December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

DCSB: Gold Denominated Burmese Opium Futures?
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Digital Commerce Society of Boston (Formerly The Boston Society for Digital Commerce) Presents Perry E. Metzger "Possible Futures: The Impact of Ubiquitous High Speed Networking on Intermediation and Regulation" or "With Spring Street Brewing shares trading on the web, are gold denominated Burmese opium futures inevitable?" *Monday*, May 6, 1996 12 - 2 PM The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston One Federal Street, Boston, MA Perry Metzger is the President of Piermont Information Systems Inc., a consulting firm specializing in communications and computer systems security. He has worked for, or consulted to, the New York financial community for most of the last decade. He has been strongly involved with the Internet Engineering Task Force's security area for some time, and is the author of several security related RFCs. He is also the co-chair of the IETF's Simple Public Key Infrastructure working group, which is developing public key cryptographic standards for the internet. Networking technology is racing far ahead of culture. Fiber optics offer the possibility of cheap truly ubiquitous internet service in the tens of gigabits per second within the decade, and cheap high speed mobile connectivity is also likely. We will likely live in a world where anyone can sit in a park with a cheap laptop and communicate over a multi-megabit per second channel to any other civilized location on the planet. This development may radically change our culture, and with it the nature of regulation and intermediation in the marketplace. Although opium futures trading might not be inevitable, the scope of the trends we are facing should not be underestimated. Mr. Metzger will discuss these and similar developments; he will also discuss the limits to our ability to predict or alter the course such changes will take. This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on *Monday*, May 6, 1996 from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the Harvard Club of Boston, One Federal Street. The price for lunch is $27.50. This price includes lunch, room rental, and the speaker's lunch. ;-). The Harvard Club *does* have a jacket and tie dress code. Please note that this meeting is on *Monday* this month, due to a scheduling problem at the Harvard Club. We go back to meeting on the first Tuesday of the month in June. We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or if we *really* know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by Saturday, March 30, or you won't be on the list for lunch. Checks payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be sent back. Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston". If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance), please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something out. Planned speakers for the following few months are: June Dan Shutzer FSTC July Pete Loshin Author, "Electronic Commerce" August Duane Hewitt Idea Futures We are actively searching for future speakers. If you are in Boston on the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga, rah(a)shipwright.com . For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send "info dcsb" in the body of a message to majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu . If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in the body of a message to majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu . Looking forward to seeing you there! Cheers, Robert Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMWv8/PgyLN8bw6ZVAQGu/gQAkdtTIsK6rbboD6NRVjpZD8WFMXgZGlOB 5MA4znnY/XC6qNvVseRRq0wcPukNsGoQdCE8LwwqS2oWdyMXlWdUO7RK+CgCvOGj 48HjCVcgItM4V3BW9W5CM897zBWAwfcCkfbzngwuhzinu0MHWgPK/MMSFX73/dtH 2kg/41CA6MM= =Tfdk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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Digital Cash Escrow
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:14 PM 4/10/96, Bill Stewart wrote: >Of course, if you happen to become dead while you're storing it, >the paper cash is far more useful to your heirs, so I assume we'll have >a government-sponsored cash-escrow system announced soon to protect >the government's interest in collection of inheritance taxes... Don't give them ideas, Bill! They are known to monitor our list for insights into what to regulate next, and I can see the 15-watt lightbulbs going on over their heads as they ponder the wonderful opportunities presented by "digital cash escrow." --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: No matter where you go, there they are.
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:41 AM 4/10/96 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: Anonymous writes: > > Location-based System Delivers User > Authentication Breakthrough > > By Dorothy E. Denning and Peter F. MacDoran > Copyright(c), 1996 - Computer Security Institute - All Rights Reserved > Top - Help > When I first started reading the paper I said to myself, "Ah, they are going to have a box that provides digitally signed GPS locations." I still think they might try that as plan "B". Combined with a password or biometrics to prevent unauthorized use of the box, they might have a useful, if limited, system. A few other practical problems with the system they DID describe that haven't been mentioned: (1) GPS doesn't work well near the walls of canyons. The positions reported can be off by a considerable distance. This problem probably also applies in the steel and glass canyons of cities. (2) Consumer grade GPS receivers have problems acquiring satalites in forested areas. The same problem probably will also occur in skyscrapers. Using your portable in some client's office will involve shoving an antenna out the non-openable window. With these problems, I just can't see GPS authentication being popular for the masses. For some military and industrial uses it may solve a real problem. Regards - Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: Scientologists may subpoena anonymous remailer records?
by Declan B. McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message begins here ---------- Date: Wed, 10 Apr 1996 11:38:58 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)eff.org> To: fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu cc: rnewman(a)cybercom.net, grady(a)northcoast.com, kaj.malmberg(a)mallu.pp.fi, sthomson(a)netcom.com Subject: Re: Anonymous Remailer threat: Scientologists may subpoena anonymous remailer records? Ron, thanks for the background about the CoS's renewed attempts to get a search warrant for anon.penet.fi. I hope you don't get dragged into this any more than you already are. Grady Ward writes below, in a message dated this morning: > I would say it is virtually certain that U.S. anon remailers will > be subpoenaed as well as any foreign ones in which they can handle > the authorities. Yikes! Jim's alert was timely. -Declan [This message is archived at http://fight-censorship.dementia.org/top/] // declan(a)eff.org // I do not represent the EFF // declan(a)well.com // Date: Wed, 10 Apr 1996 10:18:35 -0500 From: Ron Newman <rnewman(a)cybercom.net> Subject: Re: Clams subpoena'ing anonymous remailer records? Here's what Grady said to me in several messages. Note that they seem to be after anon.penet.fi again too. (He has given me blanket permission to distribute his e-mail to me to anyone who may find it of use.) ------- Date: Thu, 04 Apr 1996 08:52:38 -0800 To: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> I've just received e-mail from: kaj.malmberg(a)mallu.pp.fi (Kaj Malmberg) The Poilice CID in Helsinki who is being pushed by the criminal cult yet again to get a search warrant for Julf's anonymous remailer, claiming I have been violating my injunction to post cult crap. I told him that as usual the criminal cult is lying and that I gave him and Julf explicit permission to investigate any or all of my posts I have ever made through the remailer. The criminal cult is trying to use the fact of my injunction to further their own conspiracy theories. South Africa, Finland, where does it end? Grady ------------- Date: Fri, 05 Apr 1996 07:41:25 -0800 To: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: Kaj Malmberg, Finland At 10:11 AM 4/5/96 -0500, you wrote: >Why did you give them this permission? I think it sets a VERY bad >precedent. Chris Schafmeister was upset when I mentioned this >on the IRC channel yesterday afternoon -- he thinks you're being >too nice, polite, and cooperative for your own good. I like to err on the side of openness. Each to their own I suppose. Basically I trust Kaj to sense who is the criminal perpetrator in this case. I also sent him the set of trial stipulations in the Snow White case that ought to give him very interesting background on the criminal cult. >In my opinion, Julf and the Finnish cop should Just Say No >to the CoS. He is still free to do as he wishes. ------------ Date: Tue, 09 Apr 1996 14:16:32 -0700 To: Ron Newman <rnewman(a)cybercom.net> From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: a few more questions [Regarding the depositions. --Declan] No one was with me. Total hours day one: 7.5 Total hours day two: 3.25 hours, as per order of Judge Infante. Also I believe all american anonymous remailers will be subpoenaed for their records as will all my ISPs, and contents of safety deposit box held as evidence. At 04:56 PM 4/9/96 -0400, you wrote: >Was anyone with you (on YOUR side) at either day's deposition? > >How many hours total did you go each day? > -------- Date: Tue, 09 Apr 1996 19:37:57 -0700 To: Ron Newman <rnewman(a)cybercom.net> From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: what is the latest regarding penet? I don't know what's up today, but Julf wrote yesterday to tell me that my id grady(a)northcoast.com had NOT been used to go through his remailer. No word on what the police are doing to subpoena his system, if they are. Grady -------------- Date: Tue, 09 Apr 1996 22:57:26 -0700 To: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: what is the latest regarding penet? That is all he told me: that he could verify to authorities that grady(a)northcoast.com had not used his remailer. He didn;t mention anyone else or how he was helping the CID with their inquiries. Yes, you can put this datum on the web. At 01:52 AM 4/10/96 -0500, you wrote: >Was something else used to go through his remailer? > >Has he said anything in public about this? > >Should I post your message about it on my web site? Grady Ward | | http://www.northcoast.com/~grady +1 707 826 7715 | | (voice/24hr FAX) | 34877c8566839cb7 | grady(a)northcoast.com | aeab8ec5e5ee97fe | -- Ron Newman rnewman(a)cybercom.net Web: http://www.cybercom.net/~rnewman/home.html Here are some other messages that Grady sent me in the last few days. I'll put some of this on my web site in the near future. ------------ Date: Tue, 09 Apr 1996 13:34:20 -0700 To: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: deposition At 11:05 AM 4/9/96 -0500, you wrote: >When are the remaining 1.5 hours of deposition scheduled? >Are you holding firm to the 9 hour limit? I held firm to my nine hour limit; they held firm to their 2+ day limit. Hogan called me a "liar" on the record, a term I reciprocated on the record. This time there were a lot of questions about you two, Ron and Shelley. I predict that you two will be served a subpoena soon to either be deposed yourself or to have your e-mail and archives produced in evidence. We got onto the phone with Judge Infante and he told us to finish by 12:15. Which we did. The only other issue is that the cult wanted to immediately seize my safety deposit box contents. I asked that any seizures be made pursuant to a Special Master or other neutral party taking control and analyzing the significance of the contents of the backup disks therein. We got back on the phone with Infante and while he did not sanction the seizure by the scientologists, he did "freeze" the contents so as to preserve possible evidence. Grady We finished as per the Judges order at 12:15. The criminal cultists were somewhat unhappy at their interrogation being cut short. One strange man whose picture I will post soon was apparently the go-between between Warren McShane and ??? (speculating David Miscavige/OSA). The receptionist said she had not seen as many faxes in one day as had come to her office during my deposition. He was constantly ferrying stuff from the fax to McShane and Kobrin or constantly talking on a cellphone. But he and McShane looked for the world as simply carrying out their master's orders. ------------- Date: Tue, 09 Apr 1996 13:36:27 -0700 To: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: who were the CoS lawyers who deposed you? Hogan and Eric Lieberman. Both were assisted by Kobrin and McShane. Also in the room was a cult computer expert, and a couple of helpers for Lieberman and McShane. ---------- Date: Tue, 09 Apr 1996 13:41:46 -0700 To: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: Henson page added, Grady page updated Today's deposition realaudio will be available as depo_7 through depo_10 in about an hour at my site. You were the topic of some detailed questions about e-mail and phone conversations. ------------ To: Ron Newman <rnewman(a)cybercom.net> From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: who did they ask about in the depo, besides Shelley and me? At 06:38 PM 4/9/96 -0400, you wrote: >Someone listened to one of the files and noticed that they asked >about Maureen Garde. Who else did they ask about? They were most interested in *you*, then Jeff Jacobsen, then Keith Henson, then each of the other list people in turn. If I were a betting man, I would say you are going to be subpoenaed to be deposed real soon now. -------------- Date: Wed, 10 Apr 1996 07:17:01 -0700 To: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: what is the latest regarding penet? Ron, Yes do please distribute my messages as you deem necessary. Some people ought to be aware of what is coming down. My feeling is that they will be doing anything they can to attempt to produce "hard evidence" that I am part of the Grand Conspiracy. I would say it is virtually certain that U.S. anon remailers will be subpoenaed as well as any foreign ones in which they can handle the authorities. I did tell you that they sprung a surpise motion on me and Judge Infante during day #2 of the deposition by asking him if their computer expert could make copies of the contents thereof to look for contraband? I objected on the grounds that it was a thinly disguised seizure request (which had already been denied by Judge Whyte) and that the box contained much private material such as letters to my wife, etc. The judge did agree to another motion however made by Hogan to "freeze" the contents of the box to "preserve evidence". Obviously any motion that they make to examine the contents will be met by a demand that only a mutually agree 3rd party using an agreed upon protocol (i.e. grepping for an agreed list of patterns) will be permitted. No mass copying, no random cult fishing. Grady Ward | | http://www.northcoast.com/~grady +1 707 826 7715 | | (voice/24hr FAX) | 34877c8566839cb7 | grady(a)northcoast.com | aeab8ec5e5ee97fe |

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NPR is talking about smart card purses...
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by rah(a)shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga) on Wed, 10 Apr 5:53 PM >Chase, Citi, MC and others are offering a stored value >card on the west side of Manhattan. They're saying >that smart cards are faster than cash. Stick the card >in, say yes to the amount. The terminals are wired >directly to a bank account, so we're looking at a book >entry system, it looks like... > >The announcer is breathless at the possibilities.... > >I wonder if this is CAFE, Mondex, or what? anyone >know? ---------- Yep, NYT has a story on it today, the testrun is in my own pigsty. It's by Citibank, Chase Manhattan, Mastercard and Visa: electronic cash loaded on a plastic card that can be used to make small purchases. The article also reviews the state of the art. Wanna see it from me, or try http://www.nytimes.com?

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Re: No matter where you go, there they are.
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-04-10 17:49:32 EDT, you write: >Or course, I could be completely missing some neat feature of >DGPS. I really don't know the details of how it works and this >could be completely wrong. Any thoughts? Because of the fluctuations in the signals, random and otherwise, you would be detected if you used recordings that were more than a few seconds old. However, if you delayed all but one of the satellite signals by a few milliseconds (or fractions thereof) to get the desired phase relationship, you could effectively fake your position, and the delay would be masked by the delays inherent in the Net by a pretty good margin. The longer the average packet transfer delay between you and the other party, the farther you could fake your position from your real one without being detected. Jonathan Wienke

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Bay Area Meeting on Saturday?
by iang＠cs.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- So, will there be a Bay Area meeting on Saturday? Where? etc... - Ian -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMWxHeUZRiTErSPb1AQHzlAP+N3q0syVT6pmrEDDUGfY7spKqJQkFDtcU HFbzihOAHsYLzgERQoi5yLe4487ApKTpqR8ohly28R0ZLA98tV0Ev/8KHaHYJxTn /3BAL/Xj2jtVS2gvKBzyshUnh7QqyZeq1jmV4Y+lRigFggiJgENrWSnJLKfr5zwM csc/0838gqw= =LcIY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Tense visions of future imperfect
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:33 AM 4/10/96 -0700, Hal wrote: >From: frantz(a)netcom.com (Bill Frantz) >> >[Description of dcash counterfeiting scam, presumably done by stealing >> > the bank's public key] >> I don't see how this third scam would work in a system such as DigiCash >> which uses online clearing. Unissued serial numbers would be refused when >> presented for clearing. > >DigiCash banks do not issue serial numbers. Serial numbers are randomly >chosen by the user when he withdraws his cash. ... Well, teach me to post without checking the protocol. Thanks Hal and Perry. Apologies to all - Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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[UTTER NOISE] I am the very model of a modern teenage cyberpunk
by stevenw＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From the "humor" list. Thought you might enjoy. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 10 Apr 1996 07:35:36 -0500 From: Randall Woodman <randallw(a)ADSS.ESY.COM> Subject: Humor: Teenage Cyberpunk I am the Very Model of a Modern Teenage Cyberpunk -author unknown I am the very model of a modern teenage Cyberpunk I rent my own apartment and it's full of electronic junk I own a VAX, a 486, I've even got a PDP I've finished Myst and Doom but I am stumped by Wing Commander III I'm very well aquainted too with matters pornographical I have a list of image sites, both overseas and national So if you want to see a picture of that Anna Nichole Smith I'll fire up my terminal and fetch for you a naughty GIF I'm totally an anarchist, the government I'd like to wreck, Though if they were to get blown up, who'd give to me my welfare cheque? In short if you need answers that concern your electronic junk, I am the very model of a modern teenage Cyberpunk I know the ancient myths about RTM, Pengo and Mitnick I 'hack' into computers and I then perform a credit check I scare all my non-hacker friends with tales of cracker theivery and even though I'm spouting crap they'll listen and believe in me I've learned to spot a troll and I've seen flames about the way I spell, I've traced badly forged cancels and seen napalm poured on AOL I've laughed at all the newbies and their flailing cries of "You all Suck!" I've been flamed by Carasso, with an anvil I have then been struck I've hung around in alt.tasteless and seen war waged on rec.pets.cats I've spent my time in talk.bizarre and used those stupid Relay Chats In short, if you need answers that concern your electronic junk, I am the very model of a modern teenage Cyberpunk Well postings like "MAKE.MONEY.FAST", I am now somewhat wary at, I have been "Global Killfiled" by the Joel Furr Commissariat, When rosebud posts a lengthy rant 'bout Microsoft she swears is true, I know that she is just another short lived kook without a clue When I have learnt what progress has been made upon the Internet, When I know something more than just a smattering of netiquette, In short when I can have a world-wide soapbox on which I can stand I've got no time for other things, like beer and trips to Disneyland My life outside the Internet is very very sad you see I cannot get my spots to fade, my social life's a tragedy, But still if you need answers that concern your electronic junk, I am the very model of a modern teenage Cyberpunk. (With apologies to G&S) -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- -=} Randall {=- Editor without a clause. ------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | Weller's three steps to Greatness: | 1. See what others cannot | 2. Think what others cannot stevenw(a)best.com | 3. Express what others cannot

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Re: Anonymous Remailer threat: Scientologists may subpoena
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:23 AM 4/11/96, sameer wrote: > Frankly, I'm getting antsy. Is C2 going to get subpoena'd or >not? I would be very disappointed if we don't. > (Subpeonas envy!) Good one! Just stay calm and try to maintain your sangfreud. --Tim THE X-ON CONGRESS: INDECENT COMMENT ON AN INDECENT SUBJECT, by Steve Russell, American Reporter Correspondent....You motherfuckers in Congress have dropped over the edge of the earth this time... "the sorriest bunch of cocksuckers ever to sell out the First Amendment" or suggesting that "the only reason to run for Congress these days is to suck the lobbyists' dicks and fuck the people who sent you there," ....any more than I care for the language you shitheads have forced me to use in this essay...Let's talk about this fucking indecent language bullshit.

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Re: Protocols at the Point of a Gun
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:48 PM 4/10/96, Duncan Frissell wrote: >Well this is as good a time and place as any to ask the question that >none of the opposition seems to have asked (perhaps because they don't >know enough to ask): How do you force geographically dispersed nodes >on a distributed network to adopt a set of officially mandated protocols? > >But first a reading assignment: "How Anarchy Works--Inside the Internet >Engineering Task Force" from Wired. > >http://www.hotwired.com/wired/3.10/departments/electrosphere/ietf.html I'd also recommend Michael Froomkin's article "The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage," available at http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/arbitr.htm It gets into the nature of IETF-type stuff, especially vis-a-vis the difficulty jurisdictions have in enforcing parochial rules. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: No matter where you go, there they are.
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:36 PM 4/10/96 -0700, rick hoselton wrote: >At 10:04 AM 4/10/96 -0400, Peter Wayner wrote: >> >>Hmm. Here's an interesting question. Let's say that there are 3 >>satellites in view broadcasting signals f1(t), f2(t) and f3(t). >>...Okay, so why can't I just tape the signals I get from each of >>the three satellites. > >>Or course, I could be completely missing some neat feature of >>DGPS. ... Any thoughts? > >I have read that GPS uses encryption to place time-dependent, >location-dependent inaccuracies into the signals. Innacuracies >small enough so they are not a problem for civilian navigation, >(mostly) but large enough to prevent GPS from being a useful method >of military targeting for anyone who does not hold the keys. It's called "S/A" (Selective Availability) which is the NWO term for adding errors that "authorized" users can remove. (Not to be confused with A/S, or anti-spoofing) It was originally intended to be turned on in wartime to deny the enemy accurate fixes, but during the Gulf War military GPS receivers were so scarce that the soldiers had to use commercial products, so the S/A actually was turned OFF then! Since then, pressure has been building to turn off S/A, since its usefulness is nearly zero. Even so, the amplitude of S/A errors are only a little larger than natural errors caused by satellite timing errors, atmospheric propagation variations, etc. The result is that DGPS is useful, which is (more or less) a fixed antenna and GPS system which knows where it is, and subtracts where it "seems" to be by GPS every second, and broadcasts the resulting error data on some terrestrial system to receivers locally. The result is errors down to the 1-meter level and even lower. That system compensates for both natural errors and S/A, so the whole purpose of having S/A is negated. Eventually S/A will probably be turned off permanently, but even then we'll want to continue to use DGPS systems. > >Perhaps Ms. Denning is suggesting that the US feral government could >act as a "trusted server" (and she has repeatedly suggested such trust) >and tell us whether a GPS that "thinks" it's at some location, right now, >is REALLY at some known location. Denning's trust for the government is apparently boundless. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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NPR is talking about smart card purses...
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Chase, Citi, MC and others are offering a stored value card on the west side of Manhattan. They're saying that smart cards are faster than cash. Stick the card in, say yes to the amount. The terminals are wired directly to a bank account, so we're looking at a book entry system, it looks like... The announcer is breathless at the possibilities.... I wonder if this is CAFE, Mondex, or what? anyone know? Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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Re: [NOISE] Re: onyma
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:04 4/10/96, Alan Bostick wrote: >As an experienced professional in this field, I have learned that where >rules of spelling, grammar, vocabulary come from is *usage*. Words >become accepted parts of the language because people start to use them. >The acceptance of words is recognized by their adoption in to lexicons >and dictionaries, but this is description, not prescription. > >If you want to be linguistically correct and ensure that 'onyma' >prevails over 'nym,' you've got a lot of catching up to do. 'Nym' is >is clearly established by usage on the Cypherpunks list, and I expect >it's only a matter of time before it starts showing up in print media, >if it hasn't already, and get listings in the Jargon File, then >dictionaries, etc. > >You can't fight usage; it is usage that makes the language as she is >spoke what it is. I agree with you and I'll go further and state that the use of "nym" is due to it being the suffix of all the terms that are lumped into it _AND_ is spoken in them as a separate (and last) syllable. Use of ONYM would not be as obvious since the "o" is _part_ of the prior syllable _not_ the prior syllable (also none of the words use ONYMA so that is also not a good term to the general public <g>). This is a case of using the last syllable of a number of terms/words as a generic term for all of them (or the use of that syllable as a generic suffix to other words to create a new term with the connotation of that suffix's meaning [as in using -ism at the end of other words]).

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Re: Anonymous Remailer threat: Scientologists may subpoena anonymous remailerrecords?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:37 PM 4/10/96, Jim Byrd wrote: >The story is weirder than that. The first poster of church secrets (with >lots of commentary) was Dennis Erlich, an ex-scientologist. Dennis was >raided and sued, and is awaiting trial. His ISP, Tom Klemesrud, refused His ISP was Netcom. Klemesrud respresents Netcom. >to find the identity of -AB-. This turned out to be an alumni account at >Cal Tech. The poster has never been heard from again. This was without a doubt just a user of one of Hal Finney's remailers he runs out of an account at Caltech. (There's a tiny chance it was someone else, but it fits the description of Hal's "alumni" remailer exactly, and is almost certainly just that.) This is a Cypherpunk-style remailer, and Hal is one of the original Cypherpunks. The concept of "The poster has never been heard from again" is essentially meaningless, unless he or she or signed the message and established a persistent personna. Sorry to sound picky, but I've just seen several messages all of which copy a long dialog from some Finnish guy named Kaj. Some of the messages then confuse the issues by confusing the types of remailers. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: why compression doesn't perfectly even out entropy
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:36 PM 4/9/96 -0400, JonWienke(a)aol.com wrote: > Would anyone like to propose a means of measuring entropy that we can all > agree on? I haven't seen anything yet that everyone likes. Nor will you: To measure entropy is a deep unsolved philosophical and physical problem. Only a known distribution has a well defined entropy. If you do not know what kinds of order might be present in your data, you cannot define the entropy. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: Scientologists may subpoena anonymous remailer records
by me＠muddcs.cs.hmc.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Steve Reid writes: > When a person recieves a message from someone using an anonymous > remailer, the return address will usually work, depending on the > remailer. The return address is for an address on the remailer, and > sending to that address, the remailer will forward the message back to > the person who owns that anonymous address. > > The problem with that, of course, is that the remailer has to keep a > record of who owns each anonymous account, so that it can direct the > replies to the anonymous person. These records could be siezed. This is a very good reason to use one of the "alpha" pseudonym servers. These remailers in turn use other remailers to return the reply to the owner of the alias (crypted, of course). In this way, the server is operating in double-blind mode. However, the scariest thing about this is that the CoS was able to coerce the gov't in a foreign nation to get access to anon remailers. US remailers have always been suspect for just this reason, and I wait with bated breath to see whether or not the subpoena is issued. But if chaning outside the US won't even work, then the remailers aren't going to do a whole lot of good. > BTW, has anyone out there created an anonymous web forwarder? I'm sure > there are a lot of people out there who don't like the idea of having > their email address in the log files of dozens of web servers... Creating > a simple web forwarder wouldn't be hard. I've heard several people make this statement... Can anyone confirm that it is really possible to log the uid (username) of the person making the http request? I know they can get your ip address, but I'm skeptical of getting the username. me -- Michael Elkins <me(a)cs.hmc.edu> http://www.cs.hmc.edu/~me PGP key fingerprint = EB B1 68 32 3F B5 54 F9 6C AF 4E 94 5A EB 90 EC

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Re: Scientologists may subpoena anonymous remailer records
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:12 PM 4/10/96, Steve Reid wrote: >> I thought that most or all of the cypherpunk anonymous remailers don't >> keep records. Not even on backup tapes. The whole idea is that there >> aren't logs. But maybe they have found some remailers that are > >When a person recieves a message from someone using an anonymous >remailer, the return address will usually work, depending on the >remailer. The return address is for an address on the remailer, and >sending to that address, the remailer will forward the message back to >the person who owns that anonymous address. Not the standard "Cypherpunks"-style remailers, except with some fairly cumbersome tricks with "reply blocks" and/or message pools. I think you are thinking of Julf's system, of which there is only one instance, his. >I don't really know much about remailers, but I don't think there's much >to know... If I'm mistaken about any of the above, I'm sure someone will >correct me. Glad to oblige. I note also that Jim Byrd and Jim Warren are unclear on some details. (To Jim Byrd, that "alumni account at Cal Tech" that you mentioned was one of the Cypherpunks remailers at Caltech that our own pioneering Hal Finney runs.) Cypherpunks remailers account for something like 29 out of 30 of all the world's remailers, by site count, though not volume. Sophisticated users know that the Cypherpunks model is the only robust one; Julf's approach has an ecological niche, but is highly vulnerable to the very subpoena approach used recently (not "several years ago" as Jim Warren says). --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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On computer face recognition:
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On computer face recognition: >> Shaving probably will not be a problem, but holding your head at a >> slightly different angle... will screw up the system totally, >> unless the system has radically improved since the last time I read >> up on it. At 11:45 AM 4/9/96 -0500, K00l Secrets wrote: > Well, the systems I have seen are quite good at finding people's eyes. > Scaling (for distance), and rotation (for the angle of your head) > therefore don't really confuse the system once it has your eyes. Finding the eyes can only control for rotations in the plane of the image, when you tilt your head to one side. They cannot handle the much more common case of 3D rotations, where you look slightly to the right or slightly to the left of camera. Facial expressions also throw them badly. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Know Your Net.Enemies Project
by Declan B. McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Would anyone be interested in collaborating on a "Know Your Net Enemies" project? We'd start with a resource like Bob Chatelle's excellent web pages at <http://world.std.com/~kip/bcfenatl.html> and with permission build on it and list the deceptions and misrepresentations each Net-Enemy has engaged in -- what each has done to restrict liberty online. We'd include original documents and links as appropriate. Who would be listed? Well, there's the family values groups [AFA/CC/NLC/EE!/FOF/FRC], the green card spammers, Carnegie Mellon University, Marty Rimm, the Church of Scientology, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, the NSA, German state prosecutors, Senator Exon, Dorothy Denning, and so on. If each collaborator takes a particular group or person, this could be done relatively quickly. Then we'd put it online at EFF's web site, with prominent treatment. All contributors would receive full credit for their work, of course. Anyone interested? This would be a great resource. -Declan

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Re: (Fwd) British Study Claims That Photo Credit Cards Don't Work
by Clay.Olbon＠dynetics.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:10 AM 4/9/96, jim bell wrote: >At 07:57 AM 4/9/96 -0500, Mike McNally wrote: >>jamesd(a)echeque.com wrote: > >>There are supposedly some new techniques that look at the infrared >>signature of your face (like, I guess, distribution & position of >>hot & cold spots), and that's less likely to be fooled by facial >>hair and other superficial disguises. It's probably a fairly simple >>technology, and could be applied to the credit card ID problem. > >I think this is based on looking at your face with near-infrared, not the >medium and far (thermal) infrared. Near infrared is supposed to penetrate >flesh far better, so your blood vessels are visible and form a pattern >which can be recognized. > >Jim Bell >jimbell(a)pacifier.com Jim, Where did you get your info? Near IR is around 1-1.5 microns, at these wavelengths, the body radiates very little energy. I think most of the systems you are discussing use mid (3-5) or long-wave (8-12) IR, where objects that are room to body temp radiate most of their energy. Clay --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Clay Olbon II | Clay.Olbon(a)dynetics.com Systems Engineer | ph: (810) 589-9930 fax 9934 Dynetics, Inc., Ste 302 | http://www.msen.com/~olbon/olbon.html 550 Stephenson Hwy | PGP262 public key: finger olbon(a)mgr.dynetics.com Troy, MI 48083-1109 | pgp print: B97397AD50233C77523FD058BD1BB7C0 TANSTAAFL - Robert Heinlein, in various works ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: questions about bits and bytes
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:00 PM 4/10/96 -0700, Rich Graves wrote: >On Wed, 10 Apr 1996, jim bell wrote: > >> >Be careful writing code - sometimes a byte is -128 to 127 instead of 0 >> >to 255. Also, there are machines (mostly old kinky ones) that use >> >bytes of sizes other than 8 bits. >> >> No, Bill, a "byte" has ALWAYS been 8-bits. > >Not that it really matters, but you're wrong; if you're talking about an >asynchronous data stream, a byte is however many bits it takes to express >one character. If you're using ASCII, it's 8; if you're using Baudot, it's >5. If you're talking about data in computers, then I think you're right, a >byte is always 8 bits. >-rich What's the old saying, "Those of you who think you know everything are very irritating to those of us who do." First off, serial binary formats for transmitted data are at least as old as the 1930's, and the term "byte" was coined in the early-middle 70's, as I recall. Therefore it is highly unlikely (and, in fact, wrong) that the term "byte" referred specifically to serial binary streams. In fact, the term "character" is the word used to describe a serial data object composed of bits. The length of that character can vary: As any ham knows (or ought to know!) many early teleprinters used a so-called 5-level (5 bits per character; there were shift characters inserted to multiply the available codes) code called Baudot, while more recent ones used the now-common, 7-bit ASCII code. A typical ASCII asynchronous character is transmitted using a start bit, seven or eight data bits, an optional parity bit, and one or more stop bits (usually 1, today, but it can be 1.5 or 2.) Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Protocols at the Point of a Gun
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:50 PM 4/10/96 -0700, Jeff Weinstein wrote: > Given that the IETF has no "official" (whatever that means) sanction, >what would prevent any other organization from coming in and trying to >take over their turf? I saw an article today (sorry, can't remember >where) that suggested a brewing fight between IETF and W3C over future >HTTP and HTML standards. If someone stands up and says that the IETF >is becoming too slow and overcome by bickering (not my opinion, just >a what if), and that their new group is better suited to setting standards, >who decides who is right, and based on what criteria? It seems that >one aspect of anarchy is that anyone could move in and replace "their >anarchy" with the "new anarchy". > > Just some philosophical pondering late one night... > > --Jeff Why nothing. Even your employer has done a bit of this protocol "forcing". The actual question though is would a successor organization(s) do anything significantly different. The question is can a *government* order protocols. IBM couldn't (after a while). If the government can't order protocols and protocols are created by (rough) mutual consent, I'll be happy and Dorothy won't be. DCF

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Re: No matter where you go, there they are.
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, we've pretty throughly convinced ourselves that Denning's scheme can be spoofed (I'm convinced, anyway.) It's actually worse than useless - it's a substantial security breach. To spoof being at a location, Mallory needs to know the location he is trying to spoof. With S/A off (as I understand it is now), he need to know the location within a couple meters, in three dimensions. Such precise location data is usually difficult to obtain, without actually visiting the site and recording the location using GPS. Mallory might be able to work out, for example, the location of the desk in the Oval office to that precision by triangulation (though setting up theodolites on Massachusetts Avenue may attract some attention :-) However, I defy him to find the location of a specific PC in NSA headquarters, or in a secured communications facility without actually visiting the desk carrying a GPS receiver (which he won't be allowed to do, unless he's got a damn good reason). However, since the protocol requires that Alice send out location data, once she starts using it she reveals her physical location to Eve, Mallory, and anyone ese who can see the packets. Since the nature of the protocol is that Alice's location does not change frequently (and needs to transmitted via a trusted channel to Bob when it does), after the first usage Mallory *knows* the physical location he is trying to simulate, and can use this information for future spoofing. The upshot of this is that Denning's scheme not only provides no security against spoofing, and leaks potentially sensitive data about locations. If Sadaam Huissain (sp?) had used this scheme during the Gulf War, we'd have been able to send a cruise missile directly to his keyboard. [These flaws in the protocol seem so obvious that I can't help but wonder if we're missing something - Dorothy isn't *that* stupid.] Peter Trei trei(a)Process.com

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Re: Message not deliverable
by Powers Glenn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've gotten these, too. glenn - From: JonWienke(a)aol.com - Date sent: Wed, 10 Apr 1996 16:49:33 -0400 - To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com - Subject: Re: Message not deliverable - >Subj: Message not deliverable - >Date: 96-04-10 11:51:09 EDT - >From: Administrator_at_DCACINTS(a)dca.com (Administrator) - >To: JonWienke(a)aol.com - - [body text deleted] - - Has anyone else been getting these when they post to cpunks? I get one every - time I post. I emailed the administrator at dca.com, a few weeks ago, but - nothing has changed. Anyone got suggestions? - - Jonathan Wienke -

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