December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Finally, an honest man at IPG. Y'all are a hoot. I'll hire you as bozos for my kid's next birthday party. ROTFL Arley Carter Tradewinds Technologies, Inc. email: ac(a)hawk.twinds.com www: http://www.twinds.com "Trust me. This is a secure product. I'm from <insert your favorite corporation or government agency>." On Wed, 21 Feb 1996, IPG Sales wrote: > We fess up - we are pig farmers from TexasL, we never have been to > these high fluting things you call schools, so we do not even > know what you are talking about, much less anything about Cryptography. > > On Wed, 21 Feb 1996, Arley Carter wrote: > > > On Tue, 20 Feb 1996, IPG Sales wrote: > > > > Fess up guys. You are either: > > > > 1. A team of undergrads or graduate students conducting an "exploit". > > 2. A Detweiller tentacle. Dr. FC ? > > 3. The return of Alice D'nonymous ? > > 4. The reason the coderpunks lists was started. > > > > You've got to be ROTFL. > > See my sig. > > > > Arley Carter > > Tradewinds Technologies, Inc. > > email: ac(a)hawk.twinds.com > > www: http://www.twinds.com > > > > "Trust me. This is a secure product. I'm from <insert your favorite > > corporation or government agency>." > > > Appreciately, > > Ralph > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:11 PM 2/21/96 -0800, tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) wrote: >* Coderpunks -- number theory, DES, Haval, C/C++/Java, IETF and TCP/IP >stuff, digital signatures, crypto libraries and APIs, Diffie-Hellman, >BSAFE, RSAREF, etc. > >* Cypherpunks -- nuclear bomb triggers, why women are more free under the >will of Allah than in Western decadent societies, movie reviews, SS >Obergruppenfuhrer Zimmermann, Zambian newspapers, alien bases in >Antarctica, Himalayan treks, etc. Pretty much, yep. The only part of this that really annoys me is that there isn't currently any real place to talk about actual crypto matters from a user's point of view. Sure, I can carve out space for myself on my own Web pages to talk about the things that interest/concern me - and I have - but it's tough to find anyplace to _learn_ in any way except random experimentation. And sure, if I could read C well enough to puzzle through the remailer code and had the UNIX knowledge necessary to compile and run one myself, for instance, I could answer all my questions about remailer operation. But I don't. And I wish I didn't have to. Unfortunately, there seems to be a huge gap between the tiny handful of people who create the stuff and the bulk of us who are merely interested in using it. At this point, I acknowledge that I'm reinventing Alan's screed about how "cypherpunks teach" should be as true as "cypherpunks write code". If more people don't work on bridging the aforementioned gap, smart people of good will who happen to be occupied enough with other things not to be able (or interested) to become themselves good programmers and cryptographers are SOL. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dave Merriman writes: > could someone point me at the 'specs' for Mixmaster remailers? > I'm after how messages are sliced, diced, repackaged, and shipped, etc. http://www.obscura.com/~loki/remailer/remailer-essay.html Funky things are apparently happening with the obscura DNS records etc. due to some equipment moves Lance is doing, so you may or may not find this convenient to retrieve at the moment. -Lewis "You're always disappointed, nothing seems to keep you high -- drive your bargains, push your papers, win your medals, fuck your strangers; don't it leave you on the empty side ?" (Joni Mitchell, 1972)

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 22 Feb 1996, Robert Hettinga wrote: > >I'm sufficiently impressed with the arguments against name credentials > >that Carl Ellison has made that I'm looking seriously into systems > >that don't do any sort of conventional certificate binding at all... > > ... and I bet, Wei Dai's contentions to the contrary, that they'll be > *cheaper* to use than those which do certificate binding, all other things > being equal. You got my position completely backward on this. I've always supported Carl's arguments in the past on this issue (for example see the tread "subjective names..."). You may be thinking of what I said about the cost of defeating traffic analysis. The natural state of the Net seems to be a kind of semi-anonymity. Trying to push it in either direction (complete traceability or anonymity) is costly. Wei Dai

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

IPG Sales <ipgsales(a)cyberstation.net> wrote: > See my reply to Tim Phillip - it is checked extensively > > If the algorithm sucks, prove it - please read the messages back and See my comment below. [..] > > [..] > > > In general, you will find the kernel of the propgations consists of 64 > > > equation sets of the form: > > > > > > Bi=(Bi+Ci MOD Di) Mod 256 Large prime numbers > > > ENCRYPTEXTi=OTP[Bi] XOR PLAINTEXTi Encryption > > > OTP[Bi]=ENCRYPTEXTi Makes the OTP Dynamic > > > > Bah. Looks to me like simple garbling, only using a large stream. > > > > Encrypt a stream of zeros with that method, and you'll get repeated > > strings of OTP[Bi]'s. An unsophisticated high school student could > > crack that.

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In list.cypherpunks, ipgsales(a)cyberstation.net writes: > Who said that we are expanding OTP's - I believe you did, when you stated that your "OTP" (and I am only using "OTP" in this case to point up your misusage of the term, and not to claim that what you are doing is any such thing) is used to seed your "RNG" (another misnomer). > we are using them to drive RNG's > please read my mail back and forth with Derek and Roy Silvernail, Do remember that the majority of my mail has not been copied to the list. > I belive that both of then recognize that an extremely large key, 2 > to some large number, let us say for the time being 2 to 12288 bits > can be derived from a OTP when generated- Not a chance, slick. A One-Time Pad is well defined within the art, and your PRNG system is no such thing. I will thank you to not postulate what I may or may not recognize. - -- Roy M. Silvernail -- roy(a)cybrspc.mn.org will do just fine, thanks. "Does that not fit in with your plans?" -- Mr Wiggen, of Ironside and Malone (Monty Python) PGP public key available upon request (send yours) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMSwTVhvikii9febJAQEtpgP+MqcESnrisA8tYT+GulGamEhMIa9gTKAn Dc1ylyG4pgMRW+osZnnBJcWeZq8Yx7aTzteTmkNYmpXZP9liVaySSOVce36ORG4X BnRO2OGLI3JD8ssgMbifxbZay/00bDdCuMthGnXA+xKAW27p9i9tHLrPIyJhdjZa Jd3rHWCqwCc= =Cx0p -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Assassination Politics" Part 8 The following article appeared in the Sunday, February 4, 1996 issue of Asahi Evening News, in an article written by columnist Paul Maxwell, page 6. He writes a regular column about the Internet for this newspaper. "Networks: Paul Maxwell" "Dial Internet for murder" 'The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." (Shakespeare, Henry VI). A startling and controversial idea has surfaced on the Internet recently--fear with me for a moment while I explain it. It is based on two technological developments: digital cash and encryption software. Briefly, digital cash is a system for transferring funds from one person to another on the Net. For this system to be as good as cash, the transactions must be capable of being conducted anonymously, just like in real life. (You go into the Seven-Eleven, buy a Cafe Latte, and nobody knows your name or your credit history. The purchase is not recorded in a database of your consumer preferences.) Several competing schemes for digital cash have been launched, but the one that eventually gains universal acceptance will surely have this anonymity feature. The second innovation is a kind of software called public-key encryption. It allows you to send a file or an email message that is "locked" in such a way that it can only be opened by the intended recipient. The recipient, however, cannot open it until given a "key." This "key" may then be used to encrypt a return message that can only be opened by the original sender. Freelance visionary and tinkerer Jim Bell has been following both of these developments for the past few years. Recently, he asked himself a couple of tough questions: "How can we translate the freedom afforded by the Internet to ordinary life?" How can we keep government from banning encryption, digital cash, and other systems that will improve our freedom?" Suddenly, Bell had a revolutionary idea. ("Revolutionary" is the word he uses, and it fits.) You and me--the little guys, the ordinary working people of the world--could get together, all pitch in, and pay to have every rotten scoundrel in politics assassinated. And we could do it legally. Sort of. Bell imagined an organization that would award "a cash prize to somebody who correctly 'predicted' the death of one of a list of violators of rights, usually either government employees, officeholders, or appointees. It could ask for anonymous contributions from the public, and individuals would be able to send those contributions using digital cash." He explains that "using modern methods of public-key encryption and anonymous digital cash, it would be possible to make such awards in such a way so that nobody knows who is getting awarded the money, only that the award is being given. Even the organization itself would have no information that could help the authorities find the person responsible for the prediction, let alone the one who caused the death." Are you following this? Let's say that we, the public, decide we've finally had enough of [insert name of villain]. Ten dollars from me, ten from you--suddenly there's a million dollars in a fund. The money will go to the first person who can "predict" the date, time, and circumstances of the villain's death. Obviously, this information is only known in advance by the assassin. He sends an anonymous, "locked" message. He kills the villain. He sends the "key" to the message. He has, without ever revealing his identity, "correctly predicted" the murder. The "key" that he has provided is then used to "lock the award money in a file that is then publicly posted on the Internet. Only the person who originated the key may open the file and claim the digital cash. In other words, public anger could finance cash awards for assassinations. The organization that collected the money and announced a list of possible targets would never know about a crime in advance, and would never know the identity or whereabouts of a criminal. It would not technically be guilty of conspiracy or complicity. Jim Bell has thought about this a lot, and feels that the idea is technically feasible, practical, even foolproof. Suppose for a moment he's right? What are the implications? World leaders live with the threat of assassination every day of their lives. But at the local level, this could really have an impact. And the "target" list wouldn't necessarily to politicians--any offensive public personality would be fair game. Picture yourself a year from now, sitting around with friends. Somebody says, "Remember when Juice Newton got whacked?" And you say, "Yeah--best ten bucks I ever spent." Satisfying as it might be to declare war on asinine pop singers, Bell has a more civic-minded suggestion: Let's kill all the car thieves. He reasons that a very small number of career criminals are responsible for nearly all car thefts. If one million car owners in a given metropolitan area contributed just four dollars a year, it would create $10,000 a day in "prize money" for the "predictor" of any car thief's death. "Assuming that amount is far more than enough to get a typical car thief's 'friends' to 'off' him," he writes, "there is simply no way that a substantial car-theft subculture could possibly be maintained." Jim as high hopes for his plan--he thinks it could eventually lead to the end of political tyranny. But if you don't like this idea, he has others. In a recent email exchange, I asked what he was doing now. "I recommend that you rent the movie, "The Day the Earth Stood Still.," he answered. "I'm working on a similar project." [end of article]

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 18 Feb 1996, jim bell wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > At 10:25 PM 2/18/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > > I've been kind of busy recently (the reason I haven't responded to > >the more recent Assasination Politics stuff), but I'm curious what > >your method is for achieving simultaneous explosions. > > > "Multiple very thin flexible hollow tubes (1 mm ID? teflon?) filled with a > homogenous liquid > explosive (for example, pure nitromethane), length accurately cut to produce > the exactly desired delay. Kept separated from each other by foam spacers > to avoid inter-fiber detonations. Detonated from a single cap, with an > intermediary chamber of liquid explosive to stabilize the shock front, the > detonation wave travels along each tube simultaneously at (presumably) > identical velocity." This method is so dependent on the uniformity of the initiator (the cap in this instance) as to be nearly useless. Normal blasting caps do not detonate with the uniformity required to initiate each of the tube paths at the same time. In the off chance that you contemplated surrounding the cap with liquid explosive of a sufficent type, (which still wouldn't assure proper uniformity with any certainty as the liquid explosive is as likely to detonate slightly off left to right as up to down) you still have extremely difficult problems to overcome. 1> Interference from the milling shape and accuracy of the openings to the tubes containing the liquid explosive. 2> Mild to obscure impurities in the liquid explosives causing differences in velocity with respect to other tubes. Even small changes in pressures within the tubes might cause enough timing problems to make uniform initiation of the primary high explosive assembly impossible. 3> Interference from the milling shape and accuracy of the terminus of the tubes containing the liquid explosive. 4> Overpressure in the device causing premature detonation of the near portion of the high explosive assembly. All of these might cause enough timing error to prevent uniform pressure and thus prevent uniform compression and make supercriticality impossible. Remember, kryonic switiches are necessary even when dealing with the speeds of electric conductivity. The velocities of even hydrazine based explosives are signigicantly lower. The margin for error is similarly lower. Plutonium gun is still the easiest method for the home grown nuclear device, even if it requires more fissile material. > It's a race, designed so that the detonation waves reach their targets (the > foci) at > the same time. If the detonation velocity was, say, 5,000 meters per > second, an accuracy of 0.5 millimeter in length would produce a delay > accuracy of 100 nanoseconds. > > Whatcha think? > > Now where did I put that pit... <G> > > Jim Bell > jimbell(a)pacifier.com > > Klaatu Burada Nikto > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- [...] > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --- My prefered and soon to be permanent e-mail address: unicorn(a)schloss.li "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information

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Re: A Challenge (perhaps!)
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I know it doesn't exercise key technology and relies on the secrecy of the >algorithm (which from my very limited knowledge on cryptography I think makes >it almost doomed from the start (?))... Yes, it does. Without the slightest insult of any kind to your friend, the problem is that the vast majority of "new" algorithms have actually been invented time and time again long ago. And the vast majority of those have been shown to have vulnerabilities. Phil Zimmerman writes about this in the PGP docs. It is overwhelmingly likely that your friend has, no doubt with the best of intentions, stumbled across something that has a simple flaw he doesn't know about. Further, secrets are hard to keep. PGP works _because of_ its publicity, not in spite of it. When the algorithm must be kept secret, every little thing must be watched. Just a few months ago, someone cracked the encryption on Microsoft's Win95 registry database by taking a snapshot of the contents of memory at a key moment. Other hacks break other efforts at secrecy. In fact, no sensible user should trust anything to a secret algorithm. I may not be able to tell the difference between Diffie-Hellman and Lillian Helman...but I can go talk to those who can. If the coders and evaluators I trust tell me there's a problem, I can go hunt up another solution. Doing anything else buying a pig in a poke. Now, there are a lot of not-sensible users out there. Slick marketing can result in a bundle being made. But it's not the best way to go. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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mixmaster info?
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I hate to bring up the topic of privacy/crypto (yech! :-), but could someone point me at the 'specs' for Mixmaster remailers? I'm after how messages are sliced, diced, repackaged, and shipped, etc. Dave Merriman ------------------------------------------------------------- "Giving money and power to government is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenage boys." P. J. O'Rourke (b. 1947), U.S. journalist. <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> For privacy tools: http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/1148

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IPG OTM expansion
by SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have a guess as to IPG's "OTP" expansion algorithm. The clue is the prime wheels. It reminded me of something I read in Kahn that was originally done with paper tape. Take two random streams, A and B. Their lengths are relatively prime. Let's use 1000 and 999. An expanded stream C is computed thus: C[i] = A[i % 1000] ^ B[i % 999] C thus does not repeat until 999000 values have gone past. Using more than two relatively prime wheels will produce very large streams. The key, of course, is that *the entropy does not increase*. I am sure that this sort of expansion is vulnerable to attack. It certainly does not warrant the name OTP. Am I close, Ralph?

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Big Java security hole
by Robichaux, Paul E 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded to me by a fellow webmaster; I don't know the original source. -Paul Date: Sun, 18 Feb 1996 23:57:02 -0500 From: Drew Dean <ddean(a)CS.Princeton.EDU> Subject: Java security problems We have discovered a serious security problem with Netscape Navigator's 2.0 Java implementation. (The problem is also present in the 1.0 release of the Java Development Kit from Sun.) An applet is normally allowed to connect only to the host from which it was loaded. However, this restriction is not properly enforced. A malicious applet can open a connection to an arbitrary host on the Internet. At this point, bugs in any TCP/IP-based network service can be exploited. We have implemented (as a proof of concept) an exploitation of an old sendmail bug. If the user viewing the applet is behind a firewall, this attack can be used against any other machine behind the same firewall. The firewall will fail to defend against attacks on internal networks, because the attack originates behind the firewall. The immediate fix for this problem is to disable Java from Netscape's "Security Preferences" dialog. An HTTP proxy server could also disable Java applets by refusing to fetch Java ".class" files. We've sent a more detailed description of this bug to CERT, Sun, and Netscape. A second, also serious, bug exists in javap, the bytecode disassembler. An overly long method name can overflow a stack allocated buffer, potentially causing arbitrary native code to be executed. The problem is an unchecked sprintf() call, just like the syslog(3) problem last year. Many such bugs were in the alpha 3 release's runtime, but were carefully fixed in the beta release. The disassembler bug apparently slipped through. This attack only works on users who disassemble applets. The fix is to not run javap until Sun releases a patch. Note that we've only had success in exploiting the first flaw on an SGI. Windows 95 and DEC Alpha versions of Netscape have other bugs in their socket implementations that make it harder (although not necessarily impossible) to exploit the problem. This is the second time that unrelated implementation bugs have prevented us from demonstrating security problems in Java. http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~ddean/java will contain more information soon, including a revised version of our paper, to appear in the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. Drew Dean <ddean(a)cs.princeton.edu> Ed Felten <felten(a)cs.princeton.edu> Dan Wallach <dwallach(a)cs.princeton.edu> Department of Computer Science, Princeton University For more information, please contact Ed Felten, 609-258-5906, FAX 609-258-1771. _______________________________________________________ Travis Weller WebMaster, Metrowerks, Inc. tcweller(a)metrowerks.com http://www.metrowerks.com/

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San Diego Cypherpunks Physical Meeting
by Chris Claborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

San Diego Area CPUNKS symposium Thursday, Feb 29, 1996 Invitation to all Cypherpunks to join the San Diego crowd at "The Mission Cafe & Coffee Shop" were I hope to get an update of Lance Cottrell's new anonymous e-mail server, "mixmaster", exchange keys, and discuss other topical CP stuff. There might also be an announcement of a new Internet Service Provider in San Diego providing, among it's other premier services, anonymous remailers and other privacy services. Don't forget to bring your public key fingerprint. If you can figure out how to get it on the back of a business card, that would be cool. Place: The Mission Cafe & Coffee Shop 3795 Mission Bl in Mission Beach. 488-9060 Time:1800 Their Directions: 8 west to Mission Beach Ingram Exit Take west mission bay drive Go right on Mission Blvd. On the corner of San Jose and mission blvd. It is located between roller coaster and garnett. It's kind of 40s looking building... funky looking (their description, not mine) They serve stuff to eat, coffee stuff, and beer. See you there! New guy, bring your fingerprint. Drop me a note if you plan to attend. 2 -- C -- ... __o .. -\<, Chris.Claborne(a)SanDiegoCA.ATTGIS.Com ...(*)/(*). CI$: 76340.2422 http://bordeaux.sandiegoca.attgis.com/ PGP Pub Key fingerprint = A8 FA 55 92 23 20 72 69 52 AB 64 CC C7 D9 4F CA Avail on Pub Key server. Dreams. They're just screen savers for the brain.

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No Subject
by Andy Silber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> NED_PUEV <NED_PUEV(a)HP-Loveland-om2.om.hp.com>, > Radar <radar(a)itouch.net>, > Denise HP TechSupport <sdm(a)hpuerca.atl.hp.com>, > sgajar <sgajar(a)crosslink.net> >Subject: FW: FWD>Bill O Rights >Date: Wed, 21 Feb 96 14:27:43 PST >Encoding: 120 TEXT >X-Mailer: Microsoft Mail V3.0 >Status: > > > > ---------- >From: Dave Behrns >To: MIS Mail Group >Subject: FW: FWD>Bill O Rights >Date: Wednesday, February 21, 1996 2:10PM > > > >>>To whoever may read this, >>> >>>This is not a typical letter, in that by passing it on to as >>>many people as you can, you are taking part in what may yet become the >>>world's biggest practical joke. The U.S. Government has rece ntly >>>passed an act which enforces censorship on the internet. A group of >>>internet users has now come together to kick back at this oppression, >>>and have a bit of fun at the same time. >The aim of this exercise is >>>to re-establish the United States as "The land of the Free", not a >>>fascist state where freedom of speech and thought are curtailed. >>>Communist Russia fell as a result of s uch limits being placed upon >>>the minds of the general populus. On receiving this letter, please >>>pass it on to as many friends or E-mail lists as you can. We predict >>>that if everybody copies the lette r to 5 other addresses, by February >>>29th 1996, this letter should have reached in excess of 2 million >>>people. That's when the fun begins........ >On February 29th, please >>>send the message: >>> >>>Dear Mr. President, >>>Do you remember this: >>> >>>And afterwards enclose the pre-typed copy of the Bill of rights. By >>>sending the letter on the date above, you will contribute to either >>>one huge petition for freedom, or else lead to a crash of the >>>whitehouse server.Send all letters to: >President(a)Whitehouse.gov >>> >>>Remember that solidarity is the key to success !!!!! >>> >>> >>>--------------------------------------------------- >>> >>>THE BILL OF RIGHTS >>> >>>Amendment I >>> >>>Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or >>>prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of >>>speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to >>>assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. >>> >>>Amendment II >>> >>>A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free >>>state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be >>>infringed. >>> >>>Amendment III >>> >>>No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without >>>the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be >>>prescribed by law. >>> >>>Amendment IV >>> >>>The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, >>>papers, and >>>effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be >>>violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, >>>supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the >>>place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. >>> >>>Amendment V >>> >>>No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise >>>infamous >>>crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except >>>in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when >>>in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any >>>person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of >>>life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a >>>witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or >>>property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be >>>taken for public use, without just compensation. >>> >>>Amendment VI >>> >>>In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a >>>speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and >>>district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district >>>shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of >>>the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the >>>witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining >>>witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his >>>defense. >>> >>>Amendment VII >>> >>>In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed >>>twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no >>>fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of >>>the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. >>> >>>Amendment VIII >>> >>>Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor >>>cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. >>> >>>Amendment IX >>> >>>The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be >>>construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. >>> >>>Amendment X >>> >>>The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor >>>prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states >>>respectively, or to the people. >> >> >> >

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Re: "and two forms of ID"
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>You got my position completely backward on this. I feel much better now. :-). I really didn't want to cross swords with someone who's S/N ratio is as high as yours is around here. >You may be thinking of what I said about the >cost of defeating traffic analysis. That must have been it. >The natural state of the Net seems to be a kind of semi-anonymity. Ah. I believe this is what I'm talking about... >Trying to push it in either direction (complete traceability or >anonymity) is costly. I'm going to build a rant about this pretty soon, but I think that in a geodesic network, audit trails of any kind cost more money, particularly in the "fringes" of the network, where all the processor growth is going to happen, assymetries or not. As processors handle smaller and smaller stuff faster and faster, it becomes harder and harder to "control" and monitor all of them. To operate efficiently, they have to be more and more autonomous. One way to provide decision rules for autonomous processors is to introduce micro-e$ auction markets into the net's infrastructure. A good example might be packet routing. Suppose you attach some very skinny money to a packet (something issued with Micromint, maybe?), and strip it off as the packet goes through the network, sender pays. Routers price their throughput based on their load at any given moment. When you create this "economy of switches", it becomes harder to establish the hierarchical book-entry control/coodination models we all know and love, certificate hierarchies among them. I think that something like this might work as a way of randomizing traffic in a network of remailers, by the way. Let the market determine the remailer path. Specify the number of hops left, and attach enough money for that number of hops. This is one way for people to pay for the use of remailers, and eventually, it could map to packet-level-anonymity someday. For the moment, I'm going to claim that anonymous auction markets are always more efficient than identified, command economies, just like flight is faster than surface travel. At least that's what I think this morning. :-). More as I get some time. However, I do agree that it's foolish to simply declare that everything must be unauditable, just as it is to declare universal auditability. It's better to let the market figure this out. ;-). Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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Re: IBM Breakthrough?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by mpd(a)netcom.com (Mike Duvos) on Wed, 21 Feb 9:3 PM >Those wishing to read IBM's explanation of this new >technology may browse their Web page on Quantum >Teleportation at... > >http://www.research.ibm.com/quantuminfo/teleportation/ Thanks much for your precis and the IBM pointer. IBM's ad seems inspired by Clarke's "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic." The teleportation site hiply introduces the topic with its science fiction ancestry. The site even has a link to the "goulash" featured in the ad, so the tease is PR for IBM's magical research explorations. It was illuminating to read the tie of teleportation to quantum research -- cryptograpy, communication and who knows what else burbling in that wizard Watson lab. Because my Lynx could not get into IBM's "quantum cryptography," perhaps Blue is onto some Lotus-like Q-Crypto soon to be teased in ads for cosmos-wide Net security or surveillance-proof chips and goulash.

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ASS_alt
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

EcoMist of Feb 17 has more on The Seychelles lure for wealthy outlaws; a look at Richleson's new book on spying; and the assault on Swiss vaults for outlaws and spies by outlaw, spying prosecutors. ASS_alt (for the 3) [Thanks to AS]

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Re: Internet Privacy Guaranteed ad (POTP Jr.)
by Anonymous User 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

IPG Sales wrote: > running fakers like us out of business should be its own reward On the contrary: it's a voluntary waste of time, for which there seems to be an unending supply of fodder.

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Re: Need SSL firewall
by cmca＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [To: shamrock(a)netcom.com (Lucky Green)] [Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com] [Subject: Re: Need SSL firewall] Why not get BSDI's current version and run it on a PC. Rumor has it that is what Microsloth uses for a firewall. Chris McAuliffe <cmca(a)alpha.c2.org> (No, not that one.) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBMSvHLoHskC9sh/+lAQHoVwP/V9D1VmvK0awiKDvqXs27StkTy5yXSrR7 a4zs6aWF2+pz23bINhMqbdN73tzEkuHQWnFrXuAVY3XxrWH1mMARwuBZGnEctDjI d1PyFWuahyIkZgJokNPgzyoENE29WF2mMRk7LK7/BwPLNk4JGnzWPt9XhQk37NZQ MoQsoRHSujA= =gD6Y -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: IPG hoax?
by Mutant Rob 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Wink Junior wrote: > I must admit that after the first day I've been wondering if this whole > IPG thing isn't some kind of deep troll or early April Fool's joke. > anyone actually spoken on the phone with IPG or confirmed their existence > in any way? For the record, I'd like to state that I saw their ad [..] Been wondering the same thing. The noise generated by this is awfully suspicious. It's also rather suspicious that a couple of my posts here have mysteriously not showed up in the archives, although I've received replies to them (but that's another issue altogether). - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMSvslCoZzwIn1bdtAQGomgF/ckqMkUKfMmmkkz9EoadDUYetwmZHedSY RYSEAo/sTtXdBzgbKEEOTj20ZA7z5O72 =Ar7E -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Internet Privacy Guaranteed ad (POTP Jr.)
by cmca＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [To: IPG Sales <ipgsales(a)cyberstation.net>] [cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com] [Subject: Re: Internet Privacy Guaranteed ad (POTP Jr.)] IPG Sales <ipgsales(a)cyberstation.net> blathered: >that the encrypted ciphertext can be any of the N to the >256th power possibile clear/plain text messages/files. That would be 256^N, actually, a somewhat bigger number generally speaking. I hope your cryptography is better than your combinatorics, but I (like a lot of others) doubt it. Why, in your challenge, is your system to be tested by only US citizens? Why not submit it to the NSA and in 15 days you could get a CJR for it... then the c'punks in France, Germany and News Zealand could work on it too, and you will have saved a lot of time. Chris McAuliffe <cmca(a)alpha.c2.org> (No, not that one.) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBMSvGToHskC9sh/+lAQFHNwQAsVYB9OodDBRqJshya+TyAKFURc4EqmKf Sj23Y7605XteUAxlPuF+vm3KnXnAV73hWTpQu+x296oO8ubwmM5XybhyLZqN/8Wa uT4qatkTVIvrGwtbUpYrjqnO+AgdPZvxoRbrf7QZu4O7k8ONF8J9C0DVRtvGS8BU Y6ABbc5H3GI= =5PWi -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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A Challenge (perhaps!)
by KarL MarX 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi! My friend has just written a new crypto program that he is trying to get included on a PC Magazine CD-ROM over here... I don't know too much about it at the moment, but he said he thought it would be a good idea to see if anyone on this list could crack it and thus help to make it more secure. I don't know too much about it ATM... I know it doesn't exercise key technology and relies on the secrecy of the algorithm (which from my very limited knowledge on cryptography I think makes it almost doomed from the start (?))... I have some ciphertext of this application but apart from that I have nothing else... Would anyone have any objectiosn to this being posted to the list? If not, could someone tell me what I should post to the list, plaintext and resulting ciphertext, would that be enough, or shoudl I post some info on the algorithms as well ??? The application is written in Visual Basic and I could probably get a copy of the compiled (well VB is actually interpreted, but that's neither here or there) .EXE file.... -- Karl Marx

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Re: Edupage, 20 Feb 1996
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>EUROPE BACKS V-CHIP >>The European Parliament has followed the lead of the United States in >>supporting the use of Canadian-developed V-chip technology that allows >>parents to screen violent or adult content from their televisions. >>(Montreal Gazette 20 Feb 96 C7) Why, Oh why is there so so much talk about the V Chip. This stupid device only covers over-the-air broadcast TV a dying part of the spectrum. It does not cover cable-only programs (HBO, etc) and it does not cover net-based audio and (soon) video programming. It is meaningless. DCF

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Re: new "obscenity" law on the net
by pp＠pfawww.pp.se 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Ben sent this to rms at 'Sat, 3 Feb 1996 10:32:00 -0700']; "Ben A. Mesander" <ben(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu> writes: >Just curious - will the new law outlawing obscenity on the net in the us >cause you to make changes to some of the comments in the emacs source code? Some weeks ago, Lars and Richard went through the Gnus source and removed 'fuck' two times and 'fucking' one time (if I didn't get it all wrong). I wonder if that's your fault. /pp. -- anum meum aperies, asperge me spermate tuo et inquinabor url; http://pfawww.pp.se/~pp/ email; <pp(a)pfawww.pp.se> phone#'s; work/home/fax: +46 (0)18 100899/247473/103737

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Digital Signature Legislation (fwd)
by Jack Keith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 21 Feb 1996 10:25:39 -0800 (PST) From: Phil Agre <pagre(a)weber.ucsd.edu> To: rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu Subject: Digital Signature Legislation [This message includes some interesting information about significant consumer and privacy issues in state-level "digital signature" legislation that is being modeled on Utah's law -- http://www.state.ut.us/ccjj/digsig/ It is also an example of a trend I'd like to encourage: academics using the Internet to propagate ideas in concise, useful form while getting feedback from a broad public before their work gets frozen forever in journals.] =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE). Send any replies to the original author, listed in the From: field below. You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use the "redirect" command. For information on RRE, including instructions for (un)subscribing, send an empty message to rre-help(a)weber.ucsd.edu =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Date: Tue, 20 Feb 1996 20:54:03 -0800 (PST) From: C. Bradford Biddle <biddle(a)pwa.acusd.edu> To: ca-digsig(a)commerce.net Subject: Digital Signature Legislation DIGITAL SIGNATURE LEGISLATION: SOME REASONS FOR CONCERN by Brad Biddle <biddle(a)acusd.edu> February 20, 1996 [Copyright 1996 by Brad Biddle; permission granted for non-commercial electronic redistribution] A recent flurry of state digital signature legislation should provoke some concern among consumer activists, privacy advocates, and others interested in the evolving legal landscape of cyberspace. At least ten states are developing or have already implemented digital signature legislation. Much of this legislation is based on the pioneering Utah Digital Signature Act, passed in 1995 (and currently in the process of being amended). States which have introduced legislation based on the Utah Act include Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington. California has passed a different form of digital signature legislation, and a bill is pending in Illinois which is similar to the California approach. Florida and Virginia have formal resolutions pending which call for legislative investigation into digital signature laws. The American Bar Association's Information Security Committee (a sub-committee of the Section of Science and Technology) released its Digital Signature Guidelines in October of 1995. These Guidelines are "general, abstract statements of principle" and are not intended as model legislation. The Information Security Committee intended to release model digital signature legislation in June of 1995, but this effort has been, as one report describes it, "stymied by bureaucratic maneuvering." (Information Law Alert, 10/13/95). In the absence of this model legislation, the Utah Act has become a de facto model act. The intent of this message (distributed to the "ca-digsig" mailing list and to some other folks via direct e-mail) is to raise some concerns about the Utah Digital Signature Act and its progeny. The author of this message is a second-year law student at the University of San Diego School of Law, and is writing an article on this topic for the San Diego Law Review. Feedback and criticism are very welcome, and will likely be incorporated into the developing article. THE UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE ACT [Sec. 46-3-101 et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953] No attempt will be made here to explain or summarize the complex and detailed provisions of the Act. Generally, the Act envisions an infrastructure in which computer users utilize state-licensed certification authorities, online databases called repositories, and public-key encryption technology in order to "sign" electronic documents in a legally binding fashion. The Utah Act sets out an ambitious legal and regulatory framework intended to implement a public key infrastructure. It also carves out a place for digital signatures in the broader legal landscape. That is, it provides digital signatures with legal status as valid signatures and addresses a variety of issues relating to the place of electronic documents in contract and evidence law. Much of what the Utah Act accomplishes is laudable, and demonstrates how legislation can effectively solve unsettled issues in the novel arena of cyberspace. However, several aspects of the Act are troubling. The potential problem areas can be categorized generally as liability, privacy, and costs. A very brief discussion of each of these problem areas follows. LIABILITY The Utah Act makes two policy choices concerning liability allocation which are potentially troubling. First, consumers who participate in the infrastructure developed under the Utah Act subject themselves to a far greater risk of extensive liability than they face in other electronic transactions, such as credit card or debit card transactions. Most electronic transactions made by consumers are subject the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA) which limits consumer liability in the event of fraud to (in most cases) $50. Even if a consumer is negligent, liability is still capped at a rather low fixed amount. Critics of this scheme argue that it is paternalistic and ultimately drives up costs for other consumers who are careful to avoid exposing themselves to fraud. Supporters argue that if consumers were exposed to potential unlimited liability when engaging in electronic transactions they would not participate in these transactions at all, and the potential benefits of electronic transactions would not be achieved. Also, supporters say, consumers are often unable to prevent fraud, and forcing consumers to prove they were not negligent anytime fraud occurs would be an unreasonable burden. Under the Utah Act, consumers are held to a negligence standard in guarding their private encryption key. Thus, if a criminal obtains a consumer's private key and commits fraud, the consumer is financially responsible for that fraud unless the consumer can prove that the consumer used reasonable care in guarding the private key. If the consumer cannot prove this in court, or if the consumer was in fact negligent, then the consumer will bear all losses resulting from the fraud. The arguments in support of the EFTA may be applicable here. Will consumers participate in a system which subjects them to unlimited liability? Is it sensible to make consumers prove the absence of negligence? (Two related points are worth noting. First, drafters of the Utah Act initially advocated a strict liability standard, rather than negligence, for the security of private keys -- even "worse" for consumers -- and the drafters continue to advocate strict liability as an alternative for other state legislators considering digital signature laws. Second, a plausible argument can be made that the federal EFTA should preempt the state digital signature legislation on this issue -- this question is unsettled.) There is a second troubling policy choice relating to liability. The Utah Act limits the potential liability of one actor in the infrastructure -- the certification authority -- to a fixed amount (termed a "suitable guarantee" and determined by a complex formula or by administrative rule). This amount may be less than the actual damages a certification authority can cause. This policy decision, designed to create certainty for an entrepreneur contemplating a certification authority business and foster development of a certification authority industry, may have unintended consequences. It is easy to envision a scenario in which a certification authority's private key is compromised -- by brute force cryptanalysis, bribery, or incompetence, for example. A criminal with a certification authority's private key could cause an immense amount of financial damage, imposing huge losses on a number of innocent parties. These innocent parties would be unable to recover their full losses from the certification authority if the total of these losses was greater than the amount of the "suitable guarantee" -- even if the certification authority was totally at fault in creating the circumstances that led to the losses. Because the certification authority would not have to bear the full costs of any losses resulting from a compromised private key, they may not have the incentive to take expensive precautions to protect against that occurrence. PRIVACY The system contemplated by the Utah Act also raises several different types of privacy-related concerns. At a broad level, one commentator has pronounced the general type of system embodied in the Utah Act a "cultural misfit" because every merchant and consumer potentially must register with an outside authority in order to acquire the basic capacity to transact commerce. In light of the more limited scope of the Utah Act and the current state of electronic commerce, however, this argument is not particularly persuasive. More significantly, under the Utah Act's approach certain entities -- the online databases of public encryption keys termed "recognized repositories" -- will have unrestricted access to valuable transaction-generated information that could expose sensitive relationships among individuals or businesses. If Company A sends a digitally signed message to Company B, Company B must verify the digital signature by connecting to a state-recognized privately-managed database, verifying the digital signature and making sure that Company A's certificate is not on a certificate revocation list. This process, of course, will leave electronic footprints. Could the owner of the recognized repository disclose the fact that A and B were corresponding? What if A and B were discussing a possible merger, or other transaction with significant consequences in the securities markets? Similarly, could the owner of the repository disclose to Joe Whistleblower's defense-contractor employer that Whistleblower was verifying digital signatures of a reporter from the New York Times? The Utah Act is totally silent on this issue. Additionally, the public databases contemplated by the Act could expose financial data, information about affiliations, and other private information to public scrutiny -- and put this information into the direct marketing universe. Publicly-accessible certificates will contain the name of subscribers and a "recommended reliance limit," a dollar figure that may be a good indication of general financial standing. Certificates may also indicate an individual's affiliation with a company or other organization. There is no provision for anonymous or pseudonymous certificates. Proponents of the Utah Act point out that participation in the system established by the Act is voluntary, and that non-licensed certification authorities will be available for individuals who object to the requirements of the Act. However, in light of the advantages the Act gives to licensed certification authorities (liability limitations, presumptions concerning the legality of digital signatures, and the like) this may not in fact turn out to be true. Additionally, some individuals may be forced to use certificates in the course of their employment. Would an employee who did not want to be listed in an easily searchable database (perhaps because they were being harassed) be forced to quit his or her job? Finally, a very important privacy-related issue that is purposefully not addressed in the Utah Act concerns whether the infrastructure contemplated by the Act will support confidentiality of messages as well as legally binding digital signatures (a technically feasible proposition, but a politically sensitive one). The Utah Act empowers an administrative agency to determine which public key encryption algorithms are appropriate. A public key algorithm like RSA can be used both for encryption and digital signatures. A public key algorithm like DSA (implemented in DSS) can only be used for digital signatures -- it cannot be used to encrypt messages. Should such a fundamental policy decision be made in the obscurity of an administrative agency's rulemaking process? COSTS The Utah Digital Signature Act also raises several issues relating to costs. The institutional overhead associated with creating and maintaining the Act's infrastructure will be passed along to participants, and participants must have access to expensive computer hardware and software in order to participate in the system. One issue not addressed by the Utah Act is whether citizens who are unable to afford these costs should be provided with subsidized or reduced-cost access to th infrastructure. A prominent commentator has noted that, in the long term, the type of system embodied in the Utah Act is "anticipated to become indispensable for conducting government, business, and even private affairs." Another cost-related issue concerns the costs associated with legislative endorsement of one particular technology (public-key encryption technology, or more narrowly, specific implementations of this technology) and whether this endorsement will affect the development of alternative solutions to the problems posed by communications over open computer networks. An advocate of a particular biometric technology has argued that the type of infrastructure contemplated by the Utah Act is costly overkill, and is far more complex and expensive than is necessary. Even if one accepts the appropriateness of a public-key approach, note that costs could vary widely depending upon which particular proprietary encryption algorithms are licensed. As originally passed, the Utah Act limited the role of certification authority to Utah-licensed attorneys, financial institutions, title companies, and government agencies. This sort of oligopolistic arrangement is, of course, anathema to a vibrant, competitive market which would drive down costs for consumers. The pending amendments to the Utah Act eliminate this requirement. Some of the states which are following the Utah Act as a model have retained this limitation, however. CONCLUSION Legislative activity concerning digital signatures is generally appropriate and potentially helpful. The Utah Digital Signature Act, particularly its provisions establishing the legal status of digital signatures, is a step in the right direction. However, lawmakers contemplating digital signature legislation should reconsider some of the policy choices made by the Utah Act. ------------------------------------------------- Brad Biddle, Legal Intern <biddle(a)acusd.edu> Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Ctr for Public Interest Law http://pwa.acusd.edu/~prc [The views expressed in this article are not necessarily those of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse or the Center for Public Interest Law.]

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