December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

FUD about Remailers--the Strassman/Marlow "Revelations"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I didn't imagine that people would take the off-the-wall assertions here seriously, but "Anonymous" seems quite worried, so some comments can't hurt. At 4:40 AM 3/4/96, Anonymous wrote: > >>Both presenters explicitly acknowledged that a number of anonymous >>remnailers in the US are run by government agencies scanning traffic. >>Marlow said that the government runs at least a dozen remailers and that >>the most popular remailers in France and Germany are run by the >>respective government agencies in these countries. In addition they Oh really? And just which remailers are in France and Germany? (Raph's list doesn't show any ".de" or ".fr" sites, at least that I could see. It's possible that a site or two exists in France or Germany, but I'm skeptical. And certainly the "the most popular remailers in France and Germany" is an odd comment.) There are of course remailers in the Netherlands (Hacktic, for example), and Julf's site in Finland. Perhaps Marlow mistook these countries for France and Germany? In any case, the claim that the few sites in Europe are "at least a dozen remailers" and that they are run by the intelligence agencies of France and Germany is specious. I consider it unlikely that the remailer operators are working for the spooks. (Something to consider in the future, and even to be thoughtful about now. But unlikely at this time, with the current players, for various reasons.) Further, as with other recent comments we've seen, the authors seem to misunderstand the nature of chained remailers. These errors, plus the apparently slapdash way the article was cut-and-pasted together (from the Web pages of others, usually without acknowledgement), plus the scare tactic tone, makes me dismiss the entire "paper." >>mentioned that the NSA has successfully developed systems to break >>encrypted messages below 1000 bit of key length and strongly suggested >>to use at least 1024 bit keys. They said that they semselves use 1024 >>bit keys. As others have also noted, just FUD to confuse and scare. > I don't know about everyone else, but I consider this, if true, to be a >MAJOR worry. It never ceases to amaze me how lightly the government takes >lying to the people. Unfortunately I don't have the contacts or resources >to do any further investigation, I hope this thread is resolved one way or >another soon. > >nobody@unimportant "Investigation" can be done by doing what I just did: looking for these supposed "dozens" of the "most popular" remailer sites, looking for them in France or Germany, and not finding them. (Maybe they're secret, known only to CIA, SDECE, and BND operatives? The operative word being "paranoid.") --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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RE: FW: Communications Decency Act (hee-hee)
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Timothy C. May This is of course an old idea. Regrettably, the CDA is not based on a simple bright line test invovling the "Seven [exonized] Words," immortalized in the FCC--Carlin--Pacifica case. Rather, "indecent" is broadly interpreted to mean essentially whatever a prosecutor can convince a panel of bluenosed citizens is indecent. .................................................................... Well, if you were prosecuted, you could always explain what it means to kiss your "Gingrich" by pointing to any part of your body you choose. Of course they would be indicating, by their accusations, that they know enough about indecency to become suspicious over the resemblance.... (such sensitive people) .. Blanc

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Re: Duress
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 3 Mar 1996, Bill Frantz wrote: > >Of course, all smart air piracy buffs know the transponder code is 7600, > >and refuse to allow the pilots to use it. > > It changes from time to time. Of course subscribing to an IFR chart > service will keep you up-to-date with the changes. You should forward this to the list. > > Regards - Bill > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting > (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. > frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA > > > --- My prefered and soon to be permanent e-mail address: unicorn(a)schloss.li "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information

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[BABBLE] Like a Rolling Stone
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I just got off the phone with a writer from Rolling Stone magazine. They are going to be doing an article about the Geek Code. Isn't that just groovy? Maybe they'll let me be on the cover and I can do one of those Howard Stern nude things..... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: PGP Signed with PineSign 2.2 iQCVAwUBMTuPhjokqlyVGmCFAQGzoAQAqdHYz6tMEPlu/4n/nsrYO/eIz96K/ZSJ 44Gzehrtrlw0zg6rpdWab7BzbCapjqJEgnupRsGRVzlQ449LYLVZ2KIHwMfK5zFe 0hS57USj1ShQyqeNv6K2qGmH38n5/U6oAgnpXo8LPBWgkN9zxBI04hiBtoeQrnak UCfeg31EmWU= =Vq8N -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Finger for PGP Public Key \/ / -=-=-=-=-=- -=-=-=-=-=- \/ http://krypton.mankato.msus.edu/~hayden/Welcome.html -----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK----- Version: 3.1 GED/J d-- s:++>: a-- C++(++++)$ ULUO++ P+>+++ L++ !E---- W+(---) N+++ o+ K+++ w+(---) O- M+$>++ V-- PS++(+++)>$ PE++(+)>$ Y++ PGP++ t- 5+++ X++ R+++>$ tv+ b+ DI+++ D+++ G+++++>$ e++$>++++ h r-- y+** ------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------

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Re: Bombings, Surveillance, and Free Societies
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:28 AM 3/5/96, Phillip M. Hallam-Baker wrote: >Timothy C. May wrote: > >>The Red Brigade in Italy sought a fascist crackdown, and >> the "strategy of tension" is common. (And even revolutionists of crypto >> anarchist persuasion often think laws like the CDA are good in the long >> run, by undermining respect for authority and triggering more extreme >> reactions....) > >It is important to note in this regard that the worst bombing in Italy was >the Bologna station bombing, now decisively linked to right wing facist >groups the involvment in which of ex-prime minister Adreotti is shortly to >be examined in a criminal trial. The point being that the extreemists play >into each others hands. Yes, it is hard to know even which side is pulling the strings. The WW2 Italian fascist commando leader, Otto Skorzeny, not only rescued Mussolini from a ski chalet, he also helped set up the PLO in the 1960s, and consulted for the OSS, CIA, and such. (There is much more to say about this, and about the role of the early NSA in such affairs. However, continuing down this path will produce the inevitable perrygrams from the acerbic Mr. Metzger demanding "What does this have to [whatever my current interest is]?")) >> -- expect the various laws about "talking about explosives on the Net" to >> be used to clamp down on various fringe groups > >Hang on here, some of those groups are actively conspiring to commit >terrorist acts. If someone sends a message saying "lets plant a bomb >under a federal building, that will show them" I'm not worried if the >govt. decides to arrest a few people. There is a border between free >speech and conspiracy to murder which some people have crossed. I don't buy this. I said "talking about explosives on the Net," not openly conspiring to plant bombs in federal buildings. A big difference. (Not that I am aware of the OKC bombers discussing their plans on the Usenet.) >> I predict that it will take about 5 more major bombings in European and >> American cities to trigger substantive changes in laws. > >Generally it takes two. The legislation is written after the first and >then staled until being passed on the second. I am sandbagging by saying "5." I wasn't referring to 5 in, say, the U.S., but to 5 or so "horrific" bombs in Western countries, plus Israel. A second Oklahoma City-type bombing may be enough, a Sarin attack that kills 1,000 will almost surely be enough. (In the bigger scheme of things, the 150-200 or so who died in OKC are a drop in the bucket, and I wouldn't advocate _any_ new surveillance laws for them...putting a day care center in a soft target demonstrates the callousness of the Feds.) >> Personally, while I feel sorry for the dead in Israel, I think anyone who >> moves to a small desert state surrounded on all sides by Arabs who want >> their land back is asking for trouble. > >A point to consider is that there are many Isralis born in Israel who have no >other home. These people did not ask to be born in the middle of a desert >state. As with the Irish problem it is easy to solve if one could change >the past. The fundamental problem being that the wrong side won at Hastings. Let me use the language Bill Stewart used a while back, language which skirts the issue of "right" and "wrong" even more neatly than I did (when I said the Jews were "asking for trouble"): "If a religious group uses force to expel the current occupants of a desert region, and expels them to just beyond their borders, it is "unsurprising" that those expelled, and their children, and their children's children, will swear a blood oath to drive the group into the sea." Put another way, I will not be "surprised" to wake up one morning and hear on CNN that Tel Aviv has been vaporized in a nuclear explosion. Nor will I be surprised to similarly learn that Damascus has been vaporized, and so on. Being an atheist, I treat all religious mystics as suspect. When a bunch of people leave London and Chicago and Paris to live in the desert, surrounded by sworn enemies with nuclear capabilities, I think whatever happens to them is...."unsurprising." I hope this makes my outlook clearer. (And Cypherpunks should fully understand that information-trading systems and unbreakably encryption--the very technologies we so ardently are pushing--make certain actions even less "surprising" than might otherwise be the case. Think of it as evolution in action.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Teach the children well...
by Simon Spero 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I got the latest copy of the latest ComputerWare catalog (they're a big mac dealer). Up front, in there list of new releases was something that looked fun; --- Top Secret Decoder (CD-ROM) Ages 8-12 Mysterious, marvelous, mind-stretching software for kids who love creating and cracking secret codes. Kids'll sharpen their critical-thinking skills and earn top-otc secret agent credentials. Includes 300 code-cracking challenges, spectacular printing, plus 10 difficulty levels. $39.99 Houghton Mifflin Interactive ----- There is no truth to the rumours that they are POTP or IPG licencees. If you beat level 10, an animated Jim Bizdos comes out and does a little dance Take a copy along when you do your visit for NetDay Simon --- They say in online country So which side are you on boys There is no middle way Which side are you on You'll either be a Usenet man Which side are you on boys Or a thug for the CDA Which side are you on? National Union of Computer Operatives; Hackers, local 37 APL-CPIO

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None
by Mr. Boffo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>>>> "Black" == Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> writes: Black> On Sun, 3 Mar 1996, John Pettitt wrote: >> I'd like to run an encrypted mailing list - the model I'm >> linking of is this .. >> >> Poster cryptes mail with pgp using list exploder key. List >> exploder decrypts mail and recrypts with keys for all current >> list members and then sends the mail. >> >> [I don't want all the list members to need to know every other >> list members public key] >> >> Before I lanch into hacking majordomo - has anybody done this >> already or somthing like it ? Black> Someone asked this a little while ago. I don't recall if Black> there was an answer. I hope so, I'd be interested too. Check out the Web Page at www.alias.net. There is an entry on PGPdomo.

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.alias.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo hroller alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 4 Mar 96 6:48:59 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nymrod nymrod(a)nym.alias.net **+-*+***+*# 10:33 99.99% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com **#+***#+### 3:24 99.99% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org ############ :18 99.97% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net +-+-----+--+ 2:02:33 99.96% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl *********+** 8:08 99.95% gondonym alias(a)nym.gondolin.org ------------ 3:27:17 99.94% replay remailer(a)replay.com ****+**+**** 5:07 99.91% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ###* +*--##+ 25:24 99.87% gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org -----+------ 3:27:40 99.77% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org *-+*+++ +.-+ 58:19 99.76% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com *+* .+*----+ 46:22 99.75% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net -+-**** -** 32:44 99.70% c2 remail(a)c2.org +-*-++++ -* 39:23 99.66% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net ----------- 2:31:41 99.57% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com #*-#######*# 3:08 99.19% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ----___.+- 24:11:30 99.18% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com *-*+*-*** -* 24:02 98.98% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi .-.---... 23:23:07 97.58% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net +*****+* ## 25:06 90.76% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +++++++ +-+ 37:47 90.28% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu #- ## 22:41 80.89% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ..---+ 5:31:48 34.72% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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No Subject
by nobody＠vegas.gateway.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thought that this was worth reposting: >I attended last weeks "Information, National Policies, and International >Infrastructure" Symposium at Harvard Law School, organized by the Global >Information Infrastructure Commission, the Kennedy School and the >Institute for Information Technology Law & Policy of Harvard Law School. > >During the presentation by Paul Strassmann, National Defense University >and William Marlow, Science Applications International Corporation, >entitled "Anonymous Remailers as Risk-Free International Infoterrorists" >the questions was raised from audience (Professor Chaarles Nesson, >Harvard LAw School) - in a rather extended debate - whether the CIA and >similar government agencies are involved in running anonymous remailers >as this would be a perfect target to scan possibly illegal messages. > >Both presenters explicitly acknowledged that a number of anonymous >remnailers in the US are run by government agencies scanning traffic. >Marlow said that the government runs at least a dozen remailers and that >the most popular remailers in France and Germany are run by the >respective government agencies in these countries. In addition they >mentioned that the NSA has successfully developed systems to break >encrypted messages below 1000 bit of key length and strongly suggested >to use at least 1024 bit keys. They said that they semselves use 1024 >bit keys. > >I ask Marlos afterwards if these comments were off or on record, he >paused then said that he can be quoted. > >So I thought I pass that on. It seems interesting enough, don't you >think? > >Best > >Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger >Information Law Project >Austrian Institute for Legal Policy > Groundfog(a)alpha.c2.org

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PAB_lum
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

3-4-96. WSJ: "U.S. Commission Recommends Staff Cuts at Intelligence Agencies." The most numerous cuts would be at the CIA, DIA and NSA. Former Sen. Warren Rudman said the super-secret NSA, which conducts various forms of electronic eavesdropping abroad, was most in need of a cut that could provide money for new computer-related technology and bring in people with new technical skills. 3-3-96. NYT: "Spy Pablum." [Editorial] After a year of study and high public expectations, the commission stepped up to this promising moment with all the spine of a rag doll. There is nothing radical about its report, which is precisely its problem. When it comes to the larger picture of just what kind of intelligence network America needs now that the cold war is over, and whether some agencies ought to be combined or eliminated altogether, the commission lacks imagination and courage. PAB_lum

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Re: NYT on Crypto Bills
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, my first objection is that this law could become something like mail fraud. If the term "data coding" is used, it should be carefully defined. After all, this letter is coded in ASCII. My voice communications are digitized and coded by some algorithm defined by the phone company. -Peter

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Shostack writes: > > In suggesting key:// urls, I (without commenting) placed a path of > /s/telnetd/ in a URL. I was considering that a telnetd might need > many keys and associated documents, all of which could be found in a > directory. > > gateway's master telnetd public key. > daily keys > policy statements about who may connect, or how > etc > > I expect that we could extend the syntax in such a way that a URL > could contain most of the data we need. Thus, the default document > might be a 'cert of the day,' with possibly with references within the > certificate to the master telnetd key, the hosts master key. > > To expand, I was thinking of: > > key://foo.bar.com/{u,s,h,d}/family/instance While that would be useful in a lot of cases, I would hope that all that path gunk wouldn't be required.... most people would have one key, at least initially, and so a simple key://foo.bar.com/username/key.asc would be enough for them. I wouldn't want to prevent people from using your system, in fact it's a good idea. I just don't think that it should be required, just recommended. Something else to add would be a specifier for the type of key, i.e. key://slack.lne.com/pgp/ericm/key.asc The reason for the keytype specifier is obvious, so that the system can support more than just PGP keys. The problem with the above example is that the 'pgp' part is imbedded in the path. Since the apps that read these key URLS need to know which ones are for PGP and which for DH or DSS or whatever, the keytype specifier needs to be in a standard location in the URL. Suggestions? maybe key:/pgp/slack.lne.com/ericm/key/asc? Finally, a question: should the keyserver be able to serve keys in a way that is secure from a MITM attack, or can it depend on the certificate chain in the key certificate itself to validate the key certificate? I think it can, but I am not sure, so perhaps someone smarter than I can explain why, or why not. The attraction is obvious, if the key server doesn't have to validate the keys it serves, the whole problem of distributed key servers becomes much easier. -- Eric Murray ericm(a)lne.com ericm(a)motorcycle.com http://www.lne.com/ericm PGP keyid:E03F65E5 fingerprint:50 B0 A2 4C 7D 86 FC 03 92 E8 AC E6 7E 27 29 AF

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Re: NYT on Crypto Bills
by mike＠fionn.lbl.gov 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mar 4, 3:09pm, Adam Shostack wrote: > Markoff shouyld know better than this. There is a long > history of business use of codes & ciphers, going back hundereds of > years, and durring the heyday of the telegraph, there were fair size > companies that created codebooks with (locally configurable) > superencipherment systems for the market. I thought that, for the most part, the telegraph systems described above were to reduce cable charges (1 code word instead of a 15-word sentence, a huge savings in those days). Maybe it's the use to which the encoding's put that's controversial, not the (idea of) encoding itself.

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Re: (Fwd) Gov't run anon servers
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have run two remailers for about three years now, and I have never been contacted in any way by law enforcement or government people in relation to the operation of the remailers, or of any mail which has been sent through them. I get a fair number of complaints by private individuals, but I have never heard anything from the government. However, if I were a computer-savvy law enforcement agent, and I wanted to track messages through one of my remailers, I would try a technological approach. I would first break the key for my remailer. That is trivial. The passphrase is in PLAINTEXT in the script file which runs the remailer!. It has to be. That is true of all automated remailers. Anyone who can break into the remailer server and acquire root permission can find the remailer secret key. My keys have been unchanged for three years. Surely some enterprising hackers have stolen the keys by now. (That is why my keys are only < 512 bits.) Then the LEA has to insert mail-monitoring software somewhere either in the remailer system or on some connection to it. That is probably more difficult and may require cooperation from a system manager somewhere. I don't really know how hard it would be. But breaking the key is the easy part. Hal

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Re: NYT on Crypto Bills
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On Mar 4, 3:09pm, Adam Shostack wrote: >> Markoff shouyld know better than this. There is a long >> history of business use of codes & ciphers, going back >>hundereds of >> years, and durring the heyday of the telegraph, there were >>fair size >> companies that created codebooks with (locally configurable) >> superencipherment systems for the market. > >I thought that, for the most part, the telegraph systems described >above were to reduce cable charges (1 code word instead of a >15-word >sentence, a huge savings in those days). Maybe it's the use to >which >the encoding's put that's controversial, not the (idea of) encoding >itself. Yes, this is true, but the government still spent plenty of time getting a library of the standard libraries of commercial codes. There are books and books about these codes. Naturally, some were more oriented toward secrecy. Others were just so obscure that you needed the code dictionary to understand them.

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Re: Duress
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The transponder analogy might not be very accurate. When you fly in a controled airspace, the *controller* asks you to dial in certain digits on the transponder. If you do not dial them in, the controller will start harrassing you for doing it and for not complying and for entering airspace while unauthorized. You have to do it. depending on cockpit configuration, the hijacker might very well have no choice but to let the pilot do it. In any case, this is a situation where there are 3 persons involved (hijacker, pilot and controller) vs 2 in the duress case I would guess that most hijacks gets disclosed before they land because there are so many ways that the pilot could stego a help message in the flow of the numbers that are exchanged btwn him and the ground. JFA **** OLD KEY: USE ONLY FOR VERIFYING SIGNATURES **** 1024 bits Key ID:57214AED 1995/10/04 Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> 84 96 76 AE EB 7C AB 15 88 47 87 B0 18 31 74 9F

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art-stego
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The recent discussion "Chaff in the Channel" got me thinking about an alternative to hiding random bit streams in picture files. The goal of steganography, as I see it, is to provide plausible deniability. The problem with hiding bit streams is that you can never be sure if the opponent has developed an analysis technique to prove a particular file contains a suspicious bit pattern. The alternative to hiding bit streams is to not hide them. Use them to generate pretty pictures. For example, modify a fractal image generator to accept a bit stream as input. Use the bit settings to influence the values used to iterate the fractal function. You don't have to use fractals, any function that produces pretty pictures would probably work as long as there was a way to extract the bit stream from the final picture. Brute force would probably work fast enough for humans. One possibility is a screen saver that produces an "infinite" variety of pretty pictures by generating a pseudo-random bit stream and using it to help generate the next background picture. Occasionally, the picture might be so cool you will want to send it your friends or post it on the Net or just keep it around to look at. The goal is to create an innocent reason for passing around unique images that contain random bit streams so we don't have to worry if somebody finds the bit stream. If you live in a country that doesn't outlaw abstract art you have plausible deniability. Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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Re: Duress
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:14 PM 3/4/96 -0500, jf_avon(a)citenet.net (Jean-Francois Avon (JFA Technologies, QC, wrote: >The transponder analogy might not be very accurate. > >When you fly in a controled airspace, the *controller* asks you to >dial in certain digits on the transponder. The analogy may be reaching its elastic limit although you can use those transponder codes when flying VFR, not in radio contact. What I really wanted to suggest is that we try to design (when we can) to minimize the possibility of bad things happening to people who use duress codes. Regards - Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Bombings, Surveillance, and Free Societies
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The recent bombings and similar events in public places in Israel (Hamas), England (IRA), Japan (subway gas attack), and the U.S. (Oklahoma City) are triggering calls for increased communications surveillance. Often the first bombing is insufficient to trigger increased steps...but later events push states to take stronger steps. (In the U.S., for example, the OKC bombing was headline news for more than a week, but resulted in no lasting changes affecting most of us, despite the hysteria about the need to outlaw "militias" and "white supremacist" groups. A second or third such bombing would likely produce new legislation of a serious sort. This is the thrust of my article.) Revolutionary theory says of course that this increased clampdown is a desired effect of terrorist bombings and attacks. Fear and doubt. Revolutionary ends rarely happen by slow, incremental movement. Hundreds of examples, from the original "bomb-throwing anarchists" to the modern mix of terrorist bands. The Red Brigade in Italy sought a fascist crackdown, and the "strategy of tension" is common. (And even revolutionists of crypto anarchist persuasion often think laws like the CDA are good in the long run, by undermining respect for authority and triggering more extreme reactions....) CNN is reporting that U.S. intelligence agencies will share technology for communications intercepts with the Israelis (more so than they already have been doing. Maybe the "U.S.S. Liberty" will be anchored off of Haifa on a permanent basis. The implications for cryptography? -- expect increased support for a "New World Order" to restrict non-governmental access to strong crypto (via key escrow measures) -- expect the various laws about "talking about explosives on the Net" to be used to clamp down on various fringe groups -- expect "national security" to become a bigger part of the political debate -- expect more and bigger bombings, as the groups thinking about bombings see how productive they are in accomplishing policy goals (such as ending peace talks, triggering police state actions, etc.) The inescapable fact is that free societies have numerous "soft targets" than cannot be defended against such bombing attacks. Various public places are "Schelling points" for attacks: crowded streets in Bogota, Tel Aviv, New York, London, Paris. Ditto for subways, buses, government buildings, sports arenas, etc. (The 99+% of us who are not in these areas at any given time are pretty safe, actually.) I predict that it will take about 5 more major bombings in European and American cities to trigger substantive changes in laws. If we look at how easily the Communiations Decency Act (and the Wiretap Act, and similar laws) sailed through Congress, I foresee serious terrorist activity as triggering far-reaching restrictions on communications privacy, on non-governmental use of encryption, and on what may be talked about openly on the Net. (Yes, I'm aware that there's a thing called the "First Amendment," lest you lawyers point out to me that such prior restraints will never fly. Well, how has the First Amendment stopped the government from restricting what I can say about medicine, what abortion advice I can give, the "dirty words" I choose to use, the supposedly libelous and slanderous things I can say, etc.? Granted, these are not cases of prior restraint, but of actions taken after the fact, via criminal and civil actions. Not much difference so far as I can see.) Personally, while I feel sorry for the dead in Israel, I think anyone who moves to a small desert state surrounded on all sides by Arabs who want their land back is asking for trouble. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Remailers run by spooks
by Just Rich 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Mon, 4 Mar 1996, Anonymous (or so he thinks!) wrote: > >Both presenters explicitly acknowledged that a number of anonymous > >remnailers in the US are run by government agencies scanning traffic. > >Marlow said that the government runs at least a dozen remailers and that > >the most popular remailers in France and Germany are run by the > >respective government agencies in these countries. In addition they > >mentioned that the NSA has successfully developed systems to break > >encrypted messages below 1000 bit of key length and strongly suggested > >to use at least 1024 bit keys. They said that they semselves use 1024 > >bit keys. > > I don't know about everyone else, but I consider this, if true, to be a > MAJOR worry. It never ceases to amaze me how lightly the government takes > lying to the people. Unfortunately I don't have the contacts or resources > to do any further investigation, I hope this thread is resolved one way or > another soon. Yeah, didn't you know that Sameer was on the CIA payroll? How do you think he paid for his new Ferrari? I have no doubt that the CIA can break 1000-bit keys on a case-by-case basis, *if they decide to allocate the resources*. I think it's possible that some remailers are run by spooks. However, I seriously doubt that anyone is breaking stuff routinely, and I think the web of trust is pretty good. Of course, the CIA had Ames... the reverse could easily be true. However, I also have no doubt that Strassmann and Marlow are spreading disinformation and exaggerating their capabilities in an attempt to break the web of trust and incite a witch hunt. It won't work. The answer in any case is more use of remailers, not less. Just turn up the noise level. You already know that nothing is 100% secure, but you do what you can. It's a war of attrition. - -rich - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMTp7ayoZzwIn1bdtAQFJXgGAg8I4+IwZYrDI46bMj2nED+Dh0AeoMJVs PP10Ui5u46sXDAUjpMzJSwv5EqdIOEKy =611k -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Report on Privacy Enhancing
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone how to get a copy of the report on "privacy enhancing technologies - the path to anonymity" cited in this paper from the Canberra/OECD conference on Feb 7-8: http://www.nla.gov.au/gii/oconnor.html Issues Facing Government : Meeting Public Concerns Kevin O'Connor Privacy Commissioner, Australia [Giant snip] In my own sphere of activity, there is some discussion taking place over the potential of new technologies and applications to assist with privacy protection. A recent report from the Dutch and Ontario Privacy Commissioners entitled Privacy enhancing technologies - the path to anonymity, offers some intriguing suggestions about the potential of public key cryptography for use in digital signatures to act as 'identity protectors' - allowing transactions to be completed and accounted for without the true identity of the participants needing to be known. While there are some obvious concerns about such technologies from a law enforcement perspective, which we have already heard about from the previous speaker, these should not be insuperable obstacles. On the other hand, the registration of digital signatures and public keys, with sufficient integrity to gain commercial and governmental confidence, itself raises additional privacy concerns. The complex issues involved are only just starting to be addressed. ... ----- Encouragingly, another paper by Matthew Bowcock http://www.nla.gov.au/gii/bowcock.html states: [Big snip] Controls on Encryption Technology There has been much heated debate worldwide about restrictions on the use of encryption technology, so that law enforcement and national security agencies can continue to intercept communications. Two questions are worth asking in this debate. Firstly, is interception of private communications a governmental right, which must therefore be protected in the face of technological change, or is it an accidental consequence of the weaknesses of the communication techniques that we have been using? I would argue that it is the latter and that there is no community obligation to protect it. Secondly, is a country better served by a vibrant, efficient, electronic economy, using trusted secure communication techniques for its day to day business, or by attempting to reduce organised crime by restricting use of technology? So far, much of the opposition to restrictions on the use of encryption technology has centred around a right to privacy and civil libertarian issues. Perhaps, instead, we need to quantify the opportunity cost, in economic terms, of delayed and lower levels of adoption of electronic commerce by the business community because the security mechanisms are not sufficiently trustworthy. It may be that the cost to the economy of restricting the use of encryption technology outweighs the benefits to the community. ...

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[NOISE] Re: Bombings, Surveillance, and Free Societies
by tbyfield＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[This post is 100% free of remarks defending actions of the state of Israel.] At 12:51 PM 3/4/96, Timothy C. May wrote: >Personally, while I feel sorry for the dead in Israel, I think anyone who >moves to a small desert state surrounded on all sides by Arabs who want ^^^^^^^^ >their land back is asking for trouble. Like someone who crosses the road without looking both ways is asking for trouble? O necessity, we worship at your altar. Some folks--in fact, most Israelis--were born in Israel. The rest of your remarks about "a...state surrounded on all sides by Arabs who want their land back" doesn't exactly describe the Palestinians' relations with denizens of neighboring territories prior to the rise of Zionism, or even since, for that matter. </thread> Ted

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Re: (Fwd) Gov't run anon servers
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:10 PM 3/4/96, jim bell wrote: >At 10:52 AM 3/4/96 -0800, Hal wrote: >>That is trivial. The passphrase is in PLAINTEXT in the script file >>which runs the remailer!. It has to be. That is true of all automated >>remailers. > >Maybe I just don't know much about automated remailers, but I don't >understand why you said that the passphrase "has to be" in plaintext in the >script file. I find this hard to believe. While I am far from an expert on >cryptographic matters, I would assume that any received attempt at a >password could be securely hashed (128 bits?) and compared with a pre-stored >hash value. If it's the same, it's assumed that the password was correct. The "passphrase" is not for access to the remailer, but so that the remailer can itself decrypt incoming messages encrypted to its public key. An automated remailer is like a little guy sitting at the machine, taking in incoming messages, decrypting the ones that are addressed to him, and taking furhter actions. In Chaum's hardware-based "digital mix," the scripts, etc., for this are stored in tamper-resistant hardware, making the attack Hal describes much harder. (Chaum was thinking that mixes needed hardware security about 15 years ago.) Unix-based remailers, and the like, don't rely on secure hardware. We've talked about possible hardware security measures, even those that only rely on physical box security. A box that does decryption, mixing, readdressing, etc., without being part of a Unix file system/network, could be a useful "Mom and Pop remailer" (the idea being that small shop owners, "Mom and Pop," could set this up, collect a little bit of spare change as a remailing fee, and not even have access to the internal state of the machine themselves. At a Cypherpunks meeting a couple of years ago we spent some time brainstorming this. It seemed plausible that a small outfit could make such "remailer boxes" and sell them cheaply. (Hardware prices have plunged even further.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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new mixmaster remailer
by Alex Strasheim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've set up a mixmaster remailer at nsa(a)omaha.com. Here's the key: =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= omaha nsa(a)omaha.com c20bfad8d66b43448ca3bdcfa794e244 2.0b11 -----Begin Mix Key----- c20bfad8d66b43448ca3bdcfa794e244 258 AATNlQZx/gSC34PBLJNNmrBzo3m8CE6/kvCTscQ7 ciuhKGUM7vPGtiAXQiueFyDSUqh24L5dWaX2CWrm +Z0dsmJTYSulrrtS6/kFO1Qnl5TPrPcWl+BgBT4M mBWQKip4rw+hn8gfXyS+b7gd0JqW/ajlKGAchGxw NsuDVbpEL3ncVwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- -- Alex Strasheim, alex(a)proust.suba.com

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Re: art-stego
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:18 PM 03/04/96, Jim Miller wrote: >The recent discussion "Chaff in the Channel" got me thinking about an >alternative to hiding random bit streams in picture files. The goal of >steganography, as I see it, is to provide plausible deniability. The >problem with hiding bit streams is that you can never be sure if the >opponent has developed an analysis technique to prove a particular file >contains a suspicious bit pattern. The way I understand steganography working, you would use it to hide mathematically random data. Mainly encrypted data. Like a PGP encrypted message, but with all PGP headers and other non-random data removed. Photos are a great medium for steganography, since they already contain noise of various sorts. So a good steganography algorithm (which I understand exists) merely changes the values of the noise so that it now encodes your (random) message. So there's no way to look for "suspicious bit patterns", and even if you use a publically available stego program to encode your data, and they use the same program to unstego your data, all they wind up with is a random bit stream, and they have no way of telling if it's just noise in the picture or your PGP encrypted message. So you already have all the plausible deniability you need, and I don't see how Jim's method is an improvement. Of course, if they have methods to crack PGP encrypted messages, and they use it on yours even without being sure it is an encyrypted message, and eventually wind up with a clear text message, well, then they've got your clear text message. And you are unlikely to be able to claim that it's just a coincidence they managed to extract several paragraphs about laundering money in bermuda from the GIF or orca the killer whale. But this is true of any stego method--if they can manage to get a cleartext message out of it, plausible deniability is unlikely to get you far. Am I wrong about any of the above?

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