic rather than a businessman, he's set a very high up-front price so little guys don't bother him, only mega-banks that will come now that he built it. I'd guess the prices the banks he's now dealing with paid are rather lower than that, but it's a start for getting real business to evolve. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 pager 408-787-1281 # "At year's end, however, new government limits on Internet access threatened # to halt the growth of Internet use. [...] Government control of news media # generally continues to depend on self-censorship to regulate political and # social content, but the authorities also consistently penalize those who # exceed the permissible." - US government statement on China... "SigFiles of Unusual Size? I don't believe they exist!"

1 0

Re: (X:x)e$ 's other use
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:31 PM 3/23/96 -0800, Bill Stewart wrote: >Method 3 you'll recognize. There'd be nothing wrong with the Federal >Reserve if they only used methods 1 and 2; individual consumers can >decide whether to trust them not to print a lot more zeros than they should. >And they don't have a monopoly on currency - there are some kinds of >taxes that apply to some private currencies, but you can go into the >average bank today, ask them to write a cashier's check to someone >(and probably still to "bearer"), pay them, and they'll be happy to do it >for only a small commission, and American Express will do it as well. >And people will take their paper, though in the case of traveller's checks >it's sometimes a hassle to accept on an occasional basis. My experience in China in 1993 was that US Federal Reserve Notes were easy to use and American Express Traveler's checks were not. After hearing that the dollar isn't worth anything, it was refreshing to go to a country where they are in high demand. I recommend carrying good old fashioned USA dollars when going to communist countries. Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

1 0

Crypto CD
by Ben Holiday 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm considering the idea of cutting a crypto CD, and wanted to see if there was any potential interest in the idea, or not. Basically what i forsee is a disk with the basic algorithms (DES/IDEA/Etc), and steg tools, along with a few large crypto aps like PGP, and basic cracking software (Crypt Breakers Work Bench, XOR-type crackers, and dictionary attacks with a few dozen dictionaries). I'd also like to include a remail directory with some remailer sources, remailer-aware clients, and the mixmaster sources. And of course as much infomation as possible -- cyphernomicon preferably, possibly even archives of this list.. I would plan to put unix/dos/mac all on one CD. I'm thinking that realistically I can expect 50 megs or so. Possibly as much as 100 if I find a TON of wonderful text. Could be useful to individuals, as well as for groups wishing to create FTP sites etc. Pricing with shipping would wind up around US$20.00, give or take 5 dollars.. I'd like to know first off whether such a thing already exists. Secondly whether anyone would be interested in possesing such a thing. And lastly any suggestions for/about content that I may have missed.. Thanks Benji

2 1

Re: protection on IoMega ZIP drives
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:45 3/23/96, Alan Olsen wrote: >The big problem is with the zip drivers. There is some sort of >incompatibility between SFS and the zip drivers. (I hacked on it for a >couple of hours with no luck.) Win95 makes the problem worse, as it is >difficult to judge just when the driver for the zip drive loads. (I have a >number of complaints about the zip drive drivers. Lack of documentation is >one of them...) I can state that with a Zip Disk formatted for Macintosh use (and the drive plugged into a Macintosh), the drive and disk are seen by the Macintosh as a NORMAL SCSI HD and eligible for use as a Boot Drive (ie: There is a Mac Driver on the Disk in a SCSI Driver Partition). I've Booted from a ZIP Disk so this is actual not just theoretical <g>. I'd assume that if a Wintel Machine had the Microcode to be able to boot off an external SCSI Drive (something I do not know is normal for Wintel machines as it is normal for Macintosh ones) the same situation would exist for Wintel Zip Formatted Disks. All NORMAL SCSI HDs (or Cartridges) have their driver in a Driver Partition so the HD/Cartridge can be read.

1 0

private key encryption program for you to hack at
by Jack Mott 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ok, I have been working on this for a while, and I wanted to let you guys have a go at it. I wrote a private key encryption program that I think should be hard to break, I will provide you with the EXE (MS DOS) file, some ciphertext, AND a big chunk of plaintext. The key is not ridiculously large, but it won't be anything obvious so don't bother brute forcing. To encrypt, the program read in some system/time specific info, uses it to encrypt the file along with the key. It then write the system/time specific info to the end of the file encrypted with the key. I THINK that the only weaknesses should be predicitability of the system/time info, or possibly finding patterns in the encrypted values. I dont want to give out any source code yet, but it anyone wants some pieces of it just ask. crackme.zip file with paradox.exe, cipher.txt, and plain.txt -- ___ ___ _____ / \/ \ / \ || | || | || | ||he \_____/row thecrow(a)iconn.net "It can't rain all the time"

3 2

Re: New Beta Test of PGPfone available WINDOWS '95 Included!
by jis＠mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(A copy of this message has also been posted to the following newsgroups: alt.security.pgp, sci.crypt) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have received reports that some people are getting only partial files when downloading PGP and PGPfone with our new distribution server. This problem is caused by higher then normal packet loss on the Internet. Some browsers (notably the AOL browser) give up when they fail to receive any more data for a period of time (caused by high losses or other conditions that block our server). For now people should continue to attempt to download PGPfone and PGP until they get a good copy. Trying late at or on weekends when the net load is lower may help. I am working on a "fix" where our server will let the browser know up front (there is a way to do that with http) how large an item to expect. This hopefully will improve the situation, if not complete fix it. However this change will not be installed until at least Tuesday. So if you can wait, you might want to wait until Tuesday if you are having difficulties getting a complete distribution from MIT. Note: I will send out another message when this fix is in place. -Jeff -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMVVrMMUtR20Nv5BtAQEQ3gP/XjwEPbqSJXJesRYo+N4aAcMfl3O2PGoP LP/uGOOLCyx05EXkJidGly4IjY/qK325J8xDADCpJdoJgcM3CH+7EPghxAEmCIRd MttmADDv6U3QHnvPn7/L2mDtItueOCLsdeWtj7bQnRECoS/XsdQAUgZFbLlWsNhd uFm3bVG82LI= =m3v8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: Crypto CD
by Vipul Ved Prakash 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Could be useful to individuals, as well as for groups wishing to create > FTP sites etc. Excellent Idea. At least I haven't seen one around. > Pricing with shipping would wind up around US$20.00, give or take 5 dollars.. > I'd like to know first off whether such a thing already exists. Secondly > whether anyone would be interested in possesing such a thing. And lastly > any suggestions for/about content that I may have missed.. How about PGP key archives? Vipul .od8888bo. \|/ .d%::::88::888b. (@ @) .d888::::::::8:888%. ------------------oOO-(_)-OOo----------------- 88888:::::::88888::%. You walk across with your flowers in your hand d888888:::88;888888::b Trying to tell me no one understands 888888888:888888888888 Trade in your hours for a hand full of dimes Y8888888::::::888888%P Gonna make it baby in our prime. '8888888:::::::8888:%' ---------------------------------------------- '88888888:::888888%' Vipul Ved Prakash Fax : +91-11-3328849 '8888888::88888%' Positive Ideas. Internet : vipul(a)pobox.com '"Y88%B8P"' ---------------------------------------------- PGP Key : Finger <vipul(a)pobox.com> PGP Key fingerprint = 35 FF A2 CA BD 6B 80 82 61 30 F2 23 96 93 77 E4 ~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=~-=

1 0

RE: If you can't take the heat... (Was Re: Keep the pressure!)
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Timothy C. May And I think the anonymity issue is interesting. In the past, Detweiler railed against the uses of anonymity while himself being the single most prolific user of anonymous insults and the like, so it's an interesting pathology to study. ....................................................................................... Just wanted to mention that the reason Detweiler used anonymity was as a counter-example of why he opposed the use of it. He wanted to impress upon the cpunks the points he was making against anonymity by using it in the ways which he warned could become a problem. As he said in his recent post "detweiling", he aimed his efforts against those whom he considered the "big egos" - i.e., the ones who disagreed with him on his prognosis for the future. .. Blanc

1 0

Re: protection on IoMega ZIP drives
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:47 AM 3/24/96 -0500, Robert A. Rosenberg wrote: >At 2:45 3/23/96, Alan Olsen wrote: > >>The big problem is with the zip drivers. There is some sort of >>incompatibility between SFS and the zip drivers. [snip] >I can state that with a Zip Disk formatted for Macintosh use (and the drive >plugged into a Macintosh), the drive and disk are seen by the Macintosh as >a NORMAL SCSI HD and eligible for use as a Boot Drive (ie: There is a Mac >Driver on the Disk in a SCSI Driver Partition). I've Booted from a ZIP Disk >so this is actual not just theoretical <g>. I'd assume that if a Wintel >Machine had the Microcode to be able to boot off an external SCSI Drive >(something I do not know is normal for Wintel machines as it is normal for >Macintosh ones) the same situation would exist for Wintel Zip Formatted >Disks. All NORMAL SCSI HDs (or Cartridges) have their driver in a Driver >Partition so the HD/Cartridge can be read. The SCSI Zip drives do act as normal SCSI drives (though they have a limited number of SCSI ids available. (5 & 6 if I remember correctly.) Later drives may have this changed.) The problems i am encountering are due to the _parellel_ version of the Zip drive. (I bought it because I needed to be able to visit customer sites and not all of them have SCSI.) The drivers fake a scsi port. (Some laptops use a similar driver to attach hard drives to non-scsi systems.) Maybe I will just get a Jaz drive and not worry about it... --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon

1 0

Re: Crypto CD
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:52 AM 3/24/96 -0500, Ben Holiday wrote: >I would plan to put unix/dos/mac all on one CD. I'm thinking that >realistically I can expect 50 megs or so. Possibly as much as 100 if I >find a TON of wonderful text. If you include the archives of this list, the main forign archives, and the various sources in the US, you will EASILY exceed 100 megs. (More like 200.) If you seperate out all the duplications, you might squeeze under the 100 megs mark. >Could be useful to individuals, as well as for groups wishing to create >FTP sites etc. It would be a nice thing to have if it is reletivly complete. Hopefully it can be created with a minimum of government interfearence. (But then, I have been xpecting alt.binaries.crypto to be created as well...) >Pricing with shipping would wind up around US$20.00, give or take 5 dollars.. Sounds about right. You will probibly need to run about 1000 or so. Actually, the prices for CDs in bulk are pretty cheap. (Just expensive up front.) Depends how much premastering you are able to do up front. (If you need information and/or contacts to get mastering done, send me private e-mail. I used to work for a CD-ROM company.) >I'd like to know first off whether such a thing already exists. Not that I know of... I have seen a few of the "Hacker" discs with crypto code on it, but nothing complex (other than ancient versions of PGP) and you have to wade though alot of crap to get to it. >Secondly >whether anyone would be interested in possesing such a thing. And lastly >any suggestions for/about content that I may have missed.. Archives of the PGP key database, the archive at hacktic.nl, ftp.dsi.unimi.it, ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de, and probibly a few other archives would be useful. An index/search engine would also be helpful. --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon

2 1